Eppur Si Muove Toward an Integrative Theory of NATO

Zachary Ginsburg

Kings College London Department of War Studies

Dissertation for the Masters of Arts in International Relations

Original Version submitted Fall 2011 Public Version released on Scribd.com 13/3/13. (Latest Revisions: 5/1/2013) Please send feedback to zachary.ginsburg@uj.edu.pl

To Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, General John Shalikashvili, and David Ginsburg

I am greatly indebted to many for their encouragement and/or input, including (and in no particular order) Prof. Wyn Bowen, Prof. J.E. Spence OBE, Prof. Mervyn Frost, Prof. Vivienne Jabri, Prof. Philip Zelikow, Douglas MacEachin, Prof. Darlene Boroviak, Dr. Kai Hebel, Antnio Sampaio, Jonathan Wolinsky, Roland Bensted, Callie Schneider, Munir Harb, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Kings College London Department of War Studies, my father, Jonathan, my mother, Terri Lodge, and my aunt, Susan Ginsburg.

Foreword

I wrote this dissertation during the summer of 2011 for the MA in International Relations at Kings College London, from which I graduated with distinction the same year. I am now a Fulbright scholar in Krakow, Poland, at the Centre for European Studies, Jagiellonian University. After two years of deliberating what to do with this dissertation, I have decided to re-edit it and place it online for free, public viewing and write a corresponding article for a peer-reviewed journal. At the beginning of the summer, I set out to answer why NATO was still around despite the Cold Wars end, the ostensible lack of benefits for the United States unearthed in the inability of European allies to carry out even the relatively-modest Libya campaign without significant American support, etc. (Hence the title, Eppur Si Muove and yet it moves). In my opinion, I did, in fact, provide a satisfactory answer to this question, but I found that doing so required me to address a more fundamental question: How can we best understand alliances in world order? This led me to a broad critique of my own discipline, International Relations. However, it took me some additional time to realize that what I had just written was not primarily an explanation of why NATO still exists, but a critique of international theory and a proposed way forward. I am currently writing an article that will more explicitly and succinctly make this argument using NATO as a case study. In the meantime, it suffices to say that this paper purports to identify a serious flaw in the analytical branch of International Relations: Its apparent inability to fulfill its original mandate as something useful for informing the actual practice of international relations (with non-capitalized letters). An outsider to International Relations, social sciences, or perhaps simply academia might (fairly) ask, How can International Relations become so idiosyncratic that it has little useful to say about international relations? One might cynically reply that this is what inevitably happens in universities, but this is not really an explanation. This paper claims that the problem is rigid epistemologies (see Chapter IV) i.e., IR usually constructs extremely narrow ways of understanding what is true about world order (see The Correlates of War Project), writes histories that comport with these narrow views, and then claims that international society en masse works according to them. This is distinct from diplomats, generals, policymakers, terrorists, and other people in the real world, who accept that different parts of countries, different leaders, different bureaucracies, etc. can view the same thing in distinct ways. The branch of IR known as Constructivism is closer to usefulness than other branches, but here there are still problems, namely that constructivists usually employ a diachronic or, worse, teleological explanation of the international. Its most famous theorist, Alexander Wendt, sees international anarchy as an evolution from Hobbesianism to Kantianism. However, as this paper tries to make clear via NATO, the logics of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant exist side-by-side in the real world. Inspired by Paul Feyerabends anti-method, this paper appeals for an anti-foundationalist account of the international predicated on epistemological flexibility. Rereading my last paragraph now, I will simply post it here rather than trying to rewrite the conclusion of an entire summer in a coffee shop:

The debates surrounding NATO bring into sharp relief the gap between international relations theory and practice. IR, whose founders sought to deter policymakers from idealist naivet and thus global chaos, now largely proceeds with some outstanding exceptions as if policymakers are inconveniently complex components of the sacred practice of academic theorizing. Inter alia, this paper has attempted to demonstrate the promise of international theory when imbued with history and decoupled from its traditional obsession with parsimonious, timeless, and universal truth. It instead advocates conceptualizing alliance behavior in an integrative way that accepts complexity. With its many histories and principles, NATO is inherently complex. As it continues to break the supposed-rules international relations, parsimony will be forced to yield to history and complexity.

Zachary Ginsburg Krakow, 13 March 2013

Table of Contents I. Introduction 1.1 Overview and Methodology II. Alliances in World Order: Traditional Hypotheses 2.1 Why Alliances Work: Realist Hypotheses 2.2 Institutionalist Hypotheses 2.3 Constructivist Hypotheses III. Histories in Contest 3.1 Article V: A Realist Account of NATOs History 3.2 Article II: A Constructivist Account 3.3 An Alternative Constructivist Account IV. Synthesis: A Real-World Approach? 4.1 History versus Theory in International Relations 4.2 An Anti-Foundationalist, Integrative Account V. Evolution or Decay? 5.1 Two-Tiered NATO: A Strategically Irrelevant Alliance 5.2 EU-NATO: An Alliance of Alliances 5.3 Global NATO: A Global, Liberal Democratic Alliance VI. Conclusions Bibliography Abbreviations: AT Alliance Theory (as in the concentration within International Relations) CDSP Common Defense and Security Policy (now part of the CFSP) CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU) CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EUFOR European Union Force EUMS European Union Military Staff (under the auspices of the CDSP) FRG Federal Republic of Germany (or West Germany until reunification and Germany after) GDR German Democratic Republic (or East Germany) IGO International Governing Organization IMF International Monetary Fund 5 7 11 12 16 19 23 23 27 33 36 36 42 46 47 49 52 56 59 IR International Relations (as in the scholastic discipline) MAP Membership Access Plan MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (1973-1989) NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) NSC National Security Council (of the US) PfP Partnership for Peace RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism (see p. 26) SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SALT Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (1972) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe START Strategic Arms Control Reduction Treaty (I, 1991; II, 1993; III, 1997 (never entered into force); and New START, 2010). WEU Western European Union 4

I. Introduction But we must wonder how long NATO will last as an effective organization. As is often said, organizations are created by their enemies. Alliances are organized against a perceived threat. We know from balance-of-power theory as well as from history that war-winning coalitions collapse on the morrow of victory, the more surely if it is a decisive one. Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, 1993

In his last policy speech as US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates warned that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) risks a dim, if not dismal future of military irrelevance if the bulk of the United States European partners and Canada continued to fail to contribute more substantively to the alliance amid US austerity measures, perceptions of European free riding, and a new generation of American political leaders for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience it was for me. The excoriating 10 June, 2011 speech delivered almost four months after the beginning of humanitarian operations in Libya and almost a decade after the Article V declaration on Afghanistan made headlines on both sides of the Atlantic,1 rallied political grievances in the United States, and created an unmistakable impression that NATO was at a crossroads.2 Commentators and officials from the Obama administration to the far-right Heritage Foundation called for sweeping changes in the alliance.3 Some even called for its demise.4 Yet, neither the tone nor subjects of Gates speech were unprecedented. Indeed, so often has NATO faced down apparently fundamental5 or unprecedented6 crises and so often even during especially fraught Cold War tension have prominent commentators and

Libye : les Etats-Unis demandent leurs allis de plus s'investir dans l'OTAN, Le Monde, 11 June 2011; Gates Hits NATO Allies Hard, The Baltimore Sun, 11 June, 2011. 2 NATO at the Crossroads after Gates Speech, Associated Press, 12 June, 2011. 3 Daalder (2011); Gardiner (2011); Wingfield (2011). Gates says US, European allies are slowly growing apart, but final NATO split not imminent. Associated Press, 15 June 2011; Kashmeri (2011); Goldgeier (2011). 4 Wheatcroft (2011) 5 Knorr (1959), p.3; Hahn (1980) via Thies (2009), p. 3. 6 Tucker (1982), pp. 63-64 and Kissinger (1984), p. 20 via Thies (2009), p. 3.

scholars called for the alliances dissolution de facto or de jure that doing so has become clich.7 In 1964, only two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, international relations (IR) scholar Ronald Steel predicted that The End of [the] Alliance, as his volume is entitled, would correspond to the End of the Postwar World: The Atlantic alliance, which has been the keystone of American foreign policy during three administrations, has begun to founder under the impact of Europes new nationalism and the apparent decline of the Russian military threat.8 Four years later, James Avery Joyce wrote End of an Illusion, whose central tenet is that nuclear weapons have made nonsense of the whole alliance business.9 Despite that later scholars and observers would commonly assert or more often uncritically assume that pre-1991 NATO was solidified by a transatlantic consensus on its necessity amid an otherwise unmanageable Soviet threat, NATO weathered political crises and was the subject of earnest scholarly debate even during the Cold War. Of course, during and after the USSR and Warsaw Pacts wholly unanticipated 1989 through 1991 dissolutions, the calls of NATOs demise became calls of imminent demise, and (or hence) the calls for NATOs demise became more urgent. In its Summer 1990 issue, International Security published John Mearsheimers now-infamous Back to the Future. Mearsheimer, still a leading neo-realist, wrote that the Cold Wars end would cause World War III: protests would prompt US and UK troop withdrawal from Germany, Europe would become balkanized and revert to hyper-nationalist conflict, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact [would] then dissolve; they may persist on paper, but each [will cease] to function as an alliance. The idea that NATO had lost its raison dtre combined with the ascendance of a then-Western oriented President Yeltsin and amplified concerns about nuclear proliferation and stability in Eastern Europe and Central Asia led to the most significant challenge to the

7 8

Thies (2009), pp. 12-13. Steel (1964), p. 15. 9 Joyce (1968), p. ix.

alliance to date: not only was the alliance now purposeless, but now it could only serve to scuttle negotiations with Moscow for a stable and peaceful Europe.10 Contrary to most predictions, however, NATO not only outlived its original rival but did so in thriving fashion, adding nine new members and former East Germany, reestablishing French presence in its integrated military command, expanding its Partnership for Peace (PfP) throughout the entirety of the former USSR and all other European, nonNATO-member states, executing out-of-area security and humanitarian operations, and more. This discrepancy between events as they turned out to be and realist predictions enabled an emerging IR school, constructivism, to redefine the debate on alliances. Rather than contending that alliances are coalesced by fear and cemented by rationality, constructivists claimed that the secret to NATOs flexibility and longevity is its political community: NATO, as an alliance of democracies, is not primarily and never was embodied primarily by its Article V commitment to collective defense, but its Article II commitments to liberal values. As a democratic security community,11 they claimed, NATO is fundamentally different than any other alliance in history.

1.1

Methodology and Overview

At an uncertain juncture, this study weighs theories of alliance cohesion and NATOs history in an attempt to discern what drives its internal interactions. In concurrence with most post-Soviet accounts, I attribute NATOs survival and, to some extent, its Cold War cohesion to the allies like-mindedness norms, values, aspirations for world order coalesced by

10 11

See Asmus (2002), p. 281; Haglund (1994), p. 656. Deutsch (1957), ch. 1.

institutionalization and habitual dialogue, etc. However, the story does not end here; values can drive discord as well as cooperation, and they have done so periodically in NATO relations. Additionally, values are not the only motivators of action. The traditional, realist accounts capture a distinct type of interaction based on material dangers. Institutionalist ones, as I label them, also provide another important insight to rationalist, cooperative behavior. Existing theories that synthesize these theoretical strands do so in a way that acknowledges the possibility of multiple, interfacing modes, but fail to explain why behaviors correspond to one instead of another and how multiple modes can inhabit the same conceptual space. This owes to an unfortunate tradition among explanatory IR theories: an illogical commitment to single, holist narratives constructed in rigid epistemologies. This paper hopes to break new ground with an integrative theory one with a relativist epistemology tacitly assumed by policymakers, but rarely employed by academics. 12 Chapter I explores IR and alliance theory (AT) literature, defining the scope of AT and evaluating schools of thought on alliance and organizational cohesion. I divide existing alliance literature into three schools: 1) realist describing an international system of powerbalancing dyads; 2) institutionalist organizational theories based on rational, material interests; and 3) constructivist international social theories based on normative decisionmaking. The schools provide distinct explanations on why alliances operate as they do and what types of factors influence decision-making. Chapter II explores two distinct historiographies of NATO drawn from these theories. Not surprisingly, the two most prevalent holist theories realism and constructivism also dominate accounts of NATOs history. One, drawn from realism and Article V, contends that NATO is, quite simply, a collective defense organization. The other, derived from Article II

12

Feyerabend (1975), pp. 1-28; Patomaki and Wight (2000), pp. 213-237.

and the most prevalent form of liberal constructivism which emphasizes cooperation based on liberal democratic values emphasizes transatlantic community. These accounts based on singular strands of alliance theory are internally-valid and sensible on their own terms. Chapter III thus employs a synthesis rather than advocating that one history or another is somehow more essential. This method reflects the manner in which policymakers who must respond to events, not theories conceptualize the alliance and the international. This rejoinder looks to NATOs history to locate a relationship between theories, finding four modes that alternately animate alliance interactions: 1) balance-ofpower cooperation driven by external, material threats; 2) institutionalized interests driven by non-cooperative actions opportunity costs; 3) inculcated alienation driven by socio-historical reservations; and 4) normative consolidation driven by desire for greater political community. Modes 1 and 2 correspond directly to realism and institutionalism respectively, while 4 embodies the historical interpretation of typical, liberal constructivism. Mode 3 is a commonly overlooked type of political interaction detailed by an emerging subgenre of realist constructivism, also describing value-driven behavior. Ordinary politics, after all, unites and divides. Inferring from its history, NATOs typical relations can be broadly described by two inter-modal interactions: the constant increase of institutionalized interests propelled by balance-of-power and normative coalescence; and an inverse relationship between high degrees of external threat that cause balance-of-power cooperation and politico-normative interactions as exhibited in modes 3 and 4. Chapter IV, followed by conclusions, tests this modal hierarchy among recent visions for NATOs future. Examined are two-tiered NATO, one trending toward strategic irrelevance, EU-NATO, one built on a codified institutionalization of EU-NATO ties, and Global NATO, one that enlarges to formally incorporate out-of-area liberal democracies. This study finds that existing international and alliance theories provide incomplete accounts 9

of these and other debates on NATO, and finds modifications and theoretical syntheses fruitful in considering the alliances contemporary dilemmas.

10

II. Alliances and World Order: Traditional Hypotheses

Comparative studies of NATO viz. other alliances past and present are surprisingly rare given the plethora written on the organization itself and on various aspects of alliances.13 IRs longstanding theories on security cooperation within military partnerships collectively known as alliance theory (AT) are inexorable from IR en masse.14 As George Liska writes in Nations in Alliances, one of the first exclusively-AT studies, It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name.15 Yet, as Stephen Walt observed in his influential The Origins of Alliances, almost all works on alliances seek to explain whether they affect conflicts likelihood, how they distribute burdens, or some other internal or external facet rather than their genera, how their cohesion or fugacity can be explained, or how they affect global polity.16 How is it that alliances fundamental elements of IR per Liska evaded further scrutiny prior to The Origins of Alliances 1987 publication? In fact, NATOs post-Soviet endurance solved this quandary. The Cold Wars bipolar paradigm and historys other major alliance systems appeared to comport with neo-realism, the leading IR theory du jour, thus eliminating impetus for further study and providing an ostensibly obvious answer to the alliance question. The paradigms unexpected collapse and NATOs subsequent survival caused many to question popular IRs most basic assumptions states are rationally self-interested and unitary actors, they follow universal laws of power, threat, or interest balancing, etc. This precipitated the rise or return of several IR theories that challenged both neo-realisms dominance and even the more entrenched neo-utilitarian,
13 14

Thies (2009), pp. 25-26; McCalla (1996), pp. 447, 450-456. Oest (2007), pp. 24-26. 15 Liska (1962), p. 3. 16 Walt (1987), pp. 6-7; Hendrickson (1999), pp. 85-86.

11

rationalist, and structuralist meta-theories that underlie both sides of IRs now-waning neo-neo debate.17 These developments, in turn, casted unprecedented doubt on a sacred cow of AT: Alliances can only exist to oppose other alliances or erstwhile hegemonic states. Though this was consistent with the Cold Wars bipolar paradigm, NATOs survival and the emergence of powerful IGOs such as the EU and WTO gave credence to those arguing that international community can exist beyond flimsy associations of insecurity-amid-anarchy and to a gamut of new theories focused on the utility of such organizations in unipolar or multipolar systems. This led to an increase of AT studies that began in the mid-1990s.18 This chapter presents hypotheses on alliance cohesion. I broadly categorize existing works on AT into three traditions: realist, institutionalist, and constructivist. This schema is similar to recent studies such as those of Chernoff (1995), Duffield (2001), and Weitsman (2004), which identify realist cybernetic and neoliberal [theories];19 realist, liberal, and transformational [i.e. social constructivist and learning theory] perspectives;20 and realist, formal and rationalist, and liberalist approaches21 respectively.

17

Schmidt (2002), pp. 10-12; Wendt (1999), ch. 2; Weitsman (2004), p. 11. The neo-neo debate is that between neo-realism and neo-liberalism, two structural theories that almost drowned out all other theoretical debate in the 1980s. 18 Keohane (1993), p. 271; Sprecher and Krause (2006), pp. 363-369. 19 Chernoff (1995), p. 14. 20 Duffield (2001), pp. 95, 100. 21 Weitsman (2004), p. 13.

12

2.1

Why Alliances Work: The Realist Hypothesis

The first and arguably standard school of both IR and AT, realism in its two broadest subcategories classical realism and neo-realism has dominated the study of alliances for most of international theorys existence.22 The realist schools strands are united in what Dunne and Schmidt call the three Ss: statism, survival, [and] self-help.23 Statism, describes the internationals organization in the form of states and sovereigntys predominance as their overriding impulse. This precludes, inter alia, IGOs from actually governing states in any meaningful sense or superceding them in importance in any policy area. Stemming from the second aforementioned property of statism, survival denotes states instinct to place its own survival as its top policy priority. Perhaps the most central of the Ss is self-help. The self-help, tragic vision of politics contends that humans inevitably tend towards conflict in a state of nature such as international anarchy.24 Hence, the only virtue that can prevail in international politics and the only one that should be entertained by national leaders is power. Alliances serve only to boost relative power in a Leviathan-less self-help system; they are shallow confederations dedicated solely to survival in a world fraught with eternal peril. In the face of dangerous enemies and no means of ensuring that allies do not turn against you other than the force of your own arms, entertaining delusions of international community is dangerous. Owing to the word limit, this paper represents realism in only two of its many guises: Kenneth Waltzs balance-of-power and Walts balance-of-threat neo-realisms. Though certainly not the first influential work of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltzs 1979 Theory of

22 23

Morgenthau (1948); Schmidt (2002), pp. 10-12. Dunne and Schmidt (2008), p. 100. 24 Lebow (2003), pp. 14-15.

13

International Politics is perhaps neo-realisms most central. Like Morgenthaus genredefining classic, Politics among Nations, Waltzs volume contains only a short section dedicated to alliances but nonetheless is an AT classic due to its prominent explanation of world order generally.25 Much of it is dedicated to a expounding on and advocating for systemic approaches to IR, and by extension to AT. Like the classical realists, Waltz does not predict alliances to have important ramifications ipso facto; rather, alliances are part of the natural propensity towards balance in the competitive international system.26 In persistently dangerous international anarchy, each [states] incentive is to put itself in a position to be able of take care of itself self since no one else can be counted on to do so. 27 Thus, countries enter into alliances as an economical division of labor, based on capabilities, not for functional or moral reasons.28 Furthermore, countries will economize in defense by selecting the smallest possible number of partners to decrease bargaining costs and reduce the probability of alarming potential adversaries to action.29 Alliance pacts ensure that all allies make equitable contributions to common defense, rather than hoping, say, that Russia will take care of Germany on its own. They cannot, however, prohibit defectors as they act solely out of existential considerations.30 Waltzs most major break with his classical realist predecessors is in his praise of bipolarity. Unlike Morgenthau, Carr, or Kaplan, who with false reasoning and scant evidence believe that bipolar worlds are doubly unstable [versus multipolar ones],31 Waltz contends that bipolar systems are the only way of maintaining order in contested international

25 26

Morgenthau (1948), pp. 5-16, 194-204; Waltz (1979), pp. 164-170. Waltz (1979), pp. 128, 166. 27 Ibid., p. 107 28 Ibid., p. 96. 29 Ibid., pp. 133-139. 30 Ibid., pp. 164-167. 31 Ibid., p. 168.

14

polities: the game of power politics, if really played hard, presses the players into two rival camps32 However, this will not occur through bandwagoning wherein weaker players choose the strongest possible partner as a primary mechanism, as nothing ensures that erstwhile stronger partners will not betray; rather, states aim to balance the power of would-be hegemons by marginally adding their own power that of any other state, ensuring competitiveness in the international system and thus utility to their allies. Though the attributes or orientations of states may change, this international system does not.33 Many AT and IR studies, including Chernoffs After Bipolarity and Oests The End of Alliance Theory? see the sharpest distinction within realism between balance-of-power theories and balance-of-threat theories, popularized by Walt.34 Alternatively, Walts 1987 The Origins of Alliances refine[s] and rescue[s] Waltz underlying insight.35 Either way, Walts work, which unlike Waltzs is derived from an extensive case study, is cited in every post-1987 AT paper that I found. In large part, Walt concurs with Waltz innovations and his adaptations of classical realism, but adds a crucial modification: The balance-of-threat.36 The balance-of-threat includes all the variables studies by balance-of-power realists, but take[s] into account the impact of perceptions, ideology, and geology.37 In his case study, Walt contends actors engaged in balancing and bandwagoning behavior extensively in the Middle East from 19551958, but that decisions on to whom to bandwagon with or balance against largely resulted from ongoing Arab confrontation with Israel, interaction with Cold War superpowers, and

32

Ibid., p. 167.; Fellow neo-realist John Lewis Gaddis in fact labeled the Cold War, The Long Peace (Gaddis (1986), pp. 99-142). 33 Waltz (1979), p. 167. See also M.D. Wallaces 1815-1964 study (Wallace (1973), pp. 575-604). 34 Chernoff (1995), pp. 28-33; Oest (2007), pp. 28-32. 35 Donnelly (2000), p. 119; Walt (1987), p. 263. Walt himself (p. 263) writes that balance of threat theory improves on balance of power theory by providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony. 36 Donnelly (2000), pp. 119-120; Oest (2007), p. 31. 37 Walt (1987), p. 10.

15

Nassers revolutionary pan-Arabism.38 Monarchist Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, for example, struck an alliance in 1957 against Soviet-sponsored, populist Egypt.39 This simple insight adding geographical proximity, ideological affinity, and perceptions of intent provides neo-realism with a credibility that lacks in Waltz; however, explaining that neorealism must consider perceptions or ideology is not the same as explaining how these items affect the international system, which Walt and similar modified neo-realisms like those of the so-called neoclassical realists fail to do.40 As such, this study treats balance-ofpower and -threat ATs as only semantically distinct.

2.2

Institutionalist Hypotheses

Institutionalist hypotheses contend that states enter alliances to satisfy rational, ubiquitous self-interests other than existential danger. Distinguished from constructivist theories such as neo-functionalism by their commitment to positivism and to the unitary state as IRs essential actor, most institutionalism including neo-liberal institutionalism, its most popular form presumes that meaningful alliances are only confederations of convenience, like realism, whereas constructivism is denoted by its incorporation of values.41 Owing to its association with neo-liberalism, most AT studies categorize institutionalism as a subcategory of liberalism; however, political science contains a number of new institutionalist theories that do not necessitate a neo-liberal outlook on IR generally. Therefore, I opt to categorize neo-liberalism as a sub-category of institutionalism for the purposes of my rubric, however unorthodox.
38 39

Ibid., pp. 50-51. Ibid., pp. 68-70 40 See Rose (1998), pp. 144-172. 41 Duffield (2001), pp. 94-95.

16

Neo-liberal institutionalism, the direct application of neo-liberalism to alliances, is perhaps the most widely recognized institutionalist theory.42 At core, neo-liberals believe that states can transcend power in international anarchy because of incentives for cooperating. According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, its most prominent scholars, neoliberalism is a modification of structural realism that, in accordance with rationalist principles imported from economics, proposes that the international produces opportunities for positivesum gains.43 Conflict, they contend, is costly, and regularized policy coordination44 produces inherent political advantages and change[s] conceptions of self-interest.45 Nations are thus in a state of complex interdependence: with rivals,46 they rely on cooperation to keep rivalry from becoming violent; with friends, cooperation produces the opportunity for alliances that are not only meaningful beyond realist predictions, but indispensible amid an increasingly globalized world.47 As neo-liberal institutionalism thus expect[s] existing international institutions to adapt and to persist more easily than new institutions, formed by states on the basis of changing interests, can be created.48 While neo-liberals remain institutionalisms most prevalent advocates, a host of simple, game-theoretic arguments sometimes labeled rational choice institutionalisms (RCI) have been adapted into IR from studies on US Congressional voting and, more recently, European integration studies to explain bargaining behavior and IGOs perpetuations.49 Predicated on reducing political or real transaction costs, RCI theories predict organizational stability amid rationally self-interested partners.50 Two RCIs in

42 43

Indeed, Keohane (1993) uses the term institutionalist in lieu of liberal or neo -liberal institutionalism. Keohane and Nye (1974) 44 Keohane and Nye (1974), p. 46. 45 Keohane (1993), p. 271. 46 Though not enemies (Ibid., p. 278: [neo-liberal] institutionalism by no means predicts universal cooperation.) 47 Ibid.; Keohane and Nye (1974), p 46. 48 Keohane (1993), p. 297. ; Keohane (1984), ch. 4. 49 Hall and Taylor (1996), pp. 942-946; Pollack (2004), pp. 137-141. 50 Hall and Taylor (1996), p. 943.

17

particular show initial promise towards my research question: path dependency and twolevel game theory. Path dependency describes an arrangement wherein the costs of termination exceed the costs of continued participation.51 Thus, even if an arrangement produces no additional benefits for the participant, it will not discontinue participation. As NATO reduces participants costs through specialization and would surely be costly to dismantle,52 path dependency theory predicts that NATO should survive even without adding new purposes or functions. Two-level game theory, invented by Robert Putnam in a study on the ostensibly paradoxical outcome of the 1978 Bonn trade summit, predicts that ruling political parties use fellow negotiation participants supposed demands as pretenses to forge deals that would be otherwise unpalatable to domestic constituents.53 Thus, despite diplomatic or domestic political deadlock, two-level game theory creates the possibility of all participants [leaving negotiations] happier than when they arrived.54 More importantly, two-level games allow policymaking elites even when opposed by an erstwhile domestic majority to set international objectives with counterparts who may be more sympathetic to certain objectives than domestic constituents or have access to sensitive information withheld from the public. For example, the Libyan campaign is thought to have been relatively unpopular among NATO populaces, but diplomacy in NATO may have enabled a cooperative campaign in lieu of forming an ad hoc coalition which may have been too difficult or costly. Hence, like path dependency two-level game theory predicts organizational stability, but exclusively via political capital considerations.55

51 52

Pierson (2000), pp. 251-267; Pollack (2004), p. 140. Largely owing to specializations and divisions of labor that have already taken place 53 Putnam (1988), pp. 427-460. 54 Ibid., p. 428. 55 Ibid., pp. 427-460.

18

2.3

Constructivist Hypotheses

Though the debate over what constructivism actually entails whether it implies particular understandings of global structure or whether it is entirely meta-theoretical is one of contemporary IRs most contentious, it suffices to say that constructivist AT approaches focus on actors perceptions or values and thus usually qualify rationalism or structuralism with hermeneutics.56 Generally, constructivism, shortened from social constructivism and termed by Nicholas Onuf in 1989,57 commonly utilizes critical realist and hermeneutic epistemology.58 Per Alexander Wendt in Social Theory of International Politics, IRs most important work of the post-Soviet era, constructivism maintains that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature but also that mature theories refer to the world observation may be theory-laden [but it] should not be theory-determined.59 In other words, constructivism accepts the existence of a material world but contends that perceptions of it and of others within are made intersubjectively, while theory should be made via inference to the best explanation. This turn away from economics-style behavioralism to intersubjective sociological methodologies allows the importation of values or culture into semi-structural accounts of AT; however, constructivists were not the first international theorists to emphasize intersubjective learning or transnational political values. Todays most influential

56 57

Adler (2002), p. 97. Ibid., p. 99.; Wendt (1999), p. 1. 58 Though not one as critical realist as this study finds necessary for understanding NATO ( see conclusions). 59 Wendt (1999), pp. 1, 51, 63. Emphasis added.

19

constructivists, whom Nexon and Jackson label liberal constructivists,60 often claim a political lineage to Kants pacific federation, but beyond this, two contemporaries Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas are frequently ideological sources for constructivists.61 In the 1957 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch et al. introduces the concept of security-communities: Groups of people which have become integrated [attaining], within a territory a sense of community and [institutions] and practices strong enough to assure dependable expectations of peaceful change62 Deutschs analysis maintains that the logic of anarchy can be replaced by the logic of community when these variables correctly align, and that security communities, owing to their cybernetic natures, can enable groups to think together, to see together, and to act together.63 NATO, with its consultative features and cultural-political affinities, may have moved a long way toward becoming [a] security community by 1957, according to the study.64 The 1998 Security Communities, edited by prominent IR theorists Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, revived Deutschs concept, reintroducing it as a major component of constructivisms research agenda.65 Popularized by Ernst Haas in his 1964 Beyond the Nation-State, neo-functionalism is another important theoretical precedent to constructivism and its precepts are, like those of the security community, also integrated into constructivist understandings of AT. Haas contends that true world community can arise from technical webs of international institutional relationships.66 This interconnectedness efficiency will augur a reformist

60 61

Jackson, Nexon, et al. (2004), p. 338. Indeed, constructivist scholars like Barnett, Wendt, Onuf, Doty, and Kratochwil were taught by Deutsch or Haas or by one of their immediate protgs (Adler, 2002). 62 Deutsch et al. (1957), p. 5. 63 Adler and Barnett (1998), pp. 6-7; Deutsch et al. (1957), pp. 3-9, 36. 64 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 163. 65 Adler and Barnett (1998), pp. 3-12. Adler and Barnett (p. 6) contends that the concept of security communities was actually introduced by Richard Van Wagenen (a co -author of Deutsch et al. (1957)), but popularized by Deutsch. 66 Haas (1964), p. 6.

20

ideology by bringing into focus the distorting role of the modern state with respect to the possibilities of human fulfillment, eroding traditional state sovereignty in international order and inviting a fundamentally interconnected form of regional-federal governance.67 As nationalist boundaries recede, their governments become internationally and institutionally socialized. Thus, as in security communities, neo-functionalism predicts that alliances not only possess the ability to act in concert, but to think collectively. Efficiency thus paves the way to community, but that economic impulse is not the end of integration is central to the constructivist account of AT.68 That actors are embedded in social practices that inform their perceptions of material forces and create the possibility of common purpose within international organizations does not give way to a singular AT, but an array of accounts that incorporate normative elements in some way. The most dominant, liberal constructivism envisions NATO as a democratic society, a fact that can endow NATO with purpose ipso facto. Frank Schimmelfennig posits that policymakers acceptance of a community coalesced by values compelled them not only to maintain NATO after the Soviet collapse but to expand it, as socializing neighboring states into such a community would foster regional stability. 69 Thomas Risse also views NATO as an anomalous alliance, being comprised entirely of democracies that embody democratic decision-making in its internal behavior and find common purpose in projecting democratic identity.70 Lacking an external enemy thus does not preclude its existence or functioning.71 A constructivist arguments normative side can also derive from critical theory. Merje Kuus, for example, critiques NATOs banal militarism the paradoxical state in which an international organization purposed to conduct war is

67 68

Ibid., pp. 8-9. Ibid., ch. 1. 69 Schimmelfennig (1998), pp. 198-234. 70 Risse-Kappen (1995), ch. 1. Risse was formerly known as Risse-Kappen. 71 Ibid.

21

reconstructed as a harbinger of peace amid NATOs military-industrial-mediaentertainment network, concluding that its expansion is an expression of imperial right.72 Unlike these uniting, liberal constructivist accounts, some recent realist constructivist ones contend that the power of democratic collectives to overcome dispute is limited, 73 yet the overwhelming trend of most constructivism thus far is that liberal democratic values define alliances comprised of liberal democratic states.

Chapter Summary

This chapter highlights hypotheses for alliance cohesion based on the most commonly recognized schools of IR theory. I identify three schools of AT: realist, institutionalist, and constructivist. Realism predicated on the incapacity to inculcate trust in an international anarchy defined by human natures darkness contends that alliances exist as tools that aide states in maintaining the balance-of-power or -threat. Institutionalist theories, including liberal institutionalism, path dependency, and two-tiered game theory, predict that rationally-self interested states participate in institutions owing to inherent benefits like cost reductions. Constructivism posits that alliances form around value-rational objectives.

72 73

Kuus (2007), pp. 1-22. Jackson, Nexon, et al. (2004), pp. 337-352

22

III. Histories in Contest

The realist, institutionalist, and constructivist traditions outlined in the previous chapter correspond to distinct narratives of NATOs history. NATO is alternatively a balance to geopolitical power or threats, an assurance of regional stability and a functional integrator enabling necessary coordination on terrorism, strategic weapons, etc., a Cold War relic that is too entrenched to dismantle, or a collective of liberal democracies repurposed for the furtherance of humanitarian values and peace. As constructivists and some institutionalists claim that NATOs integration is unprecedented in the history of alliances, I now turn to the history of the Atlantic alliance itself to locate its essential elements. This chapter adds the historical element to my historical-hermeneutic exploration of NATO. This chapter constructs competing historiographies of NATO from the theories outlined above. By deploying these dialectically, this chapter aims to set up a synthesis that will combine their most convincing elements.

3.1

Article V: A Realist Account of NATOs History

The NATs collective defense clause, Article V, is the alliances most central, so says the realist historian. The Article mandates that an armed attack against one or more [member-state] shall be considered an attack against them all, and authorizes any action as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the [NAA].74 Undoubtedly in the NATs signers minds, such an attack would most likely emanate from the Soviet Union.

74

North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Article V.

23

Yet, Article V would not be invoked until 2 October 2001, in response to non-state terrorism.75 Nonetheless, commentators and policymakers alike often assumed this to be NATOs operative clause, especially during the Cold War, as it comported with the realist paradigms du jour. I call this collective defense driven alliance behavior the balance-ofpower mode of cooperation. Strictly speaking even despite embodying the realist idea of alliances created by enemies Article V itself cannot be said to be the primary source of NATOs cohesion according to realism, which maintains that the words collective self-defence are meaningless except in the presence of an external power or threat. Indeed, Article Vs originally proposed language the Europeans drafted some suggesting that an attack on any ally would trigger an automatic military response had to be diluted by none-other-than George F. Kennan to appease isolationists in the US Senate.76 Even despite the June 1948 Berlin blockade and the first Soviet atomic test in August 1949, NATO would not be transformed into a genuine military organization until the 1950-53 Korean War, according to NATOs most prolific chronicler to date, Lawrence S. Kaplan.77 Neo-realist Robert Jervis contends that this development propelled the alliance to meaning because NATO, for this first time, could play a significant role in assuring the balance-of-power via conventional forces: The confluence of the Communist invasion of southern Korea, widely perceived in the United States as marching global communism, with the newfound acknowledgment of looming Soviet parity in nuclear weaponry led the allies to realize the need to supplement European conventional forces with American ones under a singular forward defense.78 This created SHAPE, the SACEUR, the civilian Secretary-General, and most of NATOs modern professional bureaucracy. In sum, the militarization of the
75 76

Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed, NATO, 2 October 2011. Kaplan, L. (2004), p. 4. 77 Kaplan, L. (2004), p. 10. 78 Jervis (1980), pp. 580-581.

24

alliance, as Jervis puts it, and its most basic institutions were forged by war and the prospect of it.79 Realists contend that the balance-of-power was central in all of NATOs formative, Cold War events. Shortly after the creation of NATOs basic operating infrastructure, NATO added its first new members Greece and Turkey in 1952 despite that the two were as close to sworn nemeses as can exist between countries, having fought no less than five distinct wars since 1821.80 Such was the unifying power of the Soviet threat that Athens and Ankara agreed to join each other in military alliance and the original members were willing to accept them owing to the need for additional conventional forces81 despite the obvious risks that a war between two members would pose.82 While later feuds between the two new members particularly over Cyprus would produce fluctuations in their commitments to NATOs military command, the static nature [bipolarity] of the Cold-War European theatre would ensure that internal risks never became really critical for the fulfillment of the Alliances purpose.83 The rest of the Cold War too proved that realist needs trump liberal principles or institutional illusions when existential security is at stake. The Cold Wars first period culminated in the in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the closest the world ever came to nuclear annihilation. The dtente that followed did not spell an end to the realist worldview: The West stood idly by during the 1968 Prague Spring the brutal Soviet suppression of a short-lived liberal turn in Czechoslovakia entrenching Moscows control over its empire

79 80

Ibid., p. 580. Including the Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire 81 Kaplan, L. (1999), p. 227. 82 Indeed, Greece and Turkey pursued hostilities just short of war, as Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. The same year, Greece left the military command over American toleration of the invasion and Turkey denied allied use of its air bases in retaliation for US suspension of military aid that was being used in the Cypriot invasion (Kaplan, L. (1999), p. 228). 83 Kramer (2008), p. 237.

25

and strengthening its bargaining position.84 Meanwhile, strategic arms control agreements like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1972 SALT accords and the NATO allies proposed conventional manpower cuts contained in their 1973 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) proposal85 were decidedly mutual and balanced so as not to disrupt the balance-of-power. To the extent that American proposals seemed somewhat unilateral to Western Europe as apparently in the MBFR and SALT talks, many European leaders fretted that the Nixon administration was responding to conceptions of Americas own weakness and was reevaluating its commitment to Europe as it refocused resources on its own security.86 This sort of interaction would continue apace: the logic of strategic deterrence a strong component of neo-realism would be the primary feature of the Cold War until 1989. The dissolutions of the USSR and Warsaw Pact certainly did not lead to a repudiation of realist principles; indeed, recent examples provide ample evidence for the enduring logic of the security dilemma.87 In the summer of 2008, Russia invaded the Georgian breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following years of hostile exchanges between Moscow and Tbilisi and ethnic restiveness in the main combat zones dating back to the Soviet dissolution. While Moscow would dubiously claim that it merely acted to protect its own citizens residing in the regions and ethnic minorities from genocide, enforce various international agreements, and rebut Georgian aggression against its peacekeepers in the regions, the international community plainly understood, as Moscow undoubtedly hoped it would, that Russias invasion was intended to cool Westernization in Russias so-called near

84 85

McGinn (1999), pp. 111-138 The MBFR talks ultimately resulted in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in 1989. 86 Kaplan, L. (1999), pp. 65-71. 87 Herz (1951).

26

abroad.88 Earlier that year, the NATO council considered Georgia and a then-Western oriented Ukraine membership access plans (MAP) and most NATO allies (86%) recognized Kosovos sovereignty from Serbia, a move which drew Moscows ire owing to its own irredentist struggles in the Russian Caucuses inter alia. In the Russo-Georgian War, Moscow sought to remind the West that Russia would defend its national self-interest, and that the West should only make security guarantees it could keep. If Russia invaded Georgia if it were a full NATO member, would the West, as demanded by Article V, be willing to go to war to defend a pseudo-European country of 4.5 million? NATO, of course, could do nothing but accede to Moscows demands.89

3.2

Article II: A Constructivist Account90

The NATs Article II, so says the liberal constructivist historian, is the alliances most central. Article II mandates members to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being, including by coordination of international economic policies.91 An Article II history of NATO is by definition a counter-history: Most stories of the Cold War, both in the popular and scholastic domains, are Article V histories as in the last section. Yet, a number of convincing liberal constructivist

88 89

Medvedev (2008); Asmus (2010), p. 37. Medvedev (2008); Asmus (2010), pp. 215-230. 90 This section contains two episodes the Suez Crisis and the Three Wise Men, and the French withdrawal from integrated military command and the Harmel Exercise that I detailed in much greater length in an essay for the Diplomacy module. I have attempted to alter and summarize my accounts so as to produce original work here. 91 North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Article II.

27

accounts of events even during the Cold War have been written since constructivisms 1989 inception. Throughout its history, NATOs evolution has resembled the life of a species according to Darwin: It meets existentially-threatening predators and obstacles that force change which strengthen it and make it less vulnerable to future adversity. In this analogy, NATOs response to two Cold War events particularly the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1966 French withdrawal from integrated military command could be considered periods of punctuated equilibria. The evolutions during this period were decidedly consultative, institutionalizing, and liberal in their orientations. They undoubtedly assisted the alliance in surviving the Cold Wars end. The 1956 Suez Crisis was perhaps the greatest test of NATOs internal stability. Excepting the Cyprus conflict, no other event in NATOs history prompted such coercion among the allies one ally drafting a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the actions of another with the support of the Soviet delegation, refusal of oil aid, and even sabotage of another members currency.92 The Crisis was precipitated by the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 by the pan-Arab nationalist, President Gamel Abdul Nasser, and descended to crisis when Israel launched an unannounced attack on 29 October, shortly followed by a farcical Franco-British ceasefire declaration issued the next day, shortly followed thereafter by French and British forces joining the Israelis in invasion. France and the United Kingdom not only failed to consult the NATO or the US about the impending invasion, but had deliberately misled President Eisenhower himself, his

92

The US government caused the Bank of England to lose $50-million (US, about $400-million today) in two days and used its leverage to prevent the United Kingdom from obtaining an emergency assistance loan from the IMF. (Risse (1995), pp. 96-99.)

28

administration, and the US intelligence community.93 The bare Franco-British machinations, including but not limited to maneuvering at the UN Security Council to attempt to enforce the ceasefire, broke what the Americans thought were basic consultative norms and tacit understandings between the allies. The American administration acted quickly and coercively against Paris and, especially, London.94 Following the cessation of hostilities by the tripartite alliance and a generous loan provided by Washington to London thereafter, NATO rebuilt itself by making entrenched consultative procedures a further codified principle under the auspices of Article II. This solution penned by a working group officially known as the Committee of Three on NonMilitary Cooperation, comprised of the head delegates from Norway, Canada, and Italy, but better known as the Three Wise Men. The Committee recommended formal structures intended to improve strategic cooperation and to extend [it] in non-military fields95 and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community generally.96 The 1966 French withdrawal from integrated military command challenged the apparently-realist, Article V-centered premise of the alliance, and the solution was again derived from the principles put forth by the Three Wise Men. Until the mid-1960s, President de Gaulles ambitious plan to reconstruct France as a center of Continental power through Britain-less European integration,97 redevelopment of the French military, and, of course, recalcitrance towards Washington was restrained by the dangerous nuclear chess game between the two superpowers that culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis and lack of

93

Hendrickson (2007), pp. 98-114. Per Hendrickson: the British made specific requests to their French counterparts to avoid any NATO involvement. 94 Ibid.; Risse (1995), ch. 7, Cogan (1998), pp.100-122. Indeed, the only consultation that the tripartite alliance extended to Washington was intended to sow confusion. 95 i.e. political and economic 96 Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, (1956). 97 De Gaulle saw London, which pursued a bandwagoning bargaining strategy with Washington throughout the Cold War excepting Heaths administration, as a meddling influence in Europe. He famously referred to British and Americans collectively as les Anglos-Saxons.

29

its own nuclear weapons. The dtente that followed the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis undid this modus vivendi, unfreezing a panoply of French and European political demands.98 Crucially as well, France developed its own force de frappe in 1964. Meanwhile, as the Brandt-led Foreign Ministry in Bonn experimented with the first Ostpolitik diplomacy,99 Paris, emboldened by the thaw in Cold War tension, withdrew from NATOs integrated military command on 7 March 1966 and executed a display of provocative gestures an attempted run-around of the Alliance on German reunification, de Gaulles infamous Vive le Quebec libre speech in Montreal, etc. against its allies.100 NATOs solution was again more integration and consultation. The Johnson administration recognized that these developments prevented it from preempting any selective dtente emerging from Paris, Bonn, Moscow, or East Berlin; thus, Washington encouraged bottom-up solution, one written by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and informally dubbed The Harmel Exercise. The exercise, which examined all aspects of NATO cooperation and areas in which cooperation could be furthered, was a multilateralization of dtente, and institutionalized consultation on respective national goals and potential diplomatic efforts before their inception as official policy. The reports from the Harmel sub-groups, among other things, encouraged the NATO council to become an institutional clearing house that could further national political objectives by encouraging cooperation with fellow member-states:101 In practice [of diplomatic or dtente policy], flexibility should be allotted to each state, but they should keep their partners informed of their initiatives. The Atlantic Council should in this respect be a sort of Clearing House, so that the examination and discussion of new ideas is always possible It is necessarily true that the coordinated relationships between two groups of
98 99

Wenger, (2004), pp. 24-74. Coined during the Adenauer administration, Brandt would provide the contemporary meaning of the term when he himself became Chancellor in 1969. 100 Ibid.; Bozo (2001), pp. 103-219; de Gaulle (1967). 101 Wenger (2004), pp. 22-74.

30

powers are much more effective than those that could occur among scores of countries acting in an uncoordinated manner.102

NATOs survival and expansion provided the most obvious argument against the realist historiography. In quite stark opposition to realist predictions like those of Waltz and Mearsheimer, the USSR and Warsaw Pact dismantled peacefully from 1989 to 1991, and during that time a united Germany acceded to full NATO membership. That the former GDRs territory would become part of NATO as a non-neutral, non-demilitarized part of a united Germany was not a fait accomplit after the Berlin Walls fall; rather, it required a concerted diplomatic effort in the face of extraordinary risks viz. Moscow emanating from then-NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wrner and certain officials in Washington and Bonn.103 Indeed, not only did former East Germanys addition carry unforeseen risks that could have set off destabilizing chain reactions,104 but as part of the deal to unite Germany and bring it all under the NATO umbrella, the West was forced to make formidable concessions to Moscow. These included permitting Warsaw Pact troops to stay in the former GDR until 1994, banning German nuclear weapons development or procurement, and a cap on the Bundeswehrs troop strength ones that a realists prototypical foreign policy practitioner would reject outright.105 However, Western policymakers pushing for fullGerman inclusion in NATO indicated that they were motivated by the belief that German unification without full sovereignty over its national defense would be both unfeasible and inappropriate.106 NATO enlargements next rounds also relied upon the willingness of Western powers to risk important national security objectives with the Kremlin in pursuit of European

102 103

"Rapport Du Rapporteur Du Sous-Groupe 2" (1967), translated from the French by the author. Zelikow and Rice (1997), ch. 4; Zelikow (2011). 104 Even if the risks were increased by the slightest margin it proves my case here. 105 Zelikow and Rice (1997), pp. 341-342. 106 Zelikow (2011).

31

integration and normative goals. The first round of post-Cold War enlargement to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary invited in 1997 and fully acceded in 1999 can only partly be explained in defensive interests from those countries points of view. The three new members, whom had officially announced a joint campaign for full NATO membership in May 1992, less than a year after the failed Communist hard-liners coup in Moscow,107 had an obvious incentive to illicit concrete and codified security guarantees from NATO amid Eastward uncertainty; yet, pressing for NATO membership for the Visegrad three risked confrontation with a fragile and increasingly reactionary Moscow, one still armed with the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and Europes largest military. The West too was negotiating a gamut of top-priority diplomatic objectives with the Russians, still technically their strategic partners through the PfP, which included major nonproliferation efforts like the Comprehensive Test Ban and first two START Treaties, and later the Dayton Peace Accords that resolved the Bosnian war and created a joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping force.108 Yet, despite these considerable risks and despite that from a realist perspective, the US had the least to gain by the Visegrad members and the most to lose by virtue of geography, the Clinton administration pushed for and ultimately made NATOs enlargement possible. As administration-insider and prolific transatlantic politics scholar Ronald D. Asmus noted, When President Clinton embraced NATO enlargement, he did so as part of an effort to consolidate democracy and project stability to Central and Eastern Europe, not as a strategic response to real or imagined Russian threat to the region.109 Despite resistance by some members of the Western policymaking elite, Washington, three successive NATO Secretaries-General, and Berlin to a lesser extent successfully convinced their allies that NATO enlargement was necessary for the future of an integrated and democratic Europe.

107 108

Asmus (2002), pp. 16-17. Asmus (2002); Schimmelfennig (1998), pp. 198-234. 109 Asmus (2002), p. 296.

32

NATO would expand twice more in 2004 and 2009, including to two states Estonia and Lithuania that border mainland Russia among others.110

3.3

An Alternative Constructivist Account

In distinction from this standard, liberal constructivist account of NATO, culturalhistorical factors can also stir fear independent from material factors, spurring alliances to action. In this realist constructivism, such fears do not need a strategic justification or proof of intent; the existence of historical enmity and suspicions of nascent nationalism or militarism can be enough to spur allies to create formal, institutionalized military cooperation between themselves and feared future adversaries. Indeed, this interaction predates the 20thcentury; it was predominant alliance logic of the pre-World War II international society.111 This strategy also explains some NATO member-states actions in regards to the German question which plagued the alliance throughout the Cold War and perhaps continues to do so. The question cannot be explained in terms of the dyadic balance-ofpower, and while other realist theories could tolerate such a question, only a constructivist explanation with a cultural-historically-engrained fear of a resurgent Germany can adequately explain member-states behavior, particularly European ones. It was largely fear that drove the allies particularly the de Gaulle administration to reconstruct European security with an emphasis on regional rather than national security.112 This largely successful effort was built upon institutions such as the 1948 Western European Union and the 1951 European

110 111

Ibid.; Schimmelfennig (1998), pp. 198-234. Thies (2009), ch. 2; Jackson, Nexon, et al. (2004), pp. 337-352 112 A realist would of course counter that the regionalization of European security was a necessity in the face of expansionist Soviet ideology before Washingtons security commitment in the 1949 NAT.

33

Coal and Steel Community.113 The Attlee Labour governments Foreign Office even tinkered with the idea of a European third force that would stand independently between the two superpowers, indicating both the seriousness with which some viewed the German threat and the perceived value of cultural-political affinity amid institutionalization.114 Instead, the allies established NATO out of a necessity to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out, as Lord Ismay, the first Secretary-General, once reportedly quipped.115 While one might expect culturally-engrained fears of a resurgent Germany to dim in time, both Paris and London acted at times to prevent or stall German reunification. President Mitterrand, who warned that a reunited Germany might make even more ground than had Hitler, 116 and Prime Minister Thatcher, who supervised the release of a memorandum to the Foreign Office cautioning it of Germans inherent angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, [and] sentimentality,117 clearly found much to fear even in a mostly pacifist and demilitarized Germany. The West and united Germany too accepted institutional regionalism as post-Nazi atonement. The strong cultural distaste for nationalism and for militarism or even for the very idea of German military engagement still lingers in modern-day Germany.118 Even morally unambiguous humanitarian missions in the Balkans created fierce debates within Germany, as the Never again war! mantra encountered Never again dictatorship!119 Despite having the EUs largest population and economy, Germany has never built a bona fide military to match its size or economic strength, and it took care not to be seen bossing around their
113

The ECSC was a security instrument as it sought to ensure that Germany did not have unfettered access to the materials essential for rearmament. Per French Foreign Minister Schuman, it aimed to make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible (Green (2010), pp. 365 -377). The WEU was set up as a bulwark against further Soviet advances in 1948 before the signature of the NAT. 114 Schneer (1984), pp. 197-226. 115 While widely rumored, there is no concrete evidence that proves he did. 116 Powell (1990), p. 217; Zelikow and Rice (1997), pp. 114-134. 117 Chequers memorandum (1990) via Garton Ash (1990). 118 Berlins acceptance of a seemingly-endless stream of bail-outs for irresponsible Eurozone governments is but one example of a post-war cross to bear. 119 Zehfuss (2001), pp. 327-328. These words were some of Chancellor Kohls first to a newly-united Germany.

34

allies on the Continent until Eurozone fiscal irresponsibility challenged its fundamental economic interests in 2011.120 Germanys abiding fear of nationalism, and its subsequent refusal to re-militarize largely drives the spending deficits American officials like Robert Gates say threaten the alliance. In sum, the influence of culture and history can unite alliances by engrained fears as well as values, causing allies to create codified cooperation with erstwhile enemies even if they lack the means or desire to threaten allies.

Chapter Summary

Two primary visions of NATO one as a defensive alliance coalesced by fear of the East, one as an institution dedicated to cohesion through an institutionalization of cultural and historical links that stem from dominant accounts of AT have also prevailed as the most commonly told histories of the alliance. I also locate a third history based on realist constructivist cultural-strategic fears. All predict vastly different motivations for memberstates, and for NATOs external policies and thus its future. However, these accounts, while written of the same alliance and of the same period, share no common events and are thus incommensurable. This will be explored in the next chapter.

120

Germanys Economic Assertiveness Shakes Euro Zone, New York Times (2011).

35

IV. Synthesis: A Real-World Approach?

Chapter II outlines three schools of alliance cohesion and cooperation, while chapter III provides three accounts of NATOs history one drawn from realist IR theories, one from liberal constructivism, and one from realist constructivism. As stated in the methodology section in chapter I, this chapters end is to compare the theories validities with the historical accounts. However, institutionalism cannot be successfully tested in this historicalhermeneutic manner owing to methodological limitations, but is still surmised to affect NATO and its members to some degree based on its inherent internal strength. This leaves four potential rationales for NATO interaction, labeled balance-of-power (drawn from realism), institutionalized interests (from institutionalism), inculcated alienation (from realist constructivism), and normative consolidation (from liberal constructivism). These modes of interaction, as I call them, are weighed in hopes of finding a definitive schema of NATO relations.

4.1

History versus Theory in International Relations

When I asked Philip Zelikow, formerly of President George H.W. Bushs National Security Council (NSC) and instrumental in NATOs expansion to the former GDR, whether the NSCs positive recommendation for the 1990 enlargement had more to do with the dynamics of German, European, and transatlantic integration or with the Continental balance-of-power, he responded, I dont think anyone thought of it in those two terms people dont really think of foreign affairs in these stylized ways, with these schematic terms 36

that political scientists like so much.121 These political scientists might counter that states tend towards such goals without articulating them or without thinking of it in [these] terms, but then to what extent can they be said to be purposeful foreign policy objectives? Is it reasonable to presume that states pursue strategies not envisioned, perhaps according to some subconscious id or metaphysics? Insofar as they exist, the political scientists claims point to the Weberian dilemma of ideal-types: The one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and the synthesis of a great many diffuse [phenomena] arranged according to one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.122 Finding parsimonious narratives of AT requires the amalgamation of individual arguments into theoretical schools which can be systematically analyzed by regression to the most essential factors. As a functional subdiscipline of explanatory IR,123 AT also searches for general, enduring, probabilistic narratives or rules that can be derived from history or tangible properties ideal types that explain state and alliance behavior universally and eternally. This transformative process from individual argument to grand, dichotomous meta-narratives inevitably ends in some straw men and conflations, but is necessary to some degree to create schools of thought to compare and advance knowledge. Hoisting the mantle of the real unto themselves,124 realists created perhaps the greatest ideal-types tragedy. They invented a whole school of classical liberalism to describe a nave and actually imaginary cohort of early IR scholars inspired by Kant,

121

Zelikow (2011). Per Hendrickson (1999, p. 85): Much of the alliance literature remains solely at the theoretical level and does not aspire to 'bridge the gap' between theory and political practice. 122 Weber (1904), p. 90. 123 Explanatory IR as distinguished from critical IR, per se 124 Morgenthau (1948), p. 3.; Schmidt (2002), pp. 3-17.

37

Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations, or the Union of Democratic Control.125 Neorealists particularly exhibit a propensity to abuse classical philosophical sources like Leviathan, On War, History of the Peloponnesian War, and The Prince and even classical realist sources like Politics among Nations, conveniently taking arguments out of context to build holist narratives of how the world has always worked. Even forms of realism that accept variables unrelated to strategic power, such as Walts balance-of-threat theory or neoclassical realism,126 do not explain how they affect alliances, but merely accept them as part of an explanation. Thus, merely a cursory glance at NATOs alternative, liberal constructivist history rebukes the claim that realism can wholly encapsulate alliances generally or NATO in particular. Institutionalist and purely normative, constructivist theories fare no better. Institutionalisms predication on economic and other properties rather than history leaves this studys liberal-historical methodology ill-equipped to examine it;127 yet, other studies cast doubt on the institutionalists claims that institutions themselves prevent or predict certain types of alliance behavior. For example, in The EU and the European Security Order, Rikard Bengtsson notes that the formal grounds for engagement [between the EU and the US] common institutions are not at all as developed as is the case of Russia or the [European] neighbourhood countries128 Without the perception of community between Europe and the US, the institutionalization of NATO would likely have a much less palpable effect on members behavior.129 Meanwhile, pure normative theories that rely only on cultures role

125

Jackson (2009); Schmidt (2002), pp. 3-17. The Union of Democratic Control was a post-WWI British lobbying society dedicated, inter alia, to democratization, believing that democratic nations will never choose to war against each other (democratic peace theory). 126 Walt (1987), ch. 1. 127 This methodology does not arise out of a claim that liberal-historical studies are inherently better, but some limitation was necessary to meet the word limit. 128 Bengtsson (2010), p. 16. However, given NATO and formal US ties to individual member-states, this observation may not be as useful in describing the link between the US and Europe generally beyond the EU. 129 Ibid.

38

in international behavior are as inadequate in explaining the Article V account as the realist theories the Article II one. In short, when the effort to create parsimonious IR theories overrides the subtleties and subjectivities of the real world, one is left with one-dimensional accounts of NATO like those of chapter III. The realist and constructivist historiographies are convincing enough on their own terms. Ostensibly, they validate their respective hypotheses, demonstrating that historical events conform to their predictions. Realism accurately depicts NATOs response to the Korean War, the Prague Spring, some Nixon administration diplomatic efforts including arms control negotiations, and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War; while the Article II depiction is consistent with the Suez Crisis, French withdrawal from integrated military command and NATOs response to it, and NATOs survival and enlargement after the Cold War. Yet, if both the realist and Article II accounts of NATO prove valid on their own terms, then inherently the two cannot tell the whole story of NATOs perpetuation or alliance behavior. What is needed to make sense of alliances, then, is a theory that details under which conditions they and states within them act according to the logic of protecting against material security threats or normative goals. Though a seemingly obvious suggestion, it is one that IR has by and large neglected.130 A number of IR scholars suggest credible relationships between normative, institutional, and security goals that can be adapted fruitfully for AT. These relationships are usually expressed in meta-theoretical compounds formed out of two or more theoretical elements. Constructivism itself is such a compound in some ways. It has dominated IR since the early 1990s precisely because it synthesizes hitherto disparate theoretical aspects into a single articulation with its via media.131 Alexander Wendts Social Theory of

130 131

Hendrickson (1999), p. 85. Wendt (2000), pp. 165-180.

39

International Politics, the most popular account of constructivist theory and an IR modern classic,132 concurs with the neo-liberal and neo-realist premise that the international exists in a state of anarchy, but that interaction within anarchy takes place in three cultures: Hobbesian, a culture closely associated with classical realism wherein participants see counterparts as enemies;133 Lockean, a culture most associated with structural theories wherein participants see counterparts as potential rivals; and Kantian, a culture only associated with normative constructivism itself wherein participants see counterparts as friends.134 Constructivists, whom are predominately Kantian, have defined the alternative, Article II history of NATO as a Kantian endeavor. This matches their broadly Kantian research agenda, which responded to the mostly Lockean IR field of the 1980s.135 Wendt observes a teleology among these cultures such that Hobbesian culture must be internalized before Lockean, and Lockean before Kantian.136 In the Hobbesian culture, actors are Athenians or Melians: they coerce others or are coerced themselves into action, while Lockean actors make rational choices and Kantians strive for legitimacy. If nationstates are coerced into actions by threat of force, they do not inhabit a Lockean or Kantian culture, and if they only fulfill non-normative, rational self-interests, cooperation between them can only exist in a Lockean culture. Crucially for this study, states in Wendts hierarchy respond to the contemporary mode of international anarchy itself; thus, this essays goal of finding conditions under which NATO member-states will behave in an Article II or V

132 133

Winning the International Studies Associations Book of the Decade award Though neo-realism can be associated also with the Lockean sphere to the extent that actors join alliances as free-willing agents, per se 134 Wendt (1999), ch. 6. Kantianism can be said to be associated with constructivism itself because the constructivist research agenda has been defined by insisting on the role of norms in international relations. 135 Wendts Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian international society is actually borrowed from Martin Wights English School account (Wendt (1999), p. 247). 136 Wendt (1999), ch. 6. In another piece (Why a World State is Inevitable, 2003, pp. 490 -451), Wendt clarifies more explicitly that this hierarchy is teleological.

40

manner cannot be immediately realized by Wendts schema. In sum, this study searches for a synchronic explanation of international culture, but Wendts account is teleological.137 Constructivists who often incorporate a synthesis of multiple ideal-types of international interaction have also themselves created a new ideal-type debate that adds to the prospect of fulfilling my proposed criteria, but again the immediate product falls just short. A 2004 forum in the International Studies Review explored constructivisms internal divides, finding liberal and realist constructivists divided over whether power can be, in any way, transcended in international politics.138 This Habermas-versus-Nietzsche debate over the possibility of the ideal speech situation,139 in which parties come together without any pretense of power to elucidate the best solution to a given problem, is a major fault line in constructivism as it was in previous great debates of IR. As in Wendts three cultures of anarchy, proponents of the two sides premise their arguments on the nature of IR or international culture itself rather than relations between a given state and its fellows or organizations. Power, in other words, either defines the whole international and all that which occurs in its realm or none of it. Being able to discern when relationships among NATO member-states are defined by power, ideas, or values would be a valuable contribution towards the research question, but again the existing literature appears too committed to generalities to provide such a contribution.140

137 138

Wendt (2003), pp. 490-451. Jackson and Nexon (2004), p. 338. 139 Though obviously the debate has not always been presented in these terms, antecedents of it can be found in Greek antiquity. 140 Jackson, Nexon, et al. (2004), pp. 337-352

41

4.2

An Anti-Foundationalist, Integrative Account of NATO

Particularly during the Cold War but even in the constructivist examples above, IR has largely focused on creating grand narratives accounts of world politics based on differing metaphysical, foundational golden rules that permeate everything in the international domain. IRs ideal-type binaries define global interaction by material facts or by social constructs, interests or values, agency or structure, unitary states or sub-state units, etc. Such foundationalist accounts of the international rarely reflect the ways policymakers or citizens understand international events as such theoretical grand narratives cannot reflect the subtle, ordinary narratives of ordinary political life. On the other hand, answering my research question without reference to some sort of theory, even if only understood as an imprecise unifying concept, will likely prove equally unproductive. Without some sort of theory, one has no way of making hypotheses, guiding research, or even asking potentially productive questions.141 Advocating for an antifoundationalist approach to the NATO question is not to suggest that policymakers have no general expectations about other actors or an idea of what they doing but rather to advocate for the same common-sense criteria actually employed by policymakers. This approach accepts that there is no unifying epistemic force in the universe to which all sets of rules conform, and evidence of its promise can be widely seen in the natural sciences. The natural sciences have often proceeded with two completely different ways of viewing the same objects, even when both are drawn from internally valid explanations. In this manner, the photon and wave theories of light are analogous to the Article II and Article V accounts of NATO. While both describe the same object, it is sometimes more
141

Bhaskar (1986).

42

useful to explain light as a like-element (photon) rather than a wave; similarly, it is sometimes useful to explain NATO as an integrative, consultative, or cultural-politically driven entity rather than a defensive one, and sometimes vice versa. This possibility of one object existing amid two understandings or explanations often seems irksome to scholars in the social sciences, but natural science has embraced it productively one need only look to this computer-processed document or any product of post-industrialization for evidence.142 Abandoning the false premise that IR must abide by foundational laws while maintaining constructivisms insistence that material forces are shaped by social meaning thus results in a more adaptable, integrative theory of NATO. Incorporating multiple theories that correspond to diverse epistemologies, the integrative account can infer four distinct modes of interaction synthesized from individual strands of IR theory: 1) balance-of-power, 2) institutionalized interests, 3) inculcated alienation, and 4) normative consolidation. Balance-of-power refers to the allies propensity, when in danger, to abandon social politics in lieu of protection. At these moments, Article V seemed to define NATOs logic. The 1949 Korean War rallied the still-recovering allies around the United States. The allies ignored the Prague Spring because actions to stop it could have provoked a total war with the Warsaw Pact despite that inaction abandoned an apparently-democratizing nation to brutal Soviet suppression. The Nixon administrations arms control negotiations and other diplomatic initiatives failed in part because the allies mistook the administrations efforts as a sign of weakness. NATO refused to intervene in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War because the allies could not consent to an open confrontation with Russia over a strategicallyinsignificant, tiny country in the Caucuses. In times where member-states perceived increased strategic threat, they eschewed politics and sought defensive alignment against Moscow.

142

Kuhn (1962), pp. 148-152; Feyerabend (1975), pp. 1-28.

43

Article II seems to embody NATOs actions when the NAAs safety is not fundamentally threatened, but either normative consolidation drive towards political community or inculcated alienation political action based on engrained enmity or fear can result. The Three Wise Mens solution to the Suez Crisis was not an insistence on the Soviet threat the USSR, after all, cooperated with the US at the UN to bring the Tripartite invasion to an end but on intra-alliance consultation, including on non-military matters. Paris withdrawal from integrated military and Ostpolitik corresponded with dtente, which permitted smaller powers to engage Moscow and bargain with Washington without undermining their own security. Member-states campaign to enlarge the alliance after the Cold War largely owed to value-rational commitments rather a resurgent Russian threat, particularly in the case of the US. In times where member-states perceived diminished international danger, their interactions were defined in greater part by values. Meanwhile, institutionalized interests appear as a constant and part of a feedback loop that exponentially increases cooperation. In the first instance, normative consolidation, inculcated enmity, or balance-of-power first create cohesion which allies codify in agreements like Strategic Concepts, the Harmel and Three Wise Men reports, or various military accords. This codification then increases institutionalization among the allies, encouraging a division of labor, two-level bargaining, and other rational forms of interconnectedness. Thus, while cooperation owing to the other modes of interaction ebb and flow, institutional interests appear to be constantly maintained or increased.

44

Chapter Summary

Maintaining alliances is a sufficient condition of 1) costs of decreased institutionalization measured in real or political capital (institutionalized interests), 2) fear of a non-member power (balance-of-power), 3) fear of future threats by a member and potential adversary or historical enmity (inculcated alienation),143 or 4) desire to consolidate political community (normative consolidation). Among these modes of interaction, 3 and 4 are inversely related to 2: external threat perceptions judged in terms of power-endowing materials or those and intents as well quell value-driven behavior. At times of increased Soviet power or aggression, external threat perceptions drove stronger institutionalization, while at other times allies responded to socially- rather than materiallyderived motivations. All the while, cooperation propelled by the other modes of interaction also drove institutionalized interests, creating a positive feedback loop of integration.

143

Which, in the case of NATO (e.g. Germany, Greece, and Turkey), is determined by historically-inculcated values.

45

V. Evolution or Decay?

As aforementioned, some theory, however approximate or simple, is necessary for actors to make histories out of otherwise arbitrary sequences of events. The traditional, ideal-type alliance theories detailed in chapter II provide useful accounts of international behavior, but none that can be deductively proven superior by historical analysis. Additionally, chapter IIIs historiographies are internally valid but would be mutually exclusive if matched with a foundationalist epistemology demanding singular alliance theories. This indicates that an integrative theoretical synthesis is most apt in explaining and understanding NATOs life. Some already-extant accounts, namely constructivism, already utilize such a synthesis, and thus ostensibly show promise for the research question; however, a proper reading of NATOs history demonstrates the need to distinguish between distinct types of interaction among the allies, not multiple types of world polity that stem from metaphysical, foundationalist dogmas of how power really operates in the international. Having modified the most popular constructivist theory offered by Alexander Wendt in Social Theory of International Relations with an anti-foundationalist commitment that transforms the cultures of anarchy views of world polity into ones that describe differing relationships between states and also adding a fourth mode of interaction derived from realist constructivism, this chapter proceeds to utilize the understandings augured by this theory to assess recent predictions on and recommendations for NATOs future.

46

5.1

Two-Tiered NATO: A Strategically Irrelevant Alliance

As mentioned in the introduction, Robert Gates recently warned of NATO becoming a two-tiered alliance in which members unwilling to provide requisite military assets would render it meaningless. Gates made the remarks amid a particularly embarrassing European showing in the Libyan conflict, noting among other things that the mightiest military alliance in history is only eleven weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference.144 If such things persist, Gates argues, the alliance will be led to collective military irrelevance,145 likely leaving hard conflicts to be waged entirely by small, ad hoc coalitions of NATO allies. Such complaints about European contributions to NATO amid the post-Soviet demilitarization of the Continent which, it should be noted, included the Conventional Forces of Europe (CFE) Treaty which intentionally decreased European military assets, though it is no longer in force have been rife since the Cold Wars end. One study, Gates notes, estimates that defense spending in Europe decreased by fifteen percent since the Cold Wars end,146 but even only three years after that end, Barbara Conry of the major, libertarian Cato Institute think tank called NATO a transatlantic military welfare program.147 In 2010, the prominent US House of Representatives Democrat Barney Frank attacked US contributions to NATO, claiming that they serve no strategic purpose for US national security. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence J. Kolb echoed his comments,

144 145

Gates (2011). Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 Conry (1995).

47

urging the US to rethink the whole idea of NATO.148 In his speech, Gates too added that he had worried openly about NATO becoming a two-tiered alliance in the past, but that now this is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today.149 While Gates observation of European shortcomings in NATO defense contributions is indisputably true, to complain that NATO is becoming a two-tiered alliance invites the false impression that NATO was ever anything but a two-tiered alliance. Indeed, Western powers intentionally created the two-tiered, post-war transatlantic security structure as discussed in section 3.3 to protect Europe from the Warsaw Pact while maintaining German fealty and military inferiority. German military spending is also a product of post-war German values that are inexorable from its complex national/regional identity.150 Germany, of course, is not the only member to fall below NATOs basic defense benchmarks, and the already-threadbare defense budgets of most other NATO members are likely to decline further as austerity grips Europe in the financial crisis wake. However, strictly speaking, if multiple tiers were to be the cause of NATOs collapse, it should have come long ago. With no serious threats to fundamental Euro-Atlantic interests or security, a shifting emphasis to a policing, intelligence, and special forces-led security posture to confront nonstate threats such as terrorism and piracy, a US military that still retains huge asymmetrical advantages over its nearest rivals,151 war fatigued Western constituencies including that of the US, and European debt crises that could well result massive austerity measures, Washington is up against intractable odds in convincing its European partners to increase their defense budgets. Yet, even despite this, NATO will still be capable of carrying out its core operations collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security as
148

Barney Frank: Cut NATO Spending, It Serves No Strategic Purpose, Huffington Post, 27 December 2010. 149 Gates (2011). 150 See Maier (1997). 151 Quadrennial Defense Review (2010).

48

set forth in the 2010 Strategic Concept. While collective defense will suffer from defense austerity, NATO will still enjoy huge asymmetrical advantages over any country that might be stupid enough to invade bona fide NATO territory thanks to the United States. Meanwhile, NATOs ability to conduct crisis management and cooperative security is largely dependent on diplomatic skill and the efficacy of NATO member-state coordination, not material resources. NATOs institutionalized political structure alone has proven invaluable for these tasks and in security-beneficial consultation with out-of-area states, particularly in counterterrorism and nonproliferation. Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski suggested in Foreign Affairs that NATO also form a formal joint council with the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative,152 and more crucially, current Secretary-General Rasmussen has aggressively pushed for formalized NATO-Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ties, a move only blocked by Secretary Clinton over concerns of legitimizing the fledgling Moscow-based alliance.153 Such high profile endorsements of greater roles for NATO consultation suggest that prominent policymakers see potential for the alliance even when only engaging in diplomacy, presumably without much expenditure. The possibility to realize interests through cooperation alone is sufficient for maintaining the alliance, thus making NATOs strategic irrelevance a remote possibility.

152 153

Brzezinski (2009), p. 19. U.S. Blocking NATO-CSTO Cooperation, Eurasianet.org, 12 February 2011. Whether the CSTO is an alliance in any meaningful sense is a subject for another paper.

49

5.2

EU-NATO: An Alliance of Alliances

Amid the recent fracases over Libya and Afghanistan and Western austerity measures, some have suggested institutionalized EU-NATO cooperation as a means of improving consultation and capabilities while decreasing costs. The EU already operates European Union Forces (EUFORs) under the auspices of the Common Defense and Security Policys (CDSP) EU Military Staff (EUMS). EUFOR operations are currently under way in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), Chad and the Central African Republic (Tchad/RCA), Congo-Kinshasa (DR Congo), and Union members are embroiled over a potential EUFOR Libya.154 Small compared to NATO, CDSP has largely limited its role to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; however, even this minute military force is an important expression of European identity. Though a European Community/EU military arm has existed since the 1948 Western European Union (WEU), it came to the forefront in the late 1990s for a number of reasons, including lagging European capabilities revealed during the Kosovo operations, French President Chiracs channeling of the Gaullist legacy, enforcement of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, and allegedly-confusing signals sent by the late-Clinton and early-George W. Bush administrations. In essence, European identity and the evolution of the EU as a true supernational body called for the creation of a US-independent, EU security body with peacekeeping and crisis management in mind.155 Of course, NATOs post-Soviet military engagement particularly in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and likely soon in Libya has largely been peacekeeping. Sarwar Kashmeris NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete?, a much-hyped recent and timely addition to the NATO
154 155

Foreign Ministers Wary of EU Military Role in Libya. EU Observer.com, 12 April 2011. Cornish and Edwards (2002), pp. 587-603; Missiroli (2002), pp. 10-26; Kashmeri (2011), pp. 146-157.

50

literature, makes a case that NATO could use the CDSPs expertise and flexible military capabilities, and that institutionalized EU-NATO cooperation would help both alliances economize and promote efficiency. Kashmeri points out that only six EU members are not NATO members156 and only seven NATO members are not EU members.157 Additionally, the majorities of both the North Atlantic and CSDP Councils are appointed by the same heads of state, both are run by military committees comprised of officials from most of the same defense ministries, and both are headquartered in Brussels. More importantly still, NATO and the CDSP rely on the same pool of military assets, sometimes necessitating some members to economize between cooperation with NATO or the EU, and both are funded by the same taxpayers. Clearly, the institutional utility of such a project is not in doubt.158 Yet, despite international accords and calls for greater cooperation from governments, prominent NGOs like the Atlantic Council, and even members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,159 potential common-sense cooperation between the two alliances has fallen victim to cultural-historical proclivities. Formal EU-NATO cooperation has been blocked both by Euro-Gaullists bent on building regional identity by blunting American influence in Europe, and by Greece, Cyprus, and especially Turkey, which engage in a hostage taking game between the two organizations and as a result are unable to partake in the sensitive information sharing that would be necessary for such cooperation.160 In an era of increased threat to the North Atlantic Area, the EU and NATO might be forced to cooperate, but short of such a development, NATO and CDSP formal cooperation has not extended far beyond

156 157

Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden Albania (which is well on its way towards EU accession and now party to the Schengen agreement), Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the US 158 Kashmeri (2011), pp. 131-157. 159 Lindley-French (2008); Kashmeri (2011, Kashmeri is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council); NATO -EU Operational Cooperation (166 DSCTC 07 E bis), NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007. 160 Ibid., Specifically, Istanbuls refusal to recognize Cyprus and to join the PfP.

51

the rather weak Berlin-plus agreement.161 While clever diplomacy may be able to broach greater EU-NATO cooperation, a truly integrated EU-NATO is unlikely to come to pass in anything short of an unlikely, major defense crisis. After all, an Atlanticist vision for the EU is almost oxymoronic.162

5.3

Global NATO: A Global, Liberal Democratic Alliance

An alliance self-confessedly based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law should ostensibly be willing to accept liberal democratic members from out-of-area regions so long as it does not bring existing members fundamental security interests into question.163 Post-Cold War security debates have largely rested on confronting transnational threats and instability, a development seized by the allies to begin a series of formalized out-of-area cooperative arrangements like the 2004 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the Gulf states and the 1994 the Mediterranean Dialogue with a number of Middle Eastern states. NATO also designates Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea as special contact countries, and maintains special dialogue with a number of European, non-NATO states through the PfP. Some thus contend that extending formal membership to some of these countries is a logical next step. NATO acting as a bona fide collective of liberal democratic states would lend legitimacy to its operations, though public deliberations over who is and is not a democracy could prove provocative. The initial prospects, nevertheless, appear promising: global liberalism has done away with many old

161

Wessel (2001), pp. 405-444.; Missiroli (2002), pp. 10-26; NATO-EU Operational Cooperation (2007); Kashmeri (2011), pp. 131-157. 162 2013 Note: I now think that this section is overstated (and was at the time). Subsequent conversations with NATO and EU staff have convinced me of this fact. 163 NATO Strategic Concept, (2010).

52

concepts bound by traditional geography, and perhaps traditional, geographically-bounded collective defense could be next. One proponent of an open-door policy for out-of-area states able to meet NATOs accession requirements is if now only formerly or in secret (or if his position has changed) Ambassador Ivo Daalder, the current US Permanent Representative to NATO. Along with fellow NATO expert James Goldgeier, Daalder (before he was Ambassador) writes in Foreign Affairs that admitting out-of-area liberal democracies will increase NATOs core competencies, bolster its international legitimacy, and renew its purpose.164 Daalder and Goldgeiers insistence that a shared commitment to common values should be a more relevant determinant of membership than geography coincides with constructivist predictions of alliance behavior.165 Perhaps unfortunately then, in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the allies explicitly prohibited such memberships, restricting the open-door policy to all European democracies.166 Daalder and Goldgeiers agenda is reasonable, and the theory presented in this study leaves little recourse for explaining why NATO has not become even more global; however, expansion has never been a simple process even in the post-Soviet era, as members confront a different configuration of the same variables. The contact countries New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and particularly Australia, which contributed significant contingents of ground troops to the Second Gulf and Afghanistan wars are the obvious contenders for out-of-area membership. In the case of Japan, the allies would likely be committing an unwarranted provocation to regional balance, risking dangerous confrontation North Korea, Russia, and China, and also getting little in return owing to Japans pacifist constitution and lack of a genuine military. South Korean enlargement would carry the same risks to different degrees,
164 165

Daalder and Goldgeier (2006), pp. 105-113. Ibid., p. 111. 166 NATO Strategic Concept, (2010).

53

though the potential strategic reward could be higher. Australia and New Zealand were both once formal alliance partners in ANZUS, a US-centered military alliance, but it was dissolved de facto after New Zealand prohibited the United States from docking nuclear submarines at its ports in 1974.167 As in NATO, perceptions of lacking global threat can actions based on normative consolidation or inculcated alienation. Crucially, Daalder and Goldgeier also omit that the Euro-Atlantic coordination, however, is based on other cultural understandings than liberal democracy, including a long history transatlantic relations and community. Neither the US nor Europe can be so sure of their footing on other continents not knowing how regional powers might react. Additionally, not everyone concurs with the authors claim that geography has lost its importance. Zelikow, for one, contends that geographic proximity added impetus to NATOs intervention in Libya.168 Even discounting these uncertainties, Daalder and Goldgeiers observation that international society now witnesses an era of unprecedented low-strategic threat does not necessarily translate into a political rationality for alliance enlargement. 169 It can be a boon to alliance membership due to the normative consolidation principle, as in NATOs postSoviet enlargements, or a bust due to the inculcated alienation principle, as in French withdrawal from integrated military command.170 Nevertheless, the Global NATO vision one committed to formal expansion to out-of-area states is a feasible if difficult goal given NATOs current challenges and incentives.171

167 168

Edstrom et al. (2010), ch. 1; Daalder and Goldgeier (2006), pp. 105-113. Zelikow (2011). 169 Risse in Cooperation among Democracies (1995) also makes the false equivocation. There are a deeper ties in the Euro-Atlantic area that bind the US and Europe closer than the UK and Bolivia, for example. 170 Daalder and Goldgeier (2006), pp. 105-113. 171 Ibid.

54

Chapter Summary

Three recent visions for NATOs future a two-tiered NATO of strategic irrelevance, an EU-NATO containing an Atlanticist vision for the EU, and a Global NATO of global, liberal democratic membership are reviewed. While NATO may be losing capacities, it is unlikely to ever lose enough capacity to become strategically irrelevant. NATO has always been a two-tiered alliance, yet it has always maintained some sense of purpose even during internal crises due to institutionalized interests from diplomatic cooperation in addition to any other coalescing modes of interaction. The EU-NATO vision conforms to the normative consolidation and especially the institutionalized interests principles, but is likely an intractable one owing to the inculcated alienation of Eurocentrists and parties in the ongoing Cyprus affair. Global NATO is the most realistic of the visions presented in this chapter; however, there is little pertinent history to weigh its driving and potentially resisting political and strategic forces. Though Global NATO is rife with potential benefits, deep uncertainties surround its feasibility.

55

VI. Conclusions

The possibility that various actors conceptualize alliances in different or even multiple ways is undoubtedly commonsensical; yet, despite evolving simultaneously with historys most successful alliance, IR has largely failed to develop an alliance theory capable of encapsulating it. Notwithstanding the inherent distortions of ideal-type debates and the varied purposes of a discipline not always aiming for holist explanations, the confluence of arbitrary epistemological dogmas and selective histories in much alliance and IR literature have not generated a synthesis convincing enough for policymakers, only an incoherent mass of incomplete explanations. This paper attempts to provide such a synthesis in an integrative but multidimensional alliance theory sewn from existing strands of international thought. Realist, institutional, and constructivist schools lend themselves to credible and internally-valid accounts of NATOs history or interactions, but they are incommensurable. Rather than attempting to deduce and advocate for a universal theory of NATOs essence, discounting history and other complexities as need be, this paper relates multiple historically-derived theories in a multi-layered hierarchy. This integrative approach maintains a critical realist commitment to the powers of both material forces and social interaction even beyond that of popular constructivist accounts. It accepts that some interactions will be more materiallydriven and some more socially-driven, and that multiple types of interaction can inhabit the same conceptual or real space. This study infers from history how the theoretical strands within the hierarchy relate, predicting certain types of behavior and structural change. Four modes of interaction balance-of-power, institutionalized interests, inculcated alienation, and normative consolidation are located in alliance behavior. In the generative 56

histories presented in chapter III as well as chapter Vs contemporary histories, they are seen to interact with a high degree of historical consistency. In the presence of threatening events like the Korean or Russo-Georgian wars or arms races, NATO members temporarily jettison normative behaviors as in the inculcated alienation or normative consolidation modes, instead rallying around materially-founded fears, Article V, and usually the United States. In periods of dtente, these normative considerations were unfrozen, and allied interaction corresponded with Article II, democratic consultation, and socially-founded concerns both inculcated fears and normative goals. Meanwhile, both types of interaction necessitated greater integration, and with it a progressive institutionalization of interests and responsibilities that would be too costly to dismantle today. The would-be expense of such re-nationalization is in itself a compelling reason that NATO will persist, but others see more elaborate futures for the alliance. Robert Gates recently warned that NATO could be in the beginning stages of an international decline, a claim this paper disputes owing to the still-asymmetrical American strategic capacities, NATOs two-tiered history, the nature of post-Cold War threats, cultural entrenchment, and NATOs political utility in meeting the challenges posed by its new missions. Gates is obviously correct that the alliances force capacity will be reduced, but in the absence of a serious balance-of-power concern, the preponderance of evidence stemming from other modes of interaction appears to support the claim that NATO will endure in some, likely important capacity. Another prominent new vision for NATOs future lies in building formal ties with the European Union, creating an alliance of alliances that would benefit institutionalized interests. However, there exists neither a sufficient balance-of-power threat nor sufficient benefits from institutionalized interests to overcome inculcated alienation stemming from the Cyprus conflict and Euro-centrism (2013 though increased informal cooperation remains promising). The most realistic vision for the alliance is Global NATO, 57

one enlarged to include out-of-area liberal democracies. With the potential to reap great benefit from global normative consolidation in the face of untraditional, transnational threats, this vision is also plagued with uncertainties. It possesses the ability to violate inculcated alienations of allies sometimes only on the periphery of Euro-Atlantic history as well as the balance-of-power in unfamiliar theaters. Plausibly, NATO could take small steps in any of these directions, but equally so, it could remain as it does today. The debates surrounding NATO bring into sharp relief the gap between international relations theory and practice. IR, whose founders sought to deter policymakers from idealist naivet and thus global chaos, now largely proceeds with some outstanding exceptions as if policymakers are inconveniently complex components of the sacred practice of academic theorizing. Inter alia, this paper has attempted to demonstrate the promise of international theory when imbued with history and decoupled from its traditional obsession with parsimonious, timeless, and universal truth. It instead advocates conceptualizing alliance behavior in an integrative way that accepts complexity. With its many histories and principles, NATO is inherently complex. As it continues to break the supposed-rules international relations, parsimony will be forced to yield to history and complexity.

58

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel (2002), Constructivism and International Relations, in Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE), ch. 5. Adler, Emanuel and Michael N. Barnett (1998), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge UP) Asmus, Ronald D. (2002), Opening NATOs Door (New York: Columbia UP). Asmus, Ronald D. (2010), A Little War that Shook the World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Barney Frank: Cut NATO Spending, It Serves No Strategic Purpose, Terkel, Amanda, Huffington Post, 27 December 2010. Bengtsson, Rikard (2010), The EU and the European Security Order: Interfacing Security Actors (London: Routledge). Bhaskar, Roy (1986), Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. (London: Verso). Bozo, Frdric (2001), Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance. Trans. Susan Emanuel. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield P). Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2009), An Agenda for NATO: Toward a Global Security Web. Foreign Affairs 88.2, pp. 2-20. Chernoff, Fred (1995), After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor, MI: U Michigan P). Cloud, David S. Gates Hits NATO Allies Hard. The Baltimore Sun, 11 June, 2011. Nexis UK (accessed 4 July, 2011). Cogan, Charles C. (1998), "From the Politics of Lying to the Farce at Suez: What the US Knew." Intelligence and National Security 13.2, pp. 100-122. Conry, Barbara (1995), The Western European Union as NATO's Successor. Cato Institute (report), 18 September 1995. Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards (2001), Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture. International Affairs 77.3, pp. 587-603. Daalder, Ivo H. (2011), Who Needs NATO? We All Do. New York Times, 17 June 2011. Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier (2006), Global NATO. Foreign Affairs 88.2, pp. 105113. Deutsch, Karl W. et al (1957), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP). Donnelly, Jack (2000), Realism in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).

59

Duffield, John S. (2001), Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. International Studies Perspectives 2, pp. 93-115. Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt (2008), Realism, in Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens eds., The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 4th ed.). Evans, Peter B., Harold Karan. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California, 1993. Print. Feyerabend, Paul (1975), Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (London: Verso). Foreign Ministers Wary of EU Military Role in Libya. EU Observer.com, 12 April 2011. Gaddis, John L. (1986), "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System." International Security 10.2, pp.99-142. Gardiner, Neil, Europe Must Heed Defense Secretary Gates Warning on the Future of NATO. The Foundry (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation (blog)), 2011. Garton Ash, Timothy (1990), The Chequers Affair. The New York Review of Books, 27 September. Gates, Robert. "Speech to the Security and Defense Agenda: The Future of NATO." Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), US Department of Defense. Gates Says US, European Allies are Slowly Growing Apart, but Final NATO Split not Imminent. Associated Press, 15 June 2011. de Gaulle, Charles, Vive le Quebec Libre! 24 July 1967. <http://www.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DOHzMTSK1V4o&ei=SZhXTpCdFoi38gOEr Z2aDA&usg=AFQjCNE8Kq2wKzhIM9CIPpT_sVY00Ph0Qg> Goldgeier, James, We Need New Partners. New York Times (blog), 14 June 2011. < http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/14/can-the-europeans-defendthemselves/nato-needs-to-recruit-beyond-the-atlantic > Green, David M. (2010), Has Europe Solved the Problem of War? Explaining the Long Peace of the Post-1945 Era. European Review 18.3, pp. 365-377. Edstrm, Hkan et al. (2011), Utility for NATO Utility of NATO? in eds. Edstrm, Hkan et al., NATO: The Power of Partnerships (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), ch. 1. Haas, Ernst B (1964), Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford UP). Haglund, David G. (1994), Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and Policy Dilemmas. International Journal 50.3, pp. 651-674. Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996), Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44.5, pp. 936-957. Hendrickson, Ryan C. (1999), The Enlargement of NATO: The Theory and Politics of Alliance Expansion. European Security 8.4, pp. 84-99. 60

Hendrickson, Ryan C. (2007), The Miscalculation of NATO's Death. Parameters: The US Army's Senior Professional Journal, pp. 98-114. Herz, John H. (1951), Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: U Chicago P). Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed, NATO, 2 October 2011. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_18504.htm?selectedLocale=en> Jackson, Patrick T. (2009), Lecture 10, Liberal Constructivism. Audio Recording, available from iTunes U. Jackson, Patrick T., Daniel H. Nexon, et al. (2004), Bridging the Gap: Toward A RealistConstructivist Dialogue. International Studies Review 4, pp. 337-352. (This source is a forum edited by Jackson and Nexon within a journal with multiple contributors with contrasting viewpoints). Jervis, Robert (1980), The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24.4, pp. 563-59. Joyce, James A. (1969), End of an Illusion (London: George Allen and Unwin). Kaplan, Morton A. (1966), The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations. World Politics 19.1. Kaplan, Lawrence S. (2004), NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. (Westport, CT, USA: Praeger P). Kashmeri, Sarwar A. (2011), NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete? (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books). Keohane, Robert O. (1984), After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton UP). Keohane, Robert O. (1993), Institutionalist Theory, Realist Challenge. in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia UP). Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1974), Transnational Relations and International Organizations. World Politics 27.1, pp. 39-62. Kissinger, Henry (1954), A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). Knorr, Klaus (1959), NATO and American Security (Westport, CT: Greenwood). Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: U Chicago P). Kuus, Merje (2007), Love, Peace and Nato: Imperial Subject-Making in Central Europe. Antipode Lebow, Richard N. (2003), The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge UP). Leffler, Melvyn P. (1984) The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48. The American Historical Review 89.2, pp. 346-381.

61

"Libye : les Etats-Unis demandent leurs allis de plus s'investir dans l'OTAN." Le Monde, 11 June 2011. Lindley-French, Julian (2008), The Future of NATO-EU Relations. Remarks to the Reforming NATO for the 21st-Century Conference, Atlantic Council. <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/future-nato-eu-relations> Liska, George (1962), Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP). Maier, Charles S., The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP). McCalla, Robert B. (1996), NATOs Persistence After the Cold War. International Organization 50.3, pp 445-475. McGinn, John G. (1999), The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO's Response to the Prague Spring. Journal of Cold War Studies 1.3, pp. 111-138. Missiroli, Antonio (2002), EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP. Security Dialogue 33.1, pp. 9-26/ Mearsheimer, John. Back to the Future. International Security 15.1 (1990), 5-56. JSTOR. Medvedev, Dmitri, Press Statement following Negotiations with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Periodicals Archive, Kremlin.ru, 12 August 2008. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). Politics among Nations. (New York: Knopf). The North Atlantic Treaty (1949). NATO at the Crossroads after Gates Speech. Associated Press, 12 June, 2011. NATO-EU Operational Cooperation. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2007 Annual Session, Rep. 166 DSCTC 07 E bis. NATO Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, NATO, 19 November 2010. Oest, Kajsa J.N. (2003), The End of Alliance Theory? (Copenhagen: Institut for Statskundskab Arbejdspapir, Copenhagen University). Patomaki, Heikki, and Colin Wight (2000), After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism. International Studies Quarterly 44.2, pp. 213-237. Pierson, Paul (2000), Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review 94.2, pp. 251-267. Pollack, Mark A. (2004), The New Institutionalisms and European Integration. in Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez, eds. European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford UP), ch. 7. Powell, Charles. No. 103: Letter from Mr. Powell (No. 10) to Mr. Wall. 20 January 1990. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_09_09thatcher_unification.pdf>

62

Putnam, Robert D. (1988), "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-level Games."International Organization 42.3, pp. 427-460. Quadrennial Defense Review, US Department of Defense, February 2010. "Rapport Du Rapporteur Du Sous-Groupe 2." Rep. NATO, 1967. Harmel Report. NATO Archives, May 1999. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995), Cooperation Among Democracies: the European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton UP). (Risse is formerly known as RisseKappen). Rose, Gideon (1998), Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51.1, pp. 144-172. Schimmelfennig, Frank (1999), NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation. Security Studies 8.2, pp.198-234 Schmidt, Brian C. (2002), On the History and Historiography of International Relations, in Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE). Schneer, Jonathan (1984), Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945-49. The Journal of Modern History 56.2, pp. 197-226. Sprecher, Christopher and Volker Krause (2006), Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Peace Research 43.4, pp. 363-369 Steel, Ronald (1964), End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe. (New York: Viking). Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, (1956). Thies, Wallace J. (2009), Why NATO Endures (Cambridge: Cambridge UP). U.S. Blocking NATO-CSTO Cooperation, Joshua Kucera, Eurasianet.org, 12 February 2011. Wallace, M.D. (1973), Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cutting, and International War, 18151964: A Measurement Procedure and Some Preliminary Evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 17.4, pp. 575-604. Walt, Stephen (1987), The Origins of Alliances. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP). Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill). Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993), The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security 18.2, pp. 44-79. Watt, Donald C. (1986), British Military Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat, 1945-1949. in Josef Becker and Franz Knipping eds., Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.). 63

Weber, Max (1904), Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy. in trans and ed. Shils, Edward and Henry A. Finch, Methodology of Social Sciences: Max Weber (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), ch. 2. Weitsman, Patricia A. (2004), Dangerous Alliances. (Stanford: Stanford UP). Wendt, Alexander (1999), Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP). Wendt, Alexander (2000), On the Via Media: A Response to Critics. Review of International Studies 26, pp. 165-180. Wendt, Alexander (2003), Why a World State is Inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9.4, pp. 491-542. Wenger, Andreas (2004), "Crisis and Opportunity: NATOs Transformation and the Multilateralization of Dtente, 19661968." Journal of Cold War Studies 6.1, pp. 22-74. Wessel, Ramses A. (2001), The EU as a Black Widow: Devouring the WEU to Give Birth to a European Security and Defence Policy. in V. Kronenberger, ed., The EU and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (The Hague: T.M.C.Asser Press), ch. 17. Wingfield, Kyle, NATOs Future: Let Europe Bear the Cost of Defending Europe. AtlantaJournal Constitution (blog), 16 June 2011. <http://blogs.ajc.com/kylewingfield/2011/06/16/natos-future-let-europe-bear-the-cost-of-defendingeurope/?cxntfid=blogs_kyle_wingfield>. Wheatcroft, Geoffrey, Who Needs NATO? New York Times (blog), 15 June, 2011. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/opinion/16iht-edwheatcroft16.html?pagewanted=all> Zehfuss, Maja (2001), Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. European Journal of International Relations 7.3, pp. 315-348. Zelikow, Philip. Interview with the author (recorded with permission). 12 July and 12 August, 2011. Zelikow, Philip and Condoleeza Rice (1997). Germany Unified and Europe Transformed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP).

64