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Paper Series
New Dangers to the Western Liberal Order
Is a widening divide between Berlin and Washington threatening the alliance? Two viewpoints The U.S.-German Relationship on the Rocks
by Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard
It should be a marriage made in heaven. Barack Obama and Angela Merkel are quiet, pragmatic politicians less interested in grand gestures than in results. Merkel gives Washington someone to call when Europe is in crisis. Obama gives Europe the longed-for U.S. leader willing to invest in multilateralism and multinational institutions. So why does a widening divide between Berlin and Washington threaten the entire Western alliance? A fundamental shift in interests and outlook is leaving the United States and Germany with potentially irreconcilable differences. U.S. grand strategy relies not just on diplomats,
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Summary: Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard see the Western liberal order in danger. They identify shifts in Germanys international outlook as a trigger and see Germanys narrow focus on economic stability as running roughshod over other nations. In their understanding, Germany is a geo-economic power, using commerce to extend its influence and interests. But Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff argues change has many sources. The focus on Germany as a trigger is too narrow and the assessment of dramatic changes in Berlin is overblown. Germany does not appear to be any more disoriented than other Western nations in a global environment that is characterized by rapid shifts of power.

Too Much Alarm

by Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff
Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard decry irreconcilable differences between Washington and Berlin. A fundamental shift in interests and outlook now threatens the entire Western alliance. The authors see Germanys ever-more narrow focus on economic stability as running roughshod over other nations, including traditional allies. In Bremmers and Leonards understanding, Germany is a geo-economic power, using commerce to extend its influence and advance its interests. Increasingly it associates itself with non-aligned and mercantilist states while showing disinterest in cooperation with its NATO allies on matters of common security. The good counsel of the U.S. president, especially during the euro crisis, is constantly rejected. In the authors assessment, the divide between Germany and the United States now endangers the liberal world order.

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soldiers, and sailors but also on trade negotiators. But economic initiatives serve geopolitical goals. Promotion of theTrans-Pacific Partnership,a promising multinational trade deal, is as much about establishing a counter to rising China as is the shift of more U.S. warships into Asian waters. German officials, on the other hand, are focused ever more narrowly on economic stability and sustainability. Before the eurozone descended into crisis, Germany appeared to be becoming a normal Western power, interested in extending its political influence and willing to commit troops to defend its liberal values and security in Kosovo and Afghanistan. More recently, however, Germany has become less multilateral, at least on security questions, and less willing to transfer sovereignty to supranational institutions such as the European Union or to take part in international missions. The result is a strange mix of economic assertiveness and military abstinence. Germany has become a geo-economic power, using commerce to extend its influence and advance its interests. And U.S. geopolitical ambitions and Germanys geoeconomic agenda are clashing. Eighteen months ago, Germany infuriated the White House by joining Brazil, India, Russia, and China in abstaining on the U.N. Security Council proposal to create a no-fly zone over Libya. The decision provoked speculation that Germany wanted to shed its supporting role in the U.S.-led Western alliance in favor of the more independent, non-aligned, and mercantilist-driven positions taken by leading emerging powers. But the real rift had begun to open six months earlier, during the Group of 20 summit in South Korea. President Obama, who had spent weeks trying to rally developing countries behind the idea of global rebalancing, was taken by surprise when the German chancellor made common

cause with China and other export nations to oppose this stance. The German abstention on Libya made no difference to U.S. plans, but at the G20, Berlin and Washington stood on opposite sides of the most fundamental questions facing world leaders: How can governments rebalance the worlds trade relations, and should they stimulate demand or impose austerity? Unfortunately, there is little Obama can do to win the Germans back. Washington can bolster the loyalty of other allies with offers of political access, military hardware and intelligence. The commerce-minded Germans are not interested in these. U.S. officials gripe that Merkel will not listen to the presidents advice for managing the eurozone crisis. German officials say that the worlds second-largest creditor has little to learn from its leading debtor. Meanwhile, Berlin and Beijing, a match made in mercantilist heaven, are turning heads. On her recent trip to China, Merkel notably did not allow fundamental differences in political values to complicate a budding special relationship between the countries. In the coming months, the United States and Germany are likely to become further estranged. Differences over how to refloat the global economy will become more obvious. U.S. officials may lecture their European counterparts on the need for sharing military burdens. Europeans are likely to insist that the demands of austerity do not allow them to spend more on militaries while cutting everywhere else. In the medium term, economic realities will limit U.S. geopolitical ambitions. It will take time for Washington to get what it wants from negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and its not clear how Washington will respond if Beijing tries to force neighbors to choose between expanded security partnerships with the United States and deepening trade and investment ties with China. Germanys focus on trade power is also likely to encounter head winds. Berlins lack of geopolitical influence will seem much more important if German demands for extended austerity in Europe feed anti-German fury and if closer relations with Beijing force German officials to ignore Chinese abuses of state power. Merkels government could find itself short on influential foreign friends.

Germany has become a geoeconomic power, using commerce to extend its influence and advance its interests.
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But the biggest challenge posed by the U.S.-German estrangement extends to the foundation of a liberal world order. Since the Cold War ended, the United States and Europe have advanced the principle that democracy, not single-party rule, is key to political stability and that market-driven capitalism, not state-directed development, is crucial for lasting prosperity. If the United States becomes less willing or able to advance these values abroad,

and if Germany, Europes engine, allies with fellow creditors over fellow democracies, who will be left to advance the principles that have politically and economically empowered hundreds of millions of people since the wall fell? Published October18, 2012 The Washington Post Company

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It is certainly true that transatlanticism isnt what it used to be. The end of the Cold War and the rise of the rest have transformed the relationship. The United States is no longer Europes protector and Europe is no longer at the core of the United States foreign policy interest. Whether the United States and Europe can go global together is increasingly uncertain; and it is uncertain not least because the United States and Germany dont look eye to eye on key issues of the international agenda. But Ian Bremmers and Mark Leonards claim is bolder. In their essay, they dont seem to attribute the changes they decry to anything the United States does, and neither to anything that happens elsewhere. Virtually all change appears to originate in Berlin. The authors see Germanys willingness to commit troops to international missions waning; they see the country as less multilateral than it used to be and more aligned with mercantilist-driven rising nations. These claims warrant closer inspection. 1. Germany is becoming less willing to commit troops to defend its liberal values Bremmer and Leonard correctly observe that the willingness to deploy troops, while never high, has faded over the past few years. The question is: why? The authors assume that this reluctance is part of a larger trend of Germany going it alone, becoming ever more trade and ever less security minded. However, there are other forces at play. Disillusionment about the mission in Afghanistan and the military alliance with the United States is one. Germans did not feel felt that they were abandoning the United States. Tather, they felt that the United States was abandoning them through the endless tug of war about the accept-

ability of civilian deaths, of drone strikes, of targeted killings, the fallout of the torture scandals and the treatment of prisoners, the ripple effects of a controversial war in Iraq. In sum, the United States loss of moral compass during its neoconservative moment brought Germanys slow and conflict-laden emergence as a more normal member of the Western interventionist family to a standstill. This recent trend is by no means irreversible. After more than a decade in Afghanistan, the Germans are tired of the war. In that sense they are not an iota different from their peers in other Western countries. At the same time, the German Chancellor is already contemplating a new out of area mission, albeit a

The United States loss of moral compass during its neoconservative moment brought Germanys slow and conflict-laden emergence as a more normal member of the Western interventionist family to a standstill.

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small one, this time to Mali. For the foreseeable future, Germany will not be interested in becoming a military power. It will continue to exercise military restraint and sit out some missions as it did in Iraq and Libya. The concern, however, that the country is becoming disconnected from the Western mainstream hardly squares with German intentions, actions or attitudes. 2. Germany is becoming less multilateral For postwar West Germany, multilateralism was a religion. In the German mind, foreign relations should be governed by rules, treaties, and international organizations. Not coincidentally, this seemingly benign strategy was also the only way for a tainted nation to regain respect and influence. As if a default setting remained in place, Germany remained committed to multilateralism after achieving full sovereignty with re-unification. But the world around Germany changed. Much to the surprise of many Germans, the emergence of a multipolar world created nations more interested in their own rise than in working global institutions, global rules, and conflict mediation bodies. It came as a shock to the German foreign policy elite that the infamous Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 was, to many nations, about gaining power, not about saving the world from global warming. Since then, Germany has been slower than other nations to abandon the UN imperative and adopt a new climate realism that relies less on multilateralism.

On the other hand, cooperation with the United States improved after the election of President Barack Obama, as the United States has rediscovered multilateralism just when other (mostly rising) nations begin to see multilateralism as a constraint. This has allowed the Federal Republic to act more multilateral, not less. Take relations with Russia. Here, indeed, Germany has had a tendency to go it alone, especially under Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. But the election of Angela Merkel, combined with President Obamas reset policy, has resulted in Germany going multilateral on Russia. Iran is another case in point. Since the United States no longer sees the combination of pressure and sanctions as simply the necessary prelude to an inevitable war, but rather as a strategy to possibly avoid war, Germany has joined France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to get tough on Iran. In this instance, too, Germany has become more multilateral, not less. 3. Germany has become a geo-economic power that is aligning with mercantilist-driven emerging powers Here, Bremmer and Leonard are certainly onto something. But they exaggerate their point, thus reducing its usefulness. For half a century, most Western nations were in a comfortable position. Their most important strategic and economic partners were aligned or even identical. Take Germany. Strategic partner: the United States. Trade partners: France, the United States, the Netherlands. Take Australia. Strategic partner: the United States. Largest trading partner: also the United States. But things have changed. China has triggered a lasting boom down under by buying up the continents mineral wealth. Consequently, a debate has been waging about whether Australia should realign and accommodate its new most important trading partner. Yet Australia has resisted the temptation. It recently invited more American troops into the country. Australias actions demonstrate that countries have choices. As of late, Germany is in a similar position. Over the past five years, exports to China have doubled. China is surpassing France as Germanys most important trading partner. Many entrepreneurs see tomorrows major profit margins in China, not in the eurozone or the Single Market. Quite naturally, these business-

Much to the surprise of many Germans, the emergence of a multipolar world created nations more interested in their own rise than in working global institutions, global rules, and conflict mediation bodies.
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people will become a strong lobbying group which will promote accommodation of China. Their voices might be listened to more frequently as the stewardship of the eurozone becomes ever more costly and burdensome. They will find support in the relatively strong neutralist and pacifist schools of German foreign policy. And neutralism and pacifism rhyme with nationalism. So, whats wrong with Bremmers and Leonards theory? Not much, except that they conflate future and present tense. They describe as reality what lies far in the future and, therefore, may never happen. A geo-economic Germany as a high-tech wingman of the rising powers is certainly the countrys strategic alternative to the present Western integration. But it is a remote future option, nothing more. Currently, no more than a handful of foreign policy strategists in Germany advocate such a strategy. And while the gravitational pull of the trade relationship with China is getting stronger, the mainstream school of Western integrationism remains dominant. Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard ring the alarm bell in their claim the foundation of a liberal world order at stake given the ever widening cleavage between a geopolitical the United States and a geo-economic Germany. Their focus on a Germany as trigger is too narrow and their assessment of the changes in Berlin is overblown. In some ways, the authors give too much credit to Germany. Reading their claim, one wonders whether they assume there is deliberate, if devious, German strategy. Obviously, there isnt. There isnt even an unintentional one that the country is stumbling into. If one were to criticize Germany, a broadside about its lethargy in strategic matters might be warranted. Little brainpower is invested in Germanys long-term aspirations vis--vis Europe, the United States and NATO, Asia, and the emerging powers, as well as Germanys role in the global order. But given the fast pace of global change, Germanys disorientation is not any larger than that of any of its major partners. Countries make strategic choices. So will Germany. Choices are influenced by the geopolitical and commercial

environments as well as well as by partners and adversaries. If Great Britain, for one, chooses to flee the EU and go global alone, this will be a strong trigger for Germany (maybe together with a core of the eurozone) to contemplate doing the same. Another trigger would be a United States that chooses to pursue a post-Western foreign policy that sidesteps Europe. It would most certainly strengthen Germanys neutralist and anti-Atlanticist camp. In that sense, Bremmers and Leonards alarm, while sounding shrill, may serve as an opening salvo to a valuable debate about a new Western instead of a post-Western world.

About the Authors

Ian Bremmer is the President of the Eurasia Group. Mark Leonard is the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States where he leads the EuroFuture Project

About The EuroFuture Project

The German Marshall Fund of the United States understands the twin crisis in Europe and the United States to be a defining moment that will shape the transatlantic partnership and its interactions with the wider world for the long term. GMFs EuroFuture Project therefore aims to understand and explore the economic, governance and geostrategic dimensions of the EuroCrisis from a transatlantic perspective. The Project addresses the impact, implications, and ripple effects of the crisis in Europe, for the United States and the world. GMF does this through a combination of initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic, including large and small convening, regional seminars, study tours, paper series, polling, briefings, and media interviews. The Project also integrates its work on the EuroCrisis into several of GMFs existing programs. The Project is led by Thomas KleineBrockhoff, Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Senior Director for Strategy. The group of GMF experts involved in the project consists of several Transatlantic Fellows as well as program staff on both sides of the Atlantic.