Está en la página 1de 6

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

JANET D. MCDONALD,
JAMES B. STEGEMAN,
PLAINTIFFS CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO: 07CV11398-6
V

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et., al.,


DEFENDANTS

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF MR. STEGEMAN’S INVOCATION OF HIS


RIGHTS UNDER AMERICAN’S WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TITLE II
____________________________________________________________________________

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs to file Judicial Notice of Plaintiff Mr. Stegeman’s

Invocation of His Rights Under American’s With Disabilities Act, Title II. Plaintiffs

Verified Complaint provided this Court with documentation of Plaintiff Mr. Stegeman’s

disabilities. Mr. Stegeman is a member of a protected class, recognized by The ADA,

Social Security Act, and Georgia Supreme Court’s Equal Access to Justice. Having been

denied Federally funded State programs and statutory protection, Mr. Stegeman is a

disabled pro se litigant. Judge Duffey’s Order Granting Appeal in Forma Pauperis

further shows that Mr. Stegeman is disabled, see Exhibit A.

ADA TITLE II

The Supreme Court in Lane upheld Title II as “valid § 5 legislation as it applies to

the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services” 541 U.S. at 331. The

Supreme Court further held that Title II enforces rights under the Equal Protection

Clause, as well as “a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, and infringements”


as well as an array of rights subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-523; accord

Constantine, 411 F.3d at 486-487. “Mere negative attitudes alone cannot justify

disparate treatment of those with disabilities” University of Ala. V. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

367 (2001).1

A. The Due Process Clause/Equal Protection

Failure to notify of a Motion to Compel hearing is a violation of the Due Process

Clause. With neither the Plaintiffs names, nor the names of the Defendants or their

attorneys showing on a Motion Calendar, there can be no “actual knowledge” of a

hearing. Further, Plaintiffs never requested a Motion to Compel hearing as defendants

and this Court suggests. See Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2003)

“There can be no doubt that, at a minimum, the Due Process Clause


requires notice and the opportunity to be heard incident to the
deprivation of life, liberty or property” Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57 (1950).

And it is equally clear … must provide the requisite notice and


opportunity for a hearing ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner’” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 90, 92 S. Ct. 1983,
1994, 1999, (1972)

The Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative obligation upon States to take

such measures as are necessary to ensure that individuals, including those with

1
A purported rational basis for treatment of the disabled will also fail if the State does not accord
the same treatment to other groups similarly situated, id at 366 n.4.; City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-450 (1985), based on “animosity”, Rmoer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996), or if it simply gives effect to private biases, Palmer v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).

2
disabilities, are not deprived of their life, liberty, or property without procedures affording

“fundamental fairness”. Lassiter v. Department Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).

Before privately owned real property can come under jurisdiction of a Court, there

has to be a seizure of the property under State and Federal statute, especially property for

public use. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-54, 114

S. Ct. 492, 501 (1993) concluding that the right to maintain control over one’s home is “a

private interest of historic and continuing importance”; and that the interest in one’s home

“merits special constitutional protection” United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto

Parts, Inc. 971 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1992).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the seizure of property is necessary to

secure an important governmental or public interest” Feuntes at 91, 92 S. Ct. at 2000. It

is clear that Georgia statute mandates the seizure of real property to bring it under

jurisdiction of the Court,2 without which this Court has no jurisdiction. This Court’s June

11, 2008 Order is Void on its face.

States are required to afford individuals with disabilities, fair proceedings when

denied access to benefits or programs created by state regulations and polices. The

Supreme Court found that “Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive

unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, including

systematic deprivation of fundamental rights,” Lane, 541 U.S. at 524. The Lane Court
2
O.C.G.A. §§ 44-2-72 (e) After the sheriff or his deputy has entered upon the land, posted the
notices provided for in subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section, and made his return to the
court as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, the land shall be deemed to have been
seized and brought into the custody of the court for the purposes of this article; and the court's
jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem shall attach thereto for purposes of land registration
proceedings under this article.

3
found that the record included “a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the

administration of justice,” 541 S. Ct. at 255.

Title II prevents invidious discrimination3 and unconstitutional treatment in the

day-to-day actions of state officials exercising discretionary powers. See Hibbs, 538 U.S.

at 736 (“lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case

basis”).

Judges Edmondson, Hull, and Forrester in Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692 (11th

Cir. 2007) held that “disparate treatment occurs when a disabled individual is treated

differently than a non-disabled or less disabled individual” 42 U.S.C. §12112(b).

PRO SE LITIGANTS

Both Plaintiffs file Judicial Notice of the invocation of both their Rights as Pro Se

litigants It has long been held that the pleadings of pro se litigants are to be held at less

stringent pleadings than those of attorneys.

"Picking v. Pennsylvania Railway, (151 F2d. 240 Third Circuit Court


of Appeals . In Picking, the plaintiffs civil rights was 150 pages and
described by a federal judge as "inept." Nevertheless, it was held :
"where a Plaintiff pleads pro-se in a suit for protection of civil rights,
the court should endeavor to construe plaintiffs pleading without
regard to technicalities."
In Walter Process Equipment v . Food Machine 382 U.S . 172 (1965)
it was held that in a "motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the
complaint are taken as admitted." "From this vantage point, courts are
reluctant to dismiss complaints unless it appears the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief' (See Conley vs. Gibson, 355 U .S. (1957);
In Puckett v. Cox, it was held that a pro-se complaint requires less
3
Invidious discrimination (in-vid-ee-әs). Discrimination that is offensive or objectionable, esp.
because it involves prejudice Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. West Group, pg. 480

4
stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer (456 F2d. 233) (1972
Sixth Circuit U.S .C .A.) said Justice Black in Conley v . Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 at 48 1957 "The Federal Rules rejects the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision the merits ."
According to rule 8(f) FRCP "all pleadings shall be construed to do
substantial justice." The Court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds
that "all pleadings shall be construed to do substantial justice ."

"It could also be argued that to dismiss a Civil Rights action or other
lawsuit in which a serious factual pattern or allegation of a cause of
action has been made would itself be violative of procedural due
process as it would deprive a pro se litigant of equal protection of the
law visa vis a party who is represented by counsel . In a fair system,
victory should go to a party who has the better case, not better
representation."4

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs demand that their Rights be protected, the Georgia and United States

Constitutions be honored, that State and Federal laws be upheld and that the entities that

have sworn an Oath of Office, honor that Oath.

Respectfully submitted, this 24th day of February, 2009

By: ___________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se

By: ___________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF DEKALB COUNTY


STATE OF GEORGIA

4
U.S. Law Books : Pro Se Federal Decisions

5
JANET D. MCDONALD,
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, CIVIL ACTION
PLAINTIFFS
FILE NO: 07CV11398-6
v

GEORGIA POWER CO., et., al.,


DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby Certify that I have this 24th day of February, 2009 served upon
Defendants a true and correct copy of Judicial Notice of Plaintiff Mr. Stegeman’s
Invocation of His Rights Under American’s With Disabilities Act, Title II. by depositing
with U.S.P.S. First class mail, proper postage affixed and mailed to Defendant’s counsel
on record as follows:
Troutman Sanders, LLP
Brian P. Watt
5200 Bank of America Plaza
600 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216
By: ______________________________
JANET D. MCDONALD, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782

By: _______________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd.
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737