JUAN B. ALEGRE VS THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS G.R. No.

L-30783 August 27, 1929

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. He applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, but was denied. He was advised by the respondent that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board. So he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the authority vested in the Fiber Standardization Board is a delegation of legislative power. RULING: NO. The Legislature has enacted a law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp before they can be exported to other countries and the creation of a board for that purpose, vesting it with the power and authority to do the actual work.

Such authority is not a delegation of legislative power and is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board or commission. The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.

PAZ M. GARCIA VS HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR. A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971

FACTS: Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of

Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court was a newly created CFI branch and it had to be organized from scratch. Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, space for his courtroom, other items and supplies must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so. Forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be charged for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, gross incompetence, and violation of RA 296 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

RULING: Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has

never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function. In this case, government officials or officers in duty are bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice for the reason that He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in his favor. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by

mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded. It is of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS CELEDONIO AGRAVA G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 FACTS: On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and therefore the act of requiring members of the

Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law. On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled (a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys. (b) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x

In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself which provides: The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as

representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe

the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison: SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination given by the patent office before he could be allowed to practice law is the said office. 2. Whether or not appearance before the patent office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law. 3. Whether or not director of the patent office is authorized to conduct an examination for patent attorneys is contrary to law.

RULING: The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an

examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.

Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

MAXIMO CALALANG VS A.D. WILLIAMS, ET AL. GR NO. 47800 December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along

Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of

Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of

Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila ISSUES: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or

all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

CENON S. CERVANTES VS AUDITOR GENERAL G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1942

FACTS: Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00. NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949. This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year. b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void. 2. Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional. RULING: 1. R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. 2. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. 3. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs.

DIGESTED CASES

A Report Submitted to ATTY. JAMALODEN BASAR

In Completion of the Requirement in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

By SUHAINE ARINDIG-SANI ABDULGANI

October 25, 2012