Baguio City vs Masweng feb 4, 2009 DOCTRINE Even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot

simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and regulations FACTS Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land . On June 20, 1997, they obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land. On the strength of said CALC, respondents secured a building permit from the Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. Before long, they fenced the premises and began constructing a residential building thereon. Soon, respondents received a letterdated February 9, 1999 from Digna D. Torres, the Zone Administrator of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), informing them that the house they built had overlapped PEZAs territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish the same within sixty (60) days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its demolition at respondents expense. Without answering PEZAs letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City. By Order dated April 8, 1999, the RTC of Baguio City issued a TRO, which enjoined PEZA to cease and desist from threatening respondents with the demolition of their house before respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. On September 19, 2001, the RTC likewise issued an Order, which directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case The trial court ruled that respondents are entitled to possess, occupy and cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their CALC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In the assailed Decision dated October 26, 2007, the appellate court echoed the trial courts declaration that the subject lots have been set aside from the lands of the public domain. ISSUE: WHether the Petitioner or the City Engineer has the power to issue permits HELD SC ruled in the negative. Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1,[26] Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands an act of ownership that pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. On this score alone, respondents action for injunction must fail. Even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and regulations Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel oct 14, 2008 DOCTRINE The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. FACTS the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Consummation of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not take place, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Mid 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOAAD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. ISSUES 1. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 2. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; HELD The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. Tano vs Socrates aug 1, 1997 DOCTRINE There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. The Law is valid and applies to the same

FACTS On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows: In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft. The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. In their comment public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance. Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. On 1993, petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. ISSUE Whether or not the TRO is proper HELD Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners, the SC opted to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the issues raised. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, the SC found petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of Marine Merchants;

petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.Nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Alexandria Condo vs LLDA sept 11, 2009 DOCTRINE TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals FACTS On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission issued a Development Permit to Phil Realty to develop Cluster A of the project. In the Development Permit, PhilRealty was required to submit its condominium plans to the Building Official of Pasig City. A building permit was issued Shortly after Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards provided in Sections 68 and 69 of the 1978 National Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations (NPCC) as amended by Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 34. LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government standards. In a Notice of Violation dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit corrective measures to abate or control its water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay. LLDA likewise imposed upon TACC a daily fine of P1,000 from 26 March 1999 until full cessation of pollutive wastewater discharge. TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals sustained LLDAs contention that the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should have been to resort to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to judicial action. ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding TACCs exhaustive efforts in complying with the governments standards on effluent discharge; HELD The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the transfer of LLDA to the DENR under Executive Order No. 149[10] (EO 149), TACC should have first resorted to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR for policy and program coordination and/or administrative supervision x x x.[13] Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[14] However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including NPCCs function to serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution. Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

LLDA vs CA dec 7, 1995 DOCTRINE Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projectsor activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. FACTS Congress enacted RA 4850 creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake. To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the i ssues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting thesaid region including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that therates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fish pen fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by aCouncil and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: "Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters andimpose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fish pen permits. Big fish pen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fish pens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fish pens and fishcages occupied almost one-third the entirelake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 hain 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application forregistration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle the irrespective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss thecases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens andsimilar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar asfishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective localgovernment units concerned. ISSUE Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region- should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held: LLDA Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant f ishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) VS COURT OF APPEALS (CA) G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr. FACTS: RA 4850, which created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), was partially amended by Marcos due to the rapid expansion of Metro Manila and its impact on the environment. This further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of LLDA. Subsequently, the LGC took effect, where the municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion which gave rise to sharp increase in unregulated fishpen and fish cages. Because of this, the LLDA notified the public that all unregistered fishpen or fishcages are declared illegal and dismantled otherwise demolition will be effected. The affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. LLDAs motions to dismiss were denied by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The CA held that the power to grant fishing permits is now vested with the LGUs and the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC. ISSUE/S: Which agency of the Government (the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region) should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned. LLDA has jurisdiction. RATIO: The LGC do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA. LLDAs charter constitutes a special law while the LGC is a general law. . It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Thus, LLDAs charter should prevail over the LGC. The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Hizon vs CA dec 13, 1996 DOCTRINE

The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. FACTS Accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., caught fish with use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island. n July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one petitioners guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition ISSUE: whether or not the conviction was proper HELD Not Guilty. Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 which provide as follows: Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary. The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. HENARES V. LTFRB Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents LTFRB and DOTC to require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that thebases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIREPUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS? Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general

mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290. Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinosto prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of human kind, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come."It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken. Province of Rizal vs Executive Secretary dec 13, 2005 DOCTRINE: The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. An order for closure is in order. FACTS Garbage was on the rise. At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August 1995, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. In fact, this site, extending to more or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February 1990 for the solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig. A petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635. A case to the CA for the closure of the landfill stalled. ISSUE Whether or not the landfill is contrary to law HELD: SC held that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned the issues raised in their previous pleadings but not included in the memorandum,certain events we shall relate below have inclined us to address some of the more pertinent issues raised in the petition for the guidance of the herein respondents, and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar.

The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January 1999, with the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to agree that it would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In return, the municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999. Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have been lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of contract is not absolute. MMDA vs Concened Residents of Manila Bay December 18, 2008; G.R. Nos. 171947-48 (Mickey) Facts: 1. January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (with Atty. Oposa as their lawyer) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. 2. 3. The complaint alleges that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. That the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 4. Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; The Environment Code (PD 1152); The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); The Water Code (PD 1067); The Sanitation Code (PD 856); The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); Executive Order No. 192; The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and International Law

It was shown by the respondents that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

5.

The RTC held the petitioners and other agencies jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. And within 6 months have a concerted, consolidated and coordinated plan for the cleanup of the bay. The various agencies have been instructed to perform their duties including defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

6.

The petitioners appealed to the CA contending: 1. arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general and 2. that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

7. Issue: I. II.

CA affirmed in toto the trial courts decision as it did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. Is the cleaning and/or restoration of Manila Bay a ministerial act of the petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus? Does sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 pertain only to specific cleaning of pollution and not cleaning in general? *Note: It is the MMDA and DPWH together with the LGUs that are the primary agencies tasked to remove and demolish the nuisance structures and obstructions along the bay

Held: I. Yes, It is a ministerial act. a. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. b. c. The court said that the obligation to perform their ( based on MMDAs argument) duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. The MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. This is provided in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. d. A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposalrelated duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. e. f. The following agencies are therefore precluded from choosing not to perform these duties DENR, MWSS, LWUA, DA, DPWH, PCG, DILG, PPA, DOH, DepEd, DBM and MMDA. Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. i. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. g. Furthermore it is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. h. Lastly the court said that said: All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay. II. Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General

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a.

The Court finds for the respondents and their emphasis that Sec. 62(g) of RA 9275(Clean Water Act), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152. i. ii. iii. Also Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. The Court quoting the CA decision: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.

b.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.

c.

It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

d.

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along drainage ways of the river system. i. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list.

e. f.

Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. They should have their waste treatment facilities or otherwise should be forced to transfer or shutdown.

g.

The court then cites the ADB commissioned study on the garbage problem of Metro Manila in The Garbage Book which emphasizes on the alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. i. The Court then calls for sufficient sanitary landfills now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA.

h. i.

The Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Finally they reiterate what has been said in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.

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