What can university philosophy learn from primary philosophy?

Abstract Peter Worley (BA MA FRSA) will clarify some key differences between approaches to doing philosophy with children and briefly introduce his own work. He will also briefly answer the question can children do philosophy? but will then turn to the question of whether philosophy at tertiary level can learn anything from philosophy at primary level. He will look at the presentation of information, the role of dialogue, assessment and teaching. The Lecture What can university philosophy learn from primary philosophy?1 To begin, I would like to give you a task to do. Which of the following two arguments A and B do you think was said by a university undergraduate and which one was said by a 10 year old? A Ive got an argument to prove theres only one universe and nothing doesnt exist: I know the universe is infinite, but, say, half of this room is the universe and the other half of the room another universe. When they meet together, they must have a point where they meet. And what is to define that the two universes are different? I mean they [both] have the same description; they cover everything. And if the universe was here [he points] and nothing was there [points elsewhere] the universe must be touching the nothing, and if it is touching it, it must physically exist, therefore I would like to thank the following people for sharing their thoughts and experience with me on the topic of this lecture: Mateusz Boniecki (KCL and The Philosophy Shop), Lizzy Lewis (Sapere), Roger Sutcliffe (Sapere), Michael Lacewing (Heythrop), and especial thanks to Robert Torrington (KCL and The Philosophy Shop).
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B They [atoms] might be the smallest physical thing, but surely energy must be made of something. There might be, like, matter that (because even gas and things are made of atoms, which is physical) makes something which you can pass your hand through. Maybe theres, like, something smaller than the atom, which cant be divided because its actually not really physical [But] how [can] something that doesnt officially exist make something that does exist? You could say, when two monads collide they get much bigger and make an atom, but how can things that dont have any stuff hit anything?2 What is philosophy with children? Philosophy with children is something of a minefield. There are many different approaches and - something Im sure philosophy with children has in common with university philosophy - they dont all agree with each other about how this should be done. What they do agree on is that it should be done3. So heres a brief overview:

In fact, both examples were said by children: A was said by a 10 year old boy and B was said by an 11 year old boy from state schools in Lewisham, South East London. 3 I shall not here be addressing the arguments for why philosophy with children should be done, and I am not sure that any robust arguments have been offered. I am in the process of trying to offer one. It will include the importance of the intrinsic motivation found in the practice of doing philosophy and the special way in which philosophy is concerned only with conceptual thinking, and the further observation (thanks Dr. Michael Hand!) that philosophys problems and questions are to some extent inescapable.
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Philosophy For Children, also known as P4C, was started in the late sixties by Matthew Lipman4. Lipmans was a rigorous and philosophically informed approach to doing philosophy with children with a heavy emphasis on logic and logical thinking. Many variations of the Lipman approach have since sprung up and, on the whole, I think it would be fair to say that many of them share a Deweyan (John Dewey, 1859-1952) - and therefore a pragmatist - philosophical underpinning. In contrast to this there is an approach developed by Catherine McCall called CoPI (Community of Philosophical Inquiry)5 and she has challenged the pragmatist philosophical underpinning that informs the P4C movement. She is committed to an external realist position. Generally speaking, this means that she does not conflate epistemological questions and concerns with metaphysical ones, which she claims is what the pragmatist approach does: In Deweys pragmatic philosophy, truth is the product of successful, active manipulation of the world by people, and best encountered within a democratic setting there is no epistemological-metaphysical distinction.6 The approach I represent is called the PhiE method7, which stands for Philosophical Enquiry. Today, I would like to introduce you, briefly, to my own work. The PhiE method is a method I have developed over the past 9 years working in primary schools doing philosophy with both children and teachers. If I were to put my cards on the table, I suppose I should admit to being influenced mainly by the Greeks (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in particular), in that the approach is less committed to a particular philosophical underpinning - with all the philosophical problems that that brings - than to the development of what might be called intellectual virtues. I am not suggesting that the Greeks did not make metaphysical commitments - Platos theory of Forms is a metaphysical commitment after all - but I emphasise the virtues of thinking. The PhiE method could be said to be in a Socratic spirit in that Socrates seems to have been committed to an external realist position of a sort but was less sure about his ability to reach the truth, he was therefore much more interested in extolling and developing the process of trying to reach it this gives us the intellectual virtues.

See, among many others, Philosophy Goes to School by Matthew Lipman. Transforming Thinking by Catherine McCall. 6 Transforming Thinking by Catherine McCall p. 104. 7 The If Machine: Philosophical Enquiry in The Classroom by Peter Worley.
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Can children do philosophy? I would like to start by saying not what I think university philosophy can learn from primary philosophy, but what primary philosophy can learn from university philosophy. I am afraid to say that the philosophy with children movement, though it has exponents and practitioners of the very highest quality, also has, represented within its ranks, the other end of the spectrum. In other words, the quality is very wide ranging and if you were to ask philosophy-with-children practitioners what they think philosophy is you would hear an incredible variety of answers, some uncontroversial and some much more so. One strategy to answering the question Can children do philosophy? is to define philosophy so that you are in a position to say yes. If you define philosophy loosely as, for instance, a journey or as asking questions and trying to answer them then it is relatively easy to say that children can do philosophy as there are many ways in which a child can be said to have undergone a journey and it is easy to get children asking questions about something and then attempting to answer them. Another strategy is to look for statements that children say that have a superficial resemblance to a philosophical musing such as: Are we in a dream? or What does purple taste like? At best, this is nothing more than pseudo-profundity, its certainly no proof that, what Professor John White calls philosophical intention, is present8. However, many will be dissatisfied with these approaches as it could be said to be moving the goalposts to suit a particular view of doing philosophy with children. In particular, those that are familiar with philosophy as an academic subject, or with the great canon of philosophy, will not recognise these definitions as a good fit for the practice of philosophy. Also, if I may venture a personal observation, failure is seen as a dirty word in primary education and the corollary of this is that excellence is also seen with a dim view. Although philosophy, I believe, can be made accessible, I dont think it should be made to be easy. Philosophy is not easy, and should not be easy. The standard that I think philosophy offers education, that is so lacking, is that of understanding. One must understand, or, at least understand what it is that is not understood, to be able to say that one is engaging with philosophy. Unfortunately, this cannot be said for a great deal of A level philosophy. I attended a talk given by David Leal of Oxford University entitled Isnt Three As Enough? in 2009 in which he said that Oxford would no longer be recognising A level philosophy as sufficient for identifying philosophical aptitude with regard to their philosophy undergraduate intake. The reason being that questions such as
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See The Philosophy in Philosophy in Schools by Peter Worley.

this Explain and illustrate one strength of reliabilism. (15 marks) Explain and illustrate two criticisms of idealism. (15 marks) AQA Philosophy Paper 1 20089

can be answered satisfactorily by having memorised an answer no understanding has to be demonstrated to get a good mark here. In contrast, take a look at the questions that Oxford ask in their entrance exam for French and Philosophy for example: Is tragedy in the eye of the beholder? If an action is illegal in ones own country, should it also be made illegal to leave ones own country in order to perform the act in question somewhere else? Can anything be said in poetry that cannot be said in prose? Philosophy and Modern Languages Entrance Test 200810

No prior knowledge is necessary here but one has to engage the understanding in order for a satisfactory answer to be given. I am pleased to say that the questions you find in the Oxford undergraduate entrance exams resemble the questions we ask the children in primary school: Is it possible to think of nothing? Is the universe infinite? Is the mind and brain the same thing? (Used with Year 1 upwards!) Would a prisoner who has everything he wants and has no desire to leave the prison be free? (Paraphrase) If you and I swapped brains where would you be? (Paraphrase) Is it better to be an unhappy boy or a happy pig? Example Philosophy Shop Questions used with primary age children

I have been implying that university philosophy is not subject to the same criticisms that can be levelled against A level philosophy, but I shall ask you whether you agree with that suggestion. Although this is hardly scientific, I certainly only got firsts when I Examples taken from David Leals presentation slides. 10 Ibid.
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regurgitated learned essays and not when I properly philosophised. Now, it may just be that I wasnt very good at the philosophising! But heres a question worth thinking about: to what extent is university philosophy about what you know and to what extent is it about how you do it? Id be very interested to know what the audience think about this. To return to my theme, what is lacking in the world of primary philosophy is a standard of what constitutes philosophy. Now, I am fully aware that defining philosophy is a mugs game. So, I am not going to attempt an exhaustive definition, but I do want to try to identify some kind of standard and I shall do so not in the Socratic spirit of necessary and sufficient conditions but in the Wittgensteinian spirit of family resemblances as this gives me a little more wiggle room. What I would like to do is to set a standard drawn from the academic tradition (at its best) and then show that children of primary age can meet the requirements of this standard. I will then have demonstrated that children can do this kind of philosophy so that there is no need to dumb it down for children in a significant sense. I like to say that the PhiE method brings the children up to the philosophy rather than bringing the philosophy down to the children. So, heres a list of the sort of constituent parts one might be looking for when trying to say that philosophy is being done: (I must emphasise that I am not claiming that these are necessary and sufficient conditions, though there are some here that it may be claimed are at least necessary, and a good candidate for a necessary condition of philosophy might be second-order / metalevel thinking.) Formulation and analysis of arguments Second-order / meta-level thinking Generality Understanding Special subjects: metaphysics, ethics, epistemology Abstract thinking Dialogue/dialectic - internal and/or external Hypothetical thinking Conceptual analysis Complex reasoning: justification, coherence and consistency etc. Non-empirical (awareness of empirical / non-empirical distinction) History of ideas

Revaluation / re-thinking Its difficult!

Now I would like to show you some examples of primary age children doing philosophy.11 Lets now return to the list to see if the children are able to reach the standard Ive set: Formulation and analysis of arguments (Keiron and Noah) Second-order / meta-level thinking (Alice) Generality (Noah) Understanding (Keiron) Special subjects: metaphysics, ethics, epistemology (all these examples are metaphysical, dispelling the myth that children can only do ethics!) Abstract thinking (All of them!) Dialogue/dialectic - internal or external (Felix and Noah and Alice) Hypothetical thinking (Keiron) Conceptual analysis (Alice) Complex reasoning: justification, coherence and consistency (Alice, Felix) Non-empirical (aware of empirical / non-empirical distinction) (All of them were a priori!) History of ideas (Leibniz) Revaluation / re-thinking (Felix) Its difficult (Keiron, Noah and Felix)

How does PhiE work? Briefly, a PhiE session begins by the facilitator presenting the children with a philosophically rich stimulus, for instance, 11

A version of The Ship of Theseus, Mills question: Is it better to be a happy pig or an unhappy person? A version of the Experience Machine Or simply a question, such as how many eyes does a Cyclops have? Excerpts from films such as Spiderman

For transcripts of more of the footage that this list makes reference to see my article The Virtues of Thinking in the bibliography or see link: http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/view.html/PrsDiscourseArticles/115

Stories such as Mr. Good by Roger Hargreaves (check it out for its Platonic similarities). I personally like to use the medium of storytelling so I tell stories like King Midas, stories from the Odyssey, and many other fairy tales and traditional tales that I am able to draw philosophy from (often with a tweak or two).

Once the stimulus has been presented, the next stage is to ask the children what we call a Task Question, such as Should Mr. Good stay in Goodland and be happy or should he return to Badland to teach the people of Badland how to be Good? Once the parts have been replaced is the ship of Theseus the same ship as when it first set out on its journey? If you were King Midas, how might you say the wish so that it wouldnt go wrong? Would you choose situation A, and climb Mount Everest through the experience machine, or would you choose B, and climb Mount Everest for real?

Once the task question has set the philosophical arena, we conduct a discussion or Enquiry. This is child-led and very often questions emerge from the children themselves and we pursue these, such as: (Example Emergent Questions) Is everything connected so that a small change to one thing means that everything has changed? If you could choose, should you live in a place called Goodland, a place called Badland or a land called Good/Badland? If you could wish for whatever you wanted would that be good. Arent all experiences real, even the ones that happen in the machine?

The facilitator does not join in with the discussion but helps to allow a discussion between the children to unfold. An observer should not be able to tell what the facilitator thinks about the issue. What the facilitator does is to use a variety of techniques to help generate a genuine dialogue following the principle of dialectic. For instance, one of the foundational techniques we use is iffing, anchoring and opening up, which is really three-techniques-in-one.

Anchoring is when the facilitator repeats the task question, with a neutral tone, to encourage the child to show how what they have said supports the task question. This encourages premises and conclusion thinking and expression. So, Task Question: Is CO2 the same as air? Anchoring this question gently and persistently led to the following insight: Olucien (Year 5, age 10): If CO2 is the same as air we should be able to breathe it in (because w breathe in air), But if we breathe in only CO2 then we would die, So, CO2 is not the same thing as air. Iffing is when you use a hypothetical question to allow deeper thinking on an issue, often side-stepping empirical obstacles to the conceptual discussion. One example of this is what I call either-or-the-if, where you encourage the child to think about the issue both affirming what they said and denying what they said, thereby avoiding having to dismiss or discourage them or for the discussion to become a teacher-student confrontation.

Task Question: Is the ship of Theseus the same ship after the parts have been replaced? Child: Yes, because the inside might be the same. Fac: So, if the inside was the same, and only the outside of the ship was replaced, then would it be the same ship? Child: Yes, because if the inside is the same then there would be parts of the ship that were on the old one. Fac: And if the inside parts were replaced also, as well as the outside parts, then would it be the same ship? Child: No. Fac: Why? Child: Because it wouldnt have any of the parts of the old ship, so it cant be the same ship.

This last example also contains an example of the final triptych technique, opening up. This is where you ask the child to explain why they think what they think. The reason for

this is that the specificity and focus of the question-style that we require means that the questions we ask are, on the whole, closed questions (e.g. And if the inside parts were replaced also, as well as the outside parts, then would it be the same ship?) but we get round the problems of closed questions with the simple technique of opening it up again. In other words, by asking why? or words to that effect. So, take a closer look at the question I just mentioned. It is a good example of the full questioning technique iffing, anchoring and opening up:

(iffing)

(anchoring)

Fac: And if the inside parts were replaced also, as well as the outside parts, then would it (opening up) be the same ship? [Child: No.] Fac: Why? [Child: Because]

Notice also that the content of the question is drawn from the child. The facilitator does not have to create his or her own question. This minimises the facilitator bringing in his or her own agenda and it keeps the discussion child-centred but philosophically focused. There are many ways in which iffing can be used in questioning, but this should give you something of an insight into how we use techniques to encourage thinking. To mention just a couple of the other techniques Ive developed, theres the imaginary disagreer (sic), where you ask someone to think of what someone might say if they disagreed with them, and then you ask them to come up with reasons that their imaginary disagreer might use to support what they think. I really like how, on some occasions, children actually change their mind in light of what their imaginary disagreer said! Theres also Whats Needed and Whats Enough? where the facilitator asks the class, firstly, what is needed in order to have something (e.g. a square, and they may say sides are needed) but then they ask them if thats enough (e.g. no, because you need sides for a triangle too, so you need four sides.) and you carry on in this fashion. If the children can identify the features needed that would also be enough for whatever it is

they are considering, then they would have identified the necessary and sufficient conditions of that thing. So, what can university philosophy learn from primary philosophy? I would like to address the following elements: the presentation of information, the role of dialogue, assessment and teaching. Presenting information: The Sibelius Model As you may have guessed I have a concern that university philosophy may be weighted a little too much towards what you know. Naturally, philosophy in primary school particularly the PhiE method - is much more weighted towards how you do it, not least because children would struggle much more with philosophy if it were presented as theories that they had to learn, understand and recall. However, at The Philosophy Foundation (formerly The Philosophy Shop) we have a principle for the introduction of information that I think may be of interest to anyone teaching philosophy: The Sibelius Model. On the Stage One course of our training for becoming a Specialist Philosophy Teacher we play two pieces of music. First, we play them the first movement of Beethovens Fifth Symphony and then we play them the first movement of Sibelius Second Symphony. The task is to listen to the two pieces of music as dialogues or conversations and to make notes and to comment on identifiable characteristics of the two pieces apropos of their being understood as dialogues. It is easier to carry out this task with the Beethoven. The Sibelius is much more subtle and elusive, not least because it is a continuous piece of music with very little direct repetition. The key point is that, for my purposes, the Beethoven represents a more traditional mode of philosophical discussion, where a paper is read at the beginning and where there follows a focused and sustained discussion on the one or two themes raised in the paper. Dun-dun-dun-dahhh, dun-dun-dun-dahhh is the main theme, a theme never absent from the musical passages that follow. Sibelius is famous for having reinvented symphonic form, and key to his reinvention is the way in which he inverted the traditional sonata form model. The Beethoven is a good example of this form, a form that he mastered, so much so, that most composers approaching symphonic form afterwards struggled to step out of his shadow. Most composers that is, except a select few, Sibelius among them.

Comparison of treatments of sonata form in the Beethoven and the Sibelius: Exposition (repeated) (Beethoven) Main cell-like theme: dun-dundun-dahhh and main musical statement (argument) resulting from cell-like theme (Sibelius) Seemingly unrelated fragments starting and then stopping. Meandering and lacking in purpose Development This is where the ideas stated clearly in the exposition are played with and explored but still with clear adherence to the main themes opening agenda. Interplay of fragments and statement of main theme resulting from interplay Recapitulation Fairly faithful restatement of the main themes from the exposition. Coda A new section that concludes the musical statements (arguments) of the piece.

A return to the familiar themes of the exposition but notably changed and containing aporetic passages.

The piece ends without a sense of conclusiveness on quiet chords.

The Beethoven is taut and focused. Sibelius, however, lets us into the compositional process. The main ideas have clearly been worked out in advance in the Beethoven, but in the Sibelius the main theme is worked towards and doesnt appear until about two thirds of the way through. When it does, it is a long melodic theme, shared by the entire orchestra but passed from one section to the other, and it is played only once. The Beethoven, however, has a clear authority-figure that presents the arguments and sets the agenda. I hope you can begin to see the parallels in this analogy. The Beethoven lends itself - as a model - to essays and tutorials, to reading papers and then writing about them. The Sibelius lends itself to dialogue, and discussion, discovery and collaboration, with all the confusion, aporia and dead-ends etc. that this can lead to. So, heres how we like to present information to students:

The Sibelius Model:

(Illustration by Tamar Levi) A stimulus is presented and a discussion begins that often has many fragments, or undeveloped ideas, within it. Interplay between the fragments is encouraged. Larger themes start to emerge from this interplay. If philosophers/theorie s are to be introduced then they are introduced at the point that the students begin to have similar thoughts and ideas. In other words, into, what we call a thinking context. Conclusions are sometimes reached, but often the discussion ends inconclusively and aporetically. This we do not shy away from. Aporia here is understood as motivating.

So, I think that a lecture, particularly in a first semester of the first year, could look something like this (especially given that many undergraduate students are coming to philosophy for the first time):

A stimulus (such as the sort found in The If Machine, albeit adapted for the age of the students) is presented. A discussion around the theme (e.g. identity) is then had, naively.

Themes are identified and developed from the fragments that start the discussion.

When the students begin to offer ideas that resemble those of the philosophers (e.g. people are different from objects because they are conscious) then the corresponding philosopher/theory is introduced (e.g. Locke and his theory of personal identity). Or, the students themselves introduce philosophers they may know about already.

The discussion is brought to a close probably with a sense of inconclusiveness and the relevant paper(s) is set as reading/research material, but against the backdrop of the students already engaged ideas.

Dialogue The best philosophy, in my view, is done in dialogue form. There are some obvious examples, like Plato, Hume and Berkeley and there are some less obvious examples such as Descartes Meditations, which follows a dialogue in one voice analysis. Using this insight, it could be argued that all philosophy is a form of dialogue, either the writer with him or herself, like with Descartes, or the writer with other writers, such as Spinoza and Descartes, so that all philosophy is understood as a kind of dialogue with the previous voices of the past12. I myself recall doing my best philosophy in the pub after lectures. It was there, in discussion with my fellow students, that I would discover exactly what I had

I think theres a case for saying that philosophy is a form of dialogue by developing some of these themes.
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understood and what I had not (even though I often thought I had!).13 It seems odd to me, given the importance of dialogue in the history and practice of philosophy, that so little of it features either in the presentation of written work and/or in the assessment of students. My experience of being taught philosophy was very inconsistent and it seemed to depend on the personality and the personal choices of the lecturers. Sometimes I found the experience highly dialectic, that is: a collaborative, dialogue-based effort. Other times I found it to be highly eristic, that is: a combative, confrontational dynamic, where the lecturer tore you to shreds and reduced you to tears. In the PhiE method (and this is common to many if not all of the philosophy-with-children approaches), we work to a stepping out principle, something more like facilitation than teaching, though, of course, a good balance between the two would be the best approach at university level. The teacher, in our model, does not join in the conversation so much but helps the students to engage with each other and/or with (often dead) philosophers. A good facilitator may, on occasion, role-play the voice of the philosopher or the voice of the argument, but would certainly not seek to reduce anyone to tears on a personal level. We also use the principle of Socratic irony, and by this I mean the adoption of a position of defeasibility in the spirit of Socrates maxim wisest is he who knows he knows nothing. So, rather than telling the student whats true and whats not, the teacher defers to the possibility of being wrong in order to encourage thinking on the students part. This is not done disingenuously (saying I dont know when really you do) but is done by taking a tentative voice (this seems to me to be the case but I welcome anyone who can show me otherwise.)14 In discussion with me about this lecture, my colleague Robert Torrington described a distinction between what he called the experimental approach (thinking for oneself on This, it is worth noting, is a version of the Socratic principle of unrecognised ignorance moving to recognised ignorance described in the Meno and attributed to the slave boy, also memorably captured by Donald Rumsfeld when he said: because as we know there are known knowns, there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns, that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we dont know we dont know. 14 See my article Socratic Irony in the Classroom: Columbo or Clouseau?: http://www.innovatemyschool.com/industry-expert-articles/item/52-socratic-irony-in-theclassroom-clouseau-or-columbo?.html
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philosophical issues and trying things out) and the didactic approach (learning the canon and the standard arguments on the classic philosophical issues). He argued that the experimental approach is good for the student but not for the scholarship whereas the didactic approach is good for the scholarship but not for the student. Torrington suggested that one of the implications of this is that there is a place for the experimental approach (or PhiE methods and strategies) in tutorial settings where the student needs to try out their creative and original thinking (however good or bad that may be) and that the pedagogical skills needed to do this need to be properly learned and assimilated by the Tutor. He further pointed out however, that though these recommendations would be appropriate to tutorials and seminars they do not pertain to the traditional lecture where information needs to be disseminated. I found myself sympathetic to his suggestion and yet there is one notable example that challenges the immunity of the traditional lecture. I have recently come across Michael Sandels Justice material (see here: http://www.justiceharvard.org/ ) and I was pleased to see something very similar to how we work in primary schools happening at the very highest academic level. It is, of course, not identical to how we work and I wouldnt expect it to be; it is designed to meet a different level of engagement in a very different context. Yet his general approach mirrors aspects of the PhiE method in that he encourages dialogue between his audience members; he makes use of a strategy we call tension play, where the facilitator identifies opinions and views in the class/audience that dont agree and then uses these tensions to progress the discussion and engage the audience. He adopts the voice of the argument (to use a Platonic expression) and enters into a dialogue with the audience members and the ideas he wants to introduce them to. So maybe there is a sense in which even the traditional lecture can begin to resemble philosophy sessions you would see if you were to observe a PhiE session in primary school. Michael Lacewing, of Heythrop College, used (and I believe still uses) the Community of Enquiry method developed by Lipman with his undergraduate students. He then collected their feedback on the experience. Among the many things said in the feedback a notable recurrent theme was that the enquiry experience was how they expected university to be, and there was a sense of outrage that there was no enquiry at the outset of their course. If nothing else, I will be pleased if this lecture stimulates thought and dialogue on how philosophy is best practised and taught at every level. Id like to leave you with an anonymous old English poem that captures a perennial concern, both in philosophy and in education in general, that I will venture to say many

of us share: Bookworm A worm ate words. I thought that wonderfully Strange a miracle when they told me a crawling Insect had swallowed noble songs, A night-time thief had stolen writing So famous, so weighty. But the bug was foolish Still, though its belly was full of thought. [10th century] trans. by Michael Alexander

Bibliography Hargreaves, R (2008) Mr. Good, Egmont Books Ltd. Leal, D. (2010) Isnt Three As Enough? Assessment of potential for philosophical study and the public examinations system: http://www.prs.heacademy.ac.uk/view.html/prsdocuments/460 Lipman, M. (1988) Philosophy Goes to School, Temple. McCall, C. (2009) Transforming Thinking: Philosophical Inquiry in the Primary and Secondary Classroom, Routledge. Worley, P. (2011) The If Machine: Philosophical Enquiry in the Classroom, Continuum. Worley, P. (2011) Socratic Irony in the Classroom: Columbo or Clouseau?: http://www.innovatemyschool.com/industry-expert-articles/item/52-socratic-irony-in-theclassroom-clouseau-or-columbo?.html Worley, P. (2009) The Virtues of Thinking, Discourse 9 (1):143-150 Worley, P. (2009) The Philosophy in Philosophy in Schools, Think 23, vol. 8