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PUBLIC CORPORATIONS LAW

1. Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation (1998) Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a complaint for expropriation against private respondent, over two parcels of land to be used for a socialized housing project. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA 7160 and that the cause of action, if any, was barred by res judicata. Held: A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code, particularly Section 19 expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the municipal council will not suffice. The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGU's. The latter, when authorized by Congress, is subject to the legislature's control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. The principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. The State or its agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right of eminent domain by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. The same is also true of the principle of law of the case. Hence, the State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate once all the legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social justice. The petition is denied without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over the subject property.

whether the expropriation is for a public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal council that determines whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated is for public use, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts will intervene only when no real or substantial relation is established between the undertaking and public use. Under the new concept, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community. In the present case, the expropriation for the establishment of pilot development center is for a public purpose. Limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

3. Fortich vs. Corona (1998) Facts: Bukidnon Governor Carlos Fortich requested the President to suspend the DAR order denying the application for conversion of land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao for converting the subject land from agricultural to industrial land. Held: The power of local government units to reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform, this having been decided in the case of Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA.

4. Patalinghug vs. CA (1994) Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao City enacted ordinance number 363, for the expanded zoning ordinance of Davao City. Section 8 of which provide that funeral parlors shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. Petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor, but his permit to construct the building was cancelled because the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from the nearest residential structure owned by Wilfred Teepot, which is leased by laundry businesses. Petitioner argued that Teepot's building is for commercial purposes since a business was being undertaken therein, and its classification as residential in tax declaration is not conclusive. Held: Even if Teepot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. Furthermore, a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. Under Section 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, tax declaration does not bind a provincial or city assessor. In fact, a piece of land declared by the tax payer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. More importantly, the declaration of the said area as a commercial zone through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power.

2. Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA (1993) Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of petitioner passed a resolution in 1988 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase or expropriate private property contiguous to the provincial capitol for the purpose of establishing a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. The land sought to be expropriated belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the time the complaint is filed, the governing law was BP 337 which authorizes expropriation by mere resolution of the municipal council. The Court of Appeals suspended the expropriation proceedings and requires petitioner to submit the requisite approval of the DAR to convert the classification of the property from agricultural to non-agricultural. Hence, the present petition. Held: The power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL or RA 6657) particularly Section 65 which requires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified. CARL does not intimate in the least that LGU's must first secure the approval of DAR before petitioner can institute the necessary proceedings. The authority of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural land cannot extend to the exercise of eminent domain, otherwise DAR will have the authority to scrutinize

5. Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA (2000) Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit, to which Mayor Camilo Cabili issued subject to the following conditions: (1) that petitioner cannot put up an

optical clinic but only a commercial store and (2) that it cannot examine or prescribe reading and optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics. The Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOPI) lodged a complaint against petitioner, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions of the permit. Held: The authority of City Mayor to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided by law. However, distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is granted by the local authorities while the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. The first authorizes the person, natural or juridical, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license on the other hand is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his/her profession. In the present case, what is sought by petitioner from the respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop, and the city mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry. The contention that business permit is a contract and therefore the petitioner is estopped from questioning the same is untenable. A license or permit is but a special privilege, it is not in any way vested, absolute or permanent. The fact that a party acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in the subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of the authority of the City Mayor. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.

The regions themselves are not territorial and political division like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and ensuring the efficient delivery of essential services. Finally, the reorganization of administrative regions in EO No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: 1) contiguity and geographical features; 2) transportation and communication facilities; 3) cultural and language groupings; 4) land area and population; 5) socioeconomic development programs in the regions 6) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; and 7) number of provinces and cities.

7. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc (1994) Facts: The opening of a branch of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) in Cagayan de Oro City was opposed by the different sectors of the community including the local government through the mayor who brought a petition attacking, among others, gambling as intrinsically harmful invoking the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and call attention to the old case of U.S. vs. Salaveria (39 Phil. 102) which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. Petitioners also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 which created the PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operations of casinos and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. Held: The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. It is not illegal per se. The Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, LGU's are authorized to prevent or suppress, among other, gambling and other prohibited games of chance. This provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but in fact permitted by law. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of words, with which it is associated. Since the word gambling is associated with and other prohibited games of chance, the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed, contrary to petitioner's view that it includes both legal and illegal gambling. Petitioner's argument that the Code repealed PD 1869 is untenable. In case of conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the present case. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Petitioners suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.

6. Chiongban vs. Orbos (1995) Facts: Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Mindanao. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 authorizes the President to merge existing regions. On October 12, 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the administrative regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13, of RA No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President and provides no standard for the exercise of said delegated power. In addition, petitioners challenge the validity of EO No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge Regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao. Held: The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the county into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local government but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments (Abbas vs. COMELEC).

The power to grant still includes the power to withdraw or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. The aforementioned ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and are therefore ultra vires and void.

property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned . . . It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing there two (2) provisions, the Court arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule as follows: 1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A. 7160. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D. 921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the Sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.

8. Alvarez vs. Guingona (1996) Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 7720 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code by arguing that Internal Revenue Allotments are not income but merely transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Hence, the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be Php 20,074,581.97 is inaccurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Held: Petitioners asseverations are untenable because IRAs form part of the income of Local Government Units. The funds generated by LGUs from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided in the Local Government Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes of budgetary preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the LGU, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national utilization proceeds are considered items of income. Income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. IRA regularly and automatically accrues to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

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By this harmonization, the operative principle of decentralization provided under Sec. 3, R.A. 7160 encouraging local government units to consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources is fulfilled. Indeed, the essence of joint local action for common good so cherished in the Local Government Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization. Respondents claim that with the express repeal of P.D. 464, P.D. 921 being merely a supplement of said P.D. cannot exist independently on its own is untenable. By harmonizing P.D. 921 with R.A. 7160, the former can exist outside of P.D. 464, as a support, supplement and extension of R.A. 7160, which for this purpose, has replaced P.D. 464. Since it is now clear that P.D. 921 is still a good law, it is equally clear that this Courts ruling in the Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And, applying the said ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values prepared solely by the respondent municipal assessor is illegal and void,

10. Javier vs. CA (1994) 9. Ty vs. Trampe (1995) Facts: The respondent court ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160. It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area. HELD: Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real Facts: Respondent Provincial Board of Antique abolishes the office of the Provincial Engineer. Petitioner questioned the said action and contends that the abolition was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 1971 election. Respondents argue that the abolition was motivated by an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries, and operating expenses at the Office of the Provincial Engineer, and that the power of the Provincial Board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it. Held: Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that office, absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the

power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact expressed that an implied power of the province x x x (should) be liberally construed in its favor and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of local government and it should be presumed to exist. The Court ruled that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist at the time. The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act is done in good faith. The abolition of the office in the present case could have well been justified except for the convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process taken by the board. The Court is not prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents. In lieu of reinstatement, the Provincial Government of Antique is ordered to pay the employees back salaries equivalent to five (5) years.

council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operation maintenance and management of a flea market with respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative. Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction of said stalls. Petitioner Macasiano wrote Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. The trial court however upholds the validity of the ordinance. Held: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. (Art. 423, Civil Code). In the present case, the local roads are used for public service and therefore considered public properties. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga.) Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Section 10 of the Local Government Code provides closure of roads A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. However, such authority should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law, that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. It is only when the property is already withdrawn from public use, that it becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. (Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles) It is only then that the respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed in accordance with the last sentence of a Section 10 of RA 7160. In the present case, the roads and streets are available to the traffic in general, hence considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose or lease it to private persons.

11. Mariano vs. Comelec (1995) Facts: Petitioners assail section 2 of R.A. 7854 as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, in violation of section 10 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code Held: The delineated area of the proposed city of Makati provides that: SEC. 2. City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted to highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory Municipality of Makati of Metropolitan Manila area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the Municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The importance of drawing the precise strokes of territorial boundaries cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical description. Given the facts, the Court cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land area of Makati.

13. Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac (1992) Facts: Respondent enacted Ordinance No. 13 prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by Tatel a public nuisance within purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that Tatels warehouse was constructed in violation of the said ordinance, affecting the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine. Held: Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed

12. Macasiano vs. Diokno (1992) Facts: The Municipality of Paraaque passed an ordinance which authorizes the closure of certain streets and the establishment of a flea market theron. Through a resolution passed by the municipal

with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles requires that a municipal ordinance 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute 2) must not be unfair or oppressive 3) must not be partial or discriminatory 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5) must be general and consistent with public policy and 6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria.

15. Basco vs. PAGCOR (1991) Facts: PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 13 par. 2 of the decree provides exemption of PAGCOR from paying any tax of whatever kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges, or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local. Petitioner contends that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees and its exemption clause violates the principle of local autonomy. Held: Such contention is without merit for the following reasons. Firstly, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax. Secondly, the Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and establish municipal corporations due to its legislative powers. If Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even fake back the power. Thirdly, the City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by P.D. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Fourthly, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter under P.D. 1869. Lastly, the argument that P.D. 1869 violated the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution is pointless. The power of local governments to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since P.D. 1869 remains an operative law, its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of LGU's to impose taxes and fees.

14. Limbona vs. Mangelin (1989) Facts: Petitioner Alimbuses P. Limbona was expelled from membership in the Sangunniang Pampook, Autonomous Region XII, for filing a case before the Supreme Court in question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly. Presidential Decree No. 1618 which organized the Autonomous government of Mindanao established internal autonomy in the two regions (Region IX and XII ) within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities. It requires the autonomous regional governments to undertake all internal administrative matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government. In relation to the central government, it provides that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the autonomous regions. The basic issue is whether the autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts. Held: Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided. Section 2. The territorial and political subdivision shall enjoy local autonomy. Secion 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category (Sec. 15) is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class (Sec. 2) is under the supervision of the national government. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades the Supreme Court that they were meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, i.e., in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. P.D. 1618, in the first place, mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Region. In the second place, the Sangunniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. Hence, it is proper for the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction.

16. Tan vs. Comelec (1986 Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of BP Blg. 885 An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, on the ground that the plebiscite for its ratification was conducted only to the inhabitants of the territory of the proposed new province Negros del Norte. Petitioners argue that the plebiscite must be conducted in the unit or units affected which includes the inhabitants of Negros Occidental. Held: The Constitution makes it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created, divided, merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. In the present case, the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. The Court cannot agree that the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. Thus BP Blg. 885 is declared unconstitutional and the proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte is null and void.

17. Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965) Facts: In October 1964, the President acting pursuant to Sec.68, RAC (granting the president the power to create municipalities) issued a series of Executive Orders, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner Pelaez, instituted this action to restrain the respondent from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in the implementation of said Executive Orders on the ground that they are null and void upon the basis that Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A. 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by an Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the area affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated. Accordingly, if the President under R.A. 2370 cannot even create a barrio, it follows that the more he could not create a municipality which is composed of several barrios since barrios are units of municipalities. Respondent answers in the affirmative upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios such as by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of a new municipality. Held: The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature for municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential that the said law: a) be complete in itself setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and b) to fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performances of his functions. In the present case, Sec. 68 RAC does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power because it fails to enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Furthermore, the 1935 Constitution gives only general supervision of local governments by the President. This provision repeals SEC. 68, RAC. The Executive Orders are therefore unconstitutional. It must be noted also that R.A. 2370 denies the president's authority to create a new barrio which implies a negation of the bigger power to create a municipality which consists of several barrios. Whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, as provided in Sec. 68, RAC, may partake of an administrative nature, involving as it does the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipality.

municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road.

19. Dacanay vs. Asistio (1992) Facts: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up to seven (7) flea markets in that city. However, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latters policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. Held: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. Any existing leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Mayor cannot infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. Public respondents have the corresponding duty, arising from public office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

20. Greater Balanga Development Corporation vs. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1994) Facts: Greater Balanga Development Corporation applied with the Office of the Mayor for a business permit which was granted. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed a Resolution annulling the Mayors permit. Pursuant to the said resolution, Mayor Banzon issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan resolution stated that the land subject of this case was earmarked for the expansion of the Balanga Public Market. Held: The Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. While the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions for their revolution, the anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipal Government. Thus, there is no legal basis for it to impose and collect market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right to do so.

18. Pilapil vs. CA (1992) Facts: Private respondent Colomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a road right of way which leads towards the National Road and ends at the portion of petitioner Pilapil's property where a camino vicinal exists all the way to said National Road. The Colomidas tried to improve the road or camino vicinal, but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them. The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. Held: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces, cities or municipalities. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private property can interfere with such a right. Under Batas Pambasa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or regulations subject to the provision of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of

21. Knecht Imcorporated vs. Municipality of Cainta (2006) Facts: Rose Packing Co., Inc. sold three parcels of land situated in Cainta, Rizal to United Cigarette Corporation (UCC). On June 22, 1990, the Municipality of Cainta filed a complaint for expropriation against PCIB (mortgagee bank) and Rose Packing. The expropriation complaint was based on Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution No. 89-020 which sought to purchase the land as the site of the municipal administration compound and SB resolution No. 89-021 which called for the condemnation of said land if the negotiation for its voluntary sale failed. The negotiation did fail, hence, the complaint for expropriation. On June 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order directing the Municipality of Cainta to deposit 10% of the provisional value of the property. A writ of possession was subsequently issued to respondent municipality. Held: The exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit is now governed by Section 19 of Republic Act 7160. For properties under expropriation, the law now requires the deposit of an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration. In the present case, there is no valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a special metropolitan political subdivision requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. Moreover, the Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal.

24. Province of Batangas vs. Romulo (2004) 22. Roble Arrastre vs. Villafor (2006) Facts: Petitioner filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus on the ground of refusal by the municipal mayor to issue business license for arrastre operations. Petitioner argue that said function is ministerial after the applicant's satisfaction or payment of proper license fees, and refusal to issue license is a neglect to perform official duty. Held: Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, the Local chief executive has the power to Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses and permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. Said authority is derived under Section 16 or the general welfare clause which encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. License and permits are manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus. Facts: President Estrada issues Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 which led to the creation of Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund, having an Oversight Committee authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of funds to the LGUS. In RA No. 8745, otherwise known as the General Appropriation Act of 1998 (GAA), the program was renamed as the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF).Petitioner questioned said provision in the GAAs on the ground that it imposed conditions for the release of IRA of LGU's. Held: The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanics unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee, as sanctioned by the assailed provision in the GAA, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The discretion and control of the Oversight Committee over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. Finally, the Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws. Any amendments to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.

23. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association (2000) Facts: Petitioner MMDA send a notice to respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village, to open the said street to public vehicular traffic and that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The basic issue is whether Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is a political subdivision of the country authorized to order opening of private roads and demolition of perimeter walls. Held: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate, one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. The MMDA is not a political unit of government nor a public corporation endowed with legislative powers. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. It

25. Lagcao vs. Labra (2004) Facts: Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 1843 passed by the provincial council of Cebu authorizing the expropriation of certain properties including those belonging to petitioner for the purpose of selling it to the squatters. Petitioner argued that said an endeavor is contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.

Held: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate and Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: SEC. 19 Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and the pertinent laws xxx (italics supplied) However, while housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In the present case, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection as the site of a socialized housing project. The Ordinance is constitutionally infirm.

Held: The lots in question are owned by the City in its public and governmental capacity, hence subject to the absolute control of Congress. Only patrimonial properties of LGU's or held by it in its private or proprietary capacity are those which cannot be deprived without due process or taken without just compensation. RA 3120 is intended to implement the social policy of the Constitution and the government's program of land for the landless. It is a manifestation of the legislature's right and power to deal with state property including those held by municipal corporation in its public or governmental capacity. RA 3120 is constitutional.

28. Javellana vs. DILG (1992) Facts: City Engineer Divinagracia filed an Administrative case against Councilor Javellana for continuously engaging in the practice of law without securing the authorization of the DILG Regional Director and for being a counsel for Javiero and Catapang, who filed a case against City Engineer Divinagracia for illegal dismissal. Held: Atty. Javellana violated the prohibition against government officials from engaging in private practice if it will represent interests adverse to the government. In the present case, the illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government, the real employer, of which Javellana is a councilor. Any judgment against Divinagracia would be a judgment against the City government. Javellana, by serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them in prosecuting their claims is a clear violation of the above mentioned prohibition.

26. City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (1983) Facts: Quezon City council passed an ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery within the jurisdiction of Quezon City. However, Section 9 of said ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and residents of the City. Held: Police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government. It is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of property or liberty for the promotion of general welfare. Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property except where there is necessity to confiscate obnoxious properties in order to destroy and not to devote it to public use. Section 9 of the said ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power, it is not a mere regulation but an outright confiscation, for it deprives a person of his private property without dues process and just compensation.

29. Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes (1983) Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority wishes to expropriate 282 hectares of land for development into integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist value. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of Public Use. They contend that the land is already for land reform and that it should seek the approval of the Court of Agrarian Relations. CFI granted writs of possession. Petitioners brought instant petition before SC to enjoin execution. The basic issues are whether or not there is non-compliance with the public use requirement under the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights; whether or not there is disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated; and whether or not there is impairment of obligations of contracts. Held: There is compliance with the requirement of public use. The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution. The policy objective of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare among others. To include specific programs like tourism as express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulk code and would require the framers to be impossibly prescient. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform, among others, merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. On the second issue, there is no disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated. Land being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares,

27. Rabuco vs. Villegas (1974) Facts: The Congress passed RA 3120 converting the Malate Area into disposable and alienable lands of the state for the purpose of subdividing the area into small lots for sale in installment to the occupants thereof. Respondent city officials of Manila contend that RA 3120 is unconstitutional for it deprives the City of the lots in question without due process of law.

almost all of which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated consists of hilly and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive. Only 8,970 square meters of 283 hectares affected is part of the operation land transfer. This 8,970 square meters is not even within the sports complex proper but form parts of the 32 hectares resettlement area of the 40 defendants, only 2 have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. Under the facts of this petition, there is no need to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interests. Petitioners have failed to overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970 square meters covered by the Operation Land Transfer forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development of the 808 hectares tourism complex. On the third issue, the invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The nonimpairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. Parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain.

for repatriation under P.D. 725 w/c he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. The issue is whether or not repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? Held: Repatriation is valid and legal. Under Phil law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Moreover, Frivaldos repatriation seasonably cures his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold office as governor. He possessed the citizenship requirement on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Section 39 of Local Government Code must be liberally construed. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Furthermore, Sec 39 speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications should thus be possessed when the elective official begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed. Lees argument that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a voter as under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines is untenable. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.

30. Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme (1991) Facts: Morning of December 1965, collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality. Several passengers of the jeep died. Private respondents instituted a compliant for damages and a third party complaint against Municipality and the driver of dump truck. The issue is whether the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee. Held: It depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. SC notes that in permitting such entities to be sued (through allowance in the municipal charter), the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. And in the case at bar, the driver was indeed performing governmental functions. The driver of the municipality's dump truck insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." SC ruled in Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities". In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Hence, no liability.

32. Grego vs. COMELEC (1997) Facts: Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.(New LGC NOT yet in effect then). Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor and won (New LGC already in effect). After his term, Basco sought reelection twice and won on both reelections. Petition for disqualification was filed against Basco, using section 40 (b) of the LGC but dismissed. The issue is whether or not the petition for disqualification was correctly dismissed

Held: It was correctly dismisses. Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC does not apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on Jan. 1, 1992. Bascos election to office as city councilor in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office. It must be noted that there was nothing to condone in the first place. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which applies only to those removed from office on or after Jan. 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason to dwell on the matter.

31. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (2000) Facts: On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition w/ the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified for not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. During the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the elected governor. At 8:30 pm of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor. Frivaldo filed a new petition w/ COMELEC seeking the annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee and his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition

33. Rodriguez vs. COMELEC (1996) Facts: The issue is whether or not intent to evade is a necessary element of the definition of a fugitive from justice? Held: Yes. A fugitive from justice includes not only those who, after conviction, flee to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. Obviously there can only be intent to evade when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. In the case at

bar, Rodriguez arrival in the Philippines (July 95) preceded the filing of the felony complaint in Los Angeles (Nov 95). When he left the US, there was as yet no complaint & arrest warrant much less conviction that he could run away from. The circumstantial fact that the charges against Rodriguez were filed 17days after his departure cant overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. It is immaterial to determine the exact time when Rodriguez was made aware of the charges against him, having established that he was not aware of such charges when he left the US. His failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the US authorities after he learned of the charges against him does not make him a fugitive from justice. Going back to the US in the middle of his term would only violate the very functions of his office and jeopardize public interest.

left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.

36. Victoria vs. COMELEC (1994) Facts: The basic question is how should the ranking of SP members be computed for the purpose of succession? Petitioner argue that the ranking of the SP members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein (which will result in petitioner Victoria ranking first) Held: Sec 44 of Local Gpvernment Code last paragraph provides: "For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidates to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election." The law is clear that the ranking in the SP shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about factoring the numbers of voters who actually voted.

34. Borja vs. COMELEC (1998) Facts: Capco was elected Pateros vice-mayor of Pateros on 1988 for a term ending June 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, upon the death of the incumbent. Capco ran for and won as mayor in the 1992 and 1995 elections. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros for the 1998 elections. Borja who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms (counting 1989-1992 term). The issue is whether or not Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 is considered as service for one full term. Held: NO. To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider only the stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office would be to disregard one of the purposes of Article X, 8 of the Constitution. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

37. Farias vs. Barba (1996) Facts: The basic question is this case is that in case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure? Held: The Governor upon the recommendation of SB concerned. Since the vacancy in this case was created by a SB member who did not belong to any political party, the specific provision involved is par. (c) of Sec. 45 to wit:In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. To be sure the President of the Philippines can not be referred to as "local chief executive" in Sec. 45(c). It is apparent that the phrase is a misnomer and that the choice of this phrase was simply dictated by the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminably repeating the officials on whom the power to appoint is conferred. Perhaps "authorities concerned" would have been a more accurate generic phrase to use. The phrase "sanggunian concerned" in Sec. 45(c) should more properly be understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping with the policy implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3). [CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 45: Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member belonging to a Political PartySangguniang Panlalawigan and Sanguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b). Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan The Governor upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).

35. David vs. COMELEC (1997) Facts: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 reads: The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for 3 years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. The issue is whether or not the law which governs the term of office of barangay officials is RA 7160 (and not 6679) Held: YES, RA 7160. In light of the historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only 3 years as provided under the LGC emerges. Furthermore the 3-year term is not repugnant to the Constitution. (Liga ng mga Barangay posits that by excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at 3 years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a 3-year term for such officers is untenable.) The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely

Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member Not Belonging to a Political PartySangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized and independent component cites The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon recommendation- of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod as the case may be.Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan The Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.] [There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay. Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be made by the mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to have party affiliations.] [Another issue raised in this case is whether the appointing authority limited to the appointment of those "recommended" to him? The Court answered in the affirmative. The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment is a discretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing power vested with so large a discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. Since the recommendation takes the place of nomination by political party, the recommendation must likewise be considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy to the provision of Sec. 45(b).IN CAB, since neither Nacino nor Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the SB of San Nicolas. For while Nacino was appointed by Gov, he was not recommended by the SB of San Nicolas. On the other hand, Palafox was recommended by the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.]

by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

38. Marquez vs. COMELEC Facts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. Held: The core issue focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office. The Solicitor General, taking the side of the petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399,