Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC Issue: Decree of Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture,

dealing in, acquisition or disposition of firearms, ammunition or explosives (PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294) as an aggravating circumstance. G.R. Nos. 137250-51 September 13, 2001 PABLO MARGAREJO, MARTIN PAGADUAN, BERNARD ZAMBALES, VICTOR DULAP, and LOLITO ALMOITE, petitioner, vs. HON. ADELARDO ESCOSES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 51, RTC, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. BUENA, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the following: 1) The Order dated September 30, 1998, issued by Judge Adelardo S. Escoses, Branch 51, Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, in (a) CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14353 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended; and in (b) CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14354 for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3045 in relation to section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code; denying the petitioner's motions to quash the informations in the above cases;1 and 2) The Resolution dated November 20, 1998, issued by respondent judge, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said order.2 The antecedents, as found by the Solicitor General, read: "1. At about four o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998, Police Superintendent Feliciano C. Dimayuga, Sr., the Chief of Police of Puerto Princesa City, together with his Deputy Chief of Police, Police Chief Inspector Miguel B. Oceo, and four other policemen, namely, Police Senior Inspector Leopoldo M. Pacaldo, PO3 Jose B. Eleazar, PO3 Joselito R. Golifardo, and PO3 Edwin A. Barona, who were manning a COMELEC checkpoint at Barangay Sta. Lourdes at Puerto Princesa City, were able to intercept two vehicles, specifically, a Tamaraw FX vehicle, with Plate Number SDT-389 and driven by petitioner Martin Pagaduan, and a Toyota Hi-Lux Vehicle which did not have a plate number and was driven by retired Colonel Romualdo Ragel of Barangay Tinguiban, Puerto Princesa City. "2. Several firearms, with live ammunition, were seen and found in plain view inside the Toyota Hi-Lux Vehicle. Also seen in plain view were several firearms, with live ammunition, carried by petitioners and by the other passengers of said intercepted vehicle. Police Superintendent Dimayuga inquired from petitioners if they had the required licenses and the proper COMELEC authority for the firearms found in their possession and custody but petitioners could not produce any. Said firearms, together with live ammunition, were thus taken by the police and the corresponding receipts issued therefor." Petitioners and three others were charged with the earlier mentioned crimes under two separate informations, thus: "CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14353 "That on or about the 12th day of May, 1998, more or less 4:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, at Bgy. Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody, and control, the following firearms and ammunitions, to wit: '1) One (1) piece Uzi Machine Pistol with Serial No. SN-70102 with Three (3) magazines loaded with Sixty Five (65) live ammunitions '2) One (1) piece Para-Ordinance Caliber .45 Pistol with Serial No. 451529 with Ten (10) live ammunitions in Magazine '3) One (1) piece Colt Mark IV Gold Cup .45 Pistol with Serial No. 369470 with Six (6) live ammunitions in Magazine '4) One (1) piece Norinco .45 Caliber Pistol with Serial No. 704800 with Seven (7) live ammunitions in Magazine '5) One (1) piece .45 Caliber Pistol with Serial No. 957202 (w/o brand name) with Five (5) live ammunitions in Magazine '6) One (1) piece .357 Magnum Revolver Smith and Wesson with Serial No. SN-AJS-7876 with Twenty (20) live ammos '7) One (1) piece M16 Baby Armalite Rifle with Serial Number SN 145710

'8) Ten (10) pieces M16 magazines loaded with 262 rounds of live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary permits/licenses to possess the same from the proper authorities concerned.' "CONTRARY TO LAW."3 and, "CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14354 "That on or about the 12th day of May, 1998, more or less 4:00 o'clock in the morning, at Bgy. Sta. Lourdes, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control during election period the following firearms and ammunitions, to wit: '1. One (1) pc. UZI Machine Pistol with SN 70102 '2. Three (3) pcs. UZI magazine '3. Sixty Five (65) pcs. UZI live ammos. '4. One (1) pc. 45 cal. Pistol with five (5) live ammos. in magazine '5. One (1) pc. COLT MARK IV .45 cal. Pistol SN 369470 with six (6) live ammos. in magazine '6. One (1) pc. NORINCO .45 caliber pistol SN 704800 with seven (7) live ammos. in magazine '7. One (1) pc. .45 cal. Pistol SN 451529 with ten (10) live ammos. in magazine '8. One (1) pc. .357 Magnum revolver SN-AJS-7876 with twenty (20) live ammos. '9. One (1) pc. M16A1 Baby Armalite Rifle with SN-145710 '10. Ten (10) pcs. Magazine for M16 Rifle '11. Two Hundred Sixty Two (262) pc. Live ammos. for M16 Rifle.' without first securing the written permit from the COMELEC to possess the same, which act is in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3064 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. CONTRARY TO LAW."4 Before arraignment, motions to quash the aforequoted informations were filed by petitioners. In the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 14353, petitioners asserted that, "the facts charged in the Information did not constitute an offense, there being no allegation that `no other crime was committed,' which is an essential element of the offense penalized by PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294".5 And in the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 14354, petitioners claimed that, " the City Prosecutor had no authority to file the information in said case since COMELEC, which has the exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses, was conducting its own preliminary investigation for the same act complained of.6 As stated in the prefatory statement, the motions to quash were denied in the order dated September 30, 1998: "WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing jurisprudential tenets and rational application thereof to the facts of the instant case, the motion to quash the above-entitled cases is hereby denied. Let the accused be arraigned on the two Informations at bench at the earliest available calendar of the court."7 The motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted order was likewise denied in the resolution dated November 20, 1998: "WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing doctrinal tenets applied to the facts as culled from the records of these cases, the formal joint and consolidated motion for reconsideration of the September 30, 1998 order of this Court is hereby denied. Let the arraignment of the accused on the Informations at bench be set at the earliest available calendar of the court."8 The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum are as follows: "ISSUES "WHETHER OR NOT THE NON-COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF VIOLATION OF PD 1866 AS AMENDED BY RA 8294, WHICH ELEMENT MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. "WHETHER OR NOT THE PENDENCY OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE COMELEC INVOLVING THE SAME ACT OF PETITIONERS DEPRIVED THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE INFORMATION. "WHETHER OR NOT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH SUPPOSEDLY RESULTED IN THE DISCOVERY AND SEIZURE OF FIREARMS FROM PETITIONERS IS LEGAL." The first issue is resolved against the Petitioners. Their principal argument in support of this issue is not only amiss but also deceiving. Contrary to what they point out, the amendatory law (Republic Act No. 8294) does not add to the existing elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. What it does is merely to excuse the accused from prosecution of the same in case another crime is committed. In People vs. Valdez,9 this Court, under the ponencia of Justice Jose A.R. Melo, explained that the dismissal of the second case against Valdez involving violation of P.D. 1866 did not mean that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Consequently, all pending cases as well as subsequent violations of P.D. 1866, as

amended, will continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in R.A. 829410 concur. Considering that the other offense charged in Criminal Case No. 14354 for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3045 is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, the respondent judge was correct in not quashing the information in Criminal Case No. 14353.11 Still under the first issue, Petitioners' argument that the continuation of the two questioned cases against them violates the Constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy is not only strained but totally unacceptable. It is manifestly clear from the records that no first jeopardy has yet attached. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides: "Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only "(1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused." 12 Significantly, the last three requisites are absent in this case, petitioners not having been arraigned in either case up to this date. Hence, Criminal Case No. 14353 should proceed. The second issue is likewise resolved against Petitioners. While they are correct in saying that the Commission on Elections has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute all election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code,13 such authority was subsequently qualified and explained, thus: "1993 COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE "SECTION 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. "SEC. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly authorized representatives and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission." In the absence of any revocation of the aforequoted authority by COMELEC, the city prosecutor's "continuing delegation" to prosecute Criminal Case No. 14354 stays. At this point, we also take notice that no less than the counsels for the parties manifested that the COMELEC en banc has deferred further investigation of E.O. No. 98-170.14 It has also come to our attention that the said election offense principally involves the disqualification and culpability of the late Gov. Salvador P. Socrates and does not therefore fall squarely with the one before us.15 Thus, prosecution of Criminal Case No. 14354 must likewise continue. As regards the third and final issue raised, the same may not be resolved without a full blown trial. Petitioners argue that P/Supt. F.C. Dimayuga, as Chief of Police of Puerto Princesa City, had no authority to set up check points by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2968.16 Consequently, the fruits of that allegedly unlawful search are inadmissible. The Petitioners are wrong. First of all, there is no showing that it was P/Supt. Dimayuga who set up the COMELEC Checkpoint at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. What is stated in his affidavit is that they were conducting a COMELEC Checkpoint. "Conducting" may very well mean, manning a duly set up checkpoint. Second, it is hard to make any determination as to whether the checkpoint in question was sanctioned by either the Commander or the Director of the AFP or the PNP, respectively. Considering that frantic/emergency calls for assistance were sent to concerned government agencies and the local media through radio transceivers as early as the previous day, we cannot discount the possibility that the questioned checkpoint may have been sanctioned by the proper authorities. Third, the counter affidavit of the Petitioners contradicting the allegations of P/Supt. Dimayuga's affidavit only bolster the need for trial in order to ferret out the truth. Petitioners are reminded that questions of fact are not permitted under Rule 65, the inquiry being limited only to the issue of whether or not the public respondent the respondent judge in this case acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.17

All these considered, no capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic actions equivalent to grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction may be validly attributed to the respondent's refusal to quash the informations in question. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION ANGEL CELINO, SR., Petitioner, G.R. No. 170562 Present: QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge, Promulgated: Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Capiz, Roxas City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. June 29, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of Appeals Decision dated April 18, 2005 affirming the trial courts denial of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.s Motion to Quash; and Resolution dated September 26, 2005 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. The following facts are not disputed: Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 (illegal possession of firearm), as follows: Criminal Case No. C-137-04 That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 without first having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila, Philippines. CONTRARY TO LAW. Criminal Case No. C-138-04 That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary permit to possess the said firearm. CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge.

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x. By Order of July 29, 2004, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this Courts affirmation in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses of therein respondent judges denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground that the other offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution, hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. By Decision dated April 18, 2005, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts denial of the Motion to Quash. Petitioners May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of September 26, 2005, petitioner filed the present petition. The petition fails. Petitioners remedy to challenge the appellate courts decision and resolution was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a copy of the appellate court's resolution on October 5, 2005denying his motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005, a good 58 days after he received the said resolution. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not have been raised on appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced. While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period under said Rule, it finds nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification having been proffered, as just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, especially considering that it is substantially just a replication of the petition earlier filed before the appellate court. Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same. The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads: SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x. "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested. "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. "If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

(Underscoring supplied) The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored proviso. Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo, People v. Ladjaalam, and other similar cases, contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm. The Solicitor General contends otherwise on the basis of Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses and People v. Valdez. In Agote, this Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for gun ban violation but exonerated him of the illegal possession of firearm charge because it cannot but set aside petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban. Agote is based on Ladjaalam where this Court held: x x x A simple reading [of RA 8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission. Petitioners reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime. In the present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply. More applicable is Margarejo where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that the other offense charged [i.e., violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x. in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez that all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x. In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the present case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008] JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT DECISION TINGA, J,: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability. In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution[3] dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the Decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch 52[5] which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug. The antecedent facts follow.

On the strength of a warrant[6] of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon (Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The search--conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma--allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,[7] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads: That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] "shabu" with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing "shabu" residue, without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same. CONTRARY TO LAW.[8] Petitioner entered a negative plea.[9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses. Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternon--a discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner.[10] On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its progress to petitioner's mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.[11] Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found "behind" the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.[12] On cross, he admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;[13] that he brought the

seized items to the Balogo Police Station for a "true inventory," then to the trial court[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.[15] Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance. [16] She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.[17] The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos that petitioner's wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila's body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheila's body. [18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.[19] Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him came from a pillow on the bed.[20] Petitioner's account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer.[21] Licup for his part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.[22] On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.[24] Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[25] In his Appeal Brief[26] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.[27] On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court.[29] Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same issues. In its Comment,[30] the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the search.[31] It points to petitioner's incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licup's presence. It likewise notes that petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi. This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.

Prefatorily, although the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.[32] In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.[33] Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.[34] Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. [35] As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [36] It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.[37] While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.[38] The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination[39] and even substitution and exchange.[40] In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering--without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not--dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives.[41] Graham vs. State[42] positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin-was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession--was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.[43] A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases--by accident or otherwise--in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the

circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence? The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis. The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu. Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers from the commencement of the search of petitioner's house until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away. It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the search of Sheila's body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious doubts as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioner's household away from the search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternon's suspicious presence in the bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise of duty. Moreover, Section 21[44] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of petitioner's house, he brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioner's house when in fact the apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternon's course of action. Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46] of the Rules of Court. People v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties.[48] Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is

necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency.[50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.[51] Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.[52] Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[53] In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt. In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown.[54] In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 181494 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.

- versus -

MONALYN CERVANTES y SOLAR, Promulgated: Accused-Appellant. March 17, 2009 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476 which affirmed the April 23, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-181929 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53 in Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The records show the following facts: In an Information dated April 7, 2000, accused-appellant and three others were charged with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 (selling or distributing a regulated drug), allegedly committed as follows: That, on or about April 5, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ISIDRO ARGUSON y ARENDELA, @ Tisoy, MONALYN [CERVANTES] y SOLAR @ Mona, WILSON DEL MONTE @ Wilson and RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, sell, deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer, FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE POINT SEVENTY SIX (473.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE], commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug, without authority of law or the corresponding license therefor. CONTRARY TO LAW. Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of William Todavia, PO3 Reynaldo Ramos of the Philippine National Police Regional Office IV (PNP R-IV), and P/Sr. Inspector Lorna Tria, a forensic chemical officer of the same regional office. The Peoples version of the incident, as summarized by the CA in the decision now on appeal, is as follows:

On April 5, 2000, the Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV), based at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna, received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Acting on this bit of information, a team led by SPO2 Geronimo Pastrana, PO3 Ramos, and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged a buy-bust operation to be conducted at Argusons rest house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza, Cavite. Upon arriving at the rest house, PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos, acting as poseur-buyers, were introduced by the DPA to Arguson as the buyers of PhP 500,000 worth of shabu, simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Since Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises, he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow him to Pasay City. For the purpose, he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia. At about three oclock in the afternoon of that day, in front of the McDonalds branch in P. Ocampo St., Pasay City, Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come out from the nearby Estrella St. Very much later, accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. and approached PO3 Ramos to check if he still had the money. After being shown the money bundle, accused-appellant left, only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson, Wilson Del Monte, who was holding a black plastic bag, and Richard Requiz. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag, later found to contain 473.76 grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos, who in turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal to indicate the consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-appellant and her scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim. The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white crystalline substance was likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on the specimen referred to her. On April 6, 2000, C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. D-115800 on the crystalline substance. Per her report, the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Apart from the witnesses affidavits and other documents, the prosecution, in the hearing of March 4, 2002, offered in evidence the following exhibits, inclusive of its sub markings, which, as may be expected, were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit B Chemistry Report No. D-115800 prepared by C/I Geronimo; (b) Exhibit C Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5, 2000 to the Chief, Laboratory Service, requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags; (c) Exhibits D and D-1 to D-6 Black plastic bag with markings; and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags allegedly containing the confiscated shabu; and (d) Exhibit F Receipt of property seized signed by PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses. The CA decision likewise summarized the defenses account of what purportedly transpired, to wit: Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F.B. Harrison on April 4, 2000, her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, to buy ice cream. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon, there was a commotion going on in front of the restaurant. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her companions, one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her child. Thereafter, two (2) younger male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and REQUIZ, were also boarded into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came and took them to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time. On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and that on the day in question, while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonalds], Vito Cruz branch, a commotion happened near his post. As he moved backward from where he stood, he was suddenly approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that incident. For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question, he was riding a borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center, passing by F.B. Harrison St., when he bumped a parked van, wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him, saying pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan[!] The

man left and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him. Thereafter, he was boarded into the van together with the other accused. While not stated in the CA decision, Del Monte testified, like accused-appellant, that he was taken to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to Camp Vicente Lim. These testimonies remained uncontroverted. Arguson died during the course of the trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On April 23, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Finding accused MONALYN CERVANTES Y SOLAR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine in the amount of Php500,000.00; and Finding the prosecutions evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused WILSON DEL MONTE and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt, and who are hereby ACQUITTED.

2.

SO ORDERED. On May 18, 2004, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to which the RTC forwarded the records of the case to this Court. Conformably with People v. Mateo, the Court directed the transfer of the case to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476. Before the appellate court, accused-appellant urged her acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, particularly stating that the forensic chemist who actually conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly recovered from the accused was not presented in court x x x [and] hence, there was no clear identification of the contents of the confiscated sachets. By its Decision dated July 19, 2007, the CA, finding the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accused-appellant having been established, affirmed her conviction. The CA rejected accused-appellants lament about one Inspector Tria testifying on the chemistry report she did not prepare. As the appellate court stressed, C/I Geronimos forensic report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions [and] the entries thereon x x x are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The CA added the observation that absent any evidence overturning the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, the probative value and admissibility of the forensic report prepared by C/I Geronimo, who had resigned from the service, must be upheld even if she did not personally testify in court. On August 17, 2007, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the CA affirmatory decision. On March 24, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted, thus veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of accused-appellant would be: THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. For its part, the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the prosecution has established that the buy-bust transaction took place, has identified accused-appellant and her complicity in Argusons illegal trade, and has presented the corpus delicti, as evidence.

The Courts Ruling After a circumspect study, the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant, considering certain circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt. We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness, PO3 Ramos, who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box, PO3 testified that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the street whence Arguson would enter, accused-appellant emerged from said street, checked on the purchase money, asked the operatives to wait, and later re-appeared. What happened next is captured by the following answers of PO3 Ramos to the prosecutors questions: Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return the one holding the plastic bag was Wilson, sir. Q: Wilson? A: Yes, sir, together with Richard, Wilson, Arguson, they were four (4). Atty. Cruz: Your honor, may we move to strike that out x x x. Fiscal Formoso: Thats part of the answer x x x now, when all these accused here return with Monalyn Cervantes, what happen[ed]? A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson, sir and handed it to Balosbalos, Balosbalos gave Arguson the boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them. As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who emerged with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant, while at the crime scene, ever handled the merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte, but convicted accused-appellant, stating: Clearly, accused Monalyn Cervantes complicity with accused Isidro Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos. But two paragraphs later, the RTC went on to write: x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then taken from him by accused Arguson, there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag for Arguson, it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the bag.

Before us then is a situation where two personsaccused-appellant, a laundry woman; and Del Monte, a car park boy, in the company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson, during the actual buy bustare being indicted, on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness, with confederating with each and several others to sell shabu. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money, disappearing from the scene and then coming back with the principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte came accompanying Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. As between the two acts performed, carrying the bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of regulated drugs. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each testifying that they just happened to be near or passing by McDonalds at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were apprehended. But the trial court, in its observation that it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag, extended to Del Monte the benefit of the doubt, a benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. Any reasonable mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness as against accused-appellant, but an unreliable one as against Del Monte, when both accused are complete strangers to the policeman?

To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to have also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. We shall explain. In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was recovered from, or sold by, the accused. Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. This means that on top of the key elements of possession or sale, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People, the chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the prosecutions failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal. Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or the Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment, defines chain of custody, thusly: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The need for the punctilious observance of the chain-of-custody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following wise: While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. xxxx A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have

been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. (Emphasis added.)

As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. What is on record is Exhibit C, which, as earlier described, is a memorandum PO3 Ramos prepared dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust group. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was cared after following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong, [T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. And she did not as she could not, even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson. Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall: immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the seized articles at the crime scene. PO3 Ramos admitted as much, thus: Q. Now, you were able to arrest all the accused here, after their arrest, what did you do? A. After informing their rights and the reason why we arrest them we brought them immediately to our office in Canlubang. xxxx Q. Now, what about this Shabu, who was in possession of this Shabu x x x when you left the place and proceeded to Canlubang? A. PO2 Balosbalos, sir. xxxx Q. Now, when you reach your office, what did you do there? A. I made the booking sheet and I requested for their medical/physical examination x x x.

Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal, there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized the black bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in proving the corpus delicti. Adding a negative dimension to the prosecutions case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis. To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented. Thus, we wrote: x x x In People vs. Uy, we ruled that a forensic chemist is a public officer and as such, his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duties. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule 130, x x x entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Omeros reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline substance were positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. Second, it must be stressed that Atty. Enriquez raises his objection to the Initial Laboratory Report and Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 only now. He should have objected to their admissibility at the time they were being offered. Otherwise, the objection shall be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the admissibility of certain documents x x x cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Emphasis added.)

It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout, a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist, i.e., the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. In this case, C/I Geronimos resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Trias competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. At any rate, Inspector Trias testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in question only established, at best, the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this regard, the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed, a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the McDonalds was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-appellants guilt.

Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not belabor this matter anew. Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. We held in one case: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is precisely just thata mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for this kind of disposition. But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the campaign of the police and other drug enforcement agencies against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately, their best efforts, particularly successful honestto-goodness buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in the acquittal of illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser players, even when nabbed in flagrante, simply because drug enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized illegal items. This aberration is oftentimes in turn attributable to the unfamiliarity of police operatives of extant rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an opportune time to remind all concerned about these rules and procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And to put things in the proper perspective, non-compliance with the legal prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is, as we made abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal to the prosecution of drug-related cases; that police procedures may still have some lapses. These lapses, however, must be recognized, addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved by the apprehending officer or team. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476, affirming that of the RTC, Branch 53 in Manila which found her guilty of violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 and imposed upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly immediately RELEASED from custody unless she is being lawfully held for some lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 180870

Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus BRION, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Respondent. January 22, 2010 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, the State pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the constitutional pronouncement that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement. Factual Antecedents For review is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and one day to 15 years and ordering him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5] of the CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration. On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit[6] and Cacao[7] indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, we shall quote the information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads: That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic] have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or authority, in violation of the aforesaid law. CONTRARY TO LAW.[8] When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial on the merits followed. The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were briefly synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz: On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City. Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel. The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside. PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets. PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu. After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.[10] Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise: In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride going home along the National Road at the rotunda of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way to] Laoag City aboard his motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the petitioner if the latter could spare a moment to estimate a work he wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the petitioner is a contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both boarded Canlas motorcycle for Laoag City. While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public market for the latter to collect [loan payment] as he is also a money lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas motorcycle. When Canlas returned, it was then that they decided to have chicks (or womanize). They then proceeded to Starlight Hotel located along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas motorcycle. x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5 x x x. Thereafter, Canlas stayed inside Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman they [had] contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier [named] Cherry Corpuz. In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman on board as passengers. The tricycle went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where the petitioner and the lady cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion inquired where Room 5 is [and was directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who] alighted from the tricycle in the company of another male person was later on identified to be Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter, Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5 while the male companion stayed behind with the petitioner at the hotels counter. When petitioner could not wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of Mylene Daquioag if another woman is coming. The male companion answered in the negative. A couple of minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so he could [sic] go home instead because it was then getting late. Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the table inside the room. He also saw Mylene Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter refused as he said it is a woman that he was asking [for]. Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the outside. Mylene Daquiaog immediately stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are (her) companions. As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged inside the room with their guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was later bodily searched but nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of about P 7,000.00. The wallet was later turned over to the petitioners wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City. The P7,000.00 was never seen again. As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet on the floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to] it. The same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul on the assertion. Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the other police did to Canlas. Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to the Laoag City Police Station. Charges were later on filed against them.[11] Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him accordingly, viz: WHEREFORE x x x The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal Case No. 11489 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred thousand (P400,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency. The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of the Government, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio. SO ORDERED.[12] Ruling of the Court of Appeals Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming Cacaos conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly cloaked the arresting officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may be used as proof of the offense of which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the police officers compelled Cacao to admit a crime. As to the alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled that they refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to overthrow the probative value accorded them by the trial court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution[14] dated on December 11, 2007. Issues In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors: I. The lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies, discrepancies, and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15] II. The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical testimony of Benedict Villanueva.[16] III. The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of custody of the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.[17] IV. The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up cannot be given weight.[18] V. The lower court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.[19] VI. The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of innocence of the petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20] Our Ruling We find merit in the petition. As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, we find it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points. Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.[22] Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction,[23] it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession. We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring inconsistencies on material points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian. PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus: Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the accused Joseph and the one plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of Julius Cacao as well as the drug paraphernalia you mentioned, what did you do with them? A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the evidence custodian, SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned over by him to the evidence custodian, sir. Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items you said? A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24] Mangapit corroborated Pang-ags testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item he seized from Cacao. Thus: Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front pocket of accused Cacao, what did you do? A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir. Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet? A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25] The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu. Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of Cacao? A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26] During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus: Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu which was allegedly taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?

A: Julius Cacao, yes sir. Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu? A: Balolong, sir. Q: It was not Mangapit? A: No sir.[27] When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the variance. He just gave a sweeping answer I do not know.[28] We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent and contradictory testimonies of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we are of the considered view that this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the same item confiscated from Cacao. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same: Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you be able to recognize and identify the same? A: Yes, sir. Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please sort out [the] contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the custody of accused Cacao? A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness examining the plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1). Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible and readable? A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings? A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir. (Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the plastic sachet).[29] Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the plastic bag, witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the plastic sachet. At no instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao. The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, we cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it. Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian received, marked and submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence custodian. Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange that Ancheta would point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the records failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen who participated therein were Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to the hotel after the operation.[30] How then was Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance when he was neither a party to nor present during the operation? Who entrusted the substance to him assuming that somebody requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the lingering questions which must be answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as to ensure that there had been no substitution, contamination or tampering with the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item

confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.[31] In People v. Casimiro,[32]People v. Mapa,[33] we acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,[34] we also acquitted the accused in view of the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu. citing At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35] Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez[36] on chain of custody rule is instructive. Thus: As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the seized prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain. Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in drug-related cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is proof beyond reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11489-13, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.