CICERO'SCONCORDIA:

THE PROMOTION OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT

IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC
Mark A. Temelini
Department of History
Classics Program
McGill University, Montreal
January 2002
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy inClassics.
Mark A. Temelini 2002
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Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to explain the meaning of concordia by
surveying the historical context in which it emerged. The thesis concentrates
on the period 63-43 B.C. because it is in this crucial period that the concept
achieves its most articulate and influential defence by the Roman orator,
statesman, and philosopher, Marcus Tullius Cicero. My intention is to
review the important writings and speeches of Cicero and to situate them in
the political struggles in which he was implicated.
By placing the concept of concordia in this political context, a clearer
picture emerges than is available in the current literature about how Cicero
promoted, defended, and skillfully redefined the concept of concordia in order
to achieve his political aims. What emerges are three identifiable meanings
of the concept of concordia. The first is the longstanding conventional
Roman republican idea of concordia as unity, friendship, and agreement. The
second is what Cicero called the concordia ordinum, an innovative idea of
concordia as a harmony or coalition of the two Roman orders of the senate
and equites. The third is the idea of concordia as a consensus omnzum
bonorum - what Cicero called concordia civium or concordia civitatis. This
idea represents an important shift in the thinking of the Roman orator who
began to see the survival of the republic as depending on a consensus that
went beyond the coalition of the senate and equites.
ii
Rsum
Le but de cette tude est d'expliquer la signification de concordia
travers un examen attentif du cadre historique dans lequel le mot surgit.
Cette thse se concentre sur la priode entre 63 et 43 av. J.-C. car il est
precisment dans ces vingt ans que le concept est articul et defendu de la
faon la plus complte et influente par l'orateur romain Marcus Tullius
Cicero. Mon intention est de passer en revue les plus importants crits et
discours de Cicron et de les situer dans le contexte des luttes politiques dans
lesquelles il tait impliqu.
En situant le concept de concordia dans son contexte politique, on
obtient une image plus claire que dans les crits existants qui analysent
comment Cicron a prom, dfendu et habilement affin la notion de
concordia pour parvenir ses fins politiques. L'analyse relve trois sens du
concept de concordia. Le premier drive de l'ide de concordia comme unit,
amiti et accord, ide ancienne et conventionelle dans la Rome rpublicaine.
Le deuxime sens est une innovation de Cicron qui dveloppe l'ide de
concordia ordinum pour dfinir l'harmonie ou la coalition des deux premiers
ordres politiques dans la Rome rpublicaine: le snat et les equites. Le
troisime sens est l'ide de concordia comme consensus omnium bonorum-
ce que Cicron appelle concordia civium ou concordia civitatis et qui
reprsente une volution importante dans la pense de l'orateur romain.
Cicron dsormais considre que la survie de la rpublique dpend d'un
consensus qui dpasse l'accord du snat et des equites.
iii
Acknowledgements
1 wish to thank. Professor T. Wade Richardson for his supervision and
advice. 1 am particularly grateful to Eugenio Bolongaro for editing and
proofreading the manuscript and for providing insightful comments. A note
of appreciation also goes to Mauro Lo Dico for his kind research assistance.
Many special thanks to my brother Michael for his invaluable
comments and profitable discussions and to my brother Leonard for ,always
showing an interest in my field of study with his inquiries.
Lowe everything to my parents Dr. Walter Temelini and tMrs. Louise
Temelini who have always inspired and encouraged me and helped me to
learn. This dissertation is dedicated to them.
Above aU, 1 am deeplyindebted to my wife Vita who has endured
much and has stood by me from the very beginning of my academic
adventures with continuous and unceasing support. This dissertation is also
dedicated to her and to my daughter Sofia who has made it aU worth while.
iv
Abstract
Rsum
Contents
ii
iii
Acknowledgements i v
Chronology vi
Introduction 1
1. Consul Popularis, 63 9
i. Towards a Political Policy 9
ii. Concordia and the Failure of the Rogatio Servilia Agraria 17
iii. Asserting a State of Concordia 29
iv. Concordia Ordinum against Catiline 32
2. The Fragility and Failure of Concordia Ordinum,62-58 49
i. Rex Peregrinus 50
. Clodius and the Courts 57
iii. Pompey's Return 59
iv. The Publicani and the Asiatic Tax Contract 63
v. Isolation, Betrayal, and Exile 66
3. Concordia and Consensus in tota Italia,57-50 81
i. The Post-exile Speeches 83
i. An Appeal for a Dedication to the Goddess Concordia 89
ii. Consensus Omnium Bonorum 95
iv. Otium cum Dignitate 105
v. The Definitive Break-up of Triumviral Concordia 118
4. Harmony in Crisis, 49-43 125
i. Demetrius' Book De Concordia 125
i. Societas Humanitatis 139
. ii. Quae fuit Oratio de Concordia! 147
iv. Armies Unite to Secure Harmony for the Republic 157
Conclusion 160
Bibliography 163
Index Locorum 174
v
Chronology
76
69
80
81
Cicero barn, Arpinum, January 3.
Brother Quintus born.
Cicero serves under Pompey's father in the Social War.
Civil war.Marius Hees from Sulla.
Sulla's eastern campaigns (to 83). Marius returns ta Rome.
Marius dies.
(or earlier) De Inventione Rhetorica.
(early) Sulla returns from east; revives civil war against Marians.
Proscriptions begin. Sulla becomes dictator legibus jaciendis reipublicae
consti tuendae.
Proscriptions end. Senatorial role is restored and strengthened.
Pro Quinctio (judge and committee of assessors).t
Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino (jury of senators).
(?) Marriage to Terentia.
Cicero travels to Athens, Asia Minor, and Rhodes.
Daughter Tullia born.
Sulla dies.
Cicero returns to Rome. Civil war: Lepidus is killed; his supporters flee
to Spain.
Pompey's Spanish campaign against Roman general Sertorius (to 71).
Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo (judge and committee of assessors).
Cicero embarks on a senatorial career: quaestor at Lilybaeum in Sicily.
Spartacus: revolt of gladiators and slaves, crushed 1:y Crassus andPompey.
Pro Tullio (board of recuperatores).
Pompey and Crassus consuls.
Divinatio in Caecilium (jury of senators).
In Verrem (part 1, jury of senators; part 2, 5 speeches as if to jury of
senators - not delivered). Jury reformed by lex Aurelia iudiciaria.
Cicero aedile.
Pro Fonteio (jury of senators and equites).
Pro Caecina (board of recuperatores).
1 For speeches, the audience or setting is noted.
vi
79-77
79
78
77
75
73-71
71
70
106
102
89
88
87
86
85
83
82
68 Father dies.
Earliest Epistulae ad Atticum.
66 Cicero praetor.
De Imperia Cn. Pompei (public meeting).
Pro Cluentio (jury of senators and equites).
65 Son Marcus born.
Pro Cornelio (jury of senators and equites).
64 In Senatu in Toga Candida (senate). Brother Quintus publishes
Commentariolum Petitionis.
63 Cicero consul.
De Lege Agraria (speech 1, senate; speeches 2 and 3, public meetings).
Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Rea (popular assembly).
In Catilinam (speech l, senate, in temple of Jupiter Stator; speeches 2
and 3, public meetings; speech 4, senate, in temple of Concordia).
Pro Murena Gury of senators and equites).
62 Pro Sulla (jury of senators and equites).
Pro Archia Gury of senators and equites).
Earliest Epistulae ad Familiares.
61 Pompey retums from eastem campaigns.
P. Clodius tried for sacrilege (acquitted); Cicero is a hostile witness.
60 Meeting of first triumvirate (without legal sanction).
59 Caesar consul.
Pro Flacco (jury of senators and equites).
Earliest Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem.
58 mid-March: Clodius drives Cicero out of Rome and into exile.
57 August 4: recalled from exile.
September 4: triumphant return to Rome.
Post Reditum in Senatu (senate).
Post Reditum ad Quirites (public meeting).
De Domo Sua (college of pontiffs [senators]).
56 Conference of triumvirs at Luca.
Pro Sestio Gury of senators and equites).
In Vatinium (jury of senators andequites).
Pro Caelio (jury of senators and equites).
De Haruspicum Responso (senate).
De Provinciis Consularibus (senate).
Pro Balbo (jury of senators and equites).
55 Pompey and Crassus consuls II.
In Pisonem (senate).
vii
54 Pro Plancio (jury of senators and equites).
Pro Scauro (jury of senators and equites).
Pro Rabirio Postumo (jury of senators and equites).
53 Crassus defeated and killed by Parthians at Carrhae.
Cicero elected augur.
52 Pompey consul III (without a colleague until August).
Clodius murdered.
Pro Milone (jury of senators and equites).
De Oratore completed (begun in 55).
De Republica completed (begun in 54).
De Legibus begun.
51 July: Cicero governor of Cilicia.
50 July: leaves Cilicia. Nov. 24: arrives in Italy.
49 Civil war. Caesar victorious in Italy and Spain.
Cicero joins Pompey in Greece.
48 BatUe of Pharsalus. Pompey murdered in Alexandria.
Cicero returns to Italy.
47 Caesar returns to Italy. Cicero pardoned.
46 Battle of Thapsus. Cato commits suicide at Utica.
Cicero divorces Terentia (Jan.); marries Publilia (Dec.).
Brutus.
Paradoxa Stoicorum.
Orator.
Partitiones Oratoriae.
De Optimo Genere Oratorum.
Pro Marcello (senate, addressed to Caesar).
Pro Ligario (before Caesar, in the forum).
45 Daughter Tullia dies.
Cicero periodically away from Rome.
Caesar defeats Pompeians at battle of Munda.
Academica.
Timaeus.
De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
Pro Rege Deiotaro (before Caesar, in Caesar's house).
44 Ides of March: Caesar assassinated.
Tusculanae Disputationes (begun 45).
De Natura Deorum (begun 45).
De Senectute.
De Amicitia.
De Divinatione.
De Fato.
viii
Topica.
De Officiis.
De Legibus (completed).
Orationes Philippicae in M. Antonium.
(speech 1, Sept. 2, senate.
speech 2, not delivered, as if to senate in Sept.
speech 3, Dec. 26, senate.
speech 4, Dec. 26, public meeting.)
43 Civil war. Mutina: D. Brutus besieged by Antony;
Octavian defeats Antony.
Orationes Philippicae in M. Antonium.
(speech 5, Jan., senate, temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.
speech 6, Jan., public meeting.
speeches 7-14, Jan-Apr., senate.)
Nov. Il: Meeting of second triumvirate (sanctioned).
Proscriptions against aU political opponents.
Dec. 7: Cicero murdered.
ix
Introduction
One of the most important ideas to emerge from the Roman republic
was the concept of concordia, and one cannot understand this period of
history without a clear understanding of il. Furthermore, concordia was also
the keystone of the inteIlectual enterprise of republican Rome' s most
prominent orator, statesman, and political philosopher, Marcus Tullius
Cicero. Indeed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the life
and works of Cicero without a clear understanding of the meaning of
concordia. It was Cicero's most cherished ideal, something he championed,
something he tirelessly defended; it was a subject that he addressed on
countless occasions in his speeches, correspondence, and treatises.
The last century of the Roman republic witnessed fierce competition by
an embattled oligarchy, the rise of military dynasts, a series of civil wars and
urban riots, and vigorous literary activity,l yet through it aIl the figure who
gave his name to the age was Cicero.
2
Born in a prominent and wealthy
equestrian family from the municipium of Arpinum, Cicero served briefly in
1The literature includes: the poetry of Catullus (87-54) and Lucretius (99-55), war
commentaries by Caesar (102-44), historical monographs by Sallust (86-35), biographies by
Nepos (110-24), and the works by the outstanding antiquarian Varra (116-27). In addition, the
Scaevolae, father and son, were brilliant students of jurisprudence. For the vast non-extant
material, see the survey of Henry Bardon, La Littrature latine inconnue, Vol. l, L'poque
rpublicaine (Paris: Klincksieck, 1952), 149-371.
2 It is calledthe "Ciceronian era" by Erich S. Gruen. The Last Generation of the Roman
Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974),387; "age of Cicero" by Michael
Crawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., 1978),160; and "Ciceronian
age" byThomas N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1979), 203; see also David Shotter's pamphlet The Fall of the Roman Republic (London:
Routledge, 1994) in which the author has e1ected ta don the caver with Cicero's portrait bust yet
the chapter headings introduce the major demagogic and military figures of the age.
1
the Social War (but did not enjoy combat), waseducated at Rome and Athens,
rose through the senatorial ranks of the cursus honorum to become the first
novus homo in thirty-one years to reach the consulship and bestow the status
of nobilitas upon his gens. However, his family' s prominence did not
survive his death.
This dissertation will review and offer an interpretation of the concept
of concordia during Cicero's lifetime. It examines in what way Cicero was
committed to this traditional Roman policy, how he expanded and changed
its meaning and how he made it one of the fundamental governing
principles of his political career. 1 will employ the approach of historical
survey in order to place the concept in its proper social and political context.
The presentation will make use of Cicero' s original speeches, correspondence,
and treatises, as well as commentaries on these works, in an effort to find an
appropriate and cohesive framework.
The approach, then, is to place the concept of concordia in its historical
context. It is not the first time that this has been attempted. The few existing
studies on the subject have also employed the survey approach. The work by
H. Strasburger, Concordia Ordinum, eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros
(Leipzig, 1931; rpt. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1956), is not without value but it is
outdated and is presented as a patchwork of Ciceronian excerpts. In Ettore
Lepore' s elaborate study, Il princeps ciceroniano e gli ideali politici della tarda
repubblica (Napoli: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 1954), the author
examines the rhetorical transition from concordia ordinum to consensus
omnium bonorum; but a more theoretical approach makes this text difficult
to read. The present dissertation represents the first study of Cicero' s
concordia in English. Books and articles on the subject have not been
2
plentiful but do offer a variety of perspectives. Henry C. Boren, IICicero's
Coneordia in Historieal Perspective,lI (in Laudatores Temporis Aeti: Studies in
Memory of Wallace Everett Caldwell. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1964, 51-62) and E. D. Eagle, IICatiline and the Concordia
Ordinum," (Phoenix, 3, 1949, 15-30), provide a glimpse of the political
environment leading up to Cicero's poliey of concordia ordinum. P. Jal's
study, lIpax Civilis - Concordia," (Revue des tudes latines, 39, 1961, 210-
231), shows how the term IIconcordia" substitutes for II pax" in Cicero's last
series of speeches against Antony. The technical and sociological
contributions by G. Achard, Pratique rhtorique et idologie politique dans les
discours "optimates" de Cicron (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981) and C. Nicolet,
L'Ordre questre l'poque rpublicaine (312-43 av. J.-c.) (V01. l, Paris:
ditions E. de Boccard, 1966; Vol. II, 1974) are careful researches on the boni
and the equites and their role in Cicero's policy. Indeed practically every
biography of Cicero has something to say about concordia. But despite the
central importance of this term in Cicero's political career, these and other
studies have not, to my mind, explored its full range of connotation.
Three Meanings of Concordia
Through Cicero's speeches, correspondence, and treatises we get a vivid
portrait of a man who deeply believed in Rome' s republican principles and
institutions and who tirelessly worked to defend these principles and
institutions, despite the upheavals surrounding him. The concept he
eonstantly invoked in support of them was concordia. In fact, throughout ms
life, Cicero promoted and defended three interpretations of concordia: a
traditional or conventional interpretation which is used to define or describe
3
the harmony of the republic; a novel interpretation which Cicero caUs
concordia ordinum; and an interpretation he caUs concordia civium or
concordia civitatis, which he uses interchangeably with consensus omnium
bonorum. My position is that the three meanings are aU related and not
necessarily mutuaUy exclusive, but they are also different in many important
respects. The dissertation will show how the differences in meaning are
constituted by the different political drcumstances in which the concepts were
used.
1. Harmony of the Republic
In the traditional or conventional sense, concordia meant public
harmony or the harmony of the republic. It was a basic principle or belief that
the foundation of a weU functioning state must be the unity, friendship,
agreement or reconciliation of its citizens. This Roman belief in concordia
was similar to the Greek ideal of homonoia. Furthermore, it was personified
as a purely abstract Roman deity - the goddess Concordia - who had been an
object of worship sinee the early Roman republic and in whose honour many
temples and statues were built. For example, in 367 B.C.3 Marcus Camillus
built a temple to the Roman goddess Concordia in the forum to commemorate
the accord reached between patricians and plebeians (Plut. Cam. 42.3-5).4 This
Roman deity corresponded to the Greek cult of Homonoia whose largest
temple had been dedicated at Agrigentum in Sicily in the fifth century.
3 Ali dates are B.C. unless otherwise indicated.
40ther aedes or statues to Concordia followed in 304 (Livy, 9.46.6; Pliny, N. H. 33.19)
and in 216 (Livy 22.33.7f, 23.21.7). In 121, after the death of the popularistribune C. Gracchus,
the senate ordered the consul L. Opimius to restore Camillus' temple in commemoration of the
cessation of hostilities between the senatorial oligarchy and the populares(App. B. Civ. 1.26;
Plut. C. Gracch. 17.6). This was the last temple dedicated to Concordia in the republican period.
4
2. Concordia Ordinum: "The Ciceronian Tradition"
As a result of the various struggles emerging out of bis political
engagements, and because of his own personal status, Cicero coined a new
definition of concordia which he called concordia ordinum - the harmony of
the orders. First defined and put into practice in 63, concordia ordinum is an
interpretation of concordia meaning a political harmony, an alliance or a
coalition between two orders of Roman society: the senate and the equites. In
all of Cicero's writings, there are only five references in which concordia is
presented in the same sentence with ordinum.
5
The two words are only
found once as a linked phrase in ordinum concordiam (Att.1.18.3). Yet, there
is no conclusive evidence that the phrase concordia ordinum was used prior
to Cicero. Many scholars agree, therefore, that he was the first to link these
two terms. Consequently, there is a conventional belief that concordia
ordinum is a uniquely Ciceronian expression, that the expression forms part
of "the Ciceronian tradition."6
My thesis will show how the term was coined not for abstract
philosophical reasons, but because of a number of urgent political concerns.
That is, Cicero very skillfully manipulated the existing meaning of concordia
5 Glu. 152: equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos, concordia coniunctissimos esse
cupiunt; Gat. 4.15: quos ex...dissensione huius ordinis ad societatem concordiamque
revocatos...haec causa coniungit; Att. 1.14.4: de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia, de
consensione Italiae; Att. 1.17.9: multa...a me de ordinum dignitate et concordia dicta sunt; Att.
1.18.3: senatus auctoritatem abiecit et ordinum concordiam diiunxit; Fam. 12.15.3: concordiam et
conspirationem omnium ordinum; cf. Har. Resp. 60: consensus ordinum est divulsus.
6 Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, l, 635; S. P. Oakley, A Commentaryon Livy: Books VI-X
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997),723; cf. Strasburger, 1-14. Quentin Skinner ("Machiavelli's
Discorsi and the pre-humanist origins of republican ideas," in Machiavelli and Republicanism
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,130,136) claims that for Cicero ''the ideal of
concordia ordinum had been oLoverriding importance" and that the "entire tradition of thought"
that Machiavel1i repudiated "was nothing less than the Ciceronian vision of concordia ordinum."
Skinner's interpretation has prompted other scholars, such as Maurizio Viroli ("Machiavelli and the
republican idea of politics," ibid., 157), to refer to the preoccupation with concordia ordinum as
"the Ciceronian tradition."
5
so that it could be used to justify his political aims. Cicero began his public life
by appealing to the conventional meaning of republican harmony as a way of
dealing with disagreements over Sulla's reforms, over the management of
economic resources, and to deal with the antagonism of certain ambitious
individuals. He soon realised that his own success and the harmony of the
Roman republic could only be achieved within a kind of coalition, and thus
he began to see concordia as a political strategy. The strategy was to build an
alliance, and in effect political harmony, between the two major orders of the
state: the senate and the equites. In other words, Cicero applied the term
afresh to a specific political strategy of building a bond between these two
major orders. Cicero's political aims were also grounded in his personal
status. He was a man of equestrian heritage from the ltalian countryside who
achieved senatorial status in Rome. As both an eques and a senator he thus
felt a sincere moral obligation to defend both orders.
Consequently, the advice and direction Cicero gave to his friends and
colleagues was that all senatorial magistrates serving Rome and the provinces
should maintain good working relations with the financial and commercial
interests represented by the equites.
7
However, Cicero justified this advice by
arguing that this strategy would enable the senate to achieve what everyone
assumed it should: the protection and maintenance of stability, greatness, and
liberty of the republic.
My thesis will show that because of his remarkable political abilities
Cicero did achieve sorne success. By ingeniously appealing to the
longstanding conventional Roman principle of concordia and by expanding
7 For example, in 59, in the name of concordia ordinum, Cicero advised provincial
governors including his brother Quintus ta protect the needs of the business community in arder
ta guarantee peaceful existence and prosperity for Rome (Q. Fr. 1.1.32).
6
and redefining the criteria by which it could be applied, Cicero introduced a
new term in the Roman vocabulary and with it was able to promote his own
vision of republicanism as a balance between the interests of the senate and
equites.
3. Concordia Civium or Concordia Civitatis
While there has been much discussion about Cicero' s concept of
concordia ordinum, few scholars recognise that around 57, Cicero abandons
the notion of concordia ordinum and adopts the more inclusive concept of
concordia civium or concordia civitatis. Lacking the limited and somewhat
elitist connotation of concordia ordinum, the concept of concordia
civium/civitatis meant a rallying of allloyai Roman citizens of any rank, the
unity of all good or honest people who supported the principles of the
republic. In this way once again Cicero redefines the traditional concept as a
political strategy, but this time it is also used synonymously and further
defined with consensus omnium bonorum.
Once again we can look to political events as well as Cicero' s own
personal troubles for an explanation as to the origins of this new political
vocabulary. When the concordia ordinum collapsed and Cicero was sent into
exile in 58, he struggled with the problem of how to regain his influence in
Roman politics. His answer came in the fifties. Reflecting on those who
helped him return from exile, Cicero amends his earlier understanding of
concordia as a coalition of two orders to now mean a consensus omnium
bonorum, a raUying of aU good citizens. Once again he based his political
strategy on an appeal to the Roman convention of concordia, but only this
time his strategy was to apply the concept in more universal terms than to a
7
coalition of the senate and equites. In effect Cicero attempted to build a larger
coalition in the name of concordia. He argued that it was not the two orders
but actually the moral excellence of the vir bonus who could lead the Roman
republic to concordia. And the moral excellence of the vir bonus would be
achieved through the studia humanitatis. In other words, Cicero argued that
the good citizen, endowed with humanitas, is bound to preserve the safety
and good order of the republic and therefore otium cum dignitate.
Cicero's passion for the institutions of the Roman republic drove his
unparalleled devotion to the importance of concordia. When this did not
seem to be enough, his dedication to consensus helped to further define the
significance of harmony or general agreement in the name of good
government. But, however skillfully Cicero promoted such an ideal, it
proved difficult for him to muster and maintain support for concordia in an
age of military leaders who were able to offer more in terms of immediate
compensation to their supporters than Cicero' s political rhetoric.
Despite his best efforts, the concordia ordinum collapsed and the
consensus omnium bonorum could not be achieved. The political turmoil in
the forties forced Cieero to retire temporarily from polities and declare that the
republic was finished. He devoted himself to philosophy and developed a
more universal notion of collective republican rule which he termed societas
humanitatis. In his lifelong quest to promote harmony, he coined all three
phrases.
8
1
Consul Popularis, 63
The present constitution should be vigorously
defended because I have declared myself to the
Roman people to be the defender of otium and
concordia for the present year. (Leg. Agr. 3.4)1
This chapter will try to show how Cicero's idea of concordia and its
promotion did not just materialize once he entered his consulship. It was
part of the political and social environment in which he pursued his judicial
and political career. But once he became consul in 63, he was able to promote
and publicize the term with all the resources of his rhetoric. Cicero begins his
campaign in favour of concordia in his consular speeches against Rullus. In
these orations, Cicero established his political aims in the guise of a "true"
popularis committed to achieving concordia. In his speeches against Catiline,
Cicero developed a more innovative notion of concordia by identifying
clearly the political groups to which he looked for support.
Towards a Political Policy
As a triallawyer, or jurisconsult, Cicero would express his views on the
current political situation and begin to articulate the political attitude that
emerged as he rose to the consulship. From 81 to 70, during the Sullan period
and its aftermath, a concordia ordinum or consensus bonorum apparently did
not exist in Cicero's vocabulary, but, fundamental views later encompassed in
1Translations of Cicero and other ancient authors are based on those in the Loeb
Classical Library volumes. with occasional very minor changes to assist in focusing the discussion.
9
his consular policy and later ideas were in the early stages of development.
2
Sulla's work is mentioned with a significant degree of sympathy (Verr. 2.3.81)
and Cicero clearly believed the opti mi and boni had to defend the good
government the dictator had recently organized.3 In an early definition, a vi r
bonus was required to conduct himself upon principles of duty and custom
for the sake of public opinion and the common feelings of humanity (Quinet.
47,51).4 Senatorial jurors were advised to prove that they were boni (Rose.
Am. 139). They had to show justice toward equites like the falsely-accused
Roscius (Rose. Am. 142), who was himself bonus and an Italian municipal
aristocrat loyal to Rome. The boni included many from the local ruling
classes throughout Italy and Cicero appealed to their common interests (Verr.
1.54). Citizens would support the boni so long as the livelihood of innocent
individuals and welfare of the state were protected and ensured (Rose. Am.
149, Tull. 36) from audacious, greedy, and opportunistic individuals like
Naevius, Chrysogonus, and Verres.
A serious warning is given of the disastrous results criminal behaviour
would bring upon the causa nobilitatis unless checked properly by the boni
(Rose. Am. 136). The aristocratie regime reinstated by Sulla could only
survive if it dissociated itself from and showed resistance to the excessive
powers of criminals Cicero designated as homines postremi, men who had
2 Boren, 59, points out that Cicero "did not specifically speak of a concordia ordinum
before his consulship."
3 For a detailed description of Sulla's constitutional enactments, see Arthur Keaveney,
Sulla: the Last Republican (London:1982),169-213. Sallust and Plutarch provide the only
subjective viewthat Sulla's reforms were established in the name of concordia. In 80 Sulla was 50
obviously content with his new constitution that he proudly claimed to be sitting in harmony with
his fellow consul Metellus (Plut. Sull. 6.5: oS 'YE Kat 'fils lfjlOS Mn}.}.ov Oll-OVOLaS, EVTlJXLaV
al. nraL). In contrast to Lepidus' criticisms (Sali. Hist. 1.48.24-25), Philippus 100 the senate in
defence of Sulla's policyof pax et concordia (Sali. Hist.1.67.5, 10, 13).
4 The boni are al50 later described as lauti et locupletes(Att. 8.1.3, cf. AU. 1.19.4).
10
found their political niche by gaining wealth in the proscriptions and
confusion of the civil war (Rose. Am. 135-139). Cicero' s political statements
were directed against these pauci, the "few" radical representatives of the
senatorial order who were liable to inflict damage on the aristocratic system
with their ceaseless corrupt practices.
5
It was the duty of the law-courts
(recently reorganized by Sulla and presided over exclusively by senators)6 to
protect good citizens by enforcing strict justice against malicious individuals
like Verres, a senatorial govemor, who took advantage of the system's
potential for excesses. In the process, the jury had to avoid disrepute by not
engaging in scandalous administration of justice through the protection of
those who came from its own senatorial rank (Div. Caee. 8). Judicial
responsibility proved too exclusive for the senate. With the enactment of the
lex Aurelia Cotta iudiciaria in 70, just after the Verrine speeches were
published, the jury system was expanded to include a harmony of orders.
7
Duties were now shared by an equal representation of senators, equites, and a
class of citizens called tribuni aerarii.8 In essence, it was the duty of the
equites to ensure that senatorial solidarity did not lead to the acquittaI of
5 Div. Gaec. 70; Verr. 1.36; De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 65; Glu. 152.
6 Sulla had given the senate strict control of the law-courts but had increased its
membership to 600 by adlecting 300 equites sc that "equestrian"-senators could still be included
in the juries.
7 Since Gaius Gracchus' tribunate in 123 the senate and equites continually competed for
control of the courts; for further reference see H. Hill, The Roman Middle Glass in the Republican
Period(Oxtord: Blackwell, 1952), 113ff.
8 The tribuni aerariiwere actually part of the equestrian order but with a lower property
rating. This would have given the order a two-thirds majority in the courts; see Flac. 4 where
Cicero classes them with the equites proper. For a detailed explanation of them, see C. Nicolet,
The World of the Gitizen in Republican Rome, trans. P. S. Falla (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1980), 161-166. Under the terms of the lexGassiatabellaria the jurors gave their verdict by
ballot. These and other laws are catalogued and explained by Giovanni Rotondi, Leges Publicae
Populi Romani (Milan, 1912; rpt. Hildesheim, 1962).
11
guilty senators and of the senators to supervise the actions of the equites. As a
result, Cicero could court the favour of the equestrian class as well as many
optimates.
Cicero's eoneordia ordinum was linked to a social development which
integrated the equestrian order into the political arrangement of the city: their
association with community life coincided with the Lex Roscia theatralis of 67
(plut. Cie. 13). With the enactment of this law by the tribune L. Roscius Otho,
all men of equestrian status had the first fourteen rows of seats reserved for
them at any theatre. As a result they gained a visible presence with the
senatorial order before the viewing public. This represented a manifest
honour reflecting their duties to the state.
9
In 66, as praetor, Cicero marked the triumph of the equestrian order by
moulding public opinion in support of Manilius' bill De Imperio. Cn. Pompei.
91n social standing, the equites were almost equal to senators freely intermarrying with
patrician nobles and gaining entry to the senate. As a class they preferred the pursuit of money to
political responsibility, and they formed the non-political section of the upper class. Among the
equites the publicans were considered the most noteworthy grouping, with much political
influence, and they were frequently helped by the senate (Verr. 2.3.168). Their estates allowed
them to bid for contracts which brought a higher retum on capital than agriculture. Cicero
constantly praised their strength and zeal with phrases such as flos enim equitum Romanorum
(Plane. 23); cf. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 17; Verr. 2.2.175; Rab. Post. 3: C. Curtius, princeps equestris
ordinis, fortissimus et maximus publicanus; and associates them with equestrian jurors. The
publicans performed functions which were vital to the state. They negotiated contracts for military
supplies, public works, and collection of taxes and duties. Considering the importance of these
business operations for the state, one person could not shoulder ail the responsibility and risk,
and as a result these equestrian contractors formed partnerships, or companies (societates
publicanorum) whose members owned shares (partes); for companies and shareholders, see
Polyb. 6.17 and Cic. Fam. 13.9.2 re: a Bithynian company. Among the shareholders were also
members of the traditionalland-owning class of senators, who were debarred by lawfrom
performing publican duties (Cass. Dio 55.10.5; 69.16). Another group within the mixed lot of
equiteswere the negotiatores. Numerous in ail the provinces of the republic and beyond, they
were mainly traders who had a share in every business transaction that involved buying, selling or
exchange of goods. Principally connected to trade, the profession al50 included bankers,
moneylenders, and real estate dealers. For evidence of trade in Italy and the provinces, see T.
Frank, An Economie Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore: Pageant Books, 1933-1940), l, 276,
284,355; III, 135-7, 143-4, 334ft; IV, 26-32; P. A. Brunt, 'The Equites in the Late Republic,"
Second International Conference of Economic History, Aix-en-Provence, 1962. Vol. l, Trade and
Politics in the Ancient World,117-149. Rpt. in The Crisis of the Roman Republic: Studies in
Political and Social History, ed. R. Seager (Cambridge: Hefter & Sons Ltd., 1969),83-117.
12
In the east, military affairs had been going badly for Roman commanders.
The tribune Manilius, a popularis, announced the necessary bill for an
extraordinary command which had Pompey in mind and Cicero stepped
forward to lend the measure his full cooperation.
For the first time in his political career, the orator addressed an
assembly (contio) in the Roman Forum. The structured elegance of the
speech was planned with the intention not only to persuade the plebs
(electorate) but most of all to win favour from the optimates (governing
class)j even if it meant briefly dwelling on the shortcomings of the aristocracy
for its inability to check corrupt practices of a few provincial governors (De
Imp. Cn. Pomp. 64).1
0
Cicero agreed with Manilius that only an eques such as
Pompey could be appointed to command in Asia, for only he had the ability to
restore harmony and stability in the eastern provinces just as he had done in
Spain years earlier (De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 62-63).11 Advocating such a "popular"
measure might seem duplicitous but reflected the political standpoint of a
moderate optimate bowing to the needs of the moment while in pursuit of
the consulship.
Aiso in 66, Cicero' s understanding of equestrian demands was weIl
demonstrated in the Pro Cluentio in which he advocated a basic working
arrangement with the senate in the name of concordia. But the case also
stands in contrast to his popularis sentiment of the earlier speech. Before a
10 P. MacKendrick (The Speeches of Cicero: Context, Law, Rhetoric, London: Duckworth,
1995, 14) praises the speech as "perhaps the most elegantly structured of ail Cicero's speeches"
and continues his praise by comparing it to concordia: "It is proportioned, balanced, harmonious:
the rhetorical equivalent of the harmony of the orders which was Cicero's Iifelong ideal."
11 ln this passage Cicero reminds his audience how L. Philippus, the pro-Sullan senator in
76, had such great hope in Pompey's abilities that he called for the general's appointment against
Sertorius; cf. Sallust (Hist. 1.67) who adds that Philippus nominated Pompey in the name of pax
and concordia.
13
jury of senators and equites, Cicero repudiates the rabble rousing campaigns of
the popularis tribune and homo postremus Quinctius who took the
opportunity to excite popular indignation against the senate (Clu. 88f). The
case arose from the fact that his client, Cluentius, was inappropriately charged
under the sixth section of the Sullan statute, the lex Cornelia de sicariis et
veneficiis, which dealt with judicial murder. The argument was that Sulla
made the provisions of this sixth section operative only against senators, who
were only allowed to act as jurors under the Sullan constitution. Therefore,
the section did not apply to his client who was a member of the equestrian
order. Thus the Sullan statute could not be invoked in this case. Here Cicero
takes the opportunity to provide a solid definition of concordia:
The single aim and object of this (believe me, gentlemen, and look
the danger in the face) is the extension of liability under this statute
to include the equestrian order. This aim is not shared by all
senators but only by a few. For those senators who have a ready
protection in their own uprightness and innocence (as may
truthfully be said of you and of all whose lives are innocent of party
spirit) are anxious that the equites should occupy a position second
only to that of the senatorial order and most firmly allied to it by the
bond of unaniinity [equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos,
concordia coniunctissimos esse]. (Clu. 152)12
This was Cicero's first actual reference to the bond of concordia between the
12 Nec nunc quicquam agitur - mihi credite, iudices, et prospicite id, quod providendum
est - nisi ut equester ordo in huiusce /egis pericu/um conc/udatur. Neque hoc agitur ab omnibus,
sed a paucis. Nam ei senatores, qui se facile tuentur integritate et innocentia, qua/es ut vere
dicam, vos estis, et ceteri, qui sine cupiditate vixerunt, equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos,
concordia coniunctissimos esse cupiunt.
14
two major orders of the state.13
P r ~ v i o u s proposaIs by Drusus in 91 and most recently by Sulla included
the equites in an augmented senatorial nobility. However, these laws did not
really address the aspirations of this order which was primarily interested in
business and not in politics. This is aptly pointed out in a comparison
between the livelihood of the senator-politician and the equestrian-
businessman. Members of the senatorial class were subject to political
prosecutionswhich were alleviated by the many honours and privileges
obtained from the offices of the cursus honorum (Clu. 154). On behalf of the
equites he states: "satisfied with our own order sheltered from the storms of
popular prejudice and legal actions such as this 1t is unfair that We should be
debarred from public recognition and yet not be free from the danger of
political prosecution in the courts" (Clu. 153-154; cf. 150)4
Cicero's political attitude is alSO revealed in his brother' s
Commentariolum Petitionis: the equites and the majority of the senators
ratified his application for the consulship, while he had gained the sympathy
of the people through his support for Pompey and ms defence of Cornelius in
65. Only the nobiles, the aristocratie gentry, posed a threat to ms campaign,
since Cicero had aroused their suspicions in his support of a popular measure.
He would have to explain to them that he had always sided politically with
the optimates, and that speeches of a popular nature were merely to gain
Pompey's support, and he had never been an adherent of the causa
13 HiII.161, statesthat it is not justifiable to take "too literally either Cicero's picture of the
self-righteous indignation of the [equites] or his estimate of the number of senators who opposed
his line of argument, for he was already developing that conception of the collaboration of the two
upper classes (concordia ordinum) which was to become his political panacea."
14 sed ordine suo...contentos fuisse... vitam remotam a procellis invidiarum et huiusce
modi iudiciorum sequi maluisse.. .iniquum esse eos, populi beneficiis esse privatos, iudiciorum
novorum periculis non carere.
15
popularis.l
5
It is evident that Cicero' s emerging political attitude was based on a
moderate optimate position which recognized the benefits of the collective
rule of the group (i.e. the boni) and repudiated administrative and judiciary
corruption allegedly caused by a minority (i.e. the pauci). But political
conceptions or a clear political programme are not revealed. Not even the In
Toga Candida establishes any aims for the consular candidate. Cicero's success
in the elections of 64 can be attributed to the intrigues of Caesar, Pompey, and
Crassus. Pompey opened up new areas of investment for the publicani,
members of the equestrian order, who did not want the organization of the
state to be disrupted for fear of losing profitable ventures. The optimates, on
the other hand, were against the further implementation of extraordinary
powers previously handed to Pompey. The "platform" speech In Toga
Candida demonstrated how Cicero united these two groups (equestrian
publicani and optimates) and gained their trusted support. He charged his
two main opponents, C. Antonius and Catiline, and their influential
supporters, Caesar and Crassus, as insurgent radicals and violators of justice
intent on destroying the republic.l
6
As champion of law and order his win in
July 64 proved the existence of a coalition willing to back mm in the name of
harmony and peaceful existence.l
7
Cicero probably had many ideas that went
beyond current issues. But the ideas were relegated to the background with
the aim of first achieving the highest executive position in the state in
keeping with one of the main principles set forth in the introduction of the
15 Comm. Pet. 5: nos semper eum optimatibus de re publiea sensisse, minime popularis
fuisse.
16 Asconius, ln Orationem in Toga Candida, 83, 87, 90.
17 Eagle, 21; Strasburger, 38; Leg. Agr. 2.3ft; Pis. 3.
16
De Republica (1.10): a man who wished to help the state must first achieve
power.
l8
On January 1,63, Cicero formaUy achieved the most powerful executive
position in the republic as both he and his feUow consul C. Antonius marked
their coUegiality by establishing concordia with each other.l
9
Three
interesting events occurred in his consular year: the rogatio Servilia, the
conspiracy of Catiline, and the unity created between the financial interests of
the equestrian class and the governing oligarchy. AU of these brought to the
forefront and helped put into action Cicero's poHcy of concordia within the
current economic and political situation of the decade.
Concordia and the Failure of the Rogatio Servilia Agraria
Agriculture was considered an important and respectable occupation in
Italy.20 Following Ti. Gracchus' major land distribution reforms of 133 the
motives for leges agrariae were always the relief of urban overpopulation and
compensation for returning army veterans. Many free-born citizens of the
urban plebs who were forced by civil war to migrate to Rome aspired to return
to the countryside. The grain dole was not sufficient for a free male citizen to
18 Since his youth Cicero was devoted to the Homeric motto, "Far to be the best and to be
distinguished above others" (0. Fr. 3.6.4: no}..}..ov Pl.OTEUEtV Ka. vndpoxov
Cf. Iliad 6.208 and 11.784) which represented his ambitious desire to be first and excellent.
19 Leg. Agr. 2.103: exconcordia, quam mihi constitui cum col/ega. The importance of
consular harmony was notOO in the De Republica (2.54) in reference to Lucius Valerius Potitus
and Marcus Horatius Barbatus, consuls in 449, who both favoured measures to preserve the
concordia of the republic. Asimilar type of consular concordia was echoed by Sulla in 80 (Plut.
Sul/. 6.5; see above n. 3). In contrast, when consuls such as Cinna and Octavius were unwilling to
establish harmony with each other in 87 the result was civil war: Cinna Si concordiam eum Octavio
confirmare voluisset, in re publica sanitas remanere potuisset(Phil. 13.2).
20 Off. 1.151: omnium autem rerum, exquibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura
melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine Iibero dignius. For a discussion on this richly
documented topic see, interalia, A. Cossarjni, "II prestigio dell'agricoltura in Sallustio e Cicerone,"
Atti dell'istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 138 (1979-1980), 355-364.
17
support bis family. Likewise, without any other source of income most
unemployed or retired soldiers had no other choice but to return to their
traditional rurallivelihood. Having been forced to seUle in colonies they
worked the land, earning a living as farmers. Some were not successful, but
sold their land and resided in the city searching for other means of
employment. As a result Rome's population continually increased. Private
property rights were strict,21 so the government was reluctant to purchase
land and distribute it to its citizens. The aristocracy was especially unwilling
to remove and relocate tenants who were settled under Sulla's dictatorship,
for fear of violent retaliation. Land allotments were needed to repopulate the
countryside and reestablish vibrant farming communities after the civil and
servile wars of the 70s. There was also concern in the enhanced prestige and
loyal following gained by returning generals ifbeneficia of land were given to
their soldiers.
22
But the economic turmoil of the sixties proved too great and
relief was needed. The Rullan bill thus became the first insightful and
detailed agrarian measure for land distribution after Sulla's dictatorship.23
On December 10, 64, when the new tribunes took office, P. Servilius
Rullus proposed a comprehensive agrarian bill which had profound
implications and was scheduled to be brought before the senate at the
21 Cic. Off. 2.73: in primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suum
quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publiee deminutio fiat; also Off. 2.78; Rep. 1.43.
22 Gruen, 387.
23 The senate did approve a/exP/otia agraria in 70 of which very little detailed information
is known. It was originally intended only for the veterans of Pompey and Metellus after the civil and
servile wars in the preceding years. But the law was delayed apparently due to political opposition
against the powerful commanders and by further campaigns in the east in the sixties which meant
. Pompey needed his soldiers once again. For further discussions, see E. Gabba, U Lex P/otia
agraria," Laparo/ade/passato, 13 (1950),66-68; R. E. Smith, "The LexP/otiaAgrariaand
Pompey's Spanish Veterans," C/assica/Quatter/y, 7 (1957),82-85. On earlier agrarian proposais,
see G. Tibiletti, "Ricerche di storia agraria romana 1: La politica agrariadalla guerraannibalica ai
Gracchi," Athenaeum, 28 (1950), 183-266.
18
beginning of 63. Known as the rogatio Servilia agraria, its particu1ars can only
be ascertained from Cicero' s three speeches in opposition, entitled De Lege
Agraria contra Rullum. Rullus proposed that needy Roman citizens
throughout Italy should be settled in colonis set up on public land of the ager
Campanus and the campus Stellas. This measure would resolve the
overpopulation in Rome and would make land immediately available for
Pompey's troops retuming from the Mithridatic Wars.
The bill was set within an intelligent framework. About forty clauses
perceptively outlined the supervision, purchase, and distribution of the land
allotments (Leg. Agr.3.4). Procedural regulations were designed to be
impartial and many were already set on precedent. An authoritative body of
ten elected members were to hold office for five years to oversee and
administer the project. This commission would have the help of a full
support staff which included architects, clerks, scribes, and surveyors in order
to regulate all the necessary supplies (Leg. Agr.2.33). The election process was
well thought-out. A chief presiding officer would select by lot seventeen of
the thirty-five tribes in the popular assemblies whose members would elect
the ten man commission. Candidates had to be present at Rome. A position
as decemvir could be combined with a magisterial office of the cursus
honorum. Proceedings would be ratified by a lex curiata in which tribunician
vetos would be banned.24
The scope of the bill was original, yet, at the same time, problematic in
the eyes of senatorial officiaIs. It was the traditional dutYof Roman
24 For a description of the election procedures, see Leg. Agr. 2.16-17, 2.20-21, 2.24,
2.26, 2.28-30. On precedents for Rullus' electoral clauses, see E. Gabba, "Nota sulla rogatio
agraria di P. Servilio Rullo,' in Mlanges d'archologie et d'histoire offerts A. Piganiol (1966),
2:769-775. The use of seventeen tribes would reduce voter intimidation and bribery; see E. G.
Hardy, Sorne Problems in Roman History(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924),83.
19
government to distribute public land. A vast fertile area in Campania
immediately south of the via Appia surrounding the rivers Voltumus and
Clanius just north of Roman Neapolis was the main area for the project of
land distribution. This rich agricultural zone of the ager Campanus and
campus Stellas had still remained ager publicus, that is public land controlled
by the Roman government. Both territories provided a continuous source of
revenue to the state treasury from numerous rented properties. Rullus'
proposaI would deny that guaranteed steady income to the treasury. Five
thousand private citizens would have the chance to buy public lots of ten to
twelve Roman acres (iugera) within those territories (Leg. Agr. 1.20, 2.76-86).
In another measure, if landowners throughout Italy were looking to
sell their property but were unwilling to locate or could not find adequate
individual purchasers through negotiatores, then the state would be obligated
to purchase the property then sell it to any private citizen in need of the land.
Thus, the bill gave the seller the state as its customer. The state would give
full compensation to anyone, even the Sullan colonists who wished to
dispose of their holdings (Leg. Agr. 2.68-70,3.3,3.6-14). Under the new law,
the recipients would be those who had been ousted from their farms during
the Sullan period. They would recover their land at state expense. Skilled
farmers would replace frustrated veteran soldiers and their efforts would
allow the agricultural economy of Italy to increase. With ready money
veteran soldiers could invest in other ventures, thus involving another
segment of Roman society, namely financiers and bankers. The idea was to
create a stronger privately based agricultural economy. And if the individual
land owner faced difficulties he could rely on the government to bail him out
by purchasing the land. As one modern scholar aptly points out "Rullus'
20
proposal was perspicacious and thoughtful."25
A plan for new or increased sources of revenue for financing the
project was also part of the bill. Public sites in Rome and other public
properties throughout Italy would be marketable commodities.
26
In addition,
the sale of certain portions of ager publicus in rich agricultural areas of Asia
Minor, Cyprus, Egypt, and other Roman provinces would provide the
government with ready cash; not to mention the booty and spoils that were
stockpiling throughout Rome' s temples and coffers. These gains in revenue
were to aUow the government to purchase and aUocate land to colonists
throughout ltaly.27 If the bill had become law, the land distribution project
would ultimately have increased the amount of taxable citizens, which would
have become a boon to the state.
AU these well-drawn-up measures point to the fact that this bill focused
on the need to improve the life, weifare, and relations of citizens in Roman
society. 5ince Pompey and his troops were still on their voyage back .from the
eastern campaigns, the initial five thousand settlers would have been the
unemployed or underemployed plebs urbana first and foremost. Ready cash
was needed for these immediate settlements. Pompey' s veterans would be
25 Gruen, 391.
26 This was not a new idea, just the enforcement of a senatorial decree passed during the
time of Sulla in 81; see Leg. Agr. 1.3-4, 2.35-37.
27 For public land in Roman provinces, see Leg. Agr. 1.5-6,2.47-58.3.15; on vectigal
payments, Leg. Agr. 1.10, 2.56-57, 2.62; on war booty, Leg. Agr. 1.12-13, 2.59; on buying and
sellingofrealestateinltaly, Leg. Agr. 1.16-17,2.31,2.33-34.2.73,2.75.
21
compensated once they returned.28 In the end, insufficient gratia, lack of
auctoritas, and inferior oratorical prowess doomed Rullus' bill.29 Overall it
was a novel, harmonious, well-planned, and far-sighted piece of legislation
which, nonetheless, Cicero strenuously opposed.
Now in the ranks of the nobilitas, Cicero's first order of business as
consul in 63 was to speak against this agrarian proposal presented by Rullus.
Having ascribed self-seeking motives to the tribune, Cicero criticized Rullus'
role as rogator, presiding officer, and candidate on the commission (Leg. Agr.
2.20-21). He alluded to the influential political support from powerful
individuals who were against Pompey.3
0
And the safeguard and protection of
the public treasury which gained considerable profit from the rentaI
properties of the ager publicus was a cause of serious concern for Cicero. If
passed, the law would take away a part of the state' s source of income and
cause a break with long established tradition.
31
Cicero was convinced that the
decemvirs would auction off whole provinces in order to finance this
venture.
32
He is not against agrarian reform (Leg. Agr. 2.10), yet such a law
28 Pompey was honoured in the bill and was exempt from relinquishing his spoils, Leg.
Agr. 1.13, 2.60; landed benefits were expected by his troops, Leg. Agr. 2.54; the immediate
availabilityforreadycash isclearfrom Leg. Agr. 1.2: nunc praesenscerta pecunia numerata
quaeritur, see G. V. Sumner, "Cicero, Pompeius, and Rullus, n Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Phi/o/ogical Association, 97 (1966), 569-582. The plebs urbana were the rural
tribesmen (ex-country dwellers and dispossessed farmers) who had moved to the city, Leg. Agr.
2.65, 2.71, 2.79.
29 These inferences are suggested by Gruen, 394 and n. 144.
30 Leg. Agr. 1.11, 1.16, 1.22, 2.20, 2.23, 2.46, 2.63, 2.98. Modern conjectures point to
Crassus and Caesar: Hardy, 68-98; M. Gelzer, Caesar: Po!itician andStatesman, trans. Peter
Needham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968),42-45; E. J. Jonkers, Social and
Economie Commentaryon Cicero's De Lege Agraria Orationes Tres (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963),7-8;
doubts are raised by Sumner, 572-573 and Grun, 389.
31 Leg. Agr. 1.21, 2.80, 2.84, 3.15.
32 Leg. Agr. 1.1-2,2.38-46; see Hardy, 74-77.
22
presented before him would exhaust the state's treasury, increase taxation,
cause public land to disappear, and threaten to put excessive power in the
hands of the decemvirs. This economic tum-around would unbalance the
state of concordia. In his opposition to the bill, he equated himself with the
republic (Leg. Agr. 2.103) and devoted himself to the harmony, well-being, and
survival of the state. Concordia signified a state of existence that needed to be
preserved and this meant a campaign against any proposaI that disrupted this
condition. Personal necessity and political conviction demanded that he
continue to work for harmony in the state and between the orders that offered
him electoral support. Thus, the consul-orator does not limit his discussions
to the confines of the senate house but contrives to have the best of both
worlds by persuading both senate and people that he is working for their
interests with his concem to repel the proposal by the popularis tribune.
The debate around Rullus' bill coincided with the beginning of Cicero' s
term as consul. In his first month, Cicero took care to define his political aims
and lay out his political programme for carrying out ms duties in office (Leg.
Agr. 1.22-27,2.5-6). As a result of being electeduniversi populi Romani
iudicio (Leg. Agr. 2.6),33 he declared to both the senate and people that he was
a consul popularis working for the preservation of concordia and otium (Leg.
Agr. 1.23,2.6, 3.4; cf. Rab. Perd. 11). His plan would be to manage affairs in a
way which he thought was beneficial for the people rather than support
measures by popular tribunes that indicated what the people wanted done.
34
33 By asserting the sovereign power of the assemblies Cicero links his election to a
popularistechnique; see Robin Seager, Cicero and the Word Popularis," ClassicalQuarterly, 22
(1972), 331 and 333.
34 There is evidence that Cicero opposed other popular measures (introduced by
tribunes) early in the year (Cass. Dio 37.25, Plut. Cic. 12); see the discussion in E. G. Hardy, The
Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: a re-studyof the Evidence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1924),33-34.
23
He states: "the present constitution should be vigorously defended because 1
have declared myself to the Roman people to be the defender of otium and
concordia for the present year" (Leg. Agr. 3.4).35 Such a pledge was in faet a
commitment to defend the established legislation and traditional values of
Roman government set forth by its constitution.
Concordia signified a state of existence, a result and condition as
symbolized and made permanent by its eponymous temple in the Roman
forum.
36
It therefore meant agreement, a strong bond of unity among three
classes of citizens in Roman society (senators, leading citizens, masses) who
had similar interests and recognized the working institutions of Rome' s
political system. These citizens were classified as boni, men of principle or (as
French scholars note) les gens de bien, whose voices were heard in the senate,
magistracy, and popular assemblies. This harmony was solidified by the
traditions of the mos maiorum and brought about with the aid of justice
enforeed by law. Citizens were satisfied that their interests, safety, and liberty
were protected by the uninterrupted and harmonious activities of the forum,
organization of the law courts, and active legislation so that they could live
free from anxiety andfear. The result of concordia was 0 ti u m (often linked
with tranquillitas and pax) which qualified the condition of harmony. Otium
indicated the particular state of tranquillity and calm in the republic when
there was no civil disorder (seditio, tumultus). This condition a110wed a11
citizens to enjoy peaee safely without danger (Leg. Agr. 2.9: impune in otio
35 hune statum rei publieae magno opere defendendum putem qui otii et eoneordiae
patronum me in hune annum populo Romano professus sim.
36The temples and altars dedicated to Coneordia belonged to the senatorial tradition.
There were none dedicated to otium, tranquillitas, dignitas, pax. The people, represented by the
tribunes, dedicated their temples to Libertas.
24
esse).37
In the agrarian speeches, the word popularis is redefined with the use
of optimate values so that Cicero may claim to be the true popularis, not his
opponent. The values listed in the Pro Sestio38 as constituents of the
optimate ideal for concordia and otium were those attacked by Rullus and his
colleagues in 63 (Leg. Agr.2.10). In his effort to be accepted by both groups,
Cicero wanted to be seen as a consul popularis on the via optimas. In the first
speech to the senate opposing Rullus' bill, Cicero declared "1 am now speaking
of the danger to our safety and liberty" (Leg. Agr. 1.21), thus appropriating two
main themes belonging to the popularis tradition, salus and libertas
39
and
challenged Rullus to defy his power as consul and promoter of peace: "For, in
examining everything which is pleasant and agreeable to the people, we shall
find nothing so popular as peace, harmony, and quietness [quam pacem,
quam concordiam, quam otiumf' (Leg. Agr.1.23).40 Cicero equates populare
with the things that are "pleasing and agreeable to the people." But then he
37 Leg. Agr. 1.23; 2.7-9; Mur. 78; Red. Quir. 20; Dom. 15; Pis. 73; Rep. 1.49, 1.69; 2.69;
Phil. 5.41. For a further explanation on how the term was applied to certain ancient standards it is
possible to look to the Greek philosopher Speusippus (c. 407-339). In his book Definitions,
traditionally appended to Plato's works, there are two entries for the term the ancient
Greek equivalent to concordia. The first definition incorporates partnership and harmonious
agreement: ua sharing in ail existing things, a concordance (ow<pwyia) in thoughts and
conceptions" (413b); and the second is related to unanimity:"a similarity of opinion
between rulers and ruled, how they ought to rule and be ruled" (413e).
38 The values of the optimate tradition are Iisted as: re/igiones, auspicia, potestas
magistratum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum, iudicia, iuris dictio, fides, provinciae, socii,
imperii, laus, resmi/itaris, aerarium(Sest. 98).
39 For the viewthat a popularis shows interest in the salus of the people, see De Or.
3.138, Verr. 2.1.153, Red. Sen. 20, Sest. 107, Phil. 7.4; for /ibertasasapopularistheme, see
Verr. 2.1.163, Leg. Agr. 2.16, Rab. Perd. 12,16, Dom. 77, 80.
40 Etenim, ut circumspiciamus omnia, quae populo grata atque iucunda sunt, nihil tam
populare quam pacem, quam concordiam, quam otium reperiemus. Observe the fine distinction
between a conventional and a true popularis: consul veritate, non ostentatione popularis(Leg.
Agr. 1.23).
25
offers a series of optimate slogans: pax, concordia, otium and passes these
words off as "popular" catchwords when in fad they were always those of the
conservative faction which aimed to maintain law and order, and continue
business as usual.41 He guaranteed to the senate that he would continue the
propaganda of these slogans which were the foundation of senatorial
authority. The senators were well aware of the bold expedient of declaring an
optimate policy in the interests of the people.
42
Politieal aims for the year
were affirmed at the end of the speech where Cicero promises to repel
dangers, such as this fraudulent popular proposal (Leg. Agr. 1.24), and protect
tranquillitas, pax, otium for the benefit of maintaining dignitas
43
- the
politieal domination of the aristocratie landholding minority in Rome's
hierarchical social system:
But if, conscript fathers, you promise me your zeal in upholding the
common dignity, 1 will certainly fulfill the most ardent wish of the
republic, that the authority of this order which existed in the time of
our ancestors, may now, after a long interval, be seen to be restored
to the state. (Leg. Agr. 1.27)44
When Cicero addressed the people his approach was slightly different.
41 For an account of political catchwords, see Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1939; rpt. 1952), 149-161; Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, l, 663,
666; MacKendrick, 56; Mitchell, 202-203; L. Perelli, /1 pensiero politico di Cicerone. (Firenze: La
Nuova Italia. 1990),87-88.
42 Such an action was not without its forerunners in Roman politics: Valerius Potitus and
Horatius Barbatus were hominum concordiae causa sapienter popularium (Rep. 2.54).
43 See Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought(Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1988), 194-195.
44 Quodsi vos vestrum mihi studium, patres conscripti, ad communem dignitatem
defendendam profitemini, perficiam perfecto, id quod maxime res publica desiderat, ut huius
ordinis auctoritas, quae apud maiores nostros fuit, eadem nunc longo intervallo rei publicae
restituta esse videatur.
26
His specifie aim was to pursue a popular policy but not in the manner of
Rullus and his colleagues who had betrayed the commoda and salus of the
people on the pretext of "popularity," which threatened the lives of the boni
and aroused hopes in the improbi (Leg. Agr. 2.7-8).45 lnstead, Cicero would
commit himself to the true commoda of a popular policy: pax, libertas, otium
(Leg. Agr. 2.10). He continues the propaganda of optimate slogans but makes a
slight alteration by substituting the term concordia for the new slogan libertas
from the popularis tradition and again passes them off as "popular"
catchwords. Cicero's intention is to contrast the despotic will of the tribunes
proposing the agrarian law who aim "to set up kings in the republic" with the
original function of the tribuneship (Leg. Agr. 2.15).46 The tribune and the
decemviri, the committee members who would have been put in charge of
the application of the law, would take advantage of their influential position
and introduce a real tyranny, a regnum which would threaten the libertas of
the Roman people. Of course, this would not appear favourable to the many
citizens in the audience who elected the tribunes for their obligation to
libertas, a value which, for Cicero, consisted in respecting the existing laws of
the constitution.
47
At the end of the speech, Cicero reiterates his programme
with yet another slight variation: "there is nothing so desired by the people as
that which l, a consul who is a true friend of the people, offer you for this
year: pax, tranquillitas, otium" (Leg. Agr. 2.102).48 Considering his colleague's
, 45 Promoters of a new legislation such as this were themselves defined as improbi and
impotentes(Rab. Perd. 22; Mur. 24).
46 Perelli, 80.
47 Leg. Agr. 2.102; Glu. 146,155; Rab. Perd. 10.
48 nihil esse tam populare quam id, quod ego vobis in hunc annum consul popularis
adfero, pacem, tranquillitatem, otium.
27
past alliances, Cicero reassures his audience that a bond of concordia does
indeed exist between them (Leg. Agr. 2.103)49 and by checking sedition he
promises the people in the forum that concordia and 0 ti u m will be preserved
during his consular tenure (Leg. Agr. 3.4). Cicero addresses his audience as
the boni, the people whose political influence depended on elections, whose
rights depended on the courts and on the propriety of officials, and whose
economic prosperity depended on the preservation of pax, concordia, otium,
the true popularis goals. An of which were the political and economic
principles set out by traditional republicanism.
50
The bill was withdrawn and
Ru1lus was not heard from again.
It is significant that in these speeches Cicero views the senatorial
governing body and Roman citizens as a single entity. In the three versions
of his political programme, concordia, libertas, tranquillitas are central
qualifiers of pax and 0 ti u m. These aims are binding on all citizens, a
combination of values and phrases adopted from the popularis and optimate
traditions. Once again there is the suggestion as to which groups are
committed to maintaining the principles of republican government and
which groups pose a threat to it. The optimates and their supporters, who
make up the entire nation, are distinguished as the boni.51 In opposition to
them were the improbi, politically fickle and unprincipled, who inc1ined
49 C. Antonius campaigned with Catiline during the consular elections; and bath were
attacked by Cicero in the toga candida speech. Antonius was also believed to have supported
two previous defeated tribunici an bills. For the importance of consular harmony, see above n. 19.
50 Leg. Agr. 1.26-27; 2.7-9,2.101-103; Rab. Perd. 34; Faro. 1.9.12; Sest. 51; cf.Rep.1.69.
51 The boni can also be described as the verus populus from whom Cicero, the vere
popularis, sought support; Seager, 334.
28
towards the populares.
52
These tribunes who called themselves populares
and claimed to be concemed with populares' causes were, in Cicero's view,
really working against the people's interests, so they could not be populares.
Setting out these proposais allowed Cicero to achieve a great deal. He claimed
the title popularis, which meant much since it derived from populus (Leg.
Agr. 1.25,2.43),53 and appropriated it for himself and the cause of the
optimates. Thus it could be said that he designated himself as consul
popularis on the via optimas since he reformulated the traditional political
vocabulary for the preservation of concordia. It was Cicero's political aim to
defend the government and public order from the economic innovations
proposed by Rullus and his improbi supporters since, in his view, the
government's primary function was to maintain property rights (Off 1.15,
1.20f; 2.73; Rep. 3.24) and property owners were not to be stripped of their
possessions by force. This desire to moderate or to participate in two camps
also reflects his efforts to bring senators and equites together in a common
cause to frustrate an attempted putsch by extremists. Having risen from the
ranks of the equestrian order
I
Cicero entered the consulship intent on
defending the new noble status he had achieved for his gens.
Asserting a State of Concordia
Throughout his consulship, Cicero pursued the aims described in the
agrarian speeches to promote concordia and defeat the improbi. For example,
early in the year, the people in a theatre voiced their disapproval of Roscius
52 T0 the man who is popu/aris corresponds improbus (Sest. 197) and /evitas, political
fickleness or irresponsibility (Sest. 139, Phil. 7.4); for a further account, see Seager, 336.
53 For more evidence on Cicero's derivation of popularisfrom populus, seeVerr. 2.3.48,
Har. Resp. 42, Dom. 77.
29
Otho for bis law granting the equites a privileged seating arrangement at
theatrical performances.
54
Their outrage probably reflected the animosity feH
towards unscrupulous moneylenders and financiers who were members of
that order. In response, the equites showed their support for Roscius with
applause, and disorder arose. Cicero, an eques and now self-proclaimed verus
popularis, summoned a public meeting at the temple of Bellona to resolve
the confrontation. As in some of bis speeches, he no doubt pointed out the
merits of the law in question, followed by the invaluable role of the
equestrian order in charge of business activities and the people' s role to
support it and the institutions of the republic for the preservation of
concordia and otium. The people were convinced and refrained their
attacks.55
In another situation, several tribunes agitated for reform when they
persisted in their appeal to revoke one of Sulla's laws stripping citizenship
rights.fromthe sons of the men proscribed by the dictator twenty years earlier.
Cicero knew the law was unjust but believed that Sulla' s enactments were to
be honoured for the preservation of stability and peace in the republic, and
repealing any law would only lead to political disintegration.
56
In this case,
he opposed the bill for fear that embittered citizens would acquire
magistracies and threaten the constitution. He was now a noble member of a
senate created by Sulla whose members still honoured his memory and many
had profitable investments in properties acquired after the proscriptions.
54 For a description of the law. see above p. 12.
55 The speech is listed in Att. 2.1.3. For details of its content, see Plut. Cie. 13, Pliny N. H.
7.116. The role of the equites is explained in De Imp. en. Pomp. 17-20.
56 Similarly, for the sake of eoneordia, Cicero also supported Caesar's enactments in 44
(see below p. 147).
30
Cicero had no choice but to defeat the proposaI so as not to endanger the
concordia and otium enjoyed by the status quo.
57
In 1ate spring or early summer, the trial of the senator Rabirius for the
murder of the tribune Saturninus, which occurred in 100, was also promoted
as a popular undertaking against the optimates. In this trial, Caesar and the
tribune Labienus sought to overthrow the power of the senatus consultum
ultimum (which authorized Saturninus' death) and assert the sovereignty of
the people by reestablishing the right of appeal to the assembly (from the
quaestiones).58 Cassius Dio reports that this case caused the greatest disorder
(37.26-28). The issues were more political than personal as Cicero focused his
defence on the senate' s strength as an influential governing body.
In reference to the events of 100, Cicero warned that the internaI
plottings of revolutionaries (not leaders of foreign nations) were the major
threat to Rome' s survival; advice that was pertinent even in his own time.
And it was the united resistance of equites and boni mobilized by the senate's
ultimate decree which preserved the dignitas and libertas of republican
institutions against the seditiosi and improbi (Rab. Perd. 20-22,27,33-35).
Accordingly, Cicero believed that no citizen should be punished for violating
laws while in the process of protecting the safety of the country when
sanctioned by the senate's ultimate decree to do so. This was affirmed in the
precept salus populi suprema lex esto (Leg. 3.8; Phil. 11.28). In his view, the
senate JIhad the power and responsibility to determine when the public safety
57 For references to the speech, see Quint. 11.1.85; Pliny, N. H. 7.117; Casso Dio
37.25.3; Plut. Cie. 12.1; the speech is Iisted in Att. 2.1.3. For Cicero's opposition to the proposai
and attitude toward the repeal of laws, see Pis. 4, Leg. Agr. 2.10, Verr. 2.5.12, Sull. 63.
58 ln 100 Saturninus led a revoit which prompted the senate to pass its consultum ultimum
allowing consuls to employ any means to save the state. Rabirius was one of a few senators still
alive in 63 who had been a party to the death and 50 charged. Sources in T. R. S. Broughton, The
Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 1(New York: American Philological Association, 1951),576.
31
was threatened and to authorize extraordinary measures to remove the
threat," thus "the decree was an official dedaration by an authorized body that
a state of emergency existed."59 Cicero makes it known that a special
cooperation should transpire among three significant groups whenever a
domestic crisis arises. The auctoritas senatus, consulare imperium, consensio
bonorum must form a coalition to defend against the juror and audacia of
popular reformers. The senate formulates the policy which the consuls
executeand the people unite to support (Rab. Perd. 2-4, 34). As a result, the
unity (Le. concordia) of these political groups strengthens the harmony and
safety of the state. The trial itself ended without a decision but Cicero's loyalty
to a senatorial measure was announced emphatically.
Furthermore, these three examples illustrate very practical
circumstances in which Cicero maintained the traditional Roman ideal of
harmony. The unity, agreement or reconciliation of Rome's citizens secured
the harmony of the republic. It is also apparent that from this experience a
new concept of concordia is emerging - a harmony of orders. This new
concept becomes dearer in the speeches against Catiline.
Concordia Ordinum against Catiline
The practical means of securing otium and the concordia of the mixed
constitutional order wouldbe the creation of a concordia ordinum.
60
It was
Cicero's aim to save the government and public order by obtaining the
cooperation of senators and equites against the economic innovations
proposed by Catiline and his faction. By birth of equestrian status and now a
59 Mitchell, 210.
60 Wood, 198.
32
senator of the highest rank, Cicero saw his duty as that of consolidating and
leading the men of property and wealth, his "army of the rich" (AU. 1.19.4).
Concordia ordinum meant a strong bond of unity between the boni of the
senatorial and equestrian orders, specifically designated as lauti and locupletes
(AU. 8.1.3). Us mission was to protect the economic and political well-being of
the status quo. This was the only moment in Cicero' s political career when he
had actually persuaded citizens to gather around mm, like an army, against
the threat of Catiline for the preservation of republican values.
Events began during the election campaigns in July. Once again,
Catiline was determined to reach that elusive consular position and in order
to gain a wider range of support he proposed to cancel aIl debts (tabulae
novae).
Catiline's policy of tabulae novae originates in the economic conditions
of the time. The burden of debt had reached a significant height in 63 when
war expenditures had created widespread indebtedness and a serious shortage
of money (Off 2.84). The Social War, civil wars of the 80s and against Lepidus
in 77, followed by the slave revoit led by Spartacus of 73-71 brought violence
and devastation to the Italian countryside. This led to a social and economic
crisis which grew more severe from the cost of the wars against Sertorius and
Mithridates and by pirates who interrupted trade and export by extending
their marauding practices to inc1ude coastal communities.
61
The pirate
menace had causedincreased food prices and the great expenses incurred in
defeating Sertorius and Mithridates had decreased the amount of money
available for credit. Domestic grievances included the hardship of the
61 P. A. Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," Journal of Roman
Studies 52(1962),73; and ItaHan Manpower 225 S.C.-A.D. 14, 108f; M. W. Frederiksen, "Caesar,
Cicero and the Problem of Debt," Journal of Roman Studies 56 (1966), 132-33.
33
urban poor6
2
and fierce exactions of creditors. At the beginning of 63, popular
discontent toward money-lenders saw the proposa! of a bill for debt
cancellation but it was not passed (Cass. Dio 37.25.4). In light of these
circumstances Catiline took a solid political initiative when he made the
cancellation of debts the main focus of his campaign.
Catiline' s supporters included bankrupt veterans who had failed as
farmers, and spendthrift nobles who were constantly in debt (Mur. 49). He
also drew support from a desperate group against the optimate govemment:
descendants of the proscribed, bankrupt aristocrats, unprincipled youth, and
ealamitosi (Mur. 50). But his poticy would antagonize many respectable
senators and alienate equites, traders, and shopkeepers whose livelihood
depended on credit and money-Iending. Any thought of gaining assistance
from Crassus and Caesar would also be hopeless since the latter had been
recently elected Pontifex Maximus and relied on the financial backing of the
former who was himself an eques and friend of the financiers and money-
lenders.
63
Catiline distanced himself further from the optimates after sorne
unwise remarks against the state in the senate (Mur. 51) followed by life-
threatening proclamations against Cicero in his role as consul (Plut. Cie. 14,
Casso Dio 37.29). On election day, Cicero arrived to conduct his duties as
presiding officer wearing a breastplate and protected by private bodyguards.
Such a pretentious display lessened Catiline's chances for the consulship and
the equestrian financiers had no alternative but to unite with the optimates
and vote for L. Licinius Murena and D. Iunius Silanus.
62 Sail. Cat. 37; for the wretched conditions of the population in Rome, see Z. Yavetz,
"The Living Conditions of the Urban Plebs in Republican Rome," Latomus 17 (1958), 500-517;
and P. A. Brunt, "The Roman Mob," Past and Present35 (1966), 11-18. For rural dissatisfaetion,
see P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic(London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), 131.
63 Catiline received support fram Caesar and Crassus a year earlier; see Eagle, 19-23.
34
Again unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the consulship through
constitutional means, Catiline apparently planned to overthrow the
government by force. Many from the rural population were ready to join the
urban plebs in their support of a noble who guaranteed the cancel1ation of
debts once power was obtained.64 Cicero specifically lists six large groups
which supported Catiline (Cal. 2.17-23).65 However, in spite of this substantial
support, Catiline had already suffered two defeats in his bid for the consulship
and as a result of this third fallure was led to seek other means to gain power.
In the first plot, he planned uprisings in Rome and throughout Italy on
Oetober 28. It was betrayed with written evidence to Cicero, who revealed it to
the senate on Oetober 21. The senate acknowledged the crisis, passed the
consultum ultimum, and declared a state of emergency. Now with official
moral backing from the senate, Cicero took military precautions. He brought
troops into the city and sent officers to secure law and order in various parts
of Italy. The date planned for Catiline's uprising passed uneventfully. But he
persevered and so a second attempt was planned for November 7. This time
his violent designs included the murder of Cicero and other senators, riots
throughout Italy, conflagration, looting, and a march on Rome. The plot was
again thwarted because of Cicero's informant among the conspirators. The
consul summoned the senate on November 8 where he delivered his first
Catilinarian oration and denounced Catiline who was in attendance. Cicero
64See Sali. Cat. 33.1 and 4-5,37.4-9 for an account of the background to the conspiracy.
65 i) Wealthy men who were unwilling to sell their land to repay their debts (Their attitude is
explained by Frederikson, 130 and 137-138.) ii) Men who were in debt and expected to gain
positions of power through revolution. iii) Colonists from Sulla's armies who profited from the
confiscations, had Iived beyond their means and expected new proscriptions in order to free
themselves from debt. iv) Men in financial straits with age-old debts who merety wanted to avoid
their problems by joining with CatiIine. v) Criminals. vi) The wanton and malevolent young men of
the city.
35
reminded his audience of the background to the present crisis (Cat. 1.1-10). He
then pointed to the actions of the senators, which proved Catiline' s lack of
support among them, and to the garrisons of equites and others with which
Cicero had guarded the city (Cat. 1.13-20). The equites had honoured the
consul and senate with their allegiance as they stood around the temple of
Jupiter Stator, protecting the meeting place (Cat. 1.21). Catiline was urged to
leave the city. Confident of equestrian loyalty, Cicero was not afraid to make
promises to his fellow senators.
66
He asserted that Catiline's departure had
shown the unity (consensio) of consul, senate, equites, and citizens and would
lead to the crushing of the conspiracy, the preservation of the republic, and
the safety of property and fortunes of all Romans (Cat. 1.32-33). Catiline
immediately left the city and before long he and ms followers were declared
enemies of the state (hostes). The designation hostis allowed Cicero, as
consul, to proceed with any action that the senate deemed favourable for the
protection of the republic against hostile citizens.
This consensio against the conspirators reflects a political unity as weIl
as a military one and with the help of the equites the concordia ordinum
showed its military strength. This appeal for unity is pointed out more clearly
in the speech to the people. Many among the Roman masses did originally
support the conspiracy.67 It was Cicero's duty to convince them otherwise.
On November 9 he assumed his role as consul popularis and appeare.d in the
forum. Speaking in front of the people (Cat. 2), Cicero avoided identifying his
66 Throughout his pre-consular years Cicero concentrated his efforts on defending the
interests of the equestrian class, the same class from which his family had originated. Many of his
"good friends the Roman equiteS' (De /mp. Cn. Pomp. 4) followed the trials of Fonteius, Oppius
(Quint. 5.13.1 and 21), and Cluentius who themselves alsa had many equestrian followers (Font.
12, 46) who were present at the trials.
67 Cat. 2.8, 4.6; Mur. 78-79; Sail. Cat. 37.1.
36
audience with Catiline's supporters and discouraged the whole populace from
joining a conspiracy led by depraved aristocrats whose interests had nothing
in common with theirs. Cicero succeeded in splitting the urban plebs from
the conspirators by convincing them that Catiline' s aim was anarchy and not
economic reform (SalI. Cat. 48.1). Cicero warns those who want to destroy the
peace which exists in the republic to abandon their goals because, {irst of aU,
he himself is vigilant and guards the republic and: "in the second place, the
body of loyal citizens has exceptional courage, complete harmony [magnam
concordiam1 and strength in their large numbers, and there is also a strong
force of soldiers" (Cat. 2.19).68
For the first time Cicero introduces himself as a consul togatus dux et
imperator (Cat.2.28).69 But not before he compares his leadership abilities to
those of the popular leader Pompey.70 He prides himself on the fact that he is
a civil magistrate who will do his best to save the state through constitutional
means without reverting to civil war. Of course, Cicero prefers to avoid a war
against Catiline but is ready with troops throughout ltaly if forced to do so
(Cat.2.28).
In the midst of Catiline' s insurrection, an incident occurred which
threatened to jeopardize the continuation of Cicero' s policy. The threat to
concordia came from those few conservative senators (pauci nobiles) whom
68 deinde magnos animos esse in bonis viris, magnam concordiam, maximam
multitudinem, magnaspraeterea militum copias.
69 The toga was the clothing worn by a civilian; it represented peace (cf. Cicero's remark
cedant arma togae, concedant laurea laudi quoted in his speech ln Pisonem 73-74). For the
contrast between the civil and military powers, see C. Nicolet, .. Consul Togatus: remarques sur le
vocabulaire politique de Cicron et de Tite-Live," Revue des tudes latines, 38 (1960), 236-263.
70 Cat. 2.11: Omnia sunt externa unius virtute terra marique pacata: domesticum bellum
manet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis. Cum luxuria nobis, cum
amentia, cum seelere certandum est. Huic ego me belle ducem profiteor, Quirites.
37
he occasionaUy criticized during his rise to office. They resented the election
of another /lnew man" to succeed Cicero in the consulship for 62 and so
accused Murena of electioneering bribery.71 Cato led the prosecution against
the designated consul. The trial itself took place while Catiline sat with his
battle-ready troops in Etruria so the charge against Murena, that is, his guilt or
innocence, was not the main issue in Cicero's defence strategy. In the
interests of the state Cicero prays:
To the immortal gods that Murena's acquittaI may preserve mm for
his consulship, that your [the jury's] opinion given in your verdict
may taUy with the wishes of the Roman people expressed in their
votes, and that this agreement may bring peace, harmony, calm, and
tranquillity [pacem, concordiam, otium, tranquillitatem] to
yourselves and to the Roman people. (Mur. 1)72
What was vital to Cicero's policy was that there had to be two consuls
for the foUowing year, not one, and both had to be intelligent and energetic
enough to continue his own line of action against the ongoing dangers from
Catiline and his followers:
What 1 am doing, gentlemen of the jury, 1 am doing not only out of
friendship with Lucius Murena and for his good name but 1 declare
and caU upon you to bear witness that 1 am doing it for the sake of
peace, quiet, unity, liberty, our preservation [pacis, oti, concordiae,
71 For ambitus, see L. R. Taylor. Party Po/ities in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1949),67-68.
72 precor ab dis immortalibus ob eiusdem hominis consulatum una eum salute
obtinendum, et ut vestrae mentes atque sententiae eum populi Romani voluntatibus suffragiisque
eonsentiant, eaque res vobis populoque Romano paeem, tranquillitatem, otium eoneordiamque
adferat.
38
libertatis, salutis] in short the very lives of us aU. (Mur. 78)73
But apparently Cato, the academic lawyer and idealistic stoic philosopher
(Mur. 3, 61-63), lacked the foresight to appreciate the dangerous situation into
which he could thrust the state if his prosecution was successful.
A conviction for Murena meant exclusion from office and would have
encouraged Catiline (Mur. 79, 85). To gain support in his cause, Cicero plays
to the sympathies of the equestrian members of the jury having reminded
them of Murena's success in looking after their business interests while
governor of Narbonese Gau1.
74
This would encourage them further to protect
pax, otium, salus (Mur. 86). The jury of senators and equites was convinced
enough to acquit Murena for the safety of the republic.
In this trial, Cicero again reveals himself as the practical man of action
in his determined effort to maintain his policy and suppress the Catilinarian
conspiracy. His motives for defending Murena were linked to his duty as
consul: to protect law and order and preserve national security (Mur. 4,79).
Again he takes the opportunity to extol the virtues of the consul togatus and
appeals to the jury and allloyal citizens that a major crisis will be resolved
through constitutional means, with their combined help (Mur. 84). We can
see that the same political aims that were evident in the Rullan speeches were
also presented and forcefully stressed here: the optimate slogans pax,
concordia, otium, tranquillitas were combined with the popularis slogans
libertas and salus. In protecting these aims, Cicero's political thinking reaches
73 Ego quod facio, iudices, cum amicitiae dignitatisque L. Murenae gratia facio, tum me
pacis, oti, concordiae, Iibertatis, salutis, vitae denique omnium nostrum causa facere clamo atque
testor.
74 Mur. 42, 53, 69, 89.
39
a peculiar aspect.
75
The civil man of action (togatus) does not deny the need
for a military presence. And this is where Cicero' s consular colleague has a
key role. C. Antonius was more a capable general than active politician and as
Cicero was at Rome maintaining support among the orders C. Antonius' duty
would be to protect Rome from Catiline's attacks. This way pax et concordia
could be maintained.76
Cicero sees a combination of these qualities in his client. Murena was,
like Cicero, a "new man" and likely to prove sympathetic to his own policies
and prepared to continue them in the following year. Cicero devotes a large
part of the speech (Mur. 15-53) refuting the prosecution's claim that a "new
man" was prone to corrupt practices and demonstrates Murena' s superior
qualifications for consular office. Also, Murena had the military experience
and connections to organize and lead the forces of senatorial government
against any opposition to concordia, especially if Catilinarian sympathies were
revealed during his consulship.77
When Catiline left Rome, the conspiracy did not end, however. An
embassy of Allobroges, a tribe from Narbonese Gaul, who had come to Rome
to seek redress for grievances, was solicited for military aid by Catiline' s co-
conspirators. They agreed to carry letters to their fellow-countrymen outside
Rome. The Allobroges betrayed the conspirators and handed over the
documentary evidence to Cicero. On December 3, all the conspirators were
75 Mur. 30: Duae sint artes igitur quae possint locare homines in amplissimo gradu
dignitatis, una imperatoris, altera oratoris boni.
76 Mur. 84: Di faxint ut meus conlega, vir fortissimus, hoc Catilinae nefarium latrocinium
armatus opprimat! ego togatus vobis bonisque omnibus adiutoribus hoc quod conceptum res
publica periculum parturit consilio discutiam et comprimam.
77 ln 73 Murena led forces in Asia, Bithynia, and Pontus, in 65 and 64 he commanded the
forces in Transalpine Gaul (Mur. 20, 42, 68, 89); for dates, see Broughton, Il, 131.
40
arrested and led to the temple of Concordia where a meeting of the senate had
been convened to discuss the nature of their activities. The conspirators were
charged with treason and detained in custody.78
Later in the day, Cicero narrated the course of events to the people in
the forum in his third speech against Catiline. Init he describes the senate
session which had just taken place and his role in the arrest of the five co-
conspirators. Taking pride in the fact that he had saved the state without the
need of a civil war, Cicero comments on the effects of past civil wars:
And those civil wars, citizens, were not concemed with destroying
the republic but with changing iL.And yet aU those conflicts, none
of which sought the destruction of the republic, were resolved not
by a peaceful reconciliation [reconciliatione concordiae] but by the
slaughter of citizens. (Cal. 3.25)79
By unveiling the plans of the coup and the perpetrators involved through a
peaceful process, and thus restoring concordia, Cicero was honoured with a
public thanksgiving (supplicatio). This was the first time in Roman history
that a magistrate had received this honour in recognition of the distinguished
actions of his civil, as opposed to his military, power.
80
He did not have to
resort to arms to suppress the conspiracy but was nevertheless prepared; in
78 Cat. 3.3-14; Sali. Cat. 46.5-47.2.
79 Atque il/ae dissensiones erant eius modi, Quirites, quae non ad delendam sed ad
commutandam rem publicam pertinerenLAtque il/ae tamen omnes dissensiones, quarum nulla
exitium rei publicae quaesivit, eius modi fuerunt ut non reconciliatione concordiae sed
internecione civium diiudicatae sint.
80 Cat. 3.15, 3.23: togati me unD tofJato duce et imperatore vicistis.
41
case of a riot the temple was always surrounded by armed equites.
8I
The
consul could now address Pompey as an equal. He performed his duties to
Rome as a complement to the generaYs,82 the former working within the city
and the latter working outside it both for the same goal: to maintain pax et
concordia. Cicero's current political thinking finds the salvation of the
republic in the alliance of civilians and soldiers, senate and equites.
83
As much as Cicero praised his role as consul togatus, a military
presence was never too far away from himself and the senate. Factions on
both sides threatened the proceedings of the next two days. The forum was
filled with armed men who threatened Catiline' s followers (SalI. Cat. 48).
Throughout the city, the partisans of the conspirators themselves threatened
an uprising in order to free their comrades. Sorne even attacked the houses
where the prisoners were detained while others paid gangleaders to incite
public disturbances.
84
To contend with these threats, and to demonstrate his
own military zeal, Cicero stationed many guards around the forum, adjacent
81 Sail. Cat. 49.4. In the years after his consulship Cicero continued to boast that he had
saved the state without the use of direct force (Sest. 47: sine armis etiamconsul rem publicam
conservarat.), although it is obvious he did intimidate his opponents with arms (a fact which he
never acknowledged).
82 Cat. 3.26: eandemque diem intel/ego, quam spero aeternam fore, propagatam esse et
ad salutem urbis et ad memoriam consulatus mei, unoque tempare in hac re publica duos civis
exstitisse quorum alter finis vestri imperi non terrae sed caeli regionibus terminaret, alter huius
imperi domicilium sedisque servaret. Cf. Cat. 4.21-22 where Cicero praises the military leaders
who expanded Rome's empire and prefers acknowledgement within this group rather than in a
group of leaders who had triumphed in civil war because qui autem ex numero civium dementia
aliqua depravati hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, eos, cum a pernicie rei publicae reppuleris,
nec vi coercere nec beneficio placare possis; Att. 6.1.2 (February 20, 50): dies prid. Kal. lan.
suavem habuit recordationem clarissimi iuris iurandi quod ego non eram ob/itus; Magnus enim
praetextatus il/o die fui.
83 Cat. 4.22: Neque ulla profecto tanta vis reperietur quae coniunctionem vestram
equitumque Romanorum et tantam conspirationem bonorum omnium confringere et labefactare
passit. The roles of the civilian and soldier are contrasted in Mur. 19 f; see also Nicolet, "Consul
Togatus," 247.
84 App. B. Civ. 2.1, 2.5; Sail. Cat. 50.
42
temples, and the approaches to the temple of Concordia where the senatorial
proceedings took place; he also increased the number of enlisted men in case
they were needed. But his main support came from the equites whose
finandal interests he had constantly defended in the courts and who, in turn,
wanted no disruption to their business activities.
85
The praetor Torquatus
was in charge of posting many equestrian guards throughout the dtY(SulI.
34). Even Cicero' s friend Atticus, more a business man than a general, was
stationed with a troop of armed equites near the Capitoline hill ready to avert
any trouble.
86
Cicero also summoned all Romans to enlist and volunteer their
services for the safety of the republic in case more forces were needed against a
possible uprising by the partisans of the conspirators. 50 many people
answered his caU and presented themselves in the forum that the clerks could
not register them all. Equites, tribuni aerarii, scribae, ingenui, tabernarii,
libertini, and many more showed unity for Cicero's cause to preserve order,
rights of property, and the safety to earn a living in peace and security
(otium).87
85 Cie. Cat. 1.21,1.32,2.25,4.15,4.22; Red. Sen. 12,32; Pis. 7; Sull. 51; Dom. 74;
Sest. 28; Flac. 96; Phil. 2.16, 2.19, 7.24; Att. 1.14.4,2.1.7; Q. Fr. 1.1.32; Nepos, Att. 4; Sail. Cat.
49.4, 50.1-3; Plut. Cic. 14; Casso Dio 37.29,37.35.3-4; cf. equestrian merita: Fam. 13.9.2; Provo
Cons. 10; Q. Fr. 1.1.35.
86 Att. 2.1.7 (June 60); Plut. Caes. 8. It is difficult to determine exactly who were the
equitatus whom Cicero referred to in his letter to Atticus (Att. 2.1.7). Aceording to M. 1. Henderson
(''The Establishment of the Equester Ordo, " Joumal of Roman Studies, 53, 1963, 62) they were
the publicani or their peers, and the adulescentes nobiles. While Atticus led the publicani as
signifer ac princeps 50 L. Torquatus led the iuventutesalso as princeps ac signifer(Sull. 34).
These iuventuteswere the senatorial members of the equites equo publico and aise members of
the eighteen centuries in the comitia centuriata (Mur. 73). According to Plutareh (Caes. 8.2)
Cieero's equitatusduring this year were In Cieero's works,onlythe senatorial equites
are ever described as adulescentes or iuvenes, simply because they entered the senate at the
age of thirty (Phil. 2.16, 2.44).
87 Phil. 2.16; Cat. 4.14-18; Casso Dio 37.35.3-4.
43
After more evidence was presented to the senate on December 4th (SalI.
Cat. 48-49), it was on the 5th that Cicero consulted the serrate about the fate of
the imprisoned conspirators. It was not until this day that he revealed the
substance of the speeches against his opponent. Later in his career, Cicero saw
the Nones as a pivotaI moment in the understanding of concordia that he
was able to forge between the senate and the equites.
88
When the senators
assembled in the temple of Concordia,89 to debate on the type of punishment
that might be exacted, Silanus proposed the death penalty and many agreed
until Caesar pleaded for life imprisonment. His appeal gained much support.
It must have been quite an intense and heated debate since a group of armed
senators from equestrian rank got carried away and actually threatened Caesar
for ms lenient attitude. This menacing act might have put pressure on sorne
to change their decision but it surely proved the existence of Cicero' s coalition
in action.
90
When it was his turn to speak, Cicero urgently requested his fellow
senators to reach a decision (Cat. 4.1-7). After brief counter-arguments against
Caesar (Cat. 4.8-13), he passed to the main theme of ms speech, the concordia
ordinum, a uniting of citizens of aU ranks and classes in the interest of
preserving order, common political interests, rights of property and fortunes,
and otium (Cat. 4.16). Up to this point we have seen how the earlier speeches
88 AN. 1.19.6 (Mareh 15. 60): ut semel Nonarum il/arum Deeembrium iunctam invidia ae
mu/torum inimicitiis eximiamquandam atque immortalemgloriamconsecutus sumo
89 The senate meetings took place in aedem Goncordiaeon the 3rd (Gat. 3.21) and the
4th (Sali. Gat. 49.4) 50 there is rea50n to believe that it al50 took place there on the 5th which
would make the proeeedings appropriately symbolie; see Beryl Raw5On, The Politics of
Friendship: Pompey and Gicero(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1978),186.
90 Suet. lui. 14; aecording to Plutarch (Gaes. 8) armed equitesalso threatened Caesar as
he left the senate meeting; cf. Sali. Gat. 49.4: armed equites had al50 threatened Caesar outside
the senate meeting the day before. For a view on this pressure tactie, see Strasburger, 41.
44
opposing Catiline revealed the socio-political groups towhich Cicero looked
for support. Now, however, he deals with the question more clearly. It had
been suggested to him that the resources of the state might not be adequate to
enforce a verdict condemning those on trial. This was not so, for he and the
Roman people had seen to all necessary precautions with care and vigilance.
Having pointed to the unanimity clearly shown by the previous day' s
enlistments and the partisan crowd in the forum, he retorted (Cat.4.14):
Omnes adsunt omnium ordinum homines, omnium generum, omnium
denique aetatum and then proceeds to enumerate the various groups
(ordines) in this common front.
91
The people solidly supported the senate.
92
ln the final resolution of the conspiracy, Cicero finds the ultimate
opportunity to praise the successful harmony of the equestrian and senatorial
orders. Firstly, a reconciliation between the two groups was effected when
shared control of the juries of the criminal courts had been resolved by the lex
Aurelia iudiciaria in 70. Secondly, the equites were first on the list to take up
arms and register as enforcement troops indicating their solidarity with the
senate.
93
Under his guidance as consul, the coalition was solidified:
After many years of disagreement, this day and this cause has
brought them [the equites] back to an alliance and harmony with
your order [the senate], and reunites them with you. If we maintain
forever in the republic this union which has been established in my
consulship, 1 promise you that hereafter no civil and domestic strife
91 See above p. 43.
92 Cat. 4.18: Ouse cum ita sint, patres conscripti, vobis populi Romani praesidia non
desunt: vos ne populo Romano deesse videamini providete.
93 Strasburger, 42; Eagle, 29.
45
will touch any part of the state. (Cat.4.15)94
Cicero repeatedly assures his audience that all ordines were prepared to
protect the republic. The alliance between the senate and the equites together
with the collaboration of other ordines95 fromthe broaderbased consensio
bonorum was a testimony to Cicero' s programme of preserving order, rights
of property, pax, concordia, otium, and libertas against the perditi cives (Cat.
4.18-24). With all people in the senate and the forum rallying behind him
and providing political support and military intimidation, Cicero had shown
his policy in action.
But the consul was not the last to speak. Cato impugned Caesar' s
motives so forcefully that he convinced the whole senate to decree the death
sentence.
96
And Cicero was left to carry out the final decision. For ms skillful
and effective leadership without resorting to a civil war the people applauded
(Plut. Cic. 22), the senate declared him parens patriae and offered him the
corona ClVlca.
One individual was not content with the events that had transpired.
Metellus Nepos, the tribune-elect for 62, prevented Cicero from delivering the
speech to the people that was customary for an outgoing consul. The basis for
Nepos' opposition was Cicero' s responsibility for the execution, without a
trial, of Roman citizens (i.e. members of the Catilinarian conspiracy) (Fam.
94 quos ex mu/torum annorum dissensione huius ordinis ad societatem concordiamque
revocatos hodiernus dies vobiscum atque haec causa coniungit. Quam si coniunctionem in
consu/atu confirmatam meo perpetuam in re publics tenuerimus, confirmo vobis nullum posthac
ma/um civile sc domesticum adut/am rei publicaepartem esse venturum.
95 For a description of the other ordines, see B. Cohen, "Sorne Neglected Ordines: The
Apparitorial Status-Groups," in Des ordres Rome, Ed. Claude Nicolet (Paris: Publications de la
Sorbonne, 1984), 23-60.
96 Plut. Cie. 20, C. Minor23; Casso Dio 37.36; Fior. 2.12; Vell. Pat. 2.35; Sail. Gat. 52.8-53.4.
46
5.2.7-8).97 Cicero had expressed fears regarding repercussions from the
conspiracy (Cat. 4.23) but the success of his eoneordia ordinum may have
subdued these fears. Despite not being able to deliver his speech he still had
to pronounce the usual brief oath of officially leaving office. Plutarch says on
the last day of the year Cicero swore a new form of oath that "he had saved his
country and maintained its supremacy" (Cie. 23.2).
With the co-operation of the senators and of the equites, Cicero
preserved public order and had a share in maintaining the stability of the
current government against Catiline's threat. Having termed this policy of
co-operation eoneordia ordinum, he wholeheartedly prepared to manage
and consolidate it into an active coalition among the better and more reliable
segments of society.98 50 long as this coalition remained intact he assured the
senate that no civil and domestic strife would ever touch the state again (Cat.
4.15).
Throughout his life, Cicero constantly reminded people about the
successes of his consulship and continued to believe that Catiline had been
blocked by a solid coalition of senators, equites, and Italians whose first
thought was the good of the republic. In a diatribe directed at Lucius
Calpurnius Piso eight years later, Cicero summed up his consulship as if it
were the speech denied to him by Nepos:
Indeed, my consulship was so conducted from its beginning to its
end, that 1did nothing without the advice of the senate, nothing
without the approval of the Roman people; upon the rostra 1
97 Rawson, 94; Fam. 5.2.8: Cicero's strong speech against Nepos in the senate on
January 1, 62. Att. 1.13.5 (January 61): Cicero was preparing this speech for publication. There
are references to the published speech in Quint. 9.3.50 and Gell. N. A. 18.7.7.
98 Att. 1.17.10 (December 5, 61), Att. 1.19.4.
47
constantly defended the senate, in the senate house the people;
1 welded the populace with its leaders, and the equestrian order
with the senate. (Pis. 7)99
For Cicero, the events against Catiline proved the efficacy of the concordia
ordinum, and he was convinced that it would continue to guarantee the
stability of the republic)OO
99 Atque ita est a me consulatus peractus, ut nihil sine consilio senatus, nihil non
approbante populo Romano egerim, ut semper in rostris curiam, in senatu populum defenderim,
ut multitudinem cum principibus, equestrem ordinem cum senatu coniunxerim. Cicero's conceit in
reference to his consulship was weil known in his own day: in a letter ta Atticus dated June 43, M.
Brutus remarked thatCicero boasted more about his Nonesof December than the conspirators
against Caesar about their Ides of March: non omnibus horis iactamus Idus Martias similiter atque
il/e Nonas Decembres suas in ore habet (Ad Brut. 1.17.1). Seneca (the Younger) referred to the
consulship: non sine causa sed sine fine laudatus (Dial. 10.5.1); see also Plut. Cic. 24.1 and Casso
Dio 37.38.2 for similar stories. For an aspect of Cicero's personality, see A. E. Douglas, Cicero
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968),24-26; and Walter Allen, Jr., "Cicero's Conceit," Transactionsof
the American Philological Association, 85 (1954), 121-144.
100 Cicero had always believed he had established concordia: Har. Resp. 60; Pis. 4; Off.
3.88; Aff. 1.14.4,1.16.9,1.17.9-10,1.18.3; Fam.1.9.12, 17. Mitchell, 238, n. 131.
48
2
The Fragility and Failure of Concordia Ordinum,62-58
Thus, in maintenance of my settled policy, 1 am
defending as best 1can the concordia 1 myself
cemented. (AU. 1.17.10)
In 62, embarking on his new role as senior statesman, Cicero declined
to carry out the duties of a proconsular official. His desire was to govern the
Roman state as princeps senatus, the leading politician of the day, and to boast
about his accomplishments.l He deferred governing a province in order to
stay in Rome to oversee and defend his policy of concordia, and to advise the
new consul Murena.2 And, in fact, concordia ordinum would be severely
tested by religious, business, and military concerns. Within two years political
misfortunes and personal animosities would dismantle his vision and, as we
shaH see, make him ashamedly proclaim that the harmony of the orders had
been dissolved. Also, to Cicero's disappointment, the establishment of the
first triumvirate would impart a military charader to the Roman constitution
which served merely to invest the leaders with a semblance of legality. The
speeches and private letters during this period provide a noticeable view of
the hostile political and social environment encountered by the orator. The
envy, hatred, and slander that Cicero would encounter from those he called
improbi resulted in the isolation that forced him into exile.
1 Fam. 5.7.3:ea, quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio
comprobari; cf. Fam.5.6.4.
2He feared that if he were to leave no one would remember his success in the senate or
the law courts. This was a sentiment earlier expressed when he retumed from his duties in Sicily
as quaestor; see T. N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1991),63-97.
49
Rex Peregrinus
In the meantime, Cicero continued his activity in the law courts,
defending two important clients, Sulla and Archias. The senate-equestrian
solidarity which had quelled the struggle of the Catiline-led populares is
emphatically invoked in Cicero' s defence of his client Sulla. As he tries to
make his fellow-senators forget the illegal aspects and severity of the
Catilinarian repression, a friction, resulting in a rift, arises between the novus
ho m 0 and the ranks of the nobilitas. His safety is compromised, so he shows
that he is a moderate by protecting Sulla, while tenaciously reaffirming ms
class-conscious municipal origins against the verbal insults of the aristocrats
who consider him a rex peregrinus (Sull. 21-25). He has to justify his past
political actions against the envious and resentful accusations and criticisms
of opponents, improbi, and even sorne old friends.
New qualities of compassion and moderation are revealed, in contrast
to the uncompromising attitude demonstrated and subsequent action taken
when he was consul and the state was in danger a year before.
3
Cicero is
seeking a wider circle of support in his guise as a moderate (Sull. 1,20,87,92).
In April 62, a demand in a letter to Pompey alludes to Cicero's concern for his
friend's dismayed and despondent veteres hostes and novi amici (Fam. 5.7.1).4
Fearful of lack of support from the senatorial class because of his novitas
3 Sufl. 1: "1 am weil pleased that an occasion has been offered me of enabling loyal citizens
to recognize my leniency and mercy that used to be known universally but are today virtually
suspended. 1am pleased too that 1can force unprincipled (improbl) and abandoned (perditl)
citizens, now that they have been subdued and defeated, to admit that, unrelenting and firm as 1
was when the republic was collapsing about us, 1became mild and compassionate once it had
been saved."
4 For the identity of veteres hostes, novi amici, see Lily Ross Taylor, "Caesar and the
Roman Nobility," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 73 (1942), 19; Gruen,
81, n. 149; and O. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulaead Familiares, 1,62-47 B.C. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977),280-281.
50
(Sull. 3, 4, 7) but dedicated to the inseparable responsibility to the Tes publica,
Cicero' s expression is noteworthy:
There is, then, no reason why you should pick upon me to omit
from this great company of distinguished men. Duty is indivisible
and the cause of loyal men [omnium bonorum] is common to
all...There is no political interest that is mine exclusively. The
occasion for action fell to me and not to them [i.e. the optimates] but
we all shared the distress the terror and the danger. Indeed, 1could
not at the time have been the leader to safety, had not others been
willing to accompany me. For this reason, as a private citizen, 1
must now share with everybody else that responsibility which
during my consulship was peculiarly mine and shared with a few
others. 1say this, not to divide out the envy, but to share the praise;
part of my burden 1share with no man, a share in the renown 1give
to aliloyal citizens [bonis omnibus]. (Sull. 9)5
These words convey Cicero's growing fear of isolation and reveal a new
departure: the replacing of the waning concordia with a causa. The bonorum
omnium causa would soon develop into the coniunctio expressed in a letter
to Atticus (1.16.6) and then into consensus.
6
Emphasis, we note, is put upon
the leadership qualities and abilities embodied in the princeps, obviously
Cicero himself. The speech precisely states Cicero' s responsibility and
5 Qua re nihil est quod ex tanto comitatu virorum amplissimorum me unum abstrahas;
simplex officium atque una bonorum est omnium causa... Nulla est enim in re publica mea causa
propria; tempus agendi fuit magis proprium quam ceteris, doloris vero et timoris et periculi fuit il/a
causa communis; neque enim ego tune princeps ad salutem esse potuissem, si esse alii comites
noluissent. Qua re necesse est, quod mihi consuli praecipuum fuit praeter alios, id iam privato
cum ceteris esse commune. Neque ego hoc partiendae invidiae, sed communieandae laudis
causa loquor; oneris mei partem nemini impertio, gloriae bonis omnibus.
6 Lepore, 115.
51
charader as princeps ad saiutem against the accusations of his friends and
enemies and provides a clear explanation of the leader's political duty,
responsibility, and individual merit.
In contrast, the most damaging reproach to Cicero' s charader is that of
rex peregrinus (Sull. 21-25). This humiliating and derogatory accusation is
made by L. Manlius Torquatus, a member of a patrician gens and therefore
from the more conservative fadion of the senatorial nobilitas.
7
Cicero begins
his defence in this way:
At this point, gentlemen of the jury, Torquatus says that he cannot
bear my tyranny. What tyranny are you talking about, Torquatus?
My consulship, 1suppose. 1gave no orders; on the contrary 1obeyed
the senate and aliloyai citizens. During this magistracy, far from
establishing a tyranny, 1suppressed one. Or do you mean not that 1
was a tyrant when 1wielded an all-embracing power but that 1 am a
tyrant now as a private citizen? (Sull. 21)8
As in Sull. 9 above, he repeats the nature of his consular initiative to
his comites. He emphasizes the fad that there will be no pradical or far-
reaching results from this defence, as he continues: "Publius Sulla expects
from me no limitless resources, no misuse of my power, nothing but the
conscientious discharge of the duties of a counsel for the defence" (Suil. 21).
7The patricians werethe privileged class of citizens, identified with the patres (senators)
of the early republic and had an ancestry firmly based in the city of Rome. From 367 they shared
the consulship with the plebeian class and retained much of their social prestige.. However, of the
original seventy patrician gentes represented in the senate in the early republic there remained
only fourteen by the mid-50s. On patricians, see H. H. Scullard, A Historyof the Roman World,
753 to 146B.C. Fourth ed. (New York: Routledge, 1980),63-66, 80, 89-91, 117-123.
8 Hic ait se il/e, iudices, regnum meum ferre non passe. Ouod tandem, Torquate,
regnum? Consulatus, credo, mei; in quo ego imperavi nihil et contra patribus conscriptis et bonis
omnibus parui; quo in magistratu non institutum est videlicet a me regnum, sed repressum. An tu
in tanto imperio, tanta potestate non dicis me fuisse regem, nunc privatum regnare dicis?
52
Taking offence at being called the third foreign tyrant, peregrinus rex, after
Tarquin and Numa, instead of being honoured as a foreign consul, peregrinus
consul, "from a town which has twice brought salvation to this city and
empire" (Sull. 23),9 Cicero adamantly defends not only his status as a Roman
citizen and novus homo but also the rights of aIl Roman cltizens who are
inhabitants of Italy.lO Stress is on the municipales, not just Rome. If the city
of Rome is to remain strong, then the elite must recognize the strength and
worth of the Italian municipales.
ll
AlI cltizens should be recognised as equals
no matter from what town they come from in Italy. In this way, onlya
peregrinus could see the value in concordia between the patriclan-Ied senate
and the peregrinus-Ied equites. Hence, a condescending attitude toward
Torquatus' patriclan status and the patricii in general is justified: "Not a11
men are able to be patriclans and, to tell the truth, they do not even care about
it; nor do men of your own age think that they are your inferiors because they
are not patriclans" (Sull. 23). Cicero's aim is to arouse invidia in the senators
and equites who sat on the jury, few of whom were patriclans. Vpon his
retum from exile, the importance of the Italian municipal element will carry
much weight in the formation of the concept of consensus omnium
9 This is a reference to his famous Arpinate predecessor Marius, also a novus homo, who
was declared consul seven times and protected Rome's welfare by defeating the Germanic
invaders in 102-101. Cicero often compared himself with Marius' role as saviour of Rome (Red.
Quir. 9, Sest. 50, Leg. 2.6).
10 Cicero's political success granted his "municipal" family an aristocratic status which
aroused contempt from many patricians: Catiline taunted him as an inquilinus civis urbis Romae
(SaI. Cat. 31.7; cf. App. B. Civ. 2.2); Metellus Nepos (Plut. Cic. 26.6) mocked him repeatedly by
asking "T(s ool) 1TaTllP onv;" Clodius (Att. 1.16.10) ridiculed him with "quid homini Arpinati cum
aquis calidis?" Additional reproaches are found at Har. Resp. 17, and in [Sai.] Inv. in Cic. 1:
reperticius, accitus ac paulo ante insitus huic urbi civis, 4: homo novus Arpinas, 7: Romule Arpinas
(cf. Quint. 9.3.89). In retaliation, Cicero sometimes expressed his own views on Roman snobbery
(Fam. 3.7.5). See A. Desmouliez, Cicron et son got (Brussels: Latomus, 1976), 116-118.
11 On Cicero's affection for Italy, see E. 1. Salmon, "Cicero, Romanus an Italicus Anceps,"
in Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972), 75-86.
53
bonorum. Here it is revealed in an aggressive tone that does not necessarily
relegate the importance of concordia ordinum
12
but promotes a new type of
harmony among a wider range of individuals or groups:
How much more will be those fellow-candidates of yours who are
lite of the whole of Italy and are now going to contend with you for
office and every position of importance! Take care that you do not
caU any of them a foreigner or you will be swamped by your
foreigners' votes! If they bring to the election vigour and drive,
believe me, they will knock your boastful talk out of you and make
you wake up; the only way in which they will let you defeat them
for office is by merit. (Sull. 24)13
In denying the accusation of regnum, he begins to justify the motives
orads of a regium genus, as he had to defend himself against those who
considered him non diligentissimum consulem sed crudelissimum
tyrannum (Cat. 2.14; cf. 1.30) before he took action against Catiline. In fact,
after the conspirators were executed Plutarch notes that Cicero was accused by
his enemies of abusing his consular power and aiming at regnum.l
4
This is
Cicero's response:
You may of course think it tyrannical to live in such a way that you
are in bondage to no man nor even to any passion; to make light of
12 Lepore, 117, notes that the Pro Sul/a indicates Cicero's break with the concept of
eoneordia ordinum; see below n. 17.
13 Quam tibi il/os competitores tuos peregrinos videri neeesse erit qui iam ex tota /talla
deleeti teeum de honore ae de omni dignitate eontendentf Quorum cave tu quemquam
peregrinum appelles, ne peregrinorum suffragiis obruare. Qui si attulerint nervos et industriam,
mihi erede, exeutient tibi istam verborum iaetationem et te ex somno saepe exeitabunt nec
patientur se abs te, nisi virtute vineentur, honore superari.
14 Cie. 23.1-3: in which his opponents use phrases such as Tl)V lJVUOTE\UV
and TlJV lmun:(uv llEya.}.,TIV to describe his magistracy.
54
an excesses; to need neither gold, nor silver, nor any other
possession; to give your opinion freely in the senate; to consult the
people's interests more than their wishes; to yield to no man; to
resist many. If you think that this is tyrannical, then 1admit that 1
am a tyrant. (Sull. 25)15
A counter-accusation is made, alluding to a certain despotic ancestor
familiar to an Romans: "The suspicion of being a tyrant is quite foreign to my
character; but if you ask who have tried to establish tyrannies at Rome, do not
search through historical records, you will find them in your own family
tree" (Sull. 27).16 Cicero's continued opposition to the "ideas of all
unprincipled citizens [omnium mentes improborumf' against "aliloyal men
of every dass and rank [omnes boni omnium generum atque ordinum]"
(SuU. 28-29), namely the law-abiding citizens who shared his outlook, initiates
the political battle which results in his exile but also anticipates the consensus
omnium bonorum prodaimed in the post-exile speeches. According to
Lepore, the Pro Sulla marks the beginning of a new or, shall we say, expanded
concept of harmony. No longer the narrow alliance of senate and equites
anchored in special interests of the top two orders, but the rallying of allloyai
Roman citizens throughout Italy against the ideas of popular demagogues.l
7
Later in the same year, this commitment to all good men is
15 Nisi forte regium tibi videtur ita vivere ut non modo homini nemini sed ne cupiditati
quidem ulli servias, contemnere omnis libidines, non auri, non argenti, non ceterarum rerum
indigere, in senatu sentire libere, populi utilitati magis consu/ere quam vo/untati, nemini cedere,
mu/tis obsistere. Si hoc putas esse regium, regem me esse confiteor.
16Marcus Manlius Vulso Capitolinus, an ancestor of Torquatus, consul in 392, prevented
the Gauls from capturing the Capitoline hill and was later accused of attempting to set up a tyranny
(Livy 5.31, 6.14-20).
17 Lepore, 118. At this time Cicero still believed in the political groups that made his own
consulship a success and promoted him to the position of princeps senatus. But without the
powers of the consulship behind him he now realized he had to appeal to a wider audience.
55
immediately reflected in his defence of Archias. In the speech, Cicero refers to
the artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent (Arch. 2) which is the literary
education human beings should pursue in order to become good citizens. He
believed that literature was didactic. By constantly referring to his own
political accomplishments (Arch. 14,20), especially in the wake of his triumph
over tyranny during his consulship, Cicero illustrates the practical advantages
of this literary education which, for the ancients, meant an education in
philosophy. The study of literature becomes amoral endeavour. It aims at
the moral excellence of the vir bonus. In this way, the good citizen is bound
to preserve the safety and good order of republican government and of society
(Arch. 15-16).
But Cicero feU that his viri boni needed another influentialleader,
besides himself, who would be willing to unite and cooperate with them.
The one time consul togatus was now a consularis togatus in need of a
military ally. Having equated himself publicly with Pompey a year before, he
hoped the general would be this man and privately expressed his intentions
of becoming a "Laelius" to him (Fam. 5.7)8 Hence, the republic would be
safe under the protection of a civilian-soldier alliance.l
9
But this would not
be realized. Three events in 61 opened an unmendable breach between the
senate and equites causing the final demise of his concordia ordinum and
leading to the creation of a military amicitia, a concordia by another name,
between Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, in its place.
181n 147-146, Gaius Laelius was a member of Cornelius Scipio Aemitianus Minor's military
entourage in Africa and was an important figure in the Scipionic Circle which promoted Iiterature
and philosophy. The friendship between Laelius and Scipio was 50 famous that Cicero marks
them as his central figures in his work De Amicitia. In this letter Cicero envisages for himself a
similar role as friend and adviser to Pompey. On Laelius and Scipio, see Scultard, 313, 318, 362.
19 Cicero continues on the same politicalline expressed in the Catilinarian uprising; see
Nicolet, "Consul Togatus," 247-248.
56
Clodius and the Courts
The first crisis for concordia ordinum came in a scandal which occurred
in December 62 when P. Clodius Pulcher, a patrician and quaestor designate,
violated the sacred celebration of the Bona Dea. The ritual was restricted to
females, and Clodius, disguised as a woman, was unlucky enough to be
caught in attendance prior to a tryst with Caesar' s wife.
20
Roman moral fabric
wasshaken, and at the beginning of 61 the pontifices declared the matter nefas
after it had been referred to the senate andVestals (Att. 1.13.3). Subsequently,
an attempt was made by the senate to have a law passed allowing a special
jury to be chosen by an appointed praetor. Cicero participated in the debate
21
and took an unyielding stand against Clodius, fearing: "that what with neglect
by the honest men and resistance by the dishonest men these proceedings
may be productive of great mischief in the body politic" (Att. 1.13.3).22 The
motion failed, but another was passed by the tribune Q. Fufius Calenus for a
trial to take place with a proper jury selected in the customary manner from
the senate, equites, and tribuni aerarii according to the law passed in 70 (Att.
1.14.5,1.16.2).23 Clodius was brought to trial on a charge of incestus,
sacrilegious indecency. Although the accused insisted that he had not been
present at Rome on the day the crime was committed, Cicero was one of
many witnesses called to contradict the alibi (Dom. 80, Mil. 46, Att. 2.15).
20 The celebration in honour of "The good goddess" was part of the official religious
calendar and took place in the home of a magistrate, in this case of Caesar the pontifex maximus
and urban praetor. See further John O. Lenaghan's A Commentary on Cicero's Oration De
Haruspicum Responso(The Hague: Mouton & Co. N.V. Publishers, 1969),61 and 75.
21 For a discussion on Cicero's motivation to participate in the trial, see W. J. Tatum,
"Cicero and the Bona Dea Scandai," C/assica/ Phil%gy, 85 (1990), 202-208.
22 ne haec neg/ecta a bonis, defensa ab improbis magnorum rei publicae ma/orum causa
sit. Cf. Att.1.14.1-2, 5.
23 For composition of the juries, see above p. 11.
57
Caesar had recognized Clodius' potential as an ally, so he convinced Crassus
to bribe the jury for his acquittaI. This further scandaI, when it w a ~ revealed,
generated antagonism in the senate between conservative nobles and
moderate equestrian newcomers and brought disrepute to the equites, who
had tainted the law courts through the finandal resources of the richest
equestrian-backer, Crassus. 5ince through an anomalous law only senatorial
jurors could be tried for dishonest practices, a proposal was made to the senate
to review the subject of legal immunity for equites (Le. non-senatorial jurors)
from prosecutions for judidal corruption, a questionable privilege which they
had enjoyed for many years.
24
It is explained to Atticus in this way:
The state of the republic in which we live here is weak, sad, and
unstable. 1 suppose you have heard that our friends the equites
have pretty well broken with the senate; to begin with they were
greatly annoyed by the promulgation under a senatorial decree of a
bill providing for an investigation into the conduct of jurors guilty
of taking bribes. (Att. 1.17.8)25
Although it is not known who proposed the bill (promulgatum),
possibly the consul M. Piso,26 Cato moved the decree and led the
investigation (Att.2.1.8).2
7
The attempt to invalidate the equites' judidal
24 C. Gracchus transferred the repetundae court to wealthy non-senators in order to
counter flagrant senatorial corruption. Sulla reformed the composition of the courts but did not
alter the immunity of non-senators on these courts.
25 Nos hic in re publica infirma, misera commutabi/ique versamur. credo enim te audisse
nostros equites paene a senatu esse diiunctos; qui primum iIIud va/de graviter tu/erunt,
promu/gatum ex senatus consu/to fuisse ut de eis qui ob iudicandum accepissent quaereretur.
26 Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, 1,615.
27 "[Cato] speaks in the senate as though he were living in Plato's republic instead of
Romulus' cesspool. What could be fairer than that jurors who take bribes should be brought to
trial? Cato moved accordingly and the senate agreed. Result, the equites declare war upon the
senate house, not upon me" (Att. 2.1.8).
58
privilege seemed only a threat since no law was actually passed (Att. 1.18.3).28
For Cicero the dispute with Clodius was symptomatic of an imminent crisis
which threatened to undermine the concordia achieved during his
consulship:
1 can only answer that, unless some god or other takes pity on us,
the settlement of the republic which you attribute to my policy and 1
to divine providence, and which seemed unshakeably established
upon the unity of aH honest men and the prestige of my consulship,
has slipped through our fingers in this one trial. (Att. 1.16.6)29
AlI this created tension between the orders and concordia was seriously
compromised. But Pompey' s return to Rome was most on people' s minds.
Pompey' s Return
In December 62, Pompey the Great returned to Italy after five years of
accumulating military accomplishment. Pirates had been removed from the
whole Mediterranean Sea and the persistent threat of Mithridates in the east
had finally been brought to an end; all accomplished with relatively little loss
of Roman life. A clear sea meant safer trading routes to and from the new
and additional rich eastern provinces. AH the different eastern rulers, now
clients of Rome, patiently awaited orders from the general who had
negotiated a fair settlement which needed only to be ratified by the Roman
senate. No previous Roman general had ever returned with such great
acquisitions of land, spoils, prestige, and loyal following of soldiers who weH-
28 Seven years later it again materializes during the proceedings of the Pro Rabirio
Postumo.
29 rei publicae statum ilium quem tu mec consilio, ego divine confirmatum putabam, qui
bonorum omnium coniunctione et auctoritate consu/atus mei fixus et fundatus videbatur, nisi quis
nos deus respexerit, e/apsum seito esse de manibus une hoc iudicio.
59
deserved land compensation. His i mperiumand auctoritas was
unprecedented. The memory of Sulla' s brutal march on Rome was still
disturbingly vivid and it was feared that Pompey might do the same and rid
the capital of his enemies. But he surprised everyone.
After Pompey had landed at Brindisi with his victorious army, he
discharged all his soldiers and he arrived at Rome with a small entourage. By
this action of republican constitutionalloyalty, any fear of a government-
overthrow disappeared. Aware of his powerful position, he was more
vainglorous than ambitious, more inclined towards awaiting his rewards for
his accomplishments than running risks with anything else. The fact that
such a great man had shown he fully.respected the laws of the land and did
not attempt hostile action, was worthy of eternal praise and a very
honourable example for aU citizens.
In spite of aU his accomplishments, Pompey returned to Rome under
unfavourable conditions. The senate did not admire or fear the great general.
In fact, it envied him and thought him unworthy of his powerful position.
Its reluctance to grant him the honour of triumphal garments and a
supplicatio for his Eastern victories was confirmed by an obstruction over the
ratification of his administrative arrangements in that region and refusaI of
land allotments for his veterans.
3D
It was a critical moment for concordia, as
several more events indicate that the senate did not want Pompey involved
in its affairs. For example, he was denied a command against Catiline' s
army,31 he was not awarded a triumph for the campaign against the pirates,
30 Provo Cons. 11.26-27; Vell. Pat. 2.40.5.
31 Sull. 31; Ad Brut. 1.17.1; Sali. Cat. 17.43; Suet. luI. 16; Plut. Cie. 23. Cat. Min. 26.
60
and he was refused the administration of a prestigious public works project.
32
Pompey's request for a deferment of the consular eleetions, held in July 62,
was also refused by the senate, under the instigation of Cato. This request
would have allowed Pompey to support, in person, the candidature of his
loyal military colleague Marcus Pupius Piso (Plut. Cat. Min. 30.1-2). Pompey
also found it difficult to impress the senate with his disapproval of Clodius'
prosecution. Senators distrusted him so much that he withdrew in
humiliation and continued to appeal to Cicero's oratorical abilities to promote
his reputation and prestige (Att. 1.18). Cicero complied but maintained doubts
about their friendship (Att. 1.13.4).
In mid-February 61, Cicero wrote a letter to Atticus commenting on the
general unpopularity of Pompey, whose first speech in the senate had failed to
impress both the improbi and the viri boni (Att. 1.14.1). Cicero still wanted to
be seen as a leading political figure
33
in his constant attempt to be duly
acknowledged as saviour of the republic during his term as consul with the
implementation of concordia. He describes his busy day in the senate
defending Pompey and promoting stability:
ln a word, 1brought the house down. And why not, on such a
theme - the dignity of our order, concord between senate and
equites, unison of Italy, remnants of the conspiracy in their death
throes, reduced price of grain, internal peace? You should know by
now how 1can boom away on such topies. (Att. 1.14.4)34
32 Vell. Pat. 2.34.2, 2.40.5; Casso Dio, 36.17a.
33 See Nicolet, "Consul Togatus, " 246.
34 quid multa? clamores. etenim haec eratlmeEOl.S, de gravitate ordinis, de equestri
concordia, de consensione /ta/iae, de intermortuis re/iquiis coniurationis, de vilitate, de otio. nosti
iam in hac materia sonitus nostros.
61
Amid the self-prodaimed clamores from his fellow senators for his success,
he is content that "the senate is quite an Areopagus, thoroughly resolute,
strict, and courageous,"(Att. 1.14.5).35 This was not just an idle statement but
refiected Cicero's pride in the senate's daim to firm leadership.
The senate' s nerve as a decision making body had strengthened in the
last couple of years. As has been noted, it had used its emergency powers at
the end of 63 to deal with Catiline's serious threat to overthrow the
govetnment, and, except for the execution of the five conspirators, bloodshed
was avoided in Rome. This would not have been realized without the
support of the equestrian order which agreed with the senate' s decision and
acted as Rome' s police force during this time of crisis. This is what is meant
by Cicero's boast de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia (Att. 1.14.4). In a
further show of strength, the senate' s commanders Metellus Celer and C.
Antonius annihilated Catiline and his forces in northern Italy early in 62,
thus the military threat was over.
36
But the deployment of these forces was
excessively contested. For a brief period in January 62, the senate again passed
its "ultimate decree" to suspend from office its own unruly and pertinacious
magistrates.
37
This new get-tough attitude would be tested by the
troublesome episode soon instigated by the publicani.
35 senatus'"Apnos miyos. nihil eonstantius, nihil severius, nihil fortius.
36 Sail. Cat. 56-61; Casso Dio 37.39-41; Plut. Cie. 22.5; App. B. Civ. 2.7.
371t was Cicero's original proposai that allowed Metellus Celer and C. Antonius to lead the
military forces against Catiline's army. Nepos continued his antagonism against Cicero and
proposed that Pompey should command the armies. Several magistrates including Caesar and
Calpurnius Bestia supported hirn but Cato vetoed the proposai and in the ensuing tumultuous
c1amor the state of emergency was declared; as a result, bath Nepos and Caesar were removed
from their offices. On these events and Nepos' actions, see Fam. 5.2; Suet. lui. 16; Plut. Cie. 23,
Cat. Min. 26; Casso Dio 37.43.1; Rawson, 94; Shackleton Bailey, .Cieero: Epistulaead Fami!iares, l,
273-274.
62
The Publicani and the Asiatic Tax Contract
When Pompey' s seulement opened up new economic frontiers in the
wealthy eastern provinces, a weightier issue for Cicero's concordia was
introduced in the last months of 61.38 Competition was fierce for lucrative
contracts in this first year after the victory over Mithridates. Consequently, a
company of publicani, the most important economic group within the
equestrian class,39 filed a petition before the senate to reduce a considerable
overbid on a newly ratified five year contract for the collection of taxes in one
of the new provinces of Asia. Besides obvious greed and miscalculation,
there is no clear explanation, ancient or modern, as to why the successful
company had overbid.4o But the request to reduce the contract by one-third41
created a series of heated debates between the two orders during at least two
senate meetings in December. Under Crassus' leadership many "equestrian"
senators defended the publicani and approved the reduction. Cicero thought
the appeal was a disgrace but felt compelled to support it in order to keep
concordia intact and prevent further division between the two orders:
An invidious business! The demand was disgraceful, a confession
38 Although Pompey's settlement was not legally ratified by the senate it was still
recognized as a contribution to Roman imperial expansion and thus open for safe economic
exploitation. Details of the issue are found in two of Cicero's letters: Att. 1.17.9-10 (December 5,
61), and Att. 1.18.7 (January 20, 60).
39 Described as fias equitum Romanorum, ornamentum eivitatis, firmamentum rei publieae
by Cicero (Plane. 23).
40 For a complete examination, see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Roman History, 65-50 B.C.: Five
Problems," Journal of Roman Studies, 52 (1962), 135-137; E. Badian, Publieans and Sinners:
Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republie (New York: Comell University Press,
1972; revised 1983), 100-101; Lenaghan, 46-48; Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, l, 616 on the
evidence of Casso Dio 39.59.2, suggests that it could possibly be due to a recent hostile invasion
of the unknown eastern province in question which would make it difficult for the tax company
recoup its bid.
41 Casso Dio 38.7.4; App. B. Civ. 2.13; Suet lui. 20.
63
of recklessness. But there was the gravest danger of a complete
break between senate and equites if it had been turned down
altogether. Here again it was 1principally who stepped into the
breach. Through my efforts they found the senate in full attendance
and in generous mood, and on the kalends of December and the day
following 1discoursed at length upon the dignity and harmony of
the orders [de ordinum dignitate et concordia]...Thus, in
maintenance of my settled policy, 1am defending as best 1 can the
alliance [concordiam] 1myself cemented. (Att. 1.17.9-10)42
He would be willing to satisfy the publicani only "to keep the good
cause alive in the senate" (Att.2.16.4). Cicero was involved in this matter for
the good of the republic, as he attempted to forestal1 impending separation
betweenthe senatofs and equites. His dual social rank as eques and novus
h 0 m 0 in the senate demanded il. Throughout his life he had always
staunchly defended the interests of the publicani.
43
Noteworthily, in the
speech on Pompey's command (De Imp. en. Pomp. 17) senators and the
people had already been lectured on the importance of maintaining ties to
those who control the finances of the state. If the senate could grant the
publicani their demand, then there would be doser ties with the equites. But
42 invidiosa res, turpis postu/atio et eonfessio temeritatis. summum erat perieulum ne, si
nihi/ impetrassent, plane alienarentur a senatu. huie quoque rei subventum est maxime a nobis
perfectumque ut frequentissimo senatu et Iiberalissimo uterentur, multaque a me de ordinum
dignitate et eoneordia dieta sunt Ka/. Dee. et postridie... sie ego eonservans rationem
institutionemque nostram tueor, ut possum, il/am a me eonglutinatam eoneordiam.
43 Pro Fonteio, Pro Cluentio, De Imperio Cn. Pompei are the main speeches in which
Cicero defended the interests of the pub/ieani: /n Verrem 2.2.181 and 186 shows that he devoted
his early forensic career to them and, in order to earn their gratitude, avoids any offence to them.
They were an important electoral group in his rise to the consulship (Comm. Pet. 1.3). Cn.
Plancius, his client in 54, was a prominent publieanus. Cicero alsa wrote a letter of commendation
on behalf of the Bithynian company of publieaniin 51 (Fam. 13.9); for Cicero's obligation toward
publieani, see Wood. 106-107; for the suggestion that Cicero possibly owned shares in
companies, see Badian, 115 and 152, n. 105.
64
Cato and his reactionary faction of fellow noble senators strongly opposed the
request and managed to obstruct it and to hinder the tax-collectors' efforts. By
respecting the decision of the censor who leased the contract to the highest
bidder they had followed proper senatorial procedure.
44
By deciding not to abandon the financial interests of ms army of
locupletes (Att. 1.19.4), Cicero had shown himself sympathetic toward the
publicani. In a letter to ms brother Quintus, now govemor of Asia in the
wake of the publican company's overbid of 61, he explains that the aim of
those who govern is to maintain "the greatest possible happiness of the
govemed" (Q. Fr. 1.1.24). As he admits that his brother's province is packed
with conflicts among the tax-farmers themselves and the different classes of
the population so it provides a challenge to any Roman govemor: "Ah, but
among these very men serious disputes arise, numerous wrongs spring up,
and great conflicts are the result" (Q. Fr. 1.1.7). Their importance posed
serious contradictions for the brothers:
And yet to a11 your goodwi11 and devotion to duty there is a serious
obstacle in the publicani; if we oppose them, we shall alienate from
ourselves and from the commonwealth an order that has served us
we11 and has been brought through our instrumentality into close
association with the commonwealth; and yet, if we yield to them in
everything, we sha11 be acquiescing in the utter ruin of those whose
security, and interests, we are bound to protect. (Q. Fr. 1.1.32)45
44 Under the Gracchan lawof 123, the contracts for the province of Asia were leased by
thecensorsto companiesof equites; see Verr. 2.3.12, Att. 1.17.9, Provo Cons. 12.
45 Atqui huie tuae voluntati ae diligentiae diffieultatem magnam afferunt publieani; quibus
si adversamur, ordinem de nobis optime meritum et per nos eum republiea eoniunetum et a nobis
et a republiea diiungemus; sin autem omnibus in rebus obsequemur, funditus eos perire
patiemur, quorum non modo saluti, sed etiameommodis eonsulere debemus.
65
For Cicero, therefore, the interests of Roman citizens residing in his brother's
province (or in any Roman province) must suffer in order to preserve the
concordia ordinum. In principle, the representatives of the senate in a
province must, whenever possible, reconcile their duty to the provincials
with the interests of the publicani. Cicero is weIl aware of the latter's knavish
tacties "1 therefore know pretty weIl what happens to allies in distant lands
from the complaints 1 have heard from citizens in Italy" (Q. Fr. 1.1.33).46 This
concern for the weIl-being of the publicani is so important that it virtually
determined the destruction of the concordia ordinum, which slowly
disintegrated between February 61 and June 60 as Cicero's invaluable
correspondence vividly demonstrated during this time.
Isolation, Betrayal, and Exile
The first letter of 60 dated January 20 provides proof of the isolation
46 Cicero had always hoped that provincials and publieani could re50Ive their differences.
When his brother Ouintus brought a matter to the senate regarding disputes over excise duties
on transferred goods in his province, Cicero promised Ouintus that he would grant the pub/ieani
his full support so long as the publieani had come to a favourable agreement with the provincial
administrators. In this way he could support their cause in the senate and possibly mend the rift
between the coneordia ordinum. But this was only spoken about privately and was not a public
issue for Cicero (Aff. 2.16.4). When Cicero became governor of Cilicia in 51 he described to
Atticus the attitude he wished to uphold when dealing with the publieani: "You seem to want to
know how 1manage about the publieani. 1dote upon them, defer to them, butter them up with
compliments and arrange 50 that they harm nobody" (Att. 6.1.16). Atticus defends the publicans'
interests by complaining about Bibulus' edict (proconsul of Syria 51): "the only novelty is the
saving clause of which you wrote to me that it constituted 'a very serious precedent against our
order. on But Cicero reassures him that he has a clause in his edict which is favourable to the
publieani as he explains what it contains exactly: "Most surprising of ail: the rates of interest
specified in their agreements with the provincials were maintained even by Servilius [governor of
Cilicia 78-74]. My system is this: 1fix a date, giving plenty of time, and say that if they pay before
that date 1shall applya rate of one percent; if not, then the rate in the agreement. So the natives
paya tolerable interest and the tax farmers are delighted with the arrangement, since they now get
verbal compliments and frequent invitations to their hearts' content" (Att. 6.1.16). The result is
that the publieani remain on friendly terms with the Roman governor. It should not be 50 surprising
that Cicero implements a lowinterest rate: his fairness as Roman governor is an effort to avoid
disagreements and promote goodwill between the cities of his province and the tax farmers; for a
furthertreatment, see Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, l, 678-679; and Badian, 88 and 114f.
66
which Cicero began to feel as disagreements deepened the disharmony
between the two orders: ita sum ab omnibus destitutus (Att. 1.18.1). He was
distraught at the previous year' s events and a sense of failure tormented him:
"Thus the year saw the overthrow of the two foundations of the constitution
which 1 (and 1 alone) had established. The authority of the senate was thrown
to the winds and the harmony of the orders dissolved [ordinum concordiam
diiunxit]" (Att. 1.18.3).47 The concordia ordinum was a non-entity as far as he
was concerned and prompted Cicero to finally admit that "the senate had been
deserted by the equites" (Att. 2.1.7). A lack of confidence develops toward the
senatorial oligarchy and the powerful men of the time. This distrust is
combined with the necessary search for a politician who must indicate
substantial worthiness in his role as a practical statesman, so he resorts to a
Greek pun to emphasize his point: sed interea 1 T O ~ 1 . "f1.KOS vllP 01JB' ovap
quisquam inveniri potest (Att. 1.18.6).48 From this moment, Cicero searches
for a different way to re-group the ordines who are at the mercy of the dynasts
and populares.
No longer does Cicero concentrate his full efforts on the nobilitas and
old ruling class which has proven to be uncompromising. At the same time,
he does not want to detach himself from the viri boni who represent the
principles of the constitution. He does not hide his views on the weakness of
the senate or the poor political consciousness of the oligarchy and admits he
must now seek out new supporters, praesidia (AU. 1.19.6). The imbalance
being created by the break-up of his concordia emphasizes his new moderate
views and the need for a political intermediary is evident: "In fact I now
47 sic ille annus duo firmamenta rei publicae per me unum constituta evertit; nam et
senatus auctoritatem abiecit et ordinum concordiam diiunxit.
48 "But ail the while not 50 much as the shadowof a statesman is to be found."
67
avoid treading on anybody's toes, though without currying popularity or
sacrificing principle. My whole line of conduct is nicely balanced" (Att. 1.19.8).
His isolation is highlighted as he tells Atticus that he has "been holding to
this optimate road without supporters or companions" (Att. 1.20.3). The
ingratitude of the boni forces him to retreat from Rome and spend most of his
time at his country villas in Antium and Formiae where he wishes to throw
himself into his studies (AU. 2.16.3).49
The same intense disagreements which disappointed Cicero in the
senate between those of noble and equestrian rank forced Pompey and Crassus
into their infamous coalition with Caesar. An invitation to join them was
declined by the orator (Ait. 2.3.3-4)50 but it seems that concordia was given
sorne attention also during this unique moment. A coin was issued with the
head of the goddess Concordia just as the first"triurnvirate" was established
in 60 and statues were set up in her honour.
51
Through the influence of his
fellow triumvirs, Caesar was elected consul in 59 and began his term in office
under the auspices of the goddess with a speech about concordia between
himself and his fellow consul M. Calpurnius Bibulus,52 just as Cicero had
proc1aimed four years earlier with his consular colleague (Leg. Agr. 2.103).53
But it was soon revealed that Caesar's version of concordia was to promote
49 Cf. Att. 2.4.2: interea quidem cum Musis nos delectabimus.
50 Cf. Att. 4.6.2; Provo Cons. 41. This would not have been the ideal civilian-soldier
alliance advocated in the Pro Murena.
51 Other coins and statues were issued in 55 when the triumvirate was renewed; see
S. Weinstock, DivusJulius(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),261 and 263.
52 App. B. Civ. 2.10: hO)'OlJS v T 1fEp OIlOVO(aS 1fPS
53 For the importance ofconsular harmony, see above p. 17, n. 19.
68
his interests in his coalition, not his colleague's.54 On the occasions when the
senate refused him, Caesar appealed to the comitia tributa and his good friend
the tribune Vatinius to sponsor his laws. For Pompey, he arranged the
ratification of the eastem settlement and land for his veterans; for Crassus
(and to oblige the equestrian order), he adjusted the contract for the publicani
in Asia, and to Cicero's dismay he not only abolished custom duties in Italy
but also approved the passage of the agrarian law which assigned the ager
Campanus to needy families (a modified version of the Rullan land bill),
measures which decreased the amount of internaI revenue.
55
The senate was
annoyed,56 and once these laws were passed the concordia of the two orders
suffered a further setback and could never be fully restored.57 In tum, Caesar
rewarded himself with the proconsular commands of Transalpine and
Cisalpine Gaul, and nlyricum,58 positions which would take him away from
Rome and Italy for approximately ten years.
Cicero' s correspondence in 59 reveals continuing criticisms and
disagreements with his opponents, as he speaks confidently about his
54 Bibulus was forced to keep a low profile throughout most of the year (Suet. lui. 20.1 ;
Plut. Gaes. 14.6).
55 For Ccero's immediate reaction to these laws, see Att. 2.16.1-2, 2.19.3;cf.Suet.JuI.20.3.
56 For Caesar's quarrels with the senate, see Casso Dio 38.1-8.
57 ln addition, Cicero's brother Quintus, as governor of Asia, consulted the senate
regarding complaints by provincials for unfair excise duties on transferred goods imposed by the
publicani. For the sake of concordia ordinum Cicero told Atticus that he would support the
publicans' cause in the senate only if they came to some private agreement with the provincials
(Art. 2.16.4). Nothing more is known of the situation but, amid the tensions, it shows Cicero's
ongoing concerns for good relations between the two orders; cf. Lenaghan, 195, n. 60.7.
58 The lex Vatinia secured Pompey's acta, contract for the publicani, and Caesar's
commands in Cisalpine Gaul and lIIyricum for five years. The senate later added Transalpine Gaul
(Suet. luI. 22.1; Casso Dio 38.8.5).
69
unchanged political attitude.
59
Doubts appeared wbile he was worrying about
the opinion of the optimates.
60
Afraid to see the dominance of the senate
pass to the tris homines immoderatos (Alt. 2.9.2), he is aware of the danger to
all and insists on the need of support from everyone. There was a time when
the senate stood firm based on the concordia ordinum, then the alienation of
the equites led to the collapse of its authority; a bitter affirmationis expressed
following opinions on the improbitas of the powerful dynasts, the culpa of
Cato, and the attacks from Clodius as reasons for the conversio rei publicae: "1
prefer to make a bad voyage under another pilot than to steer a good course
with such ungrateful passengers" (Att.2.9.3).61 Despite moments of
optimism
62
in his struggle for the protection of constitutional values and
loyalty among the optimates,63 there were constant announcements of
impending doom: tota periit (Alt. 2.21.1).64
The courts were once again used as a platform from which to defend
bis coalition against the opposition instigated by the triumvirs. Two trials are
noteworthy in their attempt to vindicate bis actions for the republican cause
in 63, and provide an opportunity to criticise the power of the three dynasts.
59 Att. 2.4.2: neque mihi umquam veniet in mentem...paenitere quod a me ipso non
desciverim; and Att. 2.18.4: de non nullis aliis rebus angor equidem, sed iam prorsus occallui.
60 Att. 2.5.1: quid enim nostri optimates, si qui reliqui sunt, loquentur?
61 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; cf.
Lepore, 125; Jrme Carcopino, Cicero: the Secrets of his Correspondence, trans. E. O. Lorimer
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951),207,236,319.
62 Att. 2.24.4: nos tamen in his miseriis erecto animo et minime perturbato sumus
honestissimeque <et salutem> et dignitatem nostram magna cura tuemur.
63 Att. 2.3.4: semper nobis videatur 'ds otwvs 'lTEP. m:tTPTls.'
64 Cf. Q. Fr. 1.2.15: Rem publicam funditus amisimus; Art. 2.25.2: re publica nihil
desperatius, iis quorum opera nihil maiore odio.
70
First, Cicero defended C. Antonius, bis consular colleague, charged with
maiestas arising from bis involvement against the Catilinarian conspirators.
It ended in conviction and the accused was sent into exile.
65
Cicero also
defended L. Valerius Flaccus, another former associate from ms annus
mirabilis.66 The defendant was charged with e x t o r t i o ~ res repetundae,
during his term as propraetor in the province of Asia in 62, but Cicero tried to
convince the jury that the trial was actually a pretext for an attack against the
auctores, duces, principes involved in the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy
against the state four years earlier.
67
In attempting to secure an acquittaI, he
urged the jury to demonstrate that the concordia ordinum which existed
against a previous would-be demagogue (i.e. Catiline) was still active against
the current tyrants who charged his dient.
68
The senate would require a
confirmatio auctoritatis derived only from the verdict of a jury whose
representatives acted on behalf of the prevailing cooperative attitude of the
equites (Flac. 4).69 But Cicero could never lose sight of the main issue. Res
repetundae indicated a daim for restitution. For this reason, the prosecution
chose a site in the forum attended by a large and impressionable audience, 80
65 The little information that is known about this trial derives fram the Pro Flacco; see Hill,
174; Gruen, 288-289.
66 The trial washeld in August following Att. 2.25.1; cf. L. R. Taylor, 'The Date and
Meaning of the Vettius Affair," Historia 1 (1950),48. Cicero also boasts of a successful acquittai
earlier in the year for a certain Aulus Thermus (Flac. 98).
67 Flac. 96: iIIud vero terri non potest, quod per senatores et per equites Romanos, qui
haec omnia pro salute omnium communi consilio, una mente atque virtute gesserunt, harum
rerum auctores, duces, principes spoliari omnibus tortunis atque civitate expelli posse arbitrantur.
Etenim populi romani perspiciunt eandem mentem et voluntatem.
68 Flac. 1, 3, 66, 94; cf. Att. 2.21.6; Q. Fr. 1.2.16; HiII,175; Gruen, 290-291.
69 Flaccus was tried before a jury that was composed of seventy-five members equally
chosen from the senate, the equites, and the tribuni aerarii. In Flac. 4 the tribuni aerarii are
combined with the equites giving a number of fifty.
71
caution had to be used by the defence attorney. At sorne moments during the
trial, Cicero prudently lowered his voice when he wanted to convey
controversial matters about ms client only to the jury and not to the listeners
outside, since if these points were overheard by the crowd an unfavourable
atmosphere might be created against Cicero and his team of loyal followers:
"It was for this particular charge, Laelius, that you sought this site and that
crowd. You know how vast a throng it is, how close-knit [quanta concordial
and what influence it can have in public meetings" (Flac. 66).70 Concordia
among groups of people who share similar attitudes created a forceful and
fearfulopposition.
71
Evidently, by prevailing upon "the wealthy by fear, the
poor with rewards, and the stupid by deception" the prosecution and its allies
summoned an undisciplined mob to witness the proceedings and cause
disorder (Flac. 15). This was probably in response to the public criticisms
against the triumvirs exhibited in the theatre throughout Caesar' s
consulship.72 It is intolerable for Cicero that the crowd could be influenced by
greed and duress of his opponents instead of the valour of the loyal senators
and equites who fight for the common safety of ail (Flac. 96). Although the
result of the trial is not known,73 the closing segments of the speech contain
pleas which emphasize a disappointing neglect and disregard for harmony of
70 Ob hoc crimen hic locus abs te, Laeli, atque il/a turba quaesita est; scis quanta sit
manus, quanta concordia, quantum valeat in contionibus.
71 This type of harmony among friends was noted in the DeAmicitia 23: "And if it is not
understood how great the force of friendship and harmony is, this may be gathered fram quarrels
and disputes. For what house is 50 firm, or what state 50 weil established as not to be able to be
utterly overthrown by hatred or strife? Whence we may form an estimate as to how much good
there is in friendship."
72 Att. 2.19.3; H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (Fifth edition, New York: Methuen
& Co., 1982),115; Taylor, Party Po/itics, 228, n. 10.
73 Scholars favour acquittai: see Scullard, From the Gracchi, 427, n. 18; C. Macdonald,
Cicero, vol. X (The Loeb Classical Library, 1977),431; Hill, 175.
72
the orders (Flac. 97-98,103-105).
Yet in view of the correspondence of the time, scholars agree that
Cicero continued to focus his attention on a more comprehensive group, the
boni.74 As previously stated, they comprised a larger segment of society who
defended good government in the name of the Roman constitution. The
boni showed support for anyone courageous enough to make a stand against
the triumvirs (Att.2.18.1). Described as modesti homines, they inc1uded
citizens of any rank from towns throughout Italy (Att. 2.13.2, 2.19.2). A1ready
in Ju1y 59, a year before his exile, Cicero was focusinghis efforts on a renewed
commitment to harmony based on consensus of the boni: "1 think 1 have very
firm backing in my old consular army of aU honest men [exercitum bonorum
omniuml inc1uding the moderately honest" (Att. 2.19.4). An undiminished
optimism for their support is maintained when conducting governmental
affairs and defending political principles: "1 myself, as 1 think and hope and
forecast, am protected by a powerful bastion of general goodwill" (Att.
2.25.2).7
5
As Lepore states, this must imply the definitive failure of Cicero' s
traditional view of concordia ordinum. He is not seeking the support of only
two orders but of aH classes in the struggle against those few people who want
to silence him in defiance of the Roman constitution and in order to destroy
the stability of Roman civitas.
76
In fact, in the years foHowing his exile, the
74 Taylor, ''The Date and Meaning of the Vettius Affair," 49, n.13; Strasburger, 51;
Lepore, 126. It is important to note that in Cicero the term boni is somewhat unstable because it
refers both to an ideal of political conduct and an actual political group.
75 Cf.Att. 2.24.4: "1 receive warm assurances of general goodwill."
76 Lepore, 128. Cf. Att. 2.19.3: "But now there is only one universal cry, though with
hatred rather than power behind if'; Att. 2.20.3: "As things are the civitas is dying a strange
malady. Disapproval of what has been done and indignant complaint are universal."; Att. 2.21.1:
"The republic is finished... But now 1am afraid that what with the hisses of the crowd and the talk of
the respectable and the outcry in Italy, they are thoroughly exasperated."
73
focus is more on this concordia civitatis than anything else. With Clodius'
hostility increasing,77 and hardly any support from Pompey, Cicero got ready
to defend himself expecting support from a11 classes, while aware of the lack
of harmony between the two major orders; there is also a desperate attempt to
persuade Atticus to return to Rome and lead Cicero' s exerci tus in hopes of
reestablishing the political aims that were so prominent in 63 (Att. 2.21.6). A
declaration in the Pro Flacco acknowledges the consensus Romans exhibit
against those who disregard the Roman constitution: "The Roman people
shows what it feels in every way it can; men are unanimous in what they
think, in what they want and in what say. It is for this reason that, if anyone
caUs me there, 1 come" (Flac. 96-97).78 The faith maintained in the boni which
appears in the defence for Flaccus is coloured with more precise significance
in one last letter to his brother Quintus in December from Rome:
And yet it seems that people are not likely to desert our cause...This
is how the matter stands: if Clodius gives notice of an action.against
me, the whole of Italy will rally around me, so that we shaUleave
[the court] with tenfold glory; but if he attempts to carry things
through by violence, the enthusiasm not of friends alone, but also
of strangers, leads me to hope that 1 may oppose force to force. Ail
men are promising to put at my disposal themselves and their
children, their friends, clients, freedmen, slaves, and to end up
with, their purses. My old group of supporters is fired with
enthusiasm and affection for me. If there are any who before were
77 Clodius' hostility originated in 61 when Cicero testified against him during the Bona Dea
scandai which subsequently led to a continuous battle of wits between both of them in the senate
(AU. 1.16.9-10) and finally resulted in Cicero's exile.
78 omnibus rebus quibus potest populus Romanus significat quid sentiat; nulla varietas
est inter homines opinionis, nulla voluntatis, nulla sermonis. qua re, si quis iIIuc me vocat, venio.
74
inclined to be either unfriendly or lukewarm, their hatred of these
tyrants is such that they are now joining the ranks of the loyal
[bonis]. (Q. Fr. 1.2.16)79
The fate of the republic was entirely under the influence and authority
of the new dynasts, principes, who competed vigorously for potentia and
dignitas. As the voice of concern for most senators, on his voyage upon the
via optimas, Cicero displays a genuine tone of uneasiness when he declares:
"Oh, if indeed we might keep the splendid tradition and the discipline we
have inherited from our ancestors! But 1 do not know now by what
agreement it is slipping out of our hands" (Flac. 15).80
In 58, Caesar departed for Gaul on a campaign which would last almost
ten years. But Rome still feU his influence with the election of his agent P.
Clodius into the tribunate.
81
Clodius immediately won the people's approval
with the enactment of two major laws: one provided for grain to be
distributed free to citizens, and the other legalized trade guilds (collegia). The
effect of the latter was particularly pernicious. The guilds became organized,
political clubs which disrupted order and security in Rome.
Clodius also secured the senate's allegiance with a law that prohibited
the censor from debarring senators from participating in senatorial
proceedings. Henceforth, a senator could only be debarred when found guilty
79 Nostrae tamen causae non videntur homines defuturi... Si diem nobis Clodius dixerit,
tota ltalia concurret, ut multiplicata gloria discedamus; sin autem vi agere conabitur, spero fore,
studiis non solum amicorum, sed etiam alienorum, ut vi resistamus. Omnes et se et suos liberos,
amicos, clientes, libertos, servos, pecunias denique suas pollicentur. Nostra antiqua manus
bonorum ardet studio nostri atque amore. Si qui antea aut alienores fuerant, aut languidiores,
nunc horum regum odio se cum bonis coniungunt.
80 0 morempraeclarum disciplinamque quam amaioribus accepimus, si quidem
teneremus! sed nescio quo pacto iam de manibus elabitur.
81 As pontifexmaximus Caesar transferred Clodius from the patrician to the plebeian gens
(early in 59) sa that he couId be eligible for the tribuneship and extend his politica\ career.
75
of misconduct both by the censor and the senate itself. He also built an
alliance with the consuls by promulgating the lex de provinciis consularibus
which entrusted Piso and Gabinius with a five-year command in their
provinces. It is evident that Clodius gained considerable popularity for his
measures. This was an ingenious tactic for it would not bring any opposition
against his last measure primarily directed against Cicero and apparently
sanctioned by the triumvirs.82
In February, Clodius proposed the lex de capite civis Romani, a law
banning any person who had executed Roman citizens without a trial. In this
way he was exploiting the ill will already developed by Metellus Nepos
toward Cicero' s role against the Catilinarian conspirators. But, as we have
seen, Clodius bore his own personal grudge. Having sensed liUle support
from the senate, which was partly responsible for the measures of December
63 (Dom. 50, Sesto 53), Cicero did not make a personal appeal to that body.
Instead, he donned mouming garments and solicited support from the people
and his army of boni.83
As a sign of solidarity, many equites also dressed in mourning
garments while the distinguished senators Hortensius and Curio led a
delegation to speak against the bill in the senate on Cicero' s behalf.84 As a
82 Cicero (Sest. 39) alludes to the dynasts' inactive participation in the discussion of this
measure. For a description of these measures, see W. JeftreyTatum, The Patrieian Tribune:
Publius Clodi!Js Pulcher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 150-153. For
Clodius' relations with the triumvirs, see E. Gruen, "P. Clodius: Instrument or Independent
Agent?" Phoenix 20 (1966),120-130; R. Seager, "Clodius, Pompeius and the Exile of Cicero,"
Latomus 24 (1965),519-531; and A. W. Lintott, "P. Clodius-FelixCatilina?" Greeee and Rome 14
(1967), 157-169.
83 Att. 3.10.2, 3.15.5; Red. Sen. 12; Red. Quir.8, 13; Sest. 25; Pis. 77; Plane. 87; Plut.
Cie. 30.5-31.1; Casso Dio 38.16.2-6; App. B. Civ. 2.15.
84 The delegation included M. Lucullus, L. Torquatus, and the praetor Lentulus Crus who
also lobbied Pompey to intervene (Sest. 41; Pis. 77; Plut. Cie. 31).
76
result, many senators had shown their support by wearing mourning
garments also. When a deputation of equites petitioned the senate for a
hearing, Gabinius, the presiding consul, brusquely repulsed them and
banished their zealous equestrian leader L. Lamia from the city on the ground
that he was inciting the equites to riot. Soon after a consular edict strictly
forbade senators from donning mourning attire. In a final effort to neutralize
both senatorial and equestrian support for Cicero's cause, the consuls, who
had once been on friendly terms with the orator, betrayed him by publicly
denouncing the execution of the Catilinarians. Thus, in appreciation for the
Lex de provinciis consularibus, they showed their allegiance to Clodius.
85
The tribune took advantage of his popular following and incited his
operae to harass Cicero and intimidate his senatorial and equestrian
partisans.
86
He continued his attacks against the senate by inviting
Hortensius and Curio to a contio where the two senators were publicly
humiliated, and by forcing an extraordinary command on Cato.
87
It then
became evident that the senate's auctoritas was weakened and resistance
futile. With this behaviour against the optimates, Clodius, who came from a
well-known noble family with a long line of senatorial members, betrayed his
family' s contribution to this institution.
S8
When the lex de capite civis Romani was ratified on March 20, Cicero
followed the advice of sorne of his friends and left Rome, ostensibly to save
85 Cie. Red. Sen. 12f1., 32; Red. Quir.13; Dom. 91, 96,131; Sest. 25ft.; Pis. 11, 13f.,
17ft.; Planc. 861.; Plut. Cic. 31.1; Casso Dio 38.16.5-6.
86 Sest. 27; Mil. 37; Plut. Cic.30.5.
87 The lex Clodia de imperio Catonis established Cato pro quaestore pro praetore whieh
took him abroad for an extended period (Cass. Dio 38.16.5).
88 Cf. Tatum, 155-156; Lintott, 165-167.
77
his country a second time by averting further bloodshed.89 He called itfuga
(Att. 3.3), thus his "flight" from the city was voluntary. Clodius capitalized on
this opportunity and quickly promulgated another law specifically targeted
against the orator. On April 24, the Lex CLodia de exsilio Ciceronis was passed
and once Cicero received information regarding the sentence of exile he left
Brundisium and set out for Greece while his urban and country residences
were destroyed in the name of Libertas.
9o
During the following months, Cicero' s correspondence revealed the
bitterness, sorrow, and profound despair that prevailed over his shattered
personal prestige: "Can 1forget what 1was and not feel what 1am or what 1
have lost?" (Att. 3.10.2).91 When ms depression intensified, he could not
endure the fad that he had lost his rights as a citizen, his wealth and property,
and all those dear to him as he questioned his identity: "What am 1 now?"
(Att.3.15.2). In his despondency he cursed those who were hostile to him and
betrayed him.92
In the meantime, loyal supporters (praesidium bonorum) in Rome
showed defiance toward a clause in Clodius' law banning "any motion or
mention" of Cicero (Att. 3.15.6; cf. Red. Sen. 8) and initiated measures for his
recall by calling attention to the benefits he had conferred upon the state (Red.
89 Att. 3.15.4; Pis. 78; Plut. Cie. 31.4; Casso Dio 38.17.4,38.16.5.
90 With Cicero and Cato gone the senate was left without effective leadership. For an
explanation on how the Jex de exsilio made permanent and official Cicero's voluntary withdrawal
trom Rome, see Tatum, 156-166.
91 Ali of Book 3 Ad Attieum consists of Cicero's letters from exile; aise Q. Fr. 1.3, 1.4, Fam.
5.4 and 14.1-4. They are dated from ca. March 22, 58 to early February 57.
92Att. 3.9.2, 3.15.2; Q. Fr. 1.3.8; cf. Red. Quir. 21.
78
Sen. 21).93 The first attempt was made on June 1, when the tribune Ninnius
Quadratus proposed a restoration decree in the senate, but it was vetoed by his
colleague Aelius Ligus (Red. Sen. 3; Sesto 68). In August, Domitius
Ahenobarbus planned to bring the case before the senate but without success
(Att.3.15.6). The elections for 57 brought in many magistrates loyal to Cicero's
cause, especially the consul-elect P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther; his colleague
Metellus Nepos, once Cicero's rival, would also cooperate (Att. 3.23.1,3.24.2).
In late September, the tribune-elect P. Sestius prepared a bill (Att. 3.20.3)
and travelled to Cisalpine Gaul in order to secure Caesar's approval since "he
thought that to establish the harmony of citizens [ad concordiam civium] and
to carry out his purpose it was important that Caesar should not be
unfavourable to my cause" (Sest. 71).94 Sestius obtained a cautious reply from
the general and by this time Pompey had joined the movement after he
himself had several quarrels with Clodius.
95
The tribune-elect Milo also
followed a consistent poHcy for gamering support among citizens for Cicero' s
restoration, something which would earn him praise later (Sest. 87). On
October 29, eight tribunes appealed for Cicero's recall but again their decree
was vetoed by Clodius (AU. 3.23.1). On December 10, the new tribunes had
taken office and Clodius became a private citizen once more. One more
93 Ali the proposais for Cicero's recall failed. A letter to Atticus (3.23) informs that each of
the proposed restoration bills had subtle problems in its wording which contravened other existing
laws. There was the possibility for Clodius'Iaw to be repealed, as Cicero noted: "Clodius attached
sanctions to his bill to make it a/most impossible for it to be invalidated by the senate or the
assembly (Att. 3.23.2, italicsare mine).
94 pertinere et ad concordiam civium putavit et ad perficiundi facu/tatem animum Caesaris
acausa non abhorrere.
95 Pompey's quarrels with Clodius started as early as April and grew steadily worse until in
August the general was threatened with murder (Att. 3.8.3, Dom. 66; Ascon. 46-47 Clark); in a
letter dispatched on October 25 Cicero had received word from Atticus that Pompey had joined
the cause for his restoration (Att. 3.23.1).
79
unsuccessful attempt to recall Cicero was made by the tribune C. Messius
(Red. Sen. 21), but only the authority of a new consul's legislation of the
following year could bring Cicero back to Rome.
With the failure of the concordia ordinum and lacking an alliance with
a senatorial oligarchy which did not seem able to stand up to the power and
influence of the three dynasts, Cicero could not escape the legislation that
forced him into a lacrimose exile. The adverse circumstances which led to his
political failure slowly forced him into the field of political theory and
philosophical writing for which he was well suited. The efforts made by the
tribunes of the people and the overwhelming cordiality of the Italians he met
on the route back to Rome made him realize the need for a different type of
concordia beyond the confines of the two major orders based in the capital.
He attempted to draft a new policy of political coexistence which he called
consensus and he coined the phrase consensus omnium bonorum.
Consumed with excitement for a more overall view of harmony Cicero
broadened and refined his outlook to include tota Italia.
80
3
Concordia and Consensus in tota !talia, 57-50
Ali my knowledge, experience, reading...goes to
prove not that men have held the same unvarying"
convictions tiU their death but rather that they have
adapted them to political circumstances, to the
tendency of the times, and to the considerations of
concordia. (Plane. 94)
Upon his return from exile in 57, Cicero embraced the idea of harmony
to explain the support provided to him by all Roman citizens. He experienced
a wider contact with the ltalian people who applauded him along the route
from Brindisi to Rome (AU. 4.1.4). In five post-exile speeches: Post Reditum
in Senatu (Sept. 5), Post Reditum ad Quirites (Sept. 7), De Domo Sua (Sept. 30),
Pro Sestio (Feb./Mar. 56), and De Haruspicum Responso (May 56),1 the idea of
unanimity emerges frequently from the numerous occurrences of the terms
omnis, totus, and cunctus. Concordia was still a themebut no longer equated
with the failures of concordia ordinum before his departure. The context of
concordia itself became an all encompassing consensus which would include
aU classes of Roman society throughout ltaly in a wider and more permanent
political foundationwhich would include the concept of otium cum
dignitate. Cicero ceased to refer to concordia ordinum and responded with
new political slogans such as concordia civium or consensus universorum
and bonorum.
2
Concordia and consensus were now associated with Italia and
1 1have included the Pro Sestio in the group commonly considered as the quartet of post-
exile speeches because of the prevailing theme of consensus within the work and because
Sestius was partly responsible for Cicero's return. According to Lenaghan, 46, Oratio De
Haruspicum Responso lOis probably the correct form of the t i t l e . ' ~
2 Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, 1,642,650.
81
cIves. Harmony for the sake of a community of citizens, the civitas, became
the main concem.
As Rome evolved from a smaU city state into the capital of an
expanding empire, an ever-increasing number of leading men from the
Italian gentry became more prosperous and graduaUy infiltrated the political
stronghold of the traditional Roman aristocracy, which was slowly losing its
grip on the concentration of power at the capital. The dom i nobiles from the
Roman m unicipia throughout Italy, who had supported Cicero's election
campaigns through the cursus honorum, had already achieved common
cultural, social, and economic interests with Rome. As Roman citizens, they
had risen to the status of equites and senators, and as such could participate in
the govemmental process in the capital. Equally important, from Cicero' s
point of view, was the fact that these dom i nobiles would retum to their own
municipalities where they could play a role in raUying popular support for
the civic ideals Cicero was himself promoting at the centre of the empire.
The events surrounding the oratoes recal1 justify this new direction in
Cicero' s political thinking. Duovir of Capua, Pompey had a resolution carried
which declared the law de exsilio Ciceronis a privilegium and caHed on aU
Italy to aid Cicero.3 Pompey' s actions supported the consul Lentulus' appeal
that aH Italy should vote for Cicero's restoration.
4
For this reason, to effect
lasting political change the need for cooperative efforts from a consensus
Italiae was included in Cicero's fresh promotion of concordia.
Cicero constantly credited the outcome of ms restoration to the
cooperation among an good Roman citizens, who were united in the cause of
3 Red. Sen. 29,31; Provo Cons. 43; Pis. 80; Mil. 39.
4 Red. Sen. 24; Dom. 85; Sest. 50, 128; Planc. 78; Plut. Cic.33.4.
82
his recall. In fact, the boni, which included an Roman citizens throughout
Italy, were praised for this united effort. A rather large amount of propaganda
in the Post Reditum speeches champions this new version of harmony or
unanimity.
The Post-exile Speeches
During the ludi Apollinares in July 57, "a most striking demonstration
of the political potential inherent in theatrical occasion was witnessed at
Rome" in favour of the exiled Cicero.
s
Roman citizens from an classes
demonstrated unequivocal public support for the orator. At the theatrical
shows, unanimous applause was given to the senators and consul P. Lentulus
Spinther for the decrees passed in favour of Cicero' s return to Rome. Clodius
had been the only official to oppose the resolutions. In fact, when he arrived
at the theatre, the audience shouted, cursed, and made rude gestures at him.
During the performance of the comedy Simulans, the actors looked straight at
Clodius in disapproval and chanted in a mocking tone: "For this, Titus, the
end of your vicious life is in front of you" (Sest. 118).6
Similarly, passages from Accius' tragedy Eurysaces, read by the great
tragic actor Aesopus, expressed the grief of the people toward Cicero: "who
helped the republic with a firm spirit...ur most distinguished friend in our
most important baUle" (Sest. 120-121).7 The audience knew these lines
referred to Cicero and applauded wildly. Their longing was great for the man
5 Richard C. Beacham. The Roman Theatre and /ts Audience (London: Routledge.
1991),159.
6 huic, Tite, tua post principia atque exitus vitiosae vitae.
7 qui rem publicam certo anima adiuverit, ...summum amicum summo in bel/o.
83
"endowed with greatest genius" (Sest. 121).8 Aesopus also interpolated lines
from the Andromache of Ennius: "You allow him. to be banished, you cause
him. to be driven away, you suffer now that he has been exiled." He hinted to
the senate, equites, and Roman people that they had erred by banning Cicero
from the city (Sest,121-122).9
Cicero praised the tribune Milo for gaining complete concordia in order
to procure his return: "his purpose was simple, his method was consistent,
fully supported by general agreement and complete unanimity [plena
concordiae]" (Sest. 87),10 Sestius' concern with concordia civium (Sest. 71;
Red. Sen. 20) and Milo's search for support for plena concordia demonstrate
that Cicero had a working relationship with the tribunes of the plebs, the
popular element of Roman society, and therefore his ideas were channelled
through them to the common people. Milo not only had support from
consuls, senate, and equites all from noble backgrounds but also Italia erecta
made up of bonorum ac fortium civium (Sest. 87).
On September 5, 57, Cicero delivered his first post-exile speech, Post
Reditum in Senatu, thanking those responsible for his return, attacking his
enemies, and providing reasons for his departure. In the presence of his
fellow senators, he did not mention the concordia ordinum which was once
the foundation of hispolitical thought, but rather the gratitude toward a
concordia of citizens:
You decreed that no contrivance should be employed by any to
8 summo ingenio praeditum.
9 Cicero (Sest.1 OG) extolled the importance of the ludi as an opportunity for the
expression and observation of public opinion when he emphasized that "the opinion and will of
the Roman people concerning public affairs can be most effectually shown in three places: at a
meeting (contio), at an assembly (comitium), at a gathering for plays and gladiatorial shows."
10 simplex causa, constans ratio, plena consensionis omnium, plena concordiae.
84
impede your end; that any who should impede it should be visited
with your deep resentment; that such impediment would constitute
an act of hostility to the republic, the safety of patriots, and the unity
of citizens [concordiamque civiuml, and that the man responsible
for it would be made the subject of an immediate motion to your
body. (Red. Sen. 27)11
It was the rousing unanimity of allltalian people, defined as the splendorem
Italiae totius ordinumque omnium, who we1comed him (Red. Sen. 28).
By the singulari studio atque consensu (Red. Sen. 2), the senate showed
unanimous party spirit by voting for his reca1l416-1 (Red. Sen. 26) with
Clodius alone opposed. Sogreat was its consensus de salute (Red. Sen. 5) that
the senate risked threats of violence in regard for the dignitas in patria of a
distinguished member. Stock historical examples are used to contrast the
overwhelming consensus exemplified in Cicero's recall; a tactic which
ultimately drew attention to his important place in the republic. The
nobilissimi et clarissimi consulares P. Popilius Laenas and Q. Caecilius
Metellus Numidicus depended on influential family connections who could
orny muster tribunician decrees for their retum from exile,12 and not on a
senate united with magistrates and the people of Italy as in Cicero' s case. In
fact, not even Marius, sometimes worthy of Cicero' s praise as a fellow-
Arpinate, was recalled by the senate during his two-year banishment (88-86)
and so neady wiped it out in the interest of his equestrian colleagues. Cicero' s
11 decrevistis, ne qui ulla ratione rem impediret; qui id impedisset, vos graviter
molesteque laturos; J1Ium contra rem publicam salutemque bonorum concordiamque civium
facturum, et ut ad vos de eo statim referretur.
12 Laenas (cos. 132) went into voluntary exile in 125, having been persecuted by the
tribune C. Gracchus. He was recalled in 121 with appeals fram his family and kinsfolk. Numidicus
(cos. 109) went into exile in 100 after disputes with the tribune Saturninus. His family and kinsfolk,
which included the Servilii and the Scipios, procured his recall in 98.
85
social-political connections far-outweighed the desperate efforts made by his
brother Quintus and son-in-law C. Piso. For Cicero there was a unity of action
that went beyond mere family connections: the auctoritas et consensio of
senatorial magistrates, vox et convocatio of the Roman people, the motus of
cuncta Italia, imploratio of the res publica, the decreta municipiorum et
coloniarum, all restored potestas, virtus, fides of an invaluable Roman citizen
(Red. Sen. 36-39).13
Two days later, on September 7, Cicero delivered his second post-exile
speech, Post Reditum ad Quirites, at a public gathering in the forum. It was of
the same type as the one delivered in the senate but a Uttle more sentimental,
colloquial, and exaggerated. He played upon the credulity of the people by
invoking the power of the gods for the preservation of incolumitas, otium,
and concordia:
Fellow-citizens, on the day when l vowed to sacrifice myself and my
fortunes in the cause of your safety [incolumitas], tranquillity
[0 ti uml, and union [concordia], l prayed to Jupiter Best and Greatest,
and to the other immortal gods that if ever l placed considerations
of my own interest before those of your welfare, l might be visited
with eternal retribution. (Red. Quir.1)14
13 Cicero did not just miss his native land but he mourned the honours, wealth, dignity,
and happiness which he enjoyed in Rome and his country villas: Art. 3.26: potius vita quampatria
carebo; Q. Fr. 1.3.6: nunc in hac tam afflicta perditaque fortuna neque me neque meos /ugere
diutius possim; Att. 3.15.6: Quid de bonis? Quid de domo?; cf. Red. Quir. 3: res familiares sua
quemque de/ectat: reliquae meae fortunae recuperatae plus mihi nunc vo/uptatis adferunt quam
tum inco/umes adferebant. For the importance of virtus, see Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior
Statesman, 14-16, for fides, see Victor Pschl, "Quelqes principes fondamentaux de la
politique de Cicron," Comptes rendus des sances de l'acadmie des inscriptions et belles-
/ettres(Paris, 1987), 346-347; and Wood,
14 Quod precatus a/ove optimo maximo ceterisque dis immortalibus sum, Quirites, eo
tempore, quum me fortunasque mea pro vestra inco/umitate, otio, concordiaque devovi, ut, si
meas rationes umquam vestrae saluti anteposuissem, sempiternam poenam sustinerem mea
vo/untate susceptam.
86
Proud of his selfless ad of voluntary withdrawal from the city followed by the
legislated exile (that he was forced to accept), he had been accepted back to
Rome by "so striking an agreement of Italy, and so zealous a co-operation of
honest men, with all the other magistrates in agreement" and even by the
gods, who marked the event approvingly with bountiful harvests (Red. Quir.
18).15 In gratitude Cicero further promised to devote himself to the people of
the republic (Red. Quir. 5).
The emphasis in describing events changed according to his audience' s
view of political figures. For example, the popular favourite Marius is treated
more graciously than in the previous speech to the senate two days before,
and is unashamedly described as his fellow-townsman (municeps meus) and
saviour of the republic (Red. Quir. 19). Again, comparing his exile to those of
Popilius, Numidicus, and Marius, Cicero concentrated on the unique
unanimity which assured his restoration and freed him from anxiety:
50 numerous were the champions, advocates, and promoters of my
restoration that 1far surpassed these historical characters in prestige
and support...[Their cases] were never discussed in the senate...No
motion of the municipalities and colonies was advanced for their
, restoration, but all Italy [cuncta Italia] recalled me three times by its
decrees. (Red. Quir.9-10)16
Subsequently:
A full senate...honoured my worthiness in the most complimentary
15 tanta consensio Italia, tantum studium bonorum omnium, consentientes ceteri
magistratus.
16 adiutores, auctores hortatoresque ad me restituendum ita multi fuerunt, ut longe
superiores omnes hac dignitate copiaque superarem... Numquam.. .in senatu mentie facta
est. .. Nul/us in eorum reditu motus municipiorum et coloniarum factus est; at me in patriam ter suis
decretis Itafia cuncta revocavit, cf. John Nicholson, Cicero's Return from Exile: The Orations Post
Reditum (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,1992), 41.
87
terms possible, and recommended my cause to you [Quirites], and to
aU the towns and colonies. Thus did consuls, praetors, tribunes, the
whole senate, and ail Italy intercede for me. (Red. Quir.15-16)17
He wants the Roman people to deem him worthy of the republic which
showed by its unanimous consent its conviction that its dignitas (prestige)
could not survive without him (Red. Quir. 25). Even when Pompey appealed
for Cicero's return he declared that the people "were begged by the senate, the
Roman equites, and ail Italy" (Red. Quir. 16).1
8
The theme is continued and
elaborated in the two other speeches regarding his exile.
The loyal citizens believed that Cicero would restore peace to the state:
"since, they argued, aU hope of otium and concordia lay in my return,
whereas my departure had meant a daily apprehension of turmoil" (Dom.
15).19 His selfless act primarily for the boni, who always supported him, was
supposed to restrain Clodius from further cruelty toward Roman citizens.
20
Cicero insists that his return brought prosperity, stability, and harmony back
to the people: "so on my retum fertility, plenty, hope of tranquillity, security
of mind, justice, constitutional government, popular concord [concordia
populi], and senatorial authority seemed to be reinstalled with me" (Do m.
17).21 But again he humbly stresses that his recall from his "glorious" disgrace
17 frequentissimus senatus...dignitatem meam quibus potuit verbis amplissimis ornavit,
sa/utem vobis, municipiis, c%niis omnibus commendavit. /ta me...consu/es, praetores, tribuni
p/ebis, senatus, /talia cuncta deprecata est.
18 tum me in perorando posuit vos rogari a senatu, rogari ab equitibus Romanis, rogari ab
/taliacuncta; cf. Sest. 107; Pis. 34.
19 quod in mec reditu spes oti et concordiae sita videbatur, in discessu autem cotidianus
seditionis timor.
20 Dom. 6,3: "1 with my whole body met the full onset of civil strife (discordiarum). n
21 sic reditu ubertas agrorum, frugum copia, spes oti, tranquillitas animorum, iudicia,
/eges, concordia populi, senatus auctoritas mecum simu/ reducta videantur.
88
was only due to un um consensum (Dom. 75), from aIl the people of Italy:
senate, equites, publicans, clerks, guilds; even provinces and client kingdoms
(Dom. 72-6). In bis defence, it was no longer suitable or advantageous for him
to even mention the harmony of the orders that worked along with him
during bis consulship. Instead, he coyly reworked the phrase to emphasize
that bis support derived ex auctoritate senatu consensu bonorum omnium,
"from the authority of the senate and union of aIl good men" (Dom. 94). A
subsequent plea rings forth:
Let us sweep tbis spirit of discord from our society; let us rest from
our everlasting quarrels...There was a time when the fabric of our
state was so firm and sound that it could survive the carelessness of
the senate and even the injustices of citizens. It cannot any
longer.. .it is by concordia alone that we can maintain the present
condition of the state. (Har. Resp. 60-61)22
The unity of the orders may have been shattered (Har. Resp. 60) but not the
unitYof aIl good men in the state.
An Appeal for a Dedication to the Goddess Concordia
Particularly interesting for the purposes of this study is also Cicero's
speech De Domo Sua, delivered on September 30, 57. This speech provides
further evidence that the orator's notion of concordia is becoming much
more encompassing than the unitYbetween senators and equites.
In the early part of tbis text, Cicero relates the amount of discordia that
existed while he was in exile and how matters such as spes otii, tranquillitas
22 Tol/atur haec e civitate discordia... Fuit quondam ita firma haec civitas et valens, ut
negligentiam senatus vel etiam iniurias civium ferre passel. lam non potest... Qua re hune statum,
qui nunc est, qualiscumque est, nulla alia re nisi concordia retinere possumus.
89
animorum, and concordia populi were resolved upon his retum (Dom. 17).
The goddess Concordia is always present in the speech and her temple
provides the sacred backdrop for the injustices brought upon him and the
Roman people. Since the temple was the usual meeting place for the senate
during the disputes with Clodius it also became a gathering place for
supporters of the senate and Clodius alike (Dom. 11). There is a continuous
focus on the goddess Concordia when a comparison is provided between the
moral character of C. Cassius Longinus and the audacious character of the
tribune Clodius. The former was censor in 154 who revered the goddess
Concordia and wished to dedicate a statue to her in the senate-house; the
latter was a violator of concordia and criminal to the Roman people (Dom.
130-131,136-137).
Addressed to the College of pontiffs, state clergy who were elected
officiaIs (i.e. magistrates, senators), De Domo Sua was to all outward
appearances about the consecration of a house. But its context was political
self-justification. For members of the Roman ruling classes, religion was an
integral part of the political process (Dom. 1, 31, 141). Cicero insists repeatedly
on the importance of proper legal and religious procedure (Dom. 127-129,136,
138), although he flatters the pontiffs consistently (Dom. 3, 45, 104, 105, 132,
142) while deferring to their expertise (Dom. 33). He praises the dutiful
conduct of a second-century censor in a period when the senate held control
and the people did not lack liberty (Dom. 130). By associating the goddess
Concordia with contemporary events, the theme of defender of harmony in
the state is constantly conveyed. With statements such as "he wished to
dedicate a statue of Concordia in the senate-house, and to dedicate the senate-
house itself to this goddess," was there any reason for the current College of
90
pontiffs to prevent the man before them from dedicating "both statue and
senate-house to Concordia" (D0 m. 130) in the same way a previous censor
had?23
The reiteration of the same example of an earlier temple dedication six
times in the last few paragraphs of the argumentatio, just before the peroratio,
is not coincidental.24 Rhetorical evidence of this kind promotes the
possibility that Cicero himself was seeking approval from his fellow pontifical
magistrates possibly to dedicate a temple or statue to Concordia, which only
the senate could approve. The last nobilis to gain such approval was Opimius
in 121, when internaI order was threatened by the revoit of the tribune C.
Gracchus.2
5
Cicero did constantly promote the Nones of December as the
symbolic date when concordia ordinum defeated the Catilinarian conspiracy
and thus preserved the concordia of the republic (Ad Brut. 1.17.1). But there is
no documented proof of a monumentum Concordiae (similar to that of
Opimius) commissioned by the senate to go aiong with ms title of pater
23 Q. Mareius eensor [164]signum Coneordiae feeerat idque in publieo eolloearat. Hoe
signum C. Cassius eensor[154]eum in euriam transtulisset, collegium vestrum eonsuluit num quid
esse eausae videretur quin id signum euriamque Coneordiae dediearet. .. Res il/a plena iustitiae,
sapientiae, dignitatis. Censor enim, penes quem maiores nostri, id quod tu sustulisti, iudieium
senatus de dignitate esse voluerunt, Coneordiae signum volebat in euria euriamque ei deae
dedieare.
24 Dom. 130; 131 : Praeelara voluntas atque omni laude digna; praescribere enim se
arbitrabatur ut sine studiis dissensionis sententiae dieerentur, si sedem ipsam ae templum publiei
eonsili religione Coneordiae devinxisset. 136: sed ut revertar ad ius publicum dedieandi, quod ipsi
pontifiees semper non solum ad suas eaerimonias sed etiam ad populi iussa adeommodaverunt,
habetis in eommentariis vestris C. Cassium eensorem de signo Coneordiae dedicando ad
pontifieum eonlegium rettulisse, eique M. Aemilium pontificem maximum pro conlegio
respondisse, nisi eum populus Romanus nominatim praefecisset atque eius iussu faceret, non
videri eam passe reete dedieari. 137: videtisne praetori urbano negotium datum ut euraret ne id
saerum esset, et ut, si quae essent ineisae aut inscriptae litterae, tollerentur? 0 tempora, 0 mores!
tum eensorem, hominem sanctissimum, simulaerum Coneordiae dedieare pontifiees in templo
inaugurato prohibuerunt.
25 Plut. C. Graech. 17; App. B. Civ. 1.26.
91
patriae and privilege of the corona civica.
26
Since Nepos blocked Cicero's bid
for a valedictory speech at the end of his consular tenure, an appeal to
Concordia was also denied to him.
27
Clearly an indirect appeal for approval is
at stake after his return from exile, although his stoic beliefs for a dedication
to a deified abstraction such as Concordia might have prevented him from
doing so (Nat. D. 3.61).
In Cicero' s speech, a contrast exists between Concordia and Libertas.
The interests of the senate and people are represented by the goddess
Concordia, while Libertas is promoted by the rabble rouser Clodius, professed
as a liberator (Dom. 110,131).28 Maintaining a strict tradition to Concordia is
at the foundation of his discourse. The strict censor C. Cassius, in 154,
consulted the whole college of pontiffs about the dedication of a statue of
Concordia. The pontiffs had created a precedent having told Cassius that the
dedication of a statue was illegal without the expressed permission of the
Roman people. Once granted, the pontiffs ordered an accompanying
inscription chiselled out (Dom. 136).
26 ln one of his most celebrated politicalletters to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9) of December 54,
Cicero provides information regarding monumenta that were erected or restored during the
course of his consular administration. Evidence from Q. Fr. 3.1.14 and Har. Resp. 31 documents
that he was put in charge of the restoration of the aedes Tefluris. But there is no mention of a
dedication or restoration of the temple of Concordia in any letter or speech; in regard to the other
monumentumShackleton Bailey (Cicero: EpistulaeAd Familiares, 1,312) notes: "The most
plausible guess is Lange's, that this [monumentum] was some building started in Cicero's
Consulship to commemmorate the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Clodius had
apparently effaced the inscription and substituted one bearing his own name."
27 Aclue as to how Cicero might have introduced his appeal for a dedication to the
goddess Concordia in the speech denied to him at the end of his consular term may be gained
from the diatribe directed at Lucius Calpurnius Piso in which Cicero sums up his consulship as
follows: "Indeed my consulship was so conducted from its beginning to its end, that 1did nothing
without the advice of the senate, nothing without the approval of the Roman people; upon the
rostra 1constantly defended the senate, in the senate house the people; 1welded the populace
with its leaders, and the equestrian order with the senate" (Pis. 7).
28 Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Politicalldea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early
Principate (Cambridge: University Press, 1950),103.
92
In contrast, Clodius, mocker of religion, consulted only his feckless
relative Pinarius Natta, though his act was impious and unprecedented, and
the location of his new shrine highly conspicuous (Dom. 130-132). In fact,
according to Cicero, Clodius feared the prestige of the rest of the College of
Pontiffs. How would pontiffs like P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus or M. Terentius
Varro Lucullus, pillars of the republic, have greeted Clodius' proposaI to
consecrate the house of its acknowledged saviour? The pontiff whom
Clodius actually used was unworthy of his family' s ancestral rites and
incompetent to perform the present ones. With impunity Clodius pollutes
religion by the impiety of his act (Dom. 131-137).
Within the last sections of the argumentatio, there is the culmination
of the orator' s own identification with the republic. Concordia envelops what
MacKendrick likes to term Cicero' s "l'tat Cfest moi" syndrome, which:
Is intended to impress, as is the stress on the universal mourning at
his absence (Dom. 99) and rapture at his return (Dom. 76), and the
unanimous view (Dom. 5, 10, 14, 26, 122, 132) that he should return,
as being the preserver of the republic, which equates him with the
gods, and therefore gives him an even greater daim to the pontiffs'
favour. (The Speeches of Cicero, 159)
The unanimous view from princeps senatus,ordines omnes, Italia tota,
cunctae gentes had aH harmoniously confirmed that Cicero, who had not lost
his status as civis since in his view the laws pertaining to his exile were
passed illegaHy, was the one who preserved the urbem atque imperium
(Dom. 132). Accordingly, Cicero feels that bis return brought the gods and
people concordia (Dom. 17). He even maintains that the gods themselves had
played a role in securing ms return and expresses his gratitude throughout his
93
speech (Dom. 17, 26, 31, 39, 94). It is this sense of gratitude and duty to both
the gods and the people that justifies the interpretation that his repeated
references to the goddess Concordia - such as the story of Cassius and
Concordia (D0 m. 136-137) - are in effect an implicit request for the permission
to dedicate a statue to Concordia, a permission which only the pontiffs and
the senate could grant. The goddess will not be spoken about with SUCh
emphasis again until the turmoil in 43.
The importance of the dedication of the senate to Concordia is also
stressed in Cicero' s speech in defence of Sestius. Although Sestius' trial took
place in 56, Cicero recounts the events that happened during his consulship.
He mentions the temple of Concordia (Sest. 26) where the senate had
pronounced the death sentence for Catiline and his fellow-conspirators.
Mention of the temple recalls the memory of his consulship because this is
the very place where his idea of concordia ordinum began, - the "emergency"
coalition of senators and equites. When Sestius was tribune-elect in 58 he was
a supporter of Cicero's cause of concordia civium and appealed to Caesar:
"since he thought that to establish the harmony of citizens [ad concordiam
civium] and to carry out his purpose it was important that Caesar should not
be unfavourable to my cause" (Sest. 71).29 Cicero praises the tribune Milo for
gaining complete concordia and consensio in 57 in order to procure his return
from exile that same year: "his purpose was simple, his method was
consistent, fully supported by general agreement [piena consensionis] and
complete unanimity [pIena concordiae]" (Sest. 87),30
29 pertinere et ad concordiam civiumputavit et ad perficiundi facultatem animum Caesaris
a causa non abhorrere.
30 simplex causa, constans ratio, plena consensionis omnium, plena concordiae.
94
Consensus Omnium Bonorum
The political turmoil of the mid-fifties, which cu1minated in 53 when
riots prevented elections and resulted in Pompey' s sole consulship of 52, was
a litmus-test for Cicero's ideas. While writing his trilogy: De Oratore (55-52),
De Republica (54-52), and De Legibus (begun in 52) as practical guides for the
vir bonus he witnessed the disintegration of the triumvirate, the civil strife
between Milo and Clodius which resulted in the latter' s murder, and
Pompey's quest to restore order in Rome with the backing of the optimates in
the senate. At this time, Pompey was the dominant figure in Rome. His
preeminent position rested on his own auctoritas,31 the service of many
legates and tribunes,32 and the loyalty of numerous provincial colonists and
clientes. This made him the foremost princeps (Pis. 25) of the Ciceronian age.
Cicero illustrates what he means by theterm princeps in the De
Republica. The princeps is described as a gifted leader presiding over the
magistracies, whose auctoritas moderates over hostilities to bring peace and
harmony, as Numa Pompilius had done for a1most forty years (Re p. 2.27). At
the same time, the princeps is also a magistrate and not above the law: any
citizen had the right to appeal verdicts (provocatio) against a magistrate
including the princeps in order to preserve the harmony of the state. For
Cicero, this exemplifies the libertas of the Roman people (Rep. 2.54).
31 After he conquered Spain, Africa, Asia, and defeated the pirates in the Mediterranean
he wascalled victor omnium gentium (Pis. 16), invictissimuscivis(Pis. 34), domitororbis(Manilius
Astron. 1.793). In 55, Pompey built Rome's first permanent stone theatre, as a visible sign of his
power and wealth, and dedicated it to Venus Victrix.
32 ln 67, he had between15 and 24legates; in 57, he received control of the corn supply
for five years with proconsular imperium and fifteen legates; in 55. he became consul with Crassus
and received the Spanish provinces for five years which he governed through legates. While
Crassus set out for Syria and Caesar's command in Gaul was extended another five years Pompey
stayed in the suburbs of Rome until he was made sole consul in 52. His position as proconsul with
imperium did not allow him to enter the sacred pomerium, 50 tribunes and senators represented
him at senate meetings.
95
But of course the importance of concordia civitatis is acknowledged as
the foundation of the Roman res publica: Brevi multitudo dispersa atque
vaga concordia civitas facta erat (Rep. 1.40).33 From this there was a balanced
and stable combination of the three simple, good forms of government:
kingship, aristocracy, democracy:
When a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of harmony and
tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty,
no form of government is less subject to change or more stable.
And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a republic
[in... re publica... concordiam] where the interests of aIl are the same,
for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different
measures are advantageous to different citizens. (Rep. 1.49)34
In a more dramatic demonstration, a lesson in music-theory provides
the example as to how harmony must be achieved in the state in order for the
ideal statesman to have the proper environment to teach ms fellow citizens:
For just as in the music of harps and flutes or in the voices of
singers a certain harmony of the different tones must be preserved,
the interruption or violation of which is intolerable to trained ears,
and as the perfect agreement and harmony is produced by the
proportionate blending of unlike tones, so also is a state made
harmonious by agreement of dissimilar elements, brought about by
a fair and reasonable blending together of the upper, middle, and
lower classes, just as if they were musical tones. What the
33 "In a short time a scattering and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens by
mutual agreement." .
34 eoncordi populo et omnia referente ad ineolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esse
inmutabilius, nihil firmius; faeillimam autem in ea re publiea esse eoncordiam, in qua idem eondueat
omnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, euro aliis aliud expediat, nasei discordias.
96
musicians caH harmonia in song is concordia in a state [in civitate
concordia], the strongest and best bond of permanent union in any
republic; and such [concordia] can never be brought about without
the aid of justice. (Rep. 2.69)35
It is evident that Cicero appreciated a pleasant tune,36 and in this way he is
amplifying his commitment to harmony by recognizing that concordia
civitatis can only succeed with the participation of citizens from aU status-
groups, summi et infimi et medii. As he had learned after his retum from
exile, harmony could not succeed only with the participation of citizens from
the wealthy senatorial and equestrian classes. Consequently, Cicero's laws for
his ideal state point out:
If the senate is recognized as the leader of public policy, and aU the
other orders defend its decrees, and are willing to aUow the highest
order to conduct the government by its wisdom, then this
compromise, by which supreme power is granted to the people and
actual authority to the senate, will make possible the maintenance
of that balanced and harmonious constitution [teneri ille moderatus
et concors civitatis status1
so long as /lthat order shaH be free from dishonour and shaH be a model for
35 ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in cantu ipso ac vocibus concentus est quidam
tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre non
possunt, isque concentus ex dissimilfimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et
congruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas
consensu dissimillimorum concinit; et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate
concordia, artissimum atque optimum omni in re publica vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitia
nullo pacto esse potest.
36 Cf. Leg. 2.38-39 where Cicero dictates a temperate view in music.
97
the rest of the citizens" (Leg. 3.28).37
After his retum from exile, the idea of consensus becomes a broader
part of the notion of concordia. It was not just a governing principle of
Cicero' s politics but also fundamental in his definition of the state:
WeIl, then, a republic is the property of a people. But a people is not
any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way,
but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an
agreement with respect to justice and partnership for the cornmon
good. (Rep. 1.39)38
Justice and partnership for the cornrnon good constituted unifying elernents
for an enduring res publica. SaIlust's phrase: concordia parvae res crescunt
(Iug. 10.6) defined Cicero's thought adequately enough in view of man's
nature as a social and political creature in pursuit of particular interests in
collaboration with others, not in solitude (Rep. 1.39),39 and as such: Brevi
multitudo dispersa atque vaga concordia civitas facta erat (Rep. 1.40; SaIl. Cat.
6.2).
According to Cicero, the idea of consensus was expressed within the
balanced interplay of the three basic elernents of the mixed constitution:
rnagistracy, senate, and people, and in the consensus omnium bonorum, in
which the boni do not refer only to rnernbers of the two privileged orders, but
37 si senatus dominus sit publici consilii, quodque is creverit, defendant omnes, et si
ordines reliqui principis ordinis consilio rem publicam gubernari velint, possif ex temperatione iuris,
cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu sit, teneri il/e moderatus et concors civitatis status, ... Is
ordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto. In the sequel to the De Republica, the De Legibus
provides the laws for Cicero's ideal state; its third book is devoted to the legislative, judicial, and
executive powers of the state.
38 Est igitur, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo
modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.
39 Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1.1253A: "Man is by nature a poltical animaL"
98
also to the populus and plebs loyal to the senate. Following Plato, Cicero's
view of civil government demands that those who govern should not make
decisions for a select group but for the benefit of aIl the governed, which
fulfills an indispensible condition of concordia within the totum corpus rei
publicae (Off. 1.85).40 Menenius Agrippa's fable of the limbs and the body
serves as an example for the metaphor totum corpus rei publicae to further
explain the totality of a harmonious state (Off. 3.22).41 Developed further, the
concept of concordia is defined in terms of musical harmony (Rep. 2.69, above).
This matches Plato's ideal of homonoia when harmonia is the musical
metaphor used to show that temperance is the virtue that unifies the
strongest, intermediate, and weakest classes of the state together in wisdom,
courage, wealth, and justice (Resp. 4.432a-b). According to Plato, harmony
govems an orderly world, state, and soul, as explained in the Gorgias: "Wise
men tell us that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by
communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that
is the reason why they calI the whole of this world by the name of order
(kosmos), not of disorder or dissoluteness" (508a). Cicero appreciated the
importance of unity among a variety of multiple elements, as he points out:
The great men of the past, having a wider mental grasp, had also a
far deeper insight than our mind'seye can achieve, when they
asserted that aIl this universe above us and below is one single
whole, and is held together by a single force and harmony of nature
[consensione naturae]. For there exists no class of things which can
40 For Cicero's allusions to Plato, see Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentaryon Cicero, De
Officiis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 220-222.
41 Livy narrates the fable (2.32.8-12). For Greek influences regarding the fable, see Dyck,
526-7; cf. Arnaldo Momiglano, "Camillus and Concord," C/assica/ Quarter/y, 36 (1942), 117-18.
99
stand by itself, severed from the rest, or which the rest can dispense
with and yet be able to preserve their own force and everlasting
existence. (De Or. 3.19)42
In this way, consensus omnium bonorum becomes the principle by which
the republic must continue to exist: hune statum, qui nunc est, qualiseumque
est, nulla alia re nisi eoneordia retinere possumus, said Cicero around the
time of the triumviral conference at Luca in 56 (Har. Resp. 61).43
The concept of the boni which Cicero is now placing in the foreground,
was in fact important throughout the orator1s legal and senatorial career.
Cicero marked the boni, also known as optimi, as his loyal supporters and
defenders of the res publiea, pax, and 0 ti u m.
44
A first definition for this group
was actually expressed in Pro Quinctio in 81.45 They were characterized as
defenders of the laws and of civil peace and concord.46 This view was notable
in the aUack on senatorial corruption of the juries in the oration against
Verres in 70 and is explicit at the end of the speeches: "the infringement of a
Roman citizen' s rights, in whatsoever land, and among whatsoever people, is
a thing which affects the freedom and dignity of aIl Roman citizens/l (Verr.
42 veteres illi maius quiddam animo complexi, multo plus etiam vidisse videntur quam
quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest, qui omnia haec, quae supra et subter, unum
esse et una vi atque consensione naturae constricat esse dixerunt. NuJ/um est enim genus rerum
quod aut avu/sum a ceteris per se ipsum constare aut quo cetera si careant, vim suam atque
aeternitatem conservare possint.
43 "It is by unity of will alone that we can maintain the present condition of the state, such
as it is." See Poschl, 341.
44 Each influential political figure had his own circle of bonifrom which to draw support;
see W. K. Lacey, "Boni atque Improbi," Greece and Rome, 17 (1970), 10-11: G. Achard, "L'Emploi
de boni, boni viri, boni cives et de leurs formes superlatives dans l'action politique de Cicron,"
Les tudes classiques, 41 (1973), 209-210.
45 See above p. 10.
46 Lacey, 13.
100
2.5.143).47 Similarly, in Pro Caecina: "For he who thinks that the law [ius
civile] is to be despised is sundering the bonds which maintain not only
judicial procedure but the weH-being and life of the community...no
institution in our state deserves to he so carefully preserved as the law" (70).48
Dignitas, libertas, and aequitas had to be duly maintained and secured by the
rule of law (Clu. 146) and preserved by the boni.
It was not until Cicero' s consulship, when, along with concordia
ordinum, the consensus bonorum was the description for the unanimous
support he had gained during his term of office. At the end of his second
agrarian speech before an assembly of the people in the forum, it was clearly
stated: "You, whose influence is based on your votes, your liberty on the laws,
your rights on the justice of the courts and equity of the magistrates, and your
property on peace, you ought to preserve your 0 t i um by aH possible means"
(Leg. Agr.2.102).49 Only the consensus politics of the boni could ensure the
maintenance of legislation and civil harmony for the common people.
But the boni were not always a united group. It frustrated Cicero that
sorne "so-called" boni were supporters of Catiline, Clodius (Cael. 12; Har.
Resp.48), and the triumvirate (Fam. 1.9.1). In addition, Cicero maintains that
it was their ungratefullack of support that forced him into exile (Att. 2.16.2,
3.13.2; Fa m. 1.9.5). They were occasionally a cause for disappointment and
their support was not always guaranteed as Cicero had explained to Atticus
47 sed ubicumque terrarum et gentium vio/atum ius civium Romanorum sil, statuitis id
pertinere ad communem causam Iibertatis et dignitatis.
48 Nam qui ius civile contemnendum putat, is vincu/a revellit non modo iudiciorum, sed
etiam utilitatis vitaeque communis;... nihil esse in civitate tam diligenter quam ius civile retinendum.
Cf. Rep. 1.49: quare cum /ex sit civilis societatis vincu/um, ius autem /egis aequa/e, quo iure
societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium?
49 vos, qoorum gratia in suffragiis consistit, /ibertas in /egibus, ius in iudiciis et aequitate
magistratuum, res familiares in pace, omni ratione otium retinere debetis.
101
after Clodius' acquittal on the charge of impiety in the Bona Dea scandal in
June 61: "That status of the res publica...which seemed to have been secured
by the union of omnes boni, and the influence of my consulship...has slipped
from our grasp" (Alt. 1.16.6). A main feature in Cicero's thought was that the
boni were always supposed to support the rule of law and otium, they were
not to disregard the processes of law by the flagrant bribery exhibited in
Clodius' trial. In his view, no one can pose as a vir bonus and succeed since
impostors of peace and concordia are ultimately found guilty: nummarius
interpres pacis et concordiae non probabatur (Clu. 101).50 There was bitter
reaction to Caesar's consulship in 59 when those who called themselves boni
turned their allegiance toward the triumvir: "n won' t be [Caesar' s] army that
will keep me under so much as the ingratitude of the honest men [boni] as
they are so-called, who have never made me the slightest return or
recompense, material or verbal" (Alt.2.16.2). Opportunistic boni such as these
revealed their disinterest to oppose Caesar's rule. Cicero acknowledges that
the law of vis is the law of nature (Sest. 91H). He opposed the politics of
coercion throughout the fifties which became most prominent in Caesar' s
consulship in 59 and the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 55, all
the result of triumviral collusion. He further opposed the power exercised by
the tribune Clodius,51 and the continuous civil strife instigated by him and
Milo up to 52. The senate was left powerless amidst it all. Coercion, or
forceful imposition of one's will, weakened the dignitas of political office and
mocked the privilege of auctoritas inherent in that office. Any legislation
passed by magistrates who forced themselves into political office through
50 "His pose as the paid agent of peace and goodwill carried no conviction."
51 This is revealed in the post-exile speeches, especially De Domo Sua.
102
bribery or intimidation should, in Cicero's view, be considered void and of no
legal effect since the voters were not given the chance to exercise their
democratic rights and their support was obtained through coercion.
52
Much
attention in the De Republica has been given to the conclusion that the state
should be guided by a single individual, a rector or princeps, but the work,
taken together with the De Oratore and De Legibus, points out that "the res
publica was based on law, and that law was backed by the consensus of omnes
boni" also referred to as optimates.
53
For Cicero, the optimates represent the
vast majority of citizens, aU sani, boni, and beati because they hope for otium
cum dignitate (Sest. 98), whereas the leaders of the plebs are the pauci, the
fraudulent few whose support was bought through coercion.
Thus for greater political effectiveness and philosophical reasons,
Cicero abandons the notion of concordia ordinum, with its rather limited
elitist membership, and extends his thoughts more to the aU inclusive
consensus omnium bonorum and concordia civium.
54
The boni come to
refer to Cicero's supporters and defenders of the res publica, who were
encouraged to respect the laws and maintain harmony within the state. They
included senators,55 equites,56 businessmen and financiers,57 prominent
52 Lacey, 14.
53 Lacey, 15; cf. Marcus Wheeler, Cicero's Politicalldeal," Greece and Rome, 21 (1952),
49-56. By knowing the republic and its laws the good citizen could detend the state and its
institutions through his oratorical abilities.
54 Cicero's tirst thoughts about a consensus omnium bonorumwere expressed in SuU.
29 and Flac. 99 and was later developed philosophically in Sest. 71 and 106, Mil. 87, Fat. 2, Off. 1.8.
55 Mur. 70; Att. 4.8a.2; Leg. 3.20.
56 Att. 2.16.1, 2.19.3, 9.12.3; Off. 2.27; Fam. 13.11.3; cf. Nicolet, L'Ordre questre, 1,190.
57 Verr. 2.3.183; Mil. 94; cf. Comm. Pet. 53.
103
citizens, the newly enfranchised, and citizens from many other classes of
Roman society.58 They were not an elite group but a broad socio-political
force designated as defensores rei publicae and amantes rei publicae (Cat. 3.5;
flac. 8; Sesto 116) whose role was to re-inforce the poUties of the senate as a
governing body and respect senatorial authority.59 This is made clear in the
Pro Sestio (96, 97, 100) when the boni are re-defined as optimates. A larger
group of people at every sociallevel are optimates who respect the
constitution and love peaee (Sest. 98). Senators, equites, municipales,
negotiatores, rustici,60 and enfranehised are aIl eonsidered wealthy and sani,
and described as those who "have sought to engage in politics" (Sest. 96).61 As
pointed out in Cicero's eorrespondenee at this period a bonus vir must also be
a bonus civis.62 Bonus, and its superlative optimus, indicate the moral
quality of the honest citizen, a person of principle whether judge or
financier.
63
The term is often associated with honestus,fortis, beatus,
fortunatus, and locuples to further qualify the eharacter of the good citizen.
64
58 See Achard, "L'Emploi de boni," 209, n. 15.
59 J. Hellegouarc'h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la
rpublique(Paris: Socit d'dition "Les Belles Lettres," 1963), 492; Achard, 210 and 212.
60 Sorne rustici were already considered wealthy inhabitants of thecountryside in Rose.
Am. 20.
61 versari in re publica... studuerunt; this attitude is alsa found in Leg. Agr. 2.9 and Rep.1.52.
62Att. 7.7.5,10.1.3,10.11.4; Faro. 5.21.1.
63 Verr. 2.1.75, 2.3.183, 2.4.102.
64 Quinet. 24; Rose. Am. 24, 140; Verr. 2.1.127; Sest. 98; Gael. 14; Plane. 86; Mil. 4;
Phil. 13.16, 13.23.
104
Otium cum Dignitate
Affiliated with this new outlook of civic harmony is an aim denoted as
otium cum dignitate. This tranquil standard of peaceful existence and
stability was supposed to emerge from the cooperation demonstrated "among
the citizens of Italy. As we have seen, 0 t iumitself had already been
implemented in a political context during the consulship of 63, used
synonymously with the terms pax and concordia, and frequently repeated
within catchphrases including pax and libertas (especially in the speeches De
Lege Agraria).
For the Romans, pax meant simply the absence of war brought about by
the legal existence of a treaty or pactio.
65
Otium conveyed the moralquality of
this pax and was often used as itssynonym.
66
Hs phiiosophicai value
67
and
socio-politicai significance
68
indicated the internaI tranquillity in astate free
from civil strife.
69
This calmness in the state provided the necessary Ieisure
that could be enjoyed by those who appreciated a period of rest from regular
work or retirement trom duty.7o When civil disorder was highest, otium was
65 Weinstock, 267.
66 Jal, "cc Pax Civilis - ccConcordia," 216. In many current texts otiumis often transJated
as "peace" or "tranquillity" and so "Ieisure" results from this peaceful condition.
67 Pierre Boyanc, "Cum Dignitate Otium," Revue des tudes anciennes, 43 (1941),
172-191.
68 Ch. Wirszubski, "Cicero's Cum Dignitate Otium: A Reconsideration," Journal of Roman
Studies, 44 (1954), 1-13.
69 See Leg. Agr. 2.9 where pax externa is contrasted with otium domesticum.
70 Phil. 11.38: (the veterans) qui otio delectantur.
105
often expressed in direct contrast to bellum (civile).71 Otium also represented
a necessary condition for the existence of harmony, as Caesar pointed out in
his speech to the people of Hispalis in Spain: neque in otio concordiam neque
ln bello virtutem... retinere potuistis (B. Hisp.42).72
From the beginning of his consulship and for the next twenty years,
Cicero used the terms otium, pax, and concordia in various combinations,
sometimes placed opposite bellum or seditio, in order to define the true or
expected condition of the state in times of civil disturbance and civil war.
73
Sallust used the same terms to describe expectations for the Sullan years.
74
Caesar also hoped for otium in 49 (B. Civ. 1.5.5), having wished for quietem
Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii (B. Civ. 3.57.4).
As a political slogan, otium cum dignitate had a relatively short run of
only four years. The two key words first occur in the two Post reditum
speeches of September 57. Subject and theme are succinctly explained and
defined in the Pro Sestio (96-99, 104) delivered in February 56. A year later, it
is treated again in the first section of the De Oratore. Finally in 54, it is cast in
the long letter of political apology written to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9.21).
In gratitude for Pompey' s loyal efforts effecting his recall from exile,
71 Sali. Hist. 1.77.11: (Lepidus) metuit otium, odit bellum.Cat. 1.25, 4.17; Mur. 83; Rep.
2.43; Off. 1.77; Att. 2.1.4 (June 60): ac nunc quidem otium est. This contrast is significant in the
civil war period of the forties: AU. 7.18.2 (Feb. 49), Att. 9.7.1 (April 49); Fam. 2.16.2 (May 49), Fam.
5.21.2 (April 46}, Fam. 10.31.6 (April 43}, Fam. 10.32.5 (June 43); Matius is auctoroti in March 49
(Att. 9.11.2) but in April 44 (AU. 14.2.3) he is inimicissimum oti; Fam.11.2.2 (April 44); Att. 14.21.2
and 14.21.4 (May 44), Att. 14.22.1 (May 44), Att. 15.2.3 (May 44), Att. 15.1.5 (May 44), Att.
16.168.2 (July 44), Att. 16.16C.3 (July 44); Fam. 11.20.4 (May 43).
72 "Consequently you have neVr been able to maintain harmony in peace or high morale
in war."
73 Leg. Agr. 1.23-24, 2.102, 3.4; Mur. 1, 55, 78, 86; Q. Fr. 1.1.34; Red. Quir. 1, 20; Dom.
15, 137; Provo Cons. 39; Pis. 73; Marcell. 27; Fat. 2; Phil. 1.17, 2.113, 5.41, 8.10-11, 10.3,
11.36,13.7; Ad Brut. 1.15.4.
74 Hist. 1.48.25: pax et composita ... otium.
106
Cicero said: "he gave to me, a personal friend, all that he had given to the
whole state salutem, otium, dignitatem" (Red. Quir. 16). Salus was also
Cicero' s consular slogan and he reminds his audience that:
On the day when 1 vowed to sacrifice myself and my fortunes in the
cause of your safety, tranquillity, and union [incolumitate, otio,
concordiaque] 1prayed that if ever 1had placed considerations of my
own interest before those of your safety [saluti], 1 should sustain
eternal punishment (Red. Quir. 1).75
There is a connection between the state' s welfare in 63, in which he saved the
state against Catiline, and his exile in 58 for the sake of the people's welfare.
5ince Cicero identified himself with the state, his restoration coincided with
the restoration of 0 ti um to his fellow citizens.
76
Public rioting instigated by Clodius' operae and disruption of civic
administration caused Cicero to turn his attention to otium. Praise was
bestowed upon those magistrates such as Lentulus and Milo (Sest. 87) who
worked within the honourable confines of organizational government
pleading their case in the senate for Cicero' s return. Senatorial decrees in the
exile's favour and a proposal for his recall were sanctioned by a public vote in
the comitia centuriata. This was in contrast to the illegality of Clodius'
tribunate (ratified during Caesar' s consulship a year before) which made his
bills de capite civis Romanis and de exsilio Ciceronis invalid. 5ince the first
law forced Cicero to flee Rome, the latter law was also illegal because Cicero
was denied his civil right to defend himself at his own trial, thus he was
75 eo tempore quum me tortunasque meas pro vestra incolumitate, otio concordiaque
devovi, precatus sum ut, si meas rationes umquam vestrae sa/uti anteposuissem, sempiternam
poenam sustinerem mea vo/untate susceptam.
76 J. P. V. O. Balsdon, "Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium," C/assica/ Quarter/y, n.s. 10 (1960),
47; Nicholson, 43.
107
condemned in absentia.
77
Use of force and violence by Cicero's opponent to
ensure an objective contrasted with Cicero's unselfish withdrawal from Rome
to prevent his supporters from resorting to violence on his behalf (Red. Sen.
6; Red. Quir.14).
ln Pro Sestio, Cicero defines 0 tium cum dignitate as the course of action
for the optimates, comprising viri boni, within the balance of a mixed
constitution. At the head of the constitution was a strong senate elected by
the people, supported by omnes boni, and served by the annually elected
magistrates entrusted with the administration of Roman affairs. The loyal
supporters had to be sani, beati, financially secure, and could come from any
social class in Italy with the ability to defend the unsurpassable dignity,
prominence, and principles of the senate in the capital and support the
organization of Roman republican government. In this way, the ideal was
promoted by a consensus Italiae, whose members were the optimates, the
entire senatus populusque Romanus, that is, aH patriotic citizens loyal to the
Roman constitution (Sest. 97f).
Cicero envisaged resistance from sorne conservative members of the
Roman nobility since they resented Italian municipal aristocrats infiltrating
the senate.
78
In spite of this hostility, Cicero makes an appeal for conciliation
for the purpose of political harmony. In the interest of otium treachery from
those boni who were supposed to help in Cicero's restoration is pardoned in
return for dignitas:
1 pass over the crimes committed against me by certain people. It is
not the time to recall these injuries, even if 1 were able to avenge
77 Tatum, 156; Nicholson, 43.
78 Red. Sen. 33; Red. Quir. 21; Att. 3.9.2; Nicholson, 43-44.
108
them, which 1 would nevertheless prefer to forget. My whole life
should be lifted to a different level: 1 must thank people for their
services, cherish the friendship proven by fire, wage war against
open enemies, pardon timid friends, 1 must not expose traitors, and
1 must calm the grief arising from my departure by the dignitas of
my retum. (Red. Sen. 23)
There is also an inclination to honourably overlook certain disservices,
since the preservation of universal harmony is considerably more significant
than to retaliate:
The requital 1 shall exact for their crimes shall be accommodated to
the provocation 1 have received from each class; 1 shall punish
unpatriotic citizens by a wise administration of the state;
treacherous friends by crediting nothing and suspecting everything,
the envious by a devotion to glory and virtue, and the cheating
merchants by recalling them home and holding them responsible
for their provincial administration. (Red. Qui r. 21)
Cicero will pardon those who have injured him but will hold
accountable anyone who has disregarded the salus of the state. He is mainly
referring to A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso, proconsuls in 57, who were
busily creating trouble in their provinces.
79
Civil harmony is at the core of
Cicero's ideal of otium cum dignitate. Devious and immoral behaviour,
bribery, corruption, disregard for the law, and constitutional disrespect should
not be left unpunished. Contentedly confident of his ability Cicero explains:
Fellow citizens, l set greater concem by showing my gratitude
79 Parthia's friendly relations with Rome were weakened by the imprudence of Gabinius,
who as proconsul of Syria, supported a rebel brother of King Orodes II. This led to skirmishes
against Roman armies in Armenia and Mesopotamia where Crassus was eventually defeated.
Piso's administration in Macedonia was attacked byCicero in two speeches (Prov. Cons. and Pis.).
109
to you, to whom 1am so deeply indebted, than by visiting
upon my enemies requital for the cruel wrong 1have
suffered at their hands. Indeed it is an easier matter to
avenge a wrong than to repaya kindness; there is less effort
involved to be superior to wicked men than to be at the same
level with good men [bonis] ; and furthermore, one is not so
strictly bound in duty to requite disservice as to recompense
service. (Red. Quir.22)80
On numerous occasions, it satisfies mm immensely to proc1aim a deep feeling
of thanks to ms loyal supporters, the boni, among all social orders in the
senate, forum, comitia, and aliltaly whom he summons to act as participants
in the promotion of civic harmony.81
In essence, otium exists in the absence of political strife and disorder
and dignitas is the maintenance of a public figure' s personal image and
prestige within the c1imate of otium. The De Republica (1.43) acknowledges
gradus dignitatis. As supreme council of the state, the senate's dignitas was
unsurpassable and, as such, the equestrian order's dignitas would always
follow as secondary (Dom. 74; Suet.Vesp. 9). Dignitas represented a
politician' s reputation and status, his position in relation to others in the
social order or community. It was important for any political figure in the
late republic to promote and preserve his public image (Leg.Agr. 3.4; Plane.
93-94). Florus placed dignitas as the main reason for the triumvirate's
association: Pompey had to defend his dignitas against Cato's
80 and following: "Animosity can be appeased with appeals or dismissed in consideration
of the republican and common welfare, or checked by the difficulty of revenge or fade with time.
But it is not permissible that you be persuaded from dishonouring your benefactors...nor is any
excuse admissable for postponing the recollection of favours" (Red. Quir. 23).
81 Nicholson, 45.
110
uncompromising political position; Crassus was firmly based with birth,
wealth, and dignitas; and together IICaesar being desirous of winning, Crassus
of increasing, and Pompey of retaining his position [dignitatem], and all alike
being eager for power, readily came to an agreement to seize the government"
(2.9-11).82 Once back in Rome Cicero proclaimed: III took the republic with me
and retumed at the height of my prestige [dignitate]" (Dom. 87)83 - a proud
expression since, as he says: III had always made dignitas my rule of life, and
thought that nothing in life was to be sought for by a man without it" (Sest.
48).84 This attitude changes when Pompey and Crassus gain the consulship of
55 by intrigue, manipulation, and potential threat of force. Cicero feU he
could no longer speak with dignitas in the senate and preserve an
independent attitude in politics (Fa m. 1.8.3). At which point he was more
than ready to retire into a life of scholarly 0 ti um (Fam. 1.8.3-4). Furthermore,
Gabinius' acquittaI in October 54 caused this complaint: lIyou can see that
there is really no republic in existence, no senate, no law-courts, no position
of authority [nullam dignitatem] held by any one of us" (Q. Fr. 3.4.1).85 50
Cicero decided to seek 0 ti um at his Tusculan villa (Fa m. 3.4.6). For a private
individual, 0 tium referred to the enjoyment of retired life or the tranquillity
of not participating in a public life. But indulgence in voluptas due to otium
was not considered dignus (Sest. 138). Retirement from public life to engage
in scholarly pursuits was regarded honestum otium (Sail. Cat. 4). Accordingly,
82 Caesare dignitatem comparare, Crassa augere, Pompeio retinere cupientibus,
omnibusque pariter potentiae cupidis de invadenda re publica facile convenit.
83 afui simul cum republica redii cum maxima dignitate.
84 cum omnia semper ad dignitatem rettulissem nec sine ea quicquam expetendum esse
homini in vita putassem.
85 vides nul/am esse rempublicam, nul/um senatum, nulla iudicia, nul/am in ullo nostrum
dignitatem.
111
Cicero looked forward to otium senectutis (Att. 2.3.4).86 But he did not enjoy
the violence that prevailed over his honestum otium (Fam. 5.21.2).
In public matters, otium referred both to the peace that resulted after
foreign conflicts87 and political domestic tranquillity or freedom from civil
war.
88
For the sake of otium the boni must pledge to defend with dignitas:
"religious observances, the auspices, the powers of the magistrates, the
authority of the senate, the laws, ancestral custom, criminal and civil
jurisdiction, credit, our provinces, our allies, the renown of our sovereignty,
the army, the treasury" (Sest. 98).89 Ail political, social, religious, and
economic institutions must be preserved and maintained with honour for
the prosperity and welfare of the state and its constitution.
90
In contrast,
when the boni capitulated to the malicious schemes of treacherous populares,
for the sake of seeking a peaceful compromise and avoiding civil unrest, then
a c1imate of otium sine dignitate was achieved (Sest. 100), and also described
as otium quod abhorreat a dignitate (Sest. 98). This was supposed to be
avoidable when the people and optimate politicians agreed with one another.
In Cicero's opinion, the people had no desire for civil war (Sest. 104) and
otium cum dignitate meant precisely astate free from civil and foreign strife
and respect for the decision made by the electorate and by the elected members
of government. In turn, the dignitas of the members of the senatorial council
86 Alife away trom poUtics was never too far from his mind: quid si cessare Iibeat et in oti
portum confugere?(Att. 4.6.2).
87 Sallust (Iug. 41.4) described the military victories of Rome in the second century B.e.
as otium ab hostibus.
88 otium domesticum( Leg. Agr. 2.9), salus communis atque otium(Sest. 5,15).
89 religiones, auspicia, potestates magistratuum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum,
iudicia, iuris dictio, fides, provinciae, socii, imperii laus, res militaris, aerarium: ct Sesto 137; Leg. 2.8.
90 Balsdon, 47.
112
dignitatem rei publicae sustinent (Do m. 3). As supreme council, it was the
role of the senate to welcome aU citizens from aU classes according to
industria and virtus (Sest. 137).
The Pro Sestio and the four speeches pertaining to Cicero' s return from
exile praise the restoration of ordedy government (D0 m. 25) and contrast the
breakdown of government in 58 due to a) the inferior leadership of the two
consuls Piso and Gabinius who were unworthy of that office (Dom. 62, 91),
b) the novus dominatus (Dom. 68), which caused Cicero's banishment and
expeUed the res publica with him (Dom. 87), and c) the continuous faction
fighting of Milo and Sestius against Clodius. Because of his acts against Cicero
and the republic Oodius was oti et pads hostis,...cum tibi salus esse in otio
nulla posset (D0 m. 12-13), whereas Cicero' s recaU was spes oti et concordiae
(Dom. 15) since during his exile otium and the dignitas of government had
disappeared {D0 m. 2).91
After all the talk of consensus omnzum bonorum and 0 tium cum
dignitate Cicero entered into "a strange new phase"92 when he supported
Caesar publicly. In March 56, in a private letter to Quintus, Cicero expressed
his astonishment at the "monstrous" senatorial proposaIs granted to Caesar
after the triumvir's two-year campaign in Gaul (Q. Fr. 2.4.5).93 Yet, Cicero's
public "palinode" De Provinciis Consularibus, published a few months later,
was a panegyric of Caesar' s achievements in Gaul and revealed that he
91 Balsdon, 49.
92 D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero(London: Duckworth, Ltd., 1971), 84.
93 The proposais granted were: 1) Caesar would not be succeeded by a consul of 55,
thus foregoing the operation of the Jex Sempronia; 2) A commission of ten legates, instead of the
requisite three, appointed by the senate would assist in the organization of the province; 3) A
stipendium to cover the expense of four extra legions. For a treatment of these proposais, see
J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Roman History, 65-50 B.C.: Five Problems," Journal of Roman Studies, 52
(1962), 137-139.
113
supported the senate's decision in securing the passage of the three
proposals.
94
The speech was also a dedaration of his support for the
triumvirate,95 since, by now, consensus ordinum est divulsus (Har. Resp. 60).
This new alignment was all in the name of concordia. He concedes that
Caesar had never really been his enemy and so gives him a favourable vote,
if, among other things, "it is a question of sorne honourable mention, l will
have regard for concordia in the senate" (Prov. Cons.47).96 In another speech,
Cicero makes it dear that he was the one who actually tabled the three
proposals and believes political conditions should be adjusted to the
conditions of the moment: "1 desired certain ends, strove for them, did my
best: they were not secured...nor did 1think it more advisable to be swayed by
my old disagreement with Caesar than to adapt myself to the present needs of
the republic and promote concordia" (Balb. 61).97 Similarly, a subsequent
explanation is provided when disapproval is shown against the political
inconsistency of his new alliance. In response to the daim of forfeiting
dignitas, Cicero argues that a politician must sometimes regard his own safety
after doing his best for the safety of the state (Fam. 1.7.7). A politician has the
94 For the reference to the term "palinode," see Att. 4.5.1-3; and the discussion in D. R.
Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, \1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965),
app. Il, 233-234. Cicero admits he had to be cautious before allying himself with Caesar (Att.
4.6.2), but declares that he was encouraged by the senate's position and 50 lent it his support
(Prov. Cons. 25).
95 Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman, 184-185. Cicero's support for Caesar was al50
demonstrated in the non-extant speech Pro Caesare in Senatu delivered after the conference at
Luca and before the delivery of the De Provinciis Consularibus; see Jane W. Crawford, M. Tullius
Cicero: The Lost and Unpublished Orations(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1984),
158-162.
96 si honos quidam, senatus concordiae consulam.
97 voluimus quaedam, contendimus, experti sumus: obtenta non sunLneque me
dissensioni meae pristinae putavi potius adsentiri quam praesentibus rei publicae temporibus et
concordiae convenire.
114
liberty to assess situations (Plane. 93) and must adapt himself to changing
circumstances if necessary for the public good. He changed his political views
orny because that was the way by which he could further the state's welfarei a
politician must always move with the times:
AlI my knowledge, experience, reading...goes to prove not that men
have held the same unvarying convictions till their death, but
rather that they have adapted them to political circumstances, to the
tendency of the times, and to the considerations of harmony [ratio
concordiae]. (Planc. 94)98
Shackleton Bailey interprets the volte-face in this way:
[Cicero] needed to assert himself somehow... and a demonstration in
favour of Caesar would gratify his now almost pathological rancour
against the purblind, supercilious aristocrats who had ''betrayed''
him in 58, grudged his self-glorified renaissance in 57, petted the
abominable Clodius, and rejected his superior statesmanship in
jealousy of himselfand pigheaded hostility to Pompey. (Cicero, 85)
The ratio concordiae with the triumviral coalition was both economic
and persona!. Territorial expansion resulted in new sources of wealth and
Cicero supported Caesar's military capabilities in stabilizing Gaul as a Roman
province for economic motives (Prov. Cons. 32). It was not possible to oppose
a general who had accomplished such extraordinary military feats for the
welfare of the republic (Pis. 81). The economic advantages of foreign
conquests could not go unnoticed. Roman citizens living in Italy already
98 Ego vero haec didici, haec vidi, haec scripta legi...non semper easdem sententias ab
iisdem, sed, quascumque rei publicae status, inclinatio temporum, ratio concordiae postularet,
esse defensas.
115
enjoyed tax exemptions since the conquests of the eastem provinces.
99
The
publicani gained enormous profits from tax-contracts. In the Gallic territories,
there were already merchants, negotiatores (middle men/ agents), and
businessmen who promoted and increased commercial interests in trade and
opened markets for local craftsmen and imported raw materials. Many
Roman citizens bought land in Gaul and exaded enormous profits.l
OO
Later
on, when the colonisation of Gaul had been achieved and the census and
collection of tributum was working at peak efficiency Velleius Paterculus
affirmed: "The Gallic territories pay into the treasury a sum equal to, or just a
little less than, that of Egypt, Spain, and other countries" (2.39.2). Cicero's
personal reasons mainly originate from the deal his brother Quintus made to
join Caesar' s staff in return for the triumvir' s support of Cicero' s return from
exile.l
1
In an elaborate letter written to P. Lentulus Spinther in December 54,
Cicero was dissatisfied with the status of the boni and their abandonment of
his cause considering the lengths he went to in order to defend his policy of
concordia. Clodius is described as inimicum.. .legum, iudiciorum, otii, patriae,
bonorum omnium (Fam. 1.9.10). There is an argument that the coalition of
Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus was justified: "If 1saw that the state was in the
hands of unscrupulous and abandoned citizens, as occurred in the days of
Cinna, no dangerous threats would force me to join their cause" (Fam.
99 Inhabitants in Italy were exempt from tributum and only paid vectigalia which was
revenue derived from public lands, mines, saltworks, and general rents from state property.
100 The Pro Quinctio demonstrates this clearly.
101 See Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman, 189.
116
1.9.11).1
02
This statement is followed by words of praise for Pompey and
Caesar (Fam. 1.9.11-12). A reconciliation with Crassus was a difficult but
necessary undertaking.1
03
When Cicero attacked Gabinius in the senate for
restoring Ptolemy Auletes as king in Egypt in 55 Crassus, then consul with
Pompey, defended Gabinius and called Cicero "exile" (Cass. Dio 39.60.1). The
insult left an indelible mark: "He and 1were by this time on quite good terms,
for in the interests of public harmony [communis concordiae causa] 1had, as it
were, expunged by a voluntary amnesty all the very serious injuries he had
done to me" (Fam. 1.9.20).1
04
He is apologetic for his sudden conversion into
an adherent of the triumvirs. It is evident from several passages that both
Cicero and Lentulus appreciated the loyal support from consensus omnium
bonorum; the boni were declared optimates during Cicero's consulship (Fam.
1.9.17), agreed withhis opinions from 63 to 59 (Fa m. 1.9.12), protested his
exile in 58 (Fam. 1.9.13) regardless ofbeing "scattered" and "discouraged"
(Fam. 1.9.17), regained life and motivation by Lentulus during his consulship
in 57 which resulted in Cicero's retum (Fam. 1.9.14 and 17), but at the time
this letter was written, they had ultimately deserted the cause of preserving
otium cum dignitate (Fam. 1.9.20) by their votes in the senate and the law-
courts: "You will not find the feeling of our loyal citizens what it was when
you left, Lentulus. That feeling...has now been totally neglected by the very
men most bound to respect it" (Fam. 1.9.17). Therefore, Plato's advice had
102 Ego si ab improbis et perditis eivibus rempublieam teneri viderem, sieut et Cinneis
temporibus scimus, ...ne perieulis quidem compulsus ullis, ad eorum eausam me adiungerem.
103 For the fitful relationship between Cicero and Crassus, see Bruce A. Marshall, "Cicero
and Sallust on Crassus and Catiline," Latomus, (1974), 804-813 and "Problems in the Career of
Crassus," Liverpool Classieal Monthly, 3 (June 1978),159-164.
104 Ego, eum mihi eum il/o magna iamgratia esset, quod eius omnesgravissimas iniurias
eommunis coneordiae causa voluntaria quadam oblivione eontriveram.
117
always beenfollowed: "assert yourself in politics as long as you can make your
opinion credible to your citizens, for it is as wrong to use violence against
your country as against one of your parents" (Fam. 1.9.18).105
The Definitive Break-up of Triumviral Concordia
After the triumvirate was renewed in 55, coins were again issued
featuring the countenance of the goddess Concordia
106
symbolizing renewed
hope for harmony. However, the triumvirate ended in discord a year later
following the death of Iulia, guarantor of concord between her father Caesar
and husband Pompey.107 At this point, Cicero found it necessary to retire
briefly into a life of contemplation, foregoing a possible second term as
consul.1os
With the death of Crassus in Syria on June 1, 53, the triumvirate was
reduced to a duumvirate and the division of power between the two
remaining generals was more difficult to maintain. It was only a matter of
time before the competitive Roman spirit encouraged one to prevail over the
105 Crito51c: f3ui{EOem B OVX OOLOV OVIE Il-llTpa OVTE 1TaTpa, 1TO},.lJ B TOlJTWV
En nTTOV TTlV 1TaTpOa. Cicero deeply admired Plato and described him as "the man who was by
far the wisest and by far the most learned whom Greece has produced" (Leg. 2.39).
106 Weinstock, 261, n. 10.
107 Vell. Pat. 2.47.2: inter Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem concordiae pignus, lulia uxor
Magni, decessit. Val. Max. 4.6.4: totius terrarum orbis... tranqui/litas tot civilium bel/orum
truculentissimo furore perturbata non esset, si Caesaris et Pompei concordia communis sanguis
vinculo constricta mansisset.
108 It seems as though Cicero enjoyed a period of otium away from the law-courts and the
senate mainly due to the fact that he was appointed a legatuson Pompey's staff; it was a position
which would not allow him to stay within the sacred pomerium, 50 he lived close extra urbem (Aft.
4.19.2). He was alsa elected to the augural college in 53. After defending Rabirius in 54 there is
no record of any clients until Milo in 52. Atticus had returned to Italy in November 54 (Aff. 4.19.1)
and Cicero enjoyed the presence of his friend's company until his own departure for Cilicia in 51
(Aff. 5.1). During this period the De Oratore and De Republica were completed whereas the De
Legibus had just been started.
118
other. Pompey's imperium proconsulare allowed him to stay in Rome while
his legates govemed Spain under his auspicia. Although his proconsular
command did not permit him to step into the sacred pomerium of the city,
Pompey could still take part in all the governmental proceedings by making
the senate come to him and meet outside the sacred limits. He also kept ms
popularity with the masses by providing them with Rome' s first permanent
stone theatre and inaugural games. But the turmoil and civil disorder at
Rome weakened rather than strengthened his reputation. In fact, a new
building and special games could not disguise the unhealthy hostilities (or
malaise) in the city. In 53 there were so many acts of violence and riots by the
opposing armed mobs led by Clodius and Milo that meetings of the comitia
could not be held for proper elections. The city was at a political standstill as
the great Pompey was incapable of controlling the situation. Mattersgot
worse when word reached Rome that Crassus andhis army were defeated in
the sands of Syria and that serious insurrections from Gallic tribes needed
Caesar' s immediate attention. If the senate and the triumvirs themselves
could not manage to bring the republic back to the concordia civitatis Cicero
hoped for, then aIl was in serious jeopardy.109
The elections for 52 had to be postponed numerous times due to
persistent scuffles and conflicts. Clodius and Milo, impetuous agitators, were
among the candidates for office. Clodius sought a position as praetor, whereas
Milo wanted the consulship, both resorted to such methods of intimidation
and violence that the result was an unprecedented event in republican
109 ln a despondent tone Cicero urged Atticus: quin tu huc advolas et invisis iIlius nostrae
rei publicae germanae puta<mina>? ..olface dictaturam (Aff. 4.19.1). On the deterioration of the
triurnvirate, see Gruen, Last Generation, 451-454; Scullard, From the Gracchi, 118-122; and
Taylor, Party Politics, 142-148.
119
history: the year 52 began without any elected representatives.
110
At the beginning of the year the final conflict between the two main
agitators came to an end with the death of Clodius. But Rome's (and Milo's)
troubles were not over. The mob who admired Clodius and believed him to
be their protector and an avenger of their cause honoured their leader by
building a funeral pyre so close to the curia that the latter bumed to the
ground. The patres conscripti were naturally outraged and finaUy nominated
an interrex, who in turn entrusted Pompey to stand as sole consul (until
August) with the duty to save the republic from further discord.lll
Pompey had proved his ability to overcome the distrust or hostility of
people and nations and win their regard or favour. As sole consul, he could
be relied upon because he was: i) admired by the plebs for his munificence and
by the equites for opening the eastern provinces to their business activities,
li) respected by the senate because he was less threatening than Caesar and less
understanding with the populares, and after all, iii) the only man at the time
with unmatched authority. Prompt new legislation (leges Pompeiae)
included a severe law on v i s, under which Milo was prosecuted for Clodius'
murder. Cicero was hired as his defence lawyer but was intimidated by the
soldiers guarding the court and thus not allowed to speak.
112
Milo was
convicted and went into exile at Massalia in southem Caul.
The two main agitators of Rome were finally gone and once their
followers had been dispersed the city once again experienced a period of calm
and order due mainly to Pompey's efforts. AIl in aU, Pompey' s loyal devotion
110 For the violent political feud between Clodius and Milo, see Gruen, 443-444.
111 For the events in 52, see R. Seager, Pompey: A Political Biography (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), 142-150; and Taylor, 148-152.
112 The speech was later published as a political pamphlet.
120
to Rome gained him proper admiration from the good men of the senate.
Meanwhile Caesar' s reputation was hindered by the uprisings in Gaul, which
were viewed more as events provoked by his ambitious audacity than by his
loyalty to Rome. In this way, Pompey could now be considered even greater
than his declared cognomen, having saved the republic not with an army but
within the limits of legislation and mos maiorum. In August 52, Pompey
showed respect for the Roman constitution's requirement of two consuls and
so he took Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio as his colleague for the remaining
part of the year. As a reward for his services and loyalty to the constitution,
the senate extended Pompey's proconsular imperium of Spain until
December 31, 47 and so he was allowed to remain in Rome to protect the state.
By the end of 51, after a three-year military campaign which saw the
total subjugation of Gaul, Caesar held more power than the senate wished to
recognize. His superior military ingenuity and loyal army were about to
become fatal factors in a proconsular imperium that was about to expire. He
decided to remain an extra year to stabilize the region.
According to the lex Licinia Pompeia of 55, Caesar's five year term as
proconsular governor in Gaul would end on February 28, 50 without the
possibility for renewal (Cass. Dio 29.33). Thus he would become a private
citizen once again and be brought to trial basically for refusing to cooperate
with the senate.. Of course, he wanted to avoid this by possibly seeking the
consulship (Cass. Dio 40.51; Suet. lui. 28). But the elections of the consuls S.
Sulpicius Rufus and M. Claudius Marcellus in 51 and L. Aemilius Paulus and
C. Claudius Marcellus in 50 only instigated hostilities at Rome. The
optimates' attacks on Caesar began with M. Claudius Marcellus who med to
bring Caesar' s term to an end by declaring that the war in Gaul was over as
121
early as of September 51 and the army should be dismissed. But Pompey and
the other consul Rufus opposed such an illegal proposal.11
3
The following year, 50, the optimates continued their attacks onCaesar,
who curiously gained the support of Curio. The tribune, indebted to the
general (Cass. Dio 40.61), vetoed a decision by C. Claudius Marcellus regarding
a possible successor to Caesar in Gaul. Also, two of Caesar's legions were
taken away in order to be transported to the war against the Parthians who
had just invaded Syria. But they remained quartered at Capua. In the first
week of December, Marcellus convinced his fellow-senators that since
Caesar' s behaviour was aiming toward tyranny and he was preparing an
invasion of Italy all ms commands should be revoked and given to
Pompey.114 The senate agreed and Marcellus asked Pompey to defend the
republic against Caesar.
The pact of the triumvirs in 60 was now reduced to a two-man
competition between the soldier-statesman Caesar and the great Pompey,
conqueror of three worlds. And the senate could only look on as the events
unfolded between them; considering it to be impossible for Caesar to preserve
such a vast empire with the traditional institutions already in place, and
daring Pompey not to think that he could displace the current political
organization.l
15
On December 9, 50, Cicero dispatched a letter to Atticus telling him that
he was glad that his term as governor in Clicia had ended and he was on ms
113 For a discussion on the Jex Licinia Pompeia, see Seager, 150-152.
114 Pompey's reputation was very much intact as proven by the enthusiastic support
among the masses after he recovered from his iIIness (Plut. Pomp. 57).
115 Seager, 153-159; Taylor, 157-161; Gruen, 483-490.
122
way back to Rome which, as Cicero says, was "all for the best" (Att. 7.3.2).1
16
He was eager to continue ms senatorial duties in the city and promote
concordia or sorne aspect of it: "For if matters can be brought either to a
peaceful settlement [ad concordiam) or to victory for the honest men, 1 should
in both of these two cases wish to help or at any rate not to be on the outside"
(Att.7.3.2).117 Caesar's power and influence had become too great and Cicero
would still only support Pompey as ms helmsman to protect the concordia of
the state: "the only bark for me will be the one that has Pompey at the helm.. .I
shaH urge Pompey to concordia. For my feeling is that things are in a very
perilous state indeed" (Att.7.3.5).118 But the brief meeting with Pompey did
not result in a positive outlook. Since Pompey was estranged from Caesar
war seemed inevitable: "he talked as though we were certainly in for war,
nothing to suggest a hope of agreement [ad spem concordiaef' (Att. 7.4.2).1
19
Yet Cicero did not want to believe that Caesar was impetuous enough to wage
such a war. It was the hope for concordia, that is, an agreement or
compromise between the two generals, not pax that stirred Cicero's eagerness
to save the republic from the turmoils of a bellum civile.120 To seek pax
would only imply a war was about to take place.l
21
116 sed 'quid si hoc melius?' saepe opportune dici videtur, ut in hoc ipso.
117 sive enim adconcordiam res adduci potest sive ad bonorum victoriam, utriusvis rei me
aut adiutorem ve/im esse aut certe non expertem. Throughout Oecember, Cicero constantly
urged and argued for concordia; see Seager, 159-160; and Rawson, 156-157.
118 mihioKaq,os unum erit quod a Pompeio gubernabitur.. .Pompeium ad concordiam
hortabor; sic enim sentio, maximo in pericu/o rem esse.
119 ita mecum /ocutus est quasi non dubium bellum haberemus: nihil ad spem concordiae.
120 Att. 8.2.1,8.110.1: concordiam restituere; and 9.7B.1.
121 Jal, 210-219.
123
Against lhis unsettled atmosphere can be set the popular teachings of
the Pythagorean astrologer Publius Nigidius Figulus, a contemporary figure at
this time. His divinatory calendar, the Tonitruale, contained bis
interpretations of the annual thunderstorms and foretold concord or
conflict.l
2
2 Lucan placed Nigidius at the end of the first book of the Bellum
Civile conjuring darkomens at the outbreak of the civil war.
122 Figulus' works were collected in the sixth c. A.D. by loannes Laurentius Lydus, Liber
de Ostentis et Calendaria Graeca Omnia, ed. C. Wachsmuth (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1897); 29.112C.3:
1TOq.lOV 1TE1.E; 33.128C.13: WETllP\aV 1lEe' OIlOVO\aS l)o; 34.134A.16: ollOVOllOEl.
o lllJ.OS 1TPOS E\PllVl)V; also 33.130C.10, 33.1328.27, 35.138A.13, 37.1468.16, 37.1460.26;
Weinstock, 264.
124
4
Harmony in Crisis, 49-43
We met frequently, greatly seeking for a line of
policy that might lead to peace and concordia
civium. (Fat. 2)
Disagreement and the stress of civil war in the forties brought about a
flurry of dialogue regarding harmony and discord. Cicero' s correspondence,
the replies he received, and the exchange among those he influenced after the
numerous speeches against Mark Antony emphasized the great concern for
concordia among aU Roman citizens. After the death of bis friend Pompey,
who valiantly championed the cause of the senate, and the death of bis dear
daughter Tullia, Cicero withdrew from public life for two years (46-44). In tbis
period of honestum otium he absorbed bimself in scholarly writing and
dweUed upon his humanitas.
Demetrius' Book De Concordia
While Cicero approached Rome at the beginning of January 49, the
senate agreed that Caesar would be declared a public enemy if he did not
relinquish bis proconsular command of Gaul. On the night of January 11,
Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, the river that divided Cisalpine Gaul and
Italy. A day after the civil war had begun, Cicero had these words for Tiro:
1 arrived outside Rome on January 4. Nothing could have been a
greater compliment than the way people came out to meet me. But
1 found the city inflamed with civil discord, or rather with civil war,
and when 1wanted to heal the wounds, as 1 think 1could have
125
done, 1 came up against the ambitions of particular individuals; for
on both sides there are people who actually want to fight. (Fam.
16.11.2)1
In the weeks that followed, Cicero tried to be a mediator between
Pompeians and Caesarians, informing Tiro: /lEver since 1 reached the area of
Rome 1have not ceased my efforts to further agreement [concordiam]by
thought, word, and deed" (Fam. 16.12.2).2 He was criticised for this middle-of-
the-road approach and was amazed that the boni, the well-disposed men of
principle, actua1ly yearned to engage in a civil war with the improbi. But the
senate was unprepared for war and the majority (i.e. those loyal to Pompey
and the republican cause) inc1uding the consuls, C. Marcellus and L. Lentulus,
fled Rome and its environs in a panic (Fam. 16.12). To Cicero's dismay,
Pompey also left and retreated to Roman Calabria with his army. But not
before he entrusted Cicero to take over the military governorship of the
Campanian coast which he accepted, stationing himself at Formiae for a few
months. In the meantime sorne members of Caesar' s faction tried to sway
Cicero from his Pompeian sympathies. But he kept his neutrality solid,
informing Atticus that he was in constant contact with Caesar and Pompey
and a1ways urging both generals to come to sorne agreement (concordia).3
The brief letters exchanged between Pompey and Cicero (at the behest of
1 Urbem accessi pridie Nonas lanuar. Obviam mihi sic est proditum, ut nihil potuerit fieri
ornatius. Sedincidi in ipsam flammam civilis discordiae vel potius belli; cui cum cuperem mederi et,
ut arbitror, possem, cupiditates certorum hominum (nam ex utraque parte sunt, qui pugnare
cupiant) impedimento mihi fuerunt.
2 equidem ut veni ad urbem, non destiti omnia et sentire et dicere et facere quae ad
concordiam pertinerent.
3 Att. 8.2.1: ego ad Caesarem unas Capua litteras dedi, ...brevis sed benevolentiam
significantis, non modo sine contumelia sed etiam cum maxima laude Pompei; id enim il/a
sententia postulabat qua ilium ad concordiam hortabar (Formiae, February 17, 49).
126
Caesar) are not as cordial as one would expect. In February, two quite
uncomplimentary notes from Pompey urge Cicero to join him. at Luceria on
the 10th (Alt. 8.IIA), then Brundisium on the 20th (AU. 8.UC). Cicero's
extensive and very courteous answers fail to fulfill expectations. Pompey is
assured of his friend's expressed intention to join him but Cicero has reasons
for delaying and thus avoiding a meeting entirely: "It did not enter my mind
that in the state' s interests you would be going overseas. 1was in high hopes
that we should succeed either in establishing concordia, which appeared to
me the most expedient course, or in honourably defending the state in Italy"
(Att.8.UD.I).4
By the end of February, great anxiety had overwhelmed Cicero as to
how to deal with the rift between Pompey and Caesar. In a state of
uneasiness, he asks Atticus for a certain book on concordia from one of his
Greek associates: "Iremember a book 1TEP. Ollovoias being brought to you by
Demetrius of Magnesia, dedicated to yourself. Would you kindly send it to
me? You see what sort of position 1am considering" (Att.8.11.7).5 The next
day, another letter is sent to Atticus seeking ms trusted advice in this whole
situation. The feeling of uncertainty as to how Cicero can best serve his
beloved republic is monumental, and the state of affairs causes him incredible
indecision begging the question: "Is a peacemaking role required or does all
rest with the warrior?" Almost in an act of desperation, he insistently
demands, yet again, for a copy of the book on a subject he so cherished: /lAs 1
wrote to you earlier, please send me the book Demetrius of Magnesia
4 suspicionem nullam habebam te rei publicae causa mare transiturum, eramque in spe
magna fore ut in Italia possemus aut concordiam constituere, qua mihi nihil uti/ius videbatur, aut
rem publicam summa cum dignitate defendere. See also Art. 8.11B.
5 Memini librum tibi adferri a Demetrio Magnete ad te missum 1TEPl. 'Ollovoias. eum mihi
velim mittas. vides quam causam mediter (Formiae, February 27, 49).
127
dedicated to you on concordia" (Att. 8.12.6).6 While Cicero was obviously
eager to acquire a current Greek point of view, it is not known in what way
this book was beneficial since it seems to have been retumed immediately by
mid-March, with barely a comment. An idea of the book's contents may be
gathered from earlier publications on concordia by notable Greek individuals.
The factious hostilities in and among Greek states during the fifth and
fourth centuries led to erudite admiration for homonoia among notable
Athenian orators and philosophers who reflected on how the spread of
sedition seriously threatened any attempt at Greek unity. Political agreement
between the members of communities was an ongoing struggle due to
constant intemecine wars. Thucydides describes the dangerous effects of
discord (stasis) as fanatical aggression which overpowers democratic and
oligarchie leaders alike, causing suspicion and extreme urgency in everyone
(3.82-83).
In Athens, the two factions, oligarchs and democrats, were always
struggling for power and each thought its system of govemment was superior.
to the other. Homonoia was always seen as the product of the democrats. Yet,
even the oligarchs practised homonoia, for even their rule needed agreement
and unity to exist. The overthrow of the four hundred member oligarchy in
411 restored the democrats and re-established homonoia (Thuc. 8.93).
Differences were settied among opposing members and civil disturbances
subsided temporarily unti1404. In this year, the Delian League crumbled as
Athens capitulated under Sparta's dominance and endured an oligarchy of
thirty tyrants. The onset of discord revealed the breakdown of communal
spirit and the appeal for homonoia resulted in the tyrants' brief rule which
6quodante ad te scripsi, Demetri Magnetis librum quem ad te misit de concordia velim
mihi mittas (Formiae, February 28, 49).
128
ended in 403 when democracy was once again restored.
During this period, Lysias and Andocides described the conditions that
reunited Athens under homonoia. Citizenship rights and property rights,
that were taken away by the oligarchs were important aspects of the internaI
harmony of the city and civic life. A cityprospered only if homonoia was
preserved by the generosity, wisdom, self-control and devotion of its citizens
(Dem. 20, Mys. 140). Discordexisted at Athens when the oligarchs ruled and
the opposition democrats suffered "atimia" and exile. When the exiles were
welcomed back and the disenfrartchised citizens reinstated, the struggle for
peace and freedom was achieved (Mys. 106-7).
Plato (c. 429-347) provided a speculative outlook in his philosophy
regarding homonoia. He examined how goodness, justice, friendship, and
legislation are key elements for harmony to exist in the city-state. But since
citizens always had opposing opinions on methods toward achieving
homonoia then disagreements were good so long as discussions did not
develop into factional conflicts.7
Plato disapproved of war and described it as an unnatural existence
(Resp.5.470c-d). He saw it as an illness that created an imbalance within the
harmonia of a political body,8 and described it more ,as "dissension" rather
than "sedition" (Leg.5.774d). War puts injustice in the place of justice and
friendship, factors which provide order in astate (Resp. 1.351d, 1.352a). He
writes: "There is no greater evil for astate than for one to divide it and make
it into many, and no greater good than for someone to unify it and keep it
7 Alc. 127d; Cleit. 4 0 9 ~ , 410a-b; Resp. 1.351c-e, 4.432a-b, 8.545c-d, 8.554c-e; Pit.
260b, 311a-c; Leg. 703c, 4.708d, 759b; Phdr. 237d, 256b, 263a.
8 Platoreferstothe Hippocratic notion of harmonia in Phlb. 31c; Symp. 186b-187e; Phd.
85e-86d.
129
whole" (Resp. 5.462b-c). Basically, unity brings stability. Once astate is
divided into many parts there can be no possibility for a common unity or
sharing between those parts. In his opinion, a body of individuals living as
members of a community must make their services available to fellow
members of that community in order for it to grow (Prt. 322b; Resp. 2.369b-d).
In this way the society develops an inherent or natural social connection (Leg.
3.678ff; Pol. 301e-302b), kindness, and common heritage (Resp. 5.470f; Leg.
4.708c-d;Menex.237b-238b).9
Both Demosthenes (384-322) and Isocrates (436-338) independently
sought practical and strategie solutions for implementing and enforcing
homonoia in order to keep Athens strong. Threats from neighbouring states,
Persia, and a growing military influence by Philip of Macedon kept the two
orators busy in their political endeavours.
As a prosecutor, Demosthenes was concerned with internaI homonoia
and its civic importance to the public. The Athenian habits in winning rights
by free debate, honouring the constitution, agreeing with the laws, and
cancelling unjustified debts all created harmony. In this way, Athens was
more prosperous than other city-states. Since the Spartans and the Thebans
did not honour justice as the Athenians did, then their brand of homonoia
was inferior (Lept. 11-13, 108-110; Andr. 76-78).
In the Philippics, Demosthenes' struggle against the barbarian Philip of
Macedon in 341 allowed the orator to promote the strategie importance of a
homonoia among Greek states against a common enemy. The envy,
contempt, pardon, hatred, and bribery that were imported into Greece had
ruined society (3.39). Philip had become a menace causing disunion and
9 See Jal, 222.
130
corruption. The message was c1ear: homonoia could not be bought by the
invader (3.38). Demosthenes successfully convinced his fellow Athenian
citizens to persuade all Greek states to suspend their differences and battle
together in a common cause against Philip. A national state of homonoia was
created in order to preserve and protect the unique civic harmony of
individual Greek states. The Hellenic League was formed. But the Greek
alliance did not continue after a defeat at Chaeronea in 338.
Cicero's determination in the promotion of concordia is comparable to
the consistency in which the concept appears in the works of one of the Greek
orators he most admired, namely Isocrates (De Or. 2.10; Brut. 32). This
eloquent writer expressed an unwavering loyalty in his continuallonging for
goodness, justice, and homonoia. His speeches and treatises provide a c1ear
view of the political history of Greece.
After ten years of composition, Isocrates published the Panegyricus in
380. With Athens at the helm, he championed the cause of homonoia among
the Greeks for the purpose of war against the barbarian Persians. Only this
way could Athens regain its lost supremacy. Athens was so weakened after its
defeat in the war against the allies in 355 that Isocrates then advocated a
return to a more sober constitution in which the Areopagus would exercise its
ancient general supervision over aU aspects of society.IO This was actually a
plea for the restricted form of democracy of Solon. In his appeal for a just and
orderly government of the people, he daims that it is the spirit of fairness
among citizens that brings society into homonoia and advances the power of
the city (Areop. 68-70). Only with internaI homonoia strengthened can
Athens strive for leadership over Greece by persuading fellow Greeks that
10 Cf. Cicero's remark in 61 that the senate had become an Areopagus (AU. 1.14.5).
131
homonoia is a noble cause for war against the Persians (Antid. 36-37). Against
the wishes of Demosthenes, Isocrates attempted to convince Philip to unite
Greece against the Persians (Phil. 16,39-41, 141). And, in a last attempt to
promote the cause of panhellenism, the Panathenaicus, written in 339
extolled the principles of homonoia. But the Greeks did not heed the calI.
Philip had his own schemes, defeated them the following year and became
undisputed master of the Greek world.ll
While Demetrius' book On Concordia was in Cicero' s possession he
admitted to Atticus that his incapacity to make concrete decisions at this
crucial time was due to his intellectual superiority: "the underlying causes of
events always affect me more than the events themselves" (Att. 9.5.2: March
10). Eisewhere, he further stated: "But not to abandon myself wholly to grief, 1
have taken certain subjects as themes, as it were, which bear on politics and
the present times" (Att. 9.4.1). One of these themes is of course provided by
Demetrius' book, which leads him to ponder matters in Greek:
Ought a man to remain in his country under a tyrant? Ought he to
strive for the overthrow of a tyrant at aU costs, even if the existence
of the state is going to be endangered thereby? ..Ought he to use
reasoningrather than arms to save his country under a tyrant?
Should a statesman live quietly in retirement while his country is
ruled by a tyrant or should he take every risk for freedom' s
sake? ..These are the questions in which 1 exercise myself, debating
11 Angelo Gonella, Isocrate: Il Panegirico (Milano: Carlo Signorelli Editore, 1967), 18. For
further analyses on the Greek notion of homonoia, see Angelo Nucciotti, Isocrate: Panatenaico
(Milano: Carlo Signorelli Editore, 1961),5-14 and Gonella, 5-20.
132
the pros and cons now in Greek now in Latin. (Att. 9.4.2)12
After relating these thoughts to the fact that the spirit and passion for peace
negotiations must be followed by proper action from the highest officiaIs in
the state, he is appalled that the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C.
Claudius Marcellus deserted the capital and so did nothing in this regard.
Also, Pompey' s immense naval mobilisation in order to secure command of
the Mediterranean filled Cicero with anger and sadness:
This whole fleet is being collected from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre,
Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium,
Lesbos, Smyma, Miletus, Cos, in order to cut off supplies
from Italy and occupy the grain-growing provinces. (Att. 9.9.2)13
As a result, within two weeks Demetrius' book was promptly returned to
Atticus.l
4
He questioned his allegiance and a sense of betrayal toward his
country came over him: "Was l, whom sorne have called the parent and
saviour of this city, to lead troops of Getae and Armenians and Colchians
against her? Was 1 to bring famine upon my fellow citizens and devastation
upon Italy?" (Att. 9.10.3).15
Such a contemplation about the need to take arms at this moment was
12 EL fJ.EVETOV v T' TlJPUVVOwVTjS uilTi}s. Et 1TUVTI. TP01T41 rupavv\Oos
KaT.lJ01.v 1TPUW,UTElJTOV, Kv ll..U Toiho 1TEP. TWV 1] 1TO}..1.S K1.vvvruOE\v... EL
1TE1.paTOV pllyE1.V T'fi 1TUTp1. TlJpaVVOWVU KU1.p41 KU. }..OY41 ll.}..ov fj 1TO}..ll). EL
T ljOlJx{E\V vuxwPlloUVT 1TOL Tils 1TUTPLoOS TlJpaVVOWVTjS il 1TUVTS hov K1.VlIVOl}
TtjS 1Tp1.... In his me consultationibus exercens et disserens in utramque partem tum
Graecetum Latine (Formiae, March 12,49).
130mnishaecc/assisA/exandria, Co/chis, Tyro, Sidone, Arado, Cypro, Pamphylia, Lycia,
Rhodo, Chio, Byzantio, Lesbo, Smyrna, Mi/eto, Coo ad interc/udendos commeatus /taliae et ad
occupandas frumentarias provincias comparatur(Formiae, March 17,49).
14Att. 9.9.2: itaque postea Demet'; librum de concordia tibi remisi (Formiae, March 17, 49).
15 me, quem non nulli conservatorem istius urbis parentemque esse dixerunt, Getarum et
Arrneniorum et Co/chorum copias adeam adducere? me meis cMbus famem, vastitatem inferre
ltaliae?(Formiae, March 18,49).
133
instigated by the many people who addressed him as imperator in their
correspondence.l
6
One such individual was L. Balbus whose citizensbip
Cicero had defended seven years earlier. Acting outwardly in a neutral way,
though he was Caesar' s financial agent at Rome, he urged Cicero to carry on
with his efforts of reconciliation: "1 beg you, dear Cicero, put your thoughts
and concern upon a plan well worthy of your noble character, 1mean bringing
back Caesar and Pompey to their former harmony [in pristinam concordiam]"
(Att.8.15A.1).l7 An attempt was also made to persuade the orator to join
Caesar's camp. Cicero's allegiance would have been valuable since whatever
course he took would probably be followed by aIl the undecided.l8
Even Caesar addressed him as im perator in a subsequent note and
beckoned him to Rome immediately to seek his counsel, influence, position,
and assistance in a further attempt to secure bis support, or at least neutrality
(Att.9.6A). Balbus continued to write on Caesar's behalf, confident that only
Cicero could contribute to the restoration of harmony between the two
generals:
From this [copy of Caesar's letter] you will see how anxious he.is to
restore good relations [concordiam reconciliare] with Pompey and
how far removed from any sort of cruelty. 1am of course very
pleased that these are his views. As regards yourself and your
16Att. 8.11A, 8.11C, 8.15A, 9.7B, 9.13A, 10.8A, 10.8B; considering the reluctance
Cicero had in taking up the position and his earlier pride as consul togatus note also the letters in
which he appropriates the title at this time: Att. 8.11 B, 8.11 D, 9.11 D; Fam. 2.16. He was first
designated imperatorwhile governor of Cilicia from July 51 to July 50 and now due to his recent
appointment as military governor of Campania.
17 Obsecro te, Cicero, suscipe curam et cogitationem dignissimam tuae virtutis, ut
Caesarem ut Pompeium...rursus in pristinam concordiam reducas (Balbus at Rome to Cicero at
Formiae ca. March 1, 49).
18 Antony also tried to persuade Cicero to join Caesar's camp (Att. 10.8A).
134
sentiments of loyalty and gratitude, 1feel exactly as you do, my dear
Cicero, that your raputation and duty do not allow of your bearing
arms against one from whom you give out that you have received
so great a service. (Att. 9.7B.1)19
It is evident that sorne sort of agreement had to be sought between the two
generals in order to avert civil war and people were counting on Cicero to calI
the meeting between Caesar and Pompey that never was. About March 20,
Cicero responded to Caesar' s earlier request for advice and showed
enthusiasm for peace negotiations:
However, hope led me towards the notion that, as suits the wisdom
which you possess in so admirable and exceptional a degree, you
might be desirous in instituting negotiations for tranquillity, peace,
and civic harmony [de otio, de pace, de concordia civiumt and 1
conceivedmyself to be by nature and public image not ill fitted to
help in such an undertaking. (Att. 9.11A.1)20
But Pompey still had to be swayed to return to Rome for one meeting to take
place privately and another before the senate for the sake of civic harmony.
Cicero continues his plea but rather than merely asking, he begs and implores
Caesar:
To spare arnid Y0uf grave preoccupations some time to consider
how by your kindness 1 may meet the daims of honour, gratitude,
19 exqua perspicere poteris quam cupiat concordiam et Pompei reconciliare et quam
remotus sit ab omni crudelitate; quod eum sentire, ut debeo, valde gaudeo. de te et tua fide et
pietate idem me hercule, mi Cicero, sentio quod tu, non posse tuam famam et officium sustinere
ut contra eum arma feras a quo tantum beneficium te accepisse praedices (Balbus to Cicero at
Formiae, March 10 or 11,49); cf. Phil. 2.24.
20 spe tamen deducebar ad eam cogitationem ut te pro tua admirabili ac singulari sapientia
de otio, de pace, de concordia civium agi velle arbitrarer, et ad eam rationem existimabam satis
aptam esse et naturam et personam meam.
135
and loyalty in the remembrance of a single obligation. Even if my
request concemed only myself I should hope that from you I should
obtain it; but I believe it concerns both your honour and the public
welfare that l, as a friend of peace and of you both, should through
you be retained as the most appropriate agent for restoring the
harmony between you two and of our fellow-citizens [et ad vestram
et ad civium concordiam...conservari). (Att. 9.11A.3)21
Caesar was already on his way to Rome to convene a senate meeting and
arrived April 1, but not before he made a scheduled stop at Formiae to have a
private meeting with Cicero. Since Pompey had already left Italy for Greece a
week before, nothing decisive was accomplished as Cicero told Atticus (Att.
9.18; cf. Att. 9.16). Since no reconciliation was imminent Cicero did not find it
necessary to attend Caesar' s senate meeting. His decision not to attend was
also due to the fact that three hundred of the nobler and more influential
Roman senators, including both consuls, were already with Pompey at
Thessalonica. Their support ensured that Pompey was representing true
senatorial interests and defending the republican cause.
At Rome, in the presence of hundreds of partisan senators (at least
enough to establish a quorum), Caesar expressed his intention for the
restoration of pax et concordia and proposed to send messengers to Pompey to
negotiate a settlement.22 Expectations were not trifling, since at sorne point
21 ut in tuis maximis curis aliquid impertias tempons huic quoque cogitationi ut tua
beneficio bonus vir, gratus, pius denique esse in maximi benefici memoria possim. Quae si
tantum adme ipsumpertinerent, sperarem mea te tamen impetraturum, sed, ut arbitror, et ad tuam
'idem et ad rem publicam pertinet me et pacis et utriusque vestrum amicum, et ad vestram et ad
civium concordiamper te quamaccomodatissimum conservari (From Cicero at Formiae to Caesar at
Brundisium, March 19 or 20, 49).
22 Casso Dio 41.15.4: Kal. TO TE>"ElJTaLOV npo13E\S lmpTE Ti}s EtPllvlls Ka\. l.mp Ti}s
ollovoias o<j>wv napaXPllp.a npas TE TOVS im<iTolJs Kal. npos TOV llop.Tfl'\\ov nEIl<j>ellVa\
:oll'YlloaTo; cf. 41.16.4.
136
during the year two of Caesar's loyal followers, Decimus Iunius Brutus and C.
Vibius Pansa, issued coins with a representation of two dasped hands, the
symbol of concordia.
23
He promoted a new policy termed nova ratio vincendi
in which he pledged to treat the vanquished with extraordinary generosity
(Att.9.7C.l). But before dealing with his rival personally, Caesar proceeded to
Spain to defeat the Pompeians at llerda.24
One individual who was present at Caesar' s senate meeting was
Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the moderate consul of 51 who resisted the extreme
policies of his colleague M. Marcellus.
25
Famous as a jurisconsult, he was
considered a man of peace with great sanctity of character.26 ln a letter to his
friend dated April 28 Cicero explains his plan to leave Italy. He reveals that,
although their intentions were honourable, they both had made a mistake
(error fuit) in the direction of their policy. Cicero is not clear about what they
should have done besides advising for harmony and a peaceful reconciliation
between the two generals:
You assume a close connection between your cause and mine; well,
we were certainly both guilty of a like mistake, though our
sentiments were most loyal. For whatever the policy of each of us,
what we had in view was harmony [consilia ad concordiam
spectaverunt], and as there was nothing more to the advantage of
Caesar himself, we imagined that we were even earning his
23 Weinstock, 264 and n. 7.
24 Att. 10.4.8: inde ipsum cum exercitu, ubicumque Pompeius esset. eius interitum
finem illi fore.
25 Fam. 4.3.1; for a description of Caesar's senate see, Syme, ch. 6: "Caesar's New
Senators," 78-96; alsa, introduction to Att. 10.1 in G. E. Jeans, The Life and Letters of Marcus
Tullius Cicero (London: MacMillan and Co., 1925), 221.
26 Cicero eulogized him in the Ninth Philippic.
137
gratitude by our advocaey of peace. How greatly we have been
deceived, and to what a pass things have come, you can see for
yourself. (Fam. 4.2.3)27
At tbis point Cicero had failed in bis efforts as mediator and he was ready to
give up and retire (Att.9.10.3). He had put bis hopes in Pompey but
developed grave reservations about the general: sullaturit, "He is playing at
being Sulla" (Att.9.10.6).28 Caesar's attitude was just as menacing. Curio had
reported that Caesar had no intention of continuing the res publica: "[Caesar]
hates the senate. 'Everything shall come from me,' is bis motto" (AU.
10.4.9).29 It was also revealed that the polley of nova ratio vincendi was
implemented to render Caesar more popular but would not relax bis cruelty if
he lost the public's favour (Att. 10.4.8). Cicero was already led to belleve that:
"Both have aimed at personal domination, not the happiness and fair fame of
society" (Att. 8.11.2).3
0
Concordia was not a topic in Cicero's correspondence for the next four
years (that is, the duration of the civil war). After the battle of nerda, Caesar
retumed to Rome and was nominated dictator for eleven days in order to
preside over the election of consuls. He took this opportunity to once again
promote his nova ratio vincendiby carrying out three important measures: a
27 Quodexistimas meamcausam coniunctam esse cum tua, certe similis in utroque
nostrum, cum optime sentiremus, error fuit. namomnia utriusque consilia adconcordiam
spectaverunt; qua quom ipsi Caesari nihil esset utilius, gratiam quoque nos mire ab eo
defendenda pace arbitrabamur. quantum nos fefellerit et quem in Jocum res deducta sit, vides;
cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae AdFamiliares, 1,492, n. 151.
28 Pompey's desire ta imitate his one-time mentor was repeated a few more times: Att.
9.10.2,9.11.3, 9.14.1; cf. Q. Fr. 3.4.1 wherethere was aconcern that Pompey may have aimed at
tyranny.
29 odit senatum. 'a me' inquit 'omnia proficiscentur.
30 dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset.
138
compromise on the question of debts,31 amnesty to exiles under the acts of
Pompey and Sulla,32 and full extension of citizens' rights to colonists of
Novum Comum inTranspadane Gaul and Gades in Spain.3
3
Cicero criticised
and distrusted these acts of c1ementia (Att. 7.11.1,10.8.2).
In the meantime, about June 11, 49, Cicero had already left for Greece
(Fam. 14.7). The decision to support Pompey's senatorial forces and the
Il exiled" government was more in Une with his policy than to remain in Italy
under Caesar's revolutionary armies. He stayed in Thessalonica for quite a
while (with many of the emigrated senators) and by May 48 joined Pompey's
camp at Petra near Dyrrachium. He remained there until Pompey was
defeated by Caesar at the decisive battle of Pharsalus on August 9 (Fam. 9.9;
Att. 11.4). A month later, Pompey was treacherously murdered in Egypt. By
early November, Cicero returned to Italy (Att. 11.5) but did not yet venture to
Rome, while the war continued for two more years against other remaining
Pompeian forces.
Societas Humanitatis
Upon Cicero's return to Rome in 46 after his reconciliation with Caesar,
who granted him and many Pompeian sympathisers a full pardon, he
engaged himself in rhetorical writings and political science,34 and defended
few clients. However, early in 45, after the death of his daughter Tullia and
31 The substantial justice of which is proved by Rufus' letter to Cicero in early 48, Faro. 8.17.
32 Milo was the only exception to this amnesty decree.
33 The franchise of the Transpadane Gauls had probably been informally granted before
considering the large number of Latins and Roman citizens living in the province; Jeans, 125.
Gades was not even an Italian town, 50 marked a new departure in policy; Jeans, 243.
34 The works are: Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, Orator, Partitiones Oratoriae, De Optimo
Genere Oratorum.
139
the final downfall of senatorial Pompeian forces at Munda in Spain, Cicero
retreated to his country houses, mainly preferring the one at Tusculum, and
devoted himself entirely to philosophical and rhetorical study and writing.
35
The proliferation of so many philosophical and rhetorical treatises within the
space of two and a hall years helped Cicero come to terms with the "downfall
of the republic" (Off 3.4; cf. fam. 9.17.1), Caesar's demagoguery and the
perplexity that followed ms murder,36 and offered consolation for his
daughter's untimely passing.
37
This period of otium
38
is linked to a greater devotion to humanitas
which fundamentally means "human nature" (natura humana): the qualities
and feelings of mankind. Cicero's conception of human nature can be drawn
35 Between February 45 and December 44 his output included: Academica (a technical
work on scepticism and probability), Timaeus (a translation of Plato's dialogue), De Finibus
Bonorum et Ma/orum ( five books on ethical theory), Tuscu/anae Disputationes (five books on
suffering, death, and immortality), De Natura Deorum (three books on the nature of the gods), De
Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, De Fato (essays on old age, friendship, free will, and fate),
Topica (an adaptation of Aristotle's Topca),De Officiis{three books on practical duties), and
completed De Legibus (begun in 52); other non-extant works included: Conso/atio, Hortensius,
and DeGloria.
36 With Caesar as dictator and political freedom at an end these were the "times inimical to
virtue" (Orat. 35). Ten years earlier Cicero had already noted that the republic was dying (Att.
2.20.3, 2.21.1, 2.25.2) and now he believed it was indeed non-existent: the senate was a husk of
its former greatness (Att. 4.19.1) and contained no honest men (Att. 7.7.5), Caesarwascommonly
known as rex{Att. 13.37.2) and when his death introduced another civil war Cicero agreed with his
friends that omnia perisse{Att. 14.1.1) especially since even Antony demonstrated monarchie
tendencies (Fam. 11.8.1); cf. MacKendrick, The Speeches of Cicero, 443.
37 He frequently expressed his sorrow in his philosophical treatises and explained his
reasonsfor starting on them: nunc vero et fortunae gravissime percussus vu/nere et
administratione rei pub/icae /iberatus d%ris medicinama phi/osophia peta et oti ob/ectationem
hanc honestissimam iudico (Acad. 1.11); haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus mo/estiis
hac potissimum re /evaretur et prodessemus cMbus nostris, qua re cumque possemus (Div. 2.7),
and cf. Off. 2.2-5, Nat. D. 1.9. For the overwhelming grief expressed in many of his letters see
Robert E. Proctor, "Cicero in Grief: The Classical Soul Revealed," in Defining the Humanities
{B1oomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),59-75; cf. G. O. Hutchinson, "Consolation," in
Cicero's Correspondence: A Literary Study{Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988),49-77.
38 Cicero always looked forward to otiumin hisold age (Att. 2.3.4) but would have
preferred better circumstances than the current one; he described this period of scholarly writing
as honestum otium (Fam.4.4.4, 7.33.2; Acad. 1.11; Off. 2.4, 3.3; cf. Fam.5.21.2).
140
from the De Natura Deorum (2.78-79,133,147-158) and De Legibus (1.22-25).
Humans are superior to aU animaIs. The supreme god created humans and
provided them with five divine qualities which rendered them different
from the other living creatures: a soul (animus), reason, thought, speech
(ratio, cogitatio, oratio), and virtue (virtus). In appreciation for having
received divine intelligence, faith, virtue, and concord, the Roman maiores
deified Mens, Fides, Virtus, and Concordia. Thus, humans share many
qualities with the gods and together they must live by law and justice in a
universe that formsa single world state (civitas).39
However, just as the gods provided their divine gifts to humans in
order to separate them from the animaIs, humans were not supposed to sit
idle. It was man's duty to add his own contribution to these divine gifts and
in thisway the term humanitas was coined by Cicero to express the ideal
educational programme which he caUed studia humanitatis (Arch. 3).40
Human beings should pursue a literary and cultural education, which
inc1uded Greek literature and science, in order to become good citizens. Only
the artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent (Arch. 2) marked the more refined
and cultured human being.
41
The mental cultivation befitting a human
combined an aversion for war and civil strife with intellectual culture, an
39 Leg. 1.23: ut iam universus hic mundus sit una civitas communis deorum atque
hominum existimanda; Nat. D. 2.154: Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum
domus, aut urbs utrorumque.
40 Cicero uses the term humanitas and its congeners humanusand homo over 600 times;
it occurs most frequently in De Oratore, Disputationes Tusculanae, and De Officiis. Humamlas is
often linked to litterae, doctrina, studium, and sermo (for sources, see J. Hellegouarc'h, 268, n. 5).
41 Gael. 54 (in praise of L. Lucceius): Ille vir illa humanitatepraeditus, iIIis studiis, iIIis
artibus atque doctrina; Q. Cie., Comm. Pet. 33: Habes tecum ex iuventute optimumque et
studiosissimum humanitatis; ln Pis. 68, philosophers are called homines eruditissimi et
humanissimi; Verr. 2.4.98: P. Scipio homo doctissimus atque humanissimus.
141
admiration for philosophie study, a noble character and learning.
42
Humanitas also describes the humane conduet, kindness, and politeness
exhibited among friends as weil as the tie of affection for fellow-citizens. This
is clearly revealed in Cicero's correspondence in which the company,
conversation, and correspondance of friends is stated to be invaluable to
him.
43
As the moral excellence of the vir bonus is improved through studia
humanitatis, the good citizen is bound to preserve the safety and good order
of republican government and of society (Arch. 15-16). Endowed with
humanitas, the vir bonus could lead the state toward concordia (Phil. 5.40).
Cicero himself boasts of this achievement (Arch. 14,20). Any man who
possessed the humane conduet exemplified by humanitas would not be able
to commit atrocious deeds, as he says, magna est enim vis humanitatis (Rose.
Am. 63). AU men should recognize the universal society of the human race
and 1/ consider the interests of every man, whoever he may be, simply because
of the fact he is a man" (Off 3.26-27).44 Cicero refuses to grant the name of
human being to anyone who does not recognize a community based on
justice and does not share in the duties of the societas humanitatis (Rep. 2.48)
42 Modern scholars agree that Roman humanitas goes beyond the Greek definition of
paideia. Humanitasmeans "'earned" as weil as "Iearning" and includes other values such as
character, virtus, mansuetudo, clementia, aequitas, iustitia "while paideiafocuses mainly on
culture" and 50 "humanitasdoes not have any corresponding term in Greek" (Vito R. Giustiniani,
"Homo, Humanus, and the Meanings of 'Humanism, ... Journal of the History of Ideas, 46, April-
June, 1985,185; with Proctor, 212, n. 14, and Wolfgang Schadewaldt, "Humanitas Romana,"
Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der
neueren Forschung, pt. l, vol. IV, 1973, 43-62).
43Att.1.5.1, 1.13.1,6.1.1,13.9.1, 16.13a.1; Q.Fr.2.8.1-2, 2.13.3; Fam.3.1.2, 5.2.6,
7.8.1,16.21.3.
44 ut homo homini quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit; cf. Oscar E.
Nybakken, "Humanitas Romana," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 70
(1939), 408.
142
and who behaves like asavage toward his fellow men, showing disinterest in
the welfare of humanity (Off. 3.32).45 In addition, all virtues are united in
serving the societas humana,46 and even law has its foundations in the fad
that nature has inclined men to care for and be kind to their fellow men.
47
Memory, modesty, intuition, fearlessness, and love of justice (the guardian of
human society) are the mental endowments which enable man to act in a
kindly fashion toward fellow citizens and preserve the societas humanitatis
(Fin. 2.113). A common and universal human duty is the proper treatment
of others:
"Honourable men treat the greatest strangers, indeed, even their
greatest enemies in this manner, for the sake of public opinion
[hominum existimationis] and the common feelings of humanity
[communis humanitatis]; so that, having never themselves done
anything unpleasant to others knowingly [scientes], nothing
disagreeable can justly befall them by way of reprisaIs" (Quinet.
51).48
Man's duty is that he must ad knowingly (scientes) and with purpose
for the sake of communis humanitatis and hominum existimationis, which
45 Rep. 2.48: Quis enim hune hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi eum suis eivibus, qui denique
cum omni hominum genere nul/a iuris communionem, nul/am humanitatis societatem velit?;
Off. 3.32: ista in figura hominis feritas et inmanitas be/vae a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore
segreganda est.
46 Fin. 5.65-66: quidquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposui
carltate ae societate humana non abhorrebit.
47 Leg. 1.43: Atque si natura confirmatura ius non erit virtutes omnes tol/entur; ubi enim
libera/itas, ubi patriae caritas, ubi pietas. ubi aut bene merendi de altero aut referendaegratiae
vo/untas poterit existere? nam haec nascuntur ex eo, quia natura propensi sumus ad diligendos
homines, quod fundamentum iuris est.
48 Haec in homines alienissimos, denique inimieissimos viri boni faeiunt et hominum
existimationis et eommunis humanitatis causa, ut, eum ipsi nihl1 a/teri scientes incommodarint, nihi/
ipsis iure ineommodi eadere passit.
143
will win him honour and distinction from his fellow men.
49
But men's
hopes can be deceptive and lead the good man astray (De Or. 3.6). Offences
will certainly occur and must be handled justly. For this reason all men in a
good society need the virtues of kindness, clemency, and forgiveness. Thus,
humanitas conveys the qualities of clementia, mansuetudo, and benignitas,50
and includes those human refinements of sociability, politeness, good-nature,
and mature wit (comitas, facilitas, Zepos) which make up or define the
cultured man.
51
This polite and refined attitude provided a balance for
Roman gravitas and severi tas and people such as Atticus and Sextus Aufidius
were praised for typifying this successful combination of severitas et gravitas
cum humanitate.
52
Kindness and strict self-discipline of the homo Romanus
made him a valued citizen in the societas humanitatis.
As mentioned, one important quality linked to humanitas was
clementia. In this regard, the appeal to Caesar's humanitas was echoed in
three notable speeches of this post civil war period. Acknowledgement of the
commander' s generosity for granting pardons to Pompey's supporters was
underlined in the Caesarian orations: Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro Rege
Deiotaro in which Caesar was encouraged to adhere to his program of
reconciliation through clementia and policy of nova ratio vincendi. In
general, Cicero distrusted Caesar' s benevolent disposition but only endorsed it
49 Nybakken, 409.
50 Rep. 2.27; De tmp. en. Pomp. 42; Sull. 92; Mur. 65; Aff. 12.44.1, 14.13B.3, 15.1.1;
Fam. 11.22.
51 Fam.10.1.4, 16.21.3; Off. 1.145; Att. 1.13.1, 16.16A.6; Mur. 66; Red. Sen. 59;
Brut. 83-86: describing Laelius' exceptional qualities, Cicero designates Romans of the second
century B.C. as in ipso humanior, ut faciles essent in suum cuique tribuendo.
52 For Atticus, see Leg. 3.1; for Aufidius, see Fam.12.27.
144
for the sake of his clients and concordia civium.
53
In the first speech, Pro Marcello, Cicero speaks highly of the dictator's
iustitia and aequitas (Marcell. 12,32). He thanked Caesar for his clementia
toward Marcellus who was allowed to return to Rome and be among his
fel10w citizens once again.
54
In the next two speeches, Cicero had the difficult
task of defending his clients before Caesar who presided over the trials. The
orator was mostly concerned with gaining a favourable verdict and so
appealed to Caesar's policy of humanitas. The premise of fraternal unity in
the Pro Ligario (5, 34) stressed the pathos of separation from family members.
Harmony reigned between Ligarius stationed in Africa and his brothers at
Rome. The appeal to humanitas (Lig. 12-14,16,29) would induce a forgiving
mood and encourage Caesar to restore concordia among citizens and give his
client the right to return to his family and friends at Rome. In November 45,
Cicero represented his last client and former ally of Pompey. King Deiotarus
was charged with attempted murder against Caesar. The irony was that the
king of Asia Minor was always very loyal to Rome and cared about the
welfare of the Roman people to such a degree that he was willing to protect
them when he heard "nothing concerning your [i.e Caesar's] proposaIs,
nothing concerning your desire for pax and concordia" before the civil war
began (Deiot. 11).55 In this plea for his client's pardon, Cicero extended his
own disappointment at the failed negotiations between Caesar and the
senatorial forces led by Pompey and admitted that he yielded to the power of
53 Cf. Aff. 14.1.1 where Cicero's friend Matius is said to have commented: 'etenim si il/e
(Caesar] tali ingenio exitum non reperiebat, quis nunc reperiet?' ; and Fam. 4.4.
54 The Pro Marcello was a speech of thanks, delivered in the senate with Caesar in
attendance: itaque pluribus verbis egi Caesari gratias(Fam. 4.4.4).
55 nihil il/e de condicionibus tuis, nihil de studio concordiae et pacis.
145
Pompey and joined him. in a moment of danger. This misguided allegiance
was the basis for Caesar to grant clementia (Deiot. 12-13).
This speech also appealed to Caesar' s contribution to concord and in
particular to the policy of nova ratio vincendi which meant a prescribed form
of clemency for the defeated (Att. 9.7C.1) and, in turn, increased his own
popularity (Att. 10.4.8). In his role as the new Romulus, Caesar was believed
to be the only one who could restore concord in Rome.
56
A letter to the
general recommended the restoration of peace and concord,57 Colonies with
the name Concordia Iulia were founded.58 In an effort to promote the new
regime, a coin was issued with the head of the goddess Pax on the obverse and
clasped hands holding the caduceus, symbols of concord and peace, on the
reverse.
59
In an act of appreciation toward Caesar's demonstration of
clemency and most of an restoration of peace and harmony the senate decreed
in 44 that a temple of Concordia Nova be built and a festival day be added to
the ludi Romani in his honour.
6o
This new temple to a goddess with a
unique epithet was never constructed. The plan was abolished when Caesar
56 Dion. Hal. Anf. Rom. 2.11.2: oihw apa il t PWlla(wv T'DV
PxTlv K TWV u1T (' KaTaOKElJaoOvTWV Wwv, WOTE oonoTE 0\' ailJ.TOS
Kal. <i'VOlJ Tol KaT' nljwv xwPlloav VTOS Kal. Twv; cf. Art. 14.1.1.
57 Sallust addressed a letter to Caesar in which the economic and political aspects of
concordia are described for the maintenance of peace: Firmanda igitur sunt vel concordiae bona
et discordiae mala expelfenda (Ad Gaes. Sen. 1.5.3); and further, concordia is expressed within
the context of clementia: Ea vera clementia ent, consuluisse ne merito cives patria expellerentur.
retinuisse ab stultitia et falsis voluptatibus, pacem et concordiam stabiluisse (Ad Gaes. Sen. 1.6.5);
on clemency as a traditional Roman virtue, see Weinstock, 234ft.
58 Nertobrigae (Pliny 3.14), Apamea (Pliny 5.149); Weinstock, 264; for lulia Concordia see
R. Stillwell, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Glassical Sites (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976),421-422.
59 Coin of L. Aemilius Buca; Weinstock, 265.
60 Cass. Dio 44A5: VEWV TE t \J.ovo(as KawllS, biS Kal. \' aTO" E1.PllVOlVTEs,
Kal. a"ihij Tlloav aYHv Eyvwoav. Weinstock,265.
146
was murdered on the Ides of March.
Cicero always beHeved that Caesar desired tyrannical power (Att. 10.1.3,
10.4.2,10.8.6) and so justified the murder as tyrannicide (Off. 2.23-28,3.19,3.32,
3.82-85). In the De Officiis, written after Caesar's death, Cicero took the
opportunity to severely criticize Caesar's ambitions (1.26,3.36,3.83), his
demagoguery (1.64, 2.21, 2.78.), his need to confiscate property (1.43, 2.29, 2.83-
84,3.36), and his harsh treatment of Rome's enemies and allies (1.35, 2.28,
3.49). This behaviour, according to Cicero, had placed Caesar outside the
boundaries of the societas humanitatis. And so he defended those citizens
who had murdered the dictator because they performed their duty for the
republic by injuring a tyrant who had harmed their country, community, and
mankind in general (Off 3.19,3.32).
In early autumn Cicero re-emerged into the political arena and
embarked on his last and most tenacious rhetorical assignment of criticising
Mark Antony in the Philippics.
Quae fuit Oratio de Concordia!
Two days after Caesar's assassination, on March 17, the senate
convened in the guarded temple of Tellus where Mark Antony delivered a
rousing speech about concordia. One of the important highlights was
acknowledging Dolabella as his consular colleague, whom he was unwilling
to accept on an earlier occasion (Phil. 1.31). Cicero was also present and
expressed his desire for concord. when recommending the compromise of an
amnesty for Caesar's assailants and confirmation of his acts (Phil. 1.23, 13.10).
The historian Cassius Dio, writing in the third century A.D., reports that at
this meeting, in which the senate was deliberating for the welfare of the
147
nation, Cicero appealed for harmony and the abandonment of personal
differences (44.33). For as was said in the De Fato, he was always committed in
seeking for ea consilia quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent
(2).61 After the meeting, the conspirators did pledge themselves to the
amnesty (Cass. Dio 44.34.3) and in the traditional sign of concord shook hands
with the two consuls in agreement (App. B. Civ. 2.142, 2.594).
In the first week of July, the praetor C. Antonius held the Apollinarian
Games in place of M. Brutus, the conspirator who fled Rome after Caesar' s
murder. While the games took place, Cicero is proud to say that he went to
the island of Nesis, in the Bay of Naples, to meet Brutus who was thinking of
nothing but peace and of the concord of rus feIlow-citizens.
62
On the 17th,
Cicero set out for Greece.
At Leucopetra, men from Rome told him a settlement was in sight
(AU. 16.7.1). AIl ex-consuls and ex-praetors were summoned by Brutus and
Cassius to attend a senate meeting on August 1. It was expected that Antony
would give up his daim to Gaul, the root of the trouble, and conciliatory
edicts from both sides had been issued. Brutus and Cassius were prepared "to
live in perpetuaI exile as long as the harmony of the republic [concordia
reipublicae] was ensured."63 But on the scheduled day of the meeting L. Piso,
Caesar's father-in-Iaw, bitterly attacked Antony. In reply, Antony issued a
violent edict repudiating Brutus and Cassius. They in turn replied that rus
letter was like rus edict "insulting, intimidating, and quite improper;" the rest
1
of the letter was just as threatening:
61 "A Une of policy that might lead to peace and concord of citizens."
62 Phil. 10.8: videbam; .. nihi/ nisi de pace et concordia civium cogitantem; Att. 16.1-4.
63 Vell. Pat. 2.62.2: Quippe M. Brutus et C. Cassius... testati edictis, Iibenter se vel in
perpetuo exsilio victuros, dum reipublicae constaret concordia.
148
Just reflect how intolerable it is for praetors to be unable to resign
sorne of their prerogatives in the. interest of civil harmony and
freedom [concordiae ac libertatis causa] without being threatened by
the consul with military force. As we are sure of our ground, we are
not to be intimidated by you. We do not think it right to submit to
threats, nor do we agree to do so; nor do we think it the business of
Antony to issue orders to those whoseactions have made him a
free man. If other circumstances demanded that we should engage
in a civil war, your letter would be useless; letters full of threats
carry no weight with free men. You know perfectly well that we are
not to be pushed around; we think that your threats are designed to
make our sensible approach seem to be motivated by fear. We are
anxious that you should have an important and honourable
position in a free republic; we shall not provoke you, but we value
our own freedom more highly than your friendship. Please review
very carefully what you are undertaking, and the means at your
disposal; reflect on how long Caesar reigned, not how long he lived.
We pray to the gods that whatever you plan may serve the interests
of the state and yourself; if they do not, we hope that the free
republic may be preserved, and that you yourself may suffer as little
149
as possible. Fam. 11.3.3-4
64
Antony intensified his hostility toward Brutus and Cassius when they tried to
encourage him and Octavian to resolve their differences. The atmosphere at
Rome and in Italy was definitely not one of reconciHation but of a significant
crisis. When Cicero discovered that the agenda for the September 1 meeting
of the senate was honours to Caesar and not public business, he decided to
send his regrets to Antony for his unwillingness to attend. In a furious mood,
Antony attacked the absent Cicero at the meeting. Another meeting was
scheduled the following day, September 2, and Cicero arrived and delivered
his First Philippic Gration to confront Antony' s menaces with a bold
rhetorical attack.
Cicero first defended his return to the senate, followed by a rebuke
against Antony's temper. Then he solidly re-affirmed his position on his
continuing policy of compromise and harmony. Caesar' s aets had to be
maintained since they were the only foundation on which to build a strong
state. But Antony had annulled them with new laws: "those acts indeed,
conscript fathers, though 1 never approved them, 1 have thought should be so
carefully maintained for the sake of harmony [conservanda concordiae causa]
64 lIIud vero quemadmodum ferendum sit, tute cogita: non licere praetoribus concordiae
ac libertatis causa per edictum de suo iure decedere, quin consul arma minetur. Quorum fiducia
nihil est, quod nos terreas. Neque enim decet aut convenit nobis periculo ulli submittere animum
nostrum, neque est Antonio postulandum, ut iis imperet, quorum opera liber est. Nos si alia
hortarentur, ut bellum civile suscitare vellemus, litterae tuae nihil proficerent. Nulla enim minantis
auctoritas apud liberos est. Sed pulchre intellegis, non posse nos quoquam impelli; et fortassis ea
re minaciter agis, ut iudicium nostrum metus videatur. Nos in hac sententia sumus, ut te cupiamus
in libera republica magnum atque honestum esse, vocemus te ad nul/as inimicitias, sed tamen
pluris nostram libertatem, quam tuam amicitiam aestimemus. Tu etiam atque etiam vide, quid
suscipias, quid sustinere possis; neque, quam diu vixerit Caesar, sed quam non diu regnarit, fac
cogites. Deos quaesumus, consilia tua reipublicae salutaria sint ac tibi; si minus, ut, salva atque
honesta republica, tibi quam minimum noceant, optamus (trom the praetors M. lunius Brutus and
C. Cassius Longinus at Naples to the consul M. Antonius at Rome, August 4, 44); cf. W.K. Lacey,
Cicero and the end of the Roman Republic (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978),149-150;
and Carcopino, 365.
150
that 1 disagreed with the annulment of ms laws" (Phil. 1.23).65 As a result,
Cicero (sarcastically?) remarked, "That was quite a speech on harmony!"(Phil.
1.31),66 thus reminding Antony and the senate of the noteworthy oration after
Caesar's murder. Both consuls were warned not to disregard the common
people, who had shown their feelings for the absent Brutus in July at the
Apollinarian games. Always ready to serve the republic, Cicero concludes the
speech by stating that he would retum to the senate 80 long as no threats are
issued against mm. And in this way, he began his own concentrated effort to
promote the subject of harmony and peace throughout these series of
speeches against Antony which lasted until the following year.
The Second Philippic is a pamphlet on Antony's audacious character
(Phil. 2.23).67 He is charged with immoiality, lack of principles, and
inconsistency in political alliances. Having dishonoured the temple of
Concordia with ms Sept. 19 speech against Cicero (Phil. 2.19), the symbol of
the orator's current policy for peace, harmony, and reconciliation (Phil. 2.24), a
simple question i8 asked: "Why do the doors of Concordia not lie open?"
(Phil. 2.112).68
On December 20,44, Cicero delivered his Third Philippic Oration before
his fellow senators. Having praised Octavian, he applauded ms legions, and
approved ms levies with a series of motions. In addition, Cicero placed total
65 quae quidem ego, patres conscripti, qui il/a numquam probavi, tamen ita conservanda
concordiae causa arbitratus sum, ... infirmandas hoc tempare non putarem; cf. Phil. 13.10: salvis
enim actis Caesaris, quae concordiae causa defendimus.
66 Quae fuit oratio de concordia!
67 For a description of the homo audax, see Ch. Wirszubski, .. Audaces: A Study in
Political Phraseology," Journal of Roman Studies, 51 (1961), 12-22.
68 cur valvae Concordiae non patent?; the temple's open doors would symbolize the
existence of harmony.
151
confidence in Hirtius and Pansa, the two consuls elected for 43: "For they are
thorougly loyal, of excellent judgement, and agree remarkably well with one
another [singulari concordia]" (Phil. 3.2).69 Their cooperation and alliance
would be undeniable for the safety of the republic: "To the forces already at
our disposal will shortly be added consuls, wise, courageous, like-minded
[concordia], who for many months have been pondering deeply on the
freedom of the Roman people" (Phil. 3.36).70 The harmony shown by the
consuls was in sharp contrast to the irreligeous behaviour Antony showed
when he "shut armed men in the shrine of Concordia when he held a senate
meeting" back in June (Phil. 3.30).71 Cicero continued to speak for harmony
and defiance against Antony.72
The attack reaches a new height in the scathing Fourth Philippic
Oration delivered to the people in the forum on the same day as the Third
Oration. Antony is now compared to Spartacus yet not even worthy to be a
self-proclaimed Catiline. For as Cicero had defeated Catiline 80 too will the
Roman people soon hear that "Antony's villainous band of brigands has been
crushed by your [i.e. the Roman people's] unprecedented cooperation with the
senate [concordia cum senatu] and by the good fortune and valour of your
armies and generals" (Phil. 4.15).73 This is a brief but severe speech
denouncing Antony' s hostile attitude to the Roman republic' s governmental
69 sunt enim optimo animo, summo consilio, singulari concordia.
70 ad ea enim praesidia quae habemus iam accedent consules summa prudentia, virtute,
concordia, mu/tos menses de populi Romani libertate commentati atque meditati.
71 armatos in cella Concordiae, cum senatum haberet, incluserit.
72 Cf. Lacey, 161.
73 sic Antoni nefarium latrocinium vestra cum senatu concordia tanta quanta numquam
fuit, felicitate et virtute exercituum ducumque vestrorum brevi tempare oppressum audietis.
152
institutions and concordia CZVlum:
And your ancestors, Romans, had to deal with an enemy who
possessed a republic, a senate-house, a treasury, unanimity and
harmony among its citizens [consensum et concordiam civium],
sorne principle on which, if the occasion admitted, to found peace
and a treaty; this enemy of yours is attacking your republic, while he
himself has none; he is eager todestroy the senate, that is to say, the
council of the world, but he himself has no public councili he has
emptied your treasury, he has none of his own. For how can he
have harmony among citizens [concordiam civium] when he has
no citizenship? How can peace be made with a man whose cruelty
is incredible and whose good faith is nonexistent? (Phil. 4.14)74
50 on January 1, 43, Cicero attacked his current "Catiline" in the Fifth
Philippic Oration by reiterating the hostile events which happened back in
September at the temple of Concordia, a significant rhetorical moment since
the term "concordia" is emphasized four times within the short span of three
paragraphs early in the speech. It is almost as if Cicero were recreating
moments in his own consulship, when the establishment of harmony was so
much a part of his own consular year. The temple was dishonoured by
Antony' s evil speech and defiled by the protection of his armed brigands and
74 Ac maioribus quidem vestris, Quirites, eum eo hoste res erat qui haberet rem publieam,
euriam, aerarium, consensum et coneordiam eivium, rationemaliquam.siita res tulisset, paeis et
foederis; hic vester hostis vestram rem publieam oppugnat, ipse habet nul/am; senatum, id est
orbis terrae consilium, delere gestit, ipse eonsilium publieum nul/um habet; aerarium vestrum
exhausit, suum non habet. nam eoneordiam eivium qui habere potest, nul/am eum habet
eivitatem? paeis vero, quae potest esse eum eo ratio, in quo est ineredibilis erudelitas, fides nul/a?
153
barbarians stationed within and outside.
75
Cicero had no favourite princeps
to turn to, so he put bis trust in Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who had a key role
in preventing a civil war between Lucius Plancus and Asinius Pollo earlier in
November 44. By proposing a vote of thanks (supplicatio) in his honour,
Cicero tried to convince those present that only Lepidus could possibly bring
further peace and harmony to the republic:
Because Marcus Lepidus by his humanity and wisdom has changed a
most dangerous and mighty civil war to peace and harmony [ad pacem
concordiamque . convertit], 1propose that a decree of the senate be
entered in the following terms: "Whereas Marcus Lepidus, Imperator,
Pontifex Maximus, has on many occasions weIl and successfully
conducted the affairs of the republic,...that the senate and Roman
people, conscious of Marcus Lepidus' great and numerous services to
the republic, place high hope of tranquillity, peace, harmony, and
liberty [otii, pads, concordiae, libertatis], in his courage, authority, and
good fortune; and that the senate and Roman people will be mindful of
bis services to the republic. (Phil. 5.40-41)76
75 Phil. 5.18: at hanc pestemagmen armatorum sequebatur; Cassius, Mustela, Tiro,
gladios ostentantes, sui similis greges ducebant per forum; certum agminis locum tenebant
barbari sagittarii. Cum autem erat ventum adaedem Concordiae, gradus complebantur, lecticae
conlocabantur, non quo iIIe scuta occulta esse vellet, sed ne familiares, si scuta ipsi ferrent,
laborarent. lIIud vero taeterrimum non modo aspectu, sed etiam auditu, in cella Concordiae
conloca,,: armatos, latrones, sicarios, de templo carcerem fie,,: opertis valvis Concordiae cum inter
subsellia senatus versarentur latrones, patres conscriptos sententias dicere.
Phil. 5.20: Cum is dies quo me adesse iusserat, venisset, tum vero agmine quadrato in aedem
Concordiae venit atque in me absentem orationem exore impurissimo evomuit.
76 quod periculosissimum civile bellum maximumque humanitate et sapientia sua M.
Lepidus ad paCem concordiamque convertit, senatus consultum his verbis censeo
perscribendum: Cum a M. Lepido imperatore, pontifiee maximo, saepe numero res publica et
bene et feliciter gesta sit, ...senatum populumque Romanum pro maximis plurimisque in rem
publicamM. Lepidi meritis magnam spem in eius virtute, auctoritate, felicitate reponere otii, pacis,
concordiae, Iibertatis, eiusque in rem publicam meritorum senatum populumque Romanum
memorem fore.
154
An ultimatum was drawn up on January 4 for an embassy to deliver to
Antony. lt gave the general a time-limit within which he must comply to
end the siege at Mutina and evacuate Cisalpine Gaul. In the Sixth Philippic
Oration, delivered to the people that evening, Cicero was highly critical of the
decision on the embassy. He declared passionately that the Roman people
must fight for their freedom: "Matters have been brought to the utmost crisis;
the stake is freedom. Either you must be victorious, Romans, as you surely
will he in virtue of your patriotism and united will [tanta concordia], or do
anything rather than be slaves" (Phil. 6.19):77
Two or three weeks later, the envoys returned with a series of counter-
demands from Antony. In the Seventh Philippic, Cicero stated that peace
continued to be his primary concern but protested that there could be no peace
with Antony. Peace would be disgraceful, dangerous, and impossible,
especially with someone (he had to remind his audience of this) who
supported an armed stand on the steps of the temple of Concordia (Phil. 7.21).
There was a heated debate in which the senate finally declared a state of
"tumult" and Antony was called an adversary (inimicus) rather than an
enemy (hostis). Cicero, of course, vehemently opposed this move and wanted
the senate to declare a state of war. For him everything showed that a state of
war existed and, in the Eighth Philippic, he deprecates any such leniency with
Antony. In a fit of detestation he angrily rages:
This is the fifth civil war that is being waged (and all have fallen on
our own times) and the first that has taken place, not amid quarrels
and discord of citizens, but amid the most complete unity and
77 res in extremum est adducta discrimen; de Iibertate decernitur. aut vincatis oportet
Quirites, quod profecto et pietate vestra et tanta concordia consequemini, aut quidvis potiU5
quamserviatis.
155
extraordinary harmony [in maXlma consenSlOne incredibilique
concordia]. AU men have the same wishes, the same thing to
defend, the same feelings. When 1say Il all," 1 mean aU except those
whom nobody thinks worthy to be citizens. What then is the issue
at stake in the war between us? We are defending the temples of
the immortal gods, our city walls, our homes, and the abodes of the
Roman people, the altars, the hearths, and the tombs of our
ancestors; we are defending our laws, law-courts, freedom, wives,
children, and fatherlandi on the other side Marcus Antonius is
striving and fighting to perturb and upset all these things; he wants
to regard the plunder of the republic as his reason for war; partIy to
dissipate our possessions, and partIy to disperse them among his
traitorous murderers. (Phil. 8.8)78
Still, in March, at a meeting of the senate, Cicero in the Tenth Philippic
secured the senate' s approval for a military position for Brutus due to the fact
that the latter followed Cicero' s policy and thought "of nothing but of peace
and of the harmony of his fellow-citizens."79 Brutus was appointed govemor
of Greece and Macedonia and commander of the armies in those countries,
protecting them from C. Antonius. Similarly, the next day, in the Eleventh
Philippic, Cicero proposed that Cassius should obtain command in Syria to
defend it against Dolabella, stating: "1 am so far from honouring these
78 hoc bellum quintum civile geritur - atque omnia in nostram aetatem inciderunt - primum
non modo non in dissensione et discordia civium sed in maxima consensione incredibilique
oonoordia. omnes idem volunt, idem defendunt, idem sentiunt. cum omnis dico, eos excipio
quos nemo civitate dignos putat. Quae est igitur in media belli causa posita? nos deorum
immortalium templa, nos muros, nos domicilia sedesque populi Romani, aras, fooos, sepulcra
maiorum; nos leges, iudicia, libertatem, ooniuges, liberos, patriam defendimus: contra M. Antonius
id molitur, id pugnat ut haec omnia perturbet, evertat, praedam rei publicae causam belli putet,
fortunas nostras partim dissipet partim dispertiat parricidis.
79 Phil. 10.8: hunc videbam...nihil nisi de pace et oonoordia civium cogitantem.
156
enemies of tranquillity, concordia, laws, law-courts, and liberty, that 1cannot
help but hate them as much as 1 love the republic" (Phil. 11.36).80 Apparently,
Cassius was not qualified, so the commission was given to the two consuls.
ln mid March, Cicero delivered the Thirteenth Philippic in which he
deprecated peace and rejected any form of compromise with Antony.S1 At
first glance it might be surprising that he views war, not negotiations, as a
justifiable means against those who do not recognize the peace, liberty, safety,
and harmony that Roman institutions achieve. This is not quite
contradictory when negotiations fail against an enemy of the state (i.e.
Antony). Cicero believed that a pact of peace with Antony was simply a
prescription for slavery for the Roman people. So a war against him was
necessary for the safety and harmony of the republic (Phil. 13.1-3).
Armies Unite to Secure Harmony for the Republic
At the second baUle of Mutina, Antony' s forces withdrew and he was
dec1ared a public enemy. At the end of May, after Lepidus joined forces with
Antony, Plancus and D. Brutus regrouped and combined their armies at
Cularo (Grenoble) on June 9 and, with no help from Octavian, pursued their
opponents (Fam. 10.18,10.23). In a joint dispatch to the senate, people, and
plebeians of Rome, Plancus and Brutus reassured their supporters to have
confidence and hope in them "in this great crisis, since you see that both of us
generals and both of our armies too are joined in exceptional harmony
80 ego vero istos oti, concordiae, legum, iudiciorum, Iibertatis inimicos tantum abest ut
ornem uteffici non passit quin eos tam oderim quam rem publicam diligo.
81 The subject of reconciliation (concordia) with Antony had been discussed in the senate
in early March; cf. Phil. 13.36: Concordiae factam esse mentionem scribitis in senatu; and Phil.
12.18.
157
[singulari concordia] tomeet every risk for your sake" (Fam. 11.13a.2).82 They
make it a point to tell Cicero that their combined armies, united in concordia,
will help save the republic. C. Furnius, a member of Plancus' staff, also
reassured Cicero "about the cordial relations [de concordia] between Plancus
and Brutus" which made the orator "most hopeful of victory" (Fam.
10.26.1).83 At the end of June, Cicero sent a letter to Plancus on behalf of the
senate: "AU our hopes rest on you and your colleague...The cordial agreement
between you [concordia vestra] clearly expressed to the senate in your joint
dispatch gave extraordinary pleasure both to the senate and the entire state
[cuncta civitasf' (Fam. 10.22.1).84 He also expressed similar words in a letter to
Brutus: "Your union with your colleague and the harmony between you
[concordiaque vestra], which is made clear in your common dispatch, is the
most gratifying thing thathas happened to the senate and people of Rome"
(Fam. 11.15.1).85 Plancus frequently asserted to Cicero his loyalty to the
republic, but the uncertain strength of his army is explained in his last letter
to Cicero on July 28, 43 (Fa m. 10.24). He eventually deserted D. Brutus and
joined forces with Antony and Lepidus in late summer.
Cicero realized Octavian's power and urged the senate to win his
support. But the senate recognized only Sextus Pompeius as the embodiment
of Pompey's old senatorial party. Eventually even Octavian joined forces
82 eum et nos et exereitus nostros, singulari eoncordia eoniunetos, ad omnia pro vobis
videatis paratos.
83 Quod de Planei et Bruti eoncordia scribis, in eo vel maximam spem pono vietoriae,
(Cicero to Fumius, end of June, 43).
84 ln te et in col/ega omnis spes est, ... Concordia vestra, quae senatui deelarata litteris
vestris est, mirifiee et senatus et euneta civitas delectata est.
85 Coniunctio tua cum col/ega concordiaque vestra, quae litterls communibus declarata
est, senatui populoque Romano gratissima aecidit.
158
with Antony and dispensed with the senate's help. Cicero's last extant letter
to bis dear friend M. Brutus, dated July 27, 43, appeals for him. "to come to the
rescue of the republic" (Ad. Brut. 26.1).86 He is disgusted that the victorious
armies of Mutina refused to take risks and pursue a fleeing enemy and that
Lepidus joined forces with Antony and declared war on the state. On behalf
of everyone, "with such unanimity among senate and people" (Ad. Brut.
26.2),87 Brutus is urged to return to Italy.
Shortly thereafter Octavian crossed the Rubicon and marched on
Rome, signalling the final blow to Cicero's policy. After being declared
consul, he united with Antony and Lepidus to form a second triumviral
commission with autocratic powers for five years to reorganize the state. The
triumvirs proscribed their opponents and confiscated lands. Three hundred
senators and two thousand equites were killed, and among them was Cicero.
86 ut rei publicae subvenires.
87 in tanto senatus populique consensu.
159
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to explain the meaning of concordia by
surveying the historical context in which it emerged. 1 chose to concentrate
on the period 63-43 B.C. because it is in this crucial period that the concept
achieves its most articulate and influential defence by the Roman orator,
statesman, and philosopher, Marcus Tullius Cicero. My intention was not
merely to review the important writings and speeches of Cicero but to situate
them in the practical struggles in which he was implicated and thus to trace
the different uses of Cicero' s political watchword. This done, a clearer picture
has emerged than is available in the current literature about how Cicero
promoted, defended, and skillfully redefined the concept of concordia in order
to safeguard his beloved republic.
Placing the concept of concordia in its historical context, that is to say,
reviewing the important political events of the period 63-43 with concordia as
the subject, shows that there are three recognisable meanings of the concept:
the longstanding conventional Roman republican idea of concordia as unity,
friendship, and agreement, which secured the harmony of the republic; the
innovative idea of concordia as a political harmony or coalition of the two
orders of the senate and equites - what Cicero called concordia ordinum; and
the idea of concordia as a consensus omnium bonorum - what Cicero called
concordia civium or concordia civitatis.
These three varieties of concordiashare the notion of being the
fundamental principles of a stable republic. Since the early Roman republic,
the avoidance of internaI divisions and discord was regarded as an
160
indispensable condition of greatness, prosperity, and liberty.
Yet, these varieties of concordia have important differences, and the
differences can be seen when the question becomes how to preserve concord.
As a result of the many struggles of his public and private life, Cicero provides
three answers to this question, of which two are uniquely his contribution.
One answer, foUowing the conventional meaning of concordia, is thata
republic must eliminate hatred and build friendship and agreement among
its citizens. The second, which Cicero is the first to suggest, is a concept he
caUs concordia ordinum: the best way to secure concord in a republic is to
maintain a balance between its two main orders, namely the senate and the
equites. The third is also new: the key to preserving concord must be to
preserve the common good in a consensus of aU good people.
What 1 have argued is that the meaning shifted in direct response to
the political need of the day. Therefore the best way to understand the
different meanings is to grasp the underlying context in which these concepts
were used. When the conventional idea of concordia was not sufficient to
achieve his aims, Cicero coined the term conordia ordinum. When
concordia ordinum failed, Cicero tried to reach a wider audience, and in the
fifties appealed for concordia civium or concordia civitatis, used
interchangeably with and further defined as consensus omnium bonorum.
But the political turmoil in the forties again outflanked Cicero' s best
intentions, and he was forced to retire temporarily from politics and declare
that the republic was finished. He devoted himself to philosophy and
developed a more universal notion of collective rule which he termed
societas humanitatis. In his lifelong quest to promote harmony, Cicero' s
legacy was to introduce these phrases into Roman and European vocabulary.
161
It has been my contention in this dissertation that despite the central
importance of concordia to Cicero's political career, the existing literature has
not done justice to the concept. Indeed, the very diversity of its meaning has
been overlooked.l In spite of the fallure of eoneordia ordinum and his
inability to put into practice the eoneordia civium/civitatis, Cicero never
abandoned his belief that both connotations of eoneordia should be the
founding principles of the Roman res publiea. Nor does he ever disavow the
belief that the traditional meaning of eoneordia as friendship should be the
foundation of a stable republic. This meaning of eoneordia was well articulated
in the treatise De Amicitia, written in 44, a year before his death. 50, he writes:
If it is not understood how great the force of friendship and eoneordia
is, this may be gathered from quarrels and disputes. For what house
is so firm, or what state so well established as not to be able to be
utterly overthrown by hatred or strife? Whence we may form an
estimate as to how much good there is in friendship. (Amie. 23)2
1 For example, the failure to recognize the important differences even appears in a recent
commentary by the Cambridge political scientist Quentin Skinner, who conflates the three
meanings employed by Cicero ("Machiavelli's Discorsi and the pre-humanist origins of republican
ideas," 130-134). He states that according to Cicero "the surest way 'to introduce sedition and
discord into a city isto look after the interests of only one part of the citizens, while negating the rest
(Off. 1.85);'" and continues "it follows that the key to preserving civic concord must be to give
precedence to the ideal of the common good over any selfish or factional interests." What Skinner
describes is in fact not concordia ordinum but concordia civium, which gives precedence to the
common good. When he writes about Machiavelli's contribution to western political thought, he errs
again. One feature of Machiavelli's Discorsi, Skinner explains, was his defence of the "tumults" that
disfigured the politicallife of early republican Rome. According to Machiavelli it was due to the
disunion and turmoil between the plebs and the senate that Rome became a pertect republic.
Skinner says Machiavelli is repudiating "nothing less than the Ciceronian vision of the concordia
ordinum" (136). However, 1have shown that when Cicero wrote about the avoidance of internai
strife he was not just speaking about the "plebs and senate." By not distinguishing the two
different meanings of concordia, Skinner's commentary is an example of the conceptuallimitations
that exist in the current Iiterature.
2 Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque
discordiis percipi potest. Quae en/in domus tam stabt1is, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et
discidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest.
162
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1. Works of Cicero
i. Speeches
Index Locorum
De Imperio en. Pompei
4 36
17 12,64
17-20 30
42 144
62-63 13
64 13
65 Il
Responso
53
92
29
101
89
5,48,89, 114
100
De Domo Sua
1
2
3
5
10
Il
12-13
14
15
17
25
26
31
33
39
45
50
62
63
66
68
72-76
74
75
76
77
80
85
87
91
94
96
99
104
90
113
90, 113
93
93
90
113
93
25,88, 1>, 113
88, 90, 93, 94
113
93,94
90,94
90
94
90
76
113
88
79
113
89
43,110
89
93
25,29
25,57
82
111,113
77, 113
89,94
77
93
90
De Domo Sua - cont.
105
110
122
127-129
130
130-131
130-132
131
131-137
132
136
136-137
137
138
141
142
De Haruspicum
17
31
42
48
60-61
60
61
90
92
93
90
90,91
90
93
77,91,92
93
90,93
90,91,92
90,94
91, 106
90
90
90
174
De Lege Agraria De Lege Agraria - cont.
1.1-2 22 2.47-58 21
1.2 22 2.54 22
1.3-4 21 2.56-57 21
1.5-6 21 2.59 21
1.10 21 2.60 22
1.11 22 2.62 21
1.12-13 21 2.63 22
1.13 22 2.65 22
1.16 22 2.68-70 20
1.16-17 21 2.71 22
1.20 20 2.73 21
1.21 22,25 2.75 21
1.22 22 2.76-86 20
1.22-27 23 2.79 22
1.23 23,25 2.80 22
1.23-24 106 2.84 22
1.24 26 2.98 22
1.25 29 2.101-103 28
1.26-27 28 2.102 27, 101,106
1.27 26 2.103 17, 23, 28, 68
2.3ff 16 3.3 20
2.5-6 23 3.4 9, 19, 23, 24,
2.6 23 28,106,110
2.7-8 27 3.6-14 20
2.7-9 25,28 3.15 21,22
2.9 24, 104, 105,
112 De Provinciis Consularibus
2.10 22, 25, 27, 31 10 43
2.15 27 11.26-27 60
2.16 25 12 65
2.16-17 19 25 114
2.20 22 32 116
2.20-21 19,22 39 106
2.23 22 41 68
2.24 19 43 82
2.26 19 47 114
2.28-30 19
2.31 21 Divinatio in Caecilium
2.33 19 8 11
2.33-34 21 70 11
2.35-37 21
2.38-46 22 In Catilinam
2.43 29 1.1-10 36
2.46 22 1.13-20 36
175
In Catilinam - cont. In Pisonem - cont.
1.21 36,43 68 141
1.25 106 73 25,106
1.30 54 73-74 37
1.32 43 77 76
1.32-33 36 78 78
2 36 80 82
2.8 36 81 116
2.11 37
2.14 54 In Verrem
2.17-23 35 1.36 11
2.19 37 1.54 10
2.25 43 2.1.75 104
2.28 37 2.1.127 104
3.3-14 41 2.1.153 25
3.5 104 2.1.163 25
3.15 41 2.2.175 12
3.21 44 2.2.181 64
3.23 41 2.2.186 64
3.25 41 2.3.12 65
3.26 42 2.3.48 29
4.1-7 44 2.3.81 10
4.6 36 2.3.168 12
4.8-13 44 2.3.183 103, 104
4.14 45 2.4.98 141
4.14-18 43 2.4.102 104
4.15 5,43,46,47 2.5.12 31
4.16 44 2.5.143 100-101
4.17 106
4.18 45 Orationes Philippicae
4.18-24 46 1.17 106
4.21-22 42 1.23 147,151
4.22 42,43 1.31 147, 151
4.23 47 2.16 43
2.19 43, 151
In Pisonem 2.23 151
3 16 2.24 135, 151
4 31,48 2.44 43
7 43,48,92 2.112 151
11 77 2.113 106
13f 77 3.2 152
16 95 3.30 152
17ff 77 3.36 152
25 95 4.14 153
34 88,95 4.15 152
176
Orationes Philippicae - cont. Post Reditum in Senatu
5.18 154 2 85
5.20 154 3 79
5.40 142 5 85
5.40-41 154 6 108
5.41 25,106 8 78
6.19 155 12 43,76,77
7.4 25,29 20 25,84
7.21 155 21 78,80
7.24 43 23 108, 109
8.8 156 24 82
8.10-11 106 26 85
10.3 106 27 84-85
10.8 148, 156 28 85
11.28 31 29 82
11.36 106, 157 31 82
11.38 105 32 43,77
12.18 157 33 108
13.1-3 157 36-39 86
13.2 17 59 144
13.7 106
13.10 147,151 Pro Archia
13.16 104 2 56,141
13.23 104 3 141
13.36 157 14 56, 142
15-16 56, 142
Post Reditum ad Quirites 20 56, 142
1 86, 106, 107 .
3 86 Pro Balbo
5 87 61 115
8 76
9 53 Pro Caecina
9-10 87 70 101
13 76,77
14 108 Pro Caelio
15-16 87-88 12 101
16 88, 107 14 104
18 87 54 141
19 87
20 25, 106 Pro Cluentio
21 78,108,109 88f 14
22 110 101 102
23 110 146 27, 101
25 88 150 15
177
Pro Cluentio - cont. Pro Milone - cont.
152 5, 11, 14 46 57
153-154 15 87 103
154 15 94 103
155 27
Pro Murena
Pro Rege Deiotaro 1 38,106
11 145 3 39
12-13 146 4 39
15-53 40
Pro Flacco 19f 42
1 71 20 40
3 71 24 27
4 11,71 30 40
8 104 42 39,40
15 72,75 49 34
66 71,72 50 34
94 71 51 34
96 43,71,72 53 39
96-97 74 55 106
97-98 72-73 61-63 39
98 71 65 144
99 103 66 144
103-105 72-73 68 40
69 39
Pro Fonteio 70 103
12 36 73 43
46 36 78 25,39, 106
78-79 36
Pro Ligario 79 39
5 145 83 106
12-14 145 84 39,40
16 145 85 39
29 145 86 39,106
34 145 89 39,40
Pro Marcello Pro Plancio
27 106 23 12,63
12 145 78 82
32 145 86f 77, 104
87 76
Pro Milone
93-94 110
4 104 93 115
37 77 94 81,115
39 82
178
Pro Quinctio Pro Sestio - cont.
24 104 68 79
47 10 71 79,84,94,
51 10,143 103
87 79,84,94,
Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo 107
2-4 32 91ff 102
10 27 96 104
11 23 96-99 106
12 25 97 104, 108
16 25 98 25, 103, 104,
20-22 31 112
22 27 100 104,112
27 31 104 106,112
33-35 31 106 84, 103
34 28,32 107 25,88
116 104
Pro Rabirio Postumo 118 83
3 12 120-121 83
121 84
Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 121-122 84
20 104 128 82
24 104 137 112, 113
63 142 138 111
135-139 11 139 29
136 10 197 29
139 10
140 104 Pro Sulla
142 10 1 50
149 10 3 50
4 50
Pro Sestio
7 50
5 112 9 51
15 112 20 50
25 76,77 21 52
26 94 21-25 50,52
27 77 23 53
28 43 24 54
39 76 25 55
41 76 27 55
47 42 28-29 55
48 111 29 103
50 53,82 31 60
51 28 34 43
53 76 51 43
179
Pro Sulla - cont. Ad Atticum - cont.
63 31 2.3.4 70, 112,140
87 50 2.4.2 68,70
92 50, 144 2.5.1 70
2.9.2 70
Pro Tullio 2.9.3 70
36 10 2.13.2 73
2.15 57
2.16.1 103
H. Letters 2.16.1-2 69
2.16.2 101, 102
Ad Atticum 2.16.3 68
1.5.1 142 2.16.4 64,66,69
1.13.1 142, 144 2.18.1 73
1.13.3 57 2.18.4 70
1.13.4 61 2.19.2 73
1.13.5 47 2.19.3 69,72,73,
1.14.1 61 103
1.14.1-2 57 2.19.4 73
1.14.4 5, 43, 48, 61, 2.20.3 73,140
62 2.21.1 70,73,140
1.14.5 57,62,131 2.21.6 71,74
1.16.2 57 2.24.4 70,73
1.16.6 51,59, 102 2.25.1 71
1.16.9 48 2.25.2 70,73,140
1.16.9-10 74 3.3 78
1.16.10 53 3.8.3 79
1.17.8 58 3.9.2 78, 108
1.17.9 5,65 3.10.2 76,78
1.17.9-10 48,63,64 3.13.2 101
1.17.10 47,49 3.15.2 78
1.18 61 3.15.4 78
1.18.1 67 3.15.5 76
1.18.3 5,48,59,67 3.15.6 78,79,86
1.18.6 67 3.20.3 79
1.18.7 63 3.23 79
1.19.4 10, 33, 47, 65 3.23.1 79
1.19.6 44,67 3.23.2 79
1.19.8 68 3.24.2 79
1.20.3 68 3.26 86
2.1.3 30,31 4.1.4 81
2.1.4 106 4.5.1-3 114
2.1.7 43,67 4.6.2 68,112,114
2.1.8 58 4.8a.2 103
2.3.3-4 68 4.19.1 118, 119, 140
180
Ad Atticum - cont. Ad Atticum - cont.
4.19.2 118 9.18 136
5.1 118 10.1 137
6.1.1 142 10.1.3 104,147
6.1.2 42 10.4.2 147
6.1.16 66 10.4.8 137, 138, 146
7.3.2 123 10.4.9 138
7.3.5 123 10.8.2 139
7.4.2 123 10.8.6 147
7.7.5 104, 140 10.8A 134
7.11.1 139 10.8B 134
7.18.2 106 10.11.4 104
8.1.3 10,33 11.4 139
8.2.1 123, 126 11.5 139
8.11.2 138 12.44.1 144
8.11.7 127 13.9.1 142
8.11A 127,134 13.37.2 140
8.11B 127,134 14.1.1 140, 145, 146
8.11C 127, 134 14.2.3 106
8.11D 134 14.13B.3 144
8.11D.1 123,127 14.21.2 106
8.12.6 128 14.21.4 106
8.15A 134 14.22.1 106
8.15A.1 134 15.1.1 144
9.4.1 132 15.1.5 106
9.4.2 132-133 15.2.3 106
9.5.2 132 16.1-4 148
9.6A 134 16.7.1 148
9.7.1 106 16.13a.1 142
9.7B 134 16.16A.6 144
9.7B.1 123, 134-135 16.16B.2 106
9.7C.1 137, 146 16.16C.3 106
9.9.2 133
9.10.2 138 Ad Brutum
9.10.3 133, 138 1.15.4 106
9.10.6 138 1.17.1 48,60,91
9.11.2 106 26.1 159
9.11.3 138 26.2 159
9.11A.1 135
9.11A.3 136 Ad Familiares
9.11D 134 1.7.7 115
9.12.3 103 1.8.3 111
9.13A 134 1.8.3-4 111
9.14.1 138 1.9 92
9.16 136 1.9.1 101
181
Ad Familiares - cont.
1.9.5
1.9.10
1.9.11
1.9.12
1.9.13
1.9.14
1.9.17
1.9.18
1.9.20
1.9.21
2.16
2.16.2
3.1.2
3.4.6
3.7.5
4.2.3
4.3.1
4.4
4.4.4
5.2
5.2.6
5.2.7-8
5.2.8
5.4
5.6.4
5.7
5.7.1
5.7.3
5.21.1
5.21.2
7.8.1
7.33.2
8.17
9.9
9.17.1
10.1.4
10.18
10.22.1
10.23
10.24
10.26.1
10.31.6
10.32.5
Il.2.2
101
116
116-117
28,48,117
117
117
48, 117
118
117
106
134
106
142
111
53
137-138
137
145
140, 145
62
142
46
47
78
49
56
50
49
104
106, 112, 140
142
140
139
139
140
144
157
158
157
158
158
106
106
106
Ad Familiares - cont.
Il.3.3-4
11.8.1
l1.13a.2
11.15.1
11.20.4
11.22
12.15.3
12.27
13.9
13.9.2
13.11.3
14.1-4
14.7
16.11.2
16.12
16.12.2
16.21.3
Ad Quintum Fratrem
1.1.7
1.1.24
1.1.32
1.1.33
1.1.34
1.1.35
1.2.15
1.2.16
1.3
1.3.6
1.3.8
1.4
2.4.5
2.8.1-2
2.13.3
3.1.14
3.4.1
3.6.4
149-150
140
158
158
106
144
5
144
64
12,43
103
78
139
126
126
126
142, 144
65
65
6,43,65
66
106
43
70
71,74-75
78
86
78
78
113
142
142
92
111,138
17
182
iii. Rhetorical Treatises De Legibus - cont.
3.20 103
Brutus 3.28 97-98
32 131
83-86 144 De Natura Deorum
1.9 140
De Oratore 2.78-79 141
2.10 131 2.133 141
3.6 144 2.147-158 141
3.19 99-100 2.154 141
3.138 25 3.61 92
Orator De Officiis
35 140 1.8 103
1.15 29
1.20f 29
iv. Philosophical Treatises 1.26 147
1.35 147
Academica 1.43 147
1.11 140 1.64 147
1.85 99,162
De Amicitia 1.77 106
23 72,162 1.145 144
1.151 17
De Divinatione 2.2-5 140
2.7 140 2.4 140
2.21 147
De Fato 2.23-28 147
2 103, 106, 125, 2.27 103
148 2.28 147
2.29 147
De Finibus 2.73 18,29
2.113 143 2.78 18, 147
5.65-66 143 2.83-84 147
2.84 33
De Legibus
3.3 140
1.22-25 141 3.4 140
1.23 141 3.19 147
1.43 143 3.22 99
2.6 53 3.26-27 142
2.8 112 3.32 143, 147
2.38-39 97 3.36 147
2.39 118 3.49 147
3.1 144 3.82-85 147
3.8 31 3.83 147
183
De Officiis - cont. Asconius
3.88 48 Orationum Ciceronis Quinque
Enarratio
De Republica 46-47 79
1.10 17
1.39 98 In Orationem in Toga Candida
1.40 96,98 83 16
1.43 18, 110 87 16
1.49 25,96,101 90 16
1.52 104
1.69 25,28 Caesar
2.27 95, 144 De Bello Civili
2.43 106 1.5.5 106
2.48 142, 143 3.57.4 106
2.54 17,26,95
2.69 25, 96-97, 99 De Bello Hispaniensi
3.24 29 42.5 106
Quintus Cicero
2. Works of Other Ancient Authors Commentariolum Petitionis
1.3 64
Andocides
5 16
On the Mysteries
33 141
106-107 129
53 103
140 129
Cassius Dio
Appian
29.33 121
Bellum Civile 36.17a 61
1.26 4,91
37.25 23
2.1 42
37.25.3 31
2.2 53
37.25.4 34
2.5 42
37.26-28 31
2.7 62
37.29 34,43
2.10 68
37.35.3-4 43
2.13 63
37.36 46
2.15 76
37.38.2 48
2.142 148
37.39-41 62
2.594 148
37.43.1 62
38.1-8 69
Aristotle 38.7.4 63
Politics 38.8.5 69
1.1253A 98
38.16.2-6 76
38.16.5 77,78
38.16.5-6 77
38.17.4 78
184
Plato - cont. Respublica - cont.
Cleitophon 2.369b-d 130
40ge 129 4.432a-b 99,129
410a-b 129 5.462b-c 129-130
5.47Oc-d 129
Crito 5.470f 130
51c 118 8.545c-d 129
8.554c-e 129
Gorgias
508a 99 Symposium
186b-187e 129
Leges
3.678ff 130 Pliny
703c 129 Naturalis Historia
4.708c-d 130 3.14 146
4.708d 129 5.149 146
4.759b 129 7.116 30
5.774d 129 7.117 31
33.19 4
Menexenus
237b-238b 130 Plutarch
Caesar
Phaedo 8 44
85e-86d 129 8.2 43
14.6 69
Phaedrus
237d 129 Camillus
256b 129 42.3-5 4
263a 129
Cato Minor
Philebus 23 46
31c 129 26 60,62
30.1-2 61
Politicus
260b 129 Cicero
301e-302b 130 12 23
311a-c 129 12.1 31
13 12,30
Protagoras 14 34,43
322b 130 20 46
22 46
Respublica 22.5 62
1.351c-e 129 23 60,62
1.351d 129 23.1-3 54
1.352a 129 23.2 47
186
Cicero - cont. Bellum Catilinae - cont.
24.1 48 37.4-9 35
26.6 53 46.5-47.2 41
30.5 77 48 42
30.5-31.1 76 48-49 44
31 76 48.1 37
31.1 77 49.4 42,43,44
31.4 78 50 42
33.4 82 50.1-3 43
52.8-53.4 46
C. Gracchus 56-61 62
17 91
17.6 4 Bellum Iugurthinum
10.6 98
Pompeius 41.4 112
57 122
Historiae
Sulla 1.48.24-25 10
6.5 10,17 1.48.25 106
1.67 13
Polybius 1.67.5 10
6.17 12 1.67.10 10
1.67.13 10
Quintilian 1.77.11 106
Institutio Oratoria
5.13.1 36 Invectiva in Ciceronem
5.13.21 36 1 53
9.3.50 47 4 53
9.3.89 53 7 53
11.1.85 31
Seneca (the Younger)
Sallust Dialogi
Epistulae Ad Caesarem Senem 10.5.1 48
1.5.3 146
1.6.5 146 Speusippus
Definitions
Bellum Catilinae 413b 25
4 111 413e 25
6.2 98
17.43 60 Suetonius
31.7 53 Divus Iulius
33.1 35 14 44
33.4-5 35 16 60,62
37 34 20 63
37.1 36 20.1 69
187
Divus Iulius - cont.
20.3 69
22.1 69
28 121
Vespasian
9 110
Thucydides
3.82-83 128
8.93 128
Valerius Maximus
4.6.4 118
Velleius Paterculus
2.34.2 61
2.35 46
2.39.2 116
2.40.5 60,61
2.47.2 118
2.62.2 148
188