TRA SCE DE TAL U ITY

Paul Gerard Horrigan

2009

TRA SCE DE TAL U ITY COPYRIGHT 2009 Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.

CO TE TS

1. The ature of the Transcendentals 2. Transcendental Unity 3. Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being 4. Transcendental Unity is ot Quantitative Unity 5. Aquinas Criticism of Avicennas Reduction of Transcendental Unity to Predicamental Unity 6. Transcendental Unity and Being 7. The Classes and Degrees of Unity 8. Individual Unity and Universal Unity 9. Unum Accidentale Aggregative Unity 10. Unum Accidentale Relational Unity (Unity of Order) 11. Unum Accidentale Artificial Unity 12. Unum Per Accidens Accidental Unity (or Unity of Substance and Its Accidents) 13. Substantial Unity (or Unity Between the Metaphysical Principles of the Substance) 14. The Unity of Simplicity: Absolute Divine Simplicity (The Simplicity of God) 15. The Supreme Unity of God

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1. The ature of the Transcendentals Being itself, which is analogical and not univocal, is a transcendental in the sense that it rises above all divisions and categories. Being, in fact, is the first of the transcendentals.1 Owens writes that in the first cause, being is a nature. In all other things, being is present not as a nature nor part of a nature but as a participated act. Being, accordingly, is found in all things whatsoever. It is predicable of them all. It is not confined to any one of the Aristotelian categories. Rather, it runs through all the categories and extends beyond them to their first cause. In the sense of both climbing across and climbing beyond it may be said to transcend all the categories. It is therefore called a transcendental predicate.2 But what are the transcendentals of being? They are, explains Sullivan, other ways of saying being, of describing characteristics of being that are coextensive with being but which the concept of being itself does not make explicit. They are so many ways, in other words, of saying what all beings whatsoever infinite or finite, actual or possible manifest in common.3 The transcendentals of being are transcendental modes of being, convertible and coextensive with being.4 They are, explains Wallace, coextensive with being; in them being manifests itself and reveals what it actually is. Just as being is never found without such properties, so these are inseparably bound up with one another in the sense that they include and interpenetrate each other. Consequently, according to the measure and manner in which a thing possesses being, it
Studies on the transcendentals: J. RICKABY, General Metaphysics, Benziger, London, 1890, pp. 93-165 ; D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1938, pp. 443-475 ; C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1948, pp. 131-217 ; H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, pp. 168-192 ; G. P. KLUBERTANZ, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1955, pp. 186-209 ; R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, volume 2 (Metaphysics), The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1957, pp. 174-179 ; D. J. SULLIVAN, An Introduction to Philosophy, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1957, pp. 206-216 ; J. E. TWOMEY, The General otion of the Transcendentals in the Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1958 ; R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1959, pp. 167-203 ; R. JOLIVET, Metafisica (Ontologia e Teodicea), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, pp. 82-113 ; G. BERGHIN-ROS, Ontologia, Marietti, Turin, 1961, pp. 75-139 ; H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 48-103 ; H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1967, pp. 119-152 ; P. B. GRENET, Ontologia, Paideia Editrice, Brescia, 1967, pp. 243-260 ; J. DE TORRE, op. cit., pp. 118-125 ; J. OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1985, pp. 111-127 ; T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 129-172 ; B. MONDIN, Il sistema filosofico di Tommaso d Aquino, Massimo, Milan, 1992, pp. 107-123 ; L. ELDERS, La metafisica dellessere di san Tommaso dAquino in una prospettiva storica: (I) Lessere comune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp. 62-169 ; G. VENTIMIGLIA, Il trattato tomista sulle propriet trascendentali dellessere, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica, 87 (1995), pp. 51-82 ; J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996 ; B. MONDIN, Ontologia, Metafisica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1999, pp. 221-241. 2 J. OWENS, op. cit., p. 111. 3 D. J. SULLIVAN, op. cit., p. 207. 4 H. D. Gardeil explains that because they are as universal as being itself, the transcendental modes are spoken of as convertible with being, so that in a proposition where being is the subject and one of the common modes the predicate (or vice versa), we may interchange them. If, for example, being is one, then the one is being, with no shift of meaning (H. D. GARDEIL, op. cit., p. 121).
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partakes of unity, truth, goodness; and conversely, according to the measure and manner in which a thing shares in these properties, it possesses being. This ultimately implies that subsistent being is also subsistent unity, truth, and goodness.5 The transcendentals of being are certain supreme modes or attributes necessarily connected with every being, different aspects of the same fundamental being, but not explicitly contained in the concept of being as such.6 These transcendental modes are called transcendental inasmuch as they are not confined to the categories or classification of being, but are rather found in all, affecting each and every conceivable being; they transcend, or go beyond all the categories. When we use transcendental7 here when talking about the transcendental modes of being we refer to that which can be predicated of being as such and therefore of every being. The transcendental properties of being are modes which pertain to being universally and necessarily, to every being without exception. When we say properties here we do not refer to properties in the strict sense, for then they would express something that is extrinsic to the nature of being, which is impossible. Rather, we mean properties in the wide sense, as inseparable from being and designating it under another aspect.8 Transcendentals are not just notions but also realities identical with being, and flow from the act of being (esse) and therefore can be attributed to all things that are. They are not realities distinct from being but are aspects or properties of being. In reality, the transcendentals are identical with being, but as regards human knowing, they are conceptually distinct, and cannot be synonymous with the notion of being, as they express aspects which are not expressly signified by the notion of being.9 The transcendentals are convertible and interchangeable with being in reality, but gnoseologically speaking, though they are interchangeable as predicates of the same subject, they are nevertheless distinct notions. The notions of one and something add a negation to the notion of being. One negates a beings internal division and something

W. WALLACE, op. cit., p. 91. Precisely as essentially given with being, these determinants are called its essential attributes; as transcending all particularities in the order of being, they are called transcendentals; and as belonging to everything whatsoever, they are designated as the most common determinants of all things. Finally, their denomination as properties of being establishes their connection with the fourth of the predicables, i.e., property or proprium, with the following consequences: (1) these are not synonyms for being, but rather characteristics that add something to being and are of necessity found with it; (2) neither are they accidents, such as properties usually are, but rather determinants that are formally identical with being; (3) these properties do not actually arise out of being; being is their foundation, and is otherwise identical with them it is not their principle, therefore, and certainly not their cause; and (4) the distinction between being and its attributes is a distinction of reason reasoned about; although the distinction originates in the mind that understands or reasons, it has a foundation in reality because the attributes either manifest what being is or add something to it(W. WALLACE, op. cit., p. 91). 7 Short histories of the term transcendental: H. KNITTERMEYER, Der Terminus Transzendental in seiner historischen Entwicklung bis su Kant, Marburg, 1920; C. FABRO, Il trascendentale tomistico, Angelicum, 60 (1983), pp. 534-558; L. ELDERS, op .cit., pp. 62-64. 8 Robert Kreyche notes that when we speak of the transcendental properties or transcendental attributes of being, properties or attributes are taken in the broad sense, as referring not to certain genera of being, but to being as such (R. KREYCHE, op. cit., p. 169). Henry Koren explains that strictly speaking, the term property applies only to predicates which are consequent on a genus or a species. Since being is neither a genus nor a species, it should be clear that the term is used here in a wider sense to indicate a predicate which is not identical in concept with being but flows from it of necessity (H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 49). 9 Cf. R. TE VELDE, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1995, p. 55.
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negates the identity of one thing with another. The transcendentals truth (verum), goodness (bonum), and beauty (pulchrum) add a relation of reason to our notion of being. The distinction between the transcendental modes of being and being itself is formally considered a logical distinction. However, we cannot say that it is purely logical since being presents various aspects to the mind of the person who examines it. We can say that it is a virtual distinction, that is, it is a distinction that has a basis in reality, even though the terms of the distinction are not really distinct. Also, if one of the terms (e.g. being) implicitly contains the knowledge of the others (e.g. one, true, good, and beauty), the distinction before us is a minor virtual or a minor logical distinction. Let us explain virtual distinction again. A real distinction is a distinction that exists independently of ones mind, pertaining to elements of reality of which one is not actually the other or others. A logical distinction or a distinction of reason exists only in the mind. It is but a product of mental activity, occuring when the mind forms different concepts of what in itself is simply one. On the other hand, we have what is called the virtual distinction which is a distinction of reason which has a foundation in reality. If there be not a foundation in reality, the distinction of reason is a product of the mind pure and simple; it is a purely logical or verbal distinction. This is not the case with the distinction of the transcendentals from being, for while not real, it nevertheless has a foundation in reality. It is a virtual distinction. But let us be even more precise as regards the virtual distinction. There are two types of virtual distinctions: major virtual distinction and minor virtual distinction. In a major virtual distinction the concepts distinguished may be such that one contains the other or others only potentially (as genus the species). In a minor virtual distinction one concept contains the other or others actually but not explicitly (as analogue does the analogated perfections, and being the transcendental properties or attributes). This latter, the minor virtual distinction, regards the type of distinction of the transcendentals from being. Every being can be considered in itself absolutely or in relation to others. As regards being in itself, one could consider it affirmatively (as such, it signifies an essence or thing [res]) or negatively (as undivided being, that is, as one [unum]). As regards being in relation to others, being has two opposite attributes: 1. Its distinction from all other beings, and 2. Its conformity with certain other things. 1. Being in its distinction from all other beings can be said to be something (aliquid) ; 2. As regards being in its conformity with certain other things considered in relation to the intellectual soul (as it encompasses being as such) we can say that (a) Being, in its conformity with the intellect, is true (verum) ; (b) Being, in its relation to the will, is good (bonum) ; and (c) Being, in its conformity with the soul through a certain interaction between knowledge and rational appetition, is beautiful (pulchrum). Of the six transcendental notions of being, four of them are more basic and apply to God as well as to creatures; they are unity, truth, goodness, and beauty.10 Regarding the enumeration of the transcendentals of being, Sullivan, working with the text of Aquinas De Veritate, explains that we can first consider the mode of being expressed by each being absolutely, taken just by itself. In this way the mode of being expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be
10

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 134.

predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence. To express this the term thing is usedthere is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by one. For the one is simply undivided being.11 Instead of considering every being absolutely, we can also consider the mode of being expressed by every being relatively, according, that is, as it is considered in relation to something else. Here again there is a twofold distinction. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinction is expressed by the word something, which implies, as it were, some other thing. For just as being is said to be one in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be something in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in Aristotles De Anima, is in some way all things. The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is that which all desire. True expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known.12 Some philosophers would put in a further addition to being this point, namely, beauty, as the splendor of all the transcendentals together. Beauty implies according to St. Thomas a simultaneous relation to both intellect and will. It relates to the will according as it gives pleasure. It relates to the intellect according as it implies a kind of knowledge. Beauty, in short, is good considered under a special relation according, that is, as it is known.1314 2. Transcendental Unity There is a difference between transcendental unity (or transcendental one) and predicamental unity (or predicamental one), based on the accident quantity. In his Commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas explains that one is spoken of in two ways, viz., the one which is the principle of number, and the one which is convertible with being.15 In ordinary conversation, when we talk about one, what is referred to is one as the principle of number, i.e., as the mathematical unit measurement, which is a predicamental unity rooted in the accident quantity. As such, this one of common everyday speech can be applied only to things in which there is quantitative measurability. This predicamental one is limited to quantified things and cannot be the one which is referred to being qua being. In short, we must carefully distinguish between predicamental one (or quantitative unity) and transcendental one (which is the unity of being as being). Aquinas writes: The unity and number which the mathematician considers is not
11 12

De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1. Ibid. 13 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1. 14 D. J. SULLIVAN, op. cit., pp. 207-208. 15 In I Sent., d. 24, a. 1, a. 3, ad 4.

the unity and the multitude which is found in all beings, but merely [unity and number] according as they are found in material beings.16 Though it is true that all unity is negation of division, we should note that apart from division which flows from the accident quantity, there is a division which transcends the genus of quantity namely, division by formal opposition, which is not concerned with any quantity. Hencethe unity which excludes such a division must needs be more universal and more comprehensive than the genus of quantity.17 This unity which the Angelic Doctor refers to in his De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7, is none other than transcendental unity or transcendental one. Now, the plurality which is opposed to predicamental or categorical unity is not the same as that which is opposed to transcendental unity (or transcendental one). Plurality opposed to predicamental unity is called number (two, three four, five, six, seven, etc.), while the plurality opposed to transcendental unity is termed multitude. In Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 3, St. Thomas notes that every plurality is consequent upon a division. Now division is twofold. One is material and according to division of the continuous; and this division results in number, which is a species of quantity. Hence number in this sense is found only in material beings, which have quantity. The other division is formal and according to opposite or diverse forms; and this division results in multitude, which does not belong to a genus but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided into one and many. Only this kind of multitude is found in immaterial beings.18 Transcendental one does not add any positive reality to being, the way predicamental one which is the principle of number does, belonging to the genus of quantity: If the one added any positive reality to being, just as white adds a positive reality to man, it would follow that any thing is one by something else; since this thing again would be one we should have to go on to infinity if this, in turn, would be one by something else. Accordingly, we must say that the one which is convertible with being does not add anything real to being.19 Transcendental one is not a purely negative concept, for a purely negative concept is a concept which does not posit anything but merely denies something. Transcendental one, however, always implies a subject which is one. Therefore, although transcendental one means being undivided, it does not signify merely this indivision, but it signifies the substance of being together with indivisionHence the one which is convertible with being posits being itself and adds to it merely a negation of division.20 So we must say that transcendental one is not purely negative for it implies being as its subject. Every being is one or intrinsically undivided. St. Thomas gives proof of this assertion in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1, c., stating: Now every being is either simple, or compound. But what is simple, is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity
16 17

In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7. 18 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 33, a. 3. 19 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1. 20 De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7.

as it guards its being.21 Therefore, one and being are convertible terms. Gilson writes: One does not add anything to being: it is only the negation of division; for one means undivided being.22If a being is simple, it is one and, by the same token, it is a being. If a being is composed of parts, so long as its parts are not united, it is not yet one, and, by the same token, it is not yet a being. After its parts have joined in composing it, there arises, at one and the same time, a being and a unity; but if, at a later date, its component parts again divide, their compound loses both unity and being. Being and one stand or fall together. For everything there is no difference between preserving the unity and preserving the being of any given thing. In this sense, the being of anything consists in its indivision, and this is the reason why it is said that one is convertible with being: unum et ens convertuntur.2324 Although one and being are convertible, they are not synonymous, for synonymous terms signify one and the same thing under the same respect; one and being are convertible as things which really are the same, but they differ in concept only, inasmuch as one adds a negation to being.25 3. Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being In the Fourth Book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle treats of three very important themes that, together, make up the structure of a demonstrative science: the subject of the science, the attributes that necessarily belong to that subject, and the principles of demonstration. After having established in IV, 1 that metaphysics is the science of being qua being, the Stagirite then proceeds to deal with the one as a per se attribute of being. One is essentially the same as being, and although we do not apprehend them in one concept, they are of one nature by reason of an occurring correlation.... For one human being is the same as an existing human being and a human being; there is also no difference in meaning between two formulated expressions: there is one human being and there is one existing human being. It is obvious that no separation occurs here either in generation or in the process of corruption. The same is also true, therefore, of unity. It is also clear that despite the explicit mention of unity in the above formulations, the meaning remains the same, i.e., that unity is not anything other than being. Moreover, everything, insofar as it is a substance, is one, and not in an accidental way, but it likewise constitutes some definite being in the proper sense. Consequently, there are exactly as many species of unity as there are varieties of being.26 In the beginning of this passage (1003b 22-25)27 we find the Aristotelian formulation of the two features that characterize the relation between between transcendentals: real identity and
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1, c. Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 E. GILSON, Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, p. 158. 25 Cf. In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3. 26 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV, 1003b 22-34. 27 Edward Halper translates 1003b 22-23 as: Being and One are one and the same nature because they follow each other, but not because they are made clear by the same formula... His sources are the translators of Aristotles Metaphysics C. Kirwan and Ross. Halper has because they follow each other, while Kirwan has follows from each other, (Aristotles Metaphysics: Books , , and E, translated with notes by C. Kirwan, Clarendon Aristotle
22 21

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conceptual difference. This transcendentalist reading of the passage, that the words being and one signify properties that are possessed in common by all things and are connected with each other in an essential way, is maintained by the medieval commentators on the Philosopher, as well as the majority of modern day Thomists.28 On the other hand, there are those, like C. Kirwan,29 who retain that the passage expresses the identity of the extensions of two terms, that One and Being are either properties that happen to belong to all things in common or they are merely terms that happen to be used for all things. Professor Edward Halper of the University of Georgia retains that neither positions are tenable, and presents a third way, stating that Aristotle is not merely identifying the extension of these terms, he is not identifying the kinds of One with the kinds of Being, nor is he asserting the convertibility of two terms or of two characters that are common to all Ones and Beings. He is rather connecting a particular kind of One with a particular kind of Being. The basis for this convertibility is that both are caused by essence, though this is not made clear until Z-H. If this conclusion is correct, convertibility is less profound than other interpretations make it, but also less mysterious and more in line with metaphysical views Aristotle expresses elsewhere.30 Halper makes the effort to differentiate Aquinas transcendentalist interpretation of 1003b 22-23, from the Aristotelian doctrine regarding the convertibility of being and one contained in that passage. For the Angelic Doctor, there is an identification between transcendental Being as existence and transcendental One as undividedness. The former is common to all the per se ways of Being and the latter is common to all the per se ways of being One. Since these characters are non-categorical, they do not add anything to any particular individual. As Aquinas puts it, they signify the same thing but according to different concepts.31 On his view, the passage quoted at the beginning (1003b 22-23) asserts the convertibility of two transcendentals with the help of a third transcendental, thing.32 Convertibility is thus a relation of transcendental natures, and it is the consequences of these natures.33 Does the doctrine of the transcendentals (in the way St. Thomas and the Scholastics formulate it) play a role in the Aristotelian doctrine of the convertibility of the one and being? In particular, does the Aristotelian doctrine of the convertibility of the one and being depend upon the doctrine of transcendentals ? Halper says no. Though the argument for the convertibility
Series, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980) while Ross has implied in each other, (Aristotles Metaphysics I, Oxford 1924). Halper believes that both Kirwans and Ross translations are possible, noting that Aristotle does use the phrase in logical contexts. However, there is no reason to assume that the present passage intends to assert a logical connection between One and Being. The phrase could signify mere conjunctions as it does at De Anima 425b6-9 and also possibly later in 2 at 1004a6. Thus, it seems best to choose a translation that could refer to logical implication but might also signify a looser connection. My translation, follow each other, satisfies this criterion. (E. HALPER, Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being, The New Scholasticism, 59 [1985], p. 213). 28 E.g.: . GILSON, Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, pp. 159, 335 ; H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1967, pp. 128-139 ; B. MONDIN, Ontologia, Metafisica, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1999, p.227. 29 Aristotles Metaphysics, translated with notes by C. Kirwan, Clarendon Aristotle Series, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 82. Kirwan speaks of One and Being as having the same truth conditions. 30 E. HALPER, op. cit., p. 227. 31 In Metaph., lect. 2, n. 553. 32 Ibid. 33 E. HALPER, op. cit., p. 220.

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between being and one in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1 draws on the relations of transcendentals, Halper writes that Aristotles arguments do not depend upon them but on identity of extension. The only case where there might be suspicions that Aristotles argument relies on transcendentals is the argument of I, 2 that the essence of One is the essence of each thing (1054a 18-19). The first chapter of Book I describes the essence of One as potentially all of the per se Ones (1052b 7) by which Aristotle might mean that it is a character common to all of them, and part of his definition of the essence of One is undividedness (1052b 16). It seems, therefore, that the essence of One is transcendental One34 in which case transcendental One does appear in an argument for convertibility. However, this inference is faulty. The essence of One that Aristotle defines in I 1 is the essence that is closer to a word (1052b 5-7). But there is another essence of One. This essence of One is not a word but a thing; it is the particular per se Ones (1052b 11-14). The argument for convertibility that refers to the essence of One must intend to signify this second essence of One. For the argument asserts the identity of the essence of One and the essence of each thing, and such identity would make no sense if the essence of One were something closer to a word. The essence of One in this argument must be the essence that is a thing. But it is the essence of One that is closer to a word that is a candidate for transcendental One. Thus, even if Aristotle does intend to assert the existence of transcendental One in I 1, it is not this One that he refers to in the only argument for convertibility that could conceivably rely on transcendental One. We can conclude that Aristotles arguments for convertibility do not rely on transcendental One.35 Halpers anti-transcendentalist conclusion is that, since Aristotles arguments supporting convertibility do not depend on transcendental One, it is certainly unlikely that the Stagirite interprets the doctrine of convertibility as a relation of transcendentals. Other arguments that Halper presents to seal the fate of the transcendentalist interpretation are: (1) the convertibility of transcendentals is a more profound and significant doctrine than these arguments would indicate, and (2) transcendental interpretations of convertibility require the introduction of senses of One and Being that Aristotle does not discuss at length, if at all.36 Before giving a final verdict as to whether Aristotle and Aquinas were of the same mind as to the convertibility of the one and being, let us first examine the two arguments that Aristotle gives for the convertibility of the one and being immediately after the passage of 1003b 22-23, in 1003b 26-32 and 32-33. The first argument (1003b 26-32) is the following: For one human being is the same as an existing human being and a human being; there is also no difference in meaning between two formulated expressions: there is one human being and there is one existing human being. It is obvious that no separation occurs here either in generation or in the process of corruption. The same is also true, therefore, of unity. It is also clear that despite the explicit mention of unity in the above formulations, the meaning remains the same, i.e., that unity is not anything other than being. Here, the Philosopher argues for the convertibility of one and being based upon linguistic considerations subsequently confirmed by physical evidence. Such expressions as one man, being man, and man are the same. The addition of the terms one and being does not express something different from the nature of man. Such a
34 Halper notes that this is the interpretation of Aquinas in In X Metaph., L I, n. 1936. But then he goes on to say that this is an erroneous interpretation of the mind of Aristotle. 35 E. HALPER, op. cit., p. 221. 36 E. HALPER, op. cit., p. 222.

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conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the process of generation and corruption. When a man is generated, being man is generated, and at the same time one man. From this, it is clear that one is not something other than being, for any two things identical with one and the same thing are identical with each other. Aristotles second argument for the convertibility of one and being (1003b 32-33) is this: Everything, insofar as it is a substance, is one, and not in an accidental way. Interpreting this passage using the metaphysics of the Philosopher, we find that if being and one are not predicated substantially of a thing but by means of something added, there occurs an infinite regress, because being and one would have to be predicated also of that which is added. Are being and one predicated substantially or accidentally ? If the latter be the case then the same question would arise again, and so on to infinity. Therefore, the first position must be the correct one, namely, that the substance of a thing is one and being through itself. From these two arguments Aristotle draws the conclusion that there are as many species of one as there are of being. One and being are found in all the categories. They run through all of them. As being is so divided into the categories, so the one is diversified. Unity in the category of substance is the same. Unity in the category of quantity is the equal. And unity in the category of quality is the similar. Later on in Metaphysics X, ch. 1, Aristotle states that the ratio of one is indivisible or undivided. One is a negative term; it adds something conceptual to being.37 Should the Aristotelian doctrine of the convertibility of the one and being be interpreted in the transcendentalist sense, as St. Thomas does, and as do modern day Thomists like Gardeil, Gilson, and Mondin do? Aertsen is more cautious about such uncritical, wholehearted endorsements, though he does not go over to the Halperian anti-transcendentalist camp. The Dutch Thomists view is that In his two arguments for the convertibility of being and one, Aristotle does not really clarify the ontological foundation of this interchangeability. The first argument is based upon linguistic considerations which are confirmed by referring to the processes of generation and corruption; the second is based upon predication. Why is something one insofar as it is? Thomas surpasses Aristotle by establishing a metaphysical foundation of the real identity between being and one in Summa theologiae I, 11. 1.38 From the Stagirites two arguments for the convertibility of one and being, viewed within the context of the subject matter of Metaphysics IV, linking this to the ratio of the one clarified in Metaphysics X, my opinion is that the transcendentalist interpretation of Aristotle (Aquinas interpretation) is the correct one, but one should add that the Stagirites theory of transcendental unity (which does in fact acknowledge a real identification of one with being, though at the same time denoting a conceptual distinction) was not fully developed. Thomistic metaphysics, working upon the findings of Aristotelian metaphysics, was to accomplish that. And what exactly is the metaphysical foundation of the real identity between being and one, in reference to Thomas? Ultimately, it is esse, the universal, total, constituent act, the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from within, all of its perfections. As real things, the
Cf. In X Metaph., lect. 1, no. 1932. J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1996, p. 207.
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transcendentals are absolutely identical to being. Unity, our transcendental is question, is not a reality distinct from being, but only an aspect or property of being. It is a common property of every being. All things have unity by virtue of their act of being. Unity flows from the act of being and can, therefore, be attributed to everything that in some way exists. When we say that a thing is one, or that it has unity, we are not adding anything real (a substance, a quality, a real relation). No. We are merely expressing an aspect which belongs to every being by the mere fact that it has the act of being. Because every thing is, it has unity, it is one. Ens et unum convertuntur. 4. Transcendental Unity is ot Quantitative Unity Transcendental unity, which signifies being in its indivision, transcending the categories, is different from quantitative unity, which is based upon the accident quantity. Quantitative unity is a consequence of matter and is the origin of numbers which arise from its division. When a log of wood is cut into various pieces, we subsequently have three, four, five, six or more pieces of wood, which stems from the division of the quantified substance. Quantitative unity is founded upon the accident quantity, which is an accident which intrinsically affects the substance, determining the substance in itself and in an absolute manner. Dimensive quantity is an accident which is really distinct from the substance. Quantity is the first accident of the corporeal substance. The other properties determine the substance through quantity. Quantity is a real accident of material being, in the sense that it does not exist separately but is a mode of being proper to a body. An accident, it is recalled, is a reality to whose essence it is proper to be in something else, as in its subject, while substance is defined as that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself and not in another subject. Now the accident quantity, which is the first accident of a corporeal substance, is what makes a body extended. The central characteristic of dimensive quantity is continuity. It is properly continuous because it is indivisible in act, even if divisible in potency.39 As quantitative unity stems from the accident quantity, it can only be found in corporeal substances. Therefore, it cannot in any way be a transcendental, but is rather a predicamental unity. The confusion of transcendental unity with quantitative unity has had a long history. The Pythagoreans and Plato held that numbers constituted reality intrinsically. According to Aquinas and Averroes, Avicenna based his philosophical theory on the fact that esse was a mere accident of the essence. If esse would be reduced to an accident, then according to him transcendental

H. J. KOREN, An Introduction to the Philosophy of ature, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, 1960, pp. 8788: The continuum or essentially unified extended body has no actual parts, i.e., parts existing through a to be of their own, for otherwise the continuum itself would not be essentially one but merely an aggregate. The continuum, however, has potential parts, i.e., parts that can be made actual through division. A continuum, taken as such, is infinitely divisible into extended parts. The reason is that otherwise the continuum would ultimately consist of unextended parts, which is impossible because the unextended cannot give rise to the extended. Note, however, that there is a question here only of infinite divisibility and not of an infinite number of actual parts arising from division and existing simultaneously. Only successive actuation of potential parts is possible, so that there will never result an infinite number of actual parts. Extension is a fundamental characteristic or property of matter and always accompanies material beings as we know them from experience.

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unity would also be an accident. Thus, there would be a reduction of transcendental unity to a predicamental unity of quantity, which is based on the accident quantity. 5. Aquinas Criticism of Avicennas Reduction of Transcendental Unity to Predicamental Unity According to Thomas, the error of the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Avicenna stems from a failure to grasp the true nature of transcendental unity which consists in the absence of division, as well as in the failure to comprehend the fact that there is in fact a division which transcends the category of quantity. To such a division is then opposed a unity which likewise transcends the categorical order: the transcendental unity of being which is none other than being in its undividedness. Avicenna held that the esse of a thing was but an accidental attribute of the essence. Thus, transcendental unity became identified with quantitative unity. Thomas had criticized Avicennas position repeatedly in such works as the Scriptum super Sententiis, the tenth Quodlibet, the De Potentia Dei, the Commentary on the Metaphysics, and in the Summa Theologiae. According to Aquinas, Avicenna had failed to grasp the difference between one as an attribute of being, and one as the point of departure for enumeration,40 reducing transcendental unity into a predicamental unity. Unity was added to being as an accident.41 As a consequence, every multiplicity, according to Avicenna, would solely be the result of a quantitative division. Avicenna did hold that one and being were convertible but, Thomas points out, he had identified one as a transcendental with one as the principle of number. Consequently, unity would in this case be adding something positive to that to which it is joined, as the one includes in its very notion an indivisible esse. But what was esse for Avicenna? An accident. Thus, it is on account of that accidental being which is added to the complete being of a substance that the substance is one. So for Avicenna, the unity convertible with being is but an accidental positive addition based on the accident quantity. Transcendental unity, which should really transcend the categories, is reduced to a quantitative unity, based upon the accident quantity.42 In De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7, Thomas presents a picture of the confusion of transcendental unity with quantitative (numerical) unity, in Pythagoras, Plato, and Avicenna: Some philosophers failed to distinguish between unity which is convertible with being, and unity which is the principle of number, and thought that in neither sense does unity add anything to substance, and that in either sense it denotes the substance of a thing. From this it followed that number which is composed of units is the substance of all things: this was the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato. Others who failed to distinguish between unity that is convertible with being and unity that is the principle of number held the contrary opinion, namely that in either sense unity adds a certain accidental being to substance, and that in consequence all number is an accident
40 41

See: In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3. See: Quodlibet X, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. 42 Cf. In I Sent., 24: 1.3.

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pertaining to the genus of quantity. This was the position of Avicenna, and apparently all the teachers of old followed him; for they did not understand by one and many anything else but something pertaining to discrete quantity...The above opinions, then, were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false.43 Thomas then presents his solution, distinguishing one as a principle of number from one as a transcendental: Accordingly, the above opinions were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false. For since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division. Now there is a kind of division which altogether transcends the genus of quantity, and this is division according to formal opposition which has nothing to do with quantity. Hence the plurality resulting from such a division, and the unity which excludes such a division, must needs be more universal and comprehensive than the genus of quantity. Again there is a division of quantity which does not transcend the genus of quantity. Wherefore the plurality consequent to this division and the unity which excludes it are in the genus of quantity. This latter unity is an accidental addition to the thing of which it is predicated, in that it measures it: otherwise the number arising from this unity would not be an accident nor the species of a genus. Whereas the unity that is convertible with being adds nothing to being except the negation of division; not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with indivision: for one is the same as individual being. In like manner the plurality that corresponds to this unity adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms. It is clear, then, that one which is convertible with being posits being but adds nothing except the negation of division. And the number corresponding to it adds this to the things described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein is the essence of distinction. Accordingly then, while one adds to being one negation inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself; plurality adds two negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and inasmuch as distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.44 In his Commentary on the Metaphysics, the Angelic Doctor also resolves this confusing of transcendental unity with a quantitative unity founded upon the accident quantity. He shows, as against the position of Avicenna, that transcendental unity transcends the categories and is defined as being in its indivisibility or undividedness. One and being are really identical but differ conceptually: That one and being are really identical Aristotle proves by two arguments [of which the first runs as follows]. Any two things which when added to some third thing cause no difference
43 44

De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7. Ibid..

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are wholly the same. But when one and being are added to man or to anything at all, they cause no difference. Therefore they are wholly the same. The truth of the minor premise is evident; for it is the same thing to say man and one man. And similarly it is the same thing to say human being and the thing that is man; and nothing different is expressed when in speaking we repeat the terms, saying, This is a human being, a man, and one man. He proves this as follows. It is the same thing for man and the thing that is man to be generated and corrupted. This is evident from the fact that generation is a process toward being, and corruption a change from being to nonbeing. Hence a man is never generated without a human being being generated, nor is a man ever corrupted without a human being being corrupted. Now, those things which are generated and corrupted together are themselves one and the same. And just as it had been said that being and man are not separated either in generation or in corruption, so too this is evident of what is one; for when a man is generated, one man is generated, and when a man is corrupted, one man is also corrupted. It is clear, then, that the apposition of these [i.e. of one or being to man] expresses the same thing, and that just because the term one or being is added to man it is not to be understood that some nature is added to man. And from this it is clearly apparent that unity [unum] does not differ from being, because any two things which are identical with some third thing are identical with each other. It is also evident from the foregoing argument that unity and being are the same in reality [in re] but differ conceptually, for if they did not differ conceptually, they would be wholly synonymous, and then it would be pointless to say a human being and one man...45 The transcendental one, and the principle of number: Nor does it seem to be true that the one or unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number are the same; for nothing that pertains to some special class of being seems to be characteristic of all beings. Hence the unity which is limited to a special class of being discrete quantity does not seem to be interchangeable with universal being. For, if unity is a proper and essential accident of being, it must be caused by the principles of being as being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not reasonable that something having a particular mode of being should be adequately accounted for by the common principles of being as being. It cannot be true, then, that something which belongs to a definite genus and species is an accident of every being. Therefore the kind of unity which is the principle of number differs from that which is interchangeable with being; for the unity which is interchangeable with being signifies being itself, adding to it the notion of undividedness, which, since it is a negation or a privation, does not posit any reality added to being. Thus, this unity differs from being in no way in reality but only conceptually; for a negation or a privation is not a real being but a being of reason. However, the kind of unity which is the principle of number adds to substance the note of a measure, which is a special property of quantity and is found first in the unit. And it is described as the privation or negation of division which pertains to continuous quantity; for number is produced by dividing the continuous. Hence number belongs to mathematical science, whose
45

In IV Metaph., lect. 2, nos. 550-553.

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subject cannot exist apart from sensible matter but can be considered apart from sensible matter. But this would not be so if the kind of unity which is the principle of number were separate from matter in being and existed among the immaterial substances, as is true of the kind of unity which is interchangeable with being.46 The errors which the Angelic Doctor attributes to Avicenna regarding the nature of unity, can be summed up under four headings: 1. Avicenna found fault with the definition of the transcendental one as being in its indivision: The true definition of one is being which is not divided, although Avicenna endeavors to find fault with it.47 2. Avicenna had confused transcendental unity with predicamental unity, based upon the accident quantity. For Avicenna (III tract. Metaph. c. vi) says that one which is converted with being is the same as one which is the principle of number.48 Avicenna...said...that one and being signify, not the substance of a thing, but something added. ...For he thought that the one which is convertible with being is the same as the one which is the principle of number.49 3. It follows then that Avicennas unity would in fact positively add a real accident to being.50 Avicenna...believed that the one which is convertible with being adds something to the substance of being, as white does to man. This however is manifestly false, because each thing is one by its substance. For if a thing were one by anything else, since this again would be one, supposing it were again one by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. ...Therefore we must say that the one which is convertible with being does not add a reality to being, but that the one which is the principle of number does add something to being, belonging to the genus of quantity.51 As Avicenna had reduced the transcendental one to one as a principle of number, as a measure of quantity, the predicamental one would be limited to a genus, being a real accident (the accident of quantity) distinct from the substance modified.52 4. Lastly, as a consequence of the confusion of transcendental unity with predicamental unity, Avicenna had made every multitude a result of quantitative division.53 The above four formulations are Thomas criticisms of what he believed to be the position of Avicenna on the nature of unity. I believe that four factors influenced Thomas judgment upon Avicenna regarding the nature of unity: 1. The influence of Averroes
In IV Metaph., lect. 2, nos. 559-560. In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3: Haec est vera definitio unius: Unum est ens quod non dividitur; quamvis Avicenna, nitatur eam improbare ratione inducta. 48 In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, c: Avicenna enim, III tract. Metaph., c. vi, dicit, quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, est idem quod unum quod est principium numeri. 49 In IV Metaph., lect. 2, nn. 556-557: Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum.... De uno autem hoc dicebat, quia aestimabat quod illud unum quod convertitur cum ente, sit idem quod illud unum quod est principium numeri. 50 Quodlibet X, q. 1, a. 1: Si ergo unum quod convertitur cum ente sit idem quod unum quod est principium numeri, oportet quod etiam unum quod convertitur cum ente aliquid positive superaddat enti: et hoc concedit Avicenna: unde vult, quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, addat ens aliquid quod ad genus mensurae pertineat. 51 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1: Avicenna...credidit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente addat rem aliquam supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra hominem. Sed hoc manifeste falsum est, quia quaelibet res una per suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una, quaelibet res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum unum per aliquid aliud esset abire in infinitum. Unde standum est in primo: sic igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente non addit aliquam rem supra ens sed unum quod est principium numeri addit aliquid supra ens ad genus quantitatis pertinens. 52 See: In X Metaph., 1. 3, 1980-1981, In IV Metaph., 1. 2, 556, and Quodlibet XII, q. 5, a. 5. 53 De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7.
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uncompromising condemnation of Avicenna on this matter; 2. That the only work of Avicenna available to Aquinas at that time was the Shif; 3. The imperfect Latin translation of the metaphysical parts of the Shif by Dominicus Gundissalinus54; and 4. That the Platonism of Gundissalinus had biased the translation of the Shif. 1. The influence of Averroes (the Commentator). Thomas had certainly been strongly influenced by Averroes explicit condemnation of Avicenna regarding the nature of unity. The Commentator, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, severely criticized Avicennas position.55 Thomas criticisms of Avicennas account of the nature of unity in In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 556, X Quodlibet, and Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1 closely follow Averroes line of attack.56 2. The Shif. Aquinas had pronounced judgment upon Avicenna using the sole work of Avicenna available to him at that time, which was the Shif, the Arabian philosophers earliest, but most extensive, work. 3. The faulty translation. Thomas did not read Arabic (and was not fluent in Spanish, the language of the original translation of the Shif made by John of Spain, later utilized by Gundissalinus in his translation into Latin57), and therefore relied on the metaphysical parts of the Shif translated into Latin (rather imperfectly at that), by Dominicus Gundissalinus, a translation done in the twelfth century. Certain errors58 in Gundissalinus translation (from which the Angelic Doctor had drawn his information regarding the Avicennas metaphysics) certainly confirmed Thomas opinion of Avicenna regarding the nature of the One. A number of these errors arose from defects in the Arabic text, a number from Gundissalinus insufficient lack of knowledge of the special terminology in Avicennas metaphysics, and a number from the use of the Romance vernacular (Spanish) as a medium between the Arabic and the final Latin version.59 4. The Platonism of Gundissalinus. As Gundissalinus was an ardent Platonist60, parts of his translation did reflect Platos confusion between transcendental unity and predicamental unity resulting from making quantity a transcendental instead of a supreme genus or predicament.61 We find precisely this type of confusion of the two types of unity, the type which Thomas attributes to Avicenna, in a work written by Gundissalinus himself, the De unitate et uno, which is strongly Neo-Platonic in character. At the beginning of this tract, Gundissalinus makes a comparison, which reveals his notion of unity, a teaching which he will later attribute to none other than Avicenna himself: It is by unity that each thing is said to be one, for, whether it
D. GUNDISSALINUS, Metaphysica Avicennae sive eius prima philosophia, Venetiis Bernardinus Venetus, 1495. AVVEROES, In IV Metaph., comm. 3 (ed. Ven., fol. 67r B ; D-E): Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit, quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei (...) Et etiam, quia existimavit, quod unum dictum de omnibus praedicamentis, est illud unum quod est principium numerorum. Numerus autem est accidents. Unde opinatus fuit iste, quod hoc nomen unum significat accidens in entibus. Cf. A. de Libera, DAvicenne Averros, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la thorie scolastique de lun transcendental, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 4 (1994), pp. 141-179. 56 Cf. Averros tafsir ma bad at-tabiat, lib. X, c. 8, b. 57 Cf. F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book One, volume 2 (Augustine to Scotus), Image Books, Doubleday, New York, 1985, p. 194. 58 For a list of a number of these errors see: M. ALONSO, Traducciones del arcediano Domingo Gundisalvo, AlAndalus, 12 (1949), pp. 335-336. 59 Cf. M. T. DALVERNEY, otes sur les traductions mdivales des oeuvres philosophiques dAvicenne, Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen ge, 19 (1952-53), pp. 339, 344. 60 Cf. M. T. DALVERNEY, Les traductions dAvicenne (Moyen Age et Renaissance), in Avicenna nella storia della cultura mediovale, Quaderno 40, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, 1957, p. 75. 61 Cf. A. D. SERTILLANGES, La philosophie de S. Thomas dAquin, nouvelle dition, ditions Montaigne, Aubier, Paris, 1940, pp. 28-29.
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is simple or composite, spiritual or corporeal, a thing is one by unity and cannot be one except by unity, just as it cannot be white except by whiteness nor quantitative except by quantity.62 In this passage, transcendental unity, which is convertible with being, is made to look like a reality added to being and comparable to quality or quantity. Therefore, it should not surprise us at all if Gundissalinus translation of the Shif be biased. And this faulty translation is precisely what Thomas had as material for forming his opinion on Avicenna regarding the nature of unity. What exactly did Avicenna hold as regards the nature of unity? Are Thomas four formulations of the errors of Avicenna on this matter actually faithful to the teaching of the Arabian? In order to find the true answer it will be necessary, not only to examine closely the doctrine of unity in the Shif, but also to examine the Arabian philosophers other works which were not available to Aquinas.63 Thomas first opinion regarding the Arabian philosophers doctrine on the one is that Avicenna found fault with the definition of the transcendental one as being in its indivision: The true definition of one is being which is not divided, although Avicenna endeavors to find fault with it.64 Did Avicenna really deny that the definition of transcendental one is being which is not divided, or being in its indivision? Avicennas writings prove the contrary. At the end of chapter two of the third treatise of the Shif, Avicenna is explicit in asserting that the definition of the one is nothing else than being viewed from the aspect of what has no actual division.65 One is said of whatever is indivisible indivisible in that respect in which it is said to be one.66 The same conception of the one is implied in his De Anima contained in the Shif where it is contrasted with a multitude which arises from form or matter or from causes that effect division.67 He recognizes the convertibility of being and one and their conceptual distinction. The one coincides (parificatur) with being because the one, like being, is said of each of the categories, but their concepts are different. He subsequently presents the agreement between the one and being in that neither signifies the substance of anything.68 One should note
Dominicus Gundisalvi de Unitate, ed. P. Correns, Beitrge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelelters, Texte und Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, Heft. 1, Aschendorff, Mnster, 1891, p. 3. Cf. A. FOREST, La structure mtaphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas dAquin, 2nd ed., Vrin, Paris, 1956, p. 42. 63 Other important works of Avicenna aside from the Shif (Healing) which contain treatises on logic and metaphysics include: the ajt (Deliverance), Al-Ishrt wal-Tanbht (The Directives and Remarks), Dnishmeh (Book of Knowledge), Mantiq al-Mashriqyn (The Logic of the Orientals), and Uyn al-Hikmah (The Sources of Wisdom), a brief summary of Avicennas philosophical thought, which was written during the last years of his life. All these works were composed in Arabic except for Dnish- meh which is in Persian. 64 In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3: Haec est vera definitio unius: Unum est ens quod non dividitur; quamvis Avicenna, nitatur eam improbare ratione inducta. 65 D. GUNDISSALINUS, Metaphysica Avicennae sive eius prima philosophia, Bernardinus Venetus, Venetiis, 1495, no pagination, III, 2: Dicam igitur quod unum dicitur ambigue de intentionibus quae sic conveniunt quod in eis non est divisio in effectu, in quantum unumquodque eorum est id quod est. In Arabic, see: Kitb al-Shif, vol. 2, Tehran 1886, p. 425. 66 Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium, trans. N. Carame, Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Roma 1926, p. 64. In Arabic, see: IBN SN, Al- ajt, Al-Sadah, Cairo 1331 A. H., p. 364. 67 AVICENNA, De Anima (VI, 3 of the Shif), liber excerptus ex editione Venetiis 1508, ed. G. Klubertanz, St. Louis University, St. Louis, 1949, pp. 119-120. In Arabic, see: Kitb al-Shif, VI, 3, Al-Tabt, vol. 1, Tehran 1886, p. 353. 68 AVICENNA, Al-Shif, III, 2 (ed. Van Riet, p.114): Unum autem parificatur ad esse, quia unum dicitur de unoquoque praedicamentorum, sicut ens, sed intellectus eorum, sicut nosti, diversus est. Conveniunt autem in hoc quod nullum eorum significat substantiam alicuius rei, et iam nosti hoc.
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that St. Thomas did not write that Avicenna denies that one is undivided being, our definition for transcendental unity, but that he endeavours to find fault with it. In fact, Thomas, in In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, cites the Arabian as upholding the distinction between numerical and transcendental unity. In Shif, III, 3, the Arabian philosopher, inquiring into the nature of unity, asks if it is said of accidents or of substances? When it is said of predicamental accidents it cannot belong to the category of substance, and such is a cause for doubt according to Avicenna. When the one is predicated of substances, it cannot be their genus or specific difference, for the one does not enter into the definition that determines the essence of the substance. What is Avicennas conclusion? The one, he says, is rather a concomitant of the substance of which it is predicated as an accident.69 We should remember that, for Avicenna, it is not being which is the first transcendental, as is the case with the Stagirite and the Angelic Doctor; rather, it is thing (res).70 Now, how do the other common notions add to this primary transcendental, according to the metaphysics of the Avicenna? Being (ens) would be concomitant with thing (res) in the sense that it adds something real to thing (res) in the manner of an accident. One (unum) coincides with being (ens) and they agree that neither signifies the substance of anything. Therefore, for the Arabian, one (unum) must be an accident as well. In his distinction between the mutual relation between being and one, on the one hand, and the rapport between either of them with thing, on the other hand, Avicenna employs precise terminological expressions: To express the relation between being (ens) and one (unum) he uses the term parificatur, while to express the relation of being and one to thing (res), he uses the term concomitans. The nature of unity is the notion of accident and it belongs to the universality of that which is concomitant with thing.71 Avicenna does not argue that one (unum) which is convertible with being is an accident because it is identical with the one that is the principle of number. Averroes, the Commentator, is simply mistaken on this. Rather, the accidentality which Avicenna attributes to the one is not predicamental, but logical. In his metaphysical inquiry to determine to which of the predicables unity belongs, he concludes that it is neither a genus nor a specific difference, but rather an
69 AVICENNA, Shif, III, 3 (ed.Van Riet, p.117): Dico igitur quod unitas vel dicitur de accidentalibus vel dicitur de substantia; cum autem dicitur de accidentibus, non est substantia, et hoc est dubium; cum vero dicitur de substantiis, non dicitur de eis sicut genus nec sicut differentia ullo modo: non enim recipitur in certificatione quidditatis alicuius substantiarum, sed est quiddam comitans substantiam, sicut iam nosti. Non ergo dicitur de eis sicut genus vel sicut differentia, sed sicut accidens. 70 J. AERTSEN, op. cit., p. 194: In Avicennas account of the common notions and their differences, thing is the point of departure and has central place. It signifies the determinate nature (certitudo) through which a thing is what it is. The term has primarily an ontological sense, as is clear from Avicennas examples. Thus the certitudo of a triangle is that whereby it is a triangle, that of whiteness that whereby it is white. The Avicennian sense of certitudo expresses the Greek tradition of intelligibility, which focuses on the essence of a thing by posing the question concerning what it is. Res signifies the what-ness or quiddity of a thing, which Avicenna also describes as its proper being (esse proprium). The quiddity proper to each thing is something other (praeter) than esse, although the concept of ens cannot be separated from the concept of res. It is rather always concomitant with it, for the thing has being either in the singular or in the estimation and intellect. (AVICENNA, Liber de scientia divina, I, 5, [ed.Van Riet, pp.34-36]). To Avicenna thing is the primary transcendental. 71 AVICENNA, Shif, III, 3, (ed. Van Riet, p. 121): Certitudo unitatis est intentio accidentis et est de universitate eorum quae concomitantur res. Cf. AVICENNA, Shif, VII, 1 (ed. Van Riet, p. 349): Scias autem quod unum et ens iam parificantur in praedicatione sui de rebus, ita quod, de quocumque dixeris quod ens uno respectu, illud potest esse unum alio respectu.

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accident. That the accidentality which Avicenna attributes to the one is not predicamental but logical is confirmed throughout his works.72 6. Transcendental Unity and Being73
At first sight it does seem that Avicenna confused numerical or predicamental unity with transcendental unity (see for example: Shif, V, 2; ajt [Al-Sadah, Cairo 1331 A. H., p. 365. Also in Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium, trans. N. Carame, Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, Rome, 1926, p. 65]. But in his later works we see that he more clearly distinguishes the two types of unity (see: Uyn al-Hikmah, ed. A. Badawi, Institut franais darchologie orientale du Caire, Cairo, 1954, p. 47; Mantiq al-Mashriqyn, Al-Muayad Press, Cairo, 1910, p. 7; Dnish- meh, in Avicenne le livre de science, vol. 1, trans. M Achena and H. Mass, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1955, p. 121). Contrary to Aquinas third formulation against Avicenna on unity, which retains that the Arabian held that transcendental unity results from the addition of a predicamental accident to being, in reality, from what we gather from his later works, we find that Avicenna considered transcendental unity to be independent of matter and therefore also independent of quantity. He also speaks of transcendental unity in a way that excludes its connection with any real accident (see: ajt, p. 375 [N. Carame, op. cit., p. 80]; Uyn al-Hikmah, p. 59; Dnishmeh, in Avicenne- Le livre de science, vol.1, trans. M. Achena and H. Mass, p. 149; ajt, p. 323 [N. Carame, op. cit., p. 2]. From all this we can conclude that Aquinas fourth fomulation regarding Avicenna on unity, namely, that the Arabian had made every multitude a result of quantitive division, is mistaken (see especially: Mantiq alMashriqyn, Al-Muayad Press, Cairo, 1910, p. 7, where Avicenna explains that the subject matter of logic is said to be those things sometimes associated with matter, sometimes not, such as unity and multiplicity). To conclude, we state that Avicenna does not argue that the one convertible with being is an accident because it is identical with the one that is the principle of number. The accidentality which Avicenna attributes to the one is not predicamental but logical. Now, why did Thomas attribute to the Arabian doctrines on the one which the latter in fact did not hold, as is attested to in the various works of Avicenna just mentioned. I believe the major reason was that he was following Averroes on this matter, who apparently did not grasp that transcendental unity and predicamental unity are, for the Arabian philosopher, logical accidents in the order of predication (see: A. M. GOICHON, La distinction de lessence et de lexistence daprs Ibn Sn, Descle De Brouwer, Paris, 1937, pp. 9-12). In this order of predication, a real accident is regarded as not constitutive of the essence of a substance it modifies and so is, according to Avicenna, a logical accident, which for him is properly so called an accidental universal, namely, that by which the essence is described after [being constituted] (see:Uyn al-Hikmah, ed. A. Badawi, p. 2). An accidental universal is a property if it is coextensive with one species and thus is predicable only of it, but it is a common accident if predicable of many species or of the individuals of many species (see:Uyn al-Hikmah, ed. A. Badawi, p. 2. Cf. A. M. GOICHON, La distinction de lessence et de lexistence daprs Ibn Sn, p. 120; A. M. GOICHON, Lexique de la langue philosophique dIbn Sn, Descle De Brouwer, Paris, 1938, pp. 217-218). So, it is in this sense, with the proper adaptations required by a transcendental subject, that Avicenna speaks of unity in general as one of the accidents that inseparably follow (al-lzimah) upon things, and as an attribute (sifah) inseparably following upon the essence, and in the same context warns that the one is not a constituent part (muqawwin) of the quiddity of anything ( ajt, pp. 340-41[ N. Carame, op. cit., p. 28]). 73 Studies on one as a transcendental in the thought of Aristotle: E. HALPER, Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being, The New Scholasticism, 59 (1985), pp. 213-227 ; T. M. JEANNOT, Plato and Aristotle on Being and Unity, The New Scholasticism, 60 (1986), pp. 404-426. Studies on transcendental unity in St. Thomas Aquinas: A. C. PEGIS, The Dilemma of Being and Unity, in Essays in Thomism, ed. R. E. Brennan, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942, pp. 149-183 ; T. E. GLIM, The ature of Transcendental Unity in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1943 ; B. B. HUNT, The ature and the Significance of the One that Follows Being in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1950 ; L. OEING-HANHOFF, Ens et unum convertuntur. Stellung und Gehalt des Grundsatzes in der Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mnster, 1953 ; C. E. KINNEY, The Meaning of Transcendental Unity, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 28 (1954), pp. 151-159 ; J. OWENS, Unity and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas, Mediaeval Studies, 23 (1961), pp. 240-259 ; R. E. HOUSER, Thomas Aquinas on Transcendental Unity: Scholastic and Aristotelian Predecessors, University of Toronto Ph.D. dissertation, Toronto, 1961 ; P. C. COURTS, Lun selon saint Thomas, Revue Thomiste, 68 (1968), pp. 198-240 ; S. T. KOWALCZYK, Une tentative de description de lunit transcendentale, in Saint Thomas dAquin. Pour le septime centenaire de sa mort, Lublin, 1976, pp. 143-170 ; J. AERTSEN, Denken van Eenheid, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 52 (1990), pp. 399-420 ; J. AERTSEN, Medieval
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Transcendental unity is defined as being in its indivision or being in its undividedness. One means undivided being. There is nothing added to being, but only a negation of internal division, an indivision which each being possesses per se by the very fact of its being a being. In reality there is no distinction between being and one. They are the same. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics,74 had already drawn attention to the fact by transcendental unity we understand the type of unity that is identical with being, writing that being is in fact the same as unity, since every time unity arises, develops, and passes away, being arises, develops, and passes away. Unity is inseparable from being, and being is inseparable from unity. Thus, they are one and the same. They are convertible: unum et ens convertuntur.75 That which is contained in the meaning and reality of one is already contained in the meaning and reality of being. Just like being (ens) transcendental unity is based on the act of being (esse), and the more nobler or intense is a things esse, the greater degree of unity does it possess. Nevertheless, being and one are different in reason. Two viewpoints of the same reality are conceptually given: Being(ens) signifies ens in itself, whereas one signifies being in its indivisibility. Conceptually, there are two different points of view of that which is in reality the same for in reality being must be undivided in order to be. With regard to human knowing, the notion of one constitutes a further disclosure of being, manifesting the absence of any internal division in any real thing. Therefore, we first grasp being before we grasp unity, as, for example, it is only after we know a giraffe and its distinctiveness from other things do we come to understand that it is one, that is, that is a being, by itself, and distinct from other things. The first object of the intellect is being; the second is the negation of being. From these two there follows thirdly the understanding of distinction (since from the fact that we understand that this thing is and that it is not that thing we realize that these two are distinct): and it follows fourthly that the intellect apprehends the idea of unity, in that it understands that this thing is not divided in itself; and fifthly the intellect apprehends number, in that it understands this as distinct from that and each as one in itself. For however much things are conceived as distinct from one another, there is no idea of number unless each be conceived as one. 76 7. The Classes and Degrees of Unity There are two classes of unity corresponding to transcendental metaphysical participation of finite imperfect beings in the act of being, created by the Unparticipated Subsistent Pure Act of Being: the unity of simplicity and the unity of composition. The unity of simplicity is the unity of a being devoid of parts or a multiplicity of elements and constituent principles. Unity of simplicity pertains only to God, Who is the Absolute Divine Simplicity. Unity of composition, on the other hand, pertains to all finite created beings, from the angels down to minerals, all having a composition, a real distinction of act of being and essence.
Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. 201-242 ; B. BLANKENHORN, Aquinas on the Transcendental One: An Overlooked Development in Doctrine, Angelicum, 81 (2004), pp. 615-637 ; D. SVOBODA, The Ratio of Unity: Positive or egative? The Case of Thomas Aquinas, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 86 (2012), pp. 47-70. 74 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, IV, 1003b 22-34. 75 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 1. 76 De Potentia Dei, q. 9, a. 7, ad 15.

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And the various degrees of unity in the unity of composition depend upon the various levels of composition found in created things. These various degrees are: substantial unity, unum per accidens accidental unity, unum accidentale artificial unity, unum accidentale relational unity (unity of order), unum accidentale aggregative unity. As regards substantial unity there are two types: the substantial unity of the separated substances (or angels) and the substantial unity of corporeal substances composed of matter and form. There is also, in transcendental unity, an individual unity and universal unity. 8. Individual Unity and Universal Unity In transcendental unity we may distinguish between individual (or singular or real) unity in a being as it is actually or proximately capable of existing, and universal (or generic or specific) unity which is reality considered as the universal object of mans intellect. In that state it is undivided but as a universal it is a one apt to be many. The conception of a nature or essence without advertence to its individual or universal state is spoken of as having abstract unity. Concerning individual unity and universal unity, Coffey writes: Transcendental unity may be either individual (singular, numerical, concrete, real) or universal (specific, generic, abstract, logical). The former is that which characterizes being or reality considered as actually existing or as proximately capable of existing: the unity of an individual nature or essence: the unity whereby a being is not merely undivided in itself but incapable of repetition or multiplication of itself. It is only the individual as such that can actually exist: the abstract and universal is incapable of actually existing as such Abstract or universal unity is the unity which characterizes a reality conceived as an abstract, universal object by the human intellect. The object of a specific or generic concept, man or animal, for example, is one in this sense, undivided in itself, but capable of indefinite multiplication or repetition in the only mode in which it can actually exist the individual mode. The universal is unum aptum inesse pluribus. Finally, we can conceive any nature or essence without considering it in either of its alternative states either as individual or as universal. Thus conceived it is characterized by a unity which has been commonly designated as abstract.77 9. Unum Accidentale Aggregative Unity In aggregative unity, we have a mere aggregation (mass, collection) consisting in a multitude in which the union is merely external and haphazard (e.g., a heap of stones, a pile of bricks). Aggregative unity or unity of aggregation is proper to beings joined together only by nearness of place. So we say that the unity of a pile of bricks is an accidental unity of place. 10. Unum Accidentale Relational Unity (Unity of Order) At lower levels of unity of composition we find relational unity or the unity of order, which is based upon the accident relation. Relation is an accident whose nature is a reference or order of one substance to another. Examples of relational unity include the unity of a social club,
77

P. COFFEY, Ontology, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1926, p. 118.

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the unity of an army, the unity of a navy, the unity of an air force, and the unity of a civil society. Relational unity or the unity of order is made of many substances, but it does not have a substantial form of its own. Rather, its form consists in the very relationship among its various parts, that is, it consists of the relations which link the individuals together. Predicamental relation is defined as an accident whose entire being consists in its reference to another. The entire essential of this accident is a respect to something else, a towardness of some kind. In the Topics, Aristotle states that the essence of every relation is to be another.78 And in the Categories, he writes: For instance, the term superior is explained by reference to something else that is meant... Again, that which is said to be similar must be similar to something else.79 Four elements are necessary in order that a real relation may arise: 1. A subject, which is the person or thing which has a reference ; 2. A term to which the subject is referred ; 3. A basis of the order between the two substances; and 4. The relation itself or the bond which links one thing to the other. For example, Patrick (subject) is similar, or is related by similarity to another person named Sarah (term) who is Patricks mother. The basis of the order between son and mother is generation, which is the order of dependence of the son with respect to his parents. The important role of the basis of a real relation must be emphasized. Since a relation is essentially a reference to another, and not an internal determining element of the substance in which it inheres, it must necessarily have in its subject a basis different from itself. This basis is what gives rise to the relation. In the case of filiation, what causes the son to be related to his parents is his having been engendered by them; without this fact or basis, no relation would exist between parents and children.80 Every real relation is really distinct from the subject, the term, and the basis. Now, it is evident that the subject must be really distinct from the term, because, if otherwise, the relation could not be said to be real, as it is impossible for one to be related to his own identical self. The real relation itself must be really distinct from the subject, for if it were not so, the relation would only be a being of reason, since the subject may often exist before the coming to be of the relation. For example, John was a man before he had become a father. In creatures, Thomas writes, paternity adds a new to be that is accidental and not the same as the to be of the subject.81 A real accidental relation is also distinct from its term for as an accident, it should inhere in the subject. And since the subject is distinct from the term the real accident relation cannot be said to be identical with it. Lastly, the real relation must also be distinct from its basis or foundation, since to say that the real relation is to be identified with its basis or foundation is to deny real relation, since the basis, or foundation is, by priority of nature at least, not a relation and does not signify to another, but instead, another predicament such as action or quantity. If there is no real modification with the coming to be of the relation, then the relation would not be a real relation based on the accident relation, but rather, a being of reason, that is, a logical relation of mans intellect.

78 79

ARISTOTLE, Topics, Book 6, ch. 8, 146b, 3. ARISTOTLE, Categories, ch. 7, 6a, 37. 80 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 81 In I Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2 : Quia in creaturis per paternitatem additur novum esse quod est esse accidentale, et non idem, quod est esse subiecti.

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It must be affirmed that there are real predicamental relations for there exists a real order of cause and effect, of equality and proportionality in the cosmos. But such a real order can be nothing but the complex series of relations; hence to acknowledge such a order is to acknowledge real relations. Perfection and good which are things outside the mind are not only considered as something inhering absolutely in things, but also according to the order of one thing to another. There must be, therefore, in the things themselves a certain order, and this order is a relation. Whence it is necessary that there be in the things themselves certain relations, according to which one is referred to the other.82 Relation is, in fact, numbered among the predicaments which are realities which have a mode of being distinct from any other. This is seen through predication. A relation is a reality whose to be is to have itself in regard to another, something which is not expressed by any other predicament. In every predicament is posited a being existing outside of the mind; for we distinguish between a being of reason and being which is subdivided into ten predicaments. If, then, relation was not a thing outside of the mind, we would not place to another as one of the genera of the predicaments.83 The predicament relation is an accident that is imperfect and weak, for by itself, it is but a reference to. While the nature of the other accidents entail their inhering in, or being in the substance (a substance being that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself and not in another subject), as they are determining elements of the substance itself, relation, on the other hand, makes the substance get out of itself in order to tend towards another. In defining relation in terms of being, we can say that it is that whose to be is to be ordered to another, that is, it is a mode of being whose very essence is reference to another. As regards types of real relations, there are relations according to dependence in being, mutual relations based on action and passion, and relations according to fittingness based on quantity, quality, and on the substance.84 A family and an army are forms of relational units; they belong to relational unity or unity of order. In such relational units, a unity of order is made up of substances, but is devoid of a substantial nature of its own. The form here is the relationship itself which bind the substances, in this case, the individuals, together. Because relational unity is founded upon the accident relation, which is weak and imperfect, as it is in itself, a mere reference to, this type of unity is at a much lower level in the ontological hierarchy of the degrees of unity.
82 De Potentia Dei, q. 8, a. 9: Perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenduntur secundum aliquid absolute inherens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam.... Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse: hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur... Oportet quod res habentes ordinam ad aliquid realiter referantur ad ipsum et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio. 83 Ibid., q. 7, a. 9: In nullo enim predicamento ponitur aliquid, nisi res extra animam existens; nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem predicamenta. Si autem relatio non esset in rebus extra animam, non poneretur ad aliquid unum genus predicamenti. 84 Cf. T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit, pp. 69-70.

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11. Unum Accidentale Artificial Unity Artificial unity consists in an artificial unit joined together mechanically for a definite purpose. Examples of artificial unity include the unity of a house, the unity of a car, the unity of a jumbo jet. 12. Unum Per Accidens Accidental Unity (or Unity of Substance and Its Accidents) At a higher level in the hierarchy of transcendental unity we find what is called accidental unity, or the unity of substance with an accident, which is of a lesser degree of unity than the unity between the principles of the substance, for the very being of the substance does not depend upon its union with an accident. For example, when a person, out in the sun, receives a tan, the color of his skin changes, but he doesnt cease being a man. There are in things both a stable, permanent substratum, the substance, and certain secondary changeable perfections, which are the accidents. The substance is defined as that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself and not in another subject. An accident, on the other hand, is defined as that reality to whose essence it is proper to be in something else, as in its subject. To exist by self [per se] is not [strictly speaking] a definition of substance; because by this we do not manifest its quiddity, but its to be, and in a creature its quiddity is not its to be; otherwise, substance could not be a genus, because the to be cannot be common by way of genus, since each of those contained under a genus differ in their to be; but the definition or the quasi-definition of substance is a thing having quiddity, to which is acquired, or due a to be, as not in another; and likewise to be in a subject is not the definition of accident, but on the contrary [accident is] a thing to which is due a to be in another; and this is never separated from any accident, nor can it ever be separated; because to that thing which is an accident it is always due according to its quiddity to be in another.85 It is to be observed that the definition of accident includes the subject. The nature of the accident is to demand inherence in another. As the substance has a nature or essence to which subsistence is fitting, and which situates the subject within a determinate species, accidents also have their own essence by which they are differentiated from each other, and to which dependence on the being of their subjects is fitting. The essences of accidents are naturally imperfect for they demand the support of their subjects.86 Rather than being simply being, an

85 In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1: Per se existere non est definitio substantiae: quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas eius, sed eius esse; et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus: quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse; sed definitio, vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse, vel debetur, ut non in alio; et similiter esse in subiecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio; et hoc numquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest: quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper debetur esse in alio. 86 In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3: Ratio accidentis imperfectionem continet, quia esse accidentis est inesse et dependere et compositionem facere cum subiecto.

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accident is said to be something belonging to being.87 Accidents cannot be said to become or be corrupted; rather it is the subject that becomes through the accidents.88 It is for this reason that an accident cannot be defined without the subject as a quasi-part of the definition.89 No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. Accordingly, in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz., the genus; but we give it the second place which is that of the difference: thus we say snubnosedness is a curvature of the nose. But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for a white thing is something that has whiteness. Accordingly, in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of the definition; for we say that a snubnose is a curved nose.90 There is a three-fold interrelation between substance and accidents91: 1. The substance is the substratum or the subject of the accidents, the subject here the bearer and that which underlies, and it indicates the metaphysical dependence of all the accidents on the substance. Also, the substance is not just the substratum of the accidents but gives them the act of being (esse) ; 2. The substance is to accident what potency is to act, because the accidents perfect the substance. The substance has a potency or passive capacity to receive further perfections conferred to it by its accidents, called accidental forms. For example, the operations of acts of free will are accidents which are a kind of perfection to which a substance is in potency ; and 3. The substance is related to the accident as cause is to effect. The substance is the cause of the accidents which arise from it and the accidents come into being because of the substance. There is a real distinction between a substance and its accidents, as is seen when observing accidental changes. For example, when a man turns red in anger, we see an accidental change from the persons white skin to red. But he ceases not to be man: his accidents change he may weigh 200 pounds one day and 195 pounds the next week but he doesnt stop being a man. He may be stupid at the beginning of a university course and knowledgeable at the end of it, but he is still the same person who goes from ignorance to knowledge. He may be loved one day and hated the next but his substance remains throughout. And so on with the other accidents. Observing such accidental changes in the substance, we find that certain secondary perfections disappear and give rise to new ones without a substantial change in the subject. And such
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3: Non dicitur ens, quasi ipsum esse habeat, sed quia eo aliquid est; unde et magis dicitur esse entis. 88 Ibid: Proprie loquendo nullum accidens neque fit, neque corrumpitur; sed dicitur fieri et corrumpi, secundum quod subiectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. 89 De Ente et Essentia ch. 7: Non possunt definiri nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum definitione. 90 Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3: Dicendum, quod quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet dependentiam a subjecto secundum suam rationem; aliter tamen et aliter. Nam accidens significatum in abstracto importat habitudinem ad subiectum; nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. Et ideo in definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima pars definitionis, quae est genus, sed quasi secunda, quae est differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. Sed in concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens; dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. Propter quod in definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tamquam genus, quod est prima pars definitionis; dicimus enim quod simum est nasus curvus. 91 Cf. De virtutibus in communi, q. 1, a. 3.
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accidental alterations can only be possible if these accidents are really distinct from the substance they affect. All the nine accidents are, by their very essences, distinct from their subject. The substance is really distinct from the accidents, being superior to them for it is the substance that determines the very content of things, making them to be what they are, whereas the accidents must depend entirely upon the substance, their substratum, for their very being. But even though there is a real distinction between substance and the accidents, the substance being superior to the accidents, being their very substratum and giving them the act of being which it properly has, and the accidents, which indeed are acts with regard to the substance which is in potency to them, but nevertheless depend entirely on the substance for their being, for they do not have the act of being of their own but are because of the act of being of the substance, it must be stated that this real distinction and inequality does not in any way undermine the radical unity of the substance-accident composite of being (ens). The real distinction cannot destroy the unity of ens for a substance and its accidents are not many beings mixed up together to form a whole but rather, there is only one being in the strict sense, which is the substance, and all of the accidents of this particular substance belong to it, receiving their very being from the substance without which they would cease to exist. Accidents cannot be autonomous realities separated from substance; they are rather the determining aspects of a substance, perfecting and completing it. 13. Substantial Unity (or Unity Between the Metaphysical Principles of the Substance) As regards the third level in the ontological hierarchy of transcendental unity, which is substantial unity or unity between the principles of the substance, it will be necessary to distinguish between the substantial unity of the separate substances (the angels), and the substantial unity of corporeal substances composed of matter and form. 13.1. The Substantial Unity of Corporeal Substances On a lower level of substantial unity than angelic unity we find the substantial unity of corporeal substances. Here we find the metaphysical union of the intrinsic principles of the corporeal substance: that of act of being and essence, and of matter and form. The substantial unity of corporeal substances gives rise to a high level of unity which cannot be broken without destroying the corporeal substance itself. This is why this type of unity is of a higher level than accidental unity for in the union of substance and an accident, the being of the substance (the subject) is not dependent upon its union with the accident, as for example, when a man receives a sun tan after staying outdoors all day, he does not cease to be a man. In all corporeal substances we find a complex unity of a real distinction of act of being and essence, and matter and form. The essences of corporeal substances are in need of matter in order to subsist. And such a dependence upon matter explains why corporeal substances are corruptible or perishable. When the matter of the corporeal substance can no longer support the form, there occurs the separation of the form from the matter, and the substance ceases to be. And as corporeal substances possess the accident quantity, they are subsequently divisible:

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extended parts can be separated from each other, giving rise to the dissolution of the corporeal substance. All corporeal substances are hylemorphic composites of matter and form. What is hylemorphism? 92 Hylemorphism is the theory of matter (hyle) and form (morphe) which states that every natural substance, that is, every complete material substance, is a composite of two essential intrinsic principles: one a principle of potentiality, viz., primary matter, and the other a principle of actuality, viz., substantial form. Every corporeal substance is essentially an individual thing compounded of two intrinsic essential principles (or one can say co-principles): primary matter and substantial form.93 In a material substance prime matter is potential, passive, and determinable. It is the root of passivity and receptivity. Because of it, the body can be acted upon, divided, moved, changed and corrupted. On the other hand, substantial form is actualizing, determining, and active. It is by virtue of its substantial form that a body maintains its own identity, possesses its own properties, acts, causes changes in other bodies, and makes itself known. Because of the substantial form the body is of a certain nature, belonging to a certain species. In virtue of the matter it is an individual embodiment of this nature, an individual member of this species. Every body of a same species has the same substantial form in different parcels of matter, and a body of a different species has a different substantial form as well as a different matter. Matter and form are intrinsic causes of every corporeal substance. Matter is an intrinsic cause by receiving the form and embodying it in a real individual being, and form is an intrinsic cause by its actualization of the matter and its determining it to a specific nature. Form is the principle of nature or species while matter is the principle of individuation. Every corporeal substance subsists as a synthesis of two essential complementary principles: prime matter (which is the subject of the substantial form), and the substantial form (which determines the matter to be in a determinate way). Matter and form are united as potency to act: matter is the potency of the form, the receptive subject of the formal act, and form is the act of the matter, a perfecting essential determination of the matter.94 There exists an ontological hierarchy within the substantial unity of corporeal substances: at the bottom of the ladder of corporeal being we have the world of the chemical elements (for example, sodium), then the domain of the chemical compounds (for example, salt); then vegetative life (plants, trees, flowers); then comes sensitive life (the animals); and finally, on top of the world of corporeal substances we find man, the human composite of soul and body.

Studies on hylemorphism: J. A. McWILLIAMS, Peripatetic Matter and Form, Thought, 1 (1926), pp. 237-246 ; B. GERRITY, The Relations Between the Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1936 ; J. GOHEEN, The Problem of Matter and Form in the De ente et essentia of Thomas Aquinas, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1939 ; J. PETERS, Matter and Form in Metaphysics, The New Scholasticism, 31 (1957), pp. 447-483 ; M. J. KELLY, St. Thomas and the Meaning and Use of Substance and Prime Matter, The New Scholasticism, 40 (1966), pp. 177-189 ; J. E. BOLZN, Hilemorfismo y corporalidad, Sapientia, 40 (1985), pp. 25-32. 93 Cf. M. MATTHEN, Individual Substances as Hylomorphic Complexes, in Aristotle Today, Essays on Aristotles Ideal of Science, ed. M. Matthen, Edmonton, 1986, pp. 151-176. 94 See: De principiis naturae ; De ente et essentia chapter 2; In 1 Physic., lect. 11-14; In VI1 Metaph., lect. 2, 7 ; In VIII Metaph., lect. 1; Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 65, a. 4, and q. 66, a.1 ; De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 8.

92

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As was explained, the hylemorphic theory of matter and form states that every corporeal substance is a composite of two essential intrinsic co-principles: prime matter, which is a principle of potentiality, and substantial form, which is a principle of actuality. The human person, a rational suppositum, an individual substance of a rational nature, is a corporeal substance and thus a hylemorphic composite compounded of two essential intrinsic principles of prime matter and substantial form. Since man is a living organism, his substantial form is one that is given the name of soul. Man is a hylemorphic composite of body and soul, his intellectual soul being the substantial form of his body. Between the first matter and the first form of every human person there is a bond of perfect substantial union. The body of man, which is first matter, is an incomplete substance, and his soul, which is first form, is likewise an incomplete substance. But the body and soul together as a hylemorphic composite make the one complete corporeal substance which is man, the individual substance of a rational nature.95 13.2. The Substantial Unity of the Separate Substances (Finite Pure Spirits) 96 13.2.1. The Composition of Act of Being and Essence in Separate Substances (Finite Pure Spirits) Of a higher level than the substantial unity of corporeal substances is the substantial unity of the separate substances or finite pure spirits,97 which, though having a real distinction between essence and act of being, nevertheless, are devoid of any essential composition of matter and form.98 These are the angels which come closest to the unity of God, but, being created beings, necessarily have a unity of composition, their composition being that of the real distinction between act of being and essence on the substantial level (though we must not forget that they are also composed of substance and accidents).99 As the separated substances have a created act of being, participating in the act of being given to them by God, there must be a real composition, a real distinction of essence and act of being in every separated substance. However, the separated substances unique way of being, its specific manner of being, which is
Cf. G. F. KREYCHE, The Soul-Body Problem in St. Thomas, The New Scholasticism, 46 (1972), pp. 466-484; C. S. ZAMOYTA, The Unity of Man: St. Thomas Solution to the Body-Soul Problem, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1957. 96 Studies on the separate substances according to St. Thomas: J. O. RIEDL, The ature of the Angels, in Essays in Thomism, ed. R. E. Brennan, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1942, pp. 113-148, 374-378 ; J. COLLINS, The Thomistic Philosophy of the Angels, Philosophical Studies (89), Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1947 ; F. J. LESCOE, Saint Thomas Aquinas on the Separate Substances, St. Joseph College, West Hartford, 1963 ; H. P. KAINZ, Separate Substances Revisited, The New Scholasticism, 44 (1970), pp. 550-564 ; G. TAVARD, Les anges, Les Editions du Cerfs, Paris, 1971 ; M. NEGRE, La incorporeidad de los ngeles, Estudio de la ST, I, 50, 1, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 1977 ; M. D. JORDAN, The Order of Lights: Aquinas on Immateriality as Hierarchy, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 52 (1978), pp. 113-120 ; J. I. SARANYANA, Sobre la inmaterialidad de las sustancias espirituales (Santo Toms versus Avicebron), Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica, 70 (1978), pp. 63-97 ; R. C. TAYLOR, St. Thomas and the Liber De Causis on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances, Mediaeval Studies, 41 (1979), pp. 506-513 ; J. M. VERNIER, Les anges chez Saint Thomas dAquin: Fondements Historiques et Principes Philosophiques, Angelologia (3), Nouvelles ditions Latines, Paris, 1986 ; M. ADLER, The Angels and Us, Macmillan, New York, 1988 ; T. KONDOLEON, The Argument from Motion and the Argument for Angels: A Reply to John F. X. Knasas, The Thomist, 62 (1998), pp. 269-290. 97 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 1, c . 98 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 2, c. 99 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3 ; Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 1, c ; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 52.
95

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its essence, is not divided into several individuals, there being a sole separated substance in each species. Each and every angel is its own species, exhausting in its own way all the perfections belonging to that species. And as the essence of the separated substance is incorporeal100, it cannot be divided and separated, so that the angel is neither potentially nor actually divisible. Finite Pure Spirits are Altogether Incorporeal: There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (q. 14, a. 8; q. 19, a. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to here and now. Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52, 57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8). But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone.101 Finite Pure Spirits are ot Composed of Matter and Form; They are Entirely Immaterial. The angels are purely spiritual creatures, subsistent forms without any matter in them: Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things. But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it
100 101

Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 5. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 1, c.

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would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter. It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial. But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God (q. 3).102 A Scotistic Objection and a Thomistic Response. In his work, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, Garrigou-Lagrange notes Scotus position that angels have also spiritual matter and gives the Angelic Doctors reply to such a position: Scotus says that the angels are composed of form and incorporeal matter, without quantity, because, being creatures, they must have an element of potentiality. The Thomistic reply runs thus: This potential element is first the angelic essence, really distinct, as in all creatures, from existence. Secondly, the real distinction between person and existence, between quod est and existence. Thirdly, real distinction of substance from faculties, and of faculties from acts. All these distinctions are explicitly formulated by St. Thomas himself.103 Each Separate Substance is Its Own Species. From their pure spirituality we conclude that there cannot be two angels of the same species because the only principle by which a substantial form can be individualized is matter, matter capable of this quantity rather of any other. Since the angels are purely spiritual, one can find in them no principle of individuation, no principle capable of multiplying within one and the same species. Form unreceived in matter is simply unique. St. Thomas writes in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 4, c.: Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species. But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above (a. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be
102 103

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 2, c. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, aa. 1, 2, 3.

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necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus.104
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 4, c. In article 8 of his De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Aquinas gives three reasons why all the angels differ in species from one another: The first reason is derived from the makeup of their substance. For it is necessary to say either that they are simple forms subsisting apart from matter, as was held above, or that they are forms that are composed of matter and form. Now if an angel is a simple form set apart from matter, it is impossible even to conceive several angels of one species; because any form whatever, however material and low, if it be set down as abstract either in actual being or in the intellect, remains but one form in one species. For let whiteness be understood as something subsisting apart from every subject and it will not be possible to posit many whitenesses, since we see that this whiteness does not differ from that whiteness save through the fact that it is in this or in that subject. In similar fashion, if there were an abstract human nature, there would be but one only. But if an angel is a substance that is composed of matter and form, it is necessary to say that the matters of different angels are somehow distinct. Now the distinction of matter from matter is found to be one of only two kinds: one according to the proper character of matter, and this is according to its relationship (habitudo) to different acts: for, since matter according to its proper character is in potency, whereas potency is spoken of in relation to act, a distinction among potencies and matters is made from the standpoint of the order of acts. And in this way the matter of lower bodies, which is a potency to actual being, differs from the matter of the heavenly bodies, which is a potency to place. The second distinction of matter, however, is based on quantitative division, inasmuch as matter which exists under these particular dimensions is distinguished from that which is under other dimensions. And the first distinction of matter causes a generic diversity because, according to the Philosopher in, V Metaphysica [28, 1024b 10], different things are generically different on a basis of matter. The second distinction of matter, however, causes a diversity of individuals within the same species. Now this second distinction of matter cannot exist among different angels, since angels are incorporeal and entirely without quantitative dimensions. The only remaining alternative; therefore, is that if there be many angels that are composed of matter and form, there is a distinction of matters among them according to the first mode: and thus it follows that they differ not only specifically but also generically. The second reason is derived from the order of the universe. For it is obvious that the good of the universe is of two kinds: something that is separate, namely, God, Who is, as it were, the leader in an army; and a certain something in things themselves, and this is the order of the parts of the universe, just as the order of the parts of the army is the good of the army. Hence the Apostle says in Romans XIII [1]: The things which are from God are ordered. Now the higher parts of the universe must have a greater share in the good of the universe, which is order. But those things in which there is order of themselves have a more perfect share in order than do those in which there is order only accidentally. Now it is obvious that among all the individuals of one species there is no order except accidentally: for they agree in the nature of the species and differ according to individuating principles and different accidents, which are related in an accidental way to the nature of the species. But things which differ in species have order of themselves and on a basis of their essential principles. For among the species of things, one is found to be greater than another, as is also the case in the species of numbers, as is said in VIII Metaphysica [3, 1043b 36]7. However, in the case of those lower things which are subject to generation and corruption and make up the lowest part of the universe and have a lesser share in order, not all different things are found to have order of themselves, but certain ones have order only accidentally as, for example, the individuals of one species. But in the higher part of the universe, namely, among the heavenly bodies, order is not found accidentally but only essentially, since all heavenly bodies differ from one another in species, and there are not among them several individuals of one species, but one sun only, and one moon, and so of the others. Much more so, therefore, in the highest part of the universe there are not to be found any beings that are ordered accidentally and not essentially. And so the only remaining alternative is that all angels differ from one another in species, according to a greater and a less perfection of simple forms, as a result of a greater or a less nearness to God, Who is pure act and of infinite perfection. But the third reason is derived from the perfection of the angelic nature. For each individual thing is said to be perfect when it lacks none of those things which pertain to it. And in fact the degree of this perfection can be calculated from the extremes of things. For to God, Who is at the apex of perfection, none of the things which belong to the character of actual being as a whole is lacking; for He has beforehand in Himself absolutely and in the highest degree all the perfections of things, as Dionysius says [De Divinis ominibus, V, lec. 1]. But an individual in the lowest part of the world which contains beings that are subject to generation and corruption is found to be
104

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Separate Substances are Incorruptible of Their Own ature: It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above (a. 2), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature. A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.105 13.2.2. The High Degree of Unity of Knowledge of the Separate Substances (Finite Pure Spirits) So we find a high degree of unity in the angel, a being composed only of essence and act of being (and, of course, also substance and accidents), devoid of any composition of matter and form. But even with regard to the separated substances unity of activity, we find a very high degree of unity: there is manifested a great simplicity in the angels intellectual operations, having a capacity for knowledge far surpassing that of man, who must initially gather all his knowledge from sensible experience. Mans intellectual operation is limited, slow, and laborious, compared to the non-discursive process of knowledge that properly belongs to the separated

perfect from the fact that it has whatever pertains to itself, according to its own individual character, but not whatever pertains to its own specific nature, since its own specific nature is also found in other individual beings. And this quite obviously pertains to imperfection, not only in the case of animals that are subject to generation, among which one animal needs another of its own species for common life, but also in the case of all animals that are generated in any way whatever from semen, in which the male needs the female of its own species in order to generate; and further, in the case of all beings that are subject to generation and corruption, wherein a group of individuals of one species is necessary in order that the specific nature, which cannot be perpetually conserved in one individual being because of its corruptibility, may be conserved in many. But in the higher part of the universe a higher degree of perfection is found, wherein one individual being, such as the sun, is so perfect that it lacks none of the things that pertain to its own species, and hence also the whole matter of the species is contained in one individual being; and the same is true of the other heavenly bodies. Much more so, therefore, this perfection is found in the highest part of created things which is nearest to God, namely, among the angels: that one individual lacks none of the things which pertain to a whole species, and thus there are not several individuals in one species. But God, Who is at the summit of perfection, does not agree with any other being, not only in species but not even in genus, nor in any other univocal predicate.(De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 8, c.). 105 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 5, c.

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substances. The angel does not have to have recourse to sensible experience nor to abstraction, or to the comparison of ideas for its knowledge. As was said, angels have a very high degree of unity as regards their manner of knowing, much superior to that of men. However, as high as this level of unity of knowledge may be, it must be stated that the act of an angels understanding cannot be identified with the very substance itself that is the angel. Being and operation are not the same in the angel; only in God are being and will and understanding identified. St. Thomas writes: It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action. Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angels substance would neither be distinguished from Gods substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel. Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.106 An angels operation of understanding is not identical to its act of being; only in God is this so: The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agents existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act to understand, of which the object is the true; and the act to will, of which the object is the good; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; Gods being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. om. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.107 And the angels faculty or operative power of intellect is not identical to its essence; it has an intellect, it is not intellect: Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
106 107

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, a. 1, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, a. 2, c.

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operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (q. 44, a. 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angels essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.108 Now let us make a comparison betweeen a human intellect (and the process of human understanding), and an angels, which has a higher degree of unity of understanding. In mans mind, there is an active and a passive power: an agent intellect that works upon the findings of the senses, rendering them understandable, and a passive intellect which receives the understandable objects, expressing them in the human intelligence as expressed intelligible species, that is, as ideas or concepts. An angel, on the other hand, doesnt have to work out its process of knowledge in such a way: it is endowed, by its very nature, with knowledge from God at its creation. Being incorporeal substances, angels do not work out their knowledge having need to begin from the knowledge of the senses. There is no distinction between an active and passive faculty in the angels intellect. Its knowledge is not acquired by means of a laborious effort, which is the case with man. St. Thomas explains: The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect. But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.109 There is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Separated Substances: In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (q. 51, a. 1). Hence of the souls powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
108 109

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, a. 3, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, a. 4, c.

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The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called intellects and minds, as was said above (a. 3, ad 1). A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that such an inquiry does not call for much labor. Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we sense it. And hence it is that we use the word sentence. Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (q. 57, a. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion a perverted phantasy is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.110 Separated Substances Do ot Know All Things by Their Essence; Their Intellects eed to be Perfected by Some Species in Order to Know Things: The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angels essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.111 Finite Pure Spirits Understand, ot by Species Drawn from Things, But by Species Connatural to Them. While the proper object of mans intellect is the intelligible being of sense objects, the proper object of the created pure spirits intellect is the intelligible reality of spiritual creatures. Thus, the proper intelligible object of each particular angel is that angels own essence, just as Gods proper intelligible object is His own divine essence. In consequence, the human idea by which man knows, is an abstract and universal idea, drawn forth, by the agent intellect,
110 111

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 54, a. 5, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 55, a. 1, c.

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from particular sense objects. In contrast to this, the angels idea, not being drawn from external sense objects, is a natural endowment of the angels intellect, infused into it by God at the moment of creation. Thus, the angels idea is at once universal and concrete. These angelic ideas, which are infused ideas, are participations in Gods own creative ideas. Aquinas writes in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 55, a. 2, c.: The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances that is to say, human souls have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances that is, the angels the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally. The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances that is, souls have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances that is, the angels are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature.112 Gilson observes that the very nature of the being conferred by God on the angels brings with it an original mode of knowing. It cannot in any way resemble abstraction, by which man discovers the intelligible buried in the sensible. Nor can it in any way resemble that act by which God is the intelligible and at the same time apprehends it. It can only be a knowledge acquired through species which are received by the intelligence and which enlighten it. But such species are purely intelligible; that is, proportionate to a completely incorporeal being. To satisfy all these conditions, we say that angels know things through species which are connatural to them; that is, by innate species. All the intelligible essences which pre-existed from eternity in God in the form of ideas proceeded from Him at the moment of creation in two distinct and parallel lines. On the one hand, they were individuated in material beings and constituted their forms. On the other, they flowed into angelic substances, thus conferring upon them knowledge of things. We can say then that the intellect of angels is suprior to our human intellect, just as a being endowed with form is superior to formless matter. And if our intellect is like a blank tablet on which nothing is written, the intellect of the angel is rather like a canvas covered with its painting or, better, like a mirror reflecting the luminous essence of things.113
112 113

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 55, a. 2, c. E. GILSON, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Random House, New York, 1956, pp. 169-170.

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The Higher Separated Substances Understand by Fewer umber of Species, the Lower by More umber of Species. The higher an angel is in the hierarchy of being, having more esse and less potentiality limitation of its essence, the stronger will his intelligence be and the fewer its ideas, since they are more rich and universal. We see here that the higher angels have more simplicity than the lower angels, who have need of more species to understand.114 St. Thomas explains: For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower. Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.115 A Finite Pure Spirits Intellect, in Its atural Knowing, Has Its Full Knowledge, Yet It is ot Always Considering Everything that It Knows: As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, as before learning or discovering, that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider. In the first way an angels intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun. In the second way an angels intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by
In Compendium theologiae, chapter 78, Aquinas states: Since the nature of a beings activity is in keeping with its substance, the higher intellectual substances must understand in a more perfect way, inasmuch as they have intelligible species and powers that are more universal and are more unified. On the other hand, intellectual substances that are less perfect must be weaker in intelligence, and must have species that are more numerous and less universal. 115 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 55, a. 3, c. Gilson writes: The innate possession of intelligible species is common to all angels and is characteristic of their nature. But all angels do not possess the same species; and here we are coming to the basis of their distinction. What constitutes relative superiority among created beings is their greater or lesser proximity and resemblance ti the first being, God. Now Gods total fullness of knowledge is all together at one single point His essence, in which He knows all things. This intelligible fullness is in created intelligences, but in an inferior way and less simply. The intelligences inferior to God know by a multiplicity of means what God knows in a single object. The lower the nature of the intelligence, the more numerous its means of knowing. In brief, the superiority among angels is greater the fewer the species necessary for them to apprehend all intelligibles(E. GILSON, op. cit., p. 170).
114

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natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).116 Finite Pure Spirits Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time. An angels knowledge arising from the beatific vision is all possessed at once, whereas in the sphere of its natural knowledge an angel may think of many things at once if these things are comprised under the same concept or species. But things comprised under various concepts or species cannot be all thought of at once by any created intellect. As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects. Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.117 A Separated Substances Knowledge is on-Discursive. Human intellectual knowledge is developed through a step by step process, advancing from what is unknown to what is known. This is called discursive reasoning. An angel does not require this discursive reasoning as in whatsoever area of its natural knowledge the angelic intellect is utilized, it beholds the entire picture. It sees the entire thing thought about together with its implications and consequences, not needing to go from fact to fact, from point to point, to grasp the whole situation. The nature of its ideas, at once universal and concrete, make the angels knowledge intuitive, not in any way successive and discursive. It sees at a glance the particular in the universal, the conclusion in the principle, and the means in the end. The Angelic Doctor explains: As has often been stated (a. 1; q. 55, a. 1), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them heavenly minds (a. 1; q. 55, a. 1).
116 117

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 1, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 2, c.

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Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them. Therefore they are called intellectual beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood (intelligi); hence intellect is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called rational; and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.118 Finite Pure Spirits Understand Without Composition or Division. Man works out his knowledge by composing and dividing, and from his consequent judgments he proceeds to work out other judgments through discursive reasoning. An angel, on the other hand, does not have need of composing, dividing, or discursive reasoning as its knowledge is not built up by abstraction from the data provided by the senses. In its natural knowing, it has its full knowledge and there is nothing for it to learn (though it is not always considering everything that it knows). An angels mind is like a mirror that takes in the entire meaning of what it centers upon. Since the angels ideas are at once universal and concrete, making the knowledge of the angel intuitive and not successive and discursive, its act of judging does not proceed by comparing and separating different ideas. Instead, by its purely intuitive apprehension of the essence of a thing, it sees at once all characteristics of that essence. The Angelic Doctor wrties: As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said (a. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. om. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.

118

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 3, c.

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Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially.119 o Falsehood, Error, or Deception Can Exist in the Mind of a Finite Pure Spirit as Regards Its atural Knowledge. Lacking a sensitive nature, a separated substance, not making decisions on the basis of passion, has no possibility of revising its decision as passion changes. As it lacks a rational nature proper to man, it does not reason but grasps each object with all the clarity and unchangeableness with which mans intellect grasps the immediately known principles. Thus, for the mind of the finite pure spirit, no error regarding the natural conditions of things is possible, and so no change of decision on account of previous error. The created pure spirits will, therefore, adheres unchangeably to any decision it makes. Though an angels intuitive vision is infallible, not being able to make a mistake in its natural knowledge, nevertheless, it can deceive itself in the supernatural order (for example, it can make a mistake in its determination as to whether this or that particular man or woman is in a state of grace or not). An angel can also deceive itself in the forecasting of contingent future events, above all in determining the future free acts of men.120 It can also err in determining the secrets of mens hearts, secrets in no way linked with the nature of our soul or with external physical realities.121 Thomas writes: The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said (a. 4) that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, a four-footed flying beast, for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as they exist. So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on Gods supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of
119 120

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 4, c. Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 57, a. 3. 121 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 57, a. 4.

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the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, they may judge Him not to be God. From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division.122 Above the unity of composition found in separate substances, we reach the highest unity: the unity of simplicity which is that of God Himself, Pure Act of Being, devoid of any potentiality whatsoever; where is found no physical, or metaphysical composition whatsoever, as well as no logical composition of genus and specific difference. In God there is no real distinction between essence and act of being. He is Ipsum Esse Subsistens. 14. The Unity of Simplicity: Absolute Divine Simplicity (The Simplicity of God) When we hear the words simplicity and simple spoken we think of that which is not adulterated or diluted; we imagine something that is pure and not watered-down. Though simple can also refer to simpletons, it nevertheless has a moral meaning, as a simple person can refer to someone who is free from deceit, trickery, and deviousness. We observe that a child is simple, that is, he is transparent. We speak of a childs outlook as simple, writes GarrigouLagrange, because it goes straight to the point; it has no concealed motives; its inclination is not in several directions at once. When a child says a thing, it is not thinking of something else; when it says yes, it does not mean no; it is not two-faced or deceitful. Our Lord tells us: If thy eye be single [simple], thy whole body will be lightsome. That is, if our intention is straightforward and simple, then there will be a unity, truth, and transparency in our whole life, instead of its being divided as it is with those who seek to serve two masters, God and wealth. And when we consider the complexity of motive, the insincerity we find in the world and the complications arising from lying and deceit, we cannot help feeling that the moral virtue of simplicity, of candor and uprightness, is the reflection of a divine perfection. As St. Thomas says, Simplicity makes the intention right by excluding duplicity.123124 Great persons, such as old wise and holy men and women, and above all, the saints, are also referred to as being simple persons. Garrigou-Lagrange explains: Gods simplicity is an unalterable unity, the simplicity of the unchanging supreme wisdom and of the purest and strongest love of the good, remaining ever the same and infinitely surpassing our susceptibility and unstable opinions. We have a glimpse of this divine simplicity when we consider the soul that has acquired a simple outlook, so that it is now able to judge of all things wisely in the light of God and to desire nothing but for His sake. The complex soul, on the other hand, is one that bases all its
122 123

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 58, a. 5, c. Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 4. 124 R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Providence, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1937, pp. 80-81.

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judgments on the varying impressions caused by the emotions and that desires things from motives of self-interest with its changing caprices, now clinging to them obstinately, now changing with every mood or with time and circumstances. And whereas the complex soul is agitated by mere trifles, the soul that has acquired simplicity of purpose, by reason of its wisdom and unselfish love, is always at rest. The gift of wisdom brings peace, that tranquility which comes from order, together with that unity and harmony which characterize the simplified life united with God. The souls of such men as St. Joseph, St. John, St. Francis, St. Dominic, the Cur of Ars give us some idea of this simplicity of God; but still more the soul of Mary, and especially the holy soul of Jesus, who said: If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome. That is, if your soul is simple in its outlook, it will be in all things enlightened, steadfast, loyal, sincere, and free from all duplicity. Be ye wise as serpents [so as not to be seduced by the world], and simple as doves, so as to remain always in Gods truth. I confess to Thee, O Father,because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones. Let your speech be yea, yea: no, no125 In the Old Testament we read: Seek the Lord in simplicity of heart126; Better is the poor man that walketh in his simplicity, than a rich man that is perverse in his lips and unwise.127 Let us all die in our innocency, cried the Machabees amid the injustices that oppressed them.128 Obeyin the simplicity of heart, said St. Paul129; and he admonishes the Corinthians not to lose the simplicity that is in Christ.130 This simplicity, says Bossuet, enables an introverted soul to comprehend even the heights of God, the ways of Providence, the unfathomable mysteries which to a complex soul are a scandal, the mysteries of infinite justice and mercy, and the supreme liberty of the divine good pleasure. All these mysteries, in spite of their transcendence and obscurity, are simple for those of simple vision. The reason is that, in divine matters, the simplest things, such as the Our Father, are also the most profoundIn the things of God simplicity is combined with depth and loftiness; for the sublimest of divine things as also the deepest things of our heart, are simplicity itself.131 But what about metaphysical simplicity and its application to the Supreme Being? Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, recounts that Plato considered the Supreme Principle, the One, to be simple, and that the individual beings that come closer to the One participate in its simplicity.132 Aristotle himself had attributed simplicity to that which is first, whether it be primary absolutely or first in each and every genus. Thus, for the Stagirite, simplicity is
Matt. 10:16; 11:25; 5:37. Wis. 1:1. 127 Prov. 19:1. 128 1 Mach. 2:37. 129 Col. 3:22. 130 2 Cor. 11:3. 131 R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., pp. 83-85. 132 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, 989b 16; 1059b 35. For Platos writings on the simplicity of the Supreme Principle, the One, see: Republic, 380d ; 382e.
126 125

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predicated of the First Unmoved Mover.133 St. Augustine wrote of God as being the Absolute Divine Simplicity, stressing in the ninth chapter of the eleventh book of De civitate Dei (The City of God) that there is no real distinction between Gods Nature and His Divine Properties.134 The most complete and profound treatment of the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God is found in the first book of the Angelic Doctors Summa Contra Gentiles (chapters 16-27), the eleven articles of question 7 of De Potentia Dei, and in the eight articles of the third question of the Pars Prima of the Summa Theologiae.135 We have reached the highest level of unity in our hierarchy of degrees of transcendental unity, which is none other than the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God. The unity of simplicity is the unity of a being devoid of parts or of a multiplicity of constituent principles and elements. God does not have any parts, nor does He have a multiplicity of constituent principles, nor is He compounded of elements. There is absolutely no physical or metaphysical composition or compounding, nor is there logical composition of genus and specific difference, in the Supreme Being.136 In the eight articles of the third question of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae, the Angelic Doctor treats of the simplicity of God, explaining how: 1. God cannot be a body; 2. That there can be no matter in God; 3. That in God there is no composition of essence or nature and suppositum; 4. That there can also be no composition of essence and act of being in God (there is rather an identification of the two. Essentia and esse are not really distinct in God; Gods essence is To Be); 5. That there can also be no logical composition of generic nature and specific difference in Him; 6. That there can be no accidents in God, that there is no composition of substance and accidents in Him; 7. That God is altogether simple; He is the Absolute Divine Simplicity; and lastly, 8. Against pantheism, St. Thomas shows that God does not enter into the composition of things; He is not the world, nor is He part of the world. Regarding the concept of simplicity as being not merely a negation of parts but being also a positive perfection, Renard writes: The concept of simplicity, which we obtain by denying composition, denotes much more, however, than a mere negation of parts. It designates a positive
See: L. ELDERS, Aristotles Theology, Van Gorcum and Co., Assen, 1972, p. 140. Studies on the Divine Simplicity in St. Augustine: R. R. LA CROIX, Augustine on the Simplicity of God, The New Scholasticism, 51 (1977), pp. 453-469 ; W. J. WAINWRIGHT, Augustine on Gods Simplicity: A Reply to Richard La Croix, The New Scholasticism, 53 (1979), pp. 118-123 ; R. R. LA CROIX, Wainwright, Augustine, and Gods Simplicity: A Final Word, The New Scholasticism, 53 (1979), pp. 124-127. 135 Studies on the Absolute Divine Simplicity of God in St. Thomas: J. S. MORREAL, Divine Simplicity and Divine Properties, The Journal of Critical Analysis (NJ), 7 (1978), pp. 67-70 ; W. E. MANN, Divine Simplicity, Religious Studies, 18 (1982), pp. 451-471 ; E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN, Absolute Simplicity, Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 353-382 ; W. HASKER, Simplicity and Freedom : A Response to Stump and Kretzmann, Faith and Philosophy, 3 (1986), pp. 192-201 ; E. STUMP and N. KRETZMANN, Simplicity Made Plainer: A Reply to Rosss Absolute Simplicity, Faith and Philosophy, 4 (1987), pp. 198-201 ; L. DEWAN, Saint Thomas, Alvin Platinga, and the Divine Simplicity, The Modern Schoolman, 66 (1989), pp. 141-153 ; P. BURNS, The Status and Function of Divine Simpleness in the Summa Theologiae Ia, qq. 2-13, The Thomist, 57 (1993), pp. 126 ; E. SWEENEY, Thomas Aquinas Double Metaphysics of Simplicity and Infinity, International Philosophical Quarterly, 33 (1993), pp. 297-317. Studies on the Divine Simplicity in general: B. DAVIES, Classical Theism and the Doctrine of the Divine Simpicity, in Language, Meaning, and God: Essays in Honor of Herbert McCabe, Ed. B. Davies, 1987, pp. 51-74. 136 Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, I, ch. 28.
134 133

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perfection, a definite disposition, because of which a being need not be made of parts. Like unity which is not a mere denial of division, but connotes a subject, simplicity establishes the reality of being as a foundation for the negation of parts. It indicates, therefore, a very great perfection; and, as St. Thomas explains, in the same kind or genus of being, the more noble and perfect a thing is, the more simple it must be.137 14.1. God is ot a Body Against those who maintain God to be a body, like the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614-1687) who spatialized God, conceiving the Deity to be an infinite extended entity, identified with absolute space and intelligible extension,138 we answer that God is not a body.139 That God is not a body (a body being defined as a substance that is extended according to three dimensions) can be argued in a number of ways in based on reason. One way is taken from the primary property of corporeal reality, which is mutability. This proof discusses body as a physical entity. o body is in motion unless it is put in motion (we see this truth by simple induction. Moving here should be understood in an active sense, applying in the first place to the agent causing a local movement, but the principle is universally true for causing a change in a body always implies that the acting body itself changes. That no body moves without being moved is even acknowledged by modern physics in its law of action and reaction, as for any action energy is needed and thus a change is introduced into the acting body). But we know that the prima via a posteriori quia demonstration ex parte motus arrives at God as the First Unmoved Mover, without any potentiality whatsoever. Therefore, God cannot be a body.140
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, p. 24. Cf. A KOYR, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, New York, 1958, 151ff. The pantheist Spinoza erroneously held infinite extension to be an attribute of God, who he then identifies with Nature (Deus sive atura). 139 God is not a body affirms the Angelic Doctor. This can be shown, he says, in three ways: First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has already been proved (q. 2, a. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has already been proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality, because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore, its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 1, c.). 140 Garrigou-Lagrange replies to those who object to the major (that no body is in motion unless it is put in motion): Against the major there is the difficulty of attraction, since the magnet attracts other bodies to itself, although it is not itself set in motion. In reply to this we say that, although the magnet has this property of attraction, its action is not its own, its power to act is not its action; for this it would have to be its own being, because operation follows being, and the mode of operation the mode of being. Therefore the magnet is moved invisibly by the first Mover, at least as a qualitative motion. Moreover, as Cajetan observes, the magnet can also be moved locally, and every moving body is moved at least as in potentiality for this, since it is by nature apt to be moved, and this suffices to distinguish it from the absolutely immobile first mover (this immobility not being that of inertia but of perfection), which is the terminus of the first way in proving Gods existence. Hence the major can be construed as meaning: every body is mobile. But God is the first immobile Mover. Therefore He is not a body(R. GARRIGOULAGRANGE, The One God, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1943, p. 172).
138 137

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A second proof showing that God is not a body is a proof wherein the quantitative aspect of the body is considered, inasmuch as the parts of the body are continuous. Every body is in potentiality, at least because the continuous is divisible to infinity. But God is pure act, devoid of potentiality whatsoever. Therefore, God is not a body. This second proof argues from the fact that a body is extended and therefore is infinitely divisible. Now, divisibility involves potentiality. But our prima via shows that God is actus purus without potentiality whatsoever. Therefore, God cannot be a body. A third proof can be given wherein the metaphysical aspect of bodies is highlighted. The noblest of all beings cannot be a body. This is our major. We know that certain beings are nobler than others. Living things such plants are nobler than non-living things such as rocks and pebbles. The former have a higher degree of participation in the act of being (esse) than the latter. Other living beings, such as elephants and lions, which have various external and internal senses, are nobler than plants. Again, the former have a higher degree of participation in esse than the latter. And we know that man, who has not just the external and internal senses, but also the intellectual faculties of intellect and will, and also an immortal soul, is nobler than elephants and lions, that cannot reason and will and do not have immortal souls. Man has a particularly high, intensive participation in esse given to him by God. Now, God is the noblest of all beings, being the Supreme Being (the conclusion of the fourth way). He is Pure Act of Being, the Maxime Ens. Therefore, God cannot be a body. Many thinkers held God to be a body for they did not know when Sacred Scripture speaks metaphorically of Gods arm, right hand and so forth. Hence the following objections: Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea (Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body. Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure, i.e. the image, of His substance (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body. Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. Hast thou an arm like God? (Job 40:4); and The eyes of the Lord are upon the just(Ps. 33:16); and The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength(Ps. 117:16). Therefore God is a body. Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: I saw the Lord sitting(Is. 6:1), and He standeth up to judge(Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body.

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Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term wherefrom or whereto. But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term whereto, according to the words, Come ye to Him and be enlightened (Ps. 33:6), and as a term wherefrom: All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth(Jer. 17:13). Therefore God is a body.141 Against the above objections, it must be affirmed that God is not is not a body. God is a spirit and is therefore not a body. Our Lord said to the Samaritain woman: God is spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and truth.142 We read in the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans: The invisible things of Him from the Creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.143 In the Acts of the Apostles, we read St. Paul preaching to the Athenians, saying: We must not suppose the divinity to be like unto gold or silver or stone, the graving of art and device of man.144 And Vatican I declares: The Holy Catholic Church believes that there is one true and living Godabsolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance.145 St. Thomas responds to the five objections above as follows by explaining the metaphors of Sacred Scripture, when it speaks of the height or depth or God and of His knowledge: Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above (q. 1, a. 9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. om. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection. Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it is added, And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God. Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

141 142

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 1, objections 1-5. John 4:24. 143 Romans 1:20. 144 Acts 17:29. 145 Denz., 1782.

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Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.146 14.2. God is ot Composed of Matter and Form Why the need to show that God is not composed of matter and form when one has already proved, with three arguments, that God is not a body, which implies that there is no matter in Him? First of all, to respond to certain passages in sacred Scripture which seem to show that there is composition of matter and form in God (e.g., Hebrews 10:38). Secondly, to respond to those who place matter in God to explain His individuality. Thirdly, to reject the view according to which all beings are composed of contraries. It is to be recalled that during Aquinas time his friend Bonaventure and a number of other theologians held angels to be composed of (spiritual) matter and form. God is not composed of matter and form because 1. Matter is passive potency, but in God, on the contrary, there cannot be any such potency, He being the Pure Act, a fact which has been arrived at in the conclusion of the prima via; 2. A being composed of matter and form has its goodness by its form. It is good by participation inasmuch as its matter is a substrate participating in a form. God, however, is the Supreme Good, Goodness Itself. Therefore, He is good by essence and not at all by participation; and 3. Every agent acts by its form. It has the same proportion to its form as it has to its activity. Now, God is the first agent, acting by Himself (per se agens). Consequently, He must also be form by Himself. Any composition with matter in Gods being would limit and hamper His activity. In Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 2, c., Aquinas explains how God is not composed of matter and form: It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (q. 2, a. 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best viz. God is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.147

146 147

Summa Theologiae, I, a. 3, a. 1, ad 1-5. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 2, c.

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14.3. God is His Own Essence (Essentia) Regarding the relation of God as a being to His essence or nature we say this: material things share in some specific nature, but as individuals they are not entirely identical with it. Individual matter, with the accidents which make up the characteristics of the individual, is not contained in the definition of the species. On the other hand, beings without matter, like the angels, are distinguished from one another by themselves. Their specific essence is identical with what they are.148 Thefore, God, who is absolutely without matter, exists by Himself and is His deity and life. God is His own essence. He is a form existing of itself whose essence is to be God. But if God is His Godhead then why do we use the concrete noun God and the abstract noun Godhead? The Doctor Communis writes: We can speak of simple things only as though they were life the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore, in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God. 149 In God suppostium and nature are identical whereas in created things there is a composition between suppositum and nature. In the order of created things the suppositum is the complete subsisting being, of which the nature is the essential part. Thus, suppostium is really distinct from the nature, as the whole is from its principal part. So we say that man has humanity and do not say that man is his humanity. God, on the other hand, is His essence or nature. He is His Godhead; He is Deity. Man, on the other hand, is not his humanity, because the whole is not its part, but has its part. We read in Sacred Scripture that Jesus said: I am the way, and the truth, and the life,150 and not I have truth and life, or merely I am true or truthful and living. Also we read in the Bible: God is love151 and not only has love. The Council of Reims states: We believe and confess that the simple nature of the Divinity is God, nor can it be denied in any Catholic sense that the Divinity is God and God is the Divinity.152 Regarding how God is His own essence, the Doctor Communis writes: God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum, because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity
148

One should note that we do not say that an angel, the Archangel Michael for example, being a pure subsistent form apart from matter, is therefore his Michaelness. This is false, since Michaelness is only an essential part of Michael, who in addition to this has the act of being (esse) and accidents. But is should be observed that from the very fact that God is a pure form without matter we must exclude from Him individuating principles that are distinct from the common nature; likewise in the angel there are no individuating principles distinct from the nature. 149 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a.3, ad 1. 150 John 14:6. 151 1 John 4:8. 152 Denz., 389.

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signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is a man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholely identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter that is to say, to this matter the very forms being individualized of themselves, it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever is thus predicated of Him.153 14.4. God is His Own Act of Being (Esse) In God, essence and act of being (esse) are the same or identical, and so God is not composed in the order of being. If in God these two metaphysical principles were different, two contradictions would follow, namely: 1. Since essence would have to be ordered to esse as potency to act, for from two acts in the order of being, two beings would result, it would follow that there is potency on God, which is impossible; and 2. If these two metaphysical principles were different in a being, there would needs be an extrinsic agent to bring them together in composition. But God is completely uncaused. Therefore in God essence and act of being are absolutely identical. In God essentia and esse are identical. Three arguments can be given to show why this is so: 1. The first argument reasons from what is implied in the fact that a beings essence is not its esse. Whatever is in a thing outside its essence must be caused either by the thing itself or by an outside cause. Now, the act of being (esse) cannot be caused by the essence, which does not exist prior to its receiving its being. Hence it must be caused by an outside cause. But we have seen in the conclusions to the secunda via and quarta via that God is the First Being and so He cannot depend on an outside cause; 2. When we focus on what the act of being of a thing brings about, it becomes obvious that in God it cannot be different from His essence, for esse is the actualization and actuality of each form. It follows that with regard to essence, esse has the function of act, to which the essence is related as potency. In God, however, there is no potentiality whatsoever (prima via ex parte motus). Therefore, Gods essence cannot be distinguished from His act of being (esse); and 3. If God were only to have esse and not be esse, then He would be a being by participation and not being by essence. God would consequently no longer be the First Being, which is impossible. Therefore, in God essence and act of being are identical. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4, c. explains how God is His own act of being: This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man and is caused by the constituent
153

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 3, c.

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principles of the species), or by some exterior agent as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the act of being (esse) of a thing differs from its essence, this act of being (esse) must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a things act of being (esse) to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own act of being (esse), if its act of being (esse) is caused. Therefore that thing, whose act of being (esse) differs from its essence, must have its act of being (esse) caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His act of being (esse) should differ from His essence. Secondly, act of being (esse) is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore act of being (esse) must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above (a. 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from act of being (esse). Therefore His essence is His act of being (esse). Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has act of being (esse) but is not act of being (esse), is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above (a. 3); if, therefore, He is not His own act of being (esse) He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being which is absurd. Therefore God is His own act of being (esse), and not merely His own essence.154 Gods simplicity is an existential simplicity. He is not just perfect simplicity in the order of essence but absolute simplicity in the order of existence. Whereas an angelic form is not its own act of being (esse), but is really distinct from it, and therefore is an imperfect simplicity, since it implies imperfection of part, God, on the other hand, because He is the cause of created esse, because He is the Unmoved Mover, the First Uncaused Cause, and Unparticipated Being, is Esse Itself. Gods essence is To Be. He is therefore, existentially, and thus absolutely, simple. He is Simplicity Itself. 14.5. God is ot Contained in a Genus In God there is no composition of genus and specific difference. The perfection of Gods essence cannot be classified according to genus and specific difference, as can, for example, the essence of man, which is rational animal. This is so because the essence of God is one with His act of being (esse). His essence is identified with His Being. And being, as is learned in general metaphysics, transcends all species and genera. Therefore the divine essence has no logical parts. Aquinas writes: A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is
154

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4, c.

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compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus being, because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity i.e. essence must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.155 Showing how God is not under a genus as an inference deduced from the simplicity of God in the existential order, Renard writes: The logical distinction between genus and specific difference results from the fact of a real composition between distinct parts, of a lack of simplicity in a being. In corporeal entities, for example, the essential composition of matter and form founds and explains the various genera and specific differences.156 On the other hand, in the pure form which is the angelic essence, the explanation for the different specific perfection is due to the real distinction between the essence and the to be.157 Consequently, because to be under a genus supposes some composition and, therefore, a lack of simplicity, we must say that God alone is not under a genus, for He alone is absolutely simple. That is why we cannot ever define God. God has no definition, because He is To Be.158 14.6. There are o Accidents in God In God there are no accidents and so He is not composed of substance of accidents, that is, He is not composed in the order of activity. For substance is in potency to its accidents, for it receives these accidents and is perfected by them. But in God there is no potentiality whatsoever (prima via ex parte motus). Therefore, there can be no accidents in Him. Renard observes: Since God is absolutely simple, His operations are identical with his To Be. It follows that no accidental actuation is possible. The reason is that not only would such actuation presuppose

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 5, c. Genus is from matter. Genus sumitur a materia. This does not mean that matter is the genus. By no means. Matter is not the genus, but it explains why there is a genus. Cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 13; cf. C. Boyer, Cursus Philosophicus, I, p. 344. 157 Cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 6; C. Boyer, loc. cit. 158 H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1952, p. 82.
156

155

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some potential factor in God, and hence a lack of simplicity, but it would result in further composition. God, however, is absolutely simple.159 Explaining how there are no accidents in God, Thomas writes in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 6, c.: From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown (q. 2, a. 3). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.160 14.7. God is the Absolute Divine Simplicity God is the Absolute Divine Simplicity for 1. What is composed is posterior to its components, at least in the order of generation and material causality. But God is the First Being so that there is no posterior in Him; 2. What is composed has a cause, but God has no cause (He is the Uncaused Cause); 3. In every composition there is actuality and potentiality. However, there is no potentiality in God whatsoever; and 4. In every composed being there is something which does not belong to one or the other of its parts. In other words, there is something in it which it is not itself. But because God is pure act of being (esse) itself, this cannot apply to Him. In Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 7, c. we read: The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His suppositum; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (q. 2, a. 3), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for
159 160

Ibid. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 6, c.

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instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim.161 14.8. God Does ot Enter Into the Composition of Other Things Against the various forms of partial pantheism common during the time of St. Thomas, we affirm that God cannot enter into the composition of other things either the formal principle or as the matter of the world. Three proofs for this are given by Aquinas, from the truth that God is 1. The First Efficient Cause; 2. The first and essential Agent; and 3. the first and unparticipated Being: On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the worldsoul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (q. 3, a. 1): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (q. 2, a. 3).162 15. The Supreme Unity of God 15.1. God is One This section is not about the absence of division in God, for we have already seen, in our treatment of the absolute divine simplicity, that God is absolutely indivisible since there is no physical composition, metaphysical composition, or logical composition of genus and specific
161 162

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 7, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 8, c.

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difference in Him. Rather, this section focuses on Gods unicity. A being, however, is said to be unique if there cannot be or at least are not other beings of the same species or genus. Therefore, God is unique if there cannot be many Gods. But unicity has its foundation in unity and as regards the unicity of God, in the absolute indivisibility of the Deity. Those who deny Gods unity include the polytheists and those who admit of two principles, one good and the other evil, such as the Gnostics, the Marcionites, the Valentinians of the second century, the Manicheans of the third century, the Albigensians of the thirteenth century, and the Tritheists of the sixteenth century, who, with an erroneous doctrine concerning the Blessed Trinity, held the error that there were three Gods. Against these errors it must be affirmed that there is of necessity but one God. The Old and New Testaments have many references affirming monotheism. In the book of Deuteronomy, for example, we read: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.163 In the New Testament, St. Paul, insistently stresses, against pagan polytheism, the necessity of belief in the one God: We know that an idol is nothing in the world and that there is no God but one.164 The first words of the Nicene Creed are: I believe in one God.165 The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 declares: We firmly believe that there is only one true Godthe one principle of all things.166 This truth is also affirmed in the First Vatican Council of 1870.167 In the third article of the eleventh question of the Prima Pars, St. Thomas gives three proofs from reason affirming Gods unicity, namely, proofs from 1. Gods simplicity; 2. Gods infinity; and 3. the unity and order of the world: It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is this particular thing is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

163 164

Deut., 6:4. 1 Cor. 8:4. Cf. Acts 14:14; 17:23; Rom. 3:29; Eph. 4:6; 1 Tim. 1:17; 1 Tim. 2:5. 165 Denz., 54, 86. 166 Denz., 428. 167 Denz., 1782, 1801.

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Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the per se cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so per se and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.168 15.2. God is Supremely One What is supremely being and supremely undivided is supremely one. But God is supremely being for He is the self-subsisting being (Ipsum Esse Subsistens) and supremely undivided, for He is the absolute divine simplicity. Therefore, God is supremely one. God alone is essential unity, for creatures only have unity as an entity by participation: Since one is an undivided being, if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree.169

168 169

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 3, c. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 11, a. 4, c.

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