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Philosophical Review

Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism Author(s): Charles W. Morris Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Mar., 1938), pp. 109-127 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180851 Accessed: 13/12/2010 09:43
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Number 2 Volume XLVII

March, I938

Whole Number 278

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of miliar faces in the writings Americanand European philosophers of science-especially among the logical empiricists the and of defenders operationalism. In termsof this deluge of new material, as representing it does in and the main thinkers the pragmaticmovethe main interests the America'smostdistinctive ment, taskof appraising philosophic It expressionis renderedat once more easy and more difficult. is more difficult because the veryrichness the materialmakes imof and possiblethefacileexplanations, acceptances, damnations which ran riot during the futile decades in which discussion centered almostexclusively around the conceptof truth. Those decades are happilypast, and the phoenixwhichhas arisen fromtheashes reveals herselfas a muchmoreluxuriant creature. We find ourselves
1 Presidential addressto thewestern divisionof theAmerican Philosophical Association, Knox College,April23, I937. Footnotes have beenadded. I09

intellectual laborsof CharlesS. Peirceand George Mead. H. In thesameperiod John Deweyhas rounded theimplications out and and of his views foresthetics, religion, political theory, has given a glimpse thereformulation systematization us of and of his modeof thought beenkept WilliamJames' has logicaldoctrine. of us collection his ownlatercosbefore by Ferdinand Schiller's and of life mological essays, bythefulllength portrait James' and in C. thought painted words RalphBarton by Perry. I. Lewishas himself the theory knowledge devoted of fromthe pointof to viewwhich calls "conceptualistic he And pragmatism". a number of characteristic theseshave begunto showtheirf pragmatic a-

JN recent we havehad spreadbefore theresults the us years of

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confrontedwith the task of assessing a distinctiveversion of empiricism, extensivelogical tradition, developedtheoryof an a value,a comprehensive formulation ethics of and social philosophy, a detailed theoryof mind,and a minutely elaboratedcosmology. And this is a more difficult task than eitherthe friendsor the enemiesof the pragmatic movement have hitherto themselves. set Indeed, the relevantcriticaltaskhas hardlybeen envisaged, say to nothing beingperformed. of Yet in anothersense, the recentliterature made thetask of has assessmenteasier. It becomesclearerthaneverbeforethatthereis a sustainedunityto thepragmatic movement. Pragmatism reveals itselfin all its phases as a series of constantly deepening analyses of a singleset of theses.The differences between leadingreprethe are sentatives primarily variationson a commontheme, variations in part dictatedby differences fieldsof interest in and application. There are genuinedifferences be sure, but these too are often to merelydifferences to the permissible as range of extensionof a doctrine otherwise heldin common. Pragmatism comesthusto take on an integrated character. One has the sense of a complexphilosophic tapestry whichhas been woven through cooperative enterprise. The movement has in our day achieved something an of estheticculmination, like a fineconversationwhich has worked itselfout to its naturaltermination. It is not of course possible on this occasion to attempt either of the tasks which the pragmaticmovementmakes imperative. We can neither to show the systematic try contours pragmatism of nor criticallyto estimateit as a whole. But as a step in these directions, has seemed worthwhile to compare and contrast it Peirce and Mead in certain selected respects. The American philosophicalpublic is now at work digestingthe published results of these thinkers, as yet littlehas been written the but on men individually, nothing, faras I know,of a comparative and so sort. The selectionto be made also has the advantage of drawing attention the somewhatneglectedcosmologicaltheoriesof to the pragmatists relationto the constantconsideration such in by of thinkers the generaltheory signs.The fact thatno obvious of influence Peirce on Mead is discernible, of coupled with the fact that Peirce approached his problemsas a logician while Mead

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approached his as a social psychologist, makes more significant their convergencesand their differences. is believed, further, It that this comparisonof the earliestand the latest stage of pragmatism makes the continuity of and the discontinuity the developmentstand out vividly,and providesa basis for evaluating the change that has taken place fromthe metaphysical idealism the radical empiricism James to the empiriof of Peirce through cal naturalismof Dewey and Mead. The lines of this evolution likewise throw light on the possible future of the pragmatic movement. II Even the most superficial samplingof the writingsof Peirce and Mead revealscertainstriking betweenthe thought similarities of the two men. Mead held that"philosophy concerned is withthe importand presence in the universeof human reflective intelligence". Peirce and Mead, in commonwith all pragmatists, were led to theirviews by a consideration the phenomenon reof of flective intelligence-as perhaps was Aristotlein an earlier age. This is in a sense the centerwithreference whichall pragmatic to doctrinesform an ever-expanding series of circumferences. A consideration reflective of intelligence suggestsa numberof importantconsequences: it leads to attaching centralimportance to of the theory signs-and both Peirce and Mead spenta large part of their life in the elaborationof this discipline; it inevitably raises questions as to the relation of signs and thought-and both men shared the view thatthereis no thought withoutsigns; it demandsan answerin post-Darwinian days as to the relationof thoughtand organic action-and both men insistedthat thinking functionsin the context of interestedaction as an instrument in the realizationof sought values. The consideration reflecof tive thinking provokes queries as to the relationof thoughtto empirical data-and thecommon answerwas giventhatall thought must findits ultimate validationin termsof such data; such considerationsensitizesthe inquirerto the phenomenon univerof sality-and both Peirce and Mead aim adequatelyto take account of the objectivity universality, of generality, law; it seems to indicate that the envisagement ends is a genuine factorin the of attainment these ends-and bothphilosophers of insisted upon the

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reality of final causes, defendingthe objectivityof teleology, which theory againstany typeof mechanistic chance,and novelty would take frommind its role as an active agent. The studyof to draws attention the social aspect inevitably thinking reflective of thought-and both men held in high respectthe categoryof the social, discerningin the universe wider social processes of which the socialityof the humanmind is a particularmanifestasuch study raises doubts as to the validityof any tion; finally, form of dualistic separationof mind and the world-and both tracesof CarPeirce and Mead chop at the rootsof the lingering of unfractured thedichotomies by and present universe a tesianism subjective experienceand externalnature,quality and quantity, mechanismand purpose. mind and matter, show So it is that the earliestand latestphases of pragmatism agreementon basic issues. There is presentedan exsignificant the which has relinquished inpanded and renovatedempiricism exand nominalistic sensationalistic, dividualistic,subjectivistic, tremes of late British empiricism;linked with this empiricism with minute fidelity is an evolutionarycosmology,constructed to modernphysicaland biologicalscience,but in whichmechanical chance,or purpose; while the law has not squeezed out novelty, of of of keystone thearchis foundin a theory mindin terms which action and of interested mind is at once set in the framework yet linked with things in such a way that envisaged ends are concretized intoembodiedactualities. the same Nevertheless,in spite of these basic convergences, which at samplingalso discloses profounddivergences superficial are glance perhapsobscurethe factthatthe differences more first of as to the range of applicability a doctrinethan as to the docof trine itself. Peirce shows more the mentality the traditional Peirce discusses Mead writesmore as a scientist. metaphysician; fully the doctrinesof pragmatismand the empiricaltheoryof prebut oftenfails to live up to his own methodological meaning, topics,but his these cepts; Mead does not writemuch concerning within a pragmaticand empirical thinkingmoves more firmly type of mind-perof orbit.One characteristic the metaphysical of characteristic-isto notethe existence series haps the dominant the and thento affirm existenceof thelimitsof theseseries. Some

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thingsare betterthanotherthings-hence theremustbe an absolute best; one theoryis truer than another-hence there is one absolutelytrue theory; one perspectiveis more embracingthan thereare purposes another-hencethereis an absoluteperspective; which include subordinatedpurposes-hence there is one final show strongly purposeto whichall thingsmove. Peirce's writings this metaphysical tendency:truth,reality,meaning,probability, value are all definedin termsof the "long run". Mead's thinkall or contextual situational;he defines of these ing is by contrast termsin referenceto specificcontextsand situations.He agrees that the existence more with the attitudeof the mathematician of a series in itselfgives no assurancethatthe series has a limit. to He stressesthe pointthatwhile science approximates the conthe existenceof such a limit ceptionof the world at an instant, cannot be reached withoutrenderingmeaninglessthe very concepts which science employs.And while Mead sets no practical embrace may symbolically bound to the degree to which thought the common features of a pluralityof existentialperspectives, as very nature of a perspective he conceivesit makes impossible so perspective, that the metaphysics an actual single all-inclusive of absolute idealism is closed to him as it was not to Peirce. of Mead's systemaccounts in various ways for the organization pluralismwhich nature,but not at the expenseof the fundamental of is characteristic his thought. anotherway to bringout the The mention idealismfurnishes of contrast.We are all familiarwith Peirce's dictumthat "the one theoryof the universe is that of objective idealism, intelligible that matteris effetemind, inveteratehabits becomingphysical laws".2 Thinkingof mind as the operationof final causes, and Peirce extends makingliberal use of the principleof continuity, the operationof mind to the cosmic scale, so thatmind becomes while "the fountain existence"(VI.6i). Mead, on the contrary, of admittingthat mind is a particular form of processes which everywhere occur, insists more sharplyon the biological,social, of and linguisticpreconditions mind, with the result that the term'mind' is not extendedso widely: mentalprocesses are not nature,and mind,thoughone active factor assigned throughout
2

Collected Papers,VI. 25 (Harvard University Press).

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in the organizationof nature,can in no sense be said to be the generalsource of existence.Mead's accountis thusmore naturalwith is of isticthanPeirce's,and theprinciple discontinuity treated as much respectas the principleof continuity. of thatmindis the fountain existencerecalls Peirce's statement namely, tendhis featureof his cosmology, anothercharacteristic existence,and law as constituting ency to conceiveof possibility, three "Realms of Being" or "Universes of Experience" parallel to the three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and the three kinds of signs (Icon, Index and Symbol). Although of Peirce oftenstressesthe interdependence the threecategories, tendsto fall apart into realms,and yet in practicehis cosmology of with a description the world as a process by we are presented which mind (as Thirdness) convertspossibility(Firstness) into formsof existence (Secondness). There is thus a determinate the the to decided tendency hypostatize eternalpossibilities, laws which controlthe charactersand relationsof existences,and the of finalcauses whichdirectthe process into an embodiment "conis creteReasonableness". No such tendency found in Mead. The of law, and the efficacy mind are admitted, realityof possibility, by but as we shall see later,theyare integrated Mead's distinctive cosmology. objectiverelativistic conceptof theact and his resulting may attention relevantdifferences, As a finalway of exhibiting be called to the place of pragmatismin the two philosophies. as Peirce to be sure speaks of his proof of pragmatism "the one of contribution value thathe has to make to philosophy"(V.4I5). for of And yet it is clear that the importance pragmatism Peirce and onlysecondarily implications in lay primarily its metaphysical the to in its contribution the methodof determining meaningof of any concept.He thoughtthat the establishment pragmatism the of carriedwith it the establishment criticalcommon-sensism, realityof laws, and the doctrineof continuity-and these were the philosophicaltreasureswhich Peirce sought. For when the with these and other prized pragmaticmaxim seemed to conflict resultshe drew back: thus in spite of his analysis which would identicalwitha habit make the meaningof any conceptultimately raised doubts "whetherbelief is a mere (V.494), he continually conduct" (V.32); he feared so nullity far as it does not influence

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certain applications of the doctrine to mathematicalconcepts (V.3); and he even came to add a fourthstage of the clearness of ideas over and above the thirdor pragmaticstage: the meaning of a conceptis then foundin the contributions the reaction of it producesto "concreteReasonableness" (V.3). Such tendencies are absentin Mead's account; in his writings the instrumentalist position is never compromised, and meaning remains embedded to the end in its empirical Pragmatism is and behavioristic context. peripheral Peirce, but focal in Mead; to the one it is a step in in the establishment certain metaphysical of and religious beliefs, while to the other it becomes the persistentcenter for detailed analysis of philosophicand scientific concepts. Thus we see that while Peirce and Mead have much in common, Mead in every case gives a more restrictedvalidity to doctrines acceptedby both,and therestriction alwaystendstoward formua moreempirical, and pluralistic, behavioristic, naturalistic lation.We mustnow attempt see the sourcesof this difference, to and thennote theireffect determining cosmologicalformuin the lationsof the two men. III should It is my suggestionthat the source of the differences in the analyses of signs which Peirce and Mead be most evident gave, for bothmen very early singledout the fieldof semioticas of and of centralimportance, in a life-time devotionto thisancient philosophical disciplinemade contributions second to none in the modem period. First we must note in a summaryfashion the strikingconvergenceof the two analyses. In both cases the sign is held to functionwithin a triadic situation.The membersof this triad and Obare called by Peirce the Representamen, Interpretant, as ject. Somethingbecomes a representamen functioning a by as substitute for some object in virtueof being interpreted indiare needed, and cating that object. Two furtherqualifications is these mustbe discussed separately.The first qualification that beare for Peirce not all representamens signs: a representamen of comes a sign if the interpretant a cognition a mind (II.242). is to Thus the conceptof representamen not restricted situations is

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it mindsor even livingbeings. Nevertheless, is characinvolving teristicof Peirce to maintainthat even in such situationssomethingakin to mindis involved,and he occasionallyspeaks in this holds that"meaning of connection a "quasi-mind".He not merely but a is obviously triadicrelation", also that"everygenuinetriadic relationinvolves thoughtor meaning" (I.345). Since Thirdness the character reality, factthatPeirce of is takento be a categorical makes the sign situationa special case of triadic relationsand one ascribes thoughtor meaningto all such relationsconstitutes of the essentialsources for his idealism,and the ground for the workingout God's view thatthe universeis a vast representamen thatRoyce could so purposes.It is thisaspect of Peirce's thought easilyturnto the serviceof absoluteidealism. At this point we findone source of Mead's divergence.Mead does not ground his analysis of signs on a general theory of betweenhis posibut thereis no incompatibility triadicrelations, tion and such a formulation. too holds that signs involve a He fromsignificant non-significant and distinguishes triadicrelation, to symbols, the lattercorresponding Peirce's genuinesign. Using a terminology developed by Brewster3to make more explicit what is involvedin Mead's analysiswe may say that Mead's nonsymbolincludestwo sortsof signs: physicalsigns and significant of gesturesigns. A physicalsign is any property an object interproperorganismas an indicationof further pretedby a reacting in a later stage of ties of the object which are to be encountered the act: thus the bone as seen is a physical sign to the dog of the bone to be snatchedand chewed. A gesturesign is an early by phase of theact of one livingformwhichis interpreted another living formas an indicationof the later stage of the act of the firstform: thus the clenchedfistof A may serve as a sign to B with both physicalsigns and of A's comingblow. As contrasted symbol(or language sign) is a sign gesturesigns,the significant to of commonto a number livingbeings,so thatwhat it designates to one is designated all alike.We shall notconsiderin detailMead's analysis of the originand nature of such signs,but merelystate that in his opinionit is through the spoken word connectedwith
"A Accountof the Logical Function 'John M. Brewster, Behavioristic of Universals", vol. of Journal Philosophy, 33, I936.

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commonreactionsin a numberof organismsengagedin cooperative activity that the gesture-sign situationbecomes transformed into a situationinvolvinggenuine language signs or significant symbols.It is essentialto note,however,that the transformation fromone level of sign to anotheris not explainedby introducing the term 'mind' for higherlevels in contrastto 'quasi-mind'for lowerones. Ratherthedifferent situations takento characterize are the conceptof mind: to have a mind and to take cognizanceof objects by the mediationof significant symbols are in Mead's terminology and the same thing.Signs do not therefore one presupposea previously existent mind; mindis rather characteristic a of behaviorinvolvinga unique kind of sign-the language sign. The resultis thatby the geneticdifferentiation levels of signs, of Mead is able to isolate features distinctive theselevels,and the of recognition commonfeatures of offers temptation read down no to into the lowerlevels featuresdistinctive the upperlevels. Mind of is not extended throughout natureand no idealisticconclusions are drawn.It mayperhapsbe said thatthisdifference onlyterminois logical,since 'mind' can be defined distinctive certainlevels as of of signs or as a common factor involved in all sign situations. Nevertheless, howeverthe termis used, the actual differences of various levels of triadicsituations mustnot be neglected, and the danger of a wide use of the term'mind' lies precisely the emoin tional temptation to surreptitiously extend the distinctive characteristicsof higherlevels to the lower, stressingcontinuities and the equally basic discontinuities. disregarding The avoidance of this temptation may be takenas one advantageof Mead's genetic approachover the purelylogical analysisof Peirce, for the latter approach in isolationcontainsno checkagainst a too-wideextension of its results. This line of argument may become clearer if we introduce the second qualification Peirce's view that a sign involvesa repreto sentamenfunctioning a substitute some object in virtueof as for its being interpreted indicatingthat object. For Peirce it is as characteristic a genuinesign that the interpretant a repreof of in sentamen turnbecomesa representamen for indicating a successive interpretant same object indicatedby the firstrepresenthe tamen (I.541, II.242, V.I38). Peirce is impressed this situation by

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because it seems to make evidentthe doctrine continuity the in of realm of mind and meaning,and to support the contention of idealism that the world process is a continuousexpansion and interpretation meaning. Mead admits the fact in regard to of language signs,4 but once again his explanationinvolvesno such metaphysics. The factis explainedin termsof the social character of the significant symbol.Since at the level of mind (the level of the functioning significant of individual symbols) the thinking has internalized social process of communication, tends to the he replyto his own symbols anotherwould reply.He thusprogresas sivelyinterprets meaningof his symbolsin termsof further the symbols, and so amplifies and extendshis responseto the object indicated thesymbols theinitiation theprocess.Mead thus by at of gives the background whichmakes intelligible such statements of Peirce as the following:"I call thisputting oneselfin another's of place retroconsciousness" (1.586); "the inner world, apparently derived fromthe outer . . ." (V.493); "all thinking dialogic in is form.Your self of one instantappeals to yourdeeper self forhis assent" (VI.338); "we become aware of ourself in becoming aware of the not-self"(I.324). Dozens of statements this sort of mightbe quoted,and could have been written Mead as well as by by Peirce; theyindicatethe remarkable degree of convergence of the two analysesof signs and theirrelationto thought. The point important our purposeis thatthesestatements Peirce attain for of a consistentexplanation when interpreted terms of Mead's in social behavioristic approach,but when so interpreted recognithe tion of the distinctive preconditions the appearance of mind for and significant symbolsremovesthe warrantforregarding nature as a great mindinterpreting itselfby the ever-unfolding chain of signs.If itbe said thatsuch an extension justified theprinciple is by of continuity, mustbe answeredthatPeirce himself it occasionally admits that this is a methodological ratherthan a metaphysical principle,and certainlythe triumphsof the atomic theoryand quantummechanicsin our own day indicatethatthe principleof discontinuity methodologically equal importance its much is of to overworkedcomplementary principle.
4Mind, Self, and Society,i8i (University Chicago Press, I934). of

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So much by way of substantiating hypothesis that the sigthe nificant differences betweenMead and Peirce centerin theirinterpretation thephenomena signs.We have seen how Mead's of of social behavioristic approach permitsof a theoryof signs which concurswithPeirce's resultsobtainedby logical analysis,and yet furnishesa principleof limitation which does not require that theseresultsbe interpreted the idealisticmanner.We now wish in to explore in more detail the resulting cosmologicaldifferences, concentrating attention our especially upon thetreatment possiof bility, existence, and generality, upon the relationof mindto and nature.

IV

We have been contrasting metaphysical the aspect of Peirce's thought withMead's more constant scientific temper. one sense In this is unfair.It is possible to pick fromPeirce's writings many passages in which he insists that philosophyis to be scientific, neverpassingbeyondprobablestatements based on empiricalevidence; that metaphysics to be groundedon formallogic and is thisin turnupon semiotic;thatmetaphysical principles simply are logical principlesaccepted "by a figureof speech" as "truthsof being"; that metaphysics consists primarilyin "thoughtsabout words, or thoughts about thought"(V.244, 343). And such pas.sages would makepossiblean interpretation Peirce as primarily of a logician,reducing to metaphysics a somewhat literary and metaphorical extensionof logical results.This is clearlynot a false interpretation, it can hardly be regarded as the full-story. but Peirce certainly permitshimselfmany statements that fromthis point of view would have to be regardedas sentenceswhich are reallyabout signsbut are wrongly interpreted beingabout nonas symbolic objects. Peirce howevercould hardlyaccept this correction,for it is clear thathe is congenialto the typicalrationalistic belief in an isomorphism betweensigns and thingsthat are not signs; he expresslyholds that thoughtis "the mirrorof being" (1.487). The issues here are complexand not to be resolvedby a word.Nevertheless, can admitthatthereare somepropositions one true bothabout signs,and things thatare not signs,without holding thatthe isomorphism complete:not merely a reference is is to

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but the conventional factorsin languagerelevant, the introduction betweensigns the of special signsin a languageto indicate relation to in the languagemakes it impossible findontological significance for all signs. It followsthat one must exercise great caution in readingout logical principlesmetaphysically. Peirce's Scotist affiliations occasionally cause him to transgress such caution. However, it is not the generalissue thatoccupies our attention the at thispoint,but rather special formof the problem presented by the Peircean categories.Firstness,Secondness,Thirdness,isolated by attention iconic,indexical,and symbolic to typesof signs, are given metaphysical validityas the generalizedexpressionof the "realms" or "universes" of possibility, existence,and mind. We have alreadyremarkedthat Peirce tends oftento talk metato phoricallyabout these realms,as if mind works on possibility direct existenceinto the form of embodiedlawfulness.Now in betweenPeirce and termsof the generalthesisthatthe difference Mead is ratherupon the extension certaindoctrines of thanin the our problem is not to deny the Peircean doctrinesthemselves, but to see how in doctrineof "realms" and their interactions, Mead's formulation somewhathypostatized the and metaphorical description dropsaway. This requiresthatwe comprehend Mead's conceptof the act and the objectiverelativistic cosmologywhich resultsfromits application.5 Keeping forthe moment the level of biologicalexistences, to we that for Mead an act is a processof adjustment may say roughly of a livingformto an environing world,theprocess movingfrom an initial want or interestthrough stages of perceptionand manipulation objects to the satisfaction the want or interest of of by a suitable object. The act may be relatively simple,as in the case of satisfying hunger,or very complex,as in the social act by whicha nationrealizes such a complexend as victoryin war. The act is an instanceof "naturalteleology"in that its statement involvesreference the goal to whichthe earlystages of the act to tend; it does not however necessarilyinvolve "psychicalstates" nor consciousness of the goal or deliberationconcerningthe stepsto be takenin reaching goal. Now the important the pointis
I938).

5See Mead's The Philosophyof the Act (University ChicagoPress, of

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that the complex behavior-object circuitcan be consideredfrom the pointof view of behavior,or withreference the object,and to of a significant In parallelism statements of results. terms theagent theprocessmaybe analyzedintothestages of perception, manipulation,and consummation; termsof the object the object may in be said to manifest thisprocesscorresponding in distance, manipulatory, and value properties. This is the clue to the mostsignificant featureof Mead's objectiverelativistic cosmology, it involves for theviewthatsecondary, primary, tertiary and qualitiesare genuine properties theobject relativeto theappropriate of stageof the act. The food object is odorous at the perceptualstage of the act, it is a physicalobject as revealedat the manipulatory stage, and it is a value object relativeto the consummatory goal of the act. Thus objects in naturehave qualitative, quantitative, and value characters relative to certain situations,and these situationsmust be stated if the sentenceswhich ascribe these charactersare to be complete. Mead's thought in harmony is withthegrowing recognition thatobjectshave properties only in virtueof existingwithin one or moresystemic contexts;his positionis a generalized objective relativism that nature is regardedas the organizationof in such contexts(situations,systems, perspectives, presents). Mind appears withinthe act when the later stages of the act of are controlled the intervention significant by symbolswhichindicate these stages and the corresponding propertiesof objects. With the appearance of mind,itselfa phenomenon nature,the in agent is able to transform end or goal of the act intoan endthe in-view and to take account of the conditionsset by the object whichmustbe met if the act is to pass to its culmination. "Final causes" in thisway gain reality, notin a wholesaleand speculabut tive fashion: the termeitherrefersto the objectivepurposiveness of the act, or, preferably, the factthata symbolically to indicated futureis made available for the controlof the ongoingact. The tendencyto hypostatize mind loses its excuse for being and the oftenmade in terms of 'controlby the metaphysical statements of future'or 'the interaction the realmof finalcausationwiththe realmof existence'are replacedby theirempiricalequivalents. The same transformation occurs with respectto the conceptof is The worldwhichphysical mechanism. sciencepresents primarily

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the world as it reveals itself at the level of manipulation. This physicalworld assumes great importance since the passage from the stageof perception thestageof consummation all or most to of acts involvespassingthrough stage of manipulation. the Hence in isolatingthe most constantphysicalfeaturesof objects,physical sciencegives the conditions necessaryforthe completion all or of most acts. This central importanceof the world presentedby sciencedoes nothoweverrenderanyless realthestatusof distance and consummatory qualities in nature, nor permit of an allembracinggeneralizationof the conceptof the mechanical.For the mechanical,conceivedas the conditions the completion of of the act, coincideswiththe predictable, and the completion the of act is not predictable termsof the conditions mustmeet.Sciin it ence presents the best the conditions at necessaryfor the successful termination the act, but not the sufficient of conditions. What possiblecharacters objects will be realized dependson how the of agentwill reactto and use thoseobjects,and this dependsin turn upon the purposesof the agent.Even when thebiologicalsciences presentaccountsof the act, of how symbolsoperate,and of what purposes agents normallyhave under certain conditions,these accountsare still theoretical constructions withinstill more complex acts whose termination will utilize those accounts without being uniquely determinedby them. A completelygeneralized mechanicalaccount,if meantas more than a methodological precept,revealsitselfas another instanceof the metaphysical passage to the existenceof a limitof a serial process. I thinkit is a fair interpretation Mead's resultsto say thatthey renderthe genof eralized oppositionof the mechanicaland the teleologicala false formulation and the problem of their reconciliation pseudoa problem.For on the one hand thereis no limitto the attempt of science to isolate what is predictable, and yet on the otherhand the resultsof science,howevermuch theymay interact upon purposes actuallyheld,never uniquelydetermine terminations the of the wider acts withinwhich scientific theoriesfunction. The implications Mead's approach for the status of possiof bility,law, and mind in nature are clear and need no extended discussion.Possibilitiesare objectivein thatthe properties which objects manifestdepend on the interaction these objects with of

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otherobjects withindeterminate There is no temptation systems. to erect possibilities into "eternalobjects" in the sense of Peirce and Whitehead. Possibilitiesare objective, but not as entities; of statements possibility statements the behaviorof objects of are withinvarious systemiccontexts.It is evidentthat this account does not minimize Secondnessor existence.That thereare physical thingswithcharacteristic modesof interaction understipulated is conditions simplya fact,and the laws of scienceare statements of these modes of behaviorin a formsuitable for prediction. As for Thirdness,Mead admits its objective characterthroughhis insistence upon the occurrence acts in nature,and in his recogof nitionthat the eventuation these acts may be directedby the of symbolicindicationof a hypothetical future.In all three cases Mead is able to take accountof what is vaguelyand ambiguously referredto under the term 'universality'. Many objects persist throughmany contextsand exhibitcommonpropertiesin these contexts; the same laws are applicable to many situationsand entities;some signs have a commonmeaningto a numberof persons. Signs are universal(or general) to thedegreethattheyapply to diverse entitiesand occasions; entitiesand occasions are universal (or general) to the degreethat theymay be designated by the same signs. But in neithercase do universals constitutea class of entities additionto the domainof naturalprocessesand in acts of symbolization. Mead's accountimplements morethoroughly than Peirce had -done the latter'sthesisthat the being of universals "consistsin thetruth an ordinary of predication". Hence in Mead's cosmology of Peirce's characteristic all emphases are satisfied, withthe important but difference possibility, that existence, and mind do not fall apart into realms: theyremainas distinguishable but mutuallyimplicativeaspects of nature, and theirpredication propositional in formis valid onlyunderdefinite and specificconditions.In this way, unless I am mistaken, the ambiguitiesand difficulties which many readers have found in the Peircean categoriesare resolved. Just as Mead's social behaviorismavoids the idealisticconsequencesinherent Peirce's in theoryof signs, so does Mead's objective relativism provide the basis forthe integration Peirce's threeRealms of Being. of One remarkmay be added at this point,thoughit cannot be

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given the importance warrants.In our account of Mead's cosit mologywe limitedourselvesto the biological aspect of the conceptof the act. It mustnow be pointedout thatthe conceptof act is onlya formof a widercategory process,just as thebiological of conceptof the social is only a particularformof a wider concept of the social. In places Mead used the Whiteheadianterm 'organism' for whatwe called process or act, and thendistinguished inanimateand animate organisms.6 Regardless of the suitability of the terms, intent clear: Mead wishes to assert the reality the is of processesor "acts" at all levelsof nature.To thisextentnatural teleology, Thirdness, chance,and novelty extendedthroughout are nature.Nature thenconsistsof interrelated social systems peror spectives-nature is social both in the sense that its basic constituents systems whichthe natureof the members deterare in is minedby the relationship othermembers the system, to of and in the sense thatthesesystems integrated members are by whichare social in virtueof theirinclusionin a numberof systems.There is, however, Mead's analysisno possibility one all-embracing on of systemof the type found in the absolutistic philosophies.There are sub-biological, biological,and mentallevels of nature,and the later levels are interpreted emergents as fromthe otherlevels and integrated with them by emergententitiescommon to all. The terms'process (or 'act'), 'social', 'emergent', and 'possibility' apply at all levels and in the interconnection levels, but recogniof tion of continuity accompaniedby an equal recognition disis of continuity, that Mead, unlike Peirce, Whitehead,and certain so contemporary philosophers science,does not apply throughout of nature the conceptsof thought, feeling,mind, self, end-in-view, finalcause, deliberative self-control-forthe good reasonthatthe conditionsnecessary for the appearance of the phenomena in question are not found throughout nature. Once again we see how Mead's analysis,while agreeingwith certaingeneral theses of Peirce,interprets thesethesesin a moreempirical and restricted so manner, thatin place of a metaphysical idealismthereresultsa naturalistic thorough-going cosmology.
of Co., I932). losophy thePresent,I75 (Open CourtPublishing

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If our accounthas been reasonably accurateit should allow us to discernboththehistorical continuity thepragmatic of movement and the possible directionof its futuredevelopment. We have noticed on the one hand the tendency submitcertaingeneral to and metaphorical expressionsto a more criticalanalysis-and in this sense pragmatism has become increasingly less metaphysical and increasingly more empiricaland naturalistic;on the other hand, providedwe bringDewey's work withinthe range of our attention, noticeda tendencyfor pragmatism round itself we to out by givingits versionof all the traditional interests philosophic (logic, ethics, esthetics,social philosophy,cosmology)-and in this sense pragmatism moves in the direction systematization. of More carefulanalysisand widerattention fields to subject to such analysis: this is the twofold directionwhich pragmatismhas gained from its past and the probable twofold directionof its future. has While pragmatism been becoming once more criticaland at has moreambitious, new flower cometo bloomin thephilosophia cal garden-logical empiricism. roots are as deep historically, Its and its growthshave already assumed a sturdysize. Are these stock?Can theygrowin a common flowers thesame or different of in finds the logical soil? Schillerseemsto thinknot; he apparently empiricist'sstrivingfor careful logical analysis the seeds of a Schiller's protest at least makes us new dogmatic absolutism.7 of aware of the persistence the Jameseantradition withinpragbut matism, since he makes the same criticism Peirce it is posof sible thathis interpretation as wrongin the one case as in the is other.It is no doubt true that the biological orientation most of pragmatistsafter Peirce is unmistakablydifferentfrom the analytic orientationof the logical empiricists.Neverthelessit seems possibleto regardthe two traditions complementary as and convergent withina wider and more inclusivemovecomponents ment which I have called scientific empiricism.8 must not be It
63; 294-306.

in 'See his discussion withtheauthor thePersonalist, Vol. I7, i936, pp. 56-

'C. W. Morris,Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism (Hermannet Cie, Paris, I937).

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forgotten that Peirce's versionof pragmatism no sense weakin ened his interestin logical analysis or in a theoryof meaning statedin termsof the criterion verifiability. There is evidence of in C. I. Lewis and othersof the possibility regaining of this wide orientationof Peirce without sacrificingthe contributions of James, Dewey, and Mead. From this point of view the logical empiricist's refinement the techniquesof logical analysis and of of the empiricalcriteria themeaningful further of are stepsin the direction whichPeirce indicated. Thus Peirce's distinction logiof cal and materialleading principles comes to sharper formulation in Carnap's treatment logical and physicalrules; Peirce's stress of on the "strataof signs" is developed in the conceptof meta-language and in thetheory types; Peirce's stresson the importance of of probability inferences amplified Reichenbach'stheoryof in is probability and induction. incorporating In into itselfthe attitude of Peirce,contemporary pragmatism thusmovingintothe circle is of interests whichcharacterize logicalempiricists. the It is also truethatthe logical empiricists have in theirown way been movingwith remarkable rapidity the directionof typical in pragmaticemphases.Hahn and Carnap have stressedthe instrumentalsignificance formalstructures of withinthe total scientific enterprise;the earlier tendency regard judgmentsof percepto tion as indubitable givenway to the recognition has thatthe verification all propositions in varyingdegreesonly partial; the of is empiricaltheoryof meaninghas been widened by Carnapg and Reichenbachin a way which obviates the main criticismsoften raised by pragmatists against positivism;Reichenbach'0has recentlywritten that "thereis as muchmeaningin a proposition as can be utilizedforaction",and has himself seen the connection of his views withpragmatism; earliersomewhatMachian sensathe tionalismhas been replaced by a behavioristically orientedpsychology; the termlogical empiricism now generallypreferred is to the term logical positivism, and an empiricalrealism is explicitlydefended by Reichenbach,Feigl, and Schlick; the tendency to neglect the categoryof the social has attained partial
'oH. Reichenbach, Experienceand Prediction, (University Chicago go of Press, I938).
9R. Carnap,"Meaningand Testability," Philosophy Science,i936, 1937. of

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correctionin Neurath's conceptionof social behaviorism; the growingstress upon the conceptof convention, relativity the of logical propositions a specific to language, and the dependence of formallinguistic structures upon rulesof operation would all seem inevitably lead to a more consciousconsideration the pragto of maticaspectof thought and language. In the light of such convergences-and many more mightbe mentioned both sides-it does not seem unreasonableto think on of pragmatism logicalempiricism different and as emphaseswithin a common movement. Peircewas at once formal logician, empiricist, and pragmatist, and all of these pointsof view are integrated in scientific empiricism as theyare all incorporated thescientific just in enterprise itself.In working within thiswiderperspective, pragmatismwill remainfaithful its founder to and will avoid a one-sided emphasis upon the biological which has at times hindered the recognition, led to the distortion, some of its most central and of insights. is truethatthe logical empiricists It have done littlewith judgmentsof value or with assessingthe culturalimplications of scienceor withthe systematization a cosmology. of Here thework of Dewey and Mead may offer stimulation towards a more exact and systematic formulation theirinsights of whichthenewertechniques of analysismake possible.That the unityof sciencemovement, withtheInternational Encyclopaediaof Unified Science" as one of its organs,will in its development enlargeits considerations to include such mattersseems certain.Withinthe framework of the larger movement-whether called scientific empiricism by or some othername-there is manifest striving a cooperative the for intellectual synthesiswhich would bear to our day the relation whichthe thought Aristotleand Leibniz bore to theirs.Within of this modernformof the Great Traditionthe impulseswhichhave carriedthe pragmatic movement its presentculmination be to will preservedand amplified.
CHARLES W. MORRIS
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

i938.

'1To be published the University Chicago Press, beginning by of March,