To: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs From: Matteo Tomasini Re: Irans uranium enrichment

program

SUMMARY

Given that our goal is to prevent Iran from enriching uranium to the point that it can be used in weapons, broadly speaking we have three policy options that can be pursued: A U.S. military strike or sanctioning an Israeli strike Economic coercion via an enlarging of sanctions Strategic diplomatic engagement and containment

A successful policy will be one that engages Iran diplomatically to contain the threat of a nuclear Iran while strengthening only those sanctions that will directly deny Iran the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

BACKGROUND

The current Iranian nuclear crisis essentially began in 2002 with the discovery of two nuclear facilities that had been under clandestine construction. Though the International Atomic Energy Agency has yet to find evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, its refusal to allow inspections has made the United States and most of the international community suspicious of Irans intentions. Given Irans support for Muslim extremist movements and open hostility towards Israel, the world cannot allow that Iran acquire nuclear weapons. More broadly speaking, the U.S. has an interest in stemming nuclear proliferation, and enhancing stability in the Middle East. Since 2002 little progress had been made on the Iranian nuclear issue despite multiple UN resolutions, attempts at negotiations and various rounds of sanctions. Throughout this period, Iran has been steadily improving its enrichment capabilities, even declaring the existence of a previously secret enrichment facility near Qom. Political instability continues to plague the regime after its controversial presidential election last year and Iran is at the same time threatened by a worsening economic crisis. Our most reliable estimates indicate that Iran will have a nuclear weapons capability sometime in the next two to five years.

OPTIONS The Military Option

One possibility is to launch a U.S. military strike on select Iranian targets or to give the green light to Israel to attack known nuclear enrichment facilities thereby physically denying the Iranians the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Israel has already approached us regarding such a strike; however it should be noted that the U.S. would be held responsible for an Israeli strike. Either attack would certainly degrade Iranian capabilities and likely set their program back; however, we cannot know exactly to what degree a strike would be effective given the large number of targets that would have to be neutralized and our lack of reliable intelligence as to the exact location of relevant facilities. We can also expect that given the level of national pride tied to the nuclear program, Iran will reassume enrichment as soon as possible and if they werent before, become determined to have a nuclear weapons so that they might deter a future attack. Regardless, the costs of such an action fully overshadow the benefits of even a perfectly planned and coordinated attack. Such an act would be widely condemned by the international community. Besides further compromising our ability to engage diplomatically with Middle East countries and further damaging our international standing, a military strike will likely inspire militant groups to increase the amount and intensity of attacks against the United States and its interests, particularly against U.S. troops currently engaged in Middle East theatres. Iran may also attempt to mine the Strait of Hormuz in a move that would limit oil shipments thus severely impacting the global economy. In addition, an attack would have the effect of strengthening the currently troubled Iranian regime as its citizens rally around the flag. We can similarly expect that the opposition movement will be silenced and the more radical elements of the government will become further entrenched. While certain Congressmen (most prominently Sen. Lieberman), popular figures such as Sarah Palin and Dick Cheney, and pro-Israel lobbying organizations seem prepared to accept the above risks and engage Iran militarily, public opinion is decidedly in favor of pursuing diplomatic and economic options prior to a military strike and the Pentagon and State made it more than clear to us that it is opposed to exercising this option as it shares our same concerns regarding potential negative outcomes. Top generals including Adm Mullen have relayed as much publicly; however,

in the end public opinion should not be seen as a constraint on exercising the military option, as we can expect the public to galvanize in support of the administration should we choose to strike Iran. That being said, should the strike result in any of the aforementioned negative outcomes, we can expect that in short time, the public and soon after Congress will reappraise its supportive stance and the administration may feel the consequences of this in the next election.

Economic Coercion

A second option would be to push for further international and multilateral sanctions. However, we cannot ignore the fact that current sanctions are already quite comprehensive and have had no effect in terms of deterring the Iranians. In the last six years in particular, Iran has become only more powerful and capable of extending its influence. Treasury and State have declared their interest in multilateral UN sanctions; however, China and Russia have already rejected key components that would give a UN Resolution teeth. Current U.S. legislation that aims to impose such sanctions unilaterally will be wholly ineffective should we not enforce them vigilantly, but doing so will alienate the U.S. as we would be compelled to impose harsh penalties on European, Russian, Chinese and Indian companies that do not comply. Furthermore, sanctions that continue to restrict trade, aid and investment in Iran, notably in its energy sector, will perversely likely only strengthen the more the regime as the sanctions can be used to deflect the blame for the current economic difficulties. Such sanctions will only hurt the Iranian people, including the middle class supporters of the Green Movement, and will make them even more reliant on the state. While Congress, AIPAC, Tel Aviv and the American public seem to fully support sanctions, and can thus be considered the safest politically, ultimately they will not deter the Iranian regime for: 1) Tehran has demonstrated that it is quite willing to suffer through economic hardships so that it might achieve political objectives; and 2) we have given them no indication that even if they were to comply with demands regarding their nuclear program, we wouldnt refocus the target of our sanctions. Furthermore as sanctions continue to be ineffective, the administration can expect to feel more pressure from the initial sanctions proponents in Congress, Israel and pro-Israel lobby groups to engage Iran militarily which is currently our least attractive option.

Strategic Diplomatic Engagement and Containment

A third option is to engage Iran diplomatically in a grand bargain that encompasses multiple shared security concerns including Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the nuclear issue. During this period the U.S. should consider offering to reduce sanctions and recognizing its right to enrich as a means to induce Iran to the negotiating table. The purpose of these eventual negotiations would thus not be to deny Irans enrichment program but rather to control it. Under a containment strategy we must clearly communicate that the U.S. will not tolerate that Iran make a nuclear bomb. The U.S. should work to establish a system of monitoring and inspections to provide ample warning to the international community should Iran decide to break out and begin producing nuclear weapons. In addition, the U.S. must also continue building up early-warning systems and ballistic missile defenses in the Gulf while making it clear that our nuclear umbrella extends to our allies in the region so that they will not feel obliged to acquire nuclear weapons. While much of the international community may support the approach above in that it reduces tensions without having to resort to costly military or economic measures, Israel may find the above option unfathomable as Iran could conceivably advance its nuclear weapons program during this period. The administration will feel pressure from the pro-Israel lobby should this option be pursued, however, recent statements by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak indicate that at least a few Israeli leaders favor an option that mixes engagement with sanctions and recognize that capability does not equal intent, i.e., even if Iran were to produce a weapon they would likely never use it. U.S. public opinion appears to favor this approach and has been to a certain degree expecting it, however should Iran acquire the bomb as a result, we should expect a public backlash. Regardless with all the other domestic issues that the President is contending with this backlash will not be sufficient to hamper the president or depending on the timing, have too great a bearing on his reelection.

RECOMMENDATION

At issue with Iran is not the fact that it enriches uranium as much as the threat that it may eventually produce nuclear weapons. As such all energies should be focused not on denying Iran the

capability to produce a weapon, but rather on engaging Iran in such a way that ensures that it will not. Any attempts that focus purely on denying Iran this capability via punitive measures such as sanctions or military operations will only be counterproductive. A successful policy will involve engaging Iran diplomatically in a grand bargain that discusses further areas of cooperation in addition to the nuclear issue in order to build up trust between the two parties. At such a point, Iran and the U.S. can discuss in earnest a plan that will allow multilateral inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities in exchange for increased American economic and political support. During this period, existing sanctions should be reduced when appropriate, and new sanctions designed specifically to deny Iran components needed for nuclear weapons should be developed and existing ones strengthened. The consequences of pursuing the military options are far too disastrous and we should continue to talk down this option to lessen the public expectation that we will strike militarily should engagement/containment not prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb.

Bibliography
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