Questions for Walt Slocombe

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

1994(5)-2000
Interview with the 9-11 Commission
December 19, 2003
Most recent position:
Senior Advisor for Security Sector and Defense Affairs to the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq

Background
• Please provide a brief synopsis of your professional background
• Policy:
o What was the role of your office in the development of CT policy in OSD
• PC, DC, CSG and Small Group meetings
o Did you attend these meetings?
• Please describe your interaction with the other OSD and DoD components when
formulating policy:
o Secretary of Defense
o Deputy Secretary of Defense
o ASD/SOLIC
o Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
o JCS
o Combatant Commands
• Were you involved in discussion about operations with Clinton, Shelton or
individual combatant commanders
• Please describe your interaction with the DCI, DOS, and DOJ in CT policy
formulation

General Lead Off Questions

How did the military see its role in CT efforts in 1995
How did you see that role change during your tenure at OSD?
When did you first hear the name A-Q?
When did A-Q first become a significant issue in the policy making at DoD and at the
PC/DC meetings you attended?
Did DoD have a strategy for fighting terrorism during you tenure?
If so, please give us an understanding of what was that strategy and how it
evolved over time.

Khobar Towers and Response

• July 26, 1996, Bombing of Khobar Towers
• Cohen directive: Focus on Force Protection

o A defensive response and an offensive response

o No effort to develop offensive efforts to go after terrorists
 o Did force protection become a mission and an end state in itself rather
than remain just another responsibility of the commander in charge of his
troops?

Embassy Bombings and Response

• August 7,1998: Bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tazania
• August 17, 1998: POTUS admits to misleading the public about Lewinsky
• August 20, 1998: US military conducts Operation INFINITE REACH with cruise
missile attacks against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan
• Three options for response: cruise missiles, heavy bombing (B-ls, B-2, B 52),
boots on the ground. Were you aware of these options and did you take part in the
discussion of these military options?

o Do you recall who took part in the decision-making process on the US

response to the embassy attacks?
o What was the position of the OSD? Of JCS?
o Please explain the decision-making process regarding the use of TLAMs?
o What were the TLAM strikes to accomplish?
o Did the Monica Lewinsky, "wagging the dog" response to the TLAMs
affect follow-on military options?
o Do you recall if there were any considerations of other responses besides
or in addition to the strikes?
o Were there any changes DoD CT strategy following the Embassy
bombing? What if anything changed after the Embassy attacks.

USS Cole
• October 12, 2000: USS Cole attacked. POTUS directed FBI to investigate attack.
• Late 2000: Berger requests the CJCS to develop options for a possible military
response, which leads to 13 options for military action against UBL
• December 21, 2000: PC meeting: update on Cole attack and possible responses.
DoD says Principals should consider clarity of evidence, short and long-term
objectives, and likelihood of success
•
o How would you explain the lack of response to the USS Cole?
• From the DoD standpoint?
• From the USG standpoint?
o Did we rely too much on law enforcement in reaction to the Cole?
o What do you think should have been our reaction to the Cole?
o Were there any changes DoD CT strategy following the Cole? What if
anything changed in OSD after the incident?

Millennium Plot
• December 11, 1999: DoD puts military commands on alert
• December 23, 1999: Reno requests Cohen assistance in deploying federal LE
authorities within US and overseas during Millennium transition. This assistance
is agreed to by DoD on December 29, 1999.
 March 10, 1999: PC held on the millennium threat (Slocombe participated). The
agenda asks the PC to make it US policy to attrit A-Q so that large attacks against
the US are unlikely. The PC reviews the Millennium threat, then turns to four
areas: more vigorous disruption, law enforcement against terrorists inside the US,
immigration, and border control with Canada. The PC agrees to examine having
CIA "seriously attrit" A-Q until major attacks are unlikely, having DOJ
"Vigorously" enforce attiterror laws at home "consistent with concern for civil
liberties," and trying harder to stop foreign-terrorists infiltration from Canada and
to remove those already inside the country.

Military Plans and Operations

o May 19 or 20, 1998: CIA briefs JSOC/JCS on potential operations against A-Q
o Spring 1998: JSOC attends a small meeting at JCS with CJCS; decision made to
go after A-Q with TLAMs.
• In your view, was that an adequate measure to go after A-Q and UBL?
o September 19, 1998: Clarke writes Berger that CSG is implementing Plan
DELINDA, but is waiting for Small Group guidance about DELENDA's military
component
o October 1998: Navy spins TLAM gyroscopes for possible UBL hit.
o November 3, 1998: General Zinni seen as opposed to military action seeing
military operations would rock the region.
o August 18, 1999: CTC meets with SOCOM to review requirements for SOF
options in Afghanistan. CIA is frustrated.
o April-May, 2000: POTUS approaches Shelton, "You know it would scare the shit
out of A-Q if suddenly a bunch of black ninja's rappelled out of helicopters into
the middle of their camp." NSC follows up with a request to the Pentagon for a
new military plan, a small package that did not require using the entire 101st
Airborne.
o Fall 2000: Newbold presents a comprehensive plan to Clarke for operations
against AQ and UBL to include an IO plan. This plan was briefed to Shelton.

• Legal/political impediments to the use of the military. What were they and
they prevent the development of operations?
• Why was the military not used? That is what the public wants to know.
• Were these plans "done on the back of the envelope" and if so, was this
because Shelton had his own special relations with SOCOM and the
military? Could he just call and get the information requested?
• Allegations - refer to Clarke's piece
• CENTCOM: Do you recall if CENTCOM developed any plans to go after
A-Q and UBL?

Actionable Intelligence
o How would you define "actionable intelligence"
o Do you recall the issues that arose because of the inability to obtain actionable
intelligence to target UBL and A-Q pre 9-11?
 o Was AI used as an excuse not to put boots on the ground?
o How do you respond to the phrase, "if you engage in action, you will obtain the
intelligence"?

SOFs and the CIA Paramilitary

• What would you say were some of the difficulties in implementing joint
operations between SOFs and CIA Paramilitary?
• Do you recall any joint CT operations prior to 9-11 focused on A-Q and UBL?
• While we know you are no longer within the OSD structure, please tell us how
you think these relations are working today? Were you witness to some of these
successful operations in Iraq?

Military-to-Military Contacts
o March 1998 India and Pakistan tests: what was the effect on Mil-to-Mil contacts
o January 26, 1999: DoS requests JCS to pursue discussions with Pakistan
o Mil - to - Mil contact with Pakistan about attacking UBL particularly around the
time of the millennium.
o Were you aware the military-to-military contacts ongoing between the US
and Pakistan? Other relevant nations?
o Describe how these contacts served overall USG policy
o Explain how these contacts served USG CT policy
o How did it change during your tenure?
o What were the relevant countries with which we had the most contact?

Homeland Defense
o April 19, 1995: Oklahoma City bombing
o July 26, 1996: Bombing at the Atlantic Olympics
o September 30, 1996: Nunn-Lugar-Domenici passes: seeks to strengthen domestic
preparedness for CBRN terrorist attacks
o May 22, 1998: POTUS announces BW initiative in a Naval Academy speech
o How were Clinton's concerns about bioterrorism conveyed within the
USG? What actions were taken in OSD?
o July 21, 1998: Principals conduct ITRAP exercise at Blair House involving
multiple WMD domestic terrorist attacks
o August 7,1998: Clarke starts warning of possible attacks on US homeland
o September 29, 1998: Free contacts Cohen regarding DoD providing dedicated
access to support for homeland defense
o September 1998: FBI submits legislation requesting DOJ financial support for
homeland defense without DoD approval
o September 11, 1998: AG proposes that DOJ be the LFA for domestic
preparedness programs
o October 14, 1998: At the request of the AG, the CSG conducts Exercise POISED
RESPONSE involving an attack on Washington DC
o October 1998: CSG meeting: UBL use of VX and possible cell in U.S.
 o November 28, 1998: memo to SecDef regarding Civil Aviation Anti-Missile
Defense Task Force Report (threats to commercial aviation from terrorist-
launched SAMS)
o May 26, 1999: Reno signs off on "Domestic Guidelines" (under PDD-39)
regarding deployment and employment of federal agency capabilities in cases of
domestic terrorist attacks
o May 2000: Principals conduct TOPOFF exercise, a congressionally-mandated
"no-notice" exercise and scenarios involving a chem.-bio and radiological
terrorist attack in U.S.
o October 1, 2000: DOJ assumes full control from DoD of the N-L-D Domestic
Preparedness Program.

o Are you aware of the discussion that took place in 1999 regarding the
proposal by the JCS for a CINC in the US?
• If so, please describe that discussion and the opposition to that
suggestion by the Congress (where in Congress did the opposition
come from) and organizations outside the U.S.
• In your view, should the military be a lead agency for homeland
security as well as homeland defense?

Lead Federal Agencies

• PDD-39
o Signed March 2, 1995
• PDD-62
o February 4, 1998: DC meeting: PDD-62 and PDD-63
o Describe the decision making process: FBI and FEMA the lead in the
United States; DOS the lead overseas; DoD in a supporting role.
• What was the OSD and military position? Why was this position
taken?

Renditions
• Did the military view renditions an adequate means to address CT
• Do you recall the role of the military in carrying out these renditions?

Predator
• March 2000: DoD begins predictive modeling of attacking UBL using a UAV
• May 5, 2000: Admiral Frye briefed on possible support to CIAs UAV efforts
against UBL; Frye wants the NSC to resolve who pays costs associated with
UAVs
• Mid-July, 2000. US Air Force conducts Predator test in the deserts of Nevada
• September 7, 2000: First Predator mission flown in Afghanistan
• September 22, 2000: Predator flies over Tarnak Farms; sees people but does not
see UBL
• October 7, 2000: Predator flights temporarily suspended
• October 30, 2000: Predator flights re-start with a mission over Garman Bach Gar
Camp
 • December 2000: The Secretary of the AF finds money for the Predator
• January 19, 2001: First Predator test successful.

o Were you a part of the discussions regarding the use of the Predator
o Please describe the debates between the DoD/AF and CIA on the decision
to place Hellfire missiles on the Predator?
o C2 (responsibility for who shoots) and funding

Other instruments
o Were they working in the eyes of the principals and the military?

The CSG
o What is your view of the CSG process for addressing CT
• Was it an effective interagency means to address this issue?

Transition
• Shelton meets with President-Elect Bush and does not discuss the submarine force
off of Afghanistan; Post story also reports that CIA showed Rice Predator video
ofUBL.

o Did you prepare documents for the transition?

• If so, was CT addressed in those documents?
• Did you attend any of the briefings?
• If so, who was briefed?

If there is time:
Competing DoD priorities:
Please describe some of the competing issues that were ongoing in OSD/DoD and how
that affected the CT efforts: For example:
December 12, 1998: US military bombs Iraq in Operation DESERT FOX
March 24, 1999: NATO military air campaign against Serbia called Operation
ALLIED FORCE

Final Questions
• Lessons learned
• Recommendations