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Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research

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How does knowledge relate to political action?

Nico Stehr & Reiner Grundmann
a a b

Karl Mannheim Professor for Cultural Studies, Zeppelin University, D-88045, Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance, Germany
b

Reader in Sociology and Public Policy, Aston University, School of Languages and Social Sciences, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK Available online: 22 Feb 2012

To cite this article: Nico Stehr & Reiner Grundmann (2012): How does knowledge relate to political action?, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 25:1, 29-44 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2012.655572

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Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2012, 29 44

How does knowledge relate to political action?1

Nico Stehra* and Reiner Grundmannb
Karl Mannheim Professor for Cultural Studies, Zeppelin University, D-88045 Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance, Germany; bReader in Sociology and Public Policy, Aston University, School of Languages and Social Sciences, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK (Received 10 December 2011; nal version received 3 January 2012) In this paper we investigate the relation between knowledge and political action, focusing on knowledge claims stemming from science that at the same time have relevance in a policy context. In so doing, we will revisit some well-known and some lesser known approaches, such as C.P. Snows thesis of the two cultures and Mannheims conceptualization of theory and practice. We arrive at a distinction between knowledge for practice and practical knowledge, which we briefly apply to the case of climate change science and policy. We state as our thesis that policy is ever more reliant on knowledge, but science can deliver ever less certainty. Political decisions and programs have to recognize this fact, either implicitly or explicitly. This creates a paradox that is normally resolved through the political decision and not the dissemination of truth in the sense of uncontested knowledge. We use the case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as an example. Keywords: knowledge; decision-making; policy; climate change
a

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Historical roots Interest in the effect of scientific discoveries on society can be traced back to the beginnings of the modern sciences (Gillespie 2004, Gissis 2009, Merton 1938). For reasons of legitimizing science alone, this question was not only of interest to early scientists. Positive answers to the question of the practical virtues of science helped the first generation of scientists, and of course present-day scientists as well, achieve social recognition and, not least, the resources required by high-quality scientific practice, characterized by division of labor and thus increasingly expensive (Latour 1987, Shapin and Schaffer 1992, Weingart 2001). The particular, indeed outstanding, status of scientific and technical knowledge in modern society results not only from the fact that scientific knowledge is still widely perceived or treated as a true, objective, that is, reality-confirming, yardstick, or as an uncontested authority. In view of this reputation, many groups and individuals are prepared in countless daily situations to suppress their doubts and reservations. The special social, but above all economic, status stems also from the fact that scientific knowledge, more than any other form of knowledge, does not represent static knowledge, and continually creates and constitutes additional possibilities for taking action. This gives rise to an interesting analogy between scientific and economic systems in the function of additional knowledge; in both
*Corresponding author. Email: nico.stehr@t-online.de
ISSN 1351-1610 print/ISSN 1469-8412 online # 2012 ICCR Foundation http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2012.655572 http://www.tandfonline.com

30 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann systems, a reward is offered for additional knowledge, in the form either of recognition and prestige or of monetary returns. However, at the same time this openness leads to a situation of uncertainty as science cannot provide eternal truths or universal laws. There have continually been voices, on the other hand, that censure the humanities and social sciences, in particular, not only for their lack of usefulness, but also because they are held to be a danger to society. These concerns cross the political spectrum and include the worldwide fear of the ideas of Marxism, for instance; the frequently criticized influence of the Frankfurt School on the politics of the 1970s in West Germany (cf. Schelsky [1961] 1965, 1975, Wiggershaus 1986); and the influence, lamented in many quarters, of neo-liberal economic models on the economic system of developing societies in particular (see Stiglitz 2002, Mitchell 2005). Likewise, reservations and fears about the social consequences of new findings and technologies in the natural sciences are not emerging for the first time. This is also true of the promises being made to the effect that humanity will come to enjoy enormous progress by means of science and technology. Convincing arguments can be made, however, that public discussion of the social role of the sciences has reached a new phase. The link between economic development and scientific innovation is prominent in the current knowledge society. Many governments see the future competitiveness of their economies as lying in knowledge-based products and processes. As a consequence they have invested in knowledge-intensive industries, and therefore express a preference for a specific vision of the future. This vision is not shared universally across society. The first controlled laboratory experiment in genetic engineering took place in 1972; the first human being conceived outside a womans body was born in 1978; and very recently, in April 2008, the first human animal hybrid embryo produced by scientists in a laboratory at Newcastle University in the UK was conceived, a being immediately dubbed a chimera by the media. However, the current controversial discussion of embryonic stem cells, neurogenetics, xenotransplantations, reproductive cloning and the convergence of nanotechnologies, information technologies, biotechnologies and cognitive sciences (see Roco and Bainbridge 2002) also makes it clear that the question of the social prerequisites and consequences of (natural-) scientific knowledge, expanding under new types of institutional regimes, urgently needs to be placed on the agenda of day-to-day social and political activity. There are many voices that call for oversight and conscious guidance, even control of knowledge (see Grundmann and Stehr 2003). The problem is not only that we do not know enough (and thus have uncertainty), but also that we know too much, and we then have to wonder whether we indeed want to turn all of our discoveries into practical applications (see Stehr 2003). Half a century ago, in a classic essay, C.P. Snow ([1959] 2009) lamented the lack of communication between the two dominant cultures in English public life, the humanities and the sciences. As someone who after all was practicing in both fields he was a research scientist, a successful novelist and a prominent reviewer he found it dispiriting that such a cultural divide should dominate intellectual and public life in Britain. He observed the peculiarities of the education system, which led to early specialization and thus tended to crystallize social distinctions. He observed that many more children from poor families found their way into science compared with the humanities. As a comment on social justice, he emphasized sciences progressive

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Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 31 role as opposed to the elite-reproducing humanities. In his Second Look at the initial essay (offered four years later) Snow observed that he did not see the emergence of a third culture that comprised social history, sociology and political science (among others). He stated that the original title of the essay should have been The rich and the poor, and that he regreted not having used it. To further explain his view of the significance of social issues and the role science has to play, we quote from The Two Cultures: A Second Look:
We cannot avoid the realization that applied science has made it possible to remove unnecessary suffering from a billion individual human lives . . . For example, we know how to heal many of the sick: to prevent children dying in infancy and mothers in childbirth: to produce food enough to alleviate hunger: to throw up a minimum of shelter: to ensure that there arent so many births that our efforts are in vain. All this we know how to do. (Snow [1959] 2009, p. 78)

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If we learned anything in the five decades after Snows lecture, it is that we are in possession of medical and agricultural resources which reduce death, ill health and hunger, but the difficulty is implementing policies that are effective. We still do not know how to abolish hunger in the world, despite the widespread availability of food. This is a major challenge for the world community and a vexing question for the social sciences and policy-makers. However, C.P. Snow takes a different tack, continuing the above passage thus: It does not require one additional scientific discovery, though new scientific discoveries must help us. It depends on the spread of the scientific revolution all over the world. There is no other way. It is this conclusion that has become influential in policy circles, political elites and the sciences themselves. Despite his slow realization that there was an important third culture rising that was relevant to all this, Snow did not factor this into his analysis of the challenges ahead. In the mid-1970s, in a radical reversal of Charles P. Snows thesis of the dilemma of the two scientific cultures as a variant of the widespread and often resentful contrast between knowledge and ignorance, Erich Fromm provided his own call to action to modern societies finally to give priority to being, and not having, in society putting forward the thesis that it is the systematic undervaluation of the humanities and social sciences that characterizes our present era as a disastrous historical epoch. Fromm ([1976] 2007, p. 25) particularly emphasizes, in his essay To Have or to Be, that as long as the science of humanity does not have the allure that up to now has been reserved for the natural sciences and technology, the strength and vision will be lacking to see new and real alternatives. No matter which of the above-cited critical observers of the scientific landscape and the role of modern science in society is thought to be right, the reductionist view seems to be shared according to which the social relevance of science has to be problematized separately for the case of the humanities, and the natural and social sciences. The classic scientific theoretical debates regarding the particularities of different types of scientific knowledge lead to the result that our reflections are embedded (or remain trapped) as if in a kind of permafrost. Thus our capability to rethink the interplay of intellectual, moral and social aspects within the problem of socially relevant structures of science is limited. This separation calls for a revision. We are not alone in pointing out that the division between the humanities and natural sciences is questionable. There have been attempts in the past under the label

32 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann of a unity of science movement (see Cartwright et al. 1996) and more recently authors have called for an abolishment of the Yalta Pact that divides the sciences (Latour 1991). Above all, an explicit case for the third culture has been made, most notably by Lepenies ([1985] 1988) and Kagan (2009; see also Collini 2009 in the introduction to the fiftieth anniversary edition of The Two Cultures). Apart from the division between different forms of knowledge, there is the question of how to conceptualize expertise and its place in political decision-making. Important contributions have been made by authors like Fischer (1990), Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993), Jasanoff (1990) and Pielke (2007), to name but a few. In this paper we do not want to go into these debates. We only briefly mention the work of Collins and Evans (2002), who have argued for the need for a third wave of science studies (the first being the pre- and post-Kuhnian waves respectively). They write:
we want to suggest that the problem lies with the tension . . . between what we will call the Problem of Legitimacy and the Problem of Extension. Though science studies has resolved the Problem of Legitimacy by showing that the basis of technical decisionmaking can and should be widened beyond the core of certified experts, it has failed to solve the Problem of Extension: How far should participation in technical decisionmaking extend? In other words, science studies has shown that there is more to scientific and technical expertise than is encompassed in the work of formally accredited scientists and technologists, but it has not told us how much more. (Collins and Evans 2002, p. 237)

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Collins and Evans claim that expertise should have a privileged place in the process of political decision-making. Because lay people are not experts, they should not have the same influence. They defend this view a descriptive statement (this is our way of life) and a normative claim (this is how things should be). Because their model builds strongly on Collinss earlier work on core-sets in science (Collins 1985), they tend to lose sight of the broader problem, of who should be involved in political decision-making. They treat the participation in debates about truth claims on the same level as participation in debates about public policy. It seems to us that they are led astray by the core-set model and tend to confound scientific and political decision-making, moving science to the center stage. In this sense they give support to a technocratic position. Going back to some older contributions, we hope to able to illuminate the more basic question What is socially relevant knowledge? This question refers to knowledge as a whole, not divided between expert and lay, humanities and scientific knowledge. We then select one subset of knowledge and action for further analysis, scientific knowledge and political action. We will argue that, in general, practical knowledge is knowledge that is actionable. It follows that practical political knowledge must be politically actionable. We will illustrate the argument with reference to the example of climate change.

Knowledge about knowledge We suggest defining knowledge as the capacity to act (or capability of taking action),2 as the possibility of setting something in motion. Knowledge is a model for reality. Thus, for example, social statistics are not necessarily (only) a reflection of social reality, but rather an explication of its problems; they refer to that which could be, and in this sense they confer the capability of taking action.

Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 33 Research results and findings are not mere passive knowledge. Knowledge should be understood as the first step towards action; knowledge is in a position to change reality. Our choice of concepts is based upon Francis Bacons famous thesis that scientia est potentia, or as this formulation is frequently, but misleadingly, translated: knowledge is power. Bacon claims that the particular utility of knowledge derives from its ability to set something in motion. The concept of potentia, this ability, here describes the power of knowledge. Knowledge is creation. Human knowledge is the knowledge of the rules of action, and thus the capability of setting the process in question in motion, or producing something. The successes or results of human action can accordingly be seen in the alteration of reality. The result of this, at least for the modern world, is that its reality is increasingly based upon knowledge and consists of knowledge. Knowledge is not power (in the usual sense of the word power), but rather potential power.3 Consequently, we must differentiate between the capability of taking action and making use of the capability of taking action. This should be evident through the following considerations. Knowledge fulfils an active function only where action is not carried out within essentially stereotypical parameters (Max Weber), or otherwise extensively regulated.4 Knowledge plays an active role only where, for whatever reasons, there is latitude or necessity for decision-making.5 For Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1965, p. 74), therefore, social action begins only where the not yet rationalized latitude begins, where unregulated situations force decisions to be made. Formulated more concretely:
It is not an action . . ., when a bureaucrat deals with a bundle of files according to existing regulations. There is also no action when a judge subsumes a case under a section of law, nor when a factory worker produces a screw using prescribed movements, nor actually even when a technician combines general laws of natural processes to some end or other. All of these modes of behaviour should be described as reproductive, because these actions are performed in a rationalized arrangement without benefit of personal decision.6

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Consequently, for Mannheim, the problem of the relationship between theory and practice is restricted to situations of just this kind. To be sure, even extensively regulated and thoroughly rationalized situations that are constantly repeated are not free of irrational (i.e. open) moments. At the same time, this perspective points to the conditions of knowledge, and indeed of knowledge as the result of human activity. Knowledge can lead to social action, and is at the same time the result of social action. Here there is already an indication that it is by no means necessary to consider the capacity to act to be identical with actual action, i.e. knowledge is not itself already action.7 The social significance of scientific discoveries, then, lies primarily in the capacity to make use of knowledge as the ability to act. In other words: knowledge gains in distinction on the basis of its ability to change reality. Human action is indeed, as Mannheim also stresses, in manifold ways the result of a relatively set repertoire of fixed complexes of actions or modes of behavior, which play out in given triggering situations. This by no means applies to all the situations with which we are confronted in daily life, or in less routine contexts for action. As Friedrich Tenbruck (1986, p. 95) emphasizes, for example, owing to internal or external circumstances, human beings continually find themselves in new situations, for which highly automated and self-contained modes of behavior and

34 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann habits are not appropriate. In these cases it makes a great difference which elements of the situation are given and which are open (our emphasis). Even the fixed nature of social relationships, or as this is also described by many observers, the existence of structural attributes of action, which work on social action as an external force, can be conceived of as a set of imaginable or possible options for taking action, which are open for certain individuals or groups. As a general rule we posit that the practical applicability of research and knowledge is largely determined by the openness of the life situation. The probability of implementing knowledge as the capacity to act in a particular social action is an essential consequence of the correspondence between the type and content of knowledge and those elements of the situation that can be conceived of as open, i.e. controllable or manipulable by actors, and that can actually be influenced.8 It is thus logical to differentiate between knowledge for practice and practical knowledge, particularly since the pragmatic relevance of knowledge is by no means certain a priori, so that knowledge can be turned to knowledge for action or naturally practical knowledge. Here we refer to Karl Mannheims ([1929] 1965, p. 143) attempt to formulate the problems of a science of politics according to which the successful deployment of findings in concrete situations is far from trivial. The possibilities for action, i.e. the actors latitude for action and their chances of shaping events, must be linked together, in order that knowledge may become practical knowledge. This line of thought has been developed in recent studies about mode 2 of knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994). The qualities necessary for an understanding of practical knowledge, which make possible the realization of knowledge, are on the one hand particular findings, and on the other, i.e. on the side of those taking action, the control of situationally specific conditions. These abilities, which make implementing findings possible, can be called the capacity to shape, in contrast to knowledge as the capacity to act.

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Climate change as example In what follows we examine the above thoughts with reference to the example of global climate change. The questions to be asked are: how effective has knowledge about climate change been? What role does scientific knowledge play? What role is there for the humanities and social sciences? One of the most celebrated institutions to produce knowledge about climate change that can be put into political decisions is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has become emboiled in scandals recently but nevertheless has been successful in putting climate change on the political agenda. The role of the IPCC is to review and assess the published scientific literature on climate change, its costs and impacts, and possible policy responses. It also plays a role in assessing scientific and technical issues for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It assesses the state of knowledge and ensures that global governance of climate change becomes possible by representing important stakeholders in the knowledge assessment process. The IPCC describes itself thus:
The IPCC is a scientific body. It reviews and assesses the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of climate change. It does not conduct any research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. Thousands of scientists from all over the world contribute to the

Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 35

work of the IPCC on a voluntary basis. Review is an essential part of the IPCC process, to ensure an objective and complete assessment of current information. Differing viewpoints existing within the scientific community are reflected in the IPCC reports.9

From around the world, thousands of scientists have contributed to these reports. The IPCC is the international authoritative body pronouncing scientific expertise on the issue. However, the IPCC is also intergovernmental in nature, which means that there is political influence in the selection of authors and the final wording of the documents (this applies to the documents known as Summaries for Policy Makers, SPM). Some contrarian scientists and other critics think that the IPCC misrepresents the state of knowledge and exaggerates the size and urgency of the problem. While some accuse IPCC scientists of being environmentalists in disguise (stealth advocates; Pielke 2007), others point to the processes of exclusion of specific social groups representing different knowledge claims (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, b, Miller and Edwards 2001). Recent scandals have lent credibility to such claims, which in the past were dismissed as propaganda of the fossil fuel industry. It should be noted that the IPCCs first chairman, Bert Bolin, was aware of the dangers of overstating the knowledge base (Bolin 2007), and Robert Watson, IPCC chairman from 1997 to 2002, stated that mistakes in the IPCC reports all appear to have gone in the direction of making it seem like climate change is more serious by overstating the impact (The Sunday Times, online, 15 February 2010). Why has this issue of dramatization become so important? A plausible explanation could be that it serves as a substitute for practical knowledge. It is our contention that the IPCC has provided little in terms of practical knowledge. The main architecture of the IPCC consists of three working groups. Working Group I assesses the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change. Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and options for adapting to it. Working Group III assesses options for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and otherwise mitigating climate change. In addition, there are several ad-hoc task forces. IPCC assessments are to be based on the available published scientific literature (although in reality unpublished work could be influencing the assessments and some large research projects are definitely undertaken in order to influence future IPCC assessments). The IPCC publishes its assessments in a five- to six-year cycle. There is a complex governance structure ruling the tasks, activities and responsibilities of various bodies within the IPCC. The scientific core of the working groups provides the assessments, with the working groups plenary and the full panel plenary accepting and approving this work (Skodvin 2000, p. 107). In the procedure for approving the SPMs these are submitted to the full plenary for acceptance. A synthesis of the reports of all three WGs, prepared by the chairman of the IPCC and the chairs and vice-chairs of the WGs, is also submitted to the panel plenary for approval (Skodvin 2000, p. 111). This then goes through a line-by-line discussion before it is approved by the panel. The IPCC says this about itself:
Full reports are accepted during the Working Groups plenary, while for each report a Summary for Policymakers is approved line by line. The SPM therefore represents the point of agreement: participating governments acknowledge that there is enough scientific evidence worldwide to support the documents statements.10

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36 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann The scientific community is represented at full plenary sessions through the chair of the IPCC and the leaders of the working groups. However, the panel plenary is dominated by government officials. No doubt, formalization and complexity of the IPCC activities have grown over time. Shackley and Wynne (1995) observe that these different parts of the IPCC process can be seen as forming a knowledge pyramid with Working Group I standing at the top. Shaw and Robinson (2004, p. 110) argue that a core set group of modelers has established conceptual hegemony and crucially influences what information becomes tangible, relevant, and knowledgeable both in the natural and social worlds of investigation and response. These scientists typically develop Global Circulation Models (GCMs), which are based on physical variables and parameters. Despite some attempts at flattening the hierarchy between the three working groups, most notably through the development of Integrated Assessment Models, the reality of the IPCC process is determined by the dominance of GCMs developed in Working Group I. In this sense, Snows suggestion has become reality. We witness a dominance of natural science with a relative neglect of the social sciences and especially the humanities (Hulme 2009, ONeill et al. 2010). What are the consequences? Has climate policy made progress as a result? Former IPCC chairman Robert Watson (2005, p. 473) points out that knowledge . . . needs to be placed in an appropriate format for decision-making, highlighting the special role scenarios play in this process. He claims that they are one of the most important tools for helping to foster policy changes. Scenarios are plausible futures, not predictions or projections of the future (Watson 2005, p. 474). He praises the virtues of scenarios beyond the field of environmental politics, such as playing war games, projecting the prices of agricultural commodities and projecting energy demand. Many multi-national companies also use them, such as Dutch Royal Shell and Morgan Stanley. As Watson put it, [t]he goal for decisionmakers is to explore plausible futures and understand the underlying factors that determine those futures so that interventions can be crafted to realize the positive outcomes and avoid the negative outcomes (Watson 2005, p. 475).11 However, if one looks closer at the experience with scenarios, some caution might be in order. Shell is often credited with their shrewd use of scenarios to anticipate future trends. The company has confronted the very example of climate change in the late 1980s and early 1990s and is widely regarded as a pioneer and expert in the use of scenario planning (Shell 2004, Grant 2003, Wright 2004).12 Since 1971, Shell has explicitly addressed issues of uncertainty in its strategy formulation through scenario planning. Shells own literature claims that the extensive use of scenario planning is based on the belief that the only competitive advantage the company of the future will have is its managers ability to learn faster than their competitors (De Geus 1988). Shell emphasizes that scenarios are event-driven and that one has to make assumptions about crucial future developments, as its website states: Scenarios provide alternative views of the future. They identify some significant events, main actors and their motivations, and they convey how the world functions (Shell 2010). This aspect is not appropriately emphasized by Watson, nor by the IPCC. They are keen to exploit the prestige of scenario planning as a management tool. Such prestige seems to come from scenario work performed by some leading multinational corporations. However, all scenarios are driven by specific assumptions (called storylines in the IPCC jargon) about population size, economic growth and prevailing energy mix, which means that they will vary accordingly. As the IPCC

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Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 37 explicitly acknowledges, these storylines are subject to substantial uncertainty. In 2000, the IPCC published a Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, see Nakicenovic and Swart 2000) which shows four scenario families (A1, A2, B1 and B2) that explore alternative development pathways, covering a wide range of demographic, economic and technological driving forces and resulting GHG emissions. One scenario (A2) assumes that the world population in 2100 will be 15.1 billion, more than 50% higher than in other scenarios. Such details are buried in the technical details of the report and rarely used when communicating the findings to the public.13 Girod et al. (2009) undertook a survey of all hitherto published IPCC scenarios. These scenarios were published in 1990, 1992 and 2000. They observe an increase in the number of scenarios and authors, but a decrease in specific information, for example the omission of descriptive titles. The 1990 scenario did contain such descriptive titles, i.e. 2030 High Emissions and 2060 Low Emissions. In the SRES series some of the modeling teams proposed titles describing the main assumption of the storylines, but these were not included in the final version. Compared with previous scenarios, the SRES of 2000 shows a dramatic increase in available information. More information is an ambiguous virtue for policy-makers: on the one hand it can convey important aspects to be taken into account, but on the other hand it can lead to confusion. The coverage of uncertainties in population and income projections is beneficial because the impact of climate change strongly depends on these variables, as Nicholls and Tol (2006, p. 1073) point out: The most vulnerable future worlds to sea-level rise appear to be the A2 and B2 scenarios, which primarily reflects differences in the socio-economic situation . . ., rather than the magnitude of sea-level rise. While the 1990 and 1992 scenarios included the implications (such as temperature change and sea-level rise), these were removed from the final version of SRES. The 1990 scenario used a 2030 High Emissions scenario to predict future climate change. After that, equal treatment was given to all scenarios. From 1992 onwards, the scenarios are presented without any probabilities attached to them. This can easily lead to confusion in public debate and it is not surprising that some climate scientists want to introduce appropriate qualifications, based on probability estimates, however subjective they might be (Schneider 2001, p. 19). Girod et al. (2009, p. 116) do not share the call for inclusion of probabilities. Instead, they wish to see a better identification of salient scenarios, more transparency and an assessment of policy options based on intervention scenarios. This means that the effects of climate policies would be included in the scenario itself, something that goes against current practice (also Shells). Ever since the IPCC was established, governments have tried to agree on measures to prevent a dangerous build up of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere. The question is: how practical is the knowledge produced by the IPCC? And how controllable are the social situations to which this knowledge makes reference? The IPCC is a hybrid organization (Miller 2001) at the interface between science and politics, but does not truly combine different bodies of knowledge. Bjurstro m and Polk (2010) showed that the IPCC is heavily dominated by natural sciences and economics. Under 10% of all IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) citations were to noneconomic social sciences: anthropology was cited in 1%, international relations 1%, planning and development 4%, public administration 1%, and social sciences, interdisciplinary 2%. By contrast, environmental studies received 35% of citations, geography 16% and economics 33%. They also found that

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38 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann the hierarchy between the different fields of knowledge shows the earth sciences to be dominant, followed by biology, followed by interdisciplinary fields. There are no scientific fields in the TAR chapters which show dependence on the Social Sciences. Overall, the conclusion is that the IPCC reproduces the existing separation of scientific fields and has strong physical and economic bias that distorts a comprehensive understanding of climate change. This very much follows in the tracks of Snow, who advocated scientific solutions to social problems. In a way, the IPCC exemplifies his view that we need the spread of science in order to address the major problems of today and tomorrow. One could argue that the scenario work is an exception to this and has achieved some integration across disciplinary boundaries. However, Working Group 1 (which is responsible for the scientific basis) still dominates the public discourse and has greater visibility and influence compared with Working Groups 2 and 3 that deal with adaptation and social and economic impacts (Skodvin 2000, Siebenhu er 2003). Legitimate reasons for climate policies seem to be based on science, not on our ideas of what society we want to live in. Hard science, not soft culture, appears to drive policy (see Hulme 2009). But does it? Despite the important agenda-setting role the IPCC has played, it also exemplifies the weakness of traditional conceptions of the science policy relation. There is an assumption that governments will follow scientific recommendations because they produce the best available knowledge through a consensus-building process. In contrast, we argue that scientific knowledge is not per se in a position to drive the political process and lead to effective policies. The grand global targets and timetable architecture that have provided the link between the IPCC and the international negotiation process has proven ineffective. It does not provide answers to the pressing questions of detail, how we achieve what we need to do. To take up a distinction made above, the IPCC has produced knowledge for practice but not practical knowledge.14 In calling for a worldwide reduction of CO2 emissions, the IPCC does not seem to realize that these emissions are determined by forces that are beyond the political control of governments. Emission levels are linked to levels of economic activity and it is barely in the interest of governments to reduce the latter. From this simple fact a paradox follows for politics, which has to prioritize one over the other. As experience shows, economic growth has been a top political priority whereas concerns about potential future climate crises have taken a back seat (Eastin et al. 2011, Pielke 2010). Of course, there is no simple solution to the problem outlined here, but it seems highly problematic to leave this paradox unsolved by merely appealing to decisionmakers that somehow they should show more courage and rank the concern for the economy lower. There seems to be no actionable path that leads to latitude in decision-making here. Alternatives have been suggested based on the acknowledgement that we ought to produce wealth with much less climate impact, thus not juxtaposing economic development and climate change mitigation (Pielke 2009, Prins et al. 2010). A distinction is made between short-term and long-term policies. In both cases there needs to be a realization that the role played by science is very limited and there are no simple solutions to the problem. Carbon efficiency in the cement, steel and energy sectors can be increased on the basis of existing knowledge and technology, without stifling economic activity. Drastic reduction of black carbon (soot) would have enormous health benefits, as well as reducing the temperature forcing in the Arctic

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Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 39 region. Protection of tropical forests is a good in itself that should be pursued for this reason alone, but also has benefits in terms of climate. In the long term, new forms of energy generation will be needed that do not contribute to the greenhouse effect. Such approaches are the antithesis to the technocratic idea, propagated by the IPCC, that the correct science will lead to correct policy decisions. As we have argued, we need to re-evaluate nonscientific knowledge (including the social sciences, humanities and public debates), identify where latitude for action exists and develop knowledge that increases our ability to act. Conclusion The growing significance of science and its manifold social utility has led to its having an extensive monopoly on the production of socially relevant knowledge in the development of modern societies, which cannot be contested by religion, nor by politics, and in particular not by daily experience. In its function of researching new areas in a systematic way and thus expanding the latitude for making decisions and taking action in society, science seems to hold a special place in society. However, there are competing knowledge sources that are not exclusively located in the institutional structure of research institutes or universities. Decision-makers call upon experts when seeking information or knowledge. Nongovernmental organizations and lay persons present traditional or indigenous knowledge that can be relevant for policy decisions. No matter where new knowledge originates, it is never closed or absolute but reveals its limits sooner or later. Knowledge and uncertainty grow hand in hand. This can be most clearly seen in the discourse on risk in society. Much of what we know about possible ecological, climatic or technical dangers, we know on the basis of scientific investigations. Since we also know how this knowledge was produced, however, we see the associated limits of this knowledge too; we see the blind spots and the provisional nature of this knowledge. This is where lay knowledge has its significance as many people know a lot about these risks based on nonscientific reasoning (for a recent case study see Lane et al. 2011). Some defenders of the central role of science in political debates like climate change need to realize that science has lost its traditional legitimation, to the extent that it no longer appears to be the representative of social progress or the voice of reason. Science is not the authority of which man can demand what is right or true.15 Of course, we have long known that ought is not followed by is and that science does not do ethics. This is put into even sharper relief as the contingency of scientifically gained knowledge has become known, and is being communicated within society as inadequate knowledge. With the disintegration of the fiction that science produces certain knowledge comes the threat of a loss of credibility and authority in the public sphere. The completely novel element of the present situation can be seen in the fact that criticism of science is no longer from outside, couched primarily in moral, religious or ideological terms, but rather is formulated as science. Science speaks of itself as if it were a third party. This knowledge is fed into decisions as knowledge about conditions, contexts and consequences of action, which could also have turned out differently. It is for this very reason that we cannot expect to gain more certainty from more research, but rather more uncertainty, since the wealth of alternatives open to the decision-maker is reflexively increased (see Stirling 2008).

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40 N. Stehr and R. Grundmann The growth of knowledge not only leads to more uncertainty, and thus to a situation where we know too little. The opposite is also the case: we produce so much practically relevant knowledge that one could say that we know too much. We have shown this with regard to the many different scenarios that have been developed for future climate change. These could be used productively if levers for action are identified, if one is able to determine which elements of the situation are given and which are open. If socio-economic variables are the most important, we need to examine where the leeway for action lies. Otherwise, scenarios will communicate a future that is inevitable. In this case, by definition, there is no leeway for action and the only possible politics is one of despair.

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Notes
1. Our paper grows out of a discussion of the nature of the interface between knowledge and political action in Stehr (2009a, b). We are grateful to Mike Hulme for his constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2. We do not claim that this is exclusive to knowledge. In the social context, cognitive ndings do not have a monopoly on human capacity to act. A similar function can be performed by the social norms internalized by actors, for example, or even needs and tendencies (Loyal and Barnes 2001). 3. In its etymology, however, power is related to ability, and one of the most fundamental denitions of ability would be: to make a difference. In this sense, and not in the sense in which power is usually discussed in the context of social relationships, namely as power exercised to gain something, or over a person, the denition of power as ability is reminiscent of the idea of knowledge as enabling (cf. Dyrberg 1997, pp. 88 99). 4. Building on the premise that knowledge constitutes an ability to act, one can differentiate between forms of knowledge, i.e. according to which capacity to act is embodied by knowledge. Lyotards ([1979] 1984, p. 6) attempt to differentiate between investment knowledge and payment knowledge, in analogy to the difference between expenditures for investment and consumption, can be considered an example of such a functional separation of forms of knowledge. 5. Niklas Luhmanns (1992: 136) observations on the conditions for the ability to make a decision may permit an even broader application of knowledge. One can only decide, as he very plausibly emphasizes, if and insofar as it is not determined what will happen. On condition that the future is highly uncertain, the deployment of knowledge in the decision-making process can extend to many more social contexts, even to those that are normally marked only by routine and habitual behavior. 6. Similar concepts can be found in Friedrich Hayeks essay on The Valuation of Knowledge in Society from 1945, which is actually a pean to decentralization, the importance of local knowledge for taking action, and the price system as a mediator that conveys information and solves the problem of coordinating situative knowledge. Hayek ([1945] 1976, p. 82) refers to the fact that economic problems always arise only as a result of changes. As long as things stay as they are, or at least do not develop differently from what is expected, no new problems occur that require a decision, and no necessity arises to make a new plan. 7. A more recent study by an economist, which above all deals with various conceptual problems in the attempt to quantify knowledge and integrate it into economic theory, is reminiscent in several passages of the denition of knowledge as the capacity to act: I dene knowledge in terms of potentially observable behaviour, as the ability of an individual or group of individuals to undertake, or to instruct or otherwise induce others to undertake, procedures resulting in predictable transformations of material objects (Howitt [1996] 1998, p. 99). Aside from the somewhat ponderous form of the denition, the restriction of the concept to the manipulation of material objects is a step backward, into the black box of procedures and observable behaviour. Ultimately, Howitt tends to equate knowledge with action.

Innovation The European Journal of Social Science Research 41

8. A detailed scientic-theoretical and sociological account of this position can be found in Stehr (1991). 9. http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm 10. http://www.ipcc.ch/press_information/press_information_fact_sheet1.htm 11. According to the terminology used by the IPCC, climate predictions are to be distinguished from climate projections, which in turn are to be distinguished from scenarios. A climate prediction or climate forecast is the result of an attempt to produce an estimate of the actual evolution of the climate in the future, for example, at seasonal, interannual or longterm time scales. Climate projections depend upon the emission/concentration/ radiative forcing scenario used, and scenarios, in turn, are based on assumptions concerning, for example, future socioeconomic and technological developments that may or may not be realised and are therefore subject to substantial uncertainty (http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ glossary/ar4-wg1.pdf). 12. The scenario approach enables a continual assessment of trends and developments that may affect its business in the future (Skjrseth and Skodvin 2001, p. 53). Wright claims that the use of scenario planning resulted in Shell having considered and rehearsed its responses to the 1973 oil crisis and price collapse of 1981 before these events happened (Wright 2004, p. 6), and Grant explains that although all the [major oil] companies used scenario analysis to some extent, only Shell utilises scenarios as the foundation and centrepiece of its strategic planning process. Other companies tend to use scenarios as a compliment and balance to their forecasting exercises, or to explore particular issues (Grant 2003, p. 17). 13. By the way, the Stern Review (Stern 2007) made liberal use of the A2 scenario for its assessment of damages and costs of climate change. 14. This distinction is different from the IPCC terminology, which claims that it is policy relevant but not policy prescriptive. We pose the more fundamental question of what properties knowledge must have in order to become effective, whereas the IPCC emphasizes its neutrality with regard to policy options. 15. Myanna Lahson (2008, p. 208) draws attention to the fact that the increasing attention paid to environmental questions among the public and in the sciences has also led to the demonopolization of science as the reliable guarantor of truthful ndings: In the face of new environmental problems, science plays an important yet insufcient role in establishing social binding denitions of truth in this context, attitudes towards the issues and technologies involved guide interpretations of the science.

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