6. Reddi v.

Sebrio FACTS: Tanu Reddi, an American citizen of Indian descent, engaged in real estate business in the Philippines in order to speed up the generation of funds for her desire in opening a hospital in the Philippines. Atty. Diosdado Sebrio, Jr. advised Reddi to use corporate vehicles to effect the purchases since she cannot acquire ownership of the lands. Sebrio represented to Reddi another client who owned a 27 hectare lot to be sold to Reddi under a Memorandum of agreement in which Reddi would pay the titling of the lot. A portion however was under litigation. Sebrio also adviced Reddi to obtain a franchise of Jollibee food outlet, in which profits will be divided 50/50. Sebrio also presented another estate of a deceased which again was bought by Reddi, however, later learned that the lot was neither owned by a deceased nor was it for sale. He also persuaded Reddi to buy the lot where SM north mall stands, which was purportedly owned by his client. Reddi also sent large sums of money for a lot, which subsequently was discovered to be inexistent. A disbarment case was filed by Reddi. Sebrio denied the accusations in his reply. The IBP, however, recommended disbarment of Atty. Sebrio. ISSUE: Should disbarment be proper as penalty for Atty. Sebrio? HELD: Yes. The respondents acts constitute dishonest and deceitful conduct with respect to the intended transactions, real property acquisitions which turned out to be bogus. His defenses raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. This, respondent miserably failed to do. If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 7. Virgo v. Amorin FACTS: Atty. Oliver Amorin offered to buy a house and lot owned by the Wilhelmina Virgos and her husband. Both parties agreed in the sale in which downpayment was made. Atty. Amorin was kind in giving legal services for free. He, however, failed to pay the balance as alleged in the complaint of the Virgos. Checks were dishonored and signatures were altered which brought out a BP 22 complaint and a disbarment

complaint. Atty. Amorin in turn denied the allegations and also filed 1 civil case and 9 criminal cases against the Virgos. He also asserts that assuming that the accusations of complainant are true, such are not grounds for disbarment, not being related to his professional conduct but at most are merely bases for civil action. The IBP, however, concluded that Atty. Amorin should be suspended for a year for his violation of his oath. ISSUE: Should suspension be proper? HELD: No. The existence of an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Amorin and complainant was not established and that whatever legal services may have been rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for free were only incidental to their personal transaction. In addition, there is a civil case pending determining the factual issues. The Supreme Court, in this instance, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual matters that are subject of the civil cases. Therefore, the case should be dismissed and suspension is not yet proper. 8. Orocio v. Anguluan FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act restructuring the reorganization of NAPOCOR. After reorganization, some of its members resigned, retired, or separated. Atty. Edmund Anguluan, as chairman, approved a resolution authorizing the release of 184 million for distribution for NAPOCOR Welfare Funds to the exclusion of employees who resigned, retired or separated prior to the EPIRA. Members who resigned, retired, or separated filed a case against the NAPOCOR demanding their shares. They were represented by counsel Atty. Victoriano Orocio under an agreement that he will not collect any acceptance fee, appearance fee, or any other fees except that he may get 15% of the claim as attorneys fees in conformity with the compromise agreement. Respondents opposed to said agreement. ISSUE: Is the attorneys fee valid? HELD: Yes. Petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated. Petitioner was never hired or employed by respondents as their counsel. If anyone would be injured by petitioners claim for attorneys fees, it would be the non-EPIRA separated members,

and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of the separated members has questioned or complained about petitioners claim for attorneys fees. The client and his lawyer may enter into a written contract whereby the latter would be paid attorneys fees only if the suit or litigation ends favorably to the client called a contingency fee contract. A much higher compensation is allowed in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees. It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a moneymaking venture. A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society and is also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Therefore the amount should be reduced to only 10% of the claim (10% x 119M). 9. Olorga v. Beldia, Jr. FACTS: Records of a civil case filed by the mother of Olorga could no longer be found which made it very hard for them to prove their case. Olorga then filed a complaint against Respondent Judge Beldia, Jr. and the Clerk of court Atty. Mary Emilie Villanueva, former presiding judge and branch clerk of court, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch 57. In their defense, Judge Beldia, Jr. said when he assumed office and presided over the case but was designated as the acting presiding judge of the RTC, Bacolod City, and upon return the records could no longer be found. He, however, admits that docket books were not correctly recorded. Atty. Villanueva, on the other hand, in her defense, contends that she only assumed office only after it was discovered to be lost. ISSUE: Are both liable? HELD: As to respondent judge, he cannot be completely held liable since there was not enough showing that records were lost at the time of his possession. Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment.

Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent. However, Respondent judge was negligent in the discharge of his duties. He failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance. He should have directed the court personnel to be diligent in the performance of their functions. He neglected to properly supervise them, particularly those in charge of the docket books, resulting in incomplete entries therein. A fine was proper charge for his liability. As to the clerk of court, considering that she only assumed post after records could no longer be located, she is absolved from liability since these records were obviously never committed to her charge. 10. Reyes v. NLRC FACTS: Erwin Reyes was hired by Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines as route salesman. Consequently, he was terminated by the company thru the human resource officer. Reyes filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Reyes that he should be reinstated and is entitled to full backwages and attorneys fees. The respondents appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision reducing the backwages and deleting the award of attorneys fees. Only petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the CA issued a resolution dismissing the complaint since petitioner failed to serve a copy of the petition to the adverse party. Moreover, the petitioner thru counsel failed to file a motion for reconsideration. After having a new counsel, petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying his motion seeking liberality from the Court since it was his former counsel who can be faulted for procedural defects. ISSUE: Can the case be given due course despite that petitioner is bound by acts of his counsel? HELD: Yes. The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Hence, if counsel commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client must perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake. The reason for the rule is to avoid the possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice system, as no party would ever accept a losing verdict. This general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence of the lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and

inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the client is effectively deprived of his or her day in court. The negligence of petitioners former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner should not be denied his day in court and made him to suffer for his counsels indiscretions.