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JEFFREYD.KNIGHT* ABSTRACT Today, there are significant, unanswered questions lingering in the murkywatersofFifthAmendmentrighttoremainsilentinvocationlaw. One such question asks to what extent does the United States Supreme Courtsunequivocalstatementrule,articulatedinBerghuisv.Thompkins, affectMirandasmandatethataninvocationoftherighttoremainsilent may be made in any manner. By interpreting Thompkinss clear statementruletoencompassonlyoralcommunications,severalothervital facets of human expression will be ignored. Furthermore, such a narrow rulewouldunfairlyprejudiceavastpopulationofAmericanswholackthe ability to orate with laser precision. This result rips at the fabric of our democracy, as it erodes the institutional integrity of a system of justice intended, unequivocally, to protect the constitutional rights of its people. TheserightsincludetheFifthAmendmentrighttoremainsilent.Inlightof that, this Note argues that future courts should read Thompkinss unequivocal statement rule expansively, such that both (1) a relevant context and (2) nonverbal, communicative conduct necessarily enter into theinvocationcalculus.ThisNotefurtheradvocatesthat,asfuturecourts encounter Thompkins questions, they should emulate the fine methods employed by the SJC in Commonwealth v. Clarke. Finally, this Note argues thatfuturecourtsshouldtreatThompkinssunequivocalstatementrulein amannerconsistentwiththenowlongstandingtreatmentofastatement inhearsaylaw,definedbyRule801(a)oftheFederalRulesofEvidence.
*CandidateforJurisDoctor,NewEnglandLaw|Boston(2013).B.A.,Philosophy,University ofFlorida(2010).Iwouldliketothankmymother,DebraKnight,firstandforemost,forher unendingsupport.IwouldalsoliketothanktheentirestaffofVolume47oftheNewEngland Law Review for their insightful suggestions and diligent editing, all of which contributed so muchtothisarticle.Finally,IwouldliketothankthelawlibrarystaffofNewEnglandLaw| Boston,especiallyBrianFlaherty,forthesubstantialassistancetheyprovideourReviewyear inandyearout.Idedicatethis,myfirstpublication,tomylovinggrandma,JudithHerman. Whileyoucannotanymoresayit,Ihear.

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INTRODUCTION t has come to this. Vlad, a criminal suspect, lays his tightly crossed arms atop his chest.2 His right leg nervously twitches as a disheveled veteran police detective from the local precinct observes him ever so closely, while the officer slowly paces the vastly underventilated room.3 Finally,whilepressinghisknucklestothecoldsteelsurfaceseparatinghim from his suspect, the detective asks, why did you do it, Vlad? Vlad sharply replies Do what? The officer, now with a discerning look, asks Did Bo confront you before you pulled the Nine? Did you fire in self defense?4 Confused, anxious, and absolutely terrified, Vlad struggles to sink into hisstiff seatand pushes hisleft hand forwardas ifintending to signalthehaltofanoceanliner.5Hethenshakeshisheadfromsidetoside and takes his forefinger and thumb, pinching them together and draws themlaterallyacrosshislipsfromonecornertotheother.6Thedetective, unshaken,continueshisinterrogation.7 What has just occurred? It seemed fairly clear that Vlad wanted nothing to do with his interrogators line of questioning. However, the officer just brushed this off and charged fullsteam ahead with his interrogation. Is that really legalI mean, what about Vlads Fifth Amendmentrighttoremainsilent?Considerthisscenario.Thesamefacts as before, but this time in response to the detectives questions, Vlad boisterouslyrepliesIamdone,slappingbothofhishandsonthetablein frontofhim.8Evenbetterletusaddsomebackgroundfacts.Nowassume thatthisverysamedisheveleddetectivehadalreadyinterrogatedVladon this day, and in each of the three prior interrogations, Vlad responded to theofficersquestionsbystatingIaminvokingmyrighttoremainsilent, followedbyreadmylips,andinajovialvoice,Iamdone.9 While it might not immediately appear as such, fleshing out these factualvariationsonexpressiveconductisofimmenselegalimport.Each of the above variations on Vlads response to the detective seeks to

1 This page exclusively contains the authors own original, fictional hypotheticals; the followingfootnotes,however,attempttoanalogizetoseveralwelldocumentedbehaviorsof criminalsuspectsexhibitedduringthecourseofcustodialinterrogation. 2 3

Cf.JULIUSFAST,BODYLANGUAGE147(Simon&Schustereds.,1971).

Cf. David E. Zulawski & Douglas E. Wicklander, Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation37(2ded.2001).
4 See generally FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 17176 (5thed.2013)[hereinafterINBAU,CRIMINALINTERROGATIONANDCONFESSION]. 5 6 7 8 9

Cf.F.INBAU&J.REID,LIEDETECTIONANDCRIMINALINTERROGATION(3ded.1953). SeegenerallyCommonwealthv.Clarke,960N.E.2d306,31314(Mass.2012). See,e.g.,id.at312. See,e.g.,Munsonv.State,123P.3d1042,1054(Alaska2005). See,e.g.,Hurdv.Terhune,619F.3d1080,108889(9thCir.2010).

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highlight the grey areas found in todays Fifth Amendment invocation law.10SuchissuesconcernwhetherAmericancourtsshouldtakeaccountof the context in which a suspect speaks or acts, the character of nonverbal statements, and the effect of volume and tone on statement clarity.11 Framed more specifically, the paramount question ripe for resolution is, during an interrogation what conduct must a suspect perform in order to effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent? On this topic, the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has recentlyspoken.12TheThompkinsCourthighlightedthatinvocationofones right to remain silent requires the making of an unequivocal statement.13 However, the Supreme Court failed to clarify the boundaries of this unequivocal statement standard.14 Thus, without the Courts explicit guidance in this area, it becomes ever so critical to peer closely into the myriadofwaysinwhichonemayclearlycommunicatehisorherdesireto staysilent.15 In 2010, the Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins extended the holding in Davis v. United States to cover invocations of the right to remain silent by requiringthatallsuchinvocationsbemadeunequivocally.16However,the Supreme Court continues to be less than candid about explaining the boundaries of Thompkinss brightline rule.17 Beyond this single analytical infirmity, to a large degree, reactions to Thompkins have been overwhelminglycritical.18
10 Compare Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (requiring an unambiguousstatement[]),andPeoplev.Manzo,121Cal.Rptr.3d207,219(Ct.App.2011), abrogated by People v. Manzo, 251 P.3d 942 (Cal. 2011) (A suspect is not required to use specificwords...tounambiguouslyinvoke....[and]ifthewordsusedandconductdisplayed by a suspect unambiguously show[s] his or her intent to invoke the Fifth . . . then all interrogationmustcease(emphasisadded)),withCommonwealthv.Clarke,960N.E.2d306, 315(Mass.2012)(holdingthatamerelateralheadshakewassufficientlyclearforthesuspect tohaveeffectivelyinvokedhisrighttoremainsilent). 11 12 13 14 15 16

SeeinfraPart0. SeeThompkins,130S.Ct.at2260. Id. SeeinfraPart0. SeeinfraPart0.

See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 ([T]here is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent andtheMirandarighttocounselatissueinDavis.).
17 Seeid.(demonstratingthattheSupremeCourtallowsclear,verbalstatementstosuffice asunequivocal,butleavingunansweredwhetherastatementsbeingverbalisanecessary conditionunderwhichanunambiguousstatementisaccomplished).

See, e.g., Jaime M. Rogers, Comment, You Have the Right to Remain Silent . . . Sort of: Berghuisv.Thompkins,theSocialCostsofaClearStatementRule,andtheNeedforAmendingthe Miranda Warnings, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 723, 72950 (2011); George M. Dery III, Do

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ThisNotewillarguethatThompkinssbrightlineshouldbedrawnwith aneyetowardthespiritoftheSupremeJudicialCourt(SJC)holdingin Clarke,19andthebodyofMiranda,withitsinanymannerlanguage.20In addition, future courts should emulate the approach taken with hearsay, defined by Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,21 to Thompkinss requirementofastatement.22Toaccomplishthis,thekindofexpressive formalism exhibited by the Court in Thompkins23 should not be read so narrowly as to eviscerate Mirandas purposefully permissive invocation threshold.24 Instead, this Note argues that Thompkins should be read as requiringaconsiderablyhighlevelofclarity,butinsodoing,thatelevated standardshouldnothaveapreclusiveeffecton(1)framinglanguageand conductincontext,and(2)theconsiderationoftherealpotentialthatnon verbalcommunicativeconductharborstoprovideacrystalclearpictureof humanexpression. InPartI,thisNotewillbrieflysummarizethedecisioninThompkinsas wellasprovideanabbreviatedtouroftheseminalmaterialinthisareaof law. Part II will highlight and evaluate several distinct types of communicative conduct and determine which of their characteristics, if any,arelikelytoimpactstatementclarity.PartIIIwillarguethatstatement clarityoughttobedeterminedbyreferencetoarelevantcontext.InPartIV, this Note argues that some forms of nonverbal, expressive behavior should be analyzed under the Thompkins framework, and the SJCs approachinCommonwealthv.Clarkeisapositiveexampleofhowsuchnon verbal statements can be properly entered into the invocation calculus. Finally, Part V of this Note will encourage future courts to interpret the unequivocalstatementrulefromThompkinsinawayconsistentwiththe definitional approach taken by Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

You Believe in Miranda? The Supreme Court Reveals Its Doubts in Berghuis v. Thompkins by Paradoxically Ruling That Suspects Can Only Invoke Their Right to Remain Silent by Speaking, 21 GEO.MASONU.C.R.L.J.407,407,427(2011)[hereinafterDeryIII].
19 20 21

Commonwealthv.Clarke,960N.E.2d306(Mass.2012). Mirandav.Arizona,384U.S.436,44445(1966).

See FED. R.EVID.801(a)(definingastatementasanoralorwrittenassertion,or... nonverbalconduct,ifitisintendedbythepersonasanassertion).

22 23

Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2260.

SeeDeryIII,supranote18,at427(quotingDavisv.UnitedStates,512U.S.452,469(1994) (Souter,J.,concurring)).
24

SeeRogers,supranote18,at73031.

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I. TheRighttoRemainSilent:InvocationbyUnequivocalStatement A. ABriefHistoricalInterlude:FromMirandatoDavis Through a now more than halfcenturyold decision put forth by five Supreme Court Justices,25 along with decades of crimefighting television programs,26theMirandawarnings(thewarnings)madetheirwaytothe Americanpublic.27Thereisnopresentneedtoengageinacopyandpaste recitationofthewarnings.28Sufficeittosay,amongotherrightsofwhich police officials must warn criminal suspects, police must inform those suspects of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent (right to silence).29 The primary purpose of the warnings is to educate criminal suspectsorarrestees,whomaynototherwisebeawareoftherightsvested in them by the United States Constitution (Constitution).30 To many people, Miranda represents one of the brightest stars still shining in the great constellation that is our American democracy.31 To others, Miranda seemsmorelikeablackhole,overburdeningthelegitimateeffortsofpolice departments nationwide.32 The four dissenters, no doubt, were fearless
25 Justices Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William Douglas, William Brennan, and Abe Fortas comprisedthemajorityvoteinMirandav.Arizona.See384U.S.436,499,504,526(1966).

Anthony X. McDermott & H. Mitchell Caldwell, Did He or Didnt He? The Effect of Dickerson on the PostWaiver Invocation Equation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 86768 & n.24 (2001) (citingLIVABAKER,MIRANDA:CRIME,LAWANDPOLITICS404(1983)).
27 SeeDickersonv.UnitedStates,530U.S.428,443(2000)(Mirandahasbecome...partof ournationalculture.). 28 However,toreadthosefamous,oftspokenwordsinprintoneneednotlooktoofar.See, e.g.,Rogers,supranote18,at725;DavidS.Romantz,YouHavetheRighttoRemainSilent:A CasefortheUseofSilenceasSubstantiveProofoftheCriminalDefendantsGuilt,38IND.L.REV.1,2 (2005). 29 30 31

26

Miranda,384U.S.at479. Id.at468.

See Tom Gibbons & Jim Casey, Ed Meeses War on Miranda Draws Scant Support, CHI. SUNTIMES,Feb.17,1987,at41.
32 Former President Nixon was less than pleased with the Miranda Court for its role in what Nixon considered the stymieing of crimefighting efforts in America. See Patrick A. Malone, You Have the Right to Remain Silent: Miranda After Twenty Years (1986), in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 75 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds.,1998)[hereinafterLEO & THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE].Nixonwassodispleasedthat hevowedtopacktheSupremeCourtwiththosejuristswhomhecouldtrustwouldquickly move to abrogate Miranda. Id. In fact, Congress was displeased to a similar extent. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 701(a), 18 U.S.C. 3501 (2006) (purportingtoabrogatetheeffectofMiranda),invalidatedbyDickerson,530U.S.at432;seealso LEO & THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 32. Regardless, the Court in Dickerson clarified Mirandas constitutional underpinning and immunized Miranda from any congressionalattacks,exceptthoseaccomplishedbyconstitutionalamendment.Dickerson,530

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leadersofthelattercamp.33 Generalknowledgeofbothonesrighttosilenceandtheoriginofthat right is vitally important to lawyers and nonlawyers; yet, the Fifth Amendment right to silence does little good for an ordinary criminal suspect without an appreciation for how the right may be effectively invoked.34 The invocation of the right to silence, quite surprisingly, often takes up its very own chapter in many books and treatises on criminal procedure.35Whowouldhavethoughtthatassertingarighttosaynothing wouldrequiresuchintensestudy?36Thisnotionthattheinvocationofthe righttosilenceportendssomecomplexformulahaslongbeenrejectedby American courtseven well before Miranda was decided.37 Historically, Miranda has been read as embodying a rather permissive invocation threshold.38Thisresulthasbeenjustified,inlargepart,bypointingtothe Miranda Courts great concern for vindicating the ability of criminal suspectsto,albeitmomentarily,39resistthegreatcoercivepowersinherent incustodialinterrogation.40Infact,theMirandaCourtdirectedthatifthe
U.S.at432.
33 See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499545 (describing how the majoritys ruling requiringindividualstobewarnedoftheirrightswhensubjectedtocustodialinterrogation willoverburdenpolicedepartmentsnationwide).

See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/119496(OxfordUniv.Pressed.,2008) (distinguishing the Fifth Amendment privilege as symbol from that same privilege in action).Worseeven,aresuspectswhounderstandthattheypossesssucharight,andthatits genesisliesintheConstitution,butareunderthefalsebeliefthatbymerelyremainingsilent, theywillhavemadeaneffectiveinvocation.Id.at95.
35 See,e.g.,STEVEN M. SALKY, THE PRIVILEGE OF SILENCE: FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION 89 (ABA Criminal Justice Section 1st ed., 2009) [hereinafter SALKY,THEPRIVILEGEOFSILENCE](identifyingaparticularchapter,titledHowtheRightMay BeAsserted).

34

See Whys, Comment to Supreme Court: Suspects Must Assert Right to Silence, USATODAY.COM (June 2, 2010, 12:49 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/ judicial/20100601supremecourtmirandarights_N.htm.Thecommentresponded,jokingly, to the counterintuitive notion that ones silence is not a clear enough indication of ones intention to invoke his or her right to do just that, with [p]lease allow me to state for the record,Iherebyretaintherighttoexercisemyrightsatanytimewithorwithoutnoticetolaw enforcement.IherebystatethatwhenIdonotspeak,Iamexercisingmyrightnottospeak.
37 See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (identifying that there is no ritualisticformulaortalismanicphraseassociatedwithinvokingtherighttosilence). 38 39

36

SeeMiranda,384U.S.at436,47375.

Even when a criminal suspect is successful in invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right to silence, the law only requires police to scrupulously honor such an invocation before reapproaching the same suspect with further interrogation. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.96,96(1975).
40

See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1537 (2008)

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individual indicates in any manner... that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.41 In light of that, some federal courts have viewedasuspectsgeneralrefusaltocooperateduringaninterrogationas hisorherinvocationoftherighttoremainsilent.42 TherequirementofaclearstatementpredatesThompkins;thetestwas establishedinandoriginallyappliedtotherighttocounsellineofcases, beginning with the Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United States.43 In Davis,theSupremeCourtruledthataninvocationofonesrighttocounsel must be made by an unequivocal statement.44 Among the states and in legal scholarshipup until only a few years agothere was great disagreementconcerningboththeproprietyofDavisanditsapplicationto therighttosilencecontext.45Yet,in2010,theSupremeCourtfinallybroke itssilencewithThompkins.46 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority in Berghuis v. Thompkins, holdingthatwhereacriminalsuspecthasbeenadequatelyapprisedofhis Miranda rights and failed to invoke his right to silence by making an unequivocalstatementinthefaceofcustodialinterrogation,nosuchright could be asserted.47 The Thompkins Court, borrowing Daviss brightline rule,heldthatavalidinvocationoftherighttoremainsilentmustbemade byunequivocalstatement.48 InextendingDavistotherighttoremainsilentcontext,theSupreme Courtnoted,thereisnoprincipledreasontoadoptdifferentstandardsfor determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.49 Many critics regard this rationale as simply errorridden.50 Those who understand the
([T]heMirandaCourtconcludedthatcustodialinterrogationscontaininherentlycompelling pressures that undermine suspects ability to make a free and informed choice whether to speak.).
41 42 43 44 45

Miranda,384U.S.at47374(emphasisadded). See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Rambo,365F.3d906,910(10thCir.2004). 512U.S.452,459(1994). Id.

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: MIRANDA: WAIVER OF RIGHTS, 2 CRIM. PROC.6.9(g)n.191(3ded.2011);WayneD.Holly,AmbiguousInvocationsoftheRightto RemainSilent:APostDavisAnalysisandProposal,29SETONHALLL.REV.558,56263n.24(1998) (offeringanimpressivetaxonomyofpositionstakenbydifferentjurisdictions,preThompkins, concerningtheextensionofDavistotherighttosilencecontext).
46 47 48 49 50

Berghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.2250,2260(2010). Id. Id. Id.

See, e.g., Michael L. Vander Giessen, Berghuis v. Thompkins: The Continued Erosion of Mirandas Protections, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 189, 199 (2010) ([T]his statement by the Court

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coercive role that a slipperyslope paradigm plays in a commonlaw systemofadjudication51woulddonomorethangiveanaffirmingnodto the unjustifiable reliance that the majority inBerghuis v. Thompkins placed on the Supreme Courts earlier ruling in Davis.52 In 1994some would saythe first slippery step was taken.53 Nevertheless, today, Thompkins provides the standard for gauging whether a criminal suspects statementwassufficientlyunequivocaltomerittheprotectionsofthe FifthAmendment.54 B. TheFactsinThompkins Police in Ohio found the defendant in Thompkins one year after the commission of a Michigan murder for which he was a suspect and from whichhewasbelievedtohaveimmediatelyfled.55Ohiopolicearrestedthe defendant;hewasreadMirandawarningsandpolicefromthejurisdiction in which the defendant was suspected of murder arrived in Ohio to conduct the interrogation.56 During the interrogation, the defendant remainedalmostcompletelysilentfornearlythreehours.57Heresponded topolicequestionswithoccasionaleyecontactandheadnods,herefuseda peppermint, and expressed his displeasure over the lack of comfort provided the suspect by what has been described as a schoolroom type chair.58 After about two hours and fortyfive minutes, the defendant did saysomethinginresponsetoaquestionregardinghisreligiousfaith.59The interrogatoraskedthedefendant,DoyoupraytoGodtoforgiveyoufor shootingthatboydown?60Thedefendantthenrepliedyes.61
misinterpreted Davis, which justified its [holding] . . . based in part on the additional protections available to suspects under Edwards. Indeed, there is good reason for distinct standards of invocation because such is consistent with the different effects produced by invokingeachofthetworights.);Holly,supranote45,at57274.
51 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1083 (2003) (suggesting that court decisions in a commonlaw system often lead to more expansivedecisionsinthefuture,leadingtoaslipperyslopephenomenon). 52 53

SeeRogers,supranote18,at731.

See, e.g., Jane M. Faulkner, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need a Lawyer?: Ambiguous Requests for Counsel After Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REV. 275, 295 (1996) (describinghowDavishadconsiderableimpactonFifthAmendmentjurisprudence).
54 55 56 57 58

Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2260. Id. Id. Id.

Id. at 225657; see also Brief for Respondent at 5, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2250 (No. 08 1470).
59 60

Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2257. Id.

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At trial, the defendant was unsuccessful in an effort to suppress his inculpatorystatementmadetointerrogatingofficers.62Thompkinssappeal was largely predicated upon the failure of the trial court to suppress the defendants verbal response of yes to police.63 The theory employed by the defendant was that Thompkinss nearly three hours of silence, alone, constitutedaninvocationofhisrighttoremainsilent.64Thus,thedefendant argued, any of his postinvocation statements that were admitted into evidence against him violated the defendants Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.65 At the federal level, the defendant was unsuccessful with hisHabeasPetitionfiledwiththeU.S.DistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrict of Michigan.66 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals then reversed the District Court.67 The Supreme Court would later grant certioraritoreviewtheSixthCircuitsjudgment.68 C. ThompkinssObjectiveTest TheSupremeCourtinThompkinsheldthataninvocationoftherightto remain silent must be made by an unambiguous statement.69 While courts and scholars have wrestled with this brightline rule, the fact that Thompkinsreflectsanobjectivestandardseemstobeapointonwhichmost agree.70 Justice Kennedy borrowed some language from Davis: [a] requirement of an unambiguous invocation... results in an objective inquiry that avoid[s] difficulties of proof and... provide[s] guidance to officers on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.71 Thompkinss objectivestandardisnotmetsolelyattheoccurrenceofameetingofthe mindsbetweenaninterrogatorandsuspect,suchaswhereaninterrogator subjectivelyunderstandsa suspects behavior as intended by that suspect as a Fifth Amendment invocation.72 The objective standard requires some objective indication that a reasonable third party, when confronted with
61 62 63 64 65 66

Id. Id. Id.at2258. Seeid.at2257;seealsoBriefforRespondent,supranote58,at1617. Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2258.

Thompkinsv.Berghuis,No.05CV70188DT,2006WL2811303,at*1(E.D.Mich.Sept. 28,2006).
67 68 69 70

Thompkinsv.Berghuis,547F.3d572,575(6thCir.2008). Berghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.48(2009). Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2260. VanderGeissen,supranote58,at200.

71 Id.(quotingDavisv.UnitedStates,512U.S.452,45859(1994))(internalquotationmarks omitted).
72

Seeid.

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thecircumstancesofthesuspectsputativeinvocation,canreasonably... construe[]asbeinganexpressionofadesiretoremainsilent.73 II. WhatCommunicativeConductSatisfiestheThompkinsStandardfor Clarity? A. TheRequisiteQuantumofClarityforVerbalStatements The easy case presents itself where a suspect is exceptionally clear about his present desire to invoke his right to silence.74 Yet, a rather compellingargumenthasbeenmadethataclearstatementruleoperates unfairly, because the vast majority of criminal suspects do not have the requisite aptitude to orate with the discrimination of an Oxford Don.75 Consider from the following excerpt, whether the runofthemill, low income, undereducated criminal suspect can reasonably be expected to articulate his or her Fifth Amendment invocation with the level of clarity offered by Bernard Ebbers when he appeared before the House Financial ServicesCommitteein2002.
I have not been advised of the specific conduct of mine that is being called into question... I understand that preliminary statements can be taken out of context.... When all of the activities at WorldCom are fairly aired, and when I get the opportunity, and I am very much looking forward to it, to explain my actions in a setting that will not compromise my abilitytodefendmyselfinthelegalproceedingsarisingoutofthe recentevents,IbelievethatnoonewillconcludethatIengaged in any criminal or fraudulent conduct during my tenure at WorldCom. Until that time, however, I must respectfully decline to answer questions...onthebasisofmy[F]ifth[A]mendmentprivilege.76

Itseemsunlikelythatmostcriminalsuspectscouldmirrortheclarity,
73 HarveyGee,InOrdertoBeSilent,YoumustFirstSpeak:TheSupremeCourtExtendsDaviss ClarityRequirementtotheRighttoRemainSilentinBerghuisv.Thompkins,44J. MARSHALL L. REV.423,448(2011). 74 75

SeeThompkins,130S.Ct.at2260(citingMichiganv.Mosley,423U.S.96,10304(1975)).

See Davis, 512 U.S. at 476 (Souter, J., concurring); Rogers, supra note 18, at 74042 (arguing that many arrestees are undereducated and therefore unlikely to have a sound understandingoftheirrights...andmayalsolackthecapacitytoformulateanddeliveran unambiguousinvocation).
76 Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 21 (2002) (statement of Bernard Ebbers, Chief Executive Officer, WorldCom), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG107hhrg83079/pdf/CHRG 107hhrg83079.pdf.

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whichMr.Ebbersdemonstratedinthisabovequotedexcerpt.77Inlightof that, historically, courts have adjudged suspects statements to be sufficientlyunequivocalinwhatcouldbeseenasclosecalls.78Ultimately though,therealdifficultyexistsinquantifyingthemiddlegroundbetween Thompkinss requirement of an unequivocal statement and the idea expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Arnold v. Runnels that no talismanic phrase must be made for a suspect to invoke the right to silence.79 In synthesizing the relevant case law, two distinct groupings of verbal statements surface: (1) direct, assertive statements80 and (2) statements posedintheformofaquestion.81 1. Direct,Assertive,andOrallyPerformedStatements

Over the years, most courts have seemed overwhelmingly more inclinedtofindthatasuspectsstatementtopolicecontainedtherequisite unequivocality where the statement was both direct and assertive.82 A direct,assertiveoralstatementtendstorelaytheconfidenceofthespeaker
SeeDavis,512U.S.at46970(Souter,J.,concurring);TomChen,Davisv.UnitedStates: MaybeIShouldTalktoaLawyerMeansMaybeMirandaisUnraveling,23PEPP.L.REV.607,643 (1996).
78 See, e.g., Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 84243 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding unambiguousinvocationwherethesuspectsaidIgotnothingelsetosay);Munsonv.State, 123P.3d1042,1054(Alaska2005)(holdingthatasuspectinvokedhisFifthAmendmentright when he said [w]ell, Im done talking then); People v. Arroya, 988 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. 1999) (holding I dont wanna talk no more sufficient for the suspect to invoke his Fifth Amendmentright);Statev.Klimczak,268A.2d372,373(Conn.1970)(holdingunequivocala suspectsstatementof[d]ontbotherme). 77

Compare Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (stating the suspect failed to invoke his right to silence by not making any simple, unambiguous statement), with Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d859,866(9thCir.2005)(holdingtheFifthAmendmentrighttosilencethresholddoesnot requireacriminalsuspecttointone[]sometalismanicphrase).
80 81 82

79

SeeinfraPartII.A.1. SeeinfraPartII.A.2.

See, e.g., Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 108889 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a criminal suspectsstatementsofIdontwanttodothat,No,Icant,andIdontwanttoactit out were sufficiently unambiguous); United States v. ArballoVilla, No. CR 091539TUC DCB(HCE), 2010 WL 3947330, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2010) (holding that defendants responsewhen asked by police whether he had anything else to sayof No. Nothing further.Ihavenothingtosay....wasunambiguousandunequivocal).Itwouldbehoovea criminal suspect or arrestee who intends to invoke his or her right to silence to, at the very least, speak in the presence of others. Cf. State v. DiazBridges, 34 A.3d 748, 764 (N.J. 2012) (indicatingthatnoinvocationwasfoundwherecriminalsuspectstatedclearlythathewished togohome,butdidsowhilealoneinaninterrogationroom).Cf.FED. R. EVID.801advisory committeesnote(notingthatassertionisnotdefinedbytheRules,buthastheconnotation ofaforcefulorpositivedeclaration)(emphasisadded).

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in the content of his or her communication.83 Both volume and tone provide further insight into a speakers message, the demeanor of the speaker, and the sturdiness of his spoken intention.84 In stark contrast, languagesuchasmaybe,might,orIthinkcommunicatesasuspects lack of certainty in his or her desire to talk.85 Moreover, where a suspect mumbleshisresponsetoquestioning,thereisalesserlikelihoodthatsuch a statement will, on its own, qualify as unequivocal.86 This clear statement rule does, however, leave plenty of space for close cases.87 In Hurd, the Ninth Circuit held that a suspects responses were objectively unambiguous in context where the suspect repeatedly refused to perform a reenactment of shooting his wife and used no uncertain terms.88 The Supreme Court itself seems to encourage direct assertiveness in Fifth Amendment invocations, as the Court indicated that Thompkins wouldhavebeendecideddifferentlyhadRespondentjusttoldpolicethat he wished to remain silent or that he did not wish to answer questions.89 Yet,acriticaldistinctionneedbedrawnbetweenanexpressionofadesire not to answer a specific question or type of question, and a desire not to answerquestionsgenerally.90WhileThompkinsseemstodirectthatthelatter
83 See Mayo Clinic Staff, Being Assertive: Reduce Stress, Communicate Better, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/assertive/SR00042(lastvisited Nov.25,2012)(notingthat being assertive means that you express yourself effectively . . . . [and] gives you the best chanceofsuccessfullydeliveringyourmessage.)[hereinafterMayoClinicStaff].

Compare People v. Manzo, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 207, 219 (2011)(ruling that an unequivocal statementwasmadewhereacriminalsuspecthademphaticallystated:Imdoingmyright.) (emphasisadded),withStatev.Dixon,593A.2d266,275(N.J.1991)(holdingthatdefendants demeanoralthoughverytense,[and]veryagitated,and...herefusedtowriteanything wasinsufficientforhimtohaveeffectivelyinvokedhisrighttosilence). SeeArballoVilla,2010WL3947330,at*5(notingthatthedefendantssubstantialclarity wasdistinguishablefromtheuseofwordssuchasmaybeormightorIthink).
86 See Alvarez v. Grounds, No. CV 1100216AHM (OP), 2011 WL 4801895, at *9 (D. Cal. Aug.18,2011). 87 See, e.g., Manzo, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 219 (2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 960 N.E.2d 306,315,320(Mass.2012)(notingthattheSJCwasapplyingthestateconstitutionalprovisions tothefactsbeforethecourt,buttheSJCdidnotruleoutsatisfactionofthehigherThompkins threshold);Statev.Ortega,798N.W.2d59,6869(Minn.2011). 88 89 90 85

84

Hurdv.Terhune,619F.3d1080,1089(9thCir.2010). SeeBerghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.2250,2260(2010).

Whereacriminalsuspecttoldpoliceduringaninterrogation[t]hatsit,Imthrough.I toldyouadistrictcourtdeterminedthatthedefendanthadonlywishedtoceasequestioning concerningthediscretetopicsofaknifeandastabbing,whilethedefendantdidnotwishto cutoffquestioninggenerally.Ortega,798N.W.2dat6869.SeeUnitedStatesv.Reynolds,743 F.Supp.2d1087,1090(D.S.D.2010)(TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateshasrecognized thatadefendantsrefusaltoanswercertainquestionsisnottheequivalentofarequesttoend

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expressionwillsufficeasavalidinvocation,91theformerhas,timeandtime again, been held to have fallen short of that mark.92 Nevertheless, expressions like the defendants in Hurd are directly responsive to the inquiriesofinterrogatorsandconveyastrongmessageaboutasuspector arrestees intention to invoke.93 However, being directly responsive to interrogators or conveying a strong, assertive message are each likely a necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for making a valid Fifth Amendmentinvocation.94 2. IntheFormofaQuestion?

Just as a direct, assertive statement demonstrates clarity and confidence about a suspect or arrestees intention to invoke, a statement madeintheformofaquestionhasquitetheoppositeeffect.95Affirmative statements reflect a genuine, current belief of a speaker; whereas a statement made in the form of a question reflects a speakers desire to receive some added information.96 When police do in fact receive a valid Fifth Amendment invocation from a criminal suspect, they must immediately cease questioning.97 For example, where a criminal suspect asksaninterrogatordoIreallyhavetoanswerthesequestions?,setting theinvocationthresholdtoolowwouldforcepolicetoimmediatelycease all questioning of this suspect.98 The result being that, while the suspect may have only intended to learn about her rightsnot assert themshe could not lawfully be questioned further at that point.99 Many see this as too rigorous a burden to place on legitimate crimefighting efforts, since the matter of hours or sometimes days that it takes to scrupulously honor such an invocationor successive invocationscan be the
theinterrogation.).
91 92 93 94

SeeThompkins,130S.Ct.at2260. Reynolds,743F.Supp.2dat1090;seealsoRogersv.State,721S.E.2d864,87172(Ga.2012). SeeHurd,619F.3dat1089;seegenerallyMAYOCLINICSTAFF,supranote83.

SeePeoplev.Nelson,266P.3d1008,1020(Cal.2012)(demonstratingthatstatementsof frustration and animositysuch as where a suspect says that he does not care who gets caught for a murder as long as you guys leave me alonemay fall short under the unequivocal statement rule); see also People v. Scott, 257 P.3d 703, 727 (Cal. 2011) (finding thattheutteranceofthe followingstatementsby asuspectduringintenseinterrogationwas tooequivocaltomakeoutavalidinvocation:Idont,Idontwantit,Idontwanna).
95 96 97

SeeMAYOCLINICSTAFF,supranote83,at1. Seeid.

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485(1981).
98 99

SeeMosley,423U.S.at102. Id.

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differencebetweenlifeanddeath.100 Although, one could imagine many factual scenarios where a statementmadeintheformofaquestionexhibitsstrikingclarity,insofaras it demonstrates a speakers desire to invoke his or her right to remain silent.101 Nevertheless, some courts have found that voice inflection, reasonablyreceivedasaquestioningstatement,suchaswheresuspects asktospeaktofamilymembersorfriends,gotothehospital,orevenask canwedothisadifferenttime,finishup?eachlacksufficientclarityto constitute a valid Fifth Amendment invocation.102 Some courts seem to have categorically precluded statements made in the form of a question fromsatisfyingaclearstatementrulelikeDavisorThompkins.103Evenin cases where an affirmative statement, or several such statements, accompanies a question, some courts still refuse to find that a valid invocationhasbeenmade.104 B. TheUnequivocalityofSilence In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court concluded that where a criminal suspect remained almost completely silent for the duration of a nearly threehourlonginterrogation,thatsilencedidnotconstituteaninvocation of the defendants right to remain silent.105 Thompkins, however, is not novelonthatpointoflaw,asthisspecificholdingregardingthepotential
100 See,e.g.,ManSafe4DaysAfterBeingBuriedAlive,THE DAILY TIMES,Sept.27,1982,at2, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=XMNQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=dNAMA AAAIBAJ&pg=4162,2358108&dq=buried+alive&hl=en (reporting on a particularly gruesome kidnapping, which serves as an example of the practical, potentially deleterious, collateral effects that a Fifth Amendment invocation could have in a highstakes, timesensitive circumstance). 101 The following list likely reflects only a small subclass of fictional scenarios where questioningstatementseachcontainahighdegreeofclarity:(1)MayIpleasenowusemy righttonotsayanything?;(2)CanIjuststoptalkingnow?;(3)DoIevenhavetoanswerany of these questions?; (4) Will you please just leave me alone?; and (5) Im shutting up now, okay?SeeInterviewwithStanleyCox,ProfessorofLaw,NewEnglandLaw|Boston,inBos., Mass.(Jan.17,2012)(onfilewithauthor)[hereinafterInterviewwithProfessorCox]. 102 See State v. Kornberger, 2011 WL 1345011, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 11, 2011).

See People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 913 (Cal. 1994) (emphasis added) (applying Davis, the court stated that the defendant did not unequivocally state that he wanted an attorney,butsimplyaskedaquestion).
104 See McCulley v. State, 352 S.W.3d 107, 12021 (Tex. 2011) (holding that a defendant failedtoinvokehisrighttosilencewhereheaskedpolicewhetherhecouldgotothehospital andgohome,andaffirmativelystatedthathewantedtogotosleep).

103

Berghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.2250,2260(2010);seealsoAdamLiptak,MereSilence Doesnt Invoke Miranda, Justices Say, N.Y. TIMES, at A15 (June 1, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02scotus.html.

105

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of silence to convey a clear message had already been well established.106 SomecriticsofthemajorityviewinThompkinsexpressfrustrationoverthe cruel irony at play in refusing to acknowledge actual silence as clear enough a message that one wishes to remain silent pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.107 However, others fervently argue that a suspects silence, alone, may reflect a large array of that suspects emotions, including intimidation, anger, thoughtfulness, respect, or genuine shocknone of which categorically express a suspects desire to cut off questioning.108 In herfirstmajordissent,JusticeSotomayorreactedtothemajoritysstringent rule by admonishing that [a] suspect who wishes to guard his right to remainsilent,mustcounterintuitively,speak.109 C. ClearIntentionsShownThroughGesturesandOtherPhysical, ExpressiveConduct The old adage actions speak louder than words, in the present context,fitsnicely.110Itishumannaturetoexpressoneselfthroughtheuse of both verbal and nonverbal forms of communication.111 In some instances, a facial expression, hand gesture, or simple shrug can be far louder than a siren stationed mere inches away.112 Taking these empirical truths at their face, therearesome strong indications thatan unequivocal
106 See, e.g., Bobo v. Kolb, 969 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 1992)(previously holding that mutenesscannotconclusivelybeviewedasanattempttoexercise...[a]righttosilence.). 107 See Dery III, supra note 18, at 422 ([Paradoxically, if a suspect exercises his right to remainsilentbysimplyremainingsilent,suchbehaviormightnotconstituteaninvocation.). 108 Taylorv.Riddle,409F.Supp.631,635(W.D.Va.1976)(Theactualactofbeingsilent.. .doesnotnecessarilyindicateadesireordecisiontoremainsilent....Hemaybeweighting thepossibilityofcooperationinordertolessentheseverityofpossiblepunishment;orhemay be curious as to what incriminating evidence the prosecution already has . . . .); see also StevenI.Friedland,PostMirandaSilenceintheWiredEra:ReconstructingRealTimeSilenceinthe Face of Police Questioning, 80 MISS. L.J. 1339, 1343 (2011) (citing Thomas J. Bruneau, How AmericansUseSilenceandSilencestoCommunicate,4(2)CHINA MEDIA RES.77(2008))(Acloser examination of silence shows that it can be parsed and differentiated, from a void of conversation, to communicative silences constituting active listening, to a deeper withdrawal.).ProfessorFriedlandarguesthatoursocietystechnologicaladvancessuchas textmessaging capabilities on cellular phonesshape our expectations about the meanings weimputetomoderndaysilence.Seegenerallyid. 109 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majoritys ruleconstruesambiguityinfavorofthepolice). 110 SeeA DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS 2 (AdamMakkaied.,2ded.1987)(explaining that the idiom actions speak louder than words means that what a person does is more importantthanwhatapersonsays). 111 See generally ANNA ESPOSITO, FUNDAMENTALS OF VERBAL AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATIONANDTHEBIOMETRICISSUE(AnnaEspositoetal.eds.,2007). 112

Seeid.at510.

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expression may be accomplishable absent the utterance of even a single syllable.113 There is a clear disagreement among state and federal courts concerning the propriety of extending the Thompkins unequivocal statement rule to encompass gestures and other physical, expressive conduct.114InCommonwealthv.Clarke,theSJCanalogizedfromassumptions about the expansive nature of statements underlying state hearsay doctrine, to bolster the legitimacy of nonverbal conduct in the context of invocation law.115 Moreover, in 2002, the SJC held that a suspects headshakewhenmadeinresponsetoclearquestioningbypolicewasnot tantamount to silence and ambiguity, nor was this expressive, physical conduct equivocal, evasive, or nonresponsive, but rather was communicative in nature and constituted admissions.116 However, some courts have noted that nonverbal expressions, such as weeping or moaning, while unequivocal insofar as each expresses sadness or frustration,donotgivesufficientcontextforareasonableobservertoknow theintendedsourceoractualcause.117 ANALYSIS III. InApplyingtheThompkinsUnequivocalStatementRule,Future CourtsShouldAlwaysConsidertheRelevantContextWithinWhich aSuspectsWordsHaveBeenSpokenandNonVerbalConduct Performed. Context has been defined both as a particular setting or environment,118aswellasthedistinctlyinterrelatedconditionsinwhich
113 See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 960 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Mass. 2012); see also SALKY, THE PRIVILEGEOF SILENCE, supranote44,at90(assertingthat[a]suspectmustmakesomegesture orremark...toconveyhisdesiretoremainsilent(emphasisadded)). 114 CompareClarke,960N.E.2dat315([R]elyingonThompkins,theCommonwealthargues that the defendant must actually speak to invoke the right to remain silent. Thompkins, however, does not go quite so far, and we are satisfied that a suspects nonverbal expressive conductcansufficetoinvoketherighttoremainsilent.(emphasisadded)),withUnitedStates v. McCarthy, 382 F. Appx. 789, 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that a suspect must clearly and unambiguouslyinvoketherighttoremainsilent,andthattherecanbenonuanceorcontext thatcouldvarytheunequivocalmeaningofthesuspectsintenttoinvoke). 115 116 117

Clarke,960N.E.2dat315;seealsoinfraPartV. Commonwealthv.Marrero,766N.E.2d461,468(Mass.2002).

SeeStatev.Williams,535N.W.2d277,283(Minn.1995)([A]suspectshostilebehavior duringcustodialinterrogationmightbeinresponsetoanumberofstimuli....Withoutoral explanation, it is often ambiguous as to what message a suspects behavior is intended to convey).
118

BLACKSLAWDICTIONARY362(9thed.2009).

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something exists or occurs.119 In the realm of American police interrogation, accounting for a relevant context will likely include consideration of the following: (1) the demeanor of the suspect and interrogators;120 (2) the tone, inflection, and volume at which the suspect speaks;121 (3) the known level of the suspects Englishspeaking proficiency;122(4)theamountoftimeelapsedpriortothesuspectsputative invocation;123(5)thewordsandactsofboththesuspectandinterrogators made prior to the putative invocation;124 and (6) the suspects behavior both verbal and nonverbalexhibited immediately following his or her putative invocation.125 The Thompkins Court itself remained silent as to whether future courts must consider the relevant context within which a suspects putative invocation was made.126 In contrast, many courts have noted their own diligent attention to the context within which suspects statements were made.127 If a valid invocation of the right to silence is meanttoreflectanoutwardmanifestationofasuspectsintentiontoutilize one of his or her precious Fifth Amendment rights,128 then future courts shoulddemandmoreindiciaofasuspectsintentionsthanamerewordor phrasethathappenstoexitfromthequiveringlipsofafrightened,under
119 A. MERRIAMWEBSTER,WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY492(Philip B.Goveetal.eds.,1986). 120 121

Seesourcescitedsupranotes78,82,87.

See generally supra Part II.A.1. One should also consider that a clear statement rule mayinfactcategoricallydisadvantagewomen.SeeJanetE.Ainsworth,InaDifferentRegister: ThePragmaticsofPowerlessnessinPoliceInterrogation,103YALE L.J.259,28384(1993)(arguing that, while male speech patterns are aptly described as direct, clear, succinct, as would be expected of those who need not fear giving offense, the socalled female register is comprisedofindirectandtentativegrammaticalforms). Arguably,averbalclearstatementruledisproportionatelydisfavorsminoritygroup membersandnonnativeEnglishspeakers.Seegenerallyid.at31719.
123 Implicit in this factor is the idea that, where a suspect responds to affirmative police questioningwithsilence,thatsilenceoughttobeanalyzedwithacuteconcernforitsduration andtheaccompanyingnonverbalexpressionsofthesuspect.See,e.g.,Berghuisv.Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 225859 (2010) (emphasis added) (finding that the defendant had sat in his interrogationseatforalmostthreehoursbeforebreakinghissilence). 124 125 122

Cf.McCulleyv.State,352S.W.3d107,121(Tex.Crim.App.2011).

SeegenerallyINBAU, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONAND CONFESSION, supranote4,at10408; seealsoStatev.DiazBridges,34A.3d748,76164(N.J.2012).

126 127

SeeThompkins,130S.Ct.at2260.

See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972); Alvarez v. Grounds, No. CV 1100216AHM (OP), 2011 WL 4801895, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011); McCulley, 352 S.W.3d at 120 (citing Williams v. State, 257 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008));Dixonv.State,72So.3d171,17677(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011);DiazBridges,34A.3dat 76164;Statev.Kornberger,2011WL1345011,at*11(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.Apr.11,2011).
128

SeeStanleyCox,supranote101.

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educatedcriminalsuspect129whileinthegripsofapurposefullypressure filledinterrogativeprocess.130 AcontextualapproachtoassessingstatementclarityunderThompkins gives teeth to one of the Fifth Amendments overarching objectives.131 Implicit in the notion of compulsion is a careful assessment of an individuals will.132 It necessarily follows, that future courts should demand as much indicia of a suspects willwhich is comprised of a suspectswantsanddesiresascanreasonablybedrawnfromtherecord andfromtestimonyelicitedbytheparties.133Evenmore,suchanapproach fitssquarelywithbothMirandasmandate134andprinciplesoffundamental fairness.135 Imposing a clearstatement rule without considering a relevant contextand expecting thereby to fully understand a criminal suspects intentionsisakintoreadingasingleparagraphonthehundredthpageof a voluminous novel expecting to really get that book and get its author.136 Failing to take account of a relevant context can cause confusionorplainerrornotonlyintherealmofcustodialinterrogation,
129 NumerousstudieshaveshownthatthevastmajorityofAmericasprisonpopulations are comprised of young individuals, minorities, as well as the severely undereducated. See LARRYJ.SIEGEL,ESSENTIALSOFCRIMINALJUSTICE42627(6thed.2008).

See generally RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 11218 (2008).
131 Noperson...shallbecompelledinanycriminalcasetobeawitnessagainsthimself... .U.S.CONST.amend.V(emphasisadded). 132 See GEOFFREY THOMAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS: FIVE CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF MORAL JUDGEMENT184(1993)(explainingtheroleofeachdesiresandwantsinassessing thepresenceorabsenceofmentalcompulsion).

130

See, e.g., State v. DiazBridges, 34 A.3d 748, 760 (N.J. 2012) (In assessing whether a reasonable officer would have found that the suspect invoked his or her right to silence, it maybeinadequatetoconfineappellatereviewtothetranscriptoftheinterrogation.Instead.. . if the trial court has based its finding on conduct or behaviors that defendant exhibited during...interrogation...areviewofthe...interrogationisappropriate.). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (holding that a valid invocation is made where a criminal suspect indicates in any manner that he or she wishes to cut off questioningduringacustodialinterrogation).
135 Generally, parties exert much time and expense to preserve and offer evidence in a criminal trial. JOHN C. DONOVAN ET AL., PEOPLE, POWER, AND POLITICS 227 (3d ed. 1993). Today, such evidence often includes videotaped interrogations. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG248(2011).Thus,it seems fundamentally unfair for a court to turn a blind eye to strong evidence of a suspects desire to invoke a constitutionallyprotected right, especially when such evidence can be gatheredfromtherecordorfromtestimonyelicitedbeforeajudge.See,e.g., DiazBridges,34 A.3dat760. 136 Cf. Roy Dilley, Preface to 4 METHODOLOGY AND HISTORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEMOFCONTEXT,atix,x,xii(RoyDilleyed.,1999). 134

133

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but even in the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.137 Take as an example, the language of the majority opinion in Miranda, where the Supreme Court noted, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.138 If one were to try interpreting this language blindly,without considering any context whatsoever, one would likely conclude that the word alone was intended to express its ordinary meaning.139 Surely, this suggested interpretation of Mirandawhile it seems quite consistent with the abovequoted languageis not what the former Chief Justice Warren had in mind.140 Rather, by reading the immediately preceding sentence in Mirandaand by examining other contextual evidenceonewill quicklyrealize that what the Miranda Court in fact meant by alone was in the absence of counsel.141 This one exampledemonstratesthepotentiallyrecurringriskthatwillpresentitself should future courts refuse to consider the context in which a criminal suspect speaks, acts, or just does nothing at all, in the face of custodial interrogation.142 The consequences for a suspects failure to adequately make an unequivocal statement in the midst of a police interrogation can be grave.143However,theseareconsequencesforwhichmanyindividualsare simplyillequippedtoavoid.144Thisbegsthequestion,ultimately,ifeven theformerChiefJusticeWarrensexpressioninMirandawastooequivocal by Justice Kennedys standards, then how can one reasonably expect the average criminal suspect to make out an unequivocal statement under Thompkins?145 The answer seems to be that future courts should always
137 138 139

Seeinfratextaccompanyingnotes138141. Miranda,384U.S.at445.

See WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 60 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986) (defining alone both as separated . . . from all other individuals or groups and exclusiveofanyoneoranythingelse.).
140 141

SeeMiranda,384U.S.at44445.

Seeid.(If,however,heindicatesinanymannerandatanystageoftheprocessthathe wishestoconsultwithanattorneybeforespeakingtherecanbenoquestioning.).
142 143

Compareid.,withsupratextaccompanyingnotes129131.

See,e.g.,Berghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.2250,2264(2010)(concludingthatthepolice were legally justified in pursuing further interrogative ends because the defendant failed to invokehisrighttoremainsilent).
144 See Michael L. Vander Giessen, Comment, Berghuis v. Thompkins: The Continued ErosionofMirandasProtections, 46GONS. L. REV.189,209(20102011)(Onethingisclearat thisjuncture...manyofAmericasordinarycriminalsuspectsrequireeducationonhowto invoketheirMirandarights,iftheywishtodososuccessfully.). 145 Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (explaining that, where a suspect indicates in any manner that he does not want to speak to the police, questioning must cease), with

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viewThompkinsissuesthroughacontextuallens.146 IV. SomeFormsofNonVerbal,ExpressiveBehaviorShouldbe AnalyzedUndertheThompkinsFramework,andtheSJCsApproach inCommonwealthv.ClarkeServesasanExcellentExampleofHow SomeNonVerbalStatementsFitWithintheInvocationCalculus. While neither the Constitution nor Miranda require a suspect to invokehisrighttosilenceinaparticularway,147Thompkins,quiteclearly, calls for the making of an unequivocal statement.148 The key question thatremains,however,iswhethertheformertruthretainsanyrealbitein light of the latter rule.149 This Note quite enthusiastically answers that question in the affirmative.150 It has already been noted that both verbal and nonverbalforms of communication harbor thepotential to present a crystalclear picture of human intentions.151 Thus, while some physical,
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invokehisorherrighttoremainsilenttodosounambiguously.).
146 147 148 149

Holly,supranote45,at583.SeegenerallysupraPartIII. Hurdv.Terhune,619F.3d1080,1089(9thCir.2010). Thompkins,130S.Ct.at2260.

OnecommentatorpinpointedthisPandorasBoxsuperbly:[Thompkins]openstheway to other questions: Must the individual invoke the Miranda Rights verbally? Does sign languageorheadshakingtostopthequestioning[sic]qualify?Ifthepersonhasnopowerof speech or cannot invoke it in English, is there an accommodation for that individual? Coachexec, Comment to Opening ArgumentsSupreme Court in Miranda Case: Suspect Must Invoke Right, WASH. POST 1 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/supreme court/2010/06/supreme_court_rules_in_miranda.html(June1,2010,2:40PM).
150 151

SeegenerallyinfraPartIV.

See supra Part II.C. Bonnie Sudderth, Judge of the 352nd District Court of Tarrant County,Texas,providesasuperblyinsightfulcommentontheexpressivepowerofsilence: EarthDay,1971. Keep America Beautiful launches a TV ad featuring sceneafterscene of polluted rivers, trashstrewn highways, mountainous landfills and billowingindustrialsmokestacks,endingwithacloseupofanAmerican Indianwithasingletearflowingdownhischeek.Notawordwasspoken during that 60second span, yet anyone who saw it is unlikely to ever forgetthemessage.Infact,eventodaythatcommercialisconsideredone of the most powerful and successful ad campaigns of all time, demonstratinghowsilencesometimesspeakslouderthanwords. Bonnie Sudderth, Silence as Evidence, JUDGE BONNIE SUDDERTH, (Aug. 21, 2011, 3:06 AM), http://judgebonniesudderth.wordpress.com/2011/08/21/silenceasevidence/. Also indicative of the expressive power of silence is the fact that, in the area of corporate securities law, assistance by a lawyer in a fraud may be accomplished by silence in the form of material omission.

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expressive behavior when performed is equivocal at best,152 other non verbal expressions such as a headshake or nodding gesture may contain exorbitant clarity when considered within the larger framework of a particularcontext.153 However, some courts have expressed grave concern for burdening police with the task of interpreting an endless array of hidden, subjective intentionsbelongingtocriminalsuspects.154Theconcernistwofold:(1)the subjective inquiries will be very difficult to accurately and consistently assess;155and(2)theimmensetimeandresourcesrequiredtoperformthis difficultassessmentwillseverelystymiecrimefightingeffortsofpolice.156 Whiletheseconcernsshouldnotbediscounted,theinclusionofsomenon verbal, expressive behavior into the unequivocal statement paradigm does not require shifting the test away from its objective posture.157 Moreover,therearestrongindicationsthatbothstateandfederalpolicing forcesarecommonlytrainedtopinpointnonverbalexpressivebehaviorsof criminalsuspects.158Thus,thisNotearguesthatthetestshouldbewhether areasonableofficerwouldhaveinterpretedboththesuspectsverbaland nonverbalexpressions,inlightofaparticularcontext,asaninvocationof thatsuspectsrighttoremainsilent.159 The SJC in Commonwealth v. Clarke relied on state constitutional groundstoavoidapplicationofthehigherinvocationthresholdestablished in Thompkins, but in doing so, the SJC did comment on the status of the
See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Ramsey,992F.2d301,305(11thCir.1993)(findingaMiranda violationwheredefendantequivocallyinvokedrighttoremainsilentbylookingawaywhen askedtomakeastatement),abrogatedbyDavisv.UnitedStates,512U.S.452,459(1994).
153 See supra Part III; infra text accompanying notes 16376; see also Commonwealth v. Clarke,960N.E.2d306,315(Mass.2012). 154 155 152

SeeBerghuisv.Thompkins,130S.Ct.2250,2260(2010)(quotingDavis,512U.S.at461).

SeeUnitedStatesv.ArballoVilla,No.CR091539TUCDCB(HCE),2010WL3947330, at*5(D.Ariz.Sept.14,2010).
156 157

Cf.Davis,512U.S.at465(Scalia,J.,concurring).

See supra text accompanying notes 7282. In fact, police interrogators are specially trained to pick up on both the verbal and nonverbal cues of criminal suspects. See FRED E. INBAUETAL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONAND CONFESSIONS 11121 (5thed.2011).Interrogation manuals provide explicit guidance on how police should interpret particular gestures, facial expressions,andevenmomentsofsilence.Seeid.at121. See generally Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionasAmiciCuriaeinSupportofRespondentat*3233,Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 081470) [hereinafter Amici Brief of Criminal Defense Lawyers and ACLU] (discussing how police training materials, such as the preeminent Inbau Manual and various video tutorials are used by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, making the close attention paid to suspects nonverbal cues quintessentiallyactualpolicepractice).
159 158

SeeinfraPartIV.

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federalprecedentinthisareaofnonverbal,unequivocalstatements.160In Clarke, the relevant key facts were that during the course of a custodial interrogation, a criminal suspect shook his head indicating a negative responsetoaninterrogatorsquestionofSo,youdontwanttospeak?161 The SJC held that the suspects deliberate, lateral headshake, made immediatelyafterbeingaskedifhewishedtotalktointerrogators,wasa perfectly clear expression of the suspects desire to invoke his right to silence.162 The laudable underpinning of the rationale in Clarke was the SJCs acute appreciation for the vast community of inarticulate, intimidated criminal suspects.163 While such empirical research is hard to come by, some studies pinpoint the marked symmetry as amongst low socio economic groups, American prison populations, and individuals with the poorest linguistic skills.164 Such findings underscore the import of setting forth a clear statement rule that is inclusive of nonverbal, expressive behavior.165 The SJCs method in Clarke of assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding a criminal suspects putative invocation,166 combinedwiththeSJCsaffirmationoftheexpressivepowerbelongingto
160 SeeCommonwealthv.Clarke,960N.E.2d306,31517(Mass.2012)(referringtothelevel of clarity required under Thompkins, the SJC noted that we are satisfied that a suspects nonverbalexpressiveconductcansufficetoinvoketherighttoremainsilent)(emphasisadded). TheSJCwouldgoontosaythatMirandaactuallydictatesthatnonverbalformsofexpression maysufficeforaninvocation.Seeid.at315.Further,theSJCevenanalogizedfromthelawof hearsay, to provide creative support for this relatively new notion of nonverbal Fifth Amendmentinvocation.Seeid.;seealsoCommonwealthv.Marrero,766N.E.2d461,467(Mass. 2002);infraPartIV. 161 162 163

Clarke,960N.E.2dat315. Seeid.

Seeid.at319(citationomitted).Itiswidelyrecognizedthatsomepatternsofdiminished directednessinspeechbycriminalsuspectsandarresteesispartlyattributabletonervesand theoverallgravityoftheoccasion.See,e.g.,AldertVrijetal.,AnEmpiricalTestoftheBehaviour Analysis Interview, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 329, 330, 332 (2006) (stating that previously held beliefs that liars would be less comfortable than truth tellers in an interrogation are false). Whilelessrecognized,theotherpartseemsattributabletobarriersrootedinvariouscultural phenomena.SeegenerallyAinsworth,supranote121,at261,28688(discussingvariousreasons whysuspectsinhighstresssituationsmayrespondwithnonverbalexpressionsasopposed toaclearinvocationoftheirrights).
164 165

SeeHERBERTA.BLOCH&GILBERTGEIS,MAN,CRIME,ANDSOCIETY128(2ded.1970).

See id. Interestingly, the role that gender plays has also been highlighted in this area, becausewomentendtoutilizeacertainspeechregisterthatproduceslessdirect,assertive expressions when confronted with a sentiment of powerlessness. See Ainsworth, supra note 121,at28688.Thissentimentisespeciallypronouncedwhenanassertive,dominantcharacter, suchasacriminalinvestigator,istheonedoingtheconfronting.Seeid.
166

Clarke,960N.E.2dat315.

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some forms of nonverbal communication provides an enlightening conceptualmodelforfuturecourts.167 V. FutureCourtsShouldInterpretaThompkinsUnequivocal StatementinaMannerConsistentwiththeApproachTakeninthe LawofHearsay,DefinedbyRule801(a)oftheFederalRulesof Evidence. Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines a statement as a persons oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the personintendeditasanassertion.168Justasinvocationlawconcernsitself with giving effect to clearly expressed desires of criminal suspects to invoketheirconstitutionalrighttoremainsilent,thelawofhearsayseeks tounpackastatementintosomethingwithassertivecontent,evincinga speakersobservableintentions.169Inthissense,hearsayandinvocationlaw shareacommoncoreconcern:givingeffecttotheobservableintentionsof aspeakingparty.170 Invocation law should mimic the law of hearsay, insofar as the latter area defines a statement and the methods it employs to determine whether that definition has been satisfied.171 It is blackletter hearsay law that some nonverbal expressive conduct can serve as a substitute for words, such as the act of pointing to a suspect in a lineup.172 Further, deciding whether a statement sufficiently demonstrates a speakers desire to send a particular message requires looking to the speakers conductwithinadiscretecontext.173 Whiletheruleagainsthearsayismerelyevidentiary,aninvocationof the right to remain silent implicates a constitutionally protected
167 168 169

Seeid. FED.R.EVID.801(a).

J.W.Carney,Jr.etal., MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM REFERENCE, MCLE,at 5.1.1(6thed.2011).

170 Id.Quiteapartfromtheunderlyingconcernsininvocationlaw,hearsaydoctrinekeys intointentionallyassertivebehaviorbecauseboth(1)outofcourtassertionsarelessreliable thanthoseopinionsorbeliefsmanifestedbyanincourtwitness,underoath,and(2)hearsay contentisunfairlypersuasiveofjuriesbecausenomeaningfulcrossexaminationcanbehad. SeeDonnellyv.UnitedStates,228U.S.243,273(1913). 171 172 173

FED.R.EVID.801(a). SeeMASS.GUIDEEVID.801(a)(2012).

See, e.g., Brad A. Catlin, Nonverbal Statements are Still Hearsay, INDIANA LAW UPDATE THE BLOG (May 8, 2011), http://www.pricelaw.com/pdf/NonverbalStatementsAre StillHearsay.pdf (citing Sandefur v. State of Indiana, 945 N.E.2d 785, 78990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011))(introducingacase,Sandefurv.StateofIndiana,whereacourtinconductingitshearsay analysisconsideredsuchfactsasthedemeanorandpoorphysicalconditionofthespeaker).

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guarantee.174 Consequently, the legal effect given a suspects nonverbal statements under evidentiary rules should, at the very least, be commensurate to the amount of protection afforded criminal suspects undertheFifthAmendmentoftheConstitution.175Further,itisilladvised tofragmentdefinitionalapproachestononverbalstatements,evenwhere those approaches derive from separate bodies of law.176 Bringing the definitional approaches of invocation and hearsay law into harmony will givegreaterpredictabilitytothelaw,tothebenefitofbothadvocatesand futurecourts.177 For example, where a criminal suspect mouths words, which if themselvesarticulatedwithpresenceofthepitchandtonenecessarysoas tomakethosewordsaudibletoanearbyinterrogator,invocationlawjust likethelawofhearsayshouldholdthatanunequivocalstatementhad beenmade.178Thus,thelawofhearsayteachesanimportantlessonabout the potential that some nonverbal expressive conduct has to present an objectively clear message.179 Deciphering whether a statement has been made is a fallible enterprisewhether for the purpose of deciding if an outofcourt speakers behavior is meant to communicate some particular message or if a criminal suspect wishes to end interrogative questioning andinvokehisorherFifthAmendmentright.180However,theallowance and the continued useof nonverbal expression inthe hearsay definition of statement lend credence to the taking of a mirrored approach with Thompkinss unequivocal statement rule.181 There should be nothing legallymaterialaboutthesoundofparticularwordsoroftheirconstitutive
174 Compare MASS. GUIDE EVID. Art. 8, intro. note (2012), with Dickerson v. United States, 530U.S.428,432(2000)(WeholdthatMiranda,beingaconstitutionaldecisionofthisCourt, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.). 175 176

SeeU.S.CONST.amend.V;seealsoFED.R.EVID.801(a).

Diligently working toward crossdisciplinary, definitional consistency is an objective soughttobeaccomplishedthroughoutAmericanlaw.Cf.RalphCunningham,ContractRights as Property Rights, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES 169, 17677 (Andrew Robertson ed., 2004) (pointing out the necessity of maintaining consistency throughout the law while discussing a discrete point at which the laws of contract and propertyintersect).
177 178 179 180

Cf.id. SeeSandefur,945N.E.2dat787. See,e.g.,id.at78990.

See Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,14STAN.L.REV.682,68283&n.5(1962).Thepivotpointinthedebateoverwhether topermitnonverbalconducttosufficeasastatementdatesbacktoearlyEnglishcommon law.SeeWrightv.Doedem.Tatham,112Eng.Rep.488(K.B.1838).
181

SeeFED.R.EVID.801(a);seealsosupratextaccompanyingnotes168177.

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syllabic intones,182 but instead, future courts should require only that a suspect demonstrate an unequivocal expression of his or her desire to cutoffquestioning,byanymeansandinanymanner.183

CONCLUSION
Future courts should interpret Thompkinss requirement of an unequivocalstatementinawaythatacknowledgestheexpressivepower inherent in some nonverbal, human behavior.184 Moreover, Thompkins should be read with reference to how hearsay law treats such nonverbal behavior as mouthing words, a head nod, or moments of complete silence.185Itisequallyvital,however,thatfuturecourtsutilizeacontextual approach to assessing statement clarity.186 While the expectation that suspects exhibit a high level of clarity in their putative invocations is substantially justified,187 police forces are already wellequipped to scrupulouslyfollowMirandasmandatethatasuspectbeabletoinvokehis or her right to remain silent in any manner.188 It is plainly unfair to punishthosesegmentsofsocietythatlackforonereasonoranotherthe kind of linguistic flare required to satisfy a solely verbal unequivocal statement rule.189 Thus, future courts should define Thompkinss statementasthattermisdefinedbyRule801(a)oftheFederalRulesof Evidence.190Bydoingso,futurecourtswillbeleftinafarbetterpositionto evaluateandruleupontheobservableintentionsofcriminalsuspects.191By strikingthisproposedbalance,therighttosilenceaffordedtomillionsof Americans by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Stateswillbeproperlysecured.192
182 183

SeesupraParts00.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 44445 (1966); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 960 N.E.2d 306, 342, 31415 (Mass. 2012); see also Amici Brief of Criminal Defense Lawyers and ACLU, supra note 158, at 2627 (supporting a rule that is inclusive of nonverbal, expressive conduct such as a categorical refusal to answer investigative questions over the course of severalhoursofquestioning.);cf.FED.R.EVID.801(a).
184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192

Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes147167. SeesupraPart0. SeesupraPartV.

Seesupranote152andaccompanyingtext.
SeeMiranda,384U.S.at44445. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes14551,165. SeeFED.R.EVID.801(a). SeeFED.R.EVID.801(a)advisorycommitteesnotetosubdivision(a). SeesupraParts00;seealsoU.S.CONST.amend.V.