TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Dissertation Abstract Chapter One : INTRODUCTION Chapter Two : EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES Chapter Three : BURMA AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Chapter Four : SOCIALIST EDUCATION REFORMS (1962-88) Chapter Five : POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN HIGH PLACES Chapter Six : TEACHERS AS CADRES? : EDUCATIONS AND
THE REVOLUTION OF 1962 I 1
22
41
98
153

200
240
287

Chapter Seven : REVOLUTION, EDUCATION, AND STUDENTS Chapter Eight : CONCLUSION References:
I ENGLISH LANGUAGE SOURCES II BURMESE LANGUAGE SOURCES

303
314

i KNOWLEDGE, CONTROL, AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION UNDER BURMA'S MILITARY DICTATORSHIP (1962-88)

Zar Ni

Under the supervision of Professor Michael W. Apple

At the University of Wisconsin - Madison

Many of the critical studies in existing education literature base their analyses on situations where power is diffused. This study looks at the opposite. It answers the question how power is brought to bear on educational policies and practices in situations where the state is both strong and repressive. Drawing on critical and poststructuralist perspectives on knowledge and curriculum, this study critically examines social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of formal schooling in Burma during the Burma Socialist Program Party or BSPP rule (1962-88). Specifically, it addresses the issues concerning educational policies, decision-making, and knowledge production in Burma's education and it locates Burmese schooling in the context of the "Burmese Way to Socialism" revolution. Historically grounded, the study is based upon the data from the in-depth interviews with Burmese nationals residing in the United States who are former students, teachers, university instructors, and high ranking officials from the Education Ministry under the BSPP rule. The study, in part, rests on an archival investigation of official publications and policy documents published by the BSPP government, speeches by educational leaders and political authorities, and academic curricular materials used in Burmese schools throughout

ii the country. Furthermore, it is informed by the investigator's 24 year-long lived experience during the BSPP era. It is argued that despite its official educational policy pronouncements, the discursive construction of the traditional notions of the "student," "educator," and "citizen," and the selective reworkings of Burmese national cultures, traditions, and pasts, the BSPP government was, in the final analysis, preoccupied with the political and, to a lesser extent, ideological control of the Burmese educational community. In BSPP schooling, the extensive deployment of the intelligence apparatus and the use of coercion became the two most significant features in Burma's education. On their part, driven by a multiplicity of motives and depending on various factors such as ethnic identification, wealth, proximity to power, and ideological orientation, members of Burmese educational community accepted, supported, manipulated, subverted, and, chronically, revolted against the BSPP educational policies and practices at various historical moments throughout the BSPP rule.

Chapter One INTRODUCTION

Just as food turns into poison, if preserved too long, so also knowledge turns into ignorance or superstition, if it has lost its connection with life. --Lama Anagarika Govinda, From "The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy," p.40

In the study I examine critically how the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) regime (1962-88), essentially a dictatorship, attempted to utilize education in Burma to advance their political goals and in what ways a select group of individuals in the educational hierarchy (i.e., educational leaders, teachers, and students) handled these politico-educational measures, or, simply put, the politics of education in Burma under the BSPP rule. In doing so, I locate the country's education in the intersection of culture, polity, and economy and look at the continuities and ruptures in Burma's education. Although I draw largely on neoGramscian conceptual work developed by such scholars as Raymond Williams and Louis Althusser my analysis is informed, in part, by the insight offered by the French theorist Michel Foucault. Furthermore, I find some of the works done by "resistance" scholars such as Paul Willis and James Scott helpful in looking at how these members of Burma's educational community acted in local settings. The stories recounted by my interviewees reveal how, in their various capacities as educational leaders, educators, and students with diverse class locations, ethnic background, and political orientations, they implemented, complied with, supported, resisted, subverted, or manipulated BSPP educational policies and practices. The study rests on two major sources of information: a critical reading of relevant official policy documents, government publications including public speeches by prominent political and educational leaders and an oral history constructed out of the data from the indepth personal interviews with several key former educational leaders and with a diverse group of Burmese migrs who lived through the BSPP period. In addition, I draw on my own recollections of my own experience, as well as the experiences of those who I knew

intimately during my 25 years as a citizen of the Union of the Socialist Republic of Burma. I use the term "education" to refer to formal, modern (western) schooling throughout the study. The study is concerned exclusively with formal academic schooling (from kindergarten through college). In what follows I elaborate on various conceptual tools which will be used as a roadmap in the essentially historical investigation of the educational life under the Burmese military dictatorship (1962-1988).

Global Influences: History, Ideology, and Local Politics In examining the politics of education in Burma it is necessary to call attention to an inherent danger confronting "Third World" students of education who apply observations developed in the contexts of western capitalist democracies. Not only does modern education have its roots in Europe, but also the conceptual tools by which it may be analyzed were, and are, manufactured in European and North American contexts. For these Western scholars, education therefore is homegrown and organic. In his Education as Cultural Imperialism , Martin Carnoy (1974) has pointed out that western education spread to many former colonies of western colonial powers, which now make up almost the entire Third World. Education's past association with European colonialism is too crucial an element to be overlooked in the study. In this connection, Wallerstein (1990) has extended his original World System perspective, with its exclusive foci on politics and economy, to the cultural realm when he argues that the single most important outcome of the expansion of this interstate system is the universal acceptance by all post-colonial regimes of the notion of (material and economic) development or progress. As a matter of fact, the spread of the idea of material progress predated the dissolution of formal European colonial empires, the historical evidence of which I will provide in a chapter on the discussion of Burmese history. Wallerstein (1990) argues that "the rising standard of living is a central myth of this world

system....(I)n the last fifty years, a world-wide scheme of 'developmentalism' has been erected and propagated. (According to this myth) (a)ll states can develop; all states shall develop" (pp.48-49). From the Bolsheviks in Moscow since the late 1920s to Mao and his Red Experts in China with their "Great Leap Forward" sloganeering in the 1950s (Goldman & Cheek, 1987), "progress" or "development" was the name of the game. As the official BSPP publications and policy documents indicate Burma's education policies and practices too, were influenced largely by this materialist philosophy and the country's nationalist dream of building a socialist society is bound up with the notion of progress. Different historical agencies who vied for state power were all agreed on the ideal of material progress/development/modernization; what they fought over was in what specific ways--left or right, or how left--the ultimate goal was to be realized. This nationalist dream manifested itself in national aspirations and socialistic concerns which have guided the policies of the successive post-colonial governments since 1948. Some of these concerns were personal, immediate, and petty, but still some were genuinely nationalistic and for the collective good, (for instance, greater educational access). These unleashed economic and political aspirations played themselves out in the politics of education in rather complex and complicated ways and hence influenced the processes of social transformation. However, a word of caution is in order here lest one jumps to the conclusion that the post-colonial elites absorbed the notion of material progress rooted in European cultures in its entirety. In their introduction to the edited volume on post-colonialism "Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in A Bourgeois World," Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper (1997) argue that "social transformations are a product of both global and local struggles" (p.4). They attempt to avoid the overdetermination of the global over the local processes when they write:
Our subtitle, "Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World" is not meant to imply that the world was remade in the image of European propertied classes or that bourgeois norms became the aspiration of the people of colonies (p.3).

Stoler and Cooper explore what they consider "a most basic tension of empire," that is, "how grammar of difference was continuously and vigilantly crafted as people in colonies refashioned and contested European claims to superiority" (pp. 3-4). On their part, European bourgeois colonial elites deployed "politics of difference and exclusion" to deny them the universal entitlement to liberal universal principles according to which colonial empires and their rhetorical "civilizing missions" were justified. For instance, colonial bourgeois elites used various special features of Europeanness which were argued to have distinguished Europeans from the rest of humankind to deny the non-European peoples the benefits of liberalism (for instance, citizenship and self-governance) (Mehta, 1997). According to Stoler and Cooper, re-conceptualizing colonial dynamics of the bygone era helps us better understand the current local-global social transformation precisely because "(s)truggles familiar to us from colonial history--over access to residential space, over children's education, over social welfare, over cultural conventions and who has the right to be a citizen--cut across Europe and its former colonial locations (Stoler and Cooper, 1997: 36). As a logical conclusion of one of their founding premises that "social transformations are a product of both global patterns and local struggles" Stoler and Cooper suggest that metropole and colony be treated in a single analytic field "addressing the weight one gives to causal connections and the primacy of agency in its different parts" (p. 4). Indeed the new research agenda advocated by Stoler and Cooper seems to be a valid one. Burma under the Burma Socialist Program Party government however, presents itself as a unique case which requires a more sharply focused look than the dichotomous "metropole-former-colony" conceptual lens offered by Stoler and Cooper, whose otherwise insightful study does not seem to address the gravity of local dynamics, specifically in countries with regimes determined to almost completely end the aforementioned historical dynamic between exogenous forces and the local ones.

Border Closing: Cultural and Political Isolationism as the Hallmark of the BSPP rule Located between two giant neighbors, namely India and China, the Burmese governments since independence have characteristically pursued various brands of neutralism as the country's foreign policy. Burma was a founding member of the non aligned movement with Indonesia, India, and a few other newly independent nations. However, during the 14 year civilian rule after 1948, the year of independence, the country was confronted with such problems as (domestic) armed insurrection, the infiltration of Kumington forces backed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, economic subjugation by "alien" capitalists and economic pains, and so on. The BSPP leaders led by General Ne Win who overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister U Nu were bent on addressing what they considered pressing issues. And these military leaders felt that the issues including the issue of unitary versus federal state for Burma's multi-ethnic groups, continued foreign cultural influences over the country's national identity formation, and economic domination by Indian and Chinese capitalists could be tackled effectively only if Burma was shut off from the outside world, especially the West (Johnstone, 1963). 1 Accordingly the BSPP government took the neutralism of the previous regime to its extreme: self-isolationism. In Chapter 4 on educational policies and reforms I will discuss the extent to which the country was shielded or isolated from the outside world. Suffice it to say, the period between 1962 and 1988 saw the eclipse of Burma from the world's memory. While it certainly is important to bear in mind the global forces which continued to exert themselves over the country in the area of knowledge and technology import, international trade, etc., local political and economic forces shaped the politics of education more than global dynamics, in the final analysis. I turn now to a discussion of creating an

1Driven

by Cold War logic, the United States Embassy and a host of diplomatic missions in Rangoon were involved in various Burmese student and grassroots political actions during the first 14 years of Burma's independence .

eclectic conceptual framework which may be used as a "guide" in studying the politics of education under Burmese military dictatorship (1962-1988).

Fear as an Instrument of Political Control and Power Scholars who propose explanatory models of totalitarianism (e.g., Arendt, 1975) stress the repressive nature of state power and compliance through terror and intimidation. They argue that under statist regimes, as the state effectively asserts its control in all domains--physical, cultural, political, economic or otherwise, the public destroys the private. Her studies of Nazi Germany and the former USSR under Stalin led Hannah Arendt (1975) to argue thus:
Totalitarian government, like all tyrannies, certainly does not exist without destroying the public realm of life, that is, without destroying, by isolating men, their political capacities. But totalitarian domination is new in that it is not content with this isolation and destroys private life as well (p.475).

According to Arendt, terror is the essence of totalitarian rule. The secret police would maximize the effects of terror on the population by isolating people. Arendt tellingly observes thus:
(T)error can rule absolutely only over men who are isolated against each other...and...one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical government is to bring this isolation about. This isolation is, as it were, pre-totalitarian; its hallmark is impotence insofar as power always comes from men acting together (474).

Although not quite totalitarian in the same way Nazi Germany or the Stalinist USSR was, it can be argued that Burma under BSPP rule bore some resemblance to these societies under totalitarian regimes. Reflecting on the order of things in Burma during both BSPP (1962-88) and post-BSPP (1988-present) periods, Aung San Suu Kyi (1991) stresses the crucial role fear plays in the Burmese context thus:
Within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of death, fear of losing friends, family, property or means of livelihood, fear of poverty, fear of isolation, fear of failure. A most insidious form of fear is that which masquerades as common sense or even wisdom, condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile the small, daily acts of courage which help to preserve man's self-respect and inherent human dignity. It is not easy for a people conditioned by fear under the iron rule of the principle that might is right to free themselves from the enervating miasma of fear (p.184).

It is important for a study of the politics of education under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government, essentially a military dictatorship, to take into serious consideration this fear-ridden political and cultural climate and its profound impacts on the country's educational life. 2 I will say more about this in Chapter 5 when the politics at the top of the educational hierarchy is examined. The next section is devoted to a discussion of conceptualizing what Katherine Verdery calls "real socialism." 3

Conceptualizing "Real Socialism" In her review of literature on "real socialism" and analysis of the fundamental mechanisms of socialist systems, the Romanian scholar Katherine Verdery (1990) has argued that in spite of their totalitarian image, the socialist systems or states that existed in Eastern Bloc countries and China were practically weak. Several observations from her work seem useful and applicable to the Burmese case as well. Using three different notions of power there are three angles from which socialism's weak states may be conceptualize. First, based on the notion of power as "the capacity to get things done" it is argued that the socialist state "undermines its own capacity to get things done" precisely because the central organ of the state, i.e., the party sought to monopolize power by "devastating the capacity of all other organizations to get things done" (p. 426). Paradoxically, "the real power of a totalitarian state results from its being at the disposal of every inhabitant, available for hire at a moment's notice" (Gross, 1988: 120; quoted in Verdery, 1990: 426). With Gross, Verdery is
2The

opening up of archives in Eastern European countries have enabled students of authoritarianism to look in to the documented local operations of these "closed systems." Recent studies refute sufficiently the classical model of totalitarianism such as the one by Arendt. However, there seems to exist a general convergence between the classical explanatory models of totalitarianism and their recent counterparts which allow space for local maneuvering by local actors or historical agencies: both camps agreed that terror was used as an instrument of power. Where they diverge is the degree to which terror and coercion helped sustain these totalitarian systems. In other words, their difference lies on the question of "how totalitarian systems were." 3"Real socialism" refers to socialism which was actually pursued as state policy in the former USSR, Eastern Europe, and China.

arguing that there is "a pervasive "privatization" of the instruments of coercion, which--far from concentrated at the top--were made available to everyone, through the mechanism of the denunciation" (Verdery, 1990: 426). This dispersal of power is what weakens the central authority once an effective social challenge arises. Second, socialist systems are weak because they depend heavily on another actor for their performance, resources, and maintenance. This is premised on the notion of power as a relationship of dependency being that "if a social actor depends upon another for a crucial resource or performance, it is not powerful, no matter how many means of coercion lie at its disposal" (Emerson, 1962; cited in Verdery, 1990: 426). Verdery points out that these notions of power may be sometimes mixed together. In this combined notion, "power is seen as a capacity (to enact policies) mitigated by the center's dependency (on intermediate and lower-level cadres)." This leaves some room for the local actors whose role is to implement the policies made by those at the center; in their assigned mission to implement these policies local actors "may ignore, corrupt, over-execute, or otherwise adulterate them" (Verdery, 1990: 427). The third way of conceptualizing "real socialism" or socialist systems has its focus not so much on power per se, but on its cultural definition or legitimation. That is, the strength of a system/state directly correlates with the extent that it effectively creates itself as a cultural relation with its citizen-subjects, the extend to which the terms through which it attempts to legitimate itself are consonant with daily practice or to the extent that "its symbolization is not widely challenged" (Verdery, 1990: 427). Concerned exclusively with the capitalist state, the French Marxist theorist Louis Althusser (1971) argued in his influential essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," that "no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses" (Italics

original, p.147). He was the first to conceptualize and stress what he perceived as the ideologically dominant institution in class-based capitalist society, that is, the school. Classical Marxist theories perceive the capitalist state with standing army, police, prisons, and court as fundamentally repressive. Pointing out various massacres which the bourgeoisie state had committed--the massacres of June 1848 and of the Paris Commune, of Bloody Sunday, and so on--Althusser argues that the Marxist description of the (bourgeoisie) State is true and accurate as it sheds light also on the "subtle everyday domination beneath which can be glimpsed, in the forms of political democracy, for example, what Lenin, following Marx called the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" (p.139). For Althusser, the bourgeoisie class needs apparatuses which can ensure class oppression and guarantee the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction if it is to establish symbolic domination of the capitalist ideology over the rest of the society, that is, the ruled and the exploited. Althusser labels such institutions as education, churches, family, mass media, culture (i.e., literature and arts), etc. "State Ideological Apparatuses" wherein the ruling class ideology manifests itself. Of all these ideological apparatuses, Althusser contends, the school has been "installed in the dominant position ... as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle against the old dominant ideological State apparatus (i.e., the Church)" (p.153). Although he argues that the school is a critical site of class struggle, within his framework of capitalist reproduction the status quo always prevails in the last instance because of the structure's ideological unity in all these disparate apparatuses and the decisive power of the economic. This hyper-structuralist conceptualization of domination, resistance, and reproduction has been thoroughly critiqued and discounted. Responding to Althusser's position, the British sociologist Paul Willis writes thus in Learning to Labor (1977):
Structuralist theories of reproduction present the dominant ideology (under which culture is subsumed) as impenetrable. Everything fits too neatly. Ideology always pre-exists and

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preempts any authentic criticism. All specific contradictions are smoothed away in the universal reproduction functions of ideology....in my view...., there are deep dysfunctions and desperate tensions within social and cultural reproduction. Social agents are not passive bearers of ideology, but active appropriators who reproduce existing structures only through struggle, contestation, and a partial penetration of those structures (p.175).

As the American sociologist of education Michael Apple (1990) has pointed out, although the reproduction theory of Althusser recognizes the contradictory moments, owing to its undue stress on the reproduction process over the agents, it has no space for a person as a historical agency or his or her potential to affect change. Dissatisfied with this reductionistic reproduction model and stimulated by Paul Willis' famous study Learning to Labor (1977) which stresses the role of historical agency, contestation, and resistance in social and cultural reproduction, Apple (1982) attempts to show, in his Education and Power, the process of cultural and economic reproduction with its focus on "contradiction, conflicts, mediations and especially resistance, as well as reproduction" (p.24) in schools as well as the workplace. Although Apple agrees with Althusser in asserting that schools play a critical role in reproducing the system, he views schools' reproductive role as not directly dictated by the needs of the economy. The outcomes of this process of schooling, according to Apple, are not certain because of the structural contradictions (for instance, contradictions between the schools' need to legitimate the system and the economy's need for capital accumulation). This uncertainty arises because of human agencies, who can make a difference. For Apple (1988), school is "(both) a primary agency in the production and reproduction of 'legitimate' culture and a set of institutions with very real connections to the social relations of production and the social division of labor" (p.116). As such, he argues, "education has not only been one of the things that is struggled over, but is a major institutional site in which these struggles take place" (p.116). However, in Social Theory and Education Morrow and Torress (1995) caution that schools may be given more weight than they deserve since there are other institutions, for instance, the media industry, that seem to play a more central role in terms of social and

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cultural production and reproduction in capitalist societies. Legitimate though the aforementioned criticism is for schooling in capitalist societies with a pervasive media industry, the educational institutions in Burma assumed the single-most important role in the ideological manipulation by the powers that be. For my purposes here, the usefulness of Apple's argument lies in his insistence on education as a major site of contradiction, conflicts, mediations and resistance, as well as reproduction (of capitalist social relations) and his stress on the need to locate education in the web of economy, polity, and culture. However, the direct application of Apple's analysis must be tempered with the observation that reproduction--a central concern in social theories, be it post-structuralist thought or structuralism--is not so much an issue as production of a new social order. As a matter of fact, the BSPP regime was bent on radically altering the prevailing social order by drawing on the indigenous sources of culture and socialist ideology (Wiant, 1982).

Socialism and Cultural Monopoly In her review of literature on "real socialism," Katherine Verdery (1990) points out that while students of the socialist systems have much to say about political, economic, and social life under socialism they are far less articulate on the subject of culture and its production. For Verdery, the monopolistic production of cultural meaning, carefully monitored representation of reality, and control of language are vital instruments by which socialist systems sought to radically revolutionize the consciousness of the citizens or produce socialist-citizen-subjects. In her search for conceptual tools to analyze cultural production within real socialism, Verdery finds the works of such cultural theorists as Bourdieu and Williams wanting simply because they "frame their analyses explicitly in terms of capitalist markets" (p.428). She stresses that "suppression of the market in socialist

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systems means that except when reforms reintroduce market mechanisms into its sphere, culture ceases to be a commodity" (p.428). In my judgment such concept as "hegemony" seems broad enough to be useful for the study of educational politics in socialist countries. Certainly it can, and will, be used with some modifications in my study as the conceptual framework. In the remaining part of the section I will discuss the concept of hegemony drawing primarily on the work of the British scholar Raymond Williams.

The Concept of Hegemony In his Marxism and Literature Williams (1994: 593) traced the historical transformation of the notion of "hegemony":
The traditional definition of "hegemony" is a political rule or domination, especially in relations between states. Marxism extended the definition of rule or domination to relations between social classes, and especially to definitions of a ruling class. "Hegemony" then acquired a further significant sense in the work of Antonio Gramsci....

Williams continued:
..."hegemony" is a concept which at once includes and goes beyond two powerful earlier concepts: that of "culture" as a "whole social process," in which men define and shape their whole lives; and that of "ideology," in any of its Marxist senses, in which a system of meanings and values is the expression or projection of a particular class interest. "Hegemony" goes beyond "culture," as previously defined, in its insistence on relating the "whole social process" to specific distributions of power and influence. To say that "men" define and shape their whole lives is true only in abstraction. In acy actual society there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this process. Gramsci therefore introduced the necessary recognition of dominance and subordination in what has still, however, to be recognized as a whole process (p.595).

Williams differentiated the concept of Gramsci's notion of hegemony from "ideology" when he argued that "hegemony" refuses "to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which can be and ordinarily is abstracted as 'ideology'" (p. 596). Here Williams defined "hegemony":
Hegemony is...not only the articulate upper level of "ideology," nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as "manipulation" or "indoctrination." It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and

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values--constitutive and constituting--which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming (p.596).

Here what is noteworthy is Williams' insistence that a lived hegemony is a process, not something more static and more uniform than in practice it could be. Having cautioned against theorists' tendencies towards totalizing abstraction, Williams further elaborated thus:
A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or structure. It is a realized complex of experiences, relations, and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex, as can readily be seen in any concrete analysis. Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the necessary thrust of the concept), it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged by pressures not at all its own. We have then to add to the concept of hegemony the concepts of counter-hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of practice. ...The reality of any hegemony, in the extended political and cultural sense, is that, while by definition it is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. At any time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in the society (pp. 598-599).

In exploring further any lived cultural process, Williams identified three aspects: tradition, institutions, and formation. For Williams, "tradition in practice is the most evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits" operating as "the most powerful practical means of incorporation" (p. 600). The most politically significant feature of tradition is its selectivity. On selectivity, Williams wrote that "most versions of 'tradition' can be quickly shown to be radically selective. From a whole possible area of past and present, in a particular culture, certain meanings and practices are selected for emphasis and certain other meanings and practices are neglected or excluded. Yet, within a particular hegemony, and as one of it decisive processes, this selective tradition is presented and usually successfully passed off as 'the tradition,' 'the significant past'" (p.601). But a selective tradition is at once powerful and vulnerable when a particular version of the past is used to to ratify the present and map out the future course (for a community). It is "powerful because it is so skilled in making active selective connections, dismissing those it does not want as 'out of date' or 'nostalgic," attacking those it cannot incorporate as 'unprecedented' or 'alien.'" But at the same it is open to challenge because "the real record is

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effectively recoverable, and many of the alternative or opposing practical continuities are still available" (p. 601). Williams continued thus:
Vulnerable also because the selective version of 'a living tradition' is always tied, though often in complex and hidden ways, to explicit contemporary pressures and limits. Its practical inclusions and exclusions are selectively encouraged or discouraged, often so effectively that the deliberate selection is made to verify itself in practice. Yet it is selective privileges and interests, material in substance but often ideal in form, including complex elements of style and tone and of basic method, can still be recognized, demonstrated, and broken. This struggle for and against selective tradition is understandably a major part of all contemporary cultural activity.

A Critique of Williams' "Culturalism" However, Stuart Hall (1994) has pointed out that there is an "experiential pull" in Raymond Williams' concept of culture and cultural process when the latter tends to read "structures of relations in terms of how they are 'lived' and 'experienced'" (p. 527). It is here that Althusser's insistence on the role of "ideology" becomes important. For Althusser, "one could only 'live' and experience one's conditions in and through the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture" (Hall, 1993: 531). Experience is the effect of these categories and classfications, according to Althusser. Culturalist arguments which Williams (and E. P. Thompson) advanced fell short of "the radical proposition that, in culture and in language, the subject was 'spoken by' the categories of culture in which he/she thought, rather than individual productions" (Hall, 1993: 531). In this connection, Althusser stressed the role of ideology, which he defined as "a system of 'representations,' but in the majority of these cases these representations have nothing to do with 'consciousness': ... it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their 'consciousness'... it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed in altering the 'lived' relation between them and the world and acquiring that new form of specific unconsciousness called 'consciousness'" (Althusser, 1971: 233; quoted in Hall, 1993: 531). This structuralist emphasis on structures which speak through individuals enables one "to begin to think...of the relations of a structure on the basis of

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something other than their reduction to relationship between "people" (Hall, 1993: 532). Comparing Williams' 'culturalism' and Althusserian emphasis on ideology or structure, Hall warns thus:
The fact that "men" can become conscious of their conditions, organize to struggle against them and in fact transform them -- without which no active politics can even be conceived, let alone practiced -- must not be allowed to override the awareness of the fact that, in capitalist relations, men and women are placed and positioned in relations which constitute them as agents (p. 532).

Struturalist thought as re-worked by Althusser is useful; however, it frequently places overemphasis on "the power of abstraction" and takes it to its extreme by giving primacy to the formation of concepts. However, with precautions against these structural tendencies, one can still benefit from structuralist insistence that (individual) thought does not (necessarily?) reflect reality, but is articulated on and appropriates it.

Notions of Power So far I have discussed notions of hegemony and the role of ideology in cultural and class reproduction. As I pointed out early in the discussion, I am less concerned about the reproduction aspect involving social relations simply because the BSPP authorities were concerned primarily about creating a new set of social relations and consciousness through radical authoritarian means. Although there were selective social relations which the authorities determined were worth reviving in their new order to be built in accord with the Burmese Way to Socialism, there was no social order per se in the country's past which they wished to reproduce. The new social order was to be built out of an assortment of available cultural notions, social relations, and differential power distributions. Williams' notion of a "selective tradition" appears particularly helpful, as will be seen throughout the study. A word about notions of power is in order as it lives at the heart of both the concept of hegemony and domination and resistance. Essentially caught in the capitalist social relations

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themselves, structuralists treat "power" in a global, sovereign-juridical sense and see it as repressive. In his Two Lectures (and other influential works), Michel Foucault (1994) outlines different types of "power": one is associated with an ancient notion of sovereignty and the other, which he calls "disciplinary power," is a new non-sovereign power invented by the bourgeoisie state. The former is seen as repressive and always associated with phenomena involving "one individual's consolidated and homogeneous domination over the others, or that of one group or class over the others"(p.214). Concerned exclusively with the how of power, Foucault considers disciplinary power as positive. Here the individuals are "the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (p.214). He contends that relations of power within any society which "permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of a discourse" (p.211). For Foucault, one cannot exercise power "except through the production of truth" (p.211). This is true in any society, Foucault insists. Reaching his own logical conclusion, Foucault directs researchers to look at the how of power, and "toward domination and the material operators of power, toward forms of subjection and the inflections and utilization of their localized systems, and toward strategic apparatuses" (p.217). While recognizing sovereignty and disciplinary power as "the two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power" (p.221), Foucault specifically attempts to "eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power,...escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions and tactics of domination, and instead focus (his) analysis of power on the study of the techniques of domination" (p.217). According to Staurt Hall, Foucault's epistemological position -- if accepted in its entirety -- does not offer an adequate conceptual lens in looking at a social formation or a State. For "Foucault so resolutely suspends judgment and adopts so thoroughgoing a

17

skepticism about any determinacy or relationship between practices, other than the largely contingent, that we are entitled to see him, not as an agnostic on these questions, but as deeply committed to the necessary non-correspondence of all practices to one another" (Hall, 1993: 537). There is, however, no denying that Foucault's observations have opened up new and creative ways of looking at domination and subjugation involving unequal power dynamics in a society. While the study is conceptualized primarily around the concepts of "hegemony" and "counter-/alternative-hegemony" it is, in part, informed by Foucauldian insights. But the exclusive attention and overemphasis which Foucault seems to place on the thread-like elaborate exercise and mechanism of power has misdirected many research works concerning domination and subjugation. Foucault's often-quoted line "where there is (disciplinary) power, there is resistance" has pushed many scholars towards the microscopic traces and forms of resistance, and away from the equally important seductive aspect of other types of power, for instance, nondisciplinary power. This rush towards the micro-politics at the exclusion of larger institutional, sovereign, and global politics has its own price. To illustrate the point, an article in The Wall Street Journal discusses how the leaders of the G-7, the most influential "international" body made up of leaders from seven sovereign states, "planned to establish definitions of financial health for banks in developing countries, and to empower the International Monetary Fund to regularly monitor how emerging markets such as Mexico meet those demands" (Schlesinger, 1997). According to the article, these leaders from the U.S., Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada, "have agreed on the establishment of a network of supervisors for global markets, and for a program to assist emerging economies in strengthening their own financial systems." The greatest irony of the whole business of the newly proliferated power/resistance scholarship is the following. Nowadays many critical scholars are exclusively pre-occupied

18

with their search for detailed descriptions of and understanding of micro-politics and discursive constructions. Meanwhile the more conventional types of political terrain with their long historical association with sovereign power, such as state and global institutions and movers and shakers of global and national politics and economies -- just the kind of places and agencies which Foucault specifically steers us away from -- have escaped the ever-vigilant gaze of so many of today's power-analysts and "resistance scholars." With this cautionary note against writing off the importance of analyzing the exercises of power, in the physical and global sense, in the next section I present a comparative discussion of the modern bourgeoisie sovereign state and Burmese state under BSPP rule.

Fundamental Differences between Liberal Capitalist and Totalitarian Regimes According to Nicolas Rose and Peter Miller (1992), "historical sociologies of the state are realist in the sense that they seek to characterize the actual configurations of persons, organizations and events at particular historical periods, to classify the force relations that obtain between them, to identify determinants and explain transformations" (p. 177). Drawing on Foucault's (1979) notion of "governmentality, Rose and Miller advance a position which eschews "sociological realism and its burdens of explanation and causation." From their standpoint, they are not interested in "characteriz(ing) how social life really was and why" or "seeking to penetrate the surfaces of what people said to discover what they meant, what their real motives or interests were." One of their central concerns in the kind of analysis of goverment which they advocate is "discursive field" because "it is in the discursive field that 'the State' itself emerges as an historically variable linguistic device for conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling. The significance we accord to discourse does not arise from a concern with 'ideology'" (p.177). Rose and Miller construe the (modern) state "as a specific way in which the problem of government is discursively codified, a way of dividing a 'political sphere,' with its

19

particular characteristics of rule, from other 'non-political spheres' to which it must be related, and a way in which certain technologies of government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of relations with one another" (p. 177). Throughout this study instead of framing the politics of education in the conceptual language of state formation, I focus on the issues which Foucault and those who exclusively draw on his theoretical insights specifically urge social investigators to stay away from for the following reasons. Rose and Miller argue that the rise of liberalism and the liberal state was a radical departure from "the dystopian dream of a totally administered society." Upon a closer look, one comes to the realization that what social theorists who are grounded in various European Enlightement traditions call "state" and the Burmese state are fundamentally different. First, in spite of the visible features of a modern state -- in both neo-Foucauldian and sociological realist senses -- the Burmese state under the BSPP rule was far from being "a liberal state." Far from having abandoned the dystopian dream the BSPP leadership set out to administer all aspects of national life leaving no space out of their ever vigilant gaze. Instead of restricting itself to the indirect exercise of disciplinary power through an array of available mechanisms, the Burmese state under the BSPP was ever intrusive and made serious efforts to extend its long hand into virtually all analytically distinguishable spheres of a modern nation (i.e., polity, economy, culture, spiritual domain, etc.). Second, the Burmese state which the BSPP leadership sought to create however, did not resemble closely the old Burmese polities with the king at the apex of sovereign power. As a matter of fact, the BSPP state was a hybrid of both totalitarian and liberal states, in both theory and practice. To further explicate, like the proverbial liberal state about which Rose and Miller theorize, BSPP leaders did attempt to resort to various discursive strategies in constructing "subject-citizens" "teachers" "students" and redefine various power relations

20

among institutions and individuals. They also deployed the discourses of rights, citizenship, abstract legal codes and institutions, justice, freedom, equality, etc. They did forge alliances with individuals with expertise in various branches of modern knowledge. Despite all these liberal appearances, the Burmese state under the BSPP remained, in effect, dystopian and totalitarian. While the BSPP state/leadership may have resorted to discursive strategies to configure new power relations out of the existing ones or to make docile subjects, their most reliable mechanism of power was not the discursive construction of a particular state or citizen-subjects with "socialistic subjectivities," but fear and terror through the direct exercise of brute force. Here I have used the terms "Burmese state" and "BSPP leadership" interchangeably simply because the BSPP made concerted efforts to portray the BSPP state, government, and leadership as the ultimate embodiment of the popular will, the historical inevitability of the nationalist dream.

Outline of the Remainder of the Study The remainder of the study is outlined as follows. In Chapter 2 I discuss epistemological and ethical issues regarding the study. Poststructuralist/deconstructionist thought calls into question the use of "experience" as historical evidence. I address this otherwise valid criticism from a Theravada Buddhist epistemological standpoint. Such specific issues as social responsibility and location of the scholar in his or her quest for knowledge are raised. Chapter 3 presents a historical overview of Burma up to formation of the Revolutionary Council (and later the Burma Socialist Program Party) government in 1962, specifically the aspects which have direct bearings on the politics of education in Burma during the Burma Socialist Program Party rule. Here I pay special attention to the historical transformation of various cultural and political institutions, as well as changing notions of

21

cultural categories such as "educator" and "student." Burma's colonial past, its impacts on domestic/ethnic politics, and various nationalist visions are examined as well. Socialist educational policies and reform measures are analyzed in Chapter 4. In doing so I locate education in the larger political, economic, and cultural context of Burma. I then present a discussion of the ideological foundations of the BSPP's policies (and by extension, educational policies). This section is followed by an examination of various specific measures utilized by the authorities for political and ideological control. In Chapter 5 I examine critically the ways in which three prominent members of the Burmese educational community operated within Burma's educational hierarchy. Also analyzed are the nature of decision-making in education, the role of the intelligence apparatus in politico-cultural realms such as education, and the political dynamics in places inside the Ministry of Education. I then take a critical look at how a group of educators with diverse backgrounds handled the socialist educational reforms in Chapter 6. In doing so I discuss the cultural construction of "educator" and the economic conditions and opportunity and reward structures for these educators. Chapter 7 is devoted to a discussion of how the country's students, specifically a group of 22 students who had different ethnic backgrounds and class locations, received the BSPP educational reforms. I also study competing notions of "student," the development of critical consciousness, and the counter-hegemonic role of various cultural and political communities. In the concluding chapter, I revisit some of the salient points of the politics of education under Burmese military dictatorship. Finally, I reflect on the nature and process of knowledge production in a cross-cultural context.

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Chapter Two
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES

"We are justified in calling Buddhism a philosophy of relations, for which such fundamental ideas like anicca and anatta are the most typical examples. The anicca-idea reveals the dynamic character of the world, the anatta-idea, that there are no unchangeable and separate individualities, neither 'things in-themselves' nor 'souls-in-themselves...'" --Lama Anagarika Govinda, From "The Psychological Attiude of Early Buddhist Philosophy," p.159

In today's scholarship the Weberian dream of "value freedom" has been largely discredited as a methodological doctrine (Scott, 1997) and many of the taken-for-granted concepts and words have been forced to reveal their secrets (Jay, 1998). Since the invention of "post-structualist" "deconstructionist" tools within the past several decades, scholars who rely on experience as "historical evidence" have been called to task. In this chapter I discuss a few fundamental issues concerning the production of knowledge, such as the use of experience as historical evidence, the social location of the knowledge producer, the ethical and political implications of various epistemological standpoints, and the specific issues regarding my own study of schooling under the Burmese military dictatorship.

Eexperience as Historical Evidence or The Historian's Shattered Dream? 1 The following quote sheds light on the struggle between those who call into question the old notions of historical realities and those who defend the idea that historical reality is more than a discursive construct or fiction whose meaning is to be determined each time it is read. On the occasion of the founding of the Historical Society in Washington, DC, Emory

historian Elizabeth Fox-Genovese was interviewed by The New York Times (Weiner, 1998).

draw largely on the work of Berkeley intellectual historian (and social theorist) Martin Jay who presented a nice overview of historical writings in Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time. See Jay, M. (1998) Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. especially chapters 3, 4, and 5.

1I

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Professor Fox-Genovese explained the reason behind the creation of the new professional organization thus: "We're responding to a growing emphasis on personal identity as the measure of historical experience. This comes out of the rising tide of post-modernism in the humanities. Its salient features are: There are no facts, the notion of reality is a swindle, each reader creates his or her own text...." Likewise in 1992 some members of the philosophy department at Cambridge University circulated a protest statement against Cambridge's decision to award Jacques Derrida, the father of modern deconstructionism, an honorary Doctorate of Letters. The statements derided Derrida's work as "denying the distinctions between the fact and fiction, observation and imagination, evidence and prejudice" (Smith, 1998: A15). Relevant to the discussion is problematizing the use of "experience" as evidence for historical explanation. Hence a good starting point for reflecting on the study epistemologically and methodologically would be to resume the central but contested concept of "experience." For without the well-defended notion of "experience" an oral history project such as this one destroys itself.

Experience and the Construction of Reality Talking and writing about human "experience," at least among circles of critical social scientists has become a highly contested endeavor. Berkeley historian Martin Jay (1998: 62-63) examines the status of "experience" as historical evidence among the experts when he writes:
Perhaps no term has been as heatedly contested in recent Anglo-American cultural debates as "experience"... (T)hose theorists who have taken to heart what has become known as "linguistic turn" and learned from that heterogeneous body of thought categorized, for better or worse, as post-structuralism are far more suspicious of the self-evident value of experience than those who have not. Appeals to the authority of something called experience--or even more emphatically, "lived experience"--they distrust as a naive, indeed ideologically pernicious, residue of earlier epistemologies, which they typically identify with empiricism or phenomenology. For such critics, despite their occasional nuance in their formulations, discourse, textuality, language, and structures of power provide the matrix out of which experience emerges, not vice versa. To posit experience as itself a ground is thus misleading

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attribution of a constructive capacity to what is itself only a rhetorically discursively constructed category.

What is "experience" anyway? Using The Motion of Light in Water: Sex and Science Fiction Writing in the East Village, 1957-1965, an autobiographical account by Samuel Delany (1988; cited in Scott, 1991: 773), the American social scientist Joan Scott (1991) assails the foundation of "orthodox history": the use of experience as "uncontestable evidence" and as "an original point of explanation" (p. 777). Delany's autobiograpy recounted his experience of having felt empowered by the first sight of a massive number of naked, male bodies in a gay bathhouse. Delany writes, "what this experience said was that there was a population -- not of individual homosexuals... not of hundreds, not of thousands, but rather of millions of gay men, and that history had already, created for us whole galleries of institutions, good and bad, to accommodate our sex" (p.174; quoted in Scott, 1991: 774). Through his writings about gay institutions, Delany intended to make visible and historical what has hitherto been concealed from history, a political project. From Scott's perspective, Delany's work does not go far enough. She writes:
The challenge to normative history has been described, in terms of conventional historical understandings of evidence, as an enlargement of the picture, a correction to oversights resulting from inaccurate or incomplete vision, and it has rested its claim, to legitimacy on the authority of experience, the direct experience of others, as well as of the historian who learns to see and illuminate the lives of those others in his or her texts (p.776).

Drawing on Michel de Certeau, Scott continues her critique:

When the evidence offered is the evidence of "experience," the claim for referentiality is further buttressed -- what could be truer, after all, than a subject's own account of what he or she has lived through? It is precisely this kind of explanation--as a foundation on which analysis is based -- that weakens the critical thrust of histories of difference. By remaining within the epistemological frame of orthodox history, these studies lose the possibility of examining those assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of difference in the first place. They take as self-evidence the identities of those whose experience is being documented and thus naturalize this difference. They locate resistance outside its discursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus de-contextualizng it. When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the individual subject (the person who had the experience or the historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence on which explanation is built. Questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one's vision is structured--about language (or discourse) and history--are left aside (p.777).

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For Scott the solution for this problem inherently associated with "experience" as evidence is "to focus on processes of identity production, insisting on the discursive nature of 'experience' and on the politics of its construction" and not privileging experience as "the origin of the (historian's) explanation" (Scott, 1991: 797). For "experience is at once always already an interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted" (p.797). In his essay "The Limits of Limit-Experience" Martin Jay (1998) offers a counter argument and suggests a way out of "the increasingly sterile debate between those who stubbornly hold on to a naive notion of experience and those who scornfully reject any such notion as necessarily naive" (p.65). In the essay Jay (1998: 64-65) calls upon two prominent figures in post-structuralism who have done foundational conceptualization for any number of anti-foundationalisms: Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault. My discussion that follows only concerns Foucault's contradictory notion of experience. During his 1978 interview with the Italian Communist Party journalist Duccio Trombadori on his intellectual trajectory Foucault differentiated between the phenomenologist's version and that of Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot with which he identified. Foucault (1991) thus defines the two notions of experience:
(t)he phenomenologist's experience is basically a way of organizing perception (regard reflexif) of any aspect of daily, lived experience in its transitory form. Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, on the contrary, try through experience to reach that point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or extreme. They attempt to gather the maximum amount of intensity and impossibility at the same time. The work of the phenomenologist, however, essentially consists of unfolding the entire field of possibilities connected to daily experience (p.31; quoted in Jay 1998: 65).

In his judgment, phenomenology also erred in its attempts:

to grasp the significance of daily experience in order to reaffirm the fundamental character of the subject of the subject, of the self, of its transcendental functions. On the contrary, experience according to Nietzsche, Blanchot and Bataille has rather the task of "tearing" the subject from itself in such a way that it is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely "other" than itself so that it may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation (p.31; quoted in Jay, 1998: 65-66).

Here it is instructive to quote Jay at length when he writes:

Such a notion of an experience that undermines the subject, Foucault called a "limit experience," because it transgresses the limits of coherent subjectivity as it functions in

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everyday life, indeed threatens the very possibility of life--or rather the life of the individual- itself. Foucault thus provided a vigorous defense of experience, but as he further developed its meaning, it revealed certain paradoxical implications. For not only did he affirm a proactive notion of experience--the "task of 'tearing' the subject from itself"--but he also endorsed a reactive one: experience a post facto reconstruction of that action. Experience, he explained, "is always a fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it has been made, not before; it isn't something that is "true," but it has been a reality." While claiming that his works were in large measure derived from "direct personal experience (s)," earlier encounters with madness, hospitals, illness, and death, they were nonetheless themselves, qua intellectual exercises, experience-producing. For experiences did not simply happen, as perhaps the phenomenologists had thought, but were written apres coup , after the fact. Moreover, Foucault further explained, the writing was not merely for oneself, but also for others. "An experience," Foucault claimed, "is, of course, something one has alone; but it cannot have its full impact unless the individual manages to escape from pure subjectivity in such a way that others can--I won't say re-experience exactly--but at least cross paths with it or retrace it" (p. 66) So paradoxical a notion of experience--at once the task of personal, active selflaceration and the retrospective written fiction that makes it available for others to appropriate for their own lives--defies easy formulation. Whereas the former usage implies experience without a strong notion of subjectivity, indeed leaning to its subversion, the latter entails some sort of authorial persona that is powerful enough to represent experience in a kind of "secondary elaboration" sufficiently coherent to make sense to those who did not share it from the start. What Foucault seems to mean by limit-experience, then, is a curiously contradictory mixture of self-expansion and self-annihilation, immediate, proactive spontaneity and fictional retrospection, personal inwardness of communal interaction (p.67).

Jay contends that contrary to the dominant reception of poststructuralist thought by Anglo-American theorists, "experience is a term that cannot be effortlessly dissolved in a network of discursive relations. Indeed, ... it is precisely the reduction of experience to discourse that Bataille, and Foucault as well, cautions us against" (p.77). I find myself in agreement with Jay when he exhorts us "to be attentive to the various ways in which different concepts of experience -- negative as well as positive, limit as well as ordinary, non-subjective as well as subjective -- prevent us from ever having a simply foundational version on which to base an epistemology or from which to launch a politics" (p.77). Recognizing the great merit of these poststructuralist thinkers who forced social theorists "to go beyond the sterile choice between naive experiential immediacy and the no less naive discursive mediation of that experience that has for too long seemed our only alternative," Martin Jay argues, rather perceptively, that "the limits of limit-experience have thus in some sense become equivalent to the very limits of critical theory today" (p.78).

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Toward the end of his essay Jay raises some crucial issues: "Is it...a contradiction to privilege subject-annihilating ecstatic experience and at the same time try to talk about that experience 'objectively' and impersonally? Can negative experience with all of its denial of authority, structure, and coherence provide a basis for the building of institutions? Or is it...an inherently anti-institutional ideology with unexpected similarities to the old liberal notion of 'negative freedom,' 'freedom from' rather than the 'freedom to' known as 'positive freedom'? Is there, in fact, a danger that an elite group of experience virtuosos will become indifferent to the legitimate claims of those who lead more mundane lives?"

"Experience Debate" Continues Joan Scott raises some issues when Spivak (1987) endorses, in her essay "A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman's Text from tthe Third World," the "strategic use of positive essentialism" in constructing unified subjects with essentialized identity. According to Scott, Spivak resorts to deploying "essentialism" when the latter appeals to the idea that "there are fixed identities, visible to us as social or natural facts" (Scott, 1991: 791). Scott is least concerned about the strategic need for Spivak to make visible subaltern women as a fixed political community and identity. Likewise Samuel Delany perpetuates the historical orthodoxy which privileges "experience" as evidence, argues Scott. It does not matter, to Scott, whether the politically transformative experience which Delany described he had having been in the same bath house with his fellow gay men, served to make visible a marginalized community. Scott uses the aforementioned exemplary texts in order to drive home her main critique against the inherent foundationalism of the historical/social science profession. Here one of the most crucial issues is the class or social location of the critics. The two examples Scott chooses is rather removed from the life of Joan Scott. Being an Indian, woman, and social theorist, with an obvious political concerns for subaltern Indian women, Spivak has an

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apparent concern for making their categorical existence of subaltern Indian women visible and their voices heard. In the other case Samuel Delany is a gay man with his engaged pursuit of knowledge of a community of fellow marginalized human beings. It is hard to imagine that both authors are unaware of the problematic involved in their usage of the categorical and essentializing language such as "subaltern women" or "gay men" and speaking with authorial voices for both "communities." (Being a deconstructionist herself, Spivak must definitely have known the issues which Scott raised even while she was conceptualizing the essay). As members of the said the communities on the margin, both Spivak and Delany have however, chosen to prioritize, strategically, political visibility over taking deconstructionism to its extreme, that is, political paralysis, the position which Scott seems to have taken. It is well-known that even Jacques Derrida who is one of the major spokespersons 2 of deconstructionism with its absolute rejection of the absolutes has been involved in various political causes. He was opposed to apartheid, fought on behalf of Czech dissidents, and the rights of North African immigrants. When asked by the New York Times interviewer how one can distinguish what is right from what is wrong (such as opposing apartheid, as he did) if one cannot know the truth, Derrida responded by denying that deconstructionism is relativistic (Smith, 1998: A15). Dirks et al. seem to offer some insights into the issue. In their introductory essay in the edited volume Culture/Power/History Dirks et al. (1994: 32) write:
Overcoming such exclusions (that is, bracketing the issues of gender, sexuality, and the family from an account of the politics of working class formation) means recognizing the indeterminate multiplicity of identity, and it is here that the basic poststructuralist claims about language and identity become useful. How we see ourselves as a basis for action and how we are addressed in the public arena are not fixed. Sometimes we recognize ourselves as citizens, sometimes as workers, sometimes as parents, sometimes as consumers, sometimes as enthusiasts for particular sports or hobbies, sometimes as believers in religious and other
2It

is argued that Lacan had been expressing many of the key elements in deconstructionism since the 1930s on and hence should be considered the father of deconstructionist ideas. See Cantor, N. & Cantor, M. (1998) The American Century: Varieties of Culture in Modern Time. New York: Harper Perrennial. pp.448-465.

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creeds, and so on; those recognitions are usually gendered by assumptions placing us as women or men. At one level, the observation that identity of subject positions is complex and non-fixed is banal. But the important thing is that politics is usually conducted as if identity were fixed. The question then becomes, On what basis, at different times and in different places, does non-fixity become temporarily fixed in such a way that individuals and groups can behave as a particular kind of agency, political or otherwise? How do people become shaped into acting subjects, understanding themselves in particular ways?

As Dirks et al. point out insightfully, in "real life" situations people act as if their identities were fixed. To dramatize this point, when Michel Foucault carried out his sadomasochistic engagements 3 with all their intensity (Miller, 1993; cited in Jay, 1998: 67), Foucault froze all other identities of his and sought pleasure or Limit-Experience in the sexual acts, as if his identity as a gay man were fixed. I wish to extend their argument to essentially political acts of "academic writing" as well. When she carried out her primary mission as a social scientist Joan Scott acted as if she were just "professor of social science at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton." Indeed she froze other identities such as a fellow member of the human race who is potentially capable of feeling empathy for the subaltern women of India or gay men in the United States who both desire to be visible and recognized as respectable human communities. There is no denying that her critique may be essentially valid and even helps shed light on their own implicated-ness on the part of the members of the marginalized communities in perpetuating categories of difference as "gay men" or "subaltern women." However, in a world where there is no sight of lasting solutions and there is no escape from both pre-discursively existing differences, as well as discursively constructed "differences," it is banal to subject texts to Derriderian "interminable" deconstructionism, the texts which were created for radically different (political) purposes than as academic raw materials for the further production of yet another deconstructionist discourse. It is well-worth repeating a question Martin Jay raised in concluding his essay on "the Limit of Limit-Experience": "Is

3I

am by no means pointing out Foucault's sexual conducts in any pejorative sense.

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there, in fact, a danger that an elite group of experience virtuosos will become indifferent to the legitimate claims of those who lead more mundane lives?"

Social Location of Knowledge Producer When critiquing an epistemological position (s), the last thing one may wish to do is throw an "under-the-belt" punch or kick. Is it within the acceptable limits of academic discourse to even discuss the political ramifications of a particular epistemological standpoint, to examine the social location of one's epistemological rivals or opponents, or to label them, as Martin Jay does, "an elite group of experience virtuosos which is "indifferent to the legitimate (experiential) claims of those who lead more mundane lives"? I think so. Unfortunately one of the residual elements in Western social sciences is the false notion of detachment on the part of critics, theorists, and knowledge producers. Conversely, scholars demarcate their boundaries of academic dialogue and debate carefully so as not to venture into the author's non-professional life or, less often, class location. In other words, whether a critical scholar drives Mercedez Benz or lives in a 2 million dollar house should be considered a legitimate subject of discussion. It should be examined if he or she lives his or her critical knowledge (and politics). Class location is only one of many factors which more or less color the social analyst's conceptual framework. Cultural unconscious is another. For someone like myself who is steeped in Buddhist epistemological and philosophical tradition, it is, however, hard to distinguish the knower from the knowledge he or she produces. But thanks primarily to feminist scholars, examining the social location of the knowledge producer and the immediate bearings it has on the knowledge produced is considered valid, at least in various communities of critical scholars. Sandra Harding (1991) makes a self-reflective observation about how cultural unconscious constantly threatens to insinuate into the intellectual project. Harding reflects (1991: 293) that "it can't be entirely a pleasure to discover the

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unintentionally racist assumptions that have guided so many of my thoughts and practices -especially at those moments when I was exactly trying to enact a piece of antiracist business." Returning to Scott's critique of the aforementioned works by Spivak and Delany, both Spivak and Delany clearly have their overt political concerns and goals. As feelings of being marginalized predominate in their political identities, Spivak and Delany choose to privilege marginality of the communities with which they identify by talking about those communities as if they were unitary, non-fluid categories. Their writings imply that a sense of urgency was felt. These communities need to be made visible, their voices heard, and their identities as communities recognized, as far as the two are concerned, or so it seems. In contrast, Scott's critique privileges deconstructionist practice to the point that these goals would be trivialized or defeated. It lacks empathy, it lacks a sense of urgency, and it lacks any immediate relevance to life. Worse still, it attempts, wittingly or unwittingly, to delegitimate the claims made by Spivak and Delany on behalf of these marginal communities. And there are ethical issues that need to be raised here. Owing to his refusal to believe in absolutes, Martin Heidegger, "Derrida's spiritual godfather," ended up descending into a kind of amoralism which in turn embraced Nazism, according to Heidegger's detractors (Smith, 1998). Although Scott certainly is not guilty of such a crime, the ethical and political implications of pursuing her orthodox deconstructionism to the letters are of crucial import. I would argue that there are those critically minded individuals who understand that there are shades of grey in real life situation, and yet their class location, political situations, or economic and cultural conditions compel them to take politicallyoriented actions -- either in the form of writing, speaking out, taking to the streets, or armed struggles. The next section is devoted to a discussion about Buddhist epistemology as it operates as the "epistemological unconscious" in this study.

32

Buddhism as Radical Empiricism: Experience from the Theravada Buddhist Perspective Edward Said's (1978) groundbreaking work Orientalism which created a growth industry of post-colonial studies 4 calls into question essentializing categories (for instance, "Orient" or "Occident"). In his 1993 BBC Reith Lectures, Said (1993) re-articulates his central thesis thus:
The construction of fictions like "East" and "West," to say nothing of racialist essences like subject races, Orientals, Aryans, Negroes, and the like, were what my books attempted to combat. Far from encouraging a sense of aggrieved primal innocence in countries which had suffered the ravages of colonialism, I stated repeatedly that mythical abstractions such as these were lies, as were the various rhetorics of blame they gave rise to; cultures are too intermingled, their contents and histories too interdependent, and hybrid, for surgical separation into large and mostly ideological oppositions like Orient and Occident.

Recognizing the important contributions Said's works made towards the understanding of the power-knowledge nexus in the global historical context, I maintain that there are differences which are not the products of discursive constructions by the powers that be and the critical reworkings by post-colonial writers. Taking the notion of "hybridity" of cultures and human thought to its extreme or, conversely, dissolving the legitimate foundational distinctions (for instance, the distinction between Buddhist philosophical system and others) is intellectually suffocating. Here Winston King (1964) captures my sentiment when he contends:
Those in the West who wish to conceptualize even their ultimates if possible, and distrust any talk of ultimates which cannot be thus dealt with, must realize the depth of this Eastern conviction if they are to appreciate anything of Eastern, and particularly Buddhist, viewpoints. For the denial that conceptual thought can reach ultimate truth represents, or at least implies, not merely a negative mannerism characteristic of the East, but a whole philosophy and methodology of dealing with any kind of truth (p.24).

What is truth or reality in Buddhist intellectual thought?

4For

some of the important works in post-colonial studies, see Stoler, A. L. and Cooper, F. (1997) Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking Research Agenda. pp. 1-55. In F. Cooper & A. L. Stoler (Eds.) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in A Bourgeois World. Berkeley, CA: University of Californa Press. Also see Chakrabarty, D. (1992 October) Pronvincializing Europe: Postcoloniality and the Critique of History. Cultural Studies 6: 3, 337-357 and Prakash, G. (1994 December) Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism. The American Historical Review 99: 5, 1475-1490.

33

In spite of the existence of various interpretive Buddhist traditions, all Buddhists accept as ultimate truths "the three basic characteristics of all tangible experience, or tangibly experienced reality" (King, 1964: 130). They are impermanence or anicca, unsatisfactoriness or dukkha, and insubstantiality or anatta. As King puts it, "(i)t is the core of (Buddhist) knowledge of "things as they are"--a realistic picture of the essence of that existence we experience....Reality is not hard permanent substance,...but infinitely variable and always perishing forms of energy. Selves are not immaterial, imperishable, immutable, spiritual units nor unchanging minds that perceive, but simply psycho-physical series of events...." (pp.130-131; italics added). Theravada Buddhists hold as the basic doctrine of Buddhism the doctrine of Dependent Origination or "the causally-conditioned flux of events" (King, 1964: 137). This Buddhist reading of reality is extended to absolutely all phenomena except Nibbana itself (that is, cessation of sufferings) (King, 1964: 137). Here it is instructive to quote Lama Govinda (1961) at length when he attempts to distinguish Buddhistic knowing from other types of knowing. Govinda writes:
The distinction between religions of revelation and science on one hand, and Buddhism on the other, pertains to the domain of psychology. The former place the centre of gravity outside the individual, inasmuch as they depend upon the authority of tradition or of experiment and its tacit hypothesis, or upon all of them together. In Buddhism the centre of gravity lies within the individual, in his own experience which must furnish proof of the truth of what is first of all assumed to be worthy of confidence. Here what makes the man blessed is not belief (in the sense of the acceptance of a definite dogma), but the becoming conscious of reality, which latter is metaphysics to us only for as long as we have not experienced it....Viewed from without (as a system) Buddhism is metaphysics; viewed from within (as a form of reality) it is empiricism (p.39).

This epistemology or philosophy of truth seeking, according to King (1964: 24), may be placed under the following three corollary statements:

1) Conceptual and logical thinking is of only limited usefulness in truth-seeking. This anti-conceptualism was taken by Nagarjuna, the Mahayananist logician, to the Buddhist extreme as he "sought to demonstrate by dialectical reasoning that all logical and conceptual

34

thinking destroys itself." While not all Buddhists share this position, they all share this anticonceptual sentiment. 2) Because conceptual thought is limited, we should speak of "realizing" rather than "knowing" ultimate truths. (W)hen the Buddhist speaks of "realizing" the truth, what he means is, as King put it, "a direct, first-hand knowing of the truth, not an idea about it, nor the report of someone else's experience but his own personal feeling-knowing awareness. It is neither mere sensation, nor feeling (in a more general sense), nor mere idea, as the Buddhist sees it, but a kind of knowing which has elements of both what the West terms feeling and knowing, here combined in realization" (p.25).

3) Knowledge-experience, or realization, of the truth inevitably produces a change in the knower-experiencer himself. For the Buddhist, "the realization of truth immediately and irresistibly effects a change in the person. This is the case because realization is no mere idea which may lie about unused in one's mental attic, but a living awareness that issues immediately in character modification" (p. 26). However, I should hasten to point out that Buddhism, especially Theravada Buddhism with its heavy emphasis on textual studies, does not reject the value of scholarly learning; it provides a framework for experience. Theravada Buddhists distrust such things as Zen Buddhism which places almost total emphasis on immediate experience (King, 1964: 26). Buddhism is often labeled as "a philosophy of relations." And Govinda justifies this using three basic characteristics of (Buddhist) reality. Govinda (1961: 159) writes:
We are justified in calling Buddhism a philosophy of relations, for which such fundamental ideas like anicca and anatta are the most typical examples. The anicca-idea reveals the dynamic character of the world, the anatta-idea, that there are no unchangeable and separate individualities, neither 'things-in-themselves' nor 'souls-in-themselves'; positively expressed: that there is an infinite relationship between all that lives.

35

A discussion of Buddhist epistemological standpoint would be incomplete without any mention of the distrust Buddhism holds toward verbal representation of Buddhist reality, because Buddhists maintain that "(t)he language, according to its logical structure, is bound to a succession in time and, therefore, always lags far behind reality, which knows, 5 in addition to this sequence in time, a spatial co-ordination as well as non-spatial ('essential') penetration, a synchronization of manifold relations" (Govinda, 1961: 159). For the Buddhist, "realization of Buddhist reality -- anicca, annata, and dukkha -- may be thought about abstractly and given some form in words, but this conceptual cage will never contain the fullness of the realization experience itself" (King, 1964: 25). Buddhism distinguishes two types of knowledge-realization. The Burmese Buddhist scholar Shwe Zan Aung (1956: 41) explains thus:
(T)he bare intellectual element may be developed by culture into secular knowledge or loki panna on the one hand, ranging from the ordinary reasoning power exercised in the most trivial matters, through all phases of logical reason in scientific matters, to the abhinna's, or supermoral exercise of thought and will; and into higher knowledge or lokuttara-panna on the other, ranging from Path-knowledge...to omniscience.

In this section I have described at length some of the key elements in Buddhist epistemological tradition. Because Buddhist thought offers little in terms of guidance and help in practical living or emotional warmth or psychological assurances, Buddhists in general incorporate various pre-Buddhist religious practices in their culture. 6 This is accommodated in practically all cultures where Buddhism predominates. Over the past
5In

the ultimate sense, there is no duality between knower and the known, since the knower knows with the known. 6Buddhist laymen and -women believe that the Buddha is the supreme being or "non-creator 'god.'" But they turn to the nat or spirits, astrology, necromency, and other ritual practices in dealing with day-to-day issues of wealth, social problems, economic issues, and so on. There seem to be two systems of thought which the average Buddhist keeps in his philosophical tool kit, and he or she does not see any contradictions in having the two incompatible philosophies. Buddhism places ultimate responsibility on the individual and demands no submission to authority while spirit worship and other practices presume the reliance on an external authority/source in addressing mundane issues.

36

2,500 years Buddhist hierarchization of knowledge as "secular and higher" seems to have addressed the "need" for lay people to have everyday psychological security and comfort. Every other system of beliefs or thought, be it Marxism or sprit worship, is considered lower knowledge. These non-Buddhist systems of thought are needed to deal with the mundane world and day-to-day living. But higher knowledge -- the realization that everything is in flux, there is no self, and there is only pain -- is accepted as the ultimate. This appears to account for the involvement of Buddhist intellectuals, scholars, and monks in various political causes, using both violence and non-violence means, which they believe in. During the colonial period some Buddhist monks even led local resistance armed groups to fight the occupying British troops. This, to a Buddhist, is not a contradiction. He or she was simply acting in accord with secular knowledge and as if his or her individuality were fixed. Recall the parallel between Buddhist intellectual-practitioners and critical scholars who acted as if their identities were fixed. So far I have delineated deconstructionist and Buddhist approaches to "reality" and how one "knows" it. Perhaps a few comparative notes may be of help. Deconstructionism attempts to annihilate the subject as passively constituted. Power is the central element which is traced in the process of subjectivization of a (pre-discursively created?) "self." In contrast, Buddhism with its anata doctrine denies the existence of "self" in the first place. There is no fixed self to kill, but rather the illusion of "self." In its attempt to deconstruct the subject "interminably" -- as Derrida puts it -- deconstructionism has no other option than to rely on the use of language and a whole system of symbols and gestures. Buddhism on the other hand, uses language only as a way of aiding the beginners in their attempts to grasp the basics. But neither language nor cultural symbols are a part of the Buddhist tool kit for ultimate emancipation. Truth, in the Buddhist sense, can not be transferred, shared, or expressed in any culturally-grounded ways (for instance, verbally, symbolically, etc.). It can only be experienced and realized.

37

Deconstructionism makes the functions of power and authority its central concern and attacks them vigorously and interminably. Buddhism does not concern itself with anything outside of "mindfulness" and makes its weapon accordingly. Buddhism allows the individual to defy or reject any form of authority, power, or tradition including Buddhism itself, monks, and its founder Gotama Buddha, if his or her experience proves any of them unacceptable or untrue. 7 Experience is the ultimate authority. The ultimate aim of Buddhism is to come to realize that there is no self which recognizes itself in the first place. This is the ultimate realization or enlightenment at which point the distinction between the knower and the known collapses absolutely, that is, the realization of the anata or no permanent-self. Deconstructionism aims at achieving "subject-annihilating ecstatic experience" (Jay, 1998: 78). Gilles Deleuze (1986: 109; cited in Jay, 1998: 217, footnote 15) writes, "Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no 'savage': there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge." There are fundamental differences between the two epistemological traditions: one is to serve as the guide for ultimate liberation and the other is to return to rescue (and restore?) the "subject" to its pre-discursively constituted stage. One is concerned about deconstructing the individual to the ultimate point where the knower and known merge, that is, the illusory knower is "extinguished" precisely at the point the truth is known. The other one, once started, is an interminable process. The next section addresses specific methodological and political issues regarding the data gathering, interpretation, and narrative construction in this study.

Experience and the Narrative of Schooling under Burmese Military Dictatorship

7Gotama

was the proper name of the man who founded Buddhism. Buddha means the enlightened one. There are countless number of Buddha or the enlightened ones, and anyone who works hard enough can become enlightened, so the Buddhist believes.

38

In the study I chose to re-tell the tales of a select group of Burmese who were part of the educational community as students, teachers, and educators/bureaucrats/politicians. In other words, the espistemological basis of the study is the "experiences" of various members of the educational community in Burma who lived under the Burmese military dictatorship during the period between 1962-1988. Put in a nutshell, the study is essentially my reconstructed narrative of the tales which my interviewees pieced together out of their recollections of their schooling and work experiences and which they shared with me during personal interviews and conversations. I also rely on my recollections of my own schooling and, to a lesser extent, work experiences, as well as those educators and students whom I came to know intimately. In the section that preceded this one immediately I discussed relevant epistemological issues and explained my decision to use "experience" as historical evidence in this study. A legitimate question to be raised here is "how do I verify the authenticity of the narrative data provided by my interviewees?" In some cases I had opportunities to rub the "raw data" against one another. For instance, it was easier to double-check data when it was about nationally known educational leaders simply because they were in the lime light and there were sources which either were friendly to these educators or disliked them. However, when handling interview data from students and teachers I had no recourse but to compare my own experience of having been schooled under the same dictatorship. During my interviews I came to learn that the interviewees were more or less frank and honest about their own schooling experiences. This was particularly true in the case of my student interviewees all of whom saw themselves having had no responsibility for the workings of the educational system. In other words, they felt no personal need to defend themselves in terms of their educational or professional conduct. I should, however, mention that since one student interviewee, an activist, consistently exaggerated and made things up during the interview, I decided not to use any of the information which was provided.

39

When assessing the authenticity of interview data provided by the educators who held high level positions, their answers were more sophisticated and carefully worded, and at times, excusatory. The fact that this is so is understandable considering that the subject matter is about a failed educational (and political) experiment in which they played a significant role. Be that as it may, I made a conscious effort to have empathy in interpreting and selecting the data. My own lived experience under the same historical circumstances proved to be of great value in trying to treat these individuals with empathy, seeing them as fallible human beings whose actions were guided by a multiplicity of motives and desires. In spite of our differences, all of us had one thing in common: our common experience under Burmese military dictatorship. Neither one of my interviewees can be legitimately held for the systemic wrongs which the country experienced, simply because they were not the ones who came up with a blueprint for BSPP authoritarianism. Our experiences were different and yet similar at the same time. They were different because we occupied different class locations, belonged to different ethnic communities and generations, held different "local" visions, etc. Compared to the experiences of those who grew up or lived under a radically different social order, for instance, the United States or South Africa, our experiences were similar. However, even if economic destitution and political oppression were not common denominators -- because some of us belonged to the gated political communities -- then intellectual, cultural, and political experiences of isolation were. As the study focuses almost exclusively on the struggles that took place in local contexts, I privilege experiences of local actors. But due attention is paid to the way subjectivities were constructed in Burmese education. Although the data were drawn heavily from the interviews with former members of the Burmese educational community, I did interview some individuals who played various roles in the military establishment.

40

Before I conclude this section a mention must be made about the role of fear that continues to haunt virtually everyone who lived through the BSPP period. Even the high ranking members of the BSPP establishment did not escape its impacts. Some interviewees were still too fearful of the ramifications of making critical comments about the BSPP on the record; some were visiting the United States and had to return and live under the present military junta in Rangoon. Some did not intend to go back to Burma, but were concerned that their relatives, friends, or family members may be at risk of being punished by the Burmese junta, if the junta found out about the interviews. Many Burmese living or visiting abroad believe that the Burmese junta has sent its intelligence personnel to keep a watchful eye on them. Given our fear-ridden state of mind, the technical issues involving verifying the interview data or building trust became a rather complicated issue having required the interviewer to take a less technical approach to the interviews. Throughout the interviews, I found that my having lived through the same authoritarian system equipped me with the necessary empathy and understanding of the difficult experiences of some of the interviewees. In the next chapter I examine critically the educational policies articulated by the BSPP government during its authoritarian rule from 1962-88, the ideological foundations of those policies, specific educational measures, and the larger social societal context in which these reforms were launched.

41 Chapter Three BURMA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

"Historians are dangerous people. They are capable of upsetting everything." --Nikita Khruschev

In this chapter I present an historical overview of Burma. Specifically I discuss the aspects of Burmese society, culture, and politics which have direct bearings upon the study as they helped shape Burma's educational life. Perhaps a road map for the chapter may be of help here. The first section includes background information about Burmese society in terms of its ethnic composition and various political and cultural traditions. A discussion of various military and political traditions is also included as the study is necessarily located in the military-dominated politics which existed between 1962-88. Then I examine critically various educational traditions, particularly the dominant Buddhist educational traditions. I also touch upon religious values and patterns as they influenced the "indigenous" educational traditions. I then trace the continuities and ruptures in the development of education at various historical junctures. Also examined are the rise of nationalism, the formation of indigenous elites and counter-elites, the invention of new traditions such as political activism in educational institutions, the transformation of Burmese political thought, and the influence of the discourses of modernization in Burmese education. The final section is devoted to a discussion of political developments which eventually led to the coup of 1962 and its concomitant socialist revolution. Throughout the chapter I make efforts to maintain the multiplicity of voices and historical views although doing so in no way keeps me from forming my own interpretation of the events and processes concerning Burma's past.

42 Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Diversity The two fundamental elements of Burmese society and polity are its multi-ethnic character and its dominant Buddhist culture, which serves as the most potent political force in modern Burmese history. Any scholarly efforts to examine Burma would be incomplete without taking into consideration these two foundational elements. For societal transformation in Burma that has taken place since the country's early encounters with Europe is a result of dynamic interplay and tensions between the intra-political and cultural forces, as well as their interactions with European mercantilism and later colonialism. Burma's multi-ethnic communities make various claims about their historical and cultural origins, many of which are legitimate. 1 Although there are more than 100 ethnic groups and sub-groups who speak more than 50 distinct languages all indigenous to the land, only about 7 of these were the major players in Burma's political and cultural history. These major political players were the Burman, Shan, Mon, and Rakhine or Arakan, Karen, Chin, and Kachin. Of all these indigenous ethnic communities, the Bama or Burmans make up the numerical majority and the country's old name of Burma came from the name of this dominant ethnic community. The word Burma is the anglicized version of the native word "Bama." Geographically, the majority Burmans inhabit the lowland along Burma's longest river, the Irrawaddy and are surrounded by the Rakhine 2 on Burma's western coast, the Mons in the southern region called the Tenessarim coast, the Shans in the eastern plateau, the Kachins in the upper-north, the Chins in the northwestern region, and the Karens in the
1See

Kyaw Min (1957?) The Arakan State. The modified and expanded text of the speech on Arakan Affairs by U Kyaw Min, Arakan MP and ICS given before the Chamber of Deputies. The copy in my possession does not have the exact date and the name of the journal wherein it appeared; however, my guess is that it was published in the Guardian magazine between 1956 and 1958. Also see Vum Sum (1986) Zo History. Aizawl, India; San Ci Po (1928) Burma and the Karens. London: Elliot Stock.; and Karenni Provisional Government (May 1991) Focus on Successive Colonialist Burman Government and the Independent Karenni State Issue. (Place of publication not given, but is most likely to be in the Thai-Burma border area). 2Rakhine is also known as Arakan. But since many younger, nationalist members of this ethnic community wish to be addressed by their indigenous name "Rakhine," I use the term "Rakhine" instead of the standard "Arakan" or "Arakanese."

43 Southeast and the Irrawaddy Delta (Kawlthangvuta, 1983: 14). According to the data collected by Missions Advanced Research and Communication Center, the religious composition among the peoples in 1979 was as follows: 85% Buddhists, 4% Muslims, 4% Christians, 12% Secularists and animists (Missions Advanced Research Center, 1979; cited in Kawlthangvuta, 1983: 19). The Mons, Rakhine, Shans, a majority of Pwo Karens, and Burmans are Buddhists (Kawlthangvuta, 1983: 18). During the pre-colonial period, Burma was a cluster of kingdoms and smaller political communities. The pre-colonial history of Burma is a history of rulers from various kingdoms vying for political dominance over one another. On the eve of the first AngloBurman war that broke out in 1824, the Burman rulers had consolidated their control over the entire country having invaded successfully the Mon country in the lower part and along the southern coast of Burma. They had also subdued the Rakhine rulers on the country's western border and the Shan kings known as Chaofa on the eastern hills. However, Burman rulers had only sporadic contacts with the Chin and Kachin ethnic communities. Burman rulers were more concerned about sending military expeditions to neighboring Assam and Manipura (India) and Siam (Thailand) than dealing with what they considered "inferior" and "uncivilized" communities such as these non-Buddhist ethnic peoples. The two significant features of pre-colonial Buddhist Burmese society are the relatively enlightened treatment of women and lack of a rigid caste system. 3 As early as the first Burmese dynasty in Pagan (1044-1287), women were found to have held various political positions. Like their present day counterparts, Burmese women owned properties and they engaged in business activities, and they participated in scholarly endeavors. Contrary to the conventional history of Buddhism with special reference to female monks,
to the sumptuary laws, John Cady and Maung Maung Gyi contend hat Burmese society is highly status conscious, and meticulously regulated. See Maung Maung Gyi (1983) Burmese Political Values : The Socio-political Roots of Authoritarianism. New York: Praeger. Hereafter Maung Maung Gyi (1983) Burmese Political Values. Also see Cady, John (1954) Political Institutions of Burma. Data Paper #12. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program.
3Pointing

44 there were Bikkuni or fully ordained female monks in Pagan. Furthermore, there were female magistrates and women communal chiefs and local administrators (Furnivall, 1957; Nyunt-Han, 1972; Nu Nu Yi, 1973). 4

Burma's Military Traditions Often writers and scholars have privileged the role of military institutions and military ideology by arguing that historically military institutions occupied the core of Burmese society. They either ignored or overlooked the existence of competing institutions and traditions that existed even within one single dominant Buddhist political tradition in pre-colonial Burmese society. 5 Moreover, one takes a close at look at Burma's military history, one finds competing traditions and types of military institutions throughout the monarchical and later late nationalist era. For instance, even within the so-called absolute monarchical era there were those politico-military leaders who envisaged the type of military institution which would honor and respect the desires of the people, instead of subjecting them to various coercive measures. 6 During the nationalist struggle a similar vision was

4For

a historically grounded study of the political role and public status of Burmese women, see
Nyunt-Han, E. (1972) The Socio-political Roles of Women in Japan and Burma. Unpublished Ph.D.
Diss. University of Colorado at Boulder.
5See for instance, Taylor, R. (1987) The State in Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
pp.46-54.
6This was clearly articulated by a warrior-poet Let-We Thondara (1723-1799AD) who wrote:
How superior
The tactics of war,
How potent
The weapons!
Without gathering in
The hearts of the people,
Without relying on
The Strength of the people
The sword edge
Will shatter
The spear
Will bend.
See Aung San Suu Kyi (1991 September) The true meaning of Boh . Asian Survey 31: 9, 793-797.

45 rethought and pursued by General Aung San, Burma's slain independence hero. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991: 795) writes of her father's vision for Burma's military institution thus:
Aung San visualized the army he had founded as an austere and honourable institution carved out of such rock-solid virtues as incorruptibility, self-sacrifice, and self-discipline, its strength wholly dedicated to the service of the nation without the thought of personal gain. He exhorted his soldiers to refrain from adopting a stance which would make their strength of arms seem an instrument of oppression.... He warned that if the army came to be detested by the people, the reason for which it had been founded would be vitiated. (In his words), "(t)his army must be such that ... the people can revere it, take refuge in it, depend on it."

Of course, there were periods in Burma's history in which military institutions became tools of oppression in the service of abusive rulers. For those who were forcibly conscripted into the military service, it certainly was an instrument of the abusive power. But for the royal advisors who also had to assume military responsibilities in times of rebellion or during military expeditions, it was an honor, a direct route to social standing, fame, and wealth (Hoadley, 1975). In addition, the strength and reliability of royal armies in pre-colonial Burma fluctuated considerably. Hence it is important that we do not paint it in broad strokes when discussing pre-colonial military tradition and that these historical specificities be stressed. Perhaps most relevant to the study is the essentially political nature of the military institution in post-colonial Burma. As an institution which was born out of Burma's nationalist movement with leftist underpinnings, the military by and large shared the civilian government's ideological outlook: socialist, welfare-oriented domestically, and neutralist in foreign affairs (Walinsky, 1969: 431). After a long interval without any military institution controlled by the dominant Burman group (from 1886 to 1941) the Burma Independence Army 7 was an institution the
7With

the loss of the Burmese throne in January of 1886 the royal army of the Burmese kingdom disintegrated into smaller communal armed groups. Almost all throughout the colonial period, the Burma majority were barred from joining the colonial army. On the eve of the Second World War, Japanese intelligence agents were exploring ways to foment native armed revolt against the British in Southeast Asia. And they came into contact with Burmese nationalists from We, the Burmese Confederation. The latter, on their part, were looking for outside assistance to organize an underground army since they were convinced that the British rule would end only through armed struggle. A deal was struck between the two parties and 30 young nationalists were smuggled out of

46 dominant Burman people were tremendously proud of. The army drew its recruits from various segments of Burmese society. As far as the Burman majority were concerned the successive Burmese army since its inception was widely representative of various segments within the Burman majority. As such, there existed ideological differences and different political connections within its rank and file (Thant, 1961: 41-43). During the independence struggle and immediately after independence, there was a short-lived unity within Burma's armed forces and the ideological differences surfaced during the ensuing turbulent years (1948-52). Importantly, there were also military leaders who became overly-ambitious and vied for powerful ministerial positions such as Defense Minister or Home Minister posts during the cilivian rule of PM U Nu (Thant, 1961: 43). However, there were no military officers in U Nu's cabinets except General Ne Win who held the defense minister post for a short while. Ever since Ne Win resigned as Defense Minister in 1952, the defense ministry was always headed by civilian politicians throughout the civilian rule which ended with a military coup in 1962 (Hoadley, 1975: 45). Noteworthy is the fact that the continued presence of armed underground movements by the Communists and ethnic insurgent groups as well as the invasion by the CIA-backed Kuomingtang troops in the early 1950s boosted the role of military leaders in the country's politics. Despite the respect and love which the majority Burmans accorded to the military after its inception in 1941, a career in the military was not popular among the Burmese youth during the civilian period. This was attested to by the fact that the quotas for officer

the country for an intensive military training by the Japanese. After the completion of the training in Formosa (now Taiwan) and Hainan islands, they were shipped to Bangkok where, under the leadership of Aung San, they founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in December of 1941. In modern Burmese history they came to be known as the "Thirty Comrades" and became legendary military heroes. Later their role in the independence struggle was mythologized. General Ne Win who was responsible for the socialist revolution of 1962 was one of them. For a good study that draws on Japanese language sources (and perspectives), see Yoon, W. Z. (1973) Japan's Scheme for the Liberation of Burma: The Role of the Minami Kikan an dthe "Thirty Comrades" Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies.

47 training schools including the Defense Services Academy often went unfilled (Rangoon District Students' Union, 1954). Under Burma Social Program Party (BSPP) rule which was essentially militaristic and dictatorial, a particular kind of military tradition was deliberately reconstructed and called upon to legitimate and justify the military's grip on society and promote its military ideology as "the national ideology." During their 26-year rule, the BSPP generals successfully transformed military careers into one of the most popular professions. To many ambitious young men military service was the surest and quickest route to power, prestige, and wealth. Initially the nationalist army in Burma was one of many social forces that were bonded with the ultimate goal of ending colonial rule in Burma. After independence the military gradually re-fashioned itself into the most important and all-encompassing institution whose interests were equated with those of the entire nation. In the decades following the domestic armed conflicts, external Chinese threat and the messiness of democratic political processes, Burmese military leaders saw themselves as the only group capable of safeguarding the integrity of the nation and providing stability. In spite of the collapse of the socialist component of military rule as a result of popular democracy uprisings in 1988 the military continued to construct its image as the savior of the nation and the ultimate embodiment of patriotism and nationalism. Hence one must avoid portraying Burmese military institutions and tradition as timeless and monolithic. The construction of Burma's pre-colonial past in simple binaries, that is, military- versus civilian-dominated rule or "culturally-rooted" authoritarianism versus egalitarianism, 8 will not do justice to the complex dynamic of cultural formations and ideological transformation in pre-colonial Burma.

the most negative and highly imbalanced view of Burmese culture, see Maung Maung Gyi (1983) Burmese Political Values. For the opposing view that celebrates Burmese political culture as enlightened and contractual, see Htin, Maung (1972) Yaw Min Gyi U Bo Hlaing Ye Ya Za Da Ma Thin Ga Ha Kyum (A Treatise on Kingly Art and Behavior written by Yaw Minister U Bo Hlaing).

8For

48

Cultural and Political Integration: Beyond Military Traditions Theoretically, an ideal leader in Burmese pre-colonial political culture was the one who was both physically strong and intellectually fit or in short, a warrior-scholar. Many distinguished Burmese writers and poets served in the king's administration and created their literary works on and during military expeditions (see Ba Thaung, 1971). Throughout Burma's pre-colonial history, there were monarchs, royal administrators, and community leaders who showed both traditional leadership qualities, known in Burmese as Let-yone-ye or physical strength and Hna-lone Ye or wisdom. Some rulers were more scholarly- or militarily-oriented than the others. Still others were balanced between these two faculties. Hence one must be careful not to overlook the twin components of leadership in Burmese political culture. This conception of an ideal leader is very much ingrained in the Burmese of all ages and continues to play an important role in educational aims. Although a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic make-up characterizes the old, that is, pre-colonial Burma, political and cultural integration amongst these dominant Buddhist communities was not forged successfully by the old rulers. On the eve of Burma's violent encounter with British colonialism the country was held together by force by the militarily strong Burman rulers from the Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1885). As will be seen later in the chapter the attempts by the Burman elites to forge a national culture, identity, and ideology through the country's educational institutions or state-sponsored cultural and ideological integration, proved to be a highly contested process. Indeed Burma's cultural history is about the struggle over who gets to define what Raymond Williams called "selective tradition." In the following section I discuss briefly the various
Rangoon: Htein Win Sarpe, and Htin Aung, Maung (1967) A History of Burma. New York: Columbia

49 educational traditions both within the dominant Buddhist cultures and the non-Buddhist communities. Throughout the study the word "Burman" is used when referring to the majority ethnic people who speak the language "Burmese" and the term "Burmese" for all the indigenous non-Burman peoples, a great majority of whom speak the dominant group's language of "Burmese." I will use the term "non-Burman" whenever I wish to refer to the rest of the ethnic communities. In cases where I need to single out an ethnic community or people, I will use their collective proper names (for instance, Chin, Kachin, Karen, etc.).

Educational Traditions of Burma Burma's educational traditions may be placed under two general categories: One a highly literate Buddhist tradition and the other a non-Buddhist oral educational tradition. The Mon, Shan, Rakhine, and Burman have strong Buddhist educational and philosophical traditions whereas the Karen, Chin, and Kachin relied largely on oral traditions to educate their youths (Khin Mya, 1961; Kawlthangvuta, 1983; Cung Lian Hup, 1993). The cultural institutions of the non-Buddhist communities proved more amenable to the educational efforts by Europeans and American Baptist Missionaries. As a matter of fact, it was the Christian missionaries who were by and large responsible for the invention of writing systems for these non-Buddhist communities (see Cug Lian Hup, 1993; Petry, 1993). Here I will be concerned primarily with the dominant Buddhist educational tradition. Considering the predominantly Buddhist nature of Burmese society and the imminent role Buddhism played in the creation of the Burmese nation, the shaping of its institutions and the nature of its power/social relations, any historical discussion on Burmese education must begin with its originally-alien Buddhist roots. 9
9According

to the most recent archaeological research found evidence that Buddhism existed as early as the mid-4th century AD as evidenced by the recognizable Buddhist architecture. The Pyu, a Tibeto-Burman, were the patrons of Buddhism. See Stargardt, Janice (1990) The Ancient Pyu of

50 Dominant Buddhist Educational Traditions The Burmese saying "One Word One Lord" reflects the fact that Burma's dominant educational tradition has deep roots in Buddhism. 10 Buddhist Burmans were taught not to use any item that bore Burmese or Pali letters in any demeaning manner (for instance, toilet use) (Htin, 1936). In Buddist cultures of Burma teachers were held in high esteem. Teachers, along with the Buddha (or the Enlightened One), the Buddhist Order, the Buddhist teachings, and Parents, were considered the top five elements in the world most deserving of respect and honor. After all its founder is classified a guide and teacher, but not a Savior. According to Buddhist philosophy all circumstances of life are conditioned by Kamma, one's accumulated deed, and the individual must but reap the results of his or her actions, good or bad. At the heart of Buddhist thought lies the following triad: everything is changeful or anicca ; everything is sorrowful or dukkha ; and everything is empty of substantial reality anatta (Ba Han, 1965: 29). There is neither soul nor room for God's Grace, but only the cycle of life, which is perpetuated by the attachment to the illusory self and desires. The highest aim of any Buddhist, theoretically, is to enter Nirvana or the end of the life-cycle, and this final liberation is to be achieved not by faith, but through individual
Burma. Volume One. Cambridge, UK: Publications on Ancient Civilization in South East Asia.
Cambridge University. pp.191-194. This is a good archaeological study which combines sociological
and anthropological approaches to understanding ancient Burma. The findings revolutionize the
way scholars conceptualize ancient South East Asian civilizations. Paying closer attention to the
considerably more differentiated and far more complex nature of dynamics between culture, polity,
and economy of ancient South East Asian civilization, the study poses the most potent and
evidentiary challenge to such concepts as Hegel's "historyless peoples," Karl Marx's "Asiatic Mode of
Production," and K. Wittfogel's "Oriental Despotism."
Also see Than Tun, Dr. (1964) Khit Haung Myanmar Razawin (Old Burmese History). Rangoon:
Maha Dagon Press. p. 62 The first known Pyu settlements in Irrawaddy River Valley go back to the
3rd century and they were believed to have migrated from what today is China's Yunna provice area.
They received their writing from South India in the 4th century AD. Also imported were various
strands of Brahminism and Buddhism. The Pyu kingdom flourished until the 9th century AD when
it was overran by the Nanchao troops.
10This is the Burmese literal translation of Pali phrase Ak-hka-ra-mae Kit-sa Buddha Ru-pan. See Htin,
Maung (1936) Myo-chit Seik Hta Kywa Bwe Sar Pe (The Literature that arouses nationalist sentiment).
Oway 6: 1, 77-84.

51 efforts first and merit which can be accumulated by leading a life in accord with the moral principles articulated in Buddhist teachings (Nash, 1969). Buddhist belief allows its adherents great latitude in the specification of everyday living. Because it deals not with immediate situations, but with things remote and ends final, this void is filled in Burmese culture by "a body of belief oriented to the problems, desires, and hopes of men as they go about their mundane business" (Nash, 1969). There are spirits or Nat systems and several other predictive and divinatory systems such as astrology, fortune telling, charms and amulets, magical tattooing, and alchemy (Nash, 1969; see also Than Tun, 1960). From a sociological perspective, Buddhism's accommodation of the worship of deities and spirits has been its major strength and serves as one of the forces which ensures its remarkable continuity. The catch here is that the Buddhist teachings of the "Universal Truths" and the Buddha always remain at the top whereas other forms of knowledge and deities are accommodated in lesser places. The American student of Burmese Buddhism John Ferguson has captured this uniquely Buddhist (or Burmese?) cultural logic when he touches on the subject of internal contradictions in Burmese Buddhist thought. Ferguson (1975: 72) writes:
The evidence from Burmese sources would seem to say firmly that both (contrasting symbols such as Gotama Buddha and nats or deities) are true at the same time and that sharp contrast does not imply opposition. That "A" is and is not "B" at the same time is impossible for a logical Aristotelian Westerner to accept, but a Buddhist has little trouble with such "logic." A culture that adores the Jatakas (i.e., stories of the reincarnation of the Buddha) and at the same time philosophically believes fervently there is no self to be reborn is little troubled with Western notions of "contradictions."

I will say more about this later when I discuss the issue of Marxism in a Buddhist context. Theoretically, the idea of education in Buddhist tradition was linked with individual enlightenment. According to Shin Maha Thila Wuntha, the Pali word Pyin Nya or education means ability/understanding/wisdom to distinguish right from wrong and see cause and effect (Kye Zuu, 1994: 26-27; Win Mon,1967). Living by education means avoiding the acts that are wrong and engaging in acts that are right. Monks or laymen and -women who

52 observe the Dhamma are living by education (Kye Zuu, 1994). It must be pointed out that since western schools became widely popular in the country the original meaning of "education" has undergone radical transformation. After over a century under British colonial rule, education became strictly secular and heavily employment-oriented. But there was more to Buddhist monastic education than simply "character training." Equally important, Buddhist educational aims were producing self-regulating individuals and equipping them with various branches of knowledge which would assist them in making a living (Than Htut, 1980: 84). Monastic education at the level of practice contained a blend of both secular and other-worldly oriented types of knowledge. It was a reflection of the original character of Buddhist schooling which was imported during the early Burmese at Pagan. Generally there were two distinct types of curricular knowledge included in Buddhist monastic education: worldly, secular knowledge and the scriptural knowledge of Thervada Buddhism. Secular knowledge was further differentiated into two kinds: Attharasa or the Eighteen Classical branches of learning (Sein Tu, 1962: 30-31) 11 and Kalar or 64 lesser types of knowledges such as agriculture, trade, dance, music, alchemy, etc. (Ba Tin, 1967: 146-152). After the fall of the first Burman dynasty (AD 1044-1287) this tension between more secular
were traditional lore; sacred tradition; knowledge of the Sanjya Philosophy (a dualistic Philosophy propounded by the ancient Indian philosopher Kapila); knowledge of the Yoga philosophy (Also a dualistic philosophy, Yoga stresses physical exercises in the attainment of truth); knowledge of Nyaya philosophy (A school of logical realism which emphasizes the importance of epistemological questions, founded by Aksapada); knowledge of Vaisesaha philosophy (propounded by the Indian philosopher Kanada); knowledge of music; knowledge of mathematics; knowledge of archery; knowledge of legendary history; knowledge of medicine; knowledge of the chronicles (the four Hindu Sacred Books of antiquity, comprised of the Rig Veda; the Yajur Veda; the Sama Veda; and the Atharva Veda); knowledge of astronomy; knowledge of jugglery; knowledge of prosody; knowledge of poesy; knowledge of charms; and knowledge of grammar (pp.30-31). In 1502 AD, the Buddhist monk-scholar wrote the text called Lokaniti in Pali (Ethic for the Worlds). It was based on his own insights into the Burmese society and drawn from Vedic treaties of the ancient Brahministic tradition of India. During the late Konbaung Period in the 19th century, the Pali text was translated into Burmese. Lokaniti was the most widely read and most influential text as it served as a set of ethical guidelines against which individuals were judged in popular culture in society. See Sein Tu, Dr. (1962) The Lokaniti Mandalay University Research Council Publication No. 9. Mandalay: Tetnaylin Press.
11They

53 schooling and Buddhist schooling with a decidedly (Buddhist) Enlightenment-oriented focus remained strong. Pali, the language spoken at the time of the Buddha, was the primary language of instruction in "transmitting" Buddhist teachings while Sanskrit was the medium for the teaching of secular types of knowledge (Than Htut, 1980: 35). Subsequent to the collapse of the Pagan kingdom in AD 1287 the latent tension between various schools of Buddhist thought came into the open. As a result, there developed sectarianism within the now indigenized Buddhist monastic educational tradition. 12 During Pin Ya Period (AD1299-1363) and Ava Period (AD1364-1526) more secular traditions became dominant in the kingdom's monastic education (Than Htut, 1980: 68-19; also see Ferguson, 1975). These schools with more secular tradition taught their pupils the aforementioned secular branches of knowledge such as classical (that is, Attharasa ) and "lower" knowledges (e.g., Kalari), the traditional professional subjects which prepared adequately the pupils to be able to make a living within the traditional Burmese social order (Than Htut, 1980: 69). Even within the educational tradition which was solely geared towards (Buddhist) Enlightenment or individual salvation through practice, there emerged various educational sub-traditions within the Burmese monastic tradition. To further explicate, there were three central tenets of Buddhist Sasana or Guide: Pariyatti Sasana or scholarship (of Buddhist philosophy); Padipatti Sasana or practice (of Buddhist philosophy); and Padiveda Sasana or realization of the Four Noble Truths (Than Htut, 1980: 34-35). There were serious tensions especially the first two sub-traditions as they competed for primacy of their curriculum. And upon occasions the royal administrators in charge of Religious Affairs had
sects included the two original camps namely Mahayana School and Theraveda or Hinayana School, Ceylon Theravada School, Forest Dwellers' School or Aranya Wathee (i.e., the decidedly orthodox tradition) and Pwe Kyaung or Gama Wathee (i.e., school with an emphasis on secular knowledges). See Than Htut, U (1980) Myanma Naing Ngan Hbon Daw Gyi Kyaung Tha Mai (History of Burma's Monastic Education) Rangoon: Thein Min Hlaing Press. pp.68-69. Hereafter Than Htut, U (1980) History of Burma's Monastic Education.
12These

54 to intervene in various intellectual and political disputes that took place amongst these competing traditions. Historically Buddhist philosophy and education (that is, its two central schools, namely Mahaya and Hinaya or Theravada schools) 13 were imported and adopted by the then existing pre-Buddhist communities in what is now Burma (Than Tun, 1970). Every community, both at the capital city and the outlying areas of the kingdom, had at least one Buddhist monastery which also served as a community center (Kaung, 1963). After all education was a highly valued undertaking in the Burmese Buddhist context. In the old Buddhist Burma there was the tradition of sending every boy before 19 to a Buddhist monastery. Communal rituals such as funerals, pilgrimage, and other social and religious functions often included lively intellectual debates and discussions and story-telling (Maung Wa, 1976: 172). In everyday life, one of the learned persons in the extended families would read from the Jataka Tales to the younger members (Maung Wa, 1976: 174). There were also Brahministic elements from India's Vedic traditions such as astrology, selective legal codes, etc. The native pre-Buddhist practices and philosophical views were also incorporated into the imported Buddhism. One may raise the following question: why then does Buddhist education with its ultimate goal of helping the followers to reach enlightenment allow secular, this-worldly knowledge? This indeed is a paradox in Buddhist education. On one hand, the Burmese Buddhists are exhorted to strive to end the cycle of life through their Buddhist learning. They are taught to improve their material lot in this world, on the other. The heirarchization
in a nutshell, one of the major differences between these two schools is that whereas the Mahayana (Greater Wheel) tradition which predominates in Buddhist cultures in China, Japan, Korea, and Tibet elaborates on and adapts the existing Buddhist scripture in accord with time and changing social and political contexts the Theravada Buddhism, (which is the predominant religion of Southeast Asian societies such as Burmese, Thai, Laos, and Cambodia, and Sri Lankan) is more orthodox in nature. The Mahayanists believe that the Would-be-Buddha could give a helping hand to the laypeople and that the scriptures themselves have power to send individuals to Nirvana. In contrast the adherents of the latter believe that no one but the individual is responsible for his or her own enlightenment and learning without practice was inadequate for one to achieve enlightenment.
13Put

55 of knowledge into two general categories--one secular and conditional and the other universal--appears to help Buddhist Burmese to resolve this apparent paradox. Buddhists perceive any knowledge that would help them improve their material lot in the present life as a lesser type of knowledge. Buddhism, they believe, offers unconditional truths which will aid the believers to attain higher and nobler goals whereas other secular knoweldge is conditional but still useful for improving one's material well-being. To Buddhists there is no contradiction between the pursuit of material well-being and of spiritual attainment. Thus is dealt a seeming paradox in Buddhist philosophical and educational practice. Under various circumstances, Burmese educational practices and social relations within various dominant Buddhist traditions have been re-worked significantly after a series of encounters with Europe and its dominant materialist philosophy of modernization. I turn now to the transformation of power relations with special reference to educators and the powers that be and how the meaning of "student" in Burmese culture has been constructed and re-constructed throughout various historical periods. The discussion which follows concerns only the dominant Buddhist culture with its well-established indigenous educational institutions, that is, Buddhist monastic education.

Changing Notions of Educators According to Buddhist cultural values the monk-educator belongs to one of the five most respect-worthy categories along with the Buddha or the Enlightened One, the Buddhist Teachings or Knowledge, the Parents, and the Teachers of all kinds. Traditionally, the predominantly Buddhist culture of Burmese society propagated the view that those who chose a career in teaching are endowed with the following three qualities: cetana (i.e., having good intentions), garuna (i.e., loving kindness) and anitna (i.e., personal

56 sacrifice). 14 Their profession, which presumably would help indivuals in their quest for enlightenment, was generally perceived as noble in their day-to-day conducts. With prestige and social influence comes cultural pressure. Educators were under great pressure to lead an exemplary life (in accord with Buddhist teachings, to be sure). Educators, generally speaking, made conscious efforts to regulate their own lives, professional or otherwise, accordingly. 15 This perpetuates the perception of educators as "defenders of morality and ethics." It must be stressed that there existed a fundamental difference between categorically atheistic Buddhist traditions and European traditions with their originally Creationist philosophical roots. In Buddhist Burmese monarchical system Burmese kings did not exercise the kind of power and influence over the clergy. Each Burmese dynasty usually did not last more than 2-300 years. As opposed to the political institutions such as monarchy, religio-educational communities of monk-educators played a vital role in providing social continuity and therefore had a more lasting impact on Buddhist social relations in the pre dominantly Buddhist communities of Burma. In addition, from a cultural perspective the monarch or the "holder of sovereign power" ultimately, is a lesser human being vis-a-vis the monk-educator or the "bearer and practitioner of ultimate knowledge." In the cycle of births and rebirths, the monk-educators were closer to the end of the cycle, that is, Nirvana, than
14Even

in more acquistive type western capitalist societies, teaching profession is said to attract people who seek intrinsic rewards and gratification which the profession provides. The difference however is that unlike western socities, might I say Western Europe, US, and Canada, teaching profession is held in high regards. The well-known derogatory remark about teachers and teaching which was made by George Bernaw Shaw that those who can't do anything teach (not the exacting wording) typifies the general attitude regarding the profession and its members, especially those educators in pre-college institutions in Western European cultures. This is reflected in the monetary reward structure for educators in general--vis-a-vis other "helping professions" such as medicine. 15It was not just the educators who were to be defenders and upholders of Buddhist moral and ethical principles in their personal, as well as professional life. Out of my own experience, children of the educators were often expected to behave themselves. I often heard the line "your mother is a teacher and you should behave." We were more often than not judged more harshly than our peers whose parents had non-educational professions. Having immersed in the Burmese Buddhist culture, educators (and by extension children of the educators) were but affected by this cultural attitude.

57 the monarch. The former had accumulated enough merit and spiritual strength to be able to renounce the world while the latter, however mighty he might be, is still a weaker human being who is imprisoned by his own attachment to this mundane world of wealth, power, fame, and glory. To borrow Tambiah's (1976) terms, "world renouncer" (i.e., monkeducator-practitioner) is ultimately greater individual than "world conqueror" (i.e., Buddhist monarch). While there were some instances in Burma's Buddhist history in which powerful Buddhist monarchs attempted to reign in the culturally highly autonomous Buddhist Order, monk-educators by and large had a free hand as far as their "job," that is, determining the content and pedagogy of Buddhist education. After all the king was not expected to be able to add or adjust anything regarding what was considered "Universal Truths" taught by the Buddha. Regarding the economic aspect of their social relations between monk-educators and the monarch the latter was to be the patron of Buddhism. He (and Buddhist communities) typically took care of the material needs of the monk-educators. For a casual observer, this may seem as though the king was the benefactor and the monk-educators the beneficiaries. Actually the opposite is the case. The king reaps spiritual gains by taking care of the needs of Buddhism and Buddhist Order. To sum up my arguments so far, in pre-colonial Burma monk-educators were not salaried staff in the king's service, nor were they his cultural agents. Under British rule, there developed a new educational tradition, that is, Western/modern education which transmitted this-worldly or secularist knowledge. With this new development there emerged a new class of secular educators. Noteworthy is the nature of power relations between the newly emerging educators and the powers that be. The colonial power influenced through its grants what was deemed as "knowledge." Dominant knowledge gradually became closely linked to the political and economic needs of the powers that be. Even European and American Christian missionaries capitulated to the

58 demands which the colonial authorities subtly made (Than Htut, 1980; Kaung, 1963). In the mean time, the new educational tradition was replacing gradually the originally dominant Buddhist one in terms of its social popularity, influence, and economic values. Within this new arrangement, traditional monk-educators by and large refused to cooperate with the alien colonial administration and chose to remain outside this newly emerging powerknowledge nexus (Than Htut, 1980). But there emerged a new class of lay-educators who entered into this power-knowledge arrangement having received monetary compensation, grants, or direct salaries from the colonial government. Soon the colonial government set up a central mechanism to monitor and control loosely the direction and shape of modern colonial education. That was the beginning of educational bureaucracy and administration (Kaung, 1963). Here most intriguing is the general response of the society to this transformation in education. Buddhist Burmese societies transferred their cultural attitude toward monkeducators to the new class of modern educators. Modern secular educators were held in high regards in colonial society and the old social relations between teachers and pupils continued to be honored. It was in the 1920s and 1930s that this deferential attitude toward teachers on the part of pupils changed, due to the increasing politicization of education and students, and colonial society (Nu, 1955). 16 Christian missionary teachers as well as university educators came to be treated as part of the colonial establishment (Mya Ke Tu, 1970). The latter were labeled as "bureaucrat-educators." Students, especially the politically minded ones not only showed little respect to these educators, but they also denounced these educators publicly in their speeches and writing (Nyo Mya, 1970). As the struggle for independence was approaching its final phase, the campus political activism crystalized and became a hallmark
16During

his commencement address at Rangoon University Prime Minister U Nu, who was also Chancellor of the university by the University Act of 1920, included a brief historical overview of how social relations in education, particularly educators and pupils were transformed under colonial rule. See Nu, U (December 8, 1955) Tetkatho Bwe Hnin Thabin (Text of Commencement Address by Prime Minister U Nu) Citizens 4: 38, 1-10.

59 of student culture. It was this spirit of campus activism and the accompanying social relations between the trio--pupils, teachers, and the powers that be -- which independent Burma inherited (Nu, 1955).

Cultural Meaning of "Student" in Burmese Context and Its Historical Transformation In the olden days of indigenous monarchs, there were clearly defined and culturally enforced roles for students (in relation to teachers) which were rooted in Buddhist philosophical traditions. Both the teachers and pupils observed reciprocal, mutual obligations (Than Htut, 1980; Kye Zuu, 1994). There were 25 different characteristics of genuine educators (Department of Religious Affairs, 1982: 109-110). For instance, the educator took care of pupil's health, was concerned about the welfare and progress of pupils and never abandoned them in times of need. The educator accorded pupils due respect and remained their teacher for life. And respect toward teachers (and elders), obedience, and hard work on the part of pupils were emphasized. 17 Noteworthy is that students had little political involvement in the monarchical days and monarchical Burmese society lacked the tradition of student revolt (against the teachers or political authorities). 18 Besides, the highest secular aim of students was to serve in the king's administration. During the closing years of Burmese monarchy, the royal authorities
17Buddhist

scriptures, most notably Milanda Pyinsa Pali text (Department of Religious Affairs, 1966: 109-110), spell out mutual respect as one of the defining characteristics in teacher-student relationships. However, in popular cultural thought, respect is treated as if it were one directional, only required of students. Buddhist institutions of learning, basic and advanced, which taught secular knowledge such as the art of warfare, administration, and so on, had, at times, served as an oppositional camp from which palace intrigues were launched, Buddhist educational institutions were by and large not involved in the oppositional politics under monarchical times. The more distant the Buddhist order from such secular affairs as politics the more respectable and influential the order becomes, according to the Buddhist cultural perception. Ultimately the human beings who have accumulated so much good karma (i.e., past and present deeds) to be able to renounce all ties and attachment to wealth, power, and influence are incomparably superior to the kings who are slaves to their desire for power, glory, and wealth.

18Although

60 who saw the real danger of falling prey to Western (British) colonialism unless the kingdom and her institutions became modern and militarily strong, created a new role for accomplished Burmese students: agents of modernization. The newly invented tradition of students as "modernizers" was eclipsed with the final annexation of the Court of Mandalay in 1885. Under the British colonial education system, traditional cultural meanings of students and their roles were reworked. Colonial authorities deliberately formulated educational policies according to which a tiny segment of indigenous elite students was to be trained in Western/modern schools so they could be employed, albeit as clerks and later minor administrators, in the British colonial administration and European firms. Alongside this notion of students as "embryonic bureaucrats" (see Mya Ke Tu, 1970), 19 a new and important dimension was added to the cultural meaning of "student" when Burmese nationalism became more radicalized in the 1920's and 1930's. The student was to be the "agitator/freedom fighter." 20 The more political segments of the traditional Burmese society pinned their hope on student radicals for the independence struggle and gave them respect accordingly. This was a radical break from the past as the "freedom fighter student" began to

Ke Tu was a pen name for Professor U Chan Mya who was a student in the late 1920s at Rangoon University. One of his students there was Aung San. 20Like many of his contemporaries, U Aung San, the most important nationalist symbol, cut his teeth on campus. U Aung San argued that the responsibility of students was to apply whatever he learned in school (or life) to transform the world (for the better) (Aung San, 1946). In his judgment, academic freedom and the right to form associations were two indispensable pillars of "real education." Even during his student days, as a product of colonial education in traditional Buddhist Burmese society, he drew on both a Buddhist tradition of critical thought and the European Reformation and Renaissance to back up his advocacy for academic freedom (Aung San, 1960-61). His writings and thoughts were not uncommon among the nationalist elites in colonial Burma who were exposed to both foreign intellectual, cultural, and political traditions and the indigenous ones. His writings came to be read widely by various subsequent student generations and also served as words of authority. His life which progressed from student activist to the unparalleled nationalist leader at the time of his assassination itself was, and still is, the most powerful political and cultural justification for any political role students came to play in post-colonial Burma.

19Mya

61 address issues which were beyond the confines of the campus and their activities came to assume national importance. From 1948 until BSPP rule began in 1962, Burma's civilian leaders who themselves had been student activists at the forefront of Burma's independence struggle not too long ago made attempts to rework the definition of the "student" in order to remove the old agitator component from its meaning. Prime Minister U Nu urged members of the educational community--educators, students, and (by extension) parents-- to restore the amicable social relations amongst themselves. The respect-based social relations in education were considered a defining characteristics of Buddhist cultural tradition (Nu, 1955; San Ngwe,1970; 146-147). To them the new student in independent Burma was to be "modernizer/technocrat with a democratic outlook." 21 These efforts by the parliamentary democracy governments did not bring about the intended results. The manipulation of politically minded students by various political oppositions, both above- and underground (See Nu, 1955), inertia and the legacy of student political activism of the bygone nationalist days, the poor economic prospects for university graduates, and last but not least, the leftist-inspired youthful idealism prevented any effort to reconstruct "students" as merely "modernizer/technocrats." 22 The section which follows

is worth noting that in the immediate post-WWII period the British administration, under pressure from Burmese nationalists, included in its syllabus teaching of civics commensurate with a democratic way of life ( Nu, 1955) while history was to be taught "with an emphasis on the British Commonwealth of Nations." See Office of the Superintendent (1945) Syllabuses for Primary and Post-primary Schools-Burma. Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery. pp. 29-30. In the newly independent Burma with its parliamentary democracy government, school curricula retained civics, but naturally with an emphasis on Burmese cultural revival. 22A staunch leftist, retired Brigadier Kyaw Zaw, one of the legendary Thirty Comrades, openly called on the students to wage these struggles in Rangoon University publications. See Kyaw Zaw, Brigadier (1959-60) Kyaung Tha Hnin Amyo Tha Ye (Students and National Cause). Oway Rangoon University Student Union 30th Anniversary Publication. Rangoon. pp.17-23. From the perspective of more radical political elements, political independence was the first step toward establishing full independence, that is, economic and political indepenence (see Kyaw Zaw, 1959-60). Those who held the latter view exhorted students to take on new political responsibilities of continuing the struggle for full independence, in the tradition of Aung San and other revered nationalist heroes.

21It

62 presents a historical perspective on the spread of modernist materialist philosophy and the indigenous efforts to incorporate the new philosophy into the cultural and philosophical fabric of Buddhist Burmese society.

Seeds of Modernization and the Importation of Modern/Western Education In their introduction in "Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeoise World" Stoler and Cooper (1997) argue that "(d)evelopment is only a recent entry among a series of constructs that make ethnocentric claims in universalist language" (p.35). 23 The Burmese case seems to tell a different story. As I have pointed out in the preceding section Buddhism allows paradoxically its followers to pursue both material and spiritual matters simultaneously. There seems to have always been a desire for the improvement of their material well-being on the part of Buddhist Burmese elites in pre-colonial Burma. However, it was not until the ruling elites began to witness the evidence of the material and technological superiority of Europe through their interactions with early European pioneering traders and adventurer-travelers that the desire for more advanced technological knowledge developed which could aid in the betterment of their material well-being. Burmese indigenous royal elites entertained the idea of material progress or development long before their status quo was threatened by the colonial powers. To further illustrate the royal administration at the Court of Pegu in the Mon kingdom welcomed the efforts of Barnabite priest Father Calchi to bring western education. The former expressed a strong interest in the import of technological knowledge (Ba, 1964). This was the first recorded efforts by the indigenous elites to develop their societies and kingdoms along
23Stoler

and Cooper point out that the colonial subjects manipulated the universal language of development in countering the exclusionary practices by the (European) colonial elites and inequities. See Stoler, A. L. & Cooper, F. (1997) Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking Research Agenda. In Frederick Cooper & A. L. Stoler (Eds.) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World. pp. 1-55. Berkeley: University of California Press.

63 Western lines. The following passage from a letter from Father Calchi to the Superior General of the Barnabite Order in Rome, Claudio Strada (dated March 11, 1723, the Court of Ava) revealed the early sprouting of modernist dream in pursuit of material development.
The King wishes to have contact with, friendship and commerce with all the Christian Princes, especially with the Pope. He desires other missionaries and men expert in the arts of painting, and weaving cloths, making glass, astronomers, mechanics, geographers, etc., to instruct his subjects in the way of the spirit and make them more cultivated in human sciences... This kingdom is full of mines of gold and silver, of precious stones, of tin, copper, lead, chemicals and every gift of God; but they are like hidden treasures, as these people do not know how to use them for their profit. For this reason also the king desires Europeans and missionaries who understand these things to direct his people for their advancement. (Ba, 1964: 290, italics added).

However, these early joint efforts did not come to fruition due to armed conflicts between different indigenous kingdoms, namely the Mon kingdom of Lower Burma and the Burman rulers based in Ava (Ba, 1964). Here there were serious differences in terms of the motives entertained by both sides. Christian missionaries considered Burma a heathen nation ripe for mass conversion and the modernist ideology and the knowledge they promised to help import was largely driven by their primary mission for proselytizing the natives. The promise and importing of modern science and technology was a ploy on the part of the missionaries to lure the natives into accepting the superiority of new forms of knowledge and by extension Christianity. The native elites on their part, only desired modern knowledge from the Christian missionaries which would aid them in their material advancement in the present world. From the natives' perspective, they already possessed the universal truths that would ultimately aid their journey toward Nirvana or the end of sufferings. 24 Therefore the
conversation that actually took place between Dr. John E. Marks, a British Anglican bishop/missionary, and Burmese King Mindon is illuminating. The Burman king wanted his sons and other Burman boys to learn the English language and other knowledge whereas Dr. Marks was understandably keen on teaching the boys Christianity. At one point King Mindon offered Dr. Marks 50 boys to help translate the Encyclopedia Britannica. On the subject of religious conversion, the King commented that he did not want the native Buddhist boys "to forget their ancestor's religion." Here is an excerpted exchange between King Mindon and Dr. Marks: I (Dr. Marks) said, "Christianity teaches us to worship the everlasting God, to obey His law, and to receive instruction from the clergy." The King seemed annoyed for a time, and then repeated in his usual good-humoured manner: I cannot talk with you about religion in public, we will talk about it privately on your return" (p.176). See Marks, John E. (1917) Forty Years in Burma. London: Hutchinson & Co. Hereafter Marks (1917) Forty Years in Burma.
24A

64 natives by and large saw no point in adopting theisms such as Christianity of all denominations. 25 Again in 1833 native elites made efforts to import better types of technological knowledge. For instance, the Burmese Prince Makkhara patronized efforts to translate English language articles on astronomy and other physical sciences into Burmese (Wun, 1975). 26 But it was not until the kingdom had lost half of its territories to the British that the indigenous elites, that is, the King and his advisors, embarked on serious modernization projects. Scores of students were sent to Western Europe, U.S.A., and India to study various kinds of modern knowledge. By then the indigenous elites realized that the kingdom was faced with two choices: either modernize or fall prey to the technologically and economically superior Western powers, primarily Britain. But with the assassination of the King's brother Crown Prince Kanaung who led the modernization initiatives, these efforts were nipped in the bud. In addition, it proved rather late as the British were preparing to annex the remaining territories of the Burmese Kingdom (Hting Aung, 1995), which took place in 1885.

The Rise of Nationalisms in Colonial Burma Critical of the existing studies of colonialism, Stoler and Cooper (1997: 4-11) offer some insights into the dynamic interplay of colonial subjects, European elites, various
25The

categorical rejection of Christian proselytization efforts was evidenced in the fact that even 12 years of labor by the most committed Christian missionaries yielded only 13 converts amongst the Buddhist population and there was no mass conversion in the predominantly Buddhist communities. See Petry, J. L. (1993) The Sword of the Spirit: Christians, Karens, Colonialists, and the Creation of a Nation of Burma. Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. Rice University. Hereafter Petry (1993) The Sword of the Spirit. prince himself took English lessons from British merchants who were in residence at the Court of Ava. He imported books in English on various subjects from Calcutta. See Wun, U (1975) Myanma Zagar (Burmese Language). In Editorial Committee of the Burmese Tradition Series (Eds.) Myanmar Hmu (Burmese Tradition). Rangoon: Universities Press. pp.1-28.
26The

65 institutions, and bourgeois discourses. They reiterate a central point in colonial scholarship, namely that "the otherness of colonized persons (and) his or her difference had to be defined and maintained" (p.7). If the colonial authorities were intent on maintaining this critical difference so as to constantly keep a distance from, and assert their superiority over, the colonial subjects, the indigenous Buddhist elites, on their part, had a vested interest in maintaining the categorical difference as well. The dominant Buddhist elites took great pride in having been the "bearers of the Universal Truths," (that is, the teachings of Gotama Buddha). Whereas the tradition-bound monk-educators generally rejected even the usefulness of selective types of scientific knowledge on the grounds that they were against Buddhist teachings (Than Htut, 1980), the educated elites partially accepted the use value of technological and modern secular knowledge, but only out of utilitarian motives. Those Western-educated Burmese who were equipped with both types of knowledge made concerted efforts to carve out a leading role for themselves while trying to push for the creation of a new, hybrid collective national identity for their fellow countrymen and -women. Colonial (economic) exploitation went hand in hand with the cultural construction of colonial subjects and their Otherness which was portrayed as inferior to the identity of the European colonial elites. 27 In this process modern educational institutions played a crucial role. At the risk of belaboring the obvious the ultimate aim of colonial education was to create a class of native subordinates who were to aid the British colonial administration by acting as middle-men between the alien rulers and the natives (Carnoy, 1974; Furnivall, 1948; Nu, 1951). This is easily discernible in the educational policies articulated, most

spite of their seeming privileging of the construction of subject peoples over political and economic aspects of colonialism, Stoler and Cooper's critical synthesis of post-colonial studies recognizes the importance of the dynamic relationship between more traditional political economy approaches to the study of colonialisms and imperialisms and the more trendy cultural approaches which focus on "the culture of colonialism and its relationship to modernity" (p.4). See Stoler and Cooper (1997). Between Metropole and Colony.

27In

66 notably, by Lord Macaulay (cited in Carnoy, 1974). Macaulay wrote: "We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morales, and in intellect." However, the intended production of docile colonial subjects met with mixed results in Burma. As pointed out earlier in the chapter non-Buddhist communities and their elites proved most vulnerable to the process of what may be called "colonization of consciousness." Many Christian missionaries insisted that these non-Buddhist natives discard their local customs and adopt Christian names (Cung Liang, Hup, 1993). In due course, the Christian-convert minority communities accepted that to be educated was to be fluent in English (Ban Vick, 1995) and to be civilized was to behave like a White Man. 28 In contrast Buddhist elites from the Mon, Rakkhine, and Burman communities did not embrace this Macaulayan effort to create a new slavish identity which was built into British colonial educational process. No sooner had Burman Western-educated elites realized the cultural cost of this educational development and the ramifications it had on their Burmese Buddhist culture than they sounded an alarmist call for the revival of Buddhist culture. Under the British colonial rule, Buddhist monastic education came to be perceived as inferior (Hting Aung, 1967; Aye Kyaw, 1993). With the absence of the indigenous monarchs Buddhism was left without any patronage, and the prestige and influence of monastic institutions, the Buddhist teachings, cultures, and the Order declined significantly. 29 It was in these historical circumstances that U May Oung, one of the

28To

be fair to these Christian minorities, the colonized state of consciousness was to be found amongst some Buddhist elites as well. Some of the western-educated elites looked down on their own local customs, language, and culture. In response to the development of this "slave mentality" or "inferiority complex" such prominent nationalist writers as Thakhin Ko Daw Hmaing and Theik Pan Maung Wa, one tradition-bound and the other Oxford-educated, published cultural (and political) criticisms against this colonial phenomenon. 29In 1889-90 there were 2327 registered Buddhist educational institutions as opposed to 704 registered secular, modern schools. In 1933-34 the number of Buddhist schools had become 928 in

67 pioneering nationalists and a Cambridge-trained barrister, constructed an image of the new, modern Burman. Before an audience of Western-educated natives at the Young Men's Buddhist Association in Rangoon in 1908 May Oung (1908: 2) was reported to have spoken thus:
By the expression "The Modern Burman" he (May Oung) did not mean the native of Burma in general at the present day--it would require a whole volume to treat of him--but by modern Burman he meant the Burman who had received the not unmixed blessing of a Western education....For it was on them and those like them--on their training, acquirements, exertions--that the future of their race would in no small measure depend. On all sides they saw the ceaseless, ebbless tide of foreign civilization and learning steadily creeping over the land, and it seemed to him that unless they prepared themselves to meet it, to overcome it, and to apply it to their own needs, their national character, their institutions, their very existence as a distinct nationality would be swept away, submerged, irretrievably lost.

May Oung saw the danger of the (dominant) Buddhist national character decaying away. As he put it:
There were instances even now of Burmans who, nominally Buddhists, had no religion in their hearts... He (the author) would... rather see them followers of any faith that preached morality, than being without any religion at all, enemies to themselves, most dangerous examples to others....Thus, they saw that their Modern Burman could hardly be called a true Buddhist, and therein arose their first great calamity, a calamity which underlay and explained almost everything else. For Buddhism, with its unparalleled doctrine of selflessness (Anatta) taught them Love and Compassion, drew them into one great Brotherhood wherein one rejoiced in another's happiness and wept for another's woes, while yet preserving in his mind an even balance of feeling for his own affairs. Take away Buddhism, put nothing in its place, and they had the powerful, iniquitous god of self, untrammeled, unchecked, unhindered (pp.4-5).

These quotes which first appeared in 1908 are rather important in that they set the tone for the later development of various types of nationalism. They also suggest the ambivalence with which the Western-educated Buddhist elites embraced the project of modernization. The indigenous elites, on one hand, found it necessary or even desirable to acquire advanced technological know-how and the economically valuable knowledge such as (English) law and English language through modern schooling primarily because of the material benefits which accrued from them. On the other hand, the growing popularity and importance of this highly secularized modern schooling among their fellow local elites

contrast to 4967 secular/modern schools. See Than Htut, U (1980) Myanma Naing Ngan Hbon Daw Gyi Kyaung Tha Mai (History of Burma's Monastic Education) Rangoon: Thein Min Hlaing Press. pp.180-181.

68 became a cause for concern since the modern schooling cut Buddhist elites off their cultural and philosophical roots. In their efforts to counter what they considered negative developments in Burmese cultural politics, Buddhist elites revived the cultural notion that "to be Burmese is to be Buddhist," which gained currency amongst Buddhist communities. 30 It must be pointed out that in spite of their concerns about cultural decay and the ability of the Burmese young to cope with the various economic, cultural, and political forces acting on Buddhist communities in the country, early nationalists such as May Oung were building solidarity and alliances only within the Western-educated elites in urban areas. Many of them were wealthy urbanites, government workers, lawyers, and traders. Their wealthy, educated urban background gave their nationalist politics a distinctively bourgeois character and limited the scope of their nationalist vision. The next section examines the formation of new indigenous elites and counter-elites who were responsible for the creation of competing visions of a Burmese nation.

The Formation of Indigenous Elites and Nationalist Visions After the disappearance of the Burmese throne, the value of the traditional Buddhist monastic education diminished. Therefore monastic education lost its prestige and attraction amongst the country's Buddhist elites (Than Htut, 1981). By 1885 in British Burma (the coastal regions of Arakan and Tenasserim and other lower parts of Burma), there were British government Anglo-Vernacular schools and missionary schools. 31 Western schooling,
30The

strong cultural notion that "to be Burmese is to be Buddhist" has been part of the dominant thought system in the predominantly Buddhist Burma. Upon having heard the news that there were sporadic conversions of Burmese Buddhists into Christians, the Burman King Bagyidaw (AD 1824??) at the Court of Ava asked American Baptist missionary Dr. Adoniram Judson whether these Burmese Christian converts were still Burmese or not. Likewise U Aung Min, Judson's Burmese language teacher, considered a Burmese Christian convert a "Portugeese." See Kawlthangvuta (1983) A Brief History of the Planting and Growth of the Church in Burma. pp.144-145 31After the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-26) the Anglo-Vernacular schools were established in the southern and western seaports and administrative towns such as Moulmein (1835), Kyauk Phyu (1837), and Akrab (1844). See Than Htut (1980) The History of Buddhist Monastic Education in Burma. p. 147.

69 among other things, served as a foundational component in indigenous elite (and counterelite) formation. Gradually there emerged a class of native elites who acquired western/modern education. This group was initially made up of elite Buddhist children from Mon, Arakanese or Rakhine, and Burman communities (Burma Socialist Program Party, 1964). Many of them were co-opted into the new British colonial administration (Kyaw Thet, 1968). And a significant number of them went to India and England to complete their modern education. These Western-educated elites were to aid the colonial administration in maintaining law and order and, to a lesser extent, to fill the low level slots in European (mainly, British and Scottish) commercial firms. They formed the core of the early Buddhist Burmese nationalists (Kyaw Thet, 1968). This class of Western-educated indigenous elites was consciously refashioning itself as the group best positioned to meet the challenges of the (external) modern world. These elites constructed different visions of a Burmese nation after having interpreted the past in a selective manner and weaving the past and the present together, once again, selectively into their visions for a future nation. At about the same time Christian missionaries were training and converting the children from non-Buddhist ethnic communities such as the Karen, Chin, and Kachin. Compared to the slow conversion rate among the Buddhist peoples, a considerable number of animist Karens, especially Sgaw Karens, were receptive to the educational and proselytizing efforts by the American Baptist missionaries. 32
to the Burma Baptist Chronicle , Dr. Andoniam Judson, the first American Baptist whose missionary work in Burma began in the beginning of the 19th century, remarked, "When I laboured among the Karens at the commencement of that mission, I baptized one hundred converts, and the whole of them did not cost me as much labour as it has to bring in these two Burmans (who were recently baptized)" (Shwe Wa et al, 1963; cited in Petry: 1993: 47). See Shwe Wa, et al. (1963) Burma Baptist Chronicle. Rangoon: Baptist Convention, Board of Publications. After 15 years of labour, Dr. Judson had 15 converts among the 20 million inhabitants. See Petry (1993) The Sword of the Spirit. p. 47. The Chin missiologist Kawlthangvuta noted that the Buddhists who converted to Christianity were usually the poor ones. Even then rarely did mass conversion (i.e., a family or village) took place among the Buddhists. In contrast, the animist communities, especially the ones who lived in remote regions of the country, were receptive to missionary work. Also their animistic belief in a Creator God may help explain the readiness to embrace Creator-centered Christinity. See Kawlthangvuta (1983) A Brief History of the Planting and Growth of the Church in Burma.
32According

70 In due course the latter used select Karen converts to extend their missionary works into other non-Buddhist communities including the Chin and Kachin (Cung Lian Hup, 1993: 146). 33 Grateful to the Karen converts for their assistance (Cung Lian Hup, 1993: 147), American Baptist missionaries were sending scores of Karen males abroad for further studies (Cung Lian Hup, 1993: 169-170). It is noteworthy that the British colonial administrators were involved in the creation of the counter-elites of the Christian Karens. In his doctoral dissertation titled The Sword of the Spirit: Christians, Karens, Colonialists, and The Creation of A Nation of Burma Jeff Petry (1993: 48) notes thus:
The American converters and the British colonizers often came to work together, at times assisting and supporting one another. The missionaries, with their special linguistic skills and cultural contacts, were utilized by the British for interpret(ing) and recruitment. The British, above and beyond opening up all of Burma to missionary activity under their protection, contributed financially to the development of the educational system and the construction of hospitals and churches for the various ethnic groups who were becoming Christianized, and, at times, as we shall see, provided the missionaries and their flocks with arms and ammunition to help them put down rebellions and insurrections by the newly subjugated, resentful and vegeance-seeking Burmese. This latter was a critical contribution towards the armed Karen nationalism that was emerging between the Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars. 34

Similarly the Chin missiologist Kawlthangvuta (1983: 140) writes that "the (foreign Christian) missionaries (provided) strong leadership and soon trained Karen leaders." To further explicate, the Rev. Vinton described the successful efforts on the part of the

Unpublished Doctor of Missiology Diss. Fuller Theological Seminary. Hereafter Kawlthangvuta (1983) A Brief History of the Planting and Growth of the Church in Burma. 33Cung Lian Hup noted that during the first 10 years after Christian missionary work began amongst Chin communities, most teaching (and preaching) was done by Karen teachers. See Cung Lian Hup (1993) Innocent Pioneers and Their Triumps in Foreign Land: A Critical Look at the Work of the American Baptist Mission in the Chin Hills (1899-1966) in Burma from a Missiological Perspective. Unpublished Doctor of Theology Diss. Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago. Hereafter Cung Lian Hup (1993) Innocent Pioneers. 34As a policy, the British stayed clear of Christian missionary business in colonial India as the native Raj were by no means keen on having the missionaries amongst their subject peoples. This collaboration between Christian missionaries and the colonialists appeared to be intriguing. The British Anglican missionary Dr. John E. Marks recorded in his book Forty Years in Burma that he was always told the British Government would not sanction his missionary work in the territories still under the Burmese king precisely because it would create political tensions between the native power and the British administration. See Marks (1917) Forty Years in Burma. pp. 153-6. However, there were ample examples of the collaboration between Christian missionaries and the British colonial administrators as Petry (1993) has pointed out. See Petry (1993) The Sword of the Spirit.

71 American missionaries in enlisting Christian converts from Sgaw Karen villages to aid the British troops who were faced with the native rebellion following the annexation of the Burmese kingdom in January of 1886 (Smeaton, 1920: 14-15; cited in Petry, 1993: 107-108). Here it is instructive to quote Rev. Vinton at length who, in his letter to Donald Mackenzie Smeaton of the Bengal Civil Service dated (Rangoon, February 28, 1886), wrote:
I don't believe myself a coward or an alarmist, but I am warning Karens everywhere that the fight has not yet begun (italics original). Mr. Bernard told me he would arm the Karens in any threatened district if they would volunteer. I can put any number of Karens in the field...Every mission has promised me a levy en masse of all the able-bodied men. They all agree to refuse all pay and to fight from pure loyalty to the Queen...The strangest of all is the presence of poongyees (Buddhist monks) on the battlefield. This is unheard of in history. My Karens universally interpret this as God's sign that Buddhism is to be destroyed for ever. They say the challenge of (King) Theebaw could be answered by the English government, but the challenge of the fighting poongyees can only be taken up fitly by Karens under their own missionaries. Every village is now full of bows and arrows to keep off the dacoits between volleys of the fire arms...This is just welding the Karens into a nation, not an aggregation of clans. The heathen Karens to a man are brigading themselves under the Christians. This whole thing is doing good for the Karen. This will put virility into our Christianity (italics added).

Rev. Vinton of the American Baptist Mission in colonial Burma found sympathetic friends in the British administration. In his The Loyal Karens of Burma Donald M. Smeaton (1920: cited in Petry, 1993: 130 ) advocated granting a separate nation for the Karens under British supervision when he wrote:
Why should we not try -- if only as a political experiment--to give to the Karens a chance of growing as a nation in their own way? Why should we not try and bring their wild growth under cultivation, grafting on the ancient roots as time and experience improve our perception and increase our skill? We have here a people -- probably under a million in all--who aspire to keep their own nationality intact. Why should we not allow them and encourage them to do so? The result may be of the highest interest in the future, and cannot fail to be fraught with great benefit to the people themselves; it will strengthen British Rule and safeguard it in the times of trouble which may yet be in store for us in Burma.

Out of this process emerged ethnic counter-elites largely made up of native Christian converts from non-Buddhist communities, most notably the Sgaw Karens. 35 This was clearly disruptive to the historical power relations between the dominant Buddhist Burmans
to the Karens, the Chin and Kachin were not treated as favorably or generously by American and British missionaries. For instance, 40 years after the first Chin was converted the American Baptist Mission sent only 1 student to study abroad. See Cung Lian Hup (1993) Innocent Pioneers. pp. 169-170. Perhaps the fiercely loyal service the Karen Christian provided to the missionary mentors may help account for this favoritism towards the Christian Karens.
35Compared

72 and the Sgaw Karens, a large percentage of whom became Christian converts. Foreigneducated Christian Karens came back with their worldview broadened. Their material conditions improved. They (along with Chin and Kachin natives) now filled the rank and file of the colonial British Burma Army. These counter-elites from indigenous Christian minority communities, especially the Karen Christians, were becoming a formidable political force. While the Burman elites, especially the younger radicals, positioned themselves in direct opposition against the colonial order, the Christian Karen elites affirmed publicly their allegiance to the British (see Po, 1928). As Burma's nationalist movement was approaching its apex in 1945 the Karen National Association whose leadership was made up of Westerneducated Christian Karen elites pleaded with Her Majesty's Government for a separate Karen State. In a memorial to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Burma (dated Rangoon, September 26, 1945), the KNA leaders (see Petry, 1993: 126-131) wrote:
Over a hundred years ago, before the British ever set foot in Burma, the Burmese Kings and the Burmese people literally made slaves of the Karen, and persecuted them generally. The Karens, the Hill Tribes, therefore, had to flee or evade the Burmese whenever possible...Then came the British, not only as a Liberator, but also as a Guardian angel, maintaining Law and Order, and preserving Peace and giving Protection. Under such a benign Government, the Karens began to thrive, but still with great difficulty.... The Karens have unreservedly rendered military aid to the British crown and the Empire in all the crises ever since the British annexation of Lower Burma. In the early stage of the British occupation, crime, plunder and risings were very rampant in the country; and the Karens under the leadership of pioneer Missionaries helped considerably in suppressing crime and petty revolutions.... The National Policies of the Karens are all broadly based on holding high British Honour and Prestige, and to imbibe all that is finest in British Ideals. The events of this war (World War II), both at home and abroad, have made us stronger in these beliefs, and the Karens are, therefore, more determined to achieve their National Ideals, for these again affect our future security as a Nation.... In 1926, that is seventeen years ago, our accredited Leader Sir San Crombie Po, Kt, CBE, MD, in his book Burma and the Karens advocated the...Tenasserim Division for the Karen Country to be administered by the Karens directly under British Supervision.... Our blood-brothers, the Karens in Thailand, are more backward than we are in many ways. They are either severely left alone, or made to adopt the Thai culture, which is foreign to them... We therefore submit that they and the Areas they inhabit be put under the Special Regime so that we may together live secure and grow up as one united people.

Indeed it was a vision of the Karen nation enunciated by the Western-educated Christian Karens. One can also see how this particular Karen leadership remembered their

past under which the Karens were oppressed under Burman rule. 36

73 Contained in this vision

of a Karen Nation were the geographic boundaries for that Karen Nation and ethnic homogeneity as the foundation for their nation. Amongst the dominant Burman elites there were competing visions for the independent nation. For some of the older Thakhin nationalists such as Thakhin Ba Sein ethnicity-based (that is, Burman Buddhist) nationalism was to be the main ideological force which was assigned to forge a national identity and culture (see Sein Tin, 1988: 48-49). More broad-minded nationalists such as Aung San who came under the sway of Marxist thought created a vision of a multi-ethnic nation with socialistic ideals (see Aung San, 1971: 188-190). For instance, Aung San pointed specifically to the United States of America as a model which could be applied to in multi-ethnic Burma. 37 Quoting Stalin and Lenin, Aung San made attempts to articulate his vision of a nation during his address at the convention held at the Jubilee hall, Rangoon on May 23, 1947 (Silverstein, 1993) . In his words:
At this point I want to go into the question of Nation or Nationality, Race, Tribe, etc. Until we have a really good Burmese Dictionary we cannot translate exactly into Burmese the term Nation or Nationality. The British Nation for instance is composed of the English, Scotch, Welsh, and Northern Irish. The American Nation is made up of European races who have become Americans. Let us therefore find out what are the characteristics of a nation or nationality. The world-famed leader of the Soviet Union, M. Stalin has defined it thus: "A nation is not a racial or tribal community of people, but a community of language, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." A nation is not a racial or tribal community of people, but a community of races and tribes. Community of language alone does not constitute a nation. America and Britain speak the same language, yet they are two separate nations. In the absence of unifying factors a community with the same language may belong to a different nationality. When they are unifying factors, geographical, racial, linguistic, economic, common interest, common culture, common
36Both

some of the historians and Burman political leaders alike argued, correctly, in my opinion, that the oppression to which the peoples were subjected to under native monarchs was not ethnically motivated. During military expeditions, the monarchs recruited, at times, forcibly into their armies able-bodied men from communities, both Burman and non-Burman, which happened to be along the military routes. See Burma Socialist Program Party (1970) Amyo-myo-tha-ne Hnin Amyotha Pyinnya-ye Lhoke-sha-hmu Thamai Aa-kyin. ( A Concise History of the National Day and National Education Movement) Rangoon: Burma Socialist Program Party Headquarters. pp. 55 & 59. Hereafter Burma Socialist Program Party (1970) A Concise History of the National Day. 37Various speeches and writings by Aung San indicate clearly that he was fully cognizant of the internal problems that confronted the United States. While he was attracted to both Western liberalism and Marxism, his reception of them was not uncritical import of these ideologies to Burma. See Aung San (1946) Burma's Challenge. Rangoon: Tathettar Sarpe.

74
traditions--all of them, only then can a nation be evolved. M. Stalin also draws a distinction between Political Community and National Community (p.156).

Aung San then turned to the Burmese political scene. Here it is instructive to quote Aung San at length:
Whereas common language is an essential factor in a National Community, it is not so in a Political Community. Now, how many national communities are we going to have in Burma. Strictly speaking there can be only one. Of course, there can be distinct races and tribes within the nation. They are called national minorities. Perhaps by stretching a point we may regard the Shan States as a National Community. But there is no other national community within Burma. For instance, the Jingphaws (that is, the Kachin). They do not possess all the requisite features of a nation. Particularly for economic reasons they cannot stand as a separate nation. The Chins are a still worse case. They have no common language, taking recourse to Burmese or Hindustani where it was introduced by the British. Turn to the Karenni whose population, including Mobye, totals only about 80,000. And they have to use Burmese as a common language. Then the Karens. There are about 12 different kinds of Karens and two different principal languages. Burmese again is their lingua franca. The majority of the Shans also know Burmese, and their culture is similar in many respects to Burmese culture.... According to Lenin, "The various demands of democracy, including selfdetermination, are not absolute, but a small part of the general democratic (now general socialist) world movement. Possibly in individual concrete cases, the part may contradict teh whole; if so it must be rejected. The question of teh right of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the question whether it would be expedient for any given nation to secede at any given movement." The conclusion to be drawn from these various views is that in a community of nations there must be the right of self-determination. But this right must not be over-indulged in regardless of time and circumstances. These are points we should know concerning the term Nation and Nationality (pp.156-7).

There were also nationalists such as Thakhin Nu and his mentor Di-doke U Ba Cho who advocated making Buddhism the state religion in an independent Burma. 38 There were doctrinaire Marxist leaders such as Thakhin Soe and Thakhin Than Tun who strove to turn Burma into a Communist state. Likewise, the Shan communities on the Eastern Plateau had more than one vision for their ethnic communities (nations?). After the Annexation of Upper Burma and the Court of Mandalay, the Shan feudal rulers known as "Chaofas" negotiated political arrangements with the British and strove to preserve their power, wealth, elite (that is, feudal) culture, and

38Indeed

U Nu, who went on to become Prime Minister in independent Burma, made Buddhism state religion. The move alienated the minority leaders who were Christian and supported his leadership.

75 prestige, to the greatest extent possible. Under British colonial rule, Shan ruling houses pooled their resources together and built a special Western school modeled after the British elite school for their offspring in Taunggyi. Shan hereditary rulers held their own version of a Shan political and national community. On the other hand, the Shan commoners who came to study at Rangoon University came into contact with Marxist-influenced Burmese nationalists from the Doh-bama Asi-ayone or We, the Burmese Confederation, and became influenced by egalitarian socialist ideals. In the closing days of the British rule in Burma these Western-educated Shan commoners emerged as a political force in Shan local politics which the local feudal elites found it impossible to ignore (Burma Socialist Program Party, 1964). Before I conclude this section on elite formation and emergence of various national visions, I wish to discuss briefly continuities and ruptures in terms of society, cultures, and political communities in Burma. As in old pre-colonial Burma, Buddhism continued to be the predominant religion and the Buddhist communities the most politically potent. However, as various competing religious traditions had been established by numerically smaller but politically significant ethnic communities who forged their cultural and political identities around these new religions -- new to Burma -- more sober Burmese political leaders such as Aung San looked to various materialist and secularist ideologies such as Marxism, Socialism, and the liberalism of the West. Politically the personal nature of the exercising of sovereign power and of power relations amongst the monarchs, their administrations, and the subjects were transformed irreversibly. On the eve of independence, various elite communities had formulated their own blueprints for a future, independent Burma. Noteworthy is the fact that none of these elites --not even the most tradition-bound religious groups -- advocated the restoration of the

76 old, feudal systems of pre-colonial Burma. 39 Themselves products of both Eastern and Western political and educational traditions, especially in the case of Buddhist Burmese elites, Burma's nationalists made serious efforts to weave indigenous ideas, cultures, and traditions together with the Western ones. The country's post-independence history is, to a large extent, a history of local elites competing for the control of the government and a chance to pursue their own national blueprints or visions. As I will argue in the chapters that follow, these historical processes and transformations in Burmese society at large went on to shape the educational development of Burma. Burma under colonial rule was to witness the emergence of a new tradition, specifically in the area of schooling. I turn now to the birth of political activism in Burmese education, a radical departure from indigenous educational traditions.

Education and Campus Political Activism Twelve years after the young England-trained barrister May Oung first delivered his "the Modern Burman" lecture the National Education Movement, a grassroots effort aimed at educating the Burmese young in both Buddhist Burmese and modern educational traditions, was born out of the University Strike of 1920. 40 As early as 1917 the politically-minded
idea of restoring the old monarchical institutions was decidededly a thing of the past. It was rumored that a few traditionalists skirted with the idea of reviving the Burmese monarchy. 40Up to 1920 Burma had only two colleges, Rangoon College and Judson College. The former was run by the colonial administration and treated as a constituent college of Calcutta University in Calcutta. It was a former government high school which was upgraded and recognized as a B.A. degree college under the University of Calcutta in 1883. It was renamed Rangoon College in 1885. See Burma Socialist Program Party (1970) Concise History of the National Day. The latter was first established as a middle and high school in 1872 and upgraded to a junior college in 1901 and as a degree-college in 1916 by the American Baptist Mission Society in the United States. See Kawlthangvuta (1983) A Brief History of the Planning and Growth of the Church in Burma. p. 114 When the British colonial authorities decided to give Burma a full-fleged university the two colleges were to merge into the University of Rangoon. According to the 1920 University Act, the university was to be residential. It was to be the only one in the entire colony, admissions to be highly selective, and the fees costly. The essentially elitist nature of the University was vehemently opposed by the native students while the University Act was still debated within the colonial administration. The authorities, especially the British Governor, decided to enact the University Act of 1920 against native sentiment, and a group of 20 University students went on strike calling for the indefinite boycott of
39The

77 members of the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA), the pioneering cultural revivalist/nationalist organization founded by Western-educated Buddhist elites in 1906, protested against some aspects of colonial education such as the practice of reserving school administrator and senior instructor positions for the British nationals and other racially discriminatory practices in education (Burma Socialist Program Party, 1970: 111 & 121). But these early nationalist efforts in the form of Buddhist cultural revivalism were distant from the country's elite students. It was not until the first University Strike organized by the students in 1920 that political awakening amongst university (and, to a lesser extent, high school) students became a formidable political force in the country. The University Act of 1920 according to which the two existing intermediate colleges were to be merged and upgraded as Burma's only full-fledged residential university triggered the first student strike of national proportion. 41 From the perspective of the Burmese nationalists, the University as envisaged by the Act was highly elitist and rather expensive for the majority of the ordinary Burmese (Ba U, 1971). 42 Although the immediate cause of the first strike was the highly restricted access to the university, 43 the strike reflected a
the University. With the support of the older nationalist politicians and other segments of the indigenous Buddhist populace, they set up national schools throughout the country and a national college to deliver a hybrid education -- containing both modern/western knowledge and traditional Buddhist cultural learning. See Aye Kyaw (1993) The Voice of Young Burma. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. Hereafter Aye Kyaw (1993) The Voice of Young Burma. This is a concise English language version of his classic study of the development of national education in Burma. 41See Aye Kyaw (1993) The Voice of Young Burma. for a Burmese perspective of the University Strike. For the authoritative study on the subject, which won the National Literary Award in the early 1970s, Aye Kyaw (1970) Myanmar Naing Ngan Amyo Tha Pyin Nya Ye Tha Mai. (History of National Education in Burma). Rangoon: Pa Le Ban Sarpe.
42People

with menial jobs earned between 10-20 rupees a month while the salaries of police inspectors, clerical workers, and doctors were under 100 rupees. For a university student, the living cost and monthly tuition amounted to about 60 rupees a month. A great majority of those who completed high school simply could not go on to the university. Because of the expenses, university education was accessible only to the children of high level colonial administrators, land-owners, and other urban wealthy families. See Ko Ko Gyi, Dr. (1970) Shei-khit Hsay-kyaung-tha. (The Medical Students from the By-gone Era.) Rangoon University Fiftieth Anniversary Publication. pp. 131-143. 43For the first-hand account of the University Strike written by the leader U Ba U himself, see Ba U, U (1971) Amyotha Aung-pwe-ne. (National Victory Day.) Oway Magazine's Golden Jubilee Selections.

78 general discontent with colonial rule on the part of the dominant Buddhist elite communities. This was evidenced by the level of support and the nationalist spirit it generated among the politicized segments of the colonial society. University strikers were joined by grade school students throughout Burma (Ba U, 1971). Because it was the very first organized challenge against the British rule since the end of the "pacification" campaign, the University Strike touched a nerve in the people. In those days, it was considered rather daring even to look straight in the eyes of an Englishman (Mya Hsaung, 1970) and even the leaders of the highly influential General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA) and Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) were merely passing resolutions and sending appeals before the British colonial government in the midst of the unjust educational policies and practices up to the time of the University Strike (Ba U, 1971; Aye Kyaw, 1993). During the strike, the National Education Committee was founded which launched the National Education Movement aimed at hybridizing the existing curriculum which marginalized the dominant Buddhist culture and knowledge, and expanding educational access. Out of this was born a National University (Ba U, 1971; Aye Kyaw, 1993). The national education movement spread all over the country and national schools sprang up with support from local communities. Many of the strike leaders never resumed their studies at the University, gave up their own personal advancement in the colonial social ladder, and worked as nationalist teachers (Ba U, 1971). The nationalist leaders who later occupied the center stage in the Burmese anti-colonial independence struggle, as well as other prominent nationalist writers and thinkers were products of these national schools (Htin Aung, 1967). Furthermore, the older Burmese politicians such as M. A. U Maung Gyi who were in the
pp.9-19. In 1917 the British upgraded the provincial colonial administrations in several provinces in India. Burma was denied this administrative upgrade on the grounds that Burma as a colonial province did not even have 400 college graduates. Against this background, restricted slots in the new University of Rangoon became a highly charged nationalist issue among the student strikers, according to U Ba U.

79 colonial administration were sympathetic to the movement, and made attempts to provide the movement with financial assistance (Aye Kyaw, 1993). Whether or not to receive the money from the colonial government fractured the leadership of the movement. Although the movement faded away within a few years, there remained a number of national schools throughout the country and, more importantly, it had stirred up nationalist sentiment among the public (Ba U, 1971). The University Strike of 1920 -- known in modern Burmese history as the First Student Strike -- not only marked the celebrated entry of the country's elite students into national politics but it was also the forerunner of the radicalism which was to find its way amongst Burma's college students. 44 The strike was to have a profound and lasting impact on the country's dominant educational/cultural tradition. The fact that Burma celebrates the date of the University Strike as the Burmese National Day indicates the significance that Burmese society attaches to the political involvement of its students (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976). A new politico-cultural component in education, that is, "political activism," was introduced for the first time in the entire Buddhist educational history of Burma. In the following section I will examine the radicalization of Burmese nationalism and nationalist tactics.

The Radicalization of Burmese Nationalism: A Blueprint for the Burmese Nation?

44Once

again in 1934-35 Burmese students appealed the University authorities to reduce school fees, but their appeals were not heeded by the authorities. From the 1930's on, new crops of radical student leaders replaced the pro-British elements within the Rangoon University Student Union (RUSU) leadership and transformed the character of the Union. In February 1936 when the University authorities expelled Ko Nu and Ko Aung San, President and Secretary of Rangoon University Student Union respectively, for having openly criticized the pro-British university, 700 students (out of the total of 800 from University College and 300 from Judson College) boycotted the University (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976).

80 Radical nationalists of the 1930's generation who were influenced by Marxist and other revolutionary ideologies did not think much of the earlier efforts of Burmese pioneering nationalists such as May Oung. 45 In the eyes of the younger generation of nationalists, the older nationalist leaders were "England-returnees, the sons and daughters of the national bourgeoisie who did not pay attention to the plight of working classes and the peasantry" (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 121). All that these local elites wanted was to take the powerful positions then occupied by Indians and the British. Economically, they wanted to take charge of the businesses which were in the monopolistic hands of the British capitalists, and the Chinese and Indian merchants. "Their highest nationalist aim was to demand Home Rule within the British Empire" (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 121). Informed first by a mixture of Nietzschean perspective on power and Gandhian non violence ideals Western-educated nationalist elites, mostly young men from Rangoon University and Mandalay College, began to be radicalized in their nationalist thought and tactics (Nyo Mya, 1971). They re-appropriated the prefix Thakhin, the Burmese equivalent of Sahib which was then reserved for the British colonialists in Burma and addressed themselves as Thakhin or Master in order to evoke the feeling that it was they, not the British, who were the masters of the Burmese nation. The well-known nationalist writer Nyo Mya (1971) remarked that addressing every nationalist as Thakhin or Thakhinma was meant to erase the traditional status of age, wealth, social influence, and power and instill an egalitarian attitude in the members of the We, the Burmese Confederation. They were united under the Do-bama Asi-ayone or "We, the Burmese Confederation" 46 which was founded by
Ba Pe, one of the most prominent nationalists and founder of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, reminded the radical nationalist agitators from the younger generations that at the turn of the century the pioneering nationalists had to clear the political jungle and chart their own course. He emphasized correctly that the younger ones, either knowingly or unknowingly, were standing on the shoulders of the nationalists from the bygone eras. 46The founding members of the confederation that gave life to militant nationalism argued that the word "Bama" was more inclusive than the nasal-sounding "Myanmar." See Dobama Asi-ayone (1976) History of We, the Burmese Confederation. Rangoon. p133.
45Bagyi

81 a small group of Rangoon University students and instructors including Buddhists and Muslims (Nyo Mya, 1971). The original Doh-bama ideology was culture- and race-based and it was not influenced by Marxist, class-struggle perspectives. The first Dohbama ideological document opened with slogans intended to remind all Burmese that "Burma was for the Burmese" (Khin Yi, 1988: 1). In the preamble of its draft constitution the aim of the Confederation was spelled out thus:
Do-bama or We, the Burmese Confederation is intended to build solidarity, equality, and unity among all the indigenous nationalities in Burma, those who have indigenous blood (in them), and those who cherish and promote the interests and the well-being of the Burmese nation in accordance with the vision and ideology of the Do-boma (Khin Yi, 1988: 82; italics added).

The ultimate goal was defined as complete independence and in order to achieve that goal the confederation pledged to resort to "all just means" (Khin Yi, 1988: 88). This was a radical break from cultural revivalist politics of the Young Men's Buddhist Association. The national visions were no longer concealed in cultural rhetoric. Rather they became decidedly political as the Thakhin's call for Burma's independence indicated clearly. In Chapter I of its constitution (draft) it also demarcated Burma as a geo-national entity as follows:
The boundaries of the Do-bama Asi-ayone are as follows: on the north lies China, on the east Siam, on the south the Bay of Bengal, on the west part of the Indian Ocean and Assam, Manipur, and India (Khin Yi, 1988: 88).

It is evident that Do-bama Asi-ayone leaders were thinking of their Asi-ayone as a (Burmese) Nation. In addition to the village and township administrative units within the said boundaries, the Do-bama Asi-ayone was the confederation to which would belong other states and territorial units excluded (from Burma) in accordance with the new 1935 the Government of Burma Act (Khin Yi, 1988: 88). Readers should be reminded that the Christian Karen elites from the Karen Central Organization also delineated their geographic boundaries for a separate nation (Petry, 1993).

82 After the arrival and spread of Marxist and other materialist ideas among the indigenous elites in the late 1920's and '30s Burmese nationalism was re-articulated using various strands of political thought (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 168). 47 Although not everyone became Communist or Socialist, Marxist thought was becoming a dominant theoretical guide for these young leaders and agitators (Tin Htway, 1972: 24-28). 48 Indeed these new developments indicated a radical departure from the gentleman's affair or Constitutional politics of the hopeful reformists whose highest aim was Home Rule. Unlike their gentlemanly counterparts a generation ago the new radical nationalists highlighted in their speeches and writings the inadequacy of Buddhist philosophy and practices in countering the colonial domination (Khin Yi, 1988). In the following section I discuss the way in which nationalist radicals sought to extend their political radicalism to the country's cultural terrain.
47.

John S. Furnivall and other respectable Burmese academics such as U Pe Maung Tin and U Set founded the Burma Book Club through which imported leftist writings from London's Leftist circles were made available to the young nationalists. See Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 168. Thakhin Nu and his colleagues also formed another book club called Nagani or Red Dragon which published hundreds of translated works of the world's revolutionary literature. According to Tun Pe, there were a few more sources. Before the leader of the peasant revolt Saya San was hanged Tun Pe persuaded the former to donate the royalties of his (i.e., Saya San's) Burmese language book titled Signs of Diseases for the establishment a library. With the royalties in the amount of 300 rupees (about $100 at the time) Tun Pe bought books recommended in Pandit Nehrus Impressions of Soviet Russia including Das Kapital, The State, and Revolution and Counterrevolution. The books were very popular among the young nationalists and the ideologies contained in them found popular expression during public gatherings. In 1932 the second set of Marxist writings was brought back by Dr. Thein Maung, from his trip to England to attend the London Roundtable Conference on the future of Burma. See Tun Pe (1949) Sun Over Burma. Rangoon. p.34. Among the works published were Dr. Sun Yat Sen's San Man Chu, the Sinn Fein Movement writings, Karl Marx's works including Das Capital, John Strachey's Theory and Practice of Socialism, and Palme Dutt's World Politics.
48Literature

came to play a crucial role in spreading the historical consciousness among the literate Burmese populace. U Tin Htway argued that the emergence of a mass reading public was a turning point in the history of Burmese literature in the sense that "literature was no longer the preserve of a handful of learned scholars, but was available to anyone with very little money to spare" (Tin Htaw, 1972: 22). A similar observation was made by the American political scientist Benedict Anderson (1991) in his book "Imagined Communities." See Anderson, Benedict (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. (first published in 1983).

83 Cultural Politics of the Doh-bama Asi-ayone: The Creation of a Selective Tradition Culturally these Doh-bama leaders and ideologues however, were not that different from the early cultural revivalists (for instance, May Oung) who wished to revive and elevate Buddhist cultures and education. Their publications known as the "Nation Building Tract series" were filled with a heavy doze of patriotism (Khin Yi, 1988). The most popular Doh bama slogan reads thus: Burma is our nation.
Burmese is our literature.
Love our nation.
Cherish our literature.
Respect our language.
What distinguished these Doh-bama nationalists from the cultural revivalists of the YMBA and GCBA generation however, was the fact that the Doh-bama nationalists not only broadened the popular political vision and radicalized their oppositional tactics, but they also advocated the radical re-working of the dominant Buddhist culture. They called for the secularization of the dominant culture and incorporation of modern science into popular thought. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the new crop of nationalists included not merely Buddhists but other non-Buddhist individuals such as Burma-born Muslims. Hence the new version of Burmese nationalism was devoid of any overarching religious theme. The Doh-bama ideology as contained in the Doh-bama National Building Tract series represents the most comprehensive effort on the part of the new crop of Western-educated elites. They were also versed enough in the dominant Buddhist cultural tradition and history to weave together multiple worldviews. Through popular songs and various literary genres including plays (Tin Htwe, 1972), they popularized the Doh-bama ideology. They incorporated both myths and historical facts from Burma's past selectively while having propounded the virtues of modern scientific knowledge. They openly privileged science over Buddhist prayers and other cultural teachings precisely because the prayers and

84 observance of traditions would not help make the Burmese nation a rich and powerful one, one that could defend itself against alien (political) domination and economic exploitation. The birth of the Doh-bama ideology may be considered the culmination of the efforts of successive generations of the Western-educated indigenous elites, especially from the dominant Buddhist communities, to search for a comprehensive national ideology and vision for a modern nation. It was indeed ideological hybridization at its best. As will be seen in Chapter 4 on the educational policies of the Burma Socialist Program Party government, the Doh-bama ideology left a profound impact on the cultural and educational policies under various nationalist leaderships in independent Burma, be they educational policies with specific focus on the language of instruction and curricular content or the adoption of general socialist economic measures.

Buddhism, Marxism, and Nationalism: Strange Bed-fellows? Within the first 8 years, the Do-bama ideology evolved and crystalized as an essentially Marxist-guided nationalism (Do-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 168). To be sure, there were various types of nationalist ideologues -- both left and right -- who competed for the political control and the ideological dominance of the Doh-bama organization (Doh-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 282-308). However, with the entry of Marxist-inspired student leaders such as Aung San, Nu, Ba Hein, and Than Htun the Doh-bama ideology became essentially a Marxist national ideology. While a handful of these young intellectuals translated various progressive and radical ideas into Burmese 49 many of their fellow Thakhins read the translated versions of Marxism, Socialism, and other progressive ideas published by the Nagani or Red Dragon Book Club (Doh-bama Asi-ayone, 1976: 168). Not only urbanite students, but also members of the Doh-bama from the oil fields, mostly concentrated in the
a good historical analysis on the subject of popularization of modern political thoughts in Burma, see Badgley, John (1969 August) Intellectuals and the National Vision: The Burmese Case. Asian Survey 9: 8, 598-613.
49For

85 Upper Burma, became exposed to the Doh-bama idealogy as many student organizers went to various regions with a heavy labor concentration. In this new ideological version, capitalism and colonialism were treated as the two sides of the same coin. Here a brief detour may be of help in order to mention the class- and race-based nature of colonial society. In a highly pluralistic colonial society, the indigenous peoples of all ethnic backgrounds occupied the bottom. 50 Even there they found themselves in competition with imported cheap Indian laborers. The middle level slots were filled by immigrant Chinese and Indian merchants, traders, absentee landlords, and grocessors while at the top were European and British colonial administrators and capitalists (Furnivall, 1948). The new tone of nationalism was militant. They began addressing class and labor issues. The Burmese folklorist and nationalist writer Maung Htin Aung (1967) who was slightly senior to many of the prominent nationalists observed:
Like the masses, these young men were definitely of the opinion that only a revolution could bring freedom back to their nation. They had entered the university from national schools, where they had especially studied Burmese history and literature, and they found the university to be too pro-British (pp.294-295).

Many nationalist student leaders left the University (of Rangoon) in order to devote themselves to Burma's struggle for independence. Prominent student leaders were Thakhin Nu, Thakhin Kyaw Nyein, Thakhin Ba Swe, Thakhin Ba Hein, Thakhin Thein Pe, Thakhin Hla Shwe, and Thakhin Aung San. These ex-student leaders occupied leadership positions in the Do-Bama Asi-ayone in the 1930's and 40's and led the country to independence eventually.

50Robert

Taylor (1995) has pointed out that Furnivall's use of the key concept "plural society" in reference to colonial Burma has a meaning significantly different from that used by contemporary Western social science. Plural society in the Furnivallian sense does not concern about an electoral system or "ideologically celebrating human diversity." Rather it is first and foremost about economics. Furnivall's concept of plural society developed out of his analysis of the "imposition of liberal capitalism upon a defenceless traditional society in the 19th century, with the quick and unintended consequences thereof" (p.52)." See Taylor, R. (1995) Disaster or Release?: J.S. Furnivall and the Bankruptcy of Burma. Modern Asian Studies 29: 1, 45-63.

86 To this newly emerging class of radical nationalists, the class location of the older nationalists, most of whom were lawyers and wealthy individuals, was something to be denounced and discarded. 51 Whereas many "hopeful reformists" looked down upon this new crop of radical nationalists, some of the older generation nationalists with more progressive political ideas welcomed the militant tone and radical position of these Marxist-intellectuals. When the 1930 Peasant Armed Rebellion against British rule broke out, whereas the older generation Burmese nationalists were embarrassed and distanced themselves from it accordingly the radical students from Rangoon University applauded the courage of the peasants' actions and endorsed the rebellion in the form of a Student Union resolution (Thein Pe Myint, 1970). In 1938 local members of the Do-Bama Asi-ayone in the upper Burma oil fields organized labor strikes against the British firm "Burmah Oil Company" (BOC), the single largest employer of labor in Burma, for its unfair treatment, extremely poor living conditions, and chronic lay-offs, among other things. 52 From this workers' strike emerged anti-British mass protest, the largest political upheaval in the history of colonial Burma, known as "The (Burmese) Year 1, 300 Revolt" (Doh-bama Asi-ayone, 1976). The revolt spread to diverse geographical regions such as Chin Hill, Kachin, Rakhine, Beik, and Margue and more than 2 million people participated in it. It was a mass movement supported and endorsed by people from all walks of life including those who worked in

51Aung San recognized his own bourgeoise roots and admitted that bourgeoise class location often made the young college-educated nationalists waver in their revolutionary activities. See Aung San (1946) Burma's Challenge. Rangoon. 52Using official colonial reports such as the Report of the Oil Fields Labour Inquiry Committee published in 1941, the Japanese scholar Teruko Saito argues that the labor policy of the British oil firm was benevolent. However, Saito also writes that, for instance, the educational facilities were created by the BOC not to promote education of the children of the oil workers, but to train artisans and laborers for employment in their firm. Even the brightest children could not aspire to seek employment outside the oil industry nor could they pursue higher education. There was also a very rigid caste system created by the British in the oil fields. Even the American engineers who worked under the British there were not treated as equals. See Saito, T. (1996 November) Labour Issues in Mining Industry in Burma: A Historical Review. Asian Studies Review. 20: 2, 121-142.

87 British homes as cooks, gardeners, drivers, etc. (Doh-bama Asi-ayone, 1976). During the popular strike known as "The Burmese Year 1,300 Revolt," Thakhin student leaders moved into the labor movement and soon took over the leadership and gave it a socialistic orientation (p.26). In the judgment of the American scholar Frank Trager (1965), the Thakhin leaders achieved what no one else had been able to do in the nationalist struggle in Burma -- "a viable anti-British political instrument with its roots in something resembling a unified mass base of trade unions and related peasant organizations." A generation ago pioneering nationalists such as May Oung re-constructed the "true" Burmeseness to be synonymous with being Buddhist. In the skillful hands of Marxistinspired nationalists the "true" Burmese became not only Buddhist but also Marxist. The two synonymous elements -- anti-capitalism and anti-colonialism -- were integrated into the existing notion of Burmeseness. This discursive construction of a new type of "Burmese nationalist" was made possible by a number of factors. The historical experiences on the part of the dominant Burmese, Rakhine, Shan, and Mon of having been the most economically exploited under the alien colonial rule helped cement the marriage between anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. Philosophically, atheistic Buddhist intellectual tradition allowed the hybridization between modernist philosophy such as Marxism and the dominant Buddhist philosophy. Equally important, the communalistic nature of Burmese Buddhist communities played a role in the spread of Marxist thought. The Burmese psychologist Sein Tu wrote that "(w)hile this great popularity of leftist doctrines in the country may be in large part attributed to the reaction against colonialistic imperialism and foreign economic exploitation and control, we should not forget that the communalism of traditional values and attitudes also provided a fertile soil on which these ideologies could take easy roots and flourish" (p.7).

88 Even after Burma regained her independence in 1948 leftist radicals and politicians attempted to wed Buddhism which is an atheistic 53 philosophy of relations and Marxism (see Ba Swe, 1955: 27-29; King, 1964: 114-115). U Ba Swe (1955), a leading Burmese socialist and Deputy Prime Minister, advanced his view on the compatibility of Scientific Materialism and Buddhism when he writes:
Marxist philosophy rejects only creation-centered faiths. It does not oppose religion. Specifically Marxism and Buddhism are not incompatible. They are of the same nature. However, if we are to separate the two, Marxist philosophy occupies the lower plane and Buddhist philosophy the higher. Marxist philosophy applies to this mundane world (i.e, lawki) . It provides material fulfillment. Buddhist philosophy is concerned more with other (i.e., higher) worlds (i.e., lawkuttara). It leads to final liberation from the cycles of life. Furthermore, these two philosophies are interelated... (p.28).

Karl Marx was adopted as one of the disciples of the Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism. The interweaving of western materialist philosophies such as Marxism and Buddhism is made possible by a number of factors. As mentioned earlier, Buddhist categorization of different kinds of knowledge as universal and conditional truths, each useful in their own ways and for different goals, allowed the integration of Marxism into popular Burmese nationalism. In addition, Buddhist epistemology which expects transformation of the individual in the process of knowing, or more accurately, of realization comes close to ameliorative ideologies such as Marxism. It is instructive to quote King (1964) who explains thus:
(Buddhist) realization (that is, knowing) is therefore no mere matter of book-learning. Even the Theravadins, who so highly prize scriptural memorization, strongly insist that true knowledge is gained by "practice," not mere scholarship....Is there then any value at all in scholarly learning for the religious life? Considerable. It provides an orthodox framework for experience; for Theravadins distrust such Buddhist developments as Zen where the almost total emphasis is upon immediate experience (p. 26).

In their efforts to alleviate (and ultimately end) sufferings, Burmese Buddhist communities recognize a clearly defined role for the exemplary Buddhist practitioner or monk-educator.

53While

Buddhism rejects theism, the gods "were not denied, but put in their place--which was one of complete subordination and discipleship to the Buddhas" (p. 15). See King, Winston L. (1964) A Thousand Lives Away: Buddhism in Contemporary Burma. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hereafter King (1964) A Thousand Lives Away.

89 The guide, the teacher, the mentor, has a special role in the dominant Buddhist culture as it celebrates teaching or the act of guiding toward enlightenment and holds them in high esteem. This line of thinking may, in part, account for the readiness on the part of the Buddhist majority to accept a particular brand of Marxist ideology which endorsed the leading role of intellectuals as the vanguard of Marxist revolution. Also in a primarily agricultural country where a relatively small percentage of its citizenry obtained modern education, specifically higher education, college educated elites often positioned themselves as the vanguard of various social movements. Indeed these university- and urban-based nationalists did go to various parts of the country to organize and assume leadership each time there was a labor strike. It was clearly problematic for the Marxist intellectual elites to assume leadership positions in various labor and other anti-colonial and anti-capitalist strikes, to be sure. Nonetheless, their efforts to reach out to the laborers and, to a lesser extent, peasants, and build solidarity with the non-elite political communities represents a significant development in Burma's nationalist political movements and later proved fruitful. While the older "gentlemen nationalists" with their strong attachment to their urban bourgeois culture were unable to broaden the scope of their political struggle against the British colonial power, the new generation of nationalists had effectively built a broad-based political movement cutting across ethnic and class lines. The latter were very critical of their own bourgeois roots and class location. As Marxist and other progressive ideas began to take roots and spread among various anti-colonial communities in Burma, there developed a closer cooperation amongst the younger nationalists from various ethnic communities. On the eve of the country's independence, ethnic relations were beginning to improve primarily due to Aung San's fairness in handling the issue of ethnicity and future power relations amongst the constituent

90 states of the Union of Burma. In the words of the American political scientist Josef Silverstein (1993: 13):
One of the most important parts of Aung San's intellectual legacy is his stand on the question of national unity. He was trusted by the minorities because he was fair and had a clear view of their rights and place in the Union of Burma. His ideas provide an important guidepost for Burmese seeking a permanent answer to the vexing problem of majority-minority relations.

Before he could fully realize his national vision of a viable, genuine federal unoon of Burma Aung San was assassinated by an old politician who served in the pre-WWII British colonial administration on July 19, 1947. The final section that follows examines the political developments in post-independence Burma which eventually led to the coup of 1962 and the concomitant socialist revolution by the Burma Socialist Program Party government of General Ne Win.

Independence, Internal Strife, and the End of the Parliamentary Democracy Rule in Burma Earlier in the chapter I discussed the formation of elites and counter-elites and various visions for an independent Burma. Throughout the nationalist struggle these elites and counter-elites formed strategic alliances, often out of pragmatism. Often they had a common enemy to unite against. Such factors as generational differences, class location, ideological orientation, ethnicity, religion, and so on without a doubt made it difficult for any nationalist leadership to build a genuine solidarity amongst various elite groups. As the country's struggle for independence was approaching its final phase nationalists with competing visions began to work toward the control of political power and pushed their own visions and agendas. After World War II, U Aung San, who was known as a pragmatist with socialistic views, emerged as the most popular leader in Burma. Aung San at the time was the leader of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), the largest political coalition made up of such diverse political groups as Burmese Communists and rightists, and some ethnic political groups (for instance, the Karen Youth Organization). Through his skillful

91 leadership and integrity U Aung San had won over the majority of the ethnic leaders whose respect he enjoyed. As a staunch advocate of the separation of church and state, Aung San offered a strictly secularist socialistic blueprint for independent Burma (Aung San, 1946). During the last two years of his life as the most important political leader in Burma, in spite of his Marxist-oriented view, Aung San advocated a mixed economic system for independent Burma. Aung San (1946: 154) wrote:
...however anxious we may be to set up socialism in our country, her present economic position is such that socialization at the present state is by no means possible.... We will still have to countenance capitalist enterprises. Naturally, then, there will be a certain amount of proprietorship and private enterprise, but where we can we must control and restrict the operations of such enterprises in the interests of the community... This economic plan... although not entirely free of capitalism, is not capitalist. Neither does it attain to socialisation. It is somewhere betwixt and between. I should call it a New Democracy.... The idea of a New Democracy is that in each instance of a clash between conflicting interests, the State will be on the side of the poor masses on ineluctable principle.

Subsequent to the assassination of Aung San the transfer of power from Britain to Burmese nationalist leadership took place as scheduled and peacefully. On January 4, 1948 Burma joined the world's community as a newly independent nation. Various elite and counter-elite groups decided to pursue their own visions either for Burma as an entire nation (as in the case of Burmese Communists) or for their own ethnic communities (as in the case of the Karen nationalists). This was despite the fact that Burma opted for parliamentary democracy which would have allowed resolving any political issues through peaceful and constitutional means. 54 For two years immediately after independence in 1948 the country was engulfed in a multi-color armed insurgency. At one point, the Nu government was called derisively as the "Rangoon government" as the rest of the country was effectively
54As

a matter of fact as early as November of 1946 the Burmese Communist Party was expelled from the nationalist coalition "Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League" or AFPFL on the grounds that the communist leadership was manuevering for power in independent Burma by any means. See Aung San (1971) Bogyoke Aung San E Mein Hkon Mya (Collected Speechs of General Aung San 1945-47). Rangoon: Sar Pe Beik Men. pp. 143-145. After Aung San's death, the Communist leaders such as Than Tun and the AFPFL leadership attempted to reconcile and forge an alliance, but it did not come to fruitions. See San Nyein & Myint Kyi (1991) 1958-1962 Myanmar Naing Ngan Ye. (Burmese Politics 1958-62). Rangoon: Universities Press. pp.71-73.

92 under Communists and Karen separatists led the Karen National Union (KNU) and its military wing Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO). Even the army regular units mutinied and went underground as they came under the sway of their ethnic and Communist colleagues (San Nyein and Myint Kyi, 1991: 74-99). By early 1951 PM U Nu's government reestablished its control firmly over the key administrative regions and insurgency was weakened considerably. During those turbulent years following the country's independence the minority leaders, especially the Kachin, Rakhine, Shan, and Chin stood by U Nu at the height of armed revolts by the underground Communists and the secession-minded Karen National Union. Noteworthy is the fact that nearly half of the government troops which made up Burma Rifles 2 and 3 mutinied as their commanding officers joined the armed Communists (San Nyein and Myint Kyi, 1991: 83). General Ne Win who at the time was the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces remained loyal to PM U Nu. During those turbulent years, Prime Minister Nu appointed General Ne Win Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and Minister of Home Affairs (San Nyein and Myint Kyi, 1991: 105-106). Whereas the possibilities of Communist takeover and KNU secession were thwarted successfully the ideological split within the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League itself began to surface and weakened the AFPFL. After the expulsion of the Communist Party by Aung San in November 1946, the AFPFL was dominated by the leaders of the Socialist Party, a majority of whom were in fact social democrats. As early as January 1948 the social democrats within the Socialist Party had out-maneuvered their more Marxist colleagues within the party (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 100-102). This ideological and political strife within and without the ruling AFPFL government had ramifications on student political activism on campuses across the country (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 134-136). Both above- and underground Communists, and social democrats from the Socialist Party were actively involved in recruiting students and soliciting their support for their parties by

93 various means. The leaders of the Democratic Students' Organization were known to be close to Burmese Social Democrats such as Kyaw Nyein from the ruling AFPFL whereas Progressive Student Force which dominated campus political activism was controlled by Communist students (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 135-136). In addition to the ideological struggles within the ruling AFPFL, tension developed amongst the top leaders, notably, between PM U Nu and Deputy Prime Minister U Kyaw Nyein over various issues including the style of governance, political appointments, corruption, distribution of duties and portfolios, etc (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 136 138). In April 1958 (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 169), the AFPFL leadership split up into two main factions, AFPFL (Clean) led by PM U Nu and AFPFL (Stable) led by his deputies Baw Swe and Kyaw Nyein. The split of the ruling coalition was seized upon by ethnic leaders, the above-ground Communist groups, and rightist elements who put forth various demands before the leaders of the two factions. The country's political situation was to result in the growing influence and political clout of military leaders such as General Ne Win and his deputies. To further explicate, the developments within the realm of Burma's parliamentary politics caused serious concerns among the leaders of the country's armed forces. To these military leaders the most important was the issue of secession. Burma's Constitution drafted on the eve of independence in 1947 guaranteed the rights of secession to the Shan minority 55 after 10 years of independence had passed. According to Colonel Chit Myaing (1994) who was the area commander in charge of Burma Army troops in Shan State in 1950s, as early as 1953 the leaders of Burma's military were determined to thwart the secessionist efforts by the Shan leaders by any means necessary should it ever become a real issue. In the judgment of the generals civilian government had been unable to develop political stability and national unity
Shan, Chin, and Kachin were signatories of the historic Pang Long Agreement according to which these ethnic groups pledged to build a federal union with the majority Burmans. The Chin and Kachin decided to forego their rights in lieu of other political gains.
55The

94 as evidenced by the fact that Nu's government only narrowly defeated the non-confidence motion made by its rival AFPFL (Stable) faction in June 9, 1958 (San Nyein & Myint Kyi, 1991: 237-238). In addition, civilian politicians were becoming corrupt and power-hungry (Chit Myaing, 1994). As a result in October 28, 1958 a group of military leaders led by General Ne Win stepped in and pressured successfully Prime Minister U Nu to transfer power to the former. U Nu conceded to their demands, made the first coup look a constitutional transfer and helped legitimize the establishment of the Caretaker Government with General Ne Win as Prime Minister. On his part the General promised to create political stability and hold elections within 6 months so that power could be transferred back to a civilian government as envisaged by the Constitution. In the mean time civilian parties began consolidating their political bases and campaigning for the multi-party elections. In 1961 elections were held and the AFPFL (Clean) under U Nu's leadership won in a landslide against the AFPFL (Stable). During his election campaign U Nu made a campaign promise to make Buddhism as the state religion. This was in direct contradiction with the purely secularist vision for an independent Burma. 56 At this point, U Nu had already abandoned Marxism and turned conservative. He distanced himself from the proCommunist National Unity Party, promised non-interference with the promotion of commercial interests, and reiterated his pledges made in 1958 that he would allow the founding of autonomous Mon and Rakhine states. Moreover he made further concessions of self-rule for the Shans and the Kachins (Walinsky, 1969: 345). The election results disappointed the army leadership which rooted for the AFPFL (Stable) led by social democrats such as Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe. When U Nu formed his
56As

a matter of fact Burma's 1947 Constitution already recognized a special place for the predominant religion--Buddhism, but it fell short of formaly granting it state religion status. For a good discussion of the issue of religion in formulating the Constitution of Burma see Kyaw Win et al. (1991) Myanmar Naing Ngan Ye (1958-62) { Burmese Politics (1958-62)} Volume III. Rangoon: Universities Press. pp. 78-83.

95 new government under the name of the "Union Party" government the military leaders stood watching in the wings (Walinsky, 1969: 345). Premier U Nu found himself on the defensive when pressed by his diverse constituencies to honor his campaign pledges. The issue of "Buddhism as state religion" became highly controversial. Having ignored the advice from the secularist army leaders, U Nu went ahead to run on a Buddhism as state religion platform (Cady, 1966), which created serious dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities whose were largely Christian. Additionally, minority groups pressured PM U Nu to fulfill his elections pledge of a larger measure of autonomy within the Union (Walinsky, 1969: 345). As far as the leaders of the Armed Forces were concerned U Nu was too lenient and too soft in his response to these crucial demands by his various parliamentary followings. When the Shan leaders led the efforts to discuss the establishment of Burma as a genuinely federal state as opposed to the current structure which was federal only in name and unitary in effect (Law Yone, 1975), the military leaders decided that it was time for them to intervene in this unpredictable political process. Besides, the military leaders wanted to strip the Chinese and Indian traders of the economic power as the former dominated the post colonial Burmese economy. On March 2, 1962, the second day of the Federal Seminar initiated by the Shan and held in Rangoon, General Ne Win and a group of military leaders led an almost bloodless coup (Mya Han & Thein Hlaing, 1991: 219-220). 57 Brigadier Aung Gyi, the second in command, justified the coup during the two press conferences held in March 7 & 9, 1962 following the coup (Mya Han & Thein Hlaing, 1991: 223-226). Here it is instructive to quote Brigadier Aung Gyi at length:
Generally speaking military coups are rooted in political and economic conditions (of a given country). In the case of our country we were prompted to carry out the coup by a combination of economic, political, and religious issues, and finally the issue of federalism. We were by no means motivated by the desire for political power. This is evidenced by the fact that we transferred power back to the election-winning party two years ago.

was only one casuality during the coup operation. The youngest son of Sao Shwe Thaik, the first President of the Union of Burma and a prominent federalist, was killed in a pre-dawn seige of their government residence in Rangoon.

57There

96
The main reason for our taking over the control of the government is because of this federal issue. We are a small country. And as such we can not afford to let the country disintegrate into smaller nations. It is true that our Constitution included the right of secession (for certain groups such as the Shan). Look at England. Scotland has entertained secession for the past 100 years. But England and Scotland are still united. By contrast in our country secessionist voices were getting increasingly loud within the past 15 years since independence. Look at our neighboring countries such as Laos and Vietnam. We all know what is going on there. We are not prepared to let similar things happen to our country. The coup is not really about whether democracy worked in Burma or not. But it's about preventing disintegration of our country. Had the civilian government (of U Nu) handled the issues firmly in the first place things would not have become this messy. While the government on its part was showing its broad-mindedness, the minorities adopted a more and more narrow-minded ethno-nationalist stance. If we allowed the Federal Seminar to complete, upon its completion Burma was going to be in a 1948 situation (where the government was engulfed in a series of armed conflicts with various political groups).

The coup of 1962 brought an end to Burma's experiment with parliamentary democracy system and struck an effective blow to the open contestation over different national visions. The coup group headed by General Ne Win formed the Revolutionary Council as the new government with its 17-member cabinet, all of whom were soldiers, and ushered in a new era in Burma. Convinced that the political developments of the country under successive civilian rulers since independence had deviated from the path Aung San had articulated for an independent Burma the Revolutionary Council government or (RC) declared that it would steer the country in accord with Aung San's nationalist vision for Burma. 58 In the renewed project of establishing a Burmese nation as envisaged by the most revered nationalist leader Aung San, education was assigned an important role. In its policy declaration "the Burmese Way to Socialism" (hereafter The Burmese Way) the RC government enunciated its educational policy thus:

has been argued by both Burmese dissident scholars in exile, and former close associates and subordinates of General Ne Win that there were high ranking officers and commanders who felt that they could govern the country better than the civilian political leaders. Although the desire for political power was a very strong motivating factor behind the coup of 1962 it alone does not account for the coup and the BSPP revolution. I find it hardly convincing that "will to power" was the only reason behind the generals' actions. They had their own nationalist visisons -- however short sighted and destructive, in the long run, it must have been--which they wished to realize. For a typical "will to power" argument, see Aung Khin, Dr. (June 14, 1998) So-shei-lit Lanzin (Socialist Path) Voice of Burma p. 16. Also Chit Myaing, Former Colonel (1994) Audio-tape recorded interview. Potomac, Washington, DC.

58It

97
The Revolutionary Council believes that the existing education system unequated with livelihood will have to be transformed. An educational system equated with livelihood and based on socialistic moral value will be brought about. Science will be given precedence in education (p.6).

In Chapter 4 I will take a critical look at the educational policies of the Revolutionary Council government (and later the Burma Socialist Program Party government).

98 Chapter Four
SOCIALIST EDUCATION REFORMS (1962-88)

The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.

--Louis Brandeis, United States Supreme Court Justice During the 26 years rule of the Burma Socialist Program Party government, educational reforms were carried out in the larger context of the top-down socialist revolution initiated by General Ne Win and his lieutenants. In a multi-ethnic society with many different languages, cultures, traditions, and political histories, these reforms were aimed at helping to reconfigure Burma's national culture, identity, economy, and polity in accord with the socialistic, nationalistic vision of the BSPP regime. Precisely because the reformers resorted to anti-democratic measures in both formulating and implementing these reforms various members of the educational community--high level educational bureaucrats, educators, and students--resisted, manipulated, hijacked, and accommodated these reforms at all levels. This chapter takes a critical look at the educational policies articulated by the BSPP government during its authoritarian rule from 1962-88. The first part of the chapter examines the ideological components of these policies and locates them in the country's historical context. In doing so I attempt to touch upon the interface between educational policies and economic and political goals of the BSPP regime. Throughout the chapter special attention is paid to the official policy rhetoric contained in the policy documents, speeches by high ranking officials in the Ministry of Education and the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and educational laws, as well as other governmental publications. It is important to understand both the educational vision of the military leaders (and their civilian lieutenants) and the rationales behind the educational initiatives they launched. The focus here is primarily on the formal, academic curriculum-based (as opposed to vocational) schooling

99 from kindergarten through higher education as the academic track students far outnumbered those in the vocational schooling. The actual curricular contents and syllabi, especially the ideological subjects including history, geography, and philosophy, are also examined. Finally, I devote the second and remaining part of the chapter to a discussion of the two other interrelated aspects of Burmese education under the BSPP rule: political and ideological control.

Ideological Foundations of Education under the BSPP Rule In a study that examines BSPP educational reforms it is tempting to discredit every educational policy initiative and practice as merely ideological manipulation disguised as education. The temptation is even stronger when the analyst happens to be the one who is a direct product of this indoctrination/educational process having been treated, just like other school boys and girls of his generation who were schooled under the BSPP rule, as if he were a lab animal. However, upon a closer and more critical look at Burma's education past and through conversations with a group of Burmese emigres from diverse backgrounds- ethnically and socio-economically--one gets a more calibrated picture of the socialist educational reforms (that is, policies and practices of the BSPP government). Generally the BSPP educational policies may be said to have five ideological components, each with their own historical roots. These components include: 1) ideology of modernization or (material) development/progress; 2) anti-intellectualism and cultural-protectionism; 3) hybrid philosophy of vanguardist Marxist-Leninism and Buddhist philosophical thought; 4) militarism; and 5) "Aung-San-ism." In the first part of this paper I discuss the ideological aspect of Burmese education at length. My rationale for doing so is the following. Without a glimpse of personal and other behindthe-scenes factors, as well as the socio-cultural background of Burmese society, it will be hard to appreciate the importance of ideology in Burmese politics.

100 Although it was not until 1962 that a thorough execution of a Marxist-revolution -the Burmese way -- was carried out, the idea of a Marxist revolution had been floating in Burma's ruling circles, especially Burmese nationalists who became top leaders of independent Burma around the time of independence. Burmese communists wanted to establish a fully Marxist-state, but they lost the power struggle against Burmse socialists and others with more moderate views within the ruling coalition Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL). U Ba Swe, leading theoretician within the Socialist Party which dominated the AFPFL government of Prime Minister U Nu, laid out a Marxist blueprint for "the Burmese Revolution" in his speech delivered at a meeting of the leaders and organizers of the Trades Union Congress (Burma) in December 1951. Secretary General of the Burma Socialist Party and President of the Trade Unions Congress (Burma), U Ba Swe later held various government posts including the Prime Minister, Deputy-PM, and Defence Minister. General Ne Win served as the Chief-of-Staff under Defense Minister U Ba Swe in the 1950s. They were both passionate gamblers and Ne Win was close to the two top Socialist leaders U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein (Chit Myaing, 1994). According to Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994), former Deputy-Minister of Education who served as Ne Win's advisor in his capacity as Minister of Mines, the General dictated the ideological content and justification for the socialist revolution of 1962, which were then elaborated by a few other writers including U Chit Hlaing, U Saw Oo, and Colonel Than Sein. The similarities between the theoretical explanation contained in the aforementioned speech by U Ba Swe in 1951 and the essential ideological position and justification were rather striking. And it can be argued safely that General Ne Win was influenced by the ideological position of his former boss. Both men believed in the conspiracy theory being that Western imperialists were trying to exploit Burma in every conceivable way, culturally, politically,

101 and economically. The theory both men shared is summed up by U Ba Swe (1951) in his presidential address to the Trade Union Congress (Burma) thus:
In our struggle for independence and in our launching an offensive against the imperialist forces, we have seen how the imperialists instilled (short-sighted) communalism in the minds of the indigenous races of the country thus setting our own peoples at loggerheads with one another, and how political rivalry was created among political groups whose minds had been sufficiently poisoned for that purpose. We have seen how political suppression was made through the formation of Sir Paw Tun's cabinet. Lastly we have also seen the hand that wrought the conspiracy against Bogyoke Aung San and our leaders who were felled by the foul hands of the assassin. I do not want to repeat here this tale of conspiracy because you all have come to know about it. It is also within your knowledge how the imperialists, soon after the independence of Burma, conspired together with the disloyal and reactionary elements of the country to launch an economic, political and military offensie against our country (p.11; italics added).

Therefore, it is worthwhile to dwell on U Ba Swe's views regarding "the Burmese Revolution." U Ba Swe (Ba Swe, 1952) expounded the role of ideology in ushering in a new era in Burma thus:
It is generally misconceived that an era of revolution is usually brought about by one man and one man alone, or by one group or one group alone.... In point of fact the vital force that creates a revolution or establishes an era cannot be personified. Ideology alone is the genesis of revolution. Whatever be the programme of work or whatever be the kind of revolution, it is ideology which acts as a guide to action.... It is, therefore, imperative that we must have a clear-cut conception of the ideology we are going to adopt. Marxism must be a guide to action in our revolutionary movement. But when it is actually put into practice, we must take our environment into account. It must be adapted to suit our own surroundings. It is not for us to do only according to what the text says, or to what a leader dictates or to what a country is doing. So when we say that Marxism should be a guide to action in our revolutionary movement, it does not mean the adoption of Russian methods or Chinese methods or Yugoslavian methods. The Burmese revolution should be achieved by Burmese methods. This fact must be clearly understood (pp. 2-3).

General Secretary U Ba Swe went on to explain the difference between being a Marxist and becoming a Communist. In his words:
(T)here is a sea difference between becoming a Marxist and becoming a Communist....The acceptance of Marxism does not necessarily make one a Communist. To become a Communist, you have to observe a certain set of rules of conduct. Especially, the so-called Communists believe that to become a Communist one must unequivocally accept Soviet leadership.

After having stressed that Marxism and Buddhism are not incompatible because they both "reject the theory of creation" U Ba Swe pointed out the need to attend to both material and spiritual needs in life. He expounded thus:

102
(Y)ou might ask whether (the) satisfaction of material needs like food, clothing and living space is the be-all and end-all of life. In that respect we may differ from the views of the Communists. They may prefer to hold that satisfaction of material needs is the ultimate consummation of life. But I don't see it that way. According to Marxist theory, what I have enumerated 1 may be able to give us satisfacton of all material needs. But still there are spiritual needs that remain to be satisfied. Vexed by anxieties and fears in respect to food, clothing and homes, human minds cannot dwell on old age, disease and death. But with the satisfaction of men's material needs, men can boldly face these three phenomena. Marxism cannot provide an answer for spiritual liberation from this mundane world. It must, however, be conceded that material satisfaction of life can be attained only through Marxism (p.9).

He advocated the fight for "economic liberation" as the economy in politically independent Burma was controlled by the Chinese and Indians (Ba Swe, 1951: 6). He called for the democratization of administration by taking the power away from the old bureaucratic machinery set up by the British colonialists (p.5). On education, Ba Swe had this to say:
What has become of our present-day educational system? Up to now, it has catered only to a certain group of people and it was founded on colonialism....Now we are in a position to do things. We must change the educational system meant for a certain group of people to a system for the entire people (p.7).

Most Burmese were thoroughly accustomed to socialistic ideals all throughout the nationalist struggle. And there were few reasons why this type of ideological discourse which promised to do more for the bulk of the natives would be opposed by the people, with their historically marginalized existence. Indeed most Burmese, particularly members of the education community, generally endorsed the BSPP ideology which seemed heavily influenced by the political program of U Ba Swe enunciated one decade ago. 2 However, I must stress that in spite of the successful cooptation of former Communist student leaders such as Hla Win who
Ba Swe spelled out the fundamentals of his socialist program to create a society where people's material needs are met. These fundamentals were a people's democracy, people's economy, people's education, people's health, and people's social security. See Ba Swe, U (1952 July) The Burmese Revolution: The Pattern of the Burmese Revolution. Burma 2:4, 1-12. 2Many Western-educated academics, especially those with leftist orientation, embraced the BSPP socialist revolution and concomitant educational measures. In fact many gave their input to these measures. Also the restive, politically influential student organizations had been calling for more socialistic measures in education such as expansion of educational access, free and compulsory education, etc. See Rangoon District Students' Union (1954) Yanei Kyaung Pyinnya Ye Hnin Kyaung Tha Ba Wa (Present Day Education & Students Life) Rangoon. Also see Aye Kyaw, Dr. (1994, 1995, 1996, & 1997) Phone Interviews. New York City and Nyi Nyi, Dr. (1994) Audiocasette Recorded Interview. New York City.
1U

103 was given an education officer post in the Department of Education, the coup was greeted with denunciation from left-leaning student organizations (BSPP, 1965: 69-71). Now I turn to the foundational ideological "elements" which shaped BSPP educational policies.

Modernization and BSPP Education Previously I have discussed the initial development of the idea of material progress in Burmese political (and educational) thought, especially among the court elites. The native cry for science, technology, and other imported modern knowledge was somewhat silenced during the early years of British colonial rule. But it was revived and intensified as the nationalist tempo increased towards the closing years of British colonialism in Burma. After independence in 1948 the quest for science and technology which was perceived as a sign of modernity and material progress continued, but the colonial educational legacy of producing more lawyers and clerks continued to dominate Burma's education (Guyot, 1969). From the outset the BSPP authorities and educational reformers prioritized the dissemination and acquistion of science and technological knowlege which would aid the country's material development and economic progress. This was clearly spelled out in The Burmese Way to Socialism, the policy declaration of the Revolutionary Council, announced on March 2, 1962. The RC government of General Ne Win declared:
The Revolutionary Council believes that the existing education system unequated with livelihood will have to be transformed. An education system equated with livelihood and based on socialistic moral value will be brought about. Science will be given precedence in education (Revolutionary Council, 1962; italics added)

The fact that the BSPP regime was serious about the pursuit of material progress via the import of science and technology is evidenced by the creation of science scholarship awards, the number of state scholars from science and engineering sent to the Western countries with their superior technological knowledge and education, and the incorporation of science programs even in politically motivated educational projects such as the establishment of the two-year junior colleges known as Regional Colleges (or RCs).

104 Two out of 5 declared goals of the New System Education -- as the structural reforms launched by the RC government in 1964 was then called -- placed emphasis on increased productivity and technical education (Parti Ye Ya, 1967 December: 142-143). To encourage the study of science (and math) high school students who performed exceptionally well in those subjects were awarded "Science and Math Scholarships" (Nyi Nyi, 1994). 3 Throughout the BSPP rule, a disproportionate number of science and engineering students -vis-a-vis those in humanities and social sciences -- were sent abroad, specifically to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, former West Germany, Israel, Ireland, Italy, India, Switzerland, New Zealand, People's Republic of China, Egypt, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, and Philippines, and Japan for further studies (Nyi Nyi, 1975). 4 The objectives of the establishment of the two-year "Regional Colleges" modelled, in part, after the U.S. 2 year-junior colleges included an emphasis on subjects that would aid economic productivity. The official publication of the BSPP Parti Ye Ya (1977) or Party's Affairs announced the following objectives:
1) to implement the educational policy formulated by the Burma Socialist Program Party; 2) to provide for instruction in subjects which are linked to economic production; 3) to produce graduates who are not only versed in theory but also good at practice; 4) to orientate education towards the studies which are linked to economic production; and 5) to push for the development of various (geographic) regions (throughout the country).

Similarly, echoing the sentiment of the BSPP leadership, Lawrence Zane and John Rantala (1977), the two American education professors from the University of Hawaii who worked as consultants on the Regional College project in Burma, wrote in their report A Report on the Establishment of Regional Colleges in the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma
young scholars received monthly stipends all throughout their student careers in various educational institutions in Burma, provided that they maintained good academic standing. 4The United States and UK were the host countries with the largest number of Burmese state's scholars. Most scholarships were awarded by such international organizations as the World Health Organization and other United Nations organs. The Columbo Planning was the second source of these awards. Foreign governments provided the smallest number of awards. See Nyi Nyi, Dr. (1975) Myanmar Naing Ngan Amyo Tha Hmaw Gun (Burma's National Record). Rangoon: Bagan Sarpe.
3These

105 delineating the following goals: 1) to produce middle rung technicians; 2) to train students theoretically and practically so that they will fit into the industries, public and private cooperatives, etc.; 3) to engage students in production while studying in their various disciplines; and 4) to educate students in such a way that those of high intellectual calibre, diligence and interest may pursue higher learning to obtain a university degree. This emphasis on science and technological knowledge may be attributed to not only Burma's colonial history during which the British colonial administration deprived the natives of opportunities to pursue technological development -- the project on which the elites at the Court of Mandalay had already embarked -- but also a number of such factors as personal educational histories of the BSPP leaders, the continued dominance of the scientic knowleges in modern educational thought, and the universal acceptance and privileging of economic development throughout the post-World War II. Chairman of the Revolutionary Council General Ne Win and his two lieutenants -- General San Yu and Colonel Chit Myaing -- were all science students and aspired to be doctors (Maung Maung, 1965; Chit Myaing, 1994). All of them dropped out of Rangoon University for various reasons during the 1930s. Having been part of General Ne Win's cabinet Colonel Chit Myaing pushed for the establishment of a new medical school in Burma while General Ne Win was known to keep his interest in science and technology (Chit Myaing, 1994). In light of the personal nature of decision making in the inner circle it is not unreasonable to argue that the privileging of dominant branches of modern education was, in part, attributable to the personal histories of the Revolutionary Council leaders. Additionally from a perspective of educational leaders science could serve as a tool for reforming the traditional culture and superstitions (Bagyi Thu, 1970: 324; Nyi Nyi, 1976) . The next section discusses another ideological component of Burma's educational policies, namely anti-intellectual cultural protectionism.

106 Cultural Protectionism and "Anti-intellectual" Burmese nationalism One major ideological component of BSPP education which may be labeled "cultural protectionism" warrants a discussion as the authorities were keen on protecting the "official" Burmese culture. Equally important is the fact that the anti-intellectual version of Burmese nationalism seemed a larger force that underpinned this "cultural protectionism or isolationism" that characterized BSPP curricula. Burmese nationalists who subscribed to this anti-intellectualism tended to be staunchly anti-Western, generally speaking. For many newly independent nations that struggled to rid themselves of the vestiges of European colonialism nationalism was tinged with essentially anti-Western sentiment. And Burmese nationalism was no exception. The leaders of the Revolutionary Council in general and Chairman General Ne Win in particular represented the group with an anti-intellectual and anti-Western sentiment. As a matter of fact outside their military circle none of the Revolutionary Council members was known for shaping the country's intellectual current or popular political thought and culture. 5 Rather they were known for their xenophobia and narrowly defined nationalism. Unfortunately it is the anti-intellectual version of Burmese nationalism which by and large informed the BSPP educational policies and practices. General Ne Win placed the blame squarely on Western colonialim for having "undermined the national culture which would preserve the unity and the strength of the people" and "suppressed all literature likely to inspire patriotism in people" (Ne Win, 1963: 9). In the words of General Ne Win (Ne Win, 1963: 9):

5The observation is based on my recollection of numerous conversations I had with Burmese of different generations including my great uncle the late U Zan Yin. He was Aung San's friend and next door neighbor at Pegu Hall, Rangoon University in the early 1930's. He was also friends with many leading nationalist intellectuals of the day and well-acquainted with some of the military leaders including General Ne Win.

107
(Colonialism) introduced schoolbooks designed to achieve its purpose unobstrusively, and when it was assisted by missionaries accompanying it in to Burma, the fate of Burmese national culture and traditions was sealed. Our country was still suffering from the lingering ill-effects of the colonial regime.

Likewise General San Yu, who became the right hand man of Chairman General Ne Win throughout the BSPP rule (1962-88), pointed out that the successive nationalist governments since independence did not address the problem of what he considered the legacy of Western colonialism in Burmese social life. During the BSPP's Congress held in 1965 General San Yu (BSPP, 1965: 29) remarked that "the national bourgeois, the class which had supplied in varying measures the political leadership in the nationalist movement for freedom from foreign rule, and political parties of the rightist or the leftist inclinations which operated under the influence of the bourgeoise made some efforts to reform the social life. Yet, those parties, rightist and leftist, born in the shadow of the feudal social system, nourished on the educational and spiritual values of the imperialists, wore the badge of their origins in all their activities " (italics added). This anti-Westernism and anti-intellectualism led to extreme cultural protectionism and intellectual isolationism. As an act of policy the BSPP authorities curbed effectively Western influences on Burmese intellectual and cultural life. A very strict censorship policiy was maintained and enforced (Allott, 1993: Win Pe, 1998). The authorities terminated foreign aid provided by the Ford Foundation, the Asia Society and other international organizations. Educational programs and libraries set up by Western diplomatic missions were closed down (BSPP, 1965: 104-105). However, Eastern Bloc countries, especially the former USSR, were allowed to disseminate Marxist literature openly (Htun Aung Gyaw, 1994). Foreign publications such as newspapers, journals and magazines were to be first submitted to the government for censorship before they could be distributed to a relatively small number of subscribers in the country's educational community. Burmese language publications compiled by diplomatic missions wthin the country were scrutinized. Moreover, foreign publications ordered by various government departments had to pass

108 through the censorship committee. Also domestic publications such as books, textbooks, journals, and magazines were to be scrutinized so that the content would not be tainted with foreign ideas and suffer foreign domination (BSPP, 1965: 104). 6 Such educational sites as libraries, museums, and exhibits were thoroughly supervised in accordance with the Law to Supervise Libraries, Museums, and Exhibitions (BSPP, 1965: 105). This type of xenophobic cultural and intellectual isolationism suggests clearly lack of historical understanding on the part of the BSPP leadership regarding the inevitably hybrid nature of cultures, including the dominant Buddhist Burmese culture and various strands of popular nationalist thoughts. The following excerpt from the speech delivered by General Ne Win at the Opening Session of the Seminar of Theatrical Artists in Rangoon on May 23, 1963 typifies the attitude towards and the level of understanding regarding cross cultural and intellectual currents on the part of the BSPP leadership. General Ne Win (1963 April: 6-7) commented thus:
Regarding responsibilities, it is most important that we should preserve our Burmese traditional forms of cultural arts from disappearing altogether. I am advocating for the preservation of our cultural heritage because the current trend is that people in the towns including myself do not know even how to speak Burmese well.... Now regarding art forms. As I have said earlier, stage artists including musicians should study our old Burmese classical melodies with a view to handing them down to posterity in their pristine form... Also it is the duty of the musical artists to create new melodies to further enrich the national culture. In this connection, however, I would like to sound a note of warning. Many of the modern Burmese songs now in vogue are unmusical as they have been composed without paying any regard to the basic principles of harmony concerning scales, beats and rhymes. Song writers can produce new songs as a creative effort, but I would urge them to refrain from composing them in a haphazard style entirely divorced from the well-established methods.

As pointed out earlier modern Burmese nationalism is but a hybrid of diverse intellectual and political traditions; leading nationalist intellectuals imported publications

6During

the initial phase of the spread of Marxist and other progressive ideas among the country's native intelligentsia, the British colonial administration made efforts to screen the import and circulation of publications which contained "subversive" ideas, especially Bolshevik writings. See Aye Thi Da, Daw (1980 January) Ta Htaunt Koe Ya Ma Tai Mi Myanmar Naing Ngan Dwin Tho Hso She Lit Sar Pe Pyanhnan La Gyin (The spread of Socialist Literature in Burma before 1930) Tatkatho Pyinnya Pa De Tha Sar Zaung 14: Part II, 47-54.

109 from England, Germany, China, Japan, Sri Lanka, India, the Philippines and so on. They read extensively from Aristotle to Buddhist philosophy to Shakespear, from Marx and Lenin to Sun Yat Sen and Jose Rize, from Robert Owen to Fourier, from Disraeli to Edmund Burk, from Jefferson to Lincoln, from Gandhi to Nietzsche (Aung San, 1946; Chit Thwe, 1976; Aye Thida, 1980). There was indeed a great difference between nationalist intellectuals such as Ba Hein, Thein Pe, and Aung San who, among others, helped shape Burmese popular nationalist thought and the BSPP leadership who were solely responsible for garnishing Burmese nationalism with cultural isolationism and anti-intellectualism. The former were part of the best and brightest in colonial Burma who were confident enough to carry out the cross-fertilization in the country's cultural and intellectual life, even if they showed inconsistencies in their intellectual positions. In contrast General Ne Win and his lieutenants were largely college and high school drop-outs (Maung Maung, 1971; see Appendix B) who were not part of the country's nationalist and intellectual leaders. They were largely assigned to the backseat of the nationalist movement to carry out orders from above. As such they were hardly known to have swayed public opinions either through their oratories or writings. 7 Furthermore, regarding this intellectual isolationism there seemed to be a significant divergence between the educational leaders and the BSPP authorities, especially General Ne Win. The former were sufficiently exposed to the West having studied in leading universities in Europe and the United States. They wished to apply their critical skills in

Deputy-Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi who became a Ne Win advisor rated General Ne Win as the most intellectual of all the BSPP leaders. As late as 1940 even General Ne Win was an obscure underling of Thakhin Ba Sein, an older unpopular nationalist leader and a rival nationalist politician with rightist views. Ba Sein led the minority faction of "We, the Burmese Confederation." The majority faction known as Hmaing's group, was led by Aung San and Than Tun, the leader of the Burma Communist Party. At the time when the Japanese intelligence selected 30 young nationalists for military training Ne Win was working as a postal clerk in the colonial postal service. Out of their motive to control these young nationalist trainees, the Japanese purposefully chose members from both factions. See Khin Yi, Ma (1988) Dobama Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program.

7Former

110 education and continued this historical trend of hybridization 8 whereas General Ne Win did not conceal his distaste towards any Burmese educated in the West and viewed anything Western with a deep suspicion. In the judgment of General Ne Win these "half-baked" intellectuals -- as the General referred derisively to the Western-trained professionals and intellectuals -- were tainted with "Western ideas and values" which were not in accord with "Burmese culture." 9 General Ne Win took an extremist position when it came to Burma's intellectual life and in the name of preserving the "authenticity" of Burmese culture. To give an example, Professor and Head of the Burmese Department at Rangoon University Daw Si Si Win suggested, during a scholars' forum attended by General Ne Win, that scholars from her own department, too, should be sent abroad to study how languages and literature in other cultures were studied, improved, and taught (Ne Win, 1983: 38). Her suggestion proved rather costly as she lost her job. 10 The General thought hers was a stupid suggestion put forth before him. The General reasoned that if Burmese language teachers studied abroad and brought back foreign ideas as to how to teach the Burmese language it would most likely destroy the Burmese language (Ne Win, 1983: 38). In his own words:
If we have to send our scholars abroad to learn how to teach Burmese they would but bring back foreign methods and foreign literature and become "destroyers" of our language. Let

8During

the interview with me, Dr. Nyi Nyi recalled that he made plans to make sure that the country's educational life did not deteriorate because nationalist educational policies were relentlessly pursued. He mentioned several such projects including translation of cutting-edge knowledge in various fields into the Burmese language, cooperation with other Asian educational leaders from neighboring countries on various intellectual and educational projects, creating research congresses and journals in order to encourage serious scholarly works, and increasing the number of states' scholars in various fields. 9A number of former educators who knew General Ne Win made this observation during the conversations I had with them. They requested anonymity since they still hold Burmese passports and travel to and from Burma. 10A Burmese teacher shared this with me, but he requested that his name not be disclosed.

111
me be blunt on this. Do we need our young men and women to go abroad to take lessons in how to make love before they can get married? 11

There seems to be a fine line between "cultural preservation" and "cultural isolation" as far as the Burmese case. Even some members of the intelligentsia who supported the coup of 1962 and the BSPP socialist revolution were more far-sighted than the political leadership and advised the regime not to fall into the trap of cultural isolationism. An editorial in The Guardian, a government English language publication wrote that "it should not be the policy of the Government to ban contact with alien cultures and keep the country in a state of cultural isolation" (Guardian, 1964 March: 7). The same editorial conceded, nonetheless, that "the State has the duty to protect national culture from those manifestations of alien cultures which undermine one's own cultural values" (p.6). On the eve of the 1988 pro-democracy movement, twenty-four years after The Guardian advised the BSPP leadership against "cultural (and intellectual) isolationism," Burma found itself one of the world's most isolated nations--intellectually, culturally, and economically. The State had deprived successive generations of Burmese students (and established intellectuals) of the opportunities to participate in the historically inevitable process of cultural hybridization or creating their own "selective tradition." In the section that follows I will discuss how BSPP ideologues themselves created a hybrid-ideology out of Marxist-Leninist ideas and selective concepts from Buddhist philosophy.

Welding Marxist-Leninist and Buddhist Philosophical Ideas The BSPP leadership made a serious effort to create a synthesis of the two different philosophical traditions: Marxist-Leninist ideals and Buddhist philosophy. The outcome was the publication of The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment or The Correlation of Mind and Matter (hereafter The System), the most important philosophical

Ne Win was implying that to the Burmese teaching and learning Burmese should be as natural as making love and therefore needs no alien advice or instruction.

11General

112 doctrine of the BSPP which became the theoretical guide for the regime's actions all throughout its rule. It was published on January 17, 1963, almost a year after its take-over. This important ideological content found its way to formal curricula, first through the teacher education programs. Later when "political science" was introduced as a mandatory subject in universities and colleges The System was a prescribed text. I will say more about this later in the chapter. For now I will look at the theoretical pronouncement of the BSPP. The document was largely based on dialectical materialism and Buddhist Abidhamma or philosophy. 12 Prompted by criticisms from both leftist and rightist quarters, the Revolutionary Council government took pain to stress that its guiding philosophy was fundamentally different from Communists' "vulgar materialism," or Social Democrats whom the RC considered "rightist deviationists" (BSPP, 1964: 1). In its publication The Specific Characteristics of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP, 1964), it was stated that:
The B.S.P.P.... studies alike the texts and treatises of the Marxist-Leninists and of the nonMarxist-Leninists. In no area, political , economic, or other, is the study restricted. What is good and useful for human society in the Union of Burma will be extracted in its essence, adapted and applied. (T)he BSPP is guided by a Philosophy of Humanism based on the system of dialectical objective-realism. This Philosophy, because of its humanism, is one that can be most conducive to the welfare of all the working people of the Union of Burma, regardless of their race or religion (p.2).

Unlike the purely materialist philosophies of the Left, the philosophy adopted by the BSPP was tinged with Buddhist humanistic values. A distinctive characteristic of the BSPP's philosophy was articulated thus:
In the eye of the BSPP man is more than mere matter. He is a being who is endowed with feeling, intelligence and the creative power to think. Thus he can not be regarded as a robot, or an animal, or a mass of molecules. Kindness, compassion, and goodwill for fellowmen should therefore be nourished, practiced and developed for the good of man both for his selfseeking role and his role as a sharing member of society. The test which the BSPP will unfailingly apply when undertaking a task is whether it will be conducive to the welfare of Ba Thaung, the founder of We, The Burmese Confederation, translated C. P. Ranasinghe's work The Buddha's Explanation of the Universe. This translated work heavily influenced the writers of the Burmese Way philosophy. See Nyo Mya (1971) Myanmar Naingngan Dwin Thakhin Khit Ko Ti-htwin Ge Thu Thakhin Ba Thaung Ni-dan. (Introducing Thakhain Ba Thaung, the Usher of the Thakhin Era in Burma.) Golden Jubilee Selected Articles from Oway Magazine. Rangoon. Oway Sarpe. pp. 50-57. See also Ranasinghe, C. P. (1957) The Buddha's Explanation of the Universe. Colombo: Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya Fund.
12Thakhin

113
the human society. Man shall never be sacrificed, nor his interests injured, in the pursuit of any dogmatic theory (p.6; italics added).

The non-dogmatic nature of the BSPP philosophy was emphasized as is evidenced in the following passage from the key BSPP text which also provided them a great latitude ideologically:
In the outlook of the BSPP, however, no economic, political, or social treatise is infallible. It is human to err, and the treatises, essays, doctrines, utterances and predictions of man can have meaning and relevance only in the context of the time and place in which, and the motives with which, they are written or made. They can never be so absolute and complete as to make improvements unnecessary. The search for, and the development of, ideologies, systems, and programs which will better promote the welfare of society must always continue. The BSPP, while undertaking the tasks in hand, will not hesitate to adopt and apply a new system which may be found to better serve the interests of the Union of Burma (p.5).

However, there was one ideological position which leaders of BSPP regime adhered to regidly, that is, "militarism." I now present an analysis of how the BSPP regime capitalized on certain aspects of Burmese history, both pre-colonial and colonial, to establish the hegemony of military institutions and their supposed centrality. For the military ideolgy was incorporated into both formal academic school curricula and extra-curricular activities.

Military Ideology and Burma's Education In the mainstream Western social science literature, particularly political science, it is commonplace to portray military institutions in the "Third World" as the only viable institution that could hold together diverse cultural and social groups as cohesive, stable polities, that is, nation-states. Before the eyes of these Western scholars, most of whom are white and male from western democracies, soldiers are one of the most effective modernizing agents in non-white societies which are perceived to be struggling under the burden of pre-modern traditions (and colonial legacies) (see Janowitz, 1964; Johnson, 1962). On their part the BSPP regime promoted relentlessly the role of military institutions in Burma. The regime reconstructed the country's past with special reference to military traditions. In Chapter 3, I have discussed Burma's military traditions and their historical transformation. As late as the time of the coup in 1962 although it was respected generally

114 the military did not enjoy complete hegemony; nor was a career in the military the most attractive. As a matter of fact, at the end of their 17-months Caretaker Government rule (1958 September-1960 February) the populace were unhappy with their characteristically authoritarian approach in administering civil and other affairs. 13 Consequently during the 1960 multi-party elections the people voted for U Nu's AFPFL (Clean) over AFPFL (Stable) the leaders of which were considered close to the generals. The public also was aware that the army was rooting for the AFPFL (Stable). While the public acknowledged the importance of national defense and the role the military institution played in national security, it was not receptive to the idea of living under a civilian party whose leaders had just endorsed authoritarian-style management by the Caretaker government, let alone living under military rule. The election results, more than anything, attested to the popular sentiment. Aware of their own unpopularity the BSPP leaders sought to reconstruct their own image and their historical role. The country's schools were seen as a perfect venue to disseminate this "military vanguardism." During the nationalist struggle, the nationalist army was one of several groups which strove towards the country's independence. After 1962 it came to be recast in the role of the most important institution whose interests were identical to national interests. Moreover, in the BSPP socialist revolution, Tatmadaw or the Armed Forces were to defend the socialist economy (The Revolutionary Council, 1962: 30) and it was to be the backbone of the vanguardist BSPP party. Here it is instructive to quote

13The

public applauded the stability which the military-run Caretaker Government provided, which contrasted sharply with the messy and noisy nature of civilian democratic politicking which they became accustomed to after independence. Some of the accomplishments of the Caretaker government included "beautification" of the capital city Rangoon, that is, ridding the city streets of stray dogs and piles of garbage, forcibly relocating the shanty-towns from downtown to the outskirts, implementing national registration, etc. (Chit Myaing, 1994). However, after a brief honeymoon, the people became disenchanted with the military command-style management. Worse yet, the public began to realize that there were overly ambitious colonels who were meddling in democratic politics.

115 Brigadier San Yu, Vice-Chief of Staff and who later became General Secretary of the BSPP (San Yu, 1963: 17) when he stressed:
The Armed Forces have not grown up as a class; we do not stand as a class. The Armed Forces have come from the people, even as a child of the bosom, for the Armed Forces are but the sons and daughters of the peasants and the workers who form the massive majority of our nation... (H)aving arisen from the people, our forces have always been for the people. We stand as a shield against the dangers, internal and external, so that our people may live in peace and happiness, and in the discharge of that sacred duty we are ready to give our lives. As the dangers are removed, we shall give more of ourselves to the task of promoting the welfare of the people, for helping to build a better and fuller life for them in all the material, social, cultural and humanitarian aspects is also another sacred duty for us... Our Armed Forces have always served the people surely and strongly. Therefore, it can be said that the Armed Forces and the people are one and inseparable.

The BSPP militarism found its way into various school textbooks. I will say more on this later in the chapter. In the remaining part of this section on the ideological foundation of BSPP education I discuss the selected use of what may be labeled "Aung-Sanism" in the country's education.

Selected Use of Aung-Sanism in BSPP Education A cursory look at the official publications of the BSPP--from the pronouncement of new economic programs to the call to national unity, from the responsibilities of students to the nation -- will catch the prevalent use of Burma's most revered slain leader General Aung San. Indeed Aung San was the most important political symbol which was evoked throughout the BSPP rule. Contrary to the depiction of General Ne Win by academicapologists of the BSPP regime as the only leader whose status in modern Burmese history parallelled that of Aung San (see, for instance, Taylor, 1987), there was no one in the entire 17-member Revolutionary Council who had either legitimacy or intellectual capacities that came close to such top nationalist leaders as U Aung San or U Nu. Although U Nu was U Aung San's trusted deputy, he was a leader in his own right since his student days and was popular enough to formulate his own political and ideological platform. For instance, his election promise to make Buddhism "the state religion" was clearly his own creation, the one which Aung San would have rejected considering the latter's insistence on the separation of

116 politics and religion. Rightly or wrongly, Nu was confident of his own popularity and leadership in Burmese politics and had perhaps the strongest following after independence. Generally speaking a great orator, brilliant writer, shrewd politician, and sincere Buddhist, U Nu commanded respect not only amongst Burman politicians but also in the circle of the country's most influential non-Burman ethnic leaders. In contrast General Ne Win was known as a "womanizer, gambler, and drunkard" who left the affairs of the army in the hands of his deputies such as Colonels Maung Maung and Aung Gyi. And no politicians including U Nu took him that seriously. 14 As a matter of fact General Ne Win warned civilian politicians who, in his opinion, were creating distrust amongst themselves to patch up their differences for the sake of political stability in the 1950s (Chit Myaing, 1994) although no one listened to him at the time. In light of the aforementioned it is only logical that the leaders of the 1962 socialist revolution resorted to systematic manipulation of Aung San as a potent source of political ideology. While Aung San emerged as the unparraled nationalist leader after WWII, first as the head of the Burma Defence Army and, later, as the leader of the most powerful nationalist front, Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL), it was his martyrdom which turned him the most powerful political symbol in Burma after his assassination in 1947. The American political scientist and CIA officer-analyst of Southeast Asian Marxist movements Jon Wiant (1982: 23-24) notes that:
the (BSPP) Revolution has been an exercise in the hagiography of Aung San.... Since 1962, ...there has been a continual symbolic campaign to cast Aung San (and, by extension, Ne Win) in the role of the fourth Great Unifier.... It is to his ideals and to the leadership he would have brought that Ne Win turns for inspiration. No policy action is taken, no program introduced without attributing it to the wisdom of Aung San.

The 1962 coup, the concomitant revolution, the BSPP policies and programs all throughout BSPP rule were all justified by the BSPP leaders using Aung San's name. A typical thematic use of Aung San can be seen in the following passage contained in an article
I draw on my memories of the conversations I had with my great uncle the late U Zan Yin, who was Deputy Commissioner of Sagaing Division before his retirement.
14Here

117 printed in The Guardian, an English language monthly government publication. The author Ko Ko Lay (1962) writes thus:
The correctness and sagacity of the action of the Revolutionary Council will be fully appreciated if we consider only for a moment what the Founder of our Independence Bogyoke Gyi (i.e., General) Aung San himself would have done in the situation that has just occured were he alive today. No sane person would have doubted that the same steps would have been taken by that indomitable leader.

The Guardian editorial (1964 August: 5) is noteworthy. It reads: "(t)he gap between Aung San and Ne Win were the wasted years, or perhaps, to be generous, it was an idle intermission between the acts in the play. Now we are moving forward again; from General Ne Win we hear once more the authentic call of General Aung San, and the power and quality of the leadership is the same. The goals to which we march are unchanged; indeed they stand out clearer now with the clearing of the mists of the intervening years." Twenty-five years after the launching of the BSPP revolution, symbolic use of Aung San by the BSPP regime remained unabated. The editorial in the official Ngwetayi magazine (1987, July) reads thus:
If one studies the speech given by our national leader General Aung San at the mass meeting held at Rangoon City Hall on July 13, 1947 one shall find that he pointed out the need for the participation of working peoples from all national groups in carrying out national projects. Today under the leadership of the Burma Socialist Program Party a socialist society is being built within the socialist economic framework. Both a socialist economy and a socialist society were the goals laid down by General Aung San and other national martyrs.

Again Wiant (1982: 24-25) notes correctly when he writes, "without question Ne Win had a greater impact on Burmese politics than Aung San if for no other reason than that he lived and Aung San died. Yet Ne Win never sought to carve out a symbolic position for himself other than as the beneficiary of Aung San's bequest....(Ne Win's) portrait may be posted in government buildings, but it is seldom without the company of Aung San's picture." Aung San wore various hats during his political career. But while the BSPP

regime did not attempt to erase other images of Aung San -- Aung San as Student Activist, Aung San as Marxist-intellectual, Aung San as Cultural-hybridizer, and Aung San as Civilian Politician -- the most visible image which it sought to create out of various phases in Aung

San's nationalist political career was a warrior-unifier. 15 was transmitted as part of the official knowledge.

118 This is the dominant image which

Aung San belonged to the more enlightened and informed group of nationalist thinkers and political figures who refused to succumb to the characteristic embracement of the wholesale denunciation and rejection of "the West." Accordingly, Aung San drew on the works of many Western political leaders and thinkers--from Garibaldi to Marx, Stalin, Lenin, and Mao, from Edmund Burke to Disraeli, from Jefferson to Abraham Lincoln in formulating his own nationalist political platform and thought (Chit Thwe, 1976). Like his intellectual peers and mentors, in his attempts to modernize Burmese national culture and nationalist thought Aung San sought to create a kind of hybrid national culture which incorporated positive elements from Western political thought and cultures into Burmese "national culture." 16 There were numerous instances in which the BSPP knowledge producers carefully omitted what they considered potent "oppositional" messages and insights Aung San articulated, lest they induced students to think critically and question authority, just as Aung San did several generations ago. Indeed the kind of predispositions and mental attributes which the BSPP wished students to cultivate, through exposure to the official version of Aung-Sanism, were the ones which would make them carry out, selflessly, but not with critical vigilance, students' (and, by extension, socialist) responsibilities. The regime sought to drive home the message that the Burmese Way to Socialism was the correct path which
15Although

the public continued, and still continues, to refer to him as "Bogyoke or General Aung San" as early as the beginning of 1946 he relinquished his military position as the head of the Burma Defence Army in order to devote himself to civilian politics. During the last two years of his life Aung San spent most of his energies building grassroots pressure against the British for the peaceful transfer of power, campaigning for national integration and unity amongst various ethnic communities, and working out various civic and economic reconstruction projects, all in his capacities as a civilian politician. 16In Chapter 3 I have discussed the efforts made by the young, nationalist intellectuals from Dohbama or We, the Burmese Confederation to create a modern Burmese national culture, identity, and nation. Aung San usually drafted his speeches in English and translated them for delivery. See Aung San (1946) Burma's Challenge. Rangoon: Tathettar Sarpe. p. Backcover.

119 Aung San would have endorsed. And for this reason there was nothing really to which the country's students should apply their critical mental faculty, if it developed at all. Their responsibility, as the official knowledge had it, was to participate in building and defending the socialist economic system under the BSPP leadership. Last but not least, the architects of the 1962 socialist revolution re-ordered political priorities which Aung San spelled out for an independent Burma while having claimed that the socialist revolution was exactly what Aung San would have endorsed. During the last phase of the independence struggle Aung San's slogan read "Independence, Democracy, and Socialism" (Chit Thwe, 1976: 132). U Chit Hlaing, a principal BSPP ideologue and popularizer, argued that the slogan should have been "Independence, Socialism, and Democracy" all along. Having described some of the concepts from the BSPP doctrine and its attempts to make their ideology palatable to Burmese constituents, I wish to locate the BSPP ideology in a larger historical, political, and cultural context. First, socialist ideals found a fertile soil in Burma and the official display of socialism as the guiding philosophy of the BSPP was a very strategic move on the part of BSPP leaders. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, socialist ideals were inconsonant with indigenous communalistic values of the dominant Buddhist communities. Also owing to the economic exploitation which the majority of the Burmese were subjected to under alien colonial rule and its continuation after independence under successive civilian governments, a great majority of Burmese were not opposed to socialistic policies, be they educational nationalization or socializing the means of production. Second, the BSPP ideologues, especially U Chit Hlaing who was the principal author of BSPP doctrine, used cleverly the language most familiar to the Buddhist elites in expounding the BSPP doctrine. Instead of adhering dogmatically to Marxism -- as the more doctrinaire Burmese Communists typically did -- the BSPP ideologues tailored Marxist

120 Leninist concepts and ideals to suit the Burmese philosophical predisposition. For instance, the BSPP ideologues rejected the inevitability of progress in a linear fashion, a central thesis of Marxism, while acknowledging the cyclical nature of time as expounded by Buddhist philosophy. The BSPP (1963) spells out its belief regarding the notion of progress thus:
(T)he material world and the society of man are in a state of constant flux, appearing and disappearing, rising and falling, waxing and waning, dying and being born anew, always on the move and in the grip of ceaseless change. In brief, the BSPP believes in the laws of dialectics, i.e., the laws of motion and change of all phenomena. However, it is also believed that the lot of man in his society can and must be improved by his working together with fellow men in fruitful cooperation, If men work together for their betterment, progressive development will result. If men fail to make such brave efforts, the human society will slide back into the age of darkness and degeneration. Whether the human society moves forward or slides back depends on the quality of men and their endeavors (p. 4, italics added)

Indeed cultural and philosophical sensitivity carefully built into the BSPP doctrine -as opposed to the dogmatic approach adopted by Communist ideologues -- increased the mass appeal of the ideology. Sociologically in a predominantly Buddhist society over which the Buddhist Order had great social influence over the majority of the peoples, this nonantagonistic attitude toward the learned Buddhist communities was very strategic. It is noteworthy however, that the leaders of the BSPP government had waged a highly effective Public Relations campaign or "psychological warfare" -- to use the BSPPmilitary jargon -- against Communism during the brief military rule under the banner "Caretaker government" (1958-1960). In this campaign Communists and Communism were depicted effectively as "anti-Buddhism" and "anti-religion" (von der Mehden, 1960). In a deeply religious society which embraced socialist ideals the great majority of people rejected Communism overwhelmingly. U Chit Hlaing, one of the architects of this anti-Communist ideological campaign, was known to be versed in Buddhist philosophy and a sincere believer in both Marxist-Leninist ideals and Buddhism. A number of Marxist writers including Thein Pe Myint and Thakhin Tin Mya, and U Chit Hlaing promoted the BSPP's ideology through their writings.

121 Finally, what is most questionable is the ideological commitment and sincerity of the man who presided over the BSPP revolution, that is, General Ne Win himself. According to his close associates and subordinates, the General was no ideologue (Chit Myaing, 1994; Nyi Nyi, 1994). Perhaps the label Machiavellian politician best describes the type of political leader which General Ne Win was. In an open letter to General Ne Win, former Brigadier General Aung Gyi (1988) who was second in command on the original Revolutionary Council and widely believed to be the most political soldier amongst the RC leaders, revealed that General Ne Win did not hold any Burmese socialist in high regard, nor did the General care to learn socialism or Marxism. According to Aung Gyi, the General felt that there was a need for a national ideology should there ever be a time when the military felt compelled to step in and rule the country. Brigadier Aung Gyi recorded the General as saying "Let's try 'socialism.' If that doesn't work, we'll do something else. We are all colleagues." I would contend that despite the pomp and hype about socialist revolution and their describing of themselves as "socialist revolutionaries," the men who were the ultimate decision-makers --not the ideologues who helped articulate theorectical justifications for the coup of 1962 and the BSPP revolution --were no believers in socialism and its ideals. No sooner had they seen the great outcry against the BSPP rule and its policies during the 1988 popular democracy uprisings than the key leaders of the BSPP edifice declared the end of the socialist experiment in Burma and abolition of the Burma Socialist Program Party. The top 4 leaders of the socialist revolution proved to be the greatest capitalists and the richest men in socialist Burma. General Ne Win traveled to capitalist countries such as Austria and England for medical check-ups and psychiatric treatment and gambled in horse races in Switzerland and England, owned properties in Wimbledon, and pocketed rubies and other precious stones at annual gem emporiums held in Rangoon. Brigadier General Aung Gyi was one of the most successful business men in Burma running a nationwide chain of bakeries and cafes. Brigadier General Tin Pe, originally a clerk with Steel Brother Ltd., a

122 British timber firm, is the largest exporter of timber in the post-1988 era (Chit Myaing, 1994). Finally, the late General San Yu -- General Secretary of the BSPP party and life-long Ne Win-loyalist --turned a blind eye to gem smuggling business his wife Daw Than Shein ran throughout the 26 years of BSPP rule (Nyi Nyi, 1994). 17 As will be argued in the later chapters the selectiveness of ideological construction of BSPP knowledge (from a vast reservoir of cultural and political traditions and collective memories which exist in Burmese society) made the BSPP education system extremely vulnerable to ideological contestation and subversion on the ground. Historical agents, that is, critically-minded students, educators, and community members alike, came up with oppositional readings of the official knowledge or contested, in various forms, the attempt on the part of the authorities to produce, through schooling, a Burmese national culture and identity. I explore this thematic issue at greater length in chapters 5, 6, and 7. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of how the BSPP authorities attempted to use schooling as a means of political and ideological control and the integral role coercion and violence played in Burma's education after 1962.

Decision Making in the BSPP Before I proceed to discuss various measures regarding ideological and political manipulation of schooling it must first be highlighted that throughout the BSPP rule the decision making in education and educational policy formulation was rather whimsical. To further explicate General Ne Win surrounded himself with advisors and subordinates, often men with either questionable character or low calibre. Many of his "trusted" members of his inner circle felt they owed everything to General Ne Win and acquiescence to the General's demands and directives. The fact that those who were

17The

observations made here are public knowledge by and large although I have cited former RC member Colonel Chit Myaing and former Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi lest references are necessary here.

123 outspoken, sharp, and critical (of BSPP policies) tended to be sacked was no secret in the Burmese educational community. Those whom General retained were grateful to and fearful of him. Naturally out of this process the architect of the 1962 socialist revolution produced "yes-men" for himself. And in education firing and hiring, as well as creating policy initiatives were determined by political expediency and loyalty, rather than merit or educational achievements. 18 Within and without the country's educational community fearful of General Ne Win and his effective network of intelligence and informers, rarely were any important policy or political initiative adopted or implemented without a nod from the Number 1, as the General was referred to in the high offices. The most glaring example of the whimsical nature of decision making in education is when General Ne Win ordered the reversal of "nationalist" language policy which his government had pursued since its ascendancy to power in 1962, solely because his eldest daughter, a graduate of Burma's best known medical school, failed repeatedly English language proficiency tests to pursue an advanced degree in medicine in Britain. Readers therefore, are forewarned not to search for consistency or systematicity in terms of policy formulation or content in the pages that follow.

Political and Ideological Control in Schooling under BSPP Rule In spite of their vulgar, top-down approach to ideological manipulation (of the public in general and the country's students in particular) the BSPP leaders were well-aware of the fact that the underground Burmese Communists and other ethnic and religious communities

observation was based on my conversations with former Revolutionary Council Member and Retired Colonel Chit Myaing (1994), former Deputy Minister of Education and Minister of Mines Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994), Rector Dr. Chit Swe (1995) and a number of retired intelligence officers who served General Ne Win closely.

18This

124 also carried out their propaganda and educational works. The BSPP regime took a number of measures specifically designed to shield the country's students from having been exposed to these unofficial views and ideologies. In their efforts to implement these measures the authorities made attempts to solicit participation and input from the educators, especially those who were sympathetic to the BSPP's official goals. National educational seminars were held and prominent members of the educational community -- from foreign-trained experts and bureaucrats with the Ministry of Education to university academics, to outside experts and various members of the country's intelligentsia -- participated in numerous discussions on various thematic issues regarding "revolution" in the country's education. In chapters 5 and 6 I examine critically the politics and nature of power relations in the BSPP educational context. It suffices here to simply argue that while the BSPP authorities were more preoccupied with the control aspect of education and cooptation of the country's educators the educators responded to these new opportunities out of a variety of motives including helping to shape the nation's education system. What were the measures the BSPP regime took to accomplish both its official and hidden educational objectives? Here I should point out that most of the important changes in education were made during the initial phase of the BSPP socialist revolution. During the closing years of socialist education with a few exceptions such as the reversal of language policy the BSPP only tinkered with the system created after 1962.

Nationalization of Schools The Private Schools Registration Law was enacted in 1963 with the purpose of bringing all grades of private schools "under stricter disciplinary and academic control of the

125 Revolutionary Council government." Initially privately-run pre-college schools with 20 or more students 19 were required to register with the Education Department within 30 days of its enforcement. According to this law, teachers had to be qualified to teach particular grades, and detailed lists of syllabuses and courses had to be submitted to the Office of the Private School Registration Officer. Later a more drastic measure was taken. On April 1, 1965 102 high schools and 27 middle schools were nationalized as the first model example of educational nationalization. 20 On April 5, 1966 the remaining 685 private schools (493 primary, 109 middle, and 83 high schools) were nationalized (Ba Gyi Thu, 1970: 331). All nationalization activities were administered by the newly restructured Ministry of Education (The Guardian, 1965 May). Also there were factors that weighed in favor of educational nationalization and centralization: "the equality of education for the children of the working people in state schools, the uniform implementation of the alteration of thinking in the country, to prevent the domination of foreign habits, customs, ways of thought, opinions and culture which had infiltrated in many forms" (BSPP, 1965: 117-118). The Guardian (1964 April) gives another reason for educational nationalization when its editorial reads:
There are a lot of private schools which are staffed or headed by persons without teaching qualifications or, even worse without requisite academic attainments. Some private school teachers work round the clock by teaching at more than one school for the sole purpose of earning more money than they could normally do. Education of the young is a vocation to be undertaken by those qualified persons with a sense of dedication in their work. From the national point of view the State can no longer afford to leave the education of the young in the hands of unqualified or unlettered persons who take up teaching for unworthy motives. The new directive will have the effect of weeding out undesirable persons from the country's system of education (p.7).

were run privately by various missionary groups, private teachers, and Chinese and Indian communities. Virtually all of them were at the pre-college levels and catered to the well-to-do urbanite students. 20In the official assessment of these private schools which mushroomed after the country's independence, the majority of them were created "as commercial enterprises rather than to fulfil the higher and noble purpose of an educational institution. Many of them were places where the young learned undesirable habits and imbibed unhealthy thoughts" (p.5). See The Guardian (1965 May) Takeover of Schools: Editorial The Guardian. XII: 5, 4-5.

19They

126 In addition to the aforementioned concerns, in the judgment of the BSPP, these private schools perpetuated class differences. As in the colonial period, only children from the wellto-do and the wealthy families could attend these schools which were reputed to have high matriculation rates as compared to government schools (Parti Ye Ya, 1965 August). Many of the private schools charged exorbitant school fees and were "cram schools" interested solely in making profit. Under these circumstances private education catered to the needs of a handful of elite children and highly undemocratic (Parti Ye Ya, 1965 August). These nationalized schools were integrated into the pre-existing government schools. Out of this new arrangement was created a highly centralized educational system. 21 The nationalized and centralized educational system was to remain in place until the official collapse of the BSPP rule in 1988. As the aforementioned quotes from official publications suggest nationalization and its concomitant school centralization made it easier for the authorities to exercise ideological and political control in Burma's educational life. While such other official goals as equity, quality, and access were themselves important in and of themselves the most important goal of school nationalization and centralization was, as far as the authorities were concerned, the establishment of monopolistic control over schooling politically and ideologically. The BSPP leaders, themselves college and grade school drop outs, were more than prepared to sacrifice the education of the country's youth. This was evidenced by the frequent closure and slaughter of thousands of students all throughout its 26-year rule.

Structural Changes in Education

to the "Government of the Union of Burma Education Policy 1948," there was a policy recommendation for the adoption of a centralized control and administration of education. But for numerous reasons the independent government was unable to implement that recommendation. See Cameron, M. (1992) Legitimacy and Violence in Education in Burma. Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. University of Southern California. p. 83.
21According

127 In April 1964 the Ministry of Education sponsored a Seminar on University Education attended by all who mattered in Burma's higher education. Out of the seminar discussions were extracted a number of recommendations which were then submitted to the Revolutionary Council. Based on the recommendations, the Union of Burma University Act of 1964 Law was enacted and on November 2, 1964 the New System Education (at the university level) replaced the old university system (Nyi Nyi, 1976: 6). According to the changes made, the old "combination system" (of various disciplines) was ended. In its place, a "majoring system" with its central ultimate goal of training specialists in various fields who would contribute to the building of a socialist economy and social order was introduced (Tin Ohn, 1977). In place of the autonomous university councils at both the universities of Rangoon and Mandalay, the Universities' Central Council and the Council of University Academic Bodies were established. The Universities' Central Council was made up of DeputyMinisters from several Ministries, Directors, University Rectors, College Principals, Representatives of the Burma Socialist Program Party, the People's Workers' Council, the People's Peasants' Council, prominent educationists and journalists. This central council was charged with the responsibility to implement the new educational policy and coordinating work at various colleges and universities. Academic affairs were placed in the hands of the Council of University Academic Bodies made up of Directors of Departments and Co operatives from various ministries, University Rectors and College Principals, representatives of various university academic departments, educationists, and journalists (Hnin Mya Kyi, 1975). Noteworthy was a conspicuous absence of student representation in all matters related to their schooling. This was a significant departure from the tradition of including student representatives in university governing bodies in the past. Of all the systemwide changes the most important politically motivated measure was the splitting of the two major university systems with its constituent colleges in Mandalay

128 and Rangoon into 18 separate institutions which were placed under the Universities' Administrative Committee and Academic Senates. 22 Several affiliated colleges with separate administrative bodies were established and attached to the Arts and Science universities in Mandalay and Rangoon. These new affiliated colleges were Workers' College in Rangoon, Moulmein College, and Bassein College (affiliated with Rangoon Arts and Science University) and Magwe College, Taunggyi Intermediate College, and Myitkyina Intermediate College (affiliated with Mandalay Arts and Science University) (Maung De, 1979). The educational leaders whom the BSPP regime handpicked justified the structural changes on the grounds that the old university system was modelled after the British Unitary System, which was ideally suited for small (i.e., 1,000-2,000 enrollments) colleges. Since Rangoon University alone had 15,000 students and nearly 40 academic departments, it no longer made sense to continue using the old system. Moreover, large institutions created administrative problems and were not conducive to educational progress, or so the educational leaders contended (Nyi Nyi, 1976). Whatever the educational merits which were offered as the justifications for the first wave of structural changes, Dr. Nyi Nyi, the chief-architect of this new structure known as the New System Education, conceded that the BSPP regime was interested ultimately in control of students politically and literally (Nyi Nyi, 1994). During his report to the BSPP Seminar in 1965 General San Yu who was BSPP Secretary-General reported that the authorities considered university students (and politicized Buddhist monks) as the two major

22They

included Rangoon Arts and Sciences University, Mandalay Arts and Science University, Institute of Education, Institute of Economics, Faculty of Law, Institute of Veterenary Sciences, the Rangoon Institute of Technology, Faculty of Forestry, Institute of Medicine 1 (Rangoon), Institute of Medicine 2 (Rangoon), Institute of Medicine (Mandalay), Moulmein College, Bassein College, Workers' College, Taunggyi Intermediate College, Margwe Intermediate College, Myitkyina Intermediate College, and Institute of Dental Medicine. See Parti Ye ya (September 1964) So-she-lit Te-Hsauk Ye Hnin Tekkatho Pyinnya Ye. (Socialist Construction and Education). Parti Ye Ya pp.17-22. The three Institutes of Medicine and the Institute of Dental Medicine have been placed under the Ministry of Health since 1974. See Hnin Mya Kyi (1975) The Development of Higher Education in Burma. Burma: Ministry of Education.

129 threats to the BSPP revolution (BSPP, 1965: 69). In the same report he pointed out that the armed underground leftist groups such as Communists and above-ground rightist elements had been instigating campus unrests since the coup of 1962. He cautioned that although the campus unrest seemed to have been deterred effectively the potential for future campus activism continued to exist (BSPP, 1965: 71). It is hardly surprising that the authorities undertook these structural changes which were intended to make the control and monitoring of students far easier. Exactly a decade after the first wave of structural changes, the regime undertook a second wave of educational changes, specifically in academic higher education. Once again the second wave of structural changes came under similar circumstances. Here a word about the then prevailing political situation may be in order. In 1974/75 there broke out a major campus unrest known as the U Thant Crisis on campuses in Rangoon, Mandalay, Magwe, Moulmein, and so on. As in the 1962 and 63 campus unrests the BSPP authorities called in troops and tanks and cracked down violently on students on Rangoon Arts and Sciences University campus, the historical hotbed of campus activism. Several hundred students were killed as a result of this bloody crackdown (Htun Aung Gyaw, 1997). Student protests were followed by the labor unrests in Rangoon and an abortive coup in 1976. The BSPP generals swiftly carried out purges and reasserted their control over the country's administrative and educational institutions. In the face of mounting economic problems and stagnant industrialization, a number of economic reforms were introduced in the 1970's, one in the area of state controlled industrial enterprises and the other in the private sector (Hill, 1984). In addition, a greater number of professionals and technocrats were incorporated into the Party (Tin Maung Maung Than, 1993). In 1977 the "Rights of Private Enterprise Law" which provided a guarantee against nationalization until 1994 was enacted (Hill, 1984). In the midst of these changes outside education, the Ministry of Education launched the second and last structural and administrative reform in higher education in 1977.

130 Out of the existing higher education system seventeen (and later 20) two-years Regional Colleges were established (RC) (Parti Ye Ya, 1977). The official BSPP publication Parti Ye Ya or Party Affairs announced that the move was in part motivated by the logistical reason: to solve the over-crowding in the country's universities (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July: 35). A 37-member Regional College Central Administrative Council was formed with the Minister of Education as the Chair. The other members included Deputy-Ministers and Director-Generals from various Ministries. Under this central body, there were formed regional administrative bodies in all 14 States and Divisions across Burma whose task was to coordinate the administration and management affairs of the new colleges (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July). One of the fundamental differences between the regional college curriculum and that of the existing universities was the fact that the Regional Colleges were to emphasize the type of knowledge and expertise which was required by the economy and industry. 23 For instance, such areas of specialization as medicine, statistics, and education were considered "non-economically linked or non-industry and non-economy linked studies" whereas technological subjects, agricultural sciences, and veterinary sciences were labeled as "economy- or industry-based studies." The latter type of knowledge was to be the core of the Regional College curriculum (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July). Upon graduation students were supposed to have two career options: pursue further studies to receive undergraduate and other professional degrees or to join the work force. The graduates would be given two-year diplomas and those who wished to opt for joining the workforce would be given an opportunity to intern full-time in their respective vocational fields, for instance, government industries, privately owned cottage industries, agricultural farms, and relevant governmental departments (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July). Those who

23

See Parti Ye Ya (1977 May) Dei Tha Kaw Leik Mya Ba Gyaungk Hpwint Hlit Ya Tha Nei. (Why were the Regional Colleges established?). Parti Ye Ya. pp.32-38.

131 opted for establishing vocational careers of their own could enroll in the University Correspondence Program if they still wished to receive a university degree. Under this new arrangement, there were several notable features which were different from the existing New System Education (University). First, high school students would not go straight to the universities upon completion of high school education. They would be spending two years in these RCs during which time they would be able to decide which route they wished to go: further studies at the university or an immediate career in the industry, agriculture, or some other fields for which they were trained at the RCs. Second, instruction in political science courses put together by the Central Institute of Political Science of the Burma Socialist Program Party, were made a mandatory subject for both first and second year students. Third, since students would be participating in various sectors of the official economy, both agriculture and industry, during their years in Regional Colleges, they were to be given wages depending on the amount of labor they put in (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July). Finally, various governmental, administrative, and mass organizations including the People's Peasants' Council, People's Workers' Council, People's Council, Lanzin Youth Organization, and community elders were also to be helping out-of-town students with their living arrangements (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 May). Although conspicuously absent from the official pronouncements regarding new educational arrangements, the political intent on the part of the authorities was easily discernible. While school overcrowding was a legitimate educational concern, the fact that it was addressed only after the campus unrests of 1974/75 escalated made these structural and administrative measure a suspect in the eyes of the educational community. From my conversations with various establishment educators (Nyi Nyi, 1994; Chit Swe, 1995) it became apparent that the BSPP authorities were preoccupied with the potential and chronic challenges from university (and to a lesser extent, high school) students during its 26-year rule. Indeed the establishment of the BSPP rule was greeted by denunciation from various student organizations, both left and right (BSPP, 1965), their rule and legitimacy challenged by successive generations of students at

132 every opportunity, and eventually their official rule was brought to its knees by student-initiated popular uprisings in 1988. The new administrative and educational changes offered the authorities several benefits. First, the establishment of the Regional Colleges allowed them to keep the country's students from various ethnic and cultural political backgrounds isolated from one another. Before the Regional Colleges were founded students from ethnic minority communities as well as nonurban areas had to come to major cities where the universities were located. Many came to be exposed to various political and cultural perspectives to which they would least likely be exposed otherwise. Second, the new involvement of various BSPP administrative and party

organizations in educational affairs was a strategic decision. To further explicate, before, political control and monitoring of students had been carried out by military and civil intelligence personnel on campuses and dormitories. Under the new arrangement the authorities had assigned these non-campus based party and administrative organizations an additional important duty of helping the government to carry out its surveillance and control of students and the outbreak of future unrests. Students and parents had to complete consent forms at the nearest local offices of the People's Council, BSPP's countrywide administrative network, pledging not to be involved in any future unrests in any way, shape, or form once the universities were re-opened subsequent to the U Thant Crisis in 1974/75. Finally, the offering of wages to RC students who were to be involved in various sectors of the command economy was a way to keep students in line. In other words, it was a form of systematic bribery. The authorities were fully aware of the economic hardships as the country was reeling under the effects of their own mismanagement and inept policies. Provision of monetary incentives to students, a majority of whom were from economically struggling families, was adopted as a new method of pacification and control.

University Correspondence Program as part of the political control

133 One other important initiative undertaken by the BSPP government was the establishment of the University Correspondence Program beginning in the academic year 1975 76 (Khin Maung Htun, 1979). According to the Director-General of the Higher Education Department U San Tha Aung, the goal of the introduction of the University Correspondence Program offering undergraduate degrees in Arts and Sciences and Law was to expand access to higher education (Khin Maung Htun, 1979). He pointed out that correspondence courses were considered an effective vehicle for education in various parts of the world and that it was time for Burma to adopt this innovative method to fulfill the country's educational needs (Khin Maung Htun, 1979). There was to be no limit for admissions and everyone who matriculated was to be admitted to the University Correspondence Program (See Khin Maung Htun, 1979 for the course outline and the historical account of correspondence courses in Burma). A separate budget was allowed for the Program and Dr. Maung Maung Kha, Rector of the University of Rangoon became the first Director. Included in the curriculum were the study of the philosophy of the Burma Socialist Program Party and socialist economics. Pedagogical methods included radio (and later TV) broadcasts, monthly assignments and feedback through correspondence, and later one month intensive tutoring before the final examination at major university correspondence program centers in Rangoon and Mandalay. Some of the officially declared advantages of enrollment in the Correspondence Program included pursuit of university education without interruptions from work, delivery of university education to students in remote areas of the country, low cost, and a shorter amount of time (Khin Maung Htun, 1979). In the closing years (1987-88) of Burma Socialist Program Party rule, there were 104, 687 students enrolled in the University Correspondence Program as opposed to 255, 866 full-time students in universities and colleges. Correspondence programs or distance education per se do not automatically qualify to be labeled as "political control measures." However, the timing of its creation--right after

134 the bloody crackdown of the 1974 U Thant Crisis, the largest campus unrest since the military took over power in 1962 -- coupled with the establishment of smaller, Regional Colleges, made the second wave of educational changes suspect. As pointed out earlier the authorities involved various civic, community, and political organizations in these new educational endeavors. While multi-sectoral participation is a commendable goal -- if aimed at democratizing the educational process--the motives on the part of the BSPP authorities seemed rather sinister. In the larger political and societal context the authorities had curbed effectively any type of democratic rights and civil liberties. It can safely be argued that new educational measures such as have been examined above must but be construed as creative efforts on the part of the BSPP regime designed to disperse the country's students and keep them under tighter local control. In other words, whereas the authorities were not willing to relinquish their central control in key decision making areas in education such as human resource management (i.e., hiring and firing of educators), policy formulation, curriculum and textbooks, and teacher education, and scholarships, they were prepared to allow various local administrative, educational, and communal networks and leaders in student affairs. For it served their purpose of increasing their ability to keep the country's restive students under surveillance. Dr. Nyi Nyi recalled that of all the Revolutionary Council members only General Ne Win paid attention to the issue of legitimacy (of the new RC/BSPP government which he headed). The rest of the coup leaders wondered out loud why even bother with legitimacy as the power rested effectively in their hands (Nyi Nyi, 1994). As the most traveled and "most intellectual" of all the Revolutionary Council members, General Ne Win was fully aware, it can be gathered, that it was not enough for the coup group to hold power. It ought to create a citizenry which would accept the RC/BSPP rule as legitimate. That is to say, it ought to mould the collective psyche of the most vociferous opponents of its rule, that is, successive

135 generations of students. Here it is instructive to quote an editorial from The Guardian (1965 May: 4-5)
The rising generation is the generation that will make or mar the future of the country. It is those that belong to it who must be guided along the correct path of thinking and living for the striven-for just and affluent socialist society to materialize and endure. In this task, the schools are the chief means of transformation. As such, it is imperative that they impart the right kind of education instruction; instill into the young the right sense of discipline and responsibility; mold them into character and habits conducive to the promotion of a socialist society. Thus, they can not be left in private hands, though highly reputable some may be, no doubt... (Italics added).

What did the BSPP regime consider as the right kind of thinking? How did the ideology of the BSPP regime discussed earlier in the chapter seep into school curriculum? I now turn to the ideological manipulation of schools and school curriculum by the BSPP regime.

Ideological Control and School Curricula In accordance with the BSPP socialist policies, curriculum contents of ideological sciences at the pre-college level, especially middle and high school levels, were radically changed. Under the BSPP rule, the teaching of Pyithu Niti or Civic Lessons which began in the Japanese occupation period (1942-1945) (Thant, 1961) and continued on during both the brief British rule (1945-47) and the post-independence Parliamentary Democracy period (1948-1962) was ended. 24 History, Economics, and Geography curricula were re-organized along Marxist lines. In the syllabuses for Primary and Middle Schools, special instructions for history teachers were spelled out. Teachers were required to adopt a new revolutionary perspective on history. It is instructive to quote what was deemed as the essence of history teaching by the leaders of the New System Education:
History as a subject is not the chronological accounts of rulers as has been accepted generation after generation. It is rather a study of the human or the events of the working people. It may be called "history of human beings." Here it must be objective. Its
24For

the detailed curricula for Primary and post-primary levels during the brief British Rule see Office of the Superintedent (1945 October) Syllabuses for Primary and Post-Primary Schools: Burma Rangoon. Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary. Regarding the syllabuses for pre-college level schooling under the post-independence civilian rule, see Post-Primary Education Committee (1962) New Syllabus, 1961-62. Rangoon.

136
characteristic must be revolutionary. In other words, it must be commensurate with "scientific historical materialism of revolutionary socialists" (Directorate of Education, 1967: 54-55).

Some of the general goals of instruction in Burmese history, especially in middle and high schools included:
1) to understand the historical development of the working people in the Union of Burma; 2) to instill in students patriotism, the awareness of, and appreciation for, national culture and correct traditions and customs; 3) to drive home the importance of unity and mutual respect among Burma's indigenous national races, of the country's economic development, and of the defense of the Burmese nation and the peoples; 4) to inculcate altruistic spirit among students and desire to carry out their historical duties; and 5) to foster understanding of the benefits of the construction of socialist society and the will to defend such society (Directorate of Education, 1967: 55-56).

Official teachers' guides stressed that teachers follow closely the facts from the syllabi and official textbooks, as well as the pre-determined sequence of history lessons. Needless to say, history textbooks written from a nationalist perspective were to be used as references. More important, teachers were advised to immerse themselves in Marxist history (Directorate of Education, 1967: 28-29). Other important history contents were topics on the historical relations amongst the country's indigenous national races, social decay during the post-independence period under Parliamentary Democracy rule, the continued penetration of Western cultural influences in the country's national educational and cultural life, defects of the bourgeois parliamentary democracy system, deviation from the socialist path under the Parliamentary Democracy rule, insurrections which followed Burma's independence, the Socialist Revolution launched by the Revolutionary Council government of General Ne Win, its roots and justifications, the policies of the Revolutionary Council government, and the on-going socialist construction projects (Mandalay Division Education Department, 1968: 63-64, 91-92). In economics curricula, some of the notable topics were the Burmese Way, the System, the RC's Fundamental Principles in Building Socialist Economy and Society, and essentially Marxist economics (Mandalay Division Education Department, 1968: 198-206). Former Lecturer Kyi May Kaung (1998) recounted that the authorities specifically instructed

137 faculty members from the Institute of Economics in Rangoon not to teach a fundamental conception in economics, that is, "how prices are determined." They had to teach concepts of "supply" and "demand," only as separate lessons as if there existed no direct relations between the two. In Burmese Geography, the accounts of harmonious co-existence of Burma's national races was taught as a key topic (Mandalay Division Education Department, 1968). The study of Burmese language and literature was also to be in line with the socialist policies. For instance, in teaching essay writings, it was suggested that students were to be given assignments that contained socialist ideas. Other topics in essay writings were May Day, Independence Day, Burma's indigenous cultures, traditions, and festivities, students and athletic matters, school councils, etc. (Mandalay Division Education Department, 1970: 48 49). School textbooks -- English, Burmese, and history, especially -- contained stories after stories of General Aung San. Every school child learned of Aung San, his life, and courage, moral integrity, patriotism, self-sacrifices, and impeccable public service and every pupil was taught to recite poems eulogizing particular aspects of Aung San's life. From primary school readers and Burmese history textbooks to high school literature, there were writings about and by Aung San. 25 The justification for either the specific programs of the BSPP regime or the Burmese Way to Socialism was made out of selected interpretations of "Aung-Sanism." To further explicate, students were required to read an essay by Aung San titled "Student's Responsibility," not in its entirety, but as an excerpted version. Little did they know that what was omitted from the very article was Aung San advocating passionately for

history and Burmese literature texts prescribed for K-10 (that is, primary and secondary education) classes. Basic Education Curriculum, Syllabus, and Textbook Committee (1983 & 1987). Burmese History Readers. Rangoon: Ministry of Education, Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

25See

138 freedom of thought or academic freedom and freedom to form student associations (Aung San, 1960-61). 26 For Aung San considered both types of freedom essential to "genuine education." He couched his defense for freedom of thought and expression using both European notions of "academic freedom" and a particular Buddhist text which grants "ultimate freedom to exercise one's own reasoning and thinking in order to challenge authority before one accepts any truth claims." 27 Aung San spoke out against protectionism, be it carried out in the name of the individual, community, or society simply because he considered association and interactions (amongst individuals, communities, and nations) a healthy pre-requisite for cultural and individual growth. On December 8, 1946--slightly over 6 months prior to his assassination-U Aung San spoke at a meeting of The Anglo-Burman Council held in Rangoon. It is instructive to quote Aung San (1946) here when he described his nationalism/internationalism thus:
I am an internationalist, but an internationalist who does not allow himself to be swept off the firm Earth. I recognize both the virtues and limitations of pure nationalism; I love its virtues, I don't allow myself to be blinded by its limitations, though I know that it is not easy for the great majority of any nation to get over these limitations. In so far as nationalism encourages us to love our people and to love others, or at least encourages us not to hate others, there I am completely with nationalism. In so far as nationalism inculcates in us a sense of national and social justice which calls upon us to fight any system that is oppressive or tyranical both in our country and the world, there I am completely with nationalism. I hate Imperialism whether British or Japanese or Burmese.... ... in my view that every nation in the world must be free not only externally (i.e., free from any foreign rule) but also internally. That is to say that every nation in the world being a conglomeration of races and religions should develop such a nationalism as is compatible with the welfare of one and all, irrespective of race or religion or class or sex. This is my nationalism and I believe that such a nationalism is but a complement of true scientific nationalism (pp.193-194).

None of the critical thought that Aung San articulated in his writings and speeches was elevated to the status of "official knowlege." As will be argued in the later chapter on

26Aung

San wrote the article while he was a student at Rangoon University in the 1930s. See Aung San (1960-61) Kyaung Tha Wuttaya (Students' Responsibility). Rangoon University Annual Magazine. Rangoon University 40th Anniversary Commenmorative Issue. pp. 14-16. 27On Buddhism and freedom of thought, see Buddhist Thathana Coucil of Burma (1974) Inguthto Pali Daw. (Trans.) Rangoon: Department of Religious Affairs. pp. 206-210.

139 the poltics of education in the world of students, the regime was only able to omit, but not erase, the writings and speeches or recorded memories people held regarding Aung San's life and thought, which did not lend support to the BSPP policies or practices. As Raymond Williams noted there were many recoverable elements in society's past which would serve as alternative- or counter-hegemonic sources. Regarding the fostering in students of militaristic sentiment or creating the impression of Burma's past as predominantly "militaristic," a cursory look at the (K-10) textbooks is quite revealing. To give an example, out of 25 illustrations contained in the Third Grade (or Standard as it was called in Burma) Burmese History Reader, 16 were either the scenes of battles or military parades, or men carrying swords and other weapons (See Appendix D). The same reader contained an overwhelming number of stories that glorified successful execution of military and royal orders, encouraged loyalty to the rulers, or mythologized ancient soldiers from various Burmese kingdoms such as Mon, Burmese, and Shan (see Basic Education Curriculum, Syllabus, and Textbook Committee, 1987). Past "nation-builders" were depicted as great "warrior-kings" while independence heroes were mythologized as the "Thirty Comrades." School poems and nursery rhymes praised soldiers whereas Burmese readers were filled with small paintings of little, friendly, smiling soldiers helping the people and defending the nation from evils and the enemies (See Appendix E). The ultimate patriot was constructed discursively as a soldier. The soldier was also a model citizen. A first grade Burmese reader contained a little rhyme that reads:
Hey You, Brave Soldier Intelligent and noble man You are helpful and good company You are clever.

Next to this rhyme was a color drawing depicting a soldier with a child's face carrying a bayoneted rifle and crushing evils. In every class (from K through 10), students were organized into 4 different groups and the groups were named after Bandoola, Kyan Sit Tha, Bayin Naung, and Alaung Phaya,

140 the warriors and warrior-kings from Burma's past who became legendary heroes in Burmese folklores. During school sport festivals student athletes marched in different columns which were again named after these warrior-heroes. When the BSPP began recruiting the country's students into its youth wing -- "Lanzin Youth Organization" which was to serve as a reserve pool for the future cadres--the BSPP youth organizers and members alike were taught in military fashion. Youth organizations were modeled after military units in terms of organizational structure, uniform, and command vocabulary. Following the orders from above was taught as the most important leadership quality for these youth member-students. The promotion of military ideology in Burmese education was greatly helped by the fact that every single important post in the entire administration was filled by either a military officer who was still in service or an ex-military officer. Even after the "civilianisation" of the BSPP rule 1974, there were few changes in government in terms of who ran the country -- military officers and ex-officers. Before long the schooled youth were adequately "militarized." A military career became one of the top 3 most attractive employment options along with engineering and medicine. Young, single military officers, especially graduates from the Defense Services Academy -- Burma's Sandhurst -- were hot items on the country's marriage market. Perhaps most important is the monopolization of patriotism and nationalism by the soldiers, that is, there developed a strong sentiment shared amongst the members of the country's armed forces that no one loved and sacrificed as much as they for the welfare of the country and citizenry. Having created the impression in the earlier grades that all the heroes and leaders of the country's past were all warriors and empire builders, the BSPP textbooks from the 4th grade on depicted the BSPP and its essentially military leadership in the most glowing light. Justifications for the coup of 1962 and all the BSPP's policy initiatives appeared in almost every textbook beyond the 4th grade. Conversely, the civilian rule and parliamentary

141 democracy period were portrayed highly negatively. Take a look at some sample questions that appeared, for instance, in the question and answer section of the 4th and 6th grade history textbooks (see Basic Education Curriculum, Syllabus, and Textbook Committee, 1987): Discuss the country's political situation which deteriorated and therefore led to the
emergence of the Revolutionary Council.
Explain how the Revolutionary Council created and implemented policies that benefitted
workers and farmers.
Describe the socialist construction works by the BSPP government.
Discuss the accomplishments of the Caretaker Government (1958-62) headed by General Ne
Win.
In what ways did the Revolutionary Council promote workers' interests?
The fact that these were the topics which were asked repeatedly in annual final examinations ensured that students would pay special attention to them. The question Discuss the country's political situation which deteriorated and therefore led to the emergence of the Revolutionary Council was one of the most frequentedly asked questions on the most important national high school examination and carried 25% percent of the entire history paper. The next section discusses the indigenization of schooling.

Indigenization of Education One crucial issue that deserves mention is the indigenization of education, specifically the system-wide use of the Burmese language as the language of instruction. The cry for the revival of the Burmese language and the dominant Buddhist culture had been vociferous all throughout the country's nationalist struggle (See, for instance, MaungWa,

142 1976). 28 This nationalist attitude toward the dominance of colonial languages after the dissolution of formal empires was widely shared in the newly independent nations following World War II. And there is nothing unique about the Burmese case. However, because Burma is a multi-ethnic society with more than 50 language communities the return to Burmese language as the instructional medium became an issue of political significance. Prior to 1962 the previous governments had planned to use Burmese as the instructional language at the university level, but it never really materialized (Nyi Nyi, 1964). The issue became highly charged in the educational community in Rangoon during the Caretaker Government. Senior academics and university administrators were vehemently opposed to the indigenization of education, that is, the use of Burmese as the instructional language; they reasoned that that would lower the quality of education, especially in science and the technological fields. On the other hand, the younger faculty, the public, and the majority of students supported the measure (Maung Kyaung Tha, 1959-60). There was a multiplicity of motives on the part of the diverse constituents who advocated the use of Burmese language. Some were genuinely nationalistic in their support of this movement while others, such as students who were poor in English, i.e., the bulk of the country's students, had other, utilitarian motives. Under the new BSPP rule, the younger nationalistic educators such as Dr. Nyi Nyi prevailed and English was replaced with Burmese as the language of instruction in higher education. According to Article 152, it was enunciated that while "Burmese is the common

28U

Sein Tin who assumed the pen name Theikpan Maung Wa was one of the three founders of the New Experiment Era, a literary movement which began the 1920's with the aim of creating a modern style of Burmese prose and poetry. All three of them did their advanced studies at Oxford and played a key role in reviving and moderning the Burmese literature and language. They drew on both Burmese literature of the olden days and the European, especially English, literature which they learned through their elite schooling. Himself a member of the "heaven-born" Indian Civil Service (ICS), Theikpan Maung Wa defied a streotypical image of a "colonial bureaucrat" when he put his pen to use for such nationalist agenda as indigenization of education and literature, and cultural practices amongst the Western-educated elites. See Maung Wa, Theikpan (1976) Sarpe Yinkyehmu (Literature/Culture). Mandalay: Ludu Sarpe.

143 language (l)anguages of the other national races may also be taught" (BSPP, 1974). In addition, Article 153 (b) provided that "every citizen shall have the right to freely use one's language and literature which follows one's customs, culture and traditions and profess the religion of his choice. The exercise of this right shall not, however, be to the detriment of national solidarity and socialism which are the basic requirements of the entire Union. Any particular action in this respect which might adversely affect the interests of one or several national races shall be taken only after consulting with and obtaining the consent of those affected." Although the authorities formally allowed teaching of other indigenous languages in schools in minority areas, behind the scenes they put pressure on minority educators and community leaders to relinquish teaching the non-Burman students their languages and literature beyond 2nd grade. In some cases, they banned teaching of minority languages outright. 29 To belabor the obvious, language is often perceived as an effective tool for forging a national identity or culture. However, because of the authoritarian manner in which the indigenization of instruction was carried out the language policy backfired. It created much resentment among the minority students and communities toward the BSPP regime and by extension the dominant Burman communities. Like former colonial societies, the use of one's mother tongue in higher learning was part of the decolonization process addressing specifically the issue of inferiority complexes among the native elites in post-independence Burma. Certainly many educators who were profoundly impacted by the country's nationalist movement were for democratization of knowledge and making it widely accessible. But because, contrary to their own pronouncements regarding minority cultures and language, the BSPP authorities did not allow any space for various communities to participate in the process of forging a new national culture and identity their well-meaning
29This

remark is based on my interviews with several minority students.

144 (?) efforts ended up creating an "internal colonialism," something which Aung San was opposed to. At the outset of the chapter I have pointed out the whimsical nature of decision- and policy-making among the BSPP authorities and the resultant inconsistencies and policy swings. In the early 1980s General Ne Win's favorite daughter Dr. Sanda Win who also held a Major post in Burma Army Medical Corp., failed repeatedly to gain admissions to a post graduate diploma program in medicine in England on the grounds that she did not meet the English proficiency requirements. Consequently, General Ne Win ordered the raising of the country's educational standards. In 1985 the Fifth Party Congress of the Burma Socialist Program Party held in Rangoon decided to give the Ministry of Education two new assignments: to raise national educational standards and to take new educational initiatives which would assist national development (Lanzin Tha Din, 1987). Teachers were given in-service and summer supplementary teacher education courses on how to implement pre-packaged curricula designed to raise the standard of education, up to the level of Britain's General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.). The BSPP authorities made a 180 degree turn when it announced, as part of the new wave of educational reforms, the introduction of English as a mandatory subject beginning with primary grades (Lanzin Tha Din, 1987). Since the inception of the New System Education, the BSPP education, that is, English was taught as a second language beginning at 5th grade. Except in honors and masters programs university instruction was in Burmese. After the new policies all of a sudden university lectures were given in English and kindergarteners were learning English greetings. In the remaining part of this chapter I examine various measures which were designed to produce model socialist citizens who would build and defend Burmese society in accord with the vision laid down by the BSPP authorities.

145 Education and BSPP Revolution: Production of Model Socialists? During its second year in power, the BSPP government formed the Department of Youth Affairs, which was placed under the direct control of the Education Ministry. The Youth Affairs Department was responsible for guiding and supervising the youth of the country so that they would become imbued with patriotism, nationalism, right thinking, and right mental attributes and habits. Towards that goal, the RC Government introduced some educational and hands-on group programs.

Lu Ye Chun or Outstanding Students Summer Camp Of all the educational programs which the Revolutionary Council Government created Lu Ye Chun or Outstanding Students' Summer Camp was a highly significant project. It was created with the aim of realizing the following objectives: 1) to produce academically gifted students; 2) to encourage student participation in practical educational development projects; 3) to foster in students investigative mental habits which would be of use in the promulgation of socialist thinking; 4) to create a core group of individuals dedicated to building a socialist society; and 5) to train these students to become role models in various institutions of higher learning which they would enter in the near future (Hla Shwe, 1983; italics added). U Hla Shwe, the Deputy Minister of Education, (1983) defined Outstanding Students thus:
Lu Ye Chun is someone who is promising for the future of our country. Lu Ye Chun is patient, sacrificial, persistent, and developed all round. But a Lu ye Chun must not be content with present accomplishments. In building a new socialist order you must be examples in terms of spirit and unity for the entire masses of youth in our country. Lu Ye Chun must become the cadres for our country. Then only will the noble objectives of this Outstanding Youth Scheme be realized (p. 75).

Schools (and later universities) nominated academically well-performing students for annual Lu Ye Chun contests, whereby they were tested on general knowledge and physical fitness. Annually about 300 of the contestants were selected and sent to various resorts at the

146 government's expense during summer holidays (March to May) annually. In these camps, these Lu Ye Chun "play and work under the best guidance and supervision" while mixing and mingling with each other and "acquir (ing) a strong sense of comradeship" (The Guardian, 1965 February: 5). Usually the BSPP leaders hosted state dinners for these Lu Ye Chun. A set of paraphernalia including a uniform were invented exclusively for these "Outstanding Youth." The government media -- the only source of news in Burma -- carried headline news stories about, and created an image of, a group of students who were showered with praise and glories. Government leaders treated them as young heroes who would make the greatest contributions to and defend the construction of a Burmese socialist society. 30

Summer Volunteer Camp Other initiatives included Summer Volunteer Camp projects, School Councils, Practical Educational Development projects (i.e., a combination of book learning with manual labor or practice), and Student Festivals. Summer Volunteer Programs were set up with the purpose of: 1) re-channeling mental and physical energies of the country's youth into projects beneficial to the State and to instill 'love of labor' in them, 2) exposing student youth to various national development projects where they learn about, and get connected with, the life of various manual and intellectual workers of the country, 3) providing student youth from various ethnic and cultural backgrounds with an opportunity to mingle and build friendship and solidarity, and 4) transforming the student youth into the youth core of the BSPP (Parti Ye Ya, 1980 May).

30During

the last year of the Socialist Era (1988), nearly 8000 students, some of the best and the brightest, were chosen for this, the highest student honor to be conferred by the socialist State since its inception in 1964 (Kyaw Sein, 1988). And the goals of the Outstanding Youth Program remained unaltered throughout those 25 years (Hla Shwe, 1982, Kyaw Nyein, 1984; & Kyaw Sein, 1988).

147 Various types of summer volunteer programs included industrial and (government's) departmental volunteer projects, volunteer programs for high school graduates, distant sitebased volunteer projects, Rangoon Division general volunteer projects, volunteer projects for university and college students, and a Literary Campaign (Parti Ye Ya, 1972 July & 1980 May). Having displayed sensitivity to the dominant Buddhist world view, Dr. Nyi Nyi, Deputy Minister of Education, justified these programs thus: "One of the various noble acts of Dana or giving-away is donation in the form of one's labor. Of many forms of donations, donating one's labor to one's own country is nobler. And if this attitude has taken root among today's youth, it must be attributed to the Summer Volunteer Programs" (Nyi Nyi, 1976: 89). A repeated appeal to the dominant tradition, albeit, selectively is easily discernible. But there were innovative programs such as "Lanzin Youth Organization" which was aimed at creating particular type of subject population out of the country's youth.

Student Youth for the Socialist Revolution: Lanzin Youth Organization During the first decade of BSPP rule, in spite of the fact that the BSPP leaders were able to control strictly public political process in the country, the construction of the socialist economy proved elusive to the RC government, and the economy barely grew (Tin Maung Maung Than, 1993: 38). In 1967 rice shortages were reported throughout the country and there was widespread discontent with the authorities as the populace was experiencing economic hardships. The RC government re-channeled the negative energies into antiChinese riots, as Beijing was making attempts to export its Cultural Revolution into the neighboring Burma via the country's pro-Communist overseas Chinese community. It was in this political and economic climate that the BSPP moved onto college campuses to organize students as the reserve pool of prospective cadres who would participate in and defend

148 socialist construction efforts undertaken by the Party. 31 As early as 1964 the RC government's official publications were advocating the establishment of a Party-sponsored umbrella organization for youth from various classes. These publications pointed out the growing defiant youth culture which was influenced by the "anarchistic and deviant" behaviors of Hippies in contemporary capitalist societies (Parti Ye Ya, 1965 April) and hence a need for shielding the country's youth from the "decadent" West and keeping them in line. However, it was not until the fourth Party Seminar of the BSPP held in 1971, it was decided that of all the segments of the country, the youth shall be developed as a major social and political force in Burma's march toward socialism (Parti Ye Ya, 1971 June). According to the 1973 census there were 14 million youth of (age under 25) and they made up about half of the country's total population of 28 million (Parti Ye Ya, 1974 May). Out of the 14 million youth, students constituted the majority. 32 On August 4, 1971 Lanzin Lu Nge Organizing Central Committee was formed with Deputy-Minister of Education as the Chair. The Committee was charged with the task of forming age-based Lanzin Youth Organization throughout the country. They were called Lanzin Youth (15-25), Shei Hsaung Youth (10 15), and Teza Youth (6-10) respectively. The goals of the Lanzin youth organization were: 1) to transform the country's youth into the reserve force of the Burma Socialist Program Party; 2) to use them as vehicles in the

31The

RC government blamed various "destructionists" who were bent on obstructing the socialist construction of the BSPP. The Party's official publication Parti Ye Ya writes thus: all those who are opposed to the socialist construction undertaken by the BSPP -- from rightist obstructionists to dogmatic leftists, from indigenous land-owners and bourgenoisie and corrupt government officials to foreign capitalists -- are resorting to various means to attack Burma's socialist construction... One of their tactics is to spread anti-socialist ideas amongst the country's youth on whose shoulder the future socialist construction efforts will rest. These obstructionist forces are now making attempts to recruit the youth for anti-socialist obstructionist works" (p. 47). See Parti Ye Ya (1971 October) Why was Lanzin Youth Organization formed?. Parti Ye Ya. pp. 43-48. 32Youth in Burma made up about half of the total population. There were four types of youth: student, rural, labor, and armed forces. See Myat Aye (1972) Lanzin Lu Nge A-Kyaung Thi Kaung Za Ya. (On Lanzin Youth.) Myawade. 20: 11, 80-83.

149 Party's mass organizing efforts; 3) to propagate the views of the Party amongst the country's youth; 4) to nurture them as the builders and defenders of socialist system (Parti Ye Ya, 1971 October). In 1973 Lanzin Youth Organizing Committees were established in 189 townships across Burma. Beginning in the year 1973 Lanzin Youth Leadership Programs were organized to train the country's youth in major cities such as Mandalay and Rangoon during summer months. In these programs, the Lanzin Youth members were taught "correct political philosophy" and "correct historical and economic perspectives." Also basic military training was included as a subject in these leadership programs as the Lanzin Youth would be called upon to defend the socialist construction work that were being under attack from both leftist and rightist obstructionists. In addition to the strictly political courses, the Summer Youth Art Program, Youth Marching Band Program, Youth Aviation Program and Youth Agricultural Program were also offered in various urban areas throughout Burma (Parti Ye Ya, 1973 May). In order to bring students on university and college campuses under an umbrella youth organization, Lanzin Youth Organizing Departments were opened on as many as 19 universities, colleges, and institutes of higher education (Parti Ye Ya, 1977 July). Members of the Lanzin Youth Organization often worked with various local People's Councils and the Party's mass organizations.

Summary The dawn of BSPP rule was greeted with student unrest on campuses (Forward, 1962 August). Likewise its collapse too was sparked off by campus unrest. In between its rule was challenged chronically by vociferous campus protestors. On their part, the university authorities came up with plans to "make students genuinely interested in their academic studies and to dissuade them from indulging in politics" (The Guardian, 1962 August; italics added). An editorial in The Guardian which appeared a few weeks after the infamous 7 July

150 campus unrest in 1962 advised that "all facilities and encouragement be provided to keep the students entirely occupied with studies and sports. In addition, appropriate measures, it suggested, should be taken to "prevent infiltration of ideologies and political activities either directly or indirectly in Schools, Colleges, and Universities" (The Guardian, 1962 August ). The BSPP regime utilized everything available in Burmese society, history, and culture -from the predominant Buddhist cultural and philosophical traditions through Aung-Sanism to selective interpretations of past military and nationalist history of Burma -- to change the country's educational life to fit their agenda, politically, economically, and culturally. I have argued that the overriding concern for the BSPP authorities was not the educational development of the country, but rather political and ideological control. The regime was prepared to use coercion throughout its 26-year rule and it did crack down violently on any public challenge toward its educational reforms or legitimacy of its rule from the country's educational community. This however, is not to argue that they were not interested in forging a national culture or developing Burma into a modern nation. But as the United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis observed, rather perceptively, "the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." The leaders of the BSPP were men without understanding beyond the characteristically authoritarian culture of military institutions. In his report to the Party Seminar in 1965 the General Secretary of the BSPP General San Yu (BSPP, 1966: 139) noted:
At present individual leadership still persists in place of collective leadership. This is because the majority of cadres are military servicemen and often they mistakenly adopt the ways of command and order in their organizational work. Furthermore, they are inexperienced in collective leadership and lacking maturity in their political and organizational views.

At the time of this writing universities in Burma have been closed for the past two years as the current ruling junta in Rangoon is pursuing its Burmese Way to Capitalism. Since the popular uprisings of 1988 the present generation of students has spent nearly half

151 of the past decade outside classrooms simply because the authorities shut down institutions of higher learning as they have been unable to silence the students without actually keeping them away from schools completely. Although the BSPP rule was officially dismantled, the Party dissolved, and the policies abandoned, General Ne Win and his loyalists who resigned publicly at the height of the popular uprisings in 1988 are believed to be involved in running the country through the behind-the-scenes activities. During the post-BSPP era after 1988, the new military rulers have been confronted with the issue of campus activism. And thus far these soldiers have adopted the same strategy demonstrating the same lack of understanding of cultural formation in which schooling plays a part. Structural reforms were carried out and youth organizations were established. The universities and institutes were further split immediately after the bloody crackdowns of 1988. Teachers and administrators are being "re-educated" on patriotism, nationalism, and the danger of national disintegration, to be vigilant of "destructive elements" amongst the country's students and youth. This time the measures are only more stringent with a permanent presence of heavily armed soldiers near high schools and universities. There is overwhelming evidence suggesting that whatever the official policy articulation and stated intentions of various educational and extra-curricular activities were, their ultimate concern for political control, in the final analysis, motivated the BSPP authorities to reform education. But this is only half of the story. How did members of the country's educational community deal with a regime that apparently lacked an understanding befitting a national leadership and did not seem to think beyond overt and covert manipulation of education for its own political ends? The next chapter analyzes the ways in which influential educators who, during the BSPP rule, rose to prominence handled BSPP education and attempts to shed some light on their motives in working closely with the BSPP regime and their rationale for their role in BSPP educational reforms.

153 Chapter Five

POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN HIGH PLACES

Chapter 4 examines and locates the educational policies and reform initiatives of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government (1962-88) in Burma's Socialist Revolution launched in 1962 and its concomitant economic and political conditions. Whereas the desire for political and, to a lesser extent, ideological control on the part of General Ne Win's (or the BSPP) government guided significantly the process of educational transformation, the General's personal whim was no less important in shaping schooling under his rule. In this chapter, I take a critical look at the ways in which the three most influential members of the country's educational community -- ex-Deputy Minister of Education Dr. Nyi Nyi, ex-Rector of Rangoon University Dr. Chit Swe, and ex-Director of the Department of Technical, Agricultural, and Vocational Education U Ohn Maung -- operated within the Ministry of Education, how they perceived their roles, justified their active cooperation with the BSPP leadership, and what they saw as they walked in the corridors of power in Rangoon. In so doing, I first construct their biographical sketches so that readers may get a fuller understanding of their involvement in education. Also I discuss the changes in the decision-making process in education which took place under the BSPP government bent on institutionalizing "Socialist Democracy" or "Centralism." Furthermore, special attention is paid to the most unique characteristics of Burma's education vis-a-vis schooling in capitalist democracies: the role of the intelligence apparatus and how surveillance affected the professional life of these educators. I then discuss the ways in which the three educators with different ideological orientations reacted to the efforts made by the BSPP government to "educate" them. Also discussed are the existing opportunity structures for educators in

154 general. Finally, I take a critical look at the dictatorial nature of the decision making and the ramifications it had on the country's education. Throughout the chapter I have made attempts to go beyond monocausal explanations with respect to the political and ideological processes in which these three educators were caught. I argue that there were a multiplicity of motives on the part of these three educators who pursued their politico-educational careers under Burma's Socialist government and that the discourse of modernization/development was utilized uniformly by both the political bosses and their educational advisors, albeit towards different ends. The terms "General Ne Win's government," "the Revolutionary Council government," and "the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government" are used interchangeably.

Educator-Politicians in the Service of the Socialist Revolution? Often those professionals who rose to prominence within the Socialist Order under General Ne Win were perceived as "collaborators," "sycophants" and "opportunists" who played a dual role as educator-politicians. And during the many conversations I had with expatriates from Burma who lived through the BSPP period many of them recalled bitterly how sycophantic and self-serving some of the educator-professionals who offered General Ne Win's government their professional services were. More than one expatriate Burmese with Chinese origin, for instance, expressed their disgust and anger toward former DeputyMinister Dr. Nyi Nyi for his role in implementing citizenship-based rather than merit-based admissions policies. " I would slap him with my slippers, if I ever meet him," said one Burmese expatriate. From her perspective, Dr. Nyi Nyi, in spite of his Chinese ancestry, formulated admission policies which barred students whose parents, either one or both, held Foreigner Registration Cards (or "aliens") from receiving professional education, such as

155 engineering, forestry, and medicine. 1 This, they charged, was motivated by his desire to please his nationalist political bosses in solider uniform. Likewise, Dr. Chit Swe, former Rector of Rangoon University who played an instrumental role in the development of the University Computer Center and introducing Computer Science as an academic program, was much disliked for his "sycophantic" Party activities. However, the interviews with these educators paint a different picture more complex and complicated than what, at first glance, appeared to be simple collaborative, self-serving, opportunistic, and sycophantic behavior on the part of these educators. Here I must stress that I am by no means denying that the three high level educators I interviewed for the study might have been guilty of these charges. But I am simply arguing that besides their personal ambitions, access to political power, professional advancement, material rewards, and various forms of privileges, there were found a multiplicity of motives in their having participated actively in educational reform initiatives launched by General Ne Win's government. In what follows I take a critical look at the ways in which the three educators participated in the socialist educational reform initiatives launched throughout General Ne Win's reign (1962-1988). Politics in general is often said to be characterized by patron-client relations, 2 and the politics of education in Burma under the BSPP rule was no exception. There is no question

1FRCs

as they were then known officially were required to report to the local authorities, if they were to travel to places other than their residential town. By law they were excluded from government, administration, law enforcement agencies, as well as from the armed forces. Mostly recent immigrants from China and India were subjected to this citizenship policy. However, there were Burmese of Chinese and Indian ancestry whose arrival to Burma goes back to several hundred years. Many were thoroughly "Burmanized" and held prominent positions in politics (for instance, Aung Gyi, Dr. Maung Maung, Brigadier Maung Maung, Rashchid, Colonel Tan Yu Hsai, Colonel Tin Soe, etc.) both under civilian and military governments after independence. 2Area studies specialists, especially political scientists, have long constructed patron-client relationships as characteristically "Oriental." From this perspective, political connections rather than meritocracy matters in Asian politics. However, this binary position is far too black and white. The same observation can be made regarding politics in Western capitalist nations with their established democratic political systems. One only needs to glance at media reports about political scandals in the US and elsewhere involving "Old Boy Networks."

156 that the influential educators who I had an opportunity to interview for this study were accomplished educators in various higher education and technical education fields. Whether or not their professional qualifications and accomplishments alone would have catapulted them to various influential positions they occupied is a matter of opinion. In order to better understand their rise to prominence, I turn now to their personal backgrounds.

Deputy Minister of Education Dr. Nyi Nyi 3 Dr. Nyi Nyi, who was best identified with the establishment of "New System Education," was a Burmese of Chinese origin from Myaung Mya, a town in Burma's Irrawaddy Delta Region. As a young student growing up at the height of Burma's nationalist struggle in the 1940's, he was influenced by political agitation, mass strike, and, above all, left-leaning nationalism popularized by Bogyoke Aung San. In his high school days, the following popular nationalist slogans invented by the leaders of Doh-Bama, or We, the Burmese Confederation 4 were in the veins of Dr. Nyi Nyi's generation:
Burma is our Country Burmese Language is Our Language Burmese Literature is Our Literature Love Our Nation Cherish Our Literature Uphold Our Language

As a high school student Nyi Nyi would join large crowds of fellow colonial subjects that were gathered to hear the most popular nationalist leader of the day, Bogyoke Aung San. Nyi Nyi developed an early interest in political matters during his high school student days in Myaung Mya. During his undergraduate years, Nyi Nyi became involved in campus activism at the University of Rangoon, and his politics, like many young nationalists, were
3The

following narrative is based largely on the almost 4 hour tape recorded interview with Dr. Nyi Nyi, which I conducted in his UNICEF Office in New York City in November of 1994. To a lesser degree, findings from archival research and interviews with other Burmese expatriates have been integrated into the narrative. Throughout the chapter, direct quotes and paraphrasing are exclusively from this interview, unless noted otherwise. 4For an adequate discussion in English, see Khin Yi, Ma (1988) The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930-1938). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Studies Program.

157 left-leaning. (During the interview in late 1994, he said he had long given up his belief in Leftist ideologies.) His older brother Yin Hpe was also a Burmese nationalist and served as a sergeant in Burma Rifle 4, under the then Commanding Officer Colonel Ne Win, who led Burma's Socialist Revolution in 1962. 5 Education was Dr. Nyi Nyi's first love. Dr. Nyi Nyi recalled that even in his childhood, he wanted to be a teacher and played "running a school." To become a professor was his highest goal in life. Out of his passion for teaching, Dr. Nyi Nyi offered free tutoring throughout his student days. In 1946, Dr. Nyi Nyi, then 15, attended a town meeting held for the Education Inquiry Committee in his home town as a high school student representative and shared his opinion as a teenager. He attended Rangoon University where he received his B.Sc. In the early 1950s, on a State Scholarship Nyi Nyi went to England for further studies in geology at London University. Armed with a Ph.D., Nyi Nyi came back and re-joined the Rangoon University faculty in 1956. After his return from London, he began publishing a series of articles on higher education around the world in Myanmar Ahlin or the Light of Burma, a major Burmese language newspaper, and other popular magazines. At the time of the military coup in 1962, Nyi Nyi was the professor in geology. 6 After the coup of 1962, Major Maung Maung Than Htun, a high school friend of Dr. Nyi Nyi, became a Deputy-Secretary in the Education Ministry in 1963. 7 While universities and colleges in Burma were shut down as a result of campus unrest, Professor Nyi Nyi "dropped by" at his friend's office. His Major friend introduced him to Lt. Colonel Maung

5With

a few exceptions, most prominent military leaders after 1962 served in the Burma Rifle 4 under the commandership of General Ne Win. 6Universities in Burma were modeled after British elite universities. However, unlike Western universities, there is no pay differential in terms of disciplinary hierarchy. Furthermore, all universities are public, and faculty members are government employees or civil servants. 7Commodore Than Pe died shortly after having taken over the Education Ministry, and Colonel Hla Han filled the post.

158 Lwin, also a Deputy-Secretary in Education and Colonel Hla Han, who at the time was in charge of Education Ministry. 8 During their first meeting, Colonel Hla Han, himself one of the few educated RC leaders, lamented on the closure of universities and colleges and the negative implications which school closure was to create for the country's development. Delighted to see a university academic dropping in, Colonel Hla Han "solicited advice" from Professor Nyi Nyi thus: "Saya (i.e., Teacher), it's a real loss for our country to have to close the universities. The kids are not in school. Please advise us what should be done to address the issue." Soon Professor Nyi Nyi wrote and handed Colonel Hla Han and other military leaders in the Education Ministry a paper proposing structural reforms in Burma's higher education. The proposal included three different "models" for a higher education system: the US model with its characteristic autonomous universities and colleges, the USSR model with its professional institutes, and the British model with universities with their smaller constituent colleges. Nyi Nyi highlighted, in his position paper, the fact that creating smaller colleges and institutes by splitting the two existing national universities, Mandalay and Rangoon, would make it easier to administer student bodies. As discussed in Chapter 4 the BSPP leadership was preoccupied with the issue of campus activism because it perceived politically conscious students as one of the two major threats to the new BSPP order. It was to be expected then that the military leaders in charge of education, such as Colonel Hla Han, Colonel Tin Soe, and Colonel Maung Lwin, 9 were immediately attracted to the idea of splitting up the institutions of higher learning from which the lone but vociferous opposition to the military leadership originated. The dispersal of university students through this structural reform (see Chapter 4 for details) could also be

8At

9The

the time the Education Ministry was called the Education Department.
three officers who were involved in educational matters were themselves college-educated.
Colonels Hla Han and Maung Lwin were medical doctors by training and Colonel Tin Soe an
engineer.

159 justified on the grounds that the large and overcrowded educational institutions which Burma's universities had become were not conducive to the delivery of quality education. In addition, this would solve the "discipline problem" prevalent among students. The authorities then decided on the USSR model with separate professional institutes over the US and UK models. Dr. Nyi Nyi stressed that the choice of the USSR model was not ideologically driven but for reasons of efficiency. Soon the Higher Education Act of 1965 was enacted according to which 14 independent colleges and institutes were created, out of the two existing major universities in Mandalay and Rangoon. Professor Nyi Nyi, who was 34 at the time, was hand-picked for the newly created position--Director of the Universities Council, the central governing body for all universities and colleges in Burma. From then on, Nyi Nyi was on his way to becoming the most influential educator within the Education Ministry for the next 9 years. During his tenure in the Ministry of Education (from May 1965-March 1974), Nyi Nyi rose to the rank of Deputy Minister of Education. In his capacity as the Number Two (i.e., second in command) in the Ministry of Education, Dr. Nyi Nyi chaired numerous committees including the State Scholars Selection Committee. As a cabinet member in General Ne Win's government, Dr. Nyi Nyi also served on the Central Executive Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party. Ironically, Dr. Nyi Nyi never made any point of being involved in the Party's affairs beyond the bare minimum that was expected of him. In 1974 General Ne Win transferred Dr. Nyi Nyi, a geologist by training, to the Ministry of Mines and promoted him to the Minister of Mines. Dr. Nyi Nyi held the position a little over a year until he fell off favor with "Number One," i.e., General Ne Win. He was appointed ambassador to Australia before his retirement in the mid-1970s. He later joined UNICEF. Before his retirement a few years ago, he was Special Advisor to the Executive Director of UNICEF.

160 Without a doubt Dr. Nyi Nyi was the most politically connected and influential educator under the BSPP rule. Throughout his 9 years serving within the education ministry in various capacities, Dr. Nyi Nyi certainly left his mark on the country's education, for better or worse.

Rector Dr. Chit Swe 10 Dr. Chit Swe was born in Monywa, a sizable town in Upper Burma and belonged to Dr. Nyi Nyi's generation, although slightly junior to the latter. He received his undergraduate education at Mandalay University. His father was a lawyer, and one of "Thakhin Mya's men," and was involved in the Burmese nationalist movement. 11 While at Mandalay University, he became involved in campus activism. Unlike Dr. Nyi Nyi, who in his more youthful days was attracted to Marxist ideologies, Professor Chit Swe considered himself simply a "patriot." He indicated his position on ideology and politics thus: "No system is perfect. Socialist systems have their own weaknesses, and so do capitalist systems. There are pros and cons in both systems." Dr. Chit Swe worked hard behind the scene for the successful campaign to elect Ko Khin Maung Win, an older married student in philosophy, for President of Mandalay University Student Union. It should be noted here that Khin Maung Win, who later went on to receive his Ph.D. from Yale, became Education Minister (1974-80). Since his more youthful student days, Dr. Chit Swe was interested in doing community service. He stressed that his strong sense of civic responsibility and patriotism
narrative account of Dr. Chit Swe was based on a January 1995 tape-recorded interview with him while he was temporarily living in Urbana, Illinois. Some Burmese expatriates who knew Dr. Chit Swe professionally during his Rangoon University years also informed me in constructing the account. 11Thakhin Mya was a founding member of Burma's Socialist party, and widely respected nationalist leader. He was assassinated along with Aung San and a handful of other nationalist leaders during a cabinet meeting in Rangoon on July 19, 1947.
10This

161 are to be attributed to his politically involved father. In his Mandalay University years, Chit Swe was involved in organizing evening math classes for local students who had to work during the day. This passion for public service remained strong when he finished his studies in England. He commented on his love for the country and for public service thus:
I could have stayed and worked abroad after I got my Ph.D. from London in 1964. My areas of specialty were hot subjects at the time. Even my pupils there later became big names in those fields. I decided to go back to Burma because I wanted to serve our country... I went back because I love my country. I wanted to train or guide the students so that they could become leaders of our country. Whatever the political system I wanted to do my best for the society.

Referring to the socialist era and his high level involvement with the party's leadership regarding universities and math and science education, "Well, we didn't have a capitalist system, but a socialist system, then. So I decided to help make it better. If it were capitalist system, I would have done the same thing." He observed:
Since the same mathematics was taught uniformly in both Socialist and Capitalist countries, we did not necessarily have to couch our subject in Socialist vocabulary (during the BSPP period).

As early as 1966, Dr. Chit Swe chaired the newly formed Mathematics Curriculum Development Committee, in the Ministry of Education. In 1968 he submitted a paper at a National Education Seminar sponsored by the Ministry of Education. Echoing the socialist educational policies of the RC government, Chit Swe's paper argued for the vital role math and science should have in modernizing Burma via the Burmese Way to Socialism. His advocacy for the introduction of "New Math" and computer technology became controversial subjects among the country's leading academics including scientists, mathematicians, and other specialists for various reasons including "professional jealousies." Following the 1974-75 nationwide student unrest, Dr. Chit Swe wrote a position paper on the establishment of new community-based Regional Colleges. He was one of the academics who proposed the idea of further breaking up the country's universities and colleges in the form of Regional Colleges. His original proposal to launch another wave of structural reforms in higher education was submitted to Dr. Khin Maung Win, the Minister

162 of Education at the time through U San Tha Aung, Director General of the Higher Education Department. Before the idea materialized Dr. Chit Swe left for the US on a Fulbright Fellowship to do a year-long sabbatical at the University of California at Santa Cruz. The year was 1976. Upon his return, the plan to build Regional Colleges was well under way. To his dismay, Chit Swe found that those who originally opposed the idea were playing leading roles in the Regional College project. He himself was kept out of it. In the early 1980's a new Education Minister, ex-Colonel Kyaw Nyein, undertook new educational reform initiatives aimed at raising the quality of education and educational efficiency. Chit Swe then became one of the most visible educators in the country. He was responsible for the establishment of the University Computer Science Center in Burma and institutionalizing computer science instruction at Rangoon University. 12 Dr. Chit Swe was a member of the Burma Socialist Program Party and underwent the 4-months long elite cadre training at the Central Institute of Political Science, a rite of passage for those who made it within the BSPP hierarchy. He was also the Commanding Officer, with the rank of Major, of the University Training Corp., the Burmese equivalent of the Reserve Officiers' Training Corp. (ROTC) in the US. Politically, being the Chair of the Lanzin Youth Organizing Committee at Rangoon University, Chit Swe espoused the Party's official socialist views in his public speeches during various mass gatherings, including those sponsored by Rangoon University Lanzin Youth Organization, or the official youth wing of the Party. Regarding his political role, Dr. Chit Swe remarked, with a huge smile, that he encouraged Rangoon University students who joined the Lanzin Youth Organization to be critically minded and to participate in discussions about the Party's ideology and current affairs. He said laughingly,
When I became the Chair of the Lanzin Youth Organizing Committee on campus, all my students became rebels, you know. Lanzin Youth folks were scared of my students. Why? My kids would raise critical questions during public forums or discussions.
12Before

computer science was introduced as a degree program medicine and engineering were the most popular programs. But computer science became the most popular beginning in the mid-1980s.

163 Dr. Chit Swe held the Rectorship of Rangoon University and was also a member of the State Scholar Selection Committee. He was fired by the State Law and Order Restoration Council in the months following the student uprisings in 1988. After he was removed from his position, he left the country with his family and worked for the United Nations in Bangkok temporarily.

Director U Ohn Maung 13 Unlike the aforementioned two prominent figures, U Ohn Maung, former Director of Technical, Agricultural, and Vocational Education in the Ministry of Education in the 1980s, was not a university-based educator; nor was he well-known to the public in general. However, by virtue of his having been a confidante of Education Minster U Kyaw Nyein (1980-86), U Ohn Maung occupied a uniquely influential position within the Ministry. U Ohn Maung was born in May Myo, a small up-country colonial town about 40 miles north of Mandalay. He belonged to the same generation as Chit Swe and Nyi Nyi. His father was a Warrant Officer in the Burma Army serving as administrative chief in Northern Command Headquarters. Through his job, U Ohn Maung's father came to know many top leaders of the Burma Army, including General Ne Win and his deputy General San Yu, Chairman and General Secretary of the Burma Socialist Program Party respectively. Both generals addressed his father as "Ahba" or "Daddy" affectionately. In the words of Director Ohn Maung, "my father was Ne Win's man." This connection proved to be beneficial to his father as the generals promoted him to the rank of Captain and transferred him to the War Office or Defense Ministry in Rangoon, the position U Ohn Maung's father kept until the age of 72. U Ohn Maung's older brother Kyaw Win was a captain in the Burma Air Force and

13U

Ohn Maung still lives in Rangoon, Burma. The June 1995 tape-recorded interview on the basis of which the narrative was pieced together was carried out while he was in San Jose, California visiting his daughter who lives there. Unlike the other two, I did not have an opportunity to double-check the interview information.

164 killed in a plane crash. This familial background and military connection was not lost on Minister Kyaw Nyein. As U Ohn Maung said, "the Minister knew my family background." U Ohn Maung studied electrical engineering at Rangoon University in the early 1950s. He joined the teaching staff at the Government Technical Institute at Insein. 14 During Prime Minister U Nu's administration, U Ohn Maung was sent as a State's Scholar to study technical education at the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. In 1969, he was promoted to lecturer position and later made Principal of the Government Technical Institute at Kalaw, Shan State, Eastern Burma. In 1977 he was transferred back to Rangoon and appointed Education Officer in the Department of Technical, Agricultural, and Vocational Education, Ministry of Education. In 1981, U Ohn Maung became Deputy Director in the same department. Before his retirement in 1989, he was Director of the department. What distinguishes this technocrat from the two previous experts -- Chit Swe and Nyi Nyi -- is his lack of interest in politics. As a devout Roman Catholic with Eurasian ancestry, U Ohn Maung did not believe in such atheistic doctrines as the "Burmese Way to Socialism" from the very beginning. He described his view on ideology and politics thus:
You see, I am a Christian. I am an RC. It (i.e., the Burmese Way to Socialism) is against my personal belief. It is Communism.

He simply considered the rise of General Ne Win's socialist regime "bad luck." The way he coped with this bad luck was simple: "You pray. They (the Party) don't interfere

14The

Government Technical Institute (GTI) at Insein in Burma was a reputable professional institute in Southeast Asia, which granted professional credentials in various engineering and technical fields. There were a small number of foreign students from neighboring countries such as Singapore. There were 2 GTIs in Insein and Mandalay at the time of the coup in 1962. In 1972, 3 more institutes were built, and in 1990 there were 11 GTIs in the country. These 3 year non-degree granting institutes attract people from lower socio-economic backgrounds, as their curriculum is geared toward entry level, technical jobs in various government projects, as opposed to the elite Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) which also train Burma's engineers. Numerically, GTI students constitute less than 10% of the total student population in higher education. Unlike the prestigious RIT (and other fullfledged universities), GTIs are not hotbeds of radicalism. However, GTI students would follow the lead of other campuses, in times of nation-wide student uprisings. An employment-oriented student body may account for this lack of campus activism. See Ohn Maung, Director (1995) Audiocasette tape-recorded interview. San Jose, California.

165 with your religious practice... One thing good about the Burmese people is that they call themselves Communists or Socialists, but they continue to live their Buddhist way of life anyway." However, U Ohn Maung became a member of the Burma Socialist Program Party in 1974, the year the Party launched its first membership drive in order to transform itself from the "Party of Cadres" to the "Mass Party." Why would a devout Roman Catholic with no interest in politics join the Burma Socialist Program Party? U Ohn Maung explained:
The (local) Party Secretary at Insein Township was my wife's classmate. He talked me into it, and within a year, I was granted Tin Byei or Full-fledged Cadre status. Why? Because the guy knew me and my (immediate) family well.

As a card-carrying member of the Party, U Ohn Maung was obligated to attend local Class Cell meetings held twice a year. The meetings usually lasted about an hour and he just "dozed off" most of the time. In the early 1980s, when he became a confidante of Education Minister Kyaw Nyein the latter made him attend the 4-month long ideological training at the Central Institute of Political Science located on the outskirts of Rangoon. For Minister Kyaw Nyein wanted to make sure his loyal subordinate underwent the training meant for those who would be assigned influential posts. I turn now to the ways in which these three individuals with different political orientations and personal backgrounds who were differently situated within the power hierarchy in Burma's Education Ministry influenced, and were influenced by, Burma's BSPP education system.

Co-optation, Political Symbiosis, and Pragmatism: Educators and the Party The 17-member Revolutionary Council government was made up entirely of military officers. Of the 17 members, 2 were medical doctors by profession and one was a Western educated naval commodore, and the rest were either high school or college drop-outs (See Appendix B). None had any professional experience in education. After the initial, bloody

166 crackdown on student protests on Rangoon University campus in July 1962, the primary concern on the part of the military leaders was to reign in unruly students, especially those at the university. Many politically active students were hostile to General Ne Win and his heavy-handed approach towards "discipline problem" amongst students during his stay in power as head of the 17 months-long Caretaker Government (1958-60). It was during the Caretaker Government that scores of student activists and other political prisoners were shipped to the Coco Islands off Burma's Southern Coast in the Andaman Sea for "security reasons" where they served life sentences without any opportunity for family visits. Furthermore, the General's government had co-opted a handful of prominent Leftist student leaders such as Hla Win and Soe Thein by having given them influential positions in Education Department (or Ministry). 15 Still the military leadership felt a need to solicit support and cooperation from amongst the country's educators familiar with the workings of schools and universities as they "had no experience dealing with university students or education" (Nyi Nyi, 1994). During his opening address to the Party Seminar in 1965, BSPP Chairman General Ne Win said,"if it is asked what we intend to do with the saboteurs and self-seekers we will reply that we intend to absorb them into our Party. We intend, to the best of our capabilities, to absorb them for the sake of the solidarity of the Union. If we wish to serve the interests of the whole country we will have to give those elements an opportunity to mend and serve. Even if the saboteurs will not change their hearts we must first try to absorb and organize them before we take action against them" (BSPP, 1966: 10). Educators on their part needed political support and patronage to put their ideas into practice or simply for their career advancement. Unlike their counterparts in the "First World," educators in Burma's higher education had limited career and economic

15Hla

Win, a former student leader and Special Education Officer, was appointed Secretary of the Universities Central Council, which was established in 1964 . The Council oversaw the running of all 17 universities, colleges, and professional institutes. See Thiha, Maung (1965 August) Sa-hnit Thit Tekkatho Meik-sak. (Introduction to the New System University). Ngwe Ta Yi. v.62, pp.20-24.

167 opportunities outside universities and colleges, all of which were state-run institutions. The following observation which John Israel made regarding the establishment intellectuals in China under Mao's government appears to hold for Burma's establishment educators. Israel (1986: x) writes:
Anti-establishment intellectuals in China have less to gain and more to lose than their American counterparts. Though an American Marxist may be denied the chairmanship of a political science department in the suburbs of the nation's capital, professional competence offers a certain degree of protection in a pluralistic society. In China, intellectuals become political critics at their own risk. Establishment intellectuals, on the other hand, enjoy protection and privileges available in China only through powerful bureaucratic allies. By playing assigned roles as supporters of the establishment and servants of the state, they gain patriotic self-esteem, outlets for their publications, power over their peers, and opportunities for scarce commodities such as housing and travel abroad.

Furthermore the military leadership created an atmosphere of insidious fear amongst the country's educators. Not only did they come to fear the loss of employment and other punitive measures such as imprisonment, the educators quickly realized that their children too, would have to pay the price for the educator-parents' oppositional acts toward the new leaders. As Dr. Nyi Nyi mentioned that the children whose parents were black-listed by the authorities were denied state's scholarship awards and other opportunities (Nyi Nyi, 1994). I will say more on this fear in Burmese education later in the chapter. In addition, unlike their First World counterparts, nation-building was a commonly shared concern for many native educators. The "late nationalist" generation who came of age in the post-colonial or -independence era was naturally anxious to help build their newly independent country into a modern nation. The three educators interviewed for the study lived through Burma's nationalist struggle and belonged to this generation. Indeed they had their own visions for a free Burma which may or may not have been identical to the one the military leaders wished to realize. Many of those who belonged to that generation by and large were influenced by the nationalist dream of building an independent nation. Prior to the coup of 1962 most Burmese state scholars who studied at prestigious universities in the

168 West returned home willingly often having chosen to give up career opportunities over using their training and education for their newly independent native country. In the new social order which was being forged by the military leaders Dr. Nyi Nyi, Professor of Geology at Rangoon University at the time of the 1962 coup, saw an opportunity to turn his ideas into reality. He offered the authorities in charge of the country's education department his knowledge of higher education to be tapped into. Dr. Nyi Nyi justified his close cooperation and services to the military leadership thus:
Initially, I had this 'wait and see' attitude toward the RC government. That's why, I didn't even join the Party. But later when university education was about to go down the drain, I decided to give them advise. I was motivated by the desire to do something about the (educational) situation. While there was such confusion in university education, I seized the opportunity to help make some changes in university education. The Party really needed support from the educated, the intellectuals. In the earlier period, I was the only one they could use in education.

Here I found corroborating evidence in support of Dr. Nyi Nyi's claim that he was seriously concerned about university education in the country. As early as January 1959, under the pseudonym Maung Pyinnya, Dr. Nyi Nyi was publishing critical essays on the state of Burma's higher education (Maung Pyinnya, 1960-61). In Chapter 4 I stressed that the most pressing issue for the RC leaders, as far as Burma's education was concerned, was political control of campus activism. This pre occupation on the part of the RC leaders, which was coupled with the genuine concerns for the negative implications of the closure of schools on the country's development, as indicated clearly by several educated military leaders such as Colonel Hla Han, facilitated the establishment of a symbiosis between ambitious members of the country's educational community and the powers that be. Each party needed the other, for their own agendas. Former Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi perceived himself as someone who was allowed "a free hand" in educational matters. When asked if he felt he was used by the regime, he responded thus:
I don't think I was used by them for the political ends. They saw me as an educated person. They also thought highly of a Ph.D., perhaps unduly, because many of them barely finished

169
high school. They did not interfere much in education especially because they did not know how to handle education.

One of his contemporaries described him as a "staff officer," that is, someone who is very skilled and effective in executing orders from above. While describing Dr. Nyi Nyi as "brilliant," Dr. Kyaw Thet (1995), a former close friend of General Ne Win and former Professor of History at Rangoon University, observed that "they (the political authorities) used him (Dr. Nyi Nyi)." In my judgment, the term "symbiosis" characterizes more aptly the nature of relations between the two. Unlike Dr. Nyi Nyi, Dr. Chit Swe who was several years junior to the former claimed that he attempted to stay away from the BSPP government. However, contrary to his claim, as early 1968, Dr. Chit Swe, in his capacities as Professor of Mathematics at Rangoon University, submitted a paper emphasizing the importance of science and technology in modernizing the country. Dr. Chit Swe argued that math instruction ought to assume paramount importance (and, by extension, the elevated status and role of mathematicians). Therefore there was an urgent need for reforming mathematics education. Again in 1976, right after major student protests on campuses across the country, Dr. Chit Swe wrote another paper which laid out the blueprint for structural reforms in Burmese higher education, that is, further splitting the existing universities and colleges into smaller colleges in the form of 2-year regional colleges. According to Dr. Chit Swe, the idea of establishing regional colleges was appealing to him because it would address several issues at once. In his own words:
Well, I was thinking about the root causes of this chronic (campus) unrest and what should be done about it. Also I very much liked the idea of a university which is involved in the development of the local community. I looked at land grant universities and community colleges in the US. Servicing local communities is an essential function of these universities and colleges.

170 Before the idea attracted the authorities, whose primary concern was control of university students who had once again become openly defiant of the military leadership 16 Dr. Chit Swe left Burma for the United States on a year-long sabatical. Throughout our conversation, Dr. Chit Swe maintained that he did everything "for the love of the country." He stressed that his cooperation or alliance with the regime was an absolute necessity for any educator who wished to contribute to the country's education. For Dr. Chit Swe, it was a pragmatic decision. Chit Swe recalled thus:
You know, I had lots of ideas as to how to improve our education. But if you didn't toe the Party line or if you stayed out of the political process, you couldn't do anything. It was very frustrating. Finally, I decided that I would work within the system. That was a pragmatic choice, which would better position me to put my ideas into practice.

Unlike Dr. Nyi Nyi, who did not see himself as having been used by General Ne Win's government, Dr. Chit Swe characterized his relationship with the authorities thus:
They (the authorities) would call you Sayagyi or Big Teacher. They would solicit your ideas and proposals. If your ideas suited their agenda, they would use them for their political ends. Or they would instruct you to do what they wanted. Simply put, we perceived ourselves as Khine-hpat or their tools. But those of us who were acutely aware (of our situation), we looked for ways to do our best in spite of the prevailing (difficult) circumstances.

Director U Ohn Maung, who walked in the corridors of power in the Ministry of Education under several education ministers, especially ex-Colonel Kyaw Nyein, asserted that he was sincere in his role as an educator and Minister Kyaw Nyein's confidant. "He (Minister Kyaw Nyein) knew that I was sincere. He knew that I had no political ambitions. That what I was doing was good for the country. Some people cared about their own popularity, and Kyaw Nyein was sharp enough to know that," Director Ohn Maung said having explained the nature of his relationship with his former boss. With a huge smile on his face, Director U Ohn Maung recalled:
Every minister was very friendly to me. Minister Dr. Khin Maung Win called me 'Ambassador' as I was able to bring the Japanese ODA (that is, Overseas Development Aid Fund) for his Regional College project. Usually Minister Kyaw Nyein made me accompany him whenever he made a tour in the country. And he always asked for my opinion. And I
16I

give a brief overview of campus activism in Burma in Chapter 7 on educational politics and students.

171
knew how to cool him down whenever he went ballistic about something. Despite my halfcast status, I didn't feel discriminated against. I don't know if I am a lucky fellow.

Whether these educators formed a political symbiosis out of pragmatism or they were simply co-opted by the government is a matter of personal opinion. Offering a general type of insight into the relationship between the experts and the powers that be, Guy Benveniste (1972) remarks that "for many experts the only relevant actor is the Prince, who happens to pay wages, supply office space, provide status, and offer access to the substance of the research; these evident attributes make the Prince an attractive target for expert's attention" (p.13). In light of Burma's political context which was created under the BSPP rule it was hardly surprising that the educators who wished to remain in the country and at the same time, put their learned ideas into practice worked with the military leadership. To them cooperation with the military leadership was not one of several alternatives; it was one and the only choice. Burmese had always been known to be immobile as a people who were too attached to their birthplace. 17 It was indeed the only pragmatic choice one was led to make forcibly. They were caught in the whirlwind of changes in education wrought by the Burma Socialist Program Party government. What were these changes to which the three educators were responding?

From Professional Autonomy to Socialist Democracy in Education? Under previous civilian governments, educational bureaucrats, by and large, enjoyed professional autonomy. Most of these professionals received their education in prestigious universities in the West. The following excerpt from an editorial of a national professional publication reflects this space for professionals:

17There

was a gradual flow of intellectuals and professionals who were leaving the country as the country was being turned into a police state under the BSPP rule. But it was not until the closing days of the BSPP rule and immediately after its formal dissolution that there was an exodus of Burmese intelligentsia. Currently many Thai universities are staffed with exile-teachers from Burma, especially in English, science, math, and engineering fields.

172
The primary objective of our Pyinnya Da-Zaung magazine is to keep our teachers updated on the developments in curriculum and instructional fields, specifically the latest pedagogical methods. What we want to drive home for our readers is that our magazine concerns itself exclusively with educational matters....Our magazine is not a mouthpiece for any particular political party...We consider it our responsibility to offer our independent, and constructive criticism toward any educational project or policy of the government that we deem disadvantageous to our students, our teachers, our parents, and the public (Pyinnya DaZaung, 1956: 1).

The presence of professional autonomy in education during the parliamentary must be attributed not only to the country's Buddhist cultural tradition which typically holds educators in high esteem, but to the pro-intellectual nature of the civilian leadership of the country. Prime Minister U Nu and other top leaders such as U Ba Swe 18 and U Kyaw Nyein were part of a more intellectual type, university-based faction of young nationalist leaders as opposed to the less educated faction to which the 1962 coup leader General Ne Win belonged. In addition, one of the most important characteristics that distinguished the new RC government from the civilian government of U Nu, its predecessor, was its modus operandi. The 17-member RC managed the affairs of the country through a direct chain of command. At the outset the Burma Socialist Program Party was established to serve as the vanguard of the socialist revolution. The nucleus of the party was drawn almost exclusively from the rank and file of the Armed Forces (Wiant, 1982). Military officers were put in charge of various government departments, including the Ministry of Education. After the coup in 1962, the Education Ministry was re-organized along the lines of centralism. Political loyalty and connections, rather than expertise, became deciding factors in who "got ahead" in the country's educational hierarchy. Reflecting the new changes in the country's civil administration, career bureaucrats in education (that is, those who held director, commissioner, or inspector positions in the Ministry of Education), as well as educators (i.e., university academics, teachers, principals) found themselves in a new set of

18In

Chapter 4 I discussed how U Ba Swe made attempts to create a hybrid philosophy drawing on both Marxism and Buddhist philosophy.

173 power relations. The decision-making no longer rested in the hands of educational experts. In the words of Director Ohn Maung, "(Unlike during the Parliament Democracy period) decision making was no longer an exclusive domain of educational bureaucrats. Rather it became collective in nature." Director U Ohn Maung recalled thus:
Before the Revolutionary Council government, Principals (of Government Technical Institutes) had the power to hire and fire. After educational reforms (in technical and vocational education fields) were launched by the RC government, decision making in education became a collective responsibility. It was quite a good reform. There was representation from teachers. We could give principals and directors suggestions and feedback. Previously there was no structure which allowed input from various constituents. During the RC and later BSPP period, power was delegated right downward.

Likewise Dr. Nyi Nyi pointed out that professors, lecturers, assistant lecturers, and sometimes even young tutors were involved in this political process. But Dr. Nyi Nyi admitted that it was not practicable to involve a large number of people from the grassroots in the final phase of decision making although it was possible for the new educational leaders to solicit input from the grassroots. 19 In his article titled "Fundamental Changes in Educational Policy during the Revolutionary Council Government," Dr. Nyi Nyi ( 1970) pointed out that the Education Department of the RC Government sponsored three important national seminars on education: the University Education Seminar in Rangoon in April 1964, a General Education Seminar in Mandalay in October 1964, and Teacher Education Seminar in Rangoon in May 1965. During these seminars high ranking officials from the Department of Education including Minister Colonel Hla Han, educational bureaucrats, administrators, researchers, teacher educators, independent scholars researchers, and interested individuals outside of education ministry brainstormed for the establishment of a new educational system in accord with the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology. Based on seminar discussions, new

is a structural dilemma that confronts all participatory decision-making processes, not just educational decision making and planning in Burma under the BSPP rule. See Benveniste, G. (1972) The Politics of Expertise. Berkeley: The Glendessary Press. pp.12-17.

19This

174 educational laws--the University Education Law of 1964 and Basic Education Law of 1965- were drafted (Nyi Nyi, 1970 & 1994). Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994) recalled that throughout his tenure in the Education Ministry consultations were made with select groups of educators including teachers, administrators, and inspectors during his inspections and field trips to various regions of the country. He added:
In the 1960s people were quite motivated to build a new nation. There was much creative energy out there. It was a very good environment to work in. Economically, people weren't that poor either.

Various administrative and academic councils were formed at all levels of schooling. Besides educators (such as administrators and faculty members), membership in these councils which influenced educational policies and initiatives also included representatives from various mass organizations (of the Party), journalists from the state media, and influential writers. Indeed educational decision making process became more participatory. There were a number of issues that are worth noting. First, Dr. Nyi Nyi and his peers who came to fill influential positions belonged to the "late nationalist" generation. In their childhood, they witnessed, and were profoundly impacted by various strands of nationalist thought and practices. There were competing versions of nationalism. As I pointed out in Chapter 3 Burmese nationalism was generally synonymous with Marxist political thought, specifically socialism. And many of the intellectuals and educators held leftist nationalist views. But there was gradation. Some were more "red" than the others. And the BSPP political context in which they all had to function was not tolerant of the free interplay of various nationalist visions. As indicated by the earlier remarks by Dr. Chit Swe the educators who wished their voices heard had to toe the BSPP official line. But the educators such as Dr. Nyi Nyi who had the right connections and spoke the right language found ample

175 opportunities to appropriate BSPP ideology for their own agenda. Dr. Nyi Nyi therefore found the working environment under the BSPP rule to be "good." 20 Second, people like Dr. Chit Swe who did not really care about the ideology "stuff," but simply wanted to advocate the importance of math and science and hence their own profession were unable to find a foothold in the early days of the BSPP rule. Third, regardless of local politics amongst the professionals with competing versions of Burmese nationalism and patriotism, as well as varying degrees of personal ambition, the parameters for the ideological contestation and exchange were set by the BSPP authorities and placed under the gaze of the intelligence network. Participation of educators in the newly emerging political process was, for the most part, to be confined to implementation aspect of the larger Socialist policy framework. In some cases, educators were allowed to formulate new educational initiatives insofar as these initiatives served the overall objectives of the socialist government. During the 1965 BSPP Party Seminar Chairman General Ne Win mentioned that his government intended to absorb even "saboteurs and self-seekers." In his judgment, "just because a man is in opposition we should not discard him" (BSPP, 1966: 10). However, the gap between the official rhetoric and realities began to emerge. After having heard the tales of outspoken educators who met with exemplary punishments no one really dared offer critical comments on education policies or measures. This limited tolerance of criticisms and allowance of bottom-up initiatives parallels China's intellectual and educational climate. Vera Schwarcz (1986: 254) observes that "(a) certain amount of refutation of wrong ideas has been sanctioned in the realm of the intellectuals' own expertise. Thus, for example, wrong judgments in historical criticism, in literary policy, and even in scientific practice are being rectified daily. It is more

20According

to one interviewee, Dr. Nyi Nyi would plant his "men" in public forums and seminars in order to make his proposals and initiatives look broad-based.

176 problematic when the intellectuals take their critical point of view into the realm of politics, over-spilling the boundaries of specialization." Now, referring back to the Burmese education and centralism, the very limited amount of professional autonomy and intellectual freedom was indeed a logical outcome of the larger political game which was almost completely controlled by those military officers whose modus operandi was a rigid chain of command. In the next section I examine the nature of decision making in education.

Pseudo-military Chain of Command in Educational Decision Making During the interview with me, Dr. Nyi Nyi stated that during his 9 year stay in the Ministry of Education he had "a free hand" in carrying out educational reform initiatives known as "New System Education." However, from the very beginning, a chain of command was clearly established with General Ne Win at the top, who Dr. Nyi Nyi described as "the smartest, most historically minded, and most intellectual" of all the RC leaders. The relationship between General Ne Win and his lieutenants was characterized by "extreme fear" (Nyi Nyi, 1994). Dr. Nyi Nyi recalled that unlike the "Number One," as General Ne Win was nicknamed, the rest of the Revolutionary Council had little concern as to the issue of legitimacy of their military government (in the eyes of the international community) or how they would be recorded in history. The General surrounded himself with civilian advisors who had expertise on Burmese history, law, literature, international law, etc. Revolutionary Council (RC) member in charge of the Education Department Colonel Hla Han served as the link between Dr. Nyi Nyi and higher authorities, namely General Ne Win, while Dr. Nyi Nyi was a linchpin in the educational community, as far as the RC was concerned. While the general policy framework was formulated in General Ne Win's inner

177 circle, 21 the elaboration of specific policies and corresponding laws, in this case, educational policies and laws were carried out by members of the Universities Council such as Colonel Hla Han, Colonel Maung Lwin, Colonel Tin Soe, and civilian experts including Dr. Nyi Nyi. To be sure, besides Dr. Nyi Nyi there was involvement by other experts and scholars (for instance, members of the Burmese Commission) in this process. But Dr. Nyi Nyi was the most influential and most politically well-placed educator. According to Dr. Nyi Nyi, the RC government were concerned more with personnel affairs, that is, matters concerning security clearance and political loyalty of various educators and professionals. Dr. Nyi Nyi observed:
They (the RC government) did not really care about educational policies. They were not involved in writing those policies. They were more concerned about who was loyal to them or trustworthy. In those days, they were making decisions (for instance, hiring and firing) arbitrarily.

The day-to-day management of the Educational Ministry/Department was left in the hands of the Education Ministry staff and officials. However, it was necessary to brief General Ne Win on the progress of various educational reforms, the task which was usually carried out by Colonel Hla Han. This was important primarily because without General Ne Win's approval, no funding could be secured. Dr. Nyi Nyi would generally sound out new initiatives and ideas to Colonel Hla Han. Cognizant of what kind of initiatives would be acceptable to General Ne Win, Colonel Hla Han would give Dr. Nyi Nyi the green light for implementing various new initiatives. Therefore, initiatives as significant as abolishing the replacement of English with Burmese as the language of instruction could be, and was, carried out without having had to receive prior approval from General Ne Win. In cases
21Writing

under a pen name as Ko Ko Maung, U Chit Hlaing, a former staff member at the Army's Psychological Warfare Department and the principal ideologue in General Ne Win's inner circle, further elaborated on the educational policy framework and its goals, in a Burmese language article titled "What is Socialist Education?" in Myawadee, a popular magazine published by the "Psych War" Department to carry out their anti-Communist public relations work. See Ko Ko Maung (1964 August) Hso-shei-lit Pyinnya-ye Hso-da Ba-le. (What is Socialist Education?). Myawadee. 12: 10, 33 34. Myawade was established in the early 1950s as part of an anti-Communist propaganda campaign directed by the Army's "Psych War" Department.

178 where Colonel Hla Han felt uneasy or unsure how the Number One would react, he would instruct Dr. Nyi Nyi to put a hold on a given proposed project until clearance was obtained from General Ne Win who was generally more pre-occupied with the security and economic affairs of the country. Dr. Nyi Nyi mentioned that the Education Minister Colonel Hla Han was "very personable, and respectful of us (civilian educators)." Dr. Nyi Nyi revealed the nature of the relationship Colonel Hla Han had with his subordinates in the Education Ministry thus:
If we came up with a new initiative, he would take it directly to General Ne Win. If he (Colonel Hla Han) thought U Ne Win would not approve an idea--the ideas that were considered 'dangerous,' then Colonel Hla Han would tell us not to pursue it yet. We felt we were protected. So we were shielded.

Whether the idea to mobilize Burma's educational community, both inside and outside academia, by holding educational seminars presided over by Colonel Hla Han came from Dr. Nyi Nyi himself or not is not clear. However, it was possible that Dr. Nyi Nyi had a hand in mobilizing these educators as a series of seminars designed to solicit support, suggestions, and cooperation from educators took place subsequent to his meetings with the top leaders in charge of education, such as Colonel Hla Han and Major Ye Htun. One institution which was instrumental in ensuring that the RC's educational reforms were not obstructed was the intelligence agency directly controlled by General Ne Win himself. A discussion of the politics of education would be incomplete without shedding some light on the role of surveillance and fear in Burma's educational life.

Mechanisms of Surveillance and Fear and Intolerance in Burma's Education In his famous work "The Prince" Machiavelli (1981: 98) wrote, "on this question of being loved or feared, I conclude that since men love as they please but fear when the prince pleases, a wise prince should rely on what he controls, not on what he cannot control." Despite differences in terms of their ideological make-up or native cultures, all governments share one thing: reliance on an intelligence network supposed to aid its administrative and

179 security affairs (and to induce fear in the citizenry). 22 However, what is unique about authoritarian governments is the degree to which they rely on mechanisms of surveillance including extensive networks of intelligence workers, as well as paid informers. Writing several centuries after Machiavelli published his work, the French theorist Althusser (1971) articulated the way the capitalist state established and maintained its hegemony. Although the Althusserian reading of ideological domination and control was discredited as it was too neatly formulated and too abstract to come close the more messy realities (see, for instance, Willis, 1977: 175) his insights regarding the general mechanisms which the powers that be (or Capitalist State, in Althusser's case), mobilize to accomplish their domination are generally true. That is to say, State Ideological Apparatuses and Repressive Apparatuses are always present to some degree. Perhaps it is rather ironic that these apparatuses are far more discernible in more centralized, that is, authoritarian leftist political contexts. A. Braun (1989) notes that in former Eastern Bloc countries leftist authoritarian rulers resorted to the use of coercion because they were simply incapable of gaining sufficient legitimacy to maintain their power otherwise. In the case of Burma under General Ne Win, an insidious form of fear was institutionally produced (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991) and the intelligence network there played a crucial role in its production from the beginning in 1962. As a classic example of blatant social and political control through intelligence, individuals were required to report to the authorities their overnight visits to friends and even close relatives who lived in the same city

22Even

in the United States, popularly perceived as the world's vanguard and champion of freedom and democracy, one often hears and reads about stories of intelligence agencies keeping themselves busy carrying out various thinkable and unthinkable surveillance work against any number of targetted populations or individuals. Likewise South Africa's apartheid regime resorted to numerous criminal acts against ANC supporters and organizers as part of the state-sponsored terror campaign. For a good collection of studies on how various states, both left and right, relied on intelligence and coercion in dealing with dissent see Frank, C. E. S. (1989) Dissent and the State. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

180 but in different residential areas. Failure to do so could result in fine and harassment and arrest by local security forces. 23 The government with its long arms of "law enforcement" and intelligence therefore, was much dreaded by the people. General Ne Win hand-picked and groomed the long-time Intelligence chief, Brigadier General Tin Oo. The latter became so powerful and feared even by military officers in the BSPP inner circle that Tin Oo came to be known as No. 1 1/2, meaning the most powerful and most feared after No. 1 (i.e., General Ne Win himself). Intelligence reports regarding educators and students who were critical of the Revolutionary Council government were compiled by various branches of the government's intelligence networks. Based on these reports, Education Minster Colonel Hla Han would instruct Dr. Nyi Nyi to do the firing of certain individuals officially. In other words, Dr. Nyi Nyi was assigned the task of "executing" formally members of his professional clan, each time the authorities instructed him (Nyi Nyi, 1994). Furthermore, Burma's intelligence bureau played a key role in the election of State's Scholars for further studies abroad (mostly the United States and Britain). The Selection Committee was made up mostly of academics, government department heads, and high level educational administrators. Dr. Nyi Nyi maintained that in his capacities as Chair of the Scholarship Selection Committee, he was not at all concerned about the ideological orientations of the candidates who were finalists. The deciding factor, as far as the selection board was concerned, was whether or not a candidate was qualified, scholastically, for further studies abroad.
23

I once was dragged out of a guest room in an early morning by a team of local security made up of a few People's Council Members, regular police, and plain-clothed intelligence. They were making surprise visitors' checks going door to door. They came to my 80-year old grandmother's house, woke her up in the wee hours and asked if there was any guest staying overnight. I just happened to be staying over as she was sick at the time. I didn't report to the authorities simply because it was a hassle and I didn't think it would be a problem. They made me accompany them to a local People's Council office. I was questioned by a few members of the team as to why I failed to abide by the visit regulation. About dawn a People's Council member who knew my grandmother came and bailed me out.

181 However, the Committee had to submit lists of selected scholars and professionals to the Cabinet, whose members were "concerned primarily with the potential badmouthing of the Revolutionary Council by those who would be sent abroad as State's Scholars" (Nyi Nyi, 1994). 24 Various intelligence bureaus were assigned to look into the political backgrounds of these candidates. As I mentioned earlier candidates whose parents had been involved in the anti-RC government political activities were not given security clearance. In other words, intelligence bureaus had a considerable influence via the Cabinet in determining as to who would fill senior positions in the country's educational institutions. Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994) maintained that as far as he was concerned, whether or not a candidate was a Socialist did not matter. Besides candidate's ability to do well in further studies, Dr. Nyi Nyi however, took into serious consideration "patriotic attitude" (or lack thereof) on the part of a candidate, simply because it was important the country to give educational opportunities to those individuals who were keen on returning to Burma and help build a modern nation. When discussing various military traditions, I mentioned that the military officers under General Ne Win's leadership came to believe that they were the "true patriots" (Nyi Nyi, 1994) and hence entitled to rule the country. Whatever Dr. Nyi Nyi's definition of "patriot" may have been, the only notion that would have been acceptable to the BSPP authorities is "man in military uniform."

General Ne Win's government, those who wished to apply for Burmese passports were required to provide biographical information including genealogy going back two generations (parents and grandparents). The completed application was then to be submitted to the passport division headed by the Director of the Special Branch (Burma's equivalent of the FBI in the United States). The Special Branch then send out copies of these applications for security checks to various intelligence networks. As a last step in this process, the applications of those who the Special Branch gave security clearance were then submitted to the Passport Examination Board for the final approval. The Board was made up of several Cabinet members such as the Prime Minister, Ministers of Home Affairs, of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, and intelligence directors. The board held only quarterly meetings and was the ultimate authority as to who would hold Burmese passports. For a study of Burma's intelligence networks, see Selth, A. (1997) Burma's Intelligence Apparatus. Working paper. Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University.

24Under

182 Going back to the mechanisms of surveillance and political control the regime's willingness to use force in dealing with dissent and criticism sent a chilling message to campuses across the country. A handful of educators, mostly university academics, who, according to Military Intelligence reports, were openly critical of the regime's new policies, were sacked. For instance, Dr. Maung Maung Gyi, Associate Dean and Professor of political science and history at Mandalay University was removed from his position for having ridiculed the Burmese Way to Socialism doctrine during his lectures. What the authorities considered a "serious offense" by this academic was Dr. Maung Maung Gyi's derisive labeling of "the Burmese Way doctrine" as "25 pya (i.e., cents) ideology." The BSPP official publications were sold at the cost of 25 pya. The ostensible reason for the punishment was Dr. Maung Maung Gyi's alleged affair with a female student. In due course the absence of tolerance toward all kinds of dissent and criticism and the willingness to resort to force came to characterize the nature of social/power relations between members of the education community and military/political authorities. No matter how brilliant an educator might be, an ambitious educator with any intent to help improve the country's formal education had to toe the party line and self-regulate his or her own public and academic/professional life. On the matter of surveillance in education, Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994) recalled:
I was aware of the fact that there were intelligence informers (in the Education Department). The military officers did not trust anyone. In addition, they think they are the only ones who love the country and who make sacrifices.

Similarly, Director Ohn Maung observed that he felt as though someone was monitoring even when he was undergoing elite cadre training at the Central Institute of Political Science. Around the anniversaries of student unrest surveillance was very tight. Educational administrators from around the country were summoned to come down to Rangoon where they were briefed on the subject of surveillance measures. For instance, they were instructed to check any piece of paper lying on bath room floors, according to a teacher

183 who participated in the surveillance training (Aye Kyaw, 1994). Teachers were to be assigned 24 hour security duties such as combing the campus or school compound in search of any trace of subversion which they were to report immediately to the local People's Council, local Party Organizations, and other security forces. In times of student unrest, intelligence officers would come and stay at the principal's residence and monitor the developments closely, having turned a campus residence into a temporary intelligence branch office. However, U Ohn Maung pointed out, rather perceptively, that this matter of surveillance was not simply a creation of political authorities who wished to tightly control the public. There were people in the Ministry "who volunteered to inform the higher-ups about their colleagues" (Ohn Maung, 1995). When asked if he knew if there was any government spy in his work circles, U Ohn Maung answered," I don't think we had any intelligence mole, but I am not positive. I was careful anyway, so nothing happened." Likewise, Dr. Chit Swe (1995) observed," some people would go to the (Education) Minister's Office voluntarily, and misinform the Minister as to who was doing what." Here a distinction must be drawn regarding the type of "volunteer informers" who volunteered to be the eyes and ears of the Education Minister (or other BSPP authorities). Some might have been motivated by professional jealousy or other ulterior motives (for instance, currying favor from the higher-ups). But there were also paid informers at workplaces. And soon there developed a web of both volunteer and paid informers and regular intelligence moles throughout the country. While the regime was able to enforce political control, in the physical sense of the word, among educators by inducing fear through its pervasive intelligence networks generating ideological conformity, acceptance of, and support for, the Burmese Way to Socialism proved more elusive than was calculated by the BSPP ideologues and leadership.

184 In the next section I will discuss how the three influential educators dealt with the regime's attempt to educate them in the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology.

Ideology, Education and the Burma Socialist Program Party As I pointed out earlier in the study those who knew the General personally, General Ne Win was anything but an ideologue (Aung Gyi, 1988; Nyi Nyi, 1994; Chit Myaing, 1994). 25 Dr. Nyi Nyi, who later became an advisor to the General, remarked pointedly: "I don't think U Ne Win was that ideological. And I'm not sure if these socialist policies were adopted out of conviction or of convenience." However, Dr. Nyi Nyi admitted, "The rhetoric (of the Burmese Way to Socialism) was very good, you know." Everything came to be couched in the language of the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology. According to Dr. Nyi Nyi, in writing educational policies, he and his associates used socialist language because it was commensurate with the prevailing situation and time. In his own words,
We included socialist language and phrases in educational laws and policies. U Ne Win didn't ask us to do that. What was really important was the development of nationalist spirit. Socialism was secondary to (Burmese) nationalism. Many of us grew up in the Doh-Bama Khit (or We, the Burmese Confederation period). We used a lot of ideas from the Doh-bama period, but we couched them in the (Socialist) language commensurate with the time and prevailing situation.

On the later changes in curriculum contents, Nyi Nyi stated:

Changes in textbooks were made with a view toward eliminating exploitative or capitalistic attitudes. That wasn't a new idea. Since the days of Bogyoke Aung San, socialistic policies were adopted by successive governments. To put it another way, no one really thought those policies strange or new.

25In

the months of May and June of 1988 when the country was on the verge of massive uprisings exBrigadier General Aung Gyi circulated two open letters, 41- and 10-page in length respectively revealing all the inside stories including the ideological and political backgrounds of key players who orchestrated the coup and create the BSPP doctrines and party. See Aung Gyi, ex-Brigadier (May 9, 1988) Open Letters to Former Colleagues. Xeroxed copy. Rangoon. especially pp.5-7. Also "Dear General" Letter dated June 8, 1988 by the same author. General Aung Gyi was second in command in the Revolutionary Council in 1962 and sacked by General Ne Win a year later having lost a power struggle within the coup group.

185 Also Dr. Nyi Nyi stressed that during the initial years of General Ne Win's rule, he was not even active in Party affairs. And the party was "not that influential" either. The Party badly needed the intellectuals and the educated for the new BSPP bureaucracy and their support for the mass organizational work. In the late 1960's, Party officials, from the Central Institute of Political Science came up with the idea to teach their version of political science -- a combination of heavily edited Western political thought and the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology -- in teacher education programs. According to Dr. Nyi Nyi, the ideologues from the Central Institute presumed that if prospective teachers were exposed to the BSPP's ideology, they would, upon completion of "political science" course, become instant bearers and transmitters of the Burmese Way ideology among millions of students throughout the country. When the idea was put forth, Dr. Nyi Nyi and other professionals involved in teacher education created instructional time slots as "requested" by the Central Institute officials. The latter brought their own syllabus and teaching staff. Dr. Nyi Nyi pointed out that what these Party instructors did not seem to know was the fact that "training (in Socialism) did not automatically transmit (Socialist) values." In his introduction to "New System Education," a compilation of his articles on education which appeared in various publications, Dr. Nyi Nyi (1976) summed up his observation on indoctrination thus:
Speaking from my experience, when discussing with teachers, you just can't talk about (Burmese Way to Socialism) ideology abstractly. It's not enough to talk about 'socialist education'. If it is to be effective, one must also be able to talk about the specifics as to how instruction in Burmese literature should be approached (from a socialist perspective), how geography or history should be taught (so that it would be in accord with the socialist ideology), or from what perspective science should be viewed, etc. (p.Ta).

Believers or non-believers, these influential educators had to speak the Party's language: the Burmese Way to Socialism philosophy. 26 Throughout his tenure as the most

the three influential educators, there was a significant number of university academics and educators from other institutions who helped legitimize and popularize the Burmese Way ideology through their writings (see Ba Myint, 1967; Maung Phyu, 1967; Tin Ohn, 1971, Khin Maung Win, 1974; Than Oo, 1975; Maung De, 1979; Tun Kywe, 1981 & 1982; and Khin Maung Nyunt, 1979 &

26Besides

186 influential educator in the Education Ministry, Dr. Nyi Nyi couched almost everything he discussed (in public discussions, interviews, and his writings or speeches), in the official language of the "Burmese Way to Socialism." Having borrowed a phrase from Communist China, Dr. Nyi Nyi exhorted teachers to be not only experts in their own fields, but also to be good cadres of the Party or, to put it succinctly, to be "red and expert" (Nyi Nyi, 1973 & 1994). Similarly, Dr. Nyi Nyi (1972) emphasized the need to instill political consciousness in youth thus:
It is vitally important that the country's youth be provided with systematic training in political thought or consciousness. Therefore, there is much work to be done in terms of introducing teaching "political science" in universities and institutes. In addition, teaching of correct behaviors and correct thinking must be integrated into grade school curricula.

Lies, Damn Lies: "The Burmese Way" Drama Toward the late 1970s and 1980s the disillusionment with the Socialist policies and the Party became widespread. U Chit Hlaing, Chief Instructor at the Central Institute of Political Science who co-authored the "Burmese Way to Socialism" and other important BSPP doctrines, voluntarily disengaged himself from the Party, resigned his posts, and became a Buddhist monk--out of disillusionment with Socialism, as practiced by Burma's Socialist-Generals. However, no one dared to speak honestly to those in power. By now, people had learned to live a dual life: many government officials put on a public face when dealing with matters public and official by continuing to sing the praise of the Burmese Way to Socialism and the Party--even if it meant publicly lying--while they would share, in quiet, safe corners, their deep disillusionment with both the Party leadership and its guiding ideology. In order to please their top Party bosses, Ministry officials and educators in various departments including the Educational Research Bureau were instructed by their

1987). Almost all of them were rewarded by the BSPP government by promoting them to various influential posts including Director General, Director, Deputy Minister, Rector, and so on.

187 supervisors to produce reports and statistics that would make things look good on paper. 27 There was an infamous slogan to which the BSPP authorities made frequent references, "We don't care whether you use a sieve or a bucket as long as you fetch the water, as ordered." That is, means justifies end. Not prepared to deal with the consequences of speaking truth to power, government officials at various levels, by and large, falsified reports to their immediate superiors. Thanks to the tacit endorsement by the authorities at all levels, this practice of falsification of the order of things under the BSPP rule, once set in motion, became the norm, rather than an exception throughout the BSPP rule. 28 U Ohn Maung noted, "Those in high places would lie to their subordinates and vice versa." U Ohn Maung recalled his boss, Education Minister U Kyaw Nyein would tease his close friends and associates, "Every one of you is committing treason. Everyone is lying." According to U Ohn Maung, Minister Kyaw Nyein, a former Secretary at the BSPP Headquarters, would scold principals or inspectors who would place Party obligations before their professional duty of "taking care of schools."

was common knowledge in many informed circles in those days that falsification became an accepted norm for government officials. Everyone, from General Ne Win to Intelligence personnel and the People's Inspection Council in charge of overseeing and auditing these departments were aware that everyone was lying. The ultimate indicator of this was the existence of the two separate sets of reports and statistics. One set of data and reports was carefully crafted for consumption by the Hluttaw or the People's Parliament, which was the highest symbol and institution in which sovereign power was supposedly vested. The official media would use this Hluttaw Data to inform the people of the state of the country and the progress being made. The other set was collected mostly by the National Intelligence Bureau and kept in the data bases to which only top leaders such as General Ne Win and his intelligence chiefs had access. 28Everyone, both within and outside the BSPP government, from the Party Chairman General Ne Win to common clerks at offices or rick-shaw drivers on the street, knew that all that gliterred was not gold. To give but an example, soldiers in the Northern Command headquartered in Mandalay, were ordered to paint pine and Eucalyptus trees green in various scenic areas along the road which General Ne Win would travel to his summer residence in May Myo, upcountry resort town near Mandalay. Many trees in the area were burned during a forest fire. Commanding officers were motivated by their desire to make sure General Ne Win was shielded from the ugliness of the firedamaged scenic ride. Dr. Aye Kyaw, a Burmese historian, was explicitly told how rotten things had gotten in Burma under her husband's rule by Daw Ni Ni Myint, General Ne Win's wife who is also a historian. Aye Kyaw (1994) Phone Interview. New York.

27It

188 The official Socialist rhetoric of the Party however, still remained a sanctioned language among public figures in Burma including the well-known educators. Dr. Chit Swe who stressed that he was neither Left nor Right continued to toe the Party line, exhorting members of the Lanzin Youth Organization at Rangoon University to be good socialist cadres. Despite the widespread disillusionment with the Burmese Way to Socialism,

the Party's theatrical play continued and various officials carried on with their roles. Their subordinates too, continued to perform their parts in the Burmese Way drama, and so did the superior officials. In this connection, Dr. Chit Swe and U Ohn Maung underwent a 4-month political science course at the Central Institute of Political Science at a time when the Burmese Way to Socialism had already lost its appeal and credibility amongst the country's educated circles. I now turn to how the two educators, neither of whom described himself as a believer, dealt with this indoctrination process.

Ideological Training for the Government Higher-ups In the BSPP days, being hand-picked for the 4 month-long ideological training at the Central Institute of Political Science was, by and large, considered a privilege and an important rite of passage among government officials, or put differently, a feather for many ambitious officials and cadres. It was a clear indicator that the authorities wanted to promote them to various influential positions within the country's bureaucracy and administrative councils. In other words, they had made it within the Socialist System. Each batch of ideological trainees was normally made up of about 400 full-fledged cadres, who were grouped into two major sessions. The break-down by profession was something like: 10-20% government officials and civil servants including university faculty members, 50% party organizers, and the rest Armed Forces personnel. Director Ohn Maung recalled bitterly his stay at the Central Institute thus:
You just listened and observed what they (instructors) say. Don't critique them. Saint-Simon was on the list of Communist Thinkers. I felt like laughing. You listened to the lectures.

189
They were all bluffing. A topic on "contradictions" was allotted 20 hours. The instructor even took extra-hours to cover the topic. It's just bluffing. Everyday the same old thing. They were all fools. These lecturers were all liars. I don't think they believe what they were teaching. They were doing it because that was an easy way to make a living. They were opportunists. Lectures were tape-recorded. You don't discuss anything with them. We were asked to discuss the stuff, but no one did. You couldn't trust your neighbor. You couldn't trust anyone. I felt as though someone was monitoring their lectures.

U Ohn Maung said dryly this was an unsuccessful attempt at indoctrinating those who were to become leaders in various fields. However, not everyone was a non-believer like himself. Many of the BSPP local organizers, especially the ones from poor backgrounds, seemed to have believed the "stuff" (Ohn Maung, 1995). In his own words, "They think they were right, and they became Marxists. They were only partly educated, but very ambitious, you know. They wanted to rise up the Socialist ladder. For them the Party (and the knowledge of its ideology) was a ticket for a better life." For people like U Ohn Maung, it was "a holiday season or vacation." During his stay at the Central Institute, U Ohn Maung brought his golf set and usually "did his swings" after having "napped through" lectures at the Institute. While transcribing the tape-recorded interviews with this devout Roman Catholic director, I could hardly fail to recall a remark made about the Party's ideologues by another interviewee, namely former Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi: "What they (i.e., Party instructors and Party bosses) didn't know was that training did not necessarily transmit (Socialist) values and outlook." Likewise, Dr. Chit Swe underwent a similar training course at the Central Institute. Unlike Director Ohn Maung, Dr. Chit Swe who claimed to be neither left nor right, but purely public-service minded, "took part in many after-school discussions" during his 4 month stay there. These training courses for higher-ups in Education Ministry became nothing more than a rite of passage. Many instructors often joked about the Party "stuff" as public disillusionment developed with the Burmese Way to Socialism.

190 What is noteworthy here is that both the BSPP leadership and those who became part of the educational leadership such as the three educators in the chapter, were aware fully of the hollowness of their public performances each time they expounded or eulogized the BSPP on official and public occasions. The merely public show of interest in and learning of the BSPP ideology by Dr. Chit Swe and Director Ohn Maung fulfilled an inherent need of the BSPP leadership who needed exactly that. On the subject of ritual performance and the different messages conveyed and received between the powers that be and those who are in weaker, subordinate positions, the American political scientist James Scott offers some insights. Scott (1990: 66-67) writes:
Ritual subservience reliably extracted from inferior signals quite literally that there is no realistic choice other than compliance. When combined with the exemplary punishment of the occasional act of defiance, the effective display of compliance may achieve a kind of dramatization of power relations that is not to be confused with ideological hegemony in the sense of active consent. One may curse such domination--in this case preferably offstage- but one will nevertheless have to accommodate oneself to its hard reality. The effect of reinforcing power relations in this way may be, behaviorally, nearly indistinguishable from behavior that arises from willing consent.

Constructing the narratives involving the public performances of these educators, one can't help but wonder if they could have done differently given the circumstances. How could these educators have continued to live with lies and rituals? What were the alternatives?

Opportunity Structures for Burma's Educators and Professionals Researchers studying general conditions in which intellectuals under authoritarian regimes had to operate were struck by the existence of few alternative opportunity structures in terms of intellectual pursuit, career advancement, material rewards, and so on (see, for instance, Hamrin and Creek, 1986). This holds true in the case of Burmese academicians and educators. Compared to their counterparts in Capitalist countries where the three Burmese educators did their graduate studies, there were few professional or intellectual opportunities,

191 either domestically or internationally. The BSPP government was determined to keep Burma shut from the outside world and accordingly closely monitored all aspects of the country including educational and intellectual life. Nor was there an external reward system for the successful pursuit of one's own research, teaching, or consultation besides employment in government-run institutions. Educational institutions at all levels were being nationalized and centrally controlled. Employment in the government expanded significantly as the BSPP government was attempting to bring various sectors under its control. In the new BSPP order, educators found themselves with a limited number of options: they could leave the country if they could secure employment abroad commensurate with their qualifications, and many did. They could hold on to their academic positions and adapt to the newly emerging political climate under what was essentially a (military) command system, like the three interviewees had done. Or they could simply leave their profession and drive a cab or start a small family business, as some opted. A small number of academics gradually left the country while a majority of educators and academics chose to remain within the country having adjusted to the political requirements of the BSPP and lived on their meager incomes and in government housing, often moonlighting in order to make both ends meet. Thanks to Burma's predominantly Buddhist culture, educators at all levels were generally held in high regard. And university professors enjoyed a high degree of prestige. They received considerably better pay than grade school teachers, lecturers and junior faculty. The government provided them with on-campus family housing free of charge. In addition, professors and lecturers made up a very tiny segment of a society where a majority of primary school children dropped out without completing 4th grade. The three educators whose interviews formed the basis of this chapter held advanced degrees from prestigious universities in the West and held influential positions within Burma's educational establishment.

192 However, there was little for them in terms of professional and intellectual development. Worse still, the BSPP leaders, especially General Ne Win, were reputed to be distrustful of the Western-educated intellectuals. The General did not conceal his contempt toward these Western educated intellectuals and often derided them as "half-baked bread." As Director U Ohn Maung put it, "(military) officers with little education were generally hostile to the educated (and students)." In this anti-intellectual environment, some university educators pursued their own professional activities -- at their own risk. To further explicate, U Ba Maw, a lecturer in the Department of Geology, Mandalay University, jointly published the results of his field research which led to the discovery of one of the earliest fossils ever found on earth in Burma. When the authorities found out that, without their prior approval, Lecturer U Ba Maw published the findings of his research in Science, a prestigious professional journal published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, they subjected him to a series of interrogations by the Military Intelligence. Later they demoted him to an assistant lecturer position. Indeed anti-intellectual attitude of the BSPP government and the existence of few alternatives for educators compelled ambitious educators to cooperate with the authorities, if they wished to help improve Burma's educational life, and themselves. Some educators were willing to cooperate with the government out of pragmatic calculations. But was realism the only motivating factor? What other motives were there behind cooperation with the regime that showed nothing but contempt for the educated?

Seduction of Influence, Power, and Privilege Invariably the three educators justified their cooperation with the BSPP government on the grounds that they wanted to help improve the country's education. Put differently, they wished to help Burma modernize. They perceived their own cooperative actions to be "in the interest of the country." Here I by no means question the good intentions these educators

193 claimed they had regarding their own professional work within the general policy framework of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Altruism, yes. Pragmatism, yes. But what else? What were the other motivating factors which might help account for the role these educators played in the educational reforms under General Ne Win? In this chapter, I started out with a premise that any given human action is motivated by a multiplicity of motives on the part of that human agency. Certainly the three educators were caught in the web of unequal power relations vis--vis their political bosses. And the social scientist who is intent on finding traces of resistance in the complex dynamics of these unequal power relations is indeed likely to find them. Resistance theorists such as Paul Willis (1977) and James Scott (1985 & 1990) have shed some light on various forms of everyday resistance put up by human agencies in setting as diverse as Malaysian farming communities and a working class school in Britain. But from my conversations with the three educators, it is evident that resistance is only half of the story. To be sure, in the politics of education in high places there were traces of resistance, negotiation, or manipulation in the ways these educators operated in these unequal power relations. Dr. Nyi Nyi pursued his educational initiatives disguised in the official rhetoric of the Burmese Way to Socialism, while he continually questioned the sincerity of top Socialist military leaders such as General Ne Win. Dr. Chit Swe took pride in the fact that he was producing "rebel" students who would ask critical questions when it came to public discussions about the Burmese Way ideology. Likewise Director Ohn Maung adopted a "minimalist" approach to his professional work; he was "relaying (his) subordinates orders and instructions from above." A popular ethos which developed amongst government employees was "No hard work and no meddling keeps one's job in tact." However, as the three walked the corridors of power in the capital city of Rangoon, they had invariably enjoyed influence and access to power. By Burma's standards, they lived

194 comfortably. They were provided with opportunities to travel outside of Burma for educational and professional purposes. 29 Also they were provided with mansion-like residences, chauffeurs and cars, and given free pieces of land, and government permits to buy construction materials from People's Corporations at bargain prices, which could be resold at exorbitant prices on the black market. Politically, they were given influential positions in various mass organizations such as the People's Council, the administrative branch of the BSPP government. Furthermore, they were entitled to monthly purchases of high quality consumer items imported from the West and shelved in exclusive government stores in Rangoon. This was no small privilege in a society where a great majority of people struggled to buy consumer items as basic as rice, toothpaste, and soap. Both Dr. Nyi Nyi and Dr. Chit Swe also chaired important decision making bodies such as the State's Scholars Selection Committee or made decisions as to the promotion and transfer of teaching and administrative staff in the Ministry of Education. There is little doubt that the three educators were all cognizant of the privileges, influence, and access to the powerful that accrued from their having been a part of the highest echelon of Burma's educational hierarchy. However, what did it mean to form a political symbiosis with the BSPP government whose ultimate concern -- as it became apparent in due course -- was not the improvement of the country's intellectual life or formal education, but legitimating and perpetuating its stay in power, at all costs? Here it is necessary to look at what went on behind the official political processes.

The Consequences of Dictatorship in Educatoion

29Educational

tours to wealthy, industrialized nations in the West were widely considered a form of privilege simply because few citizens were allowed to travel outside of Burma. Often such trips meant daily allowances in US dollars, as well as permits to import foreign goods and to do shopping in the malls in capitalist countries.

195 Throughout the BSPP period (1962-1988) there were drastic and sudden changes in Burma's educational policies and practices, which became a distinctive characteristics of educational policy making under the BSPP rule. And "unofficial" stories which were circulated as gossips indicate that changes in education were not always ideologically driven or politically motivated; they were dictated, at times, by the personal whim of General Ne Win. Reflecting the dictatorial nature of the government, that is, rule by whim rather than rule of law, General Ne Win's personal wishes became equally important to both written policies and political philosophies of the Party. Recent studies in totalitarian political systems challenge the totalitarian thesis or paradigm, specifically when applied to the USSR under Stalin (Getty and Manning, 1993). According to this totalitarian paradigm, the (Soviet) system under Stalin was a non-pluralist, hierarchical dictatorship in which command authority existed and was exercised only from above. Ideology and violence were monopolized by the ruling elites at the top of whom sat the dictator. Terror was a key founding stone for a totalitarian system. The dictator's control was virtually unlimited in all spheres of life, from archaeology to theater. And a great majority of people were left out of the political process (Getty and Manning, 1993: 1) It is certainly inaccurate to portray dictatorial politics as a pseudo-military chain of command which renders political processes irrelevant and human beings as impotent victims, rather than historical agents. However, one should not rush to discard this totalitarian thesis once and for all. For the "Great Dictator" does dictate -- from time to time -- and makes decisions arbitrarily which have serious policy implications for the entire country. This will be illustrated by the two anecdotal stories which resulted in significant changes in Burma's education. The two following anecdotes are reproduced here as re-constructed and told by Dr. Nyi Nyi. According to Dr. Nyi Nyi, the annual "Research Congress," which was created in 1965 constituted an integral part of the New System Education. At the end of the Third

196 Research Congress in 1968, General Ne Win hosted a dinner for the scholars and researchers from universities and colleges across the country who participated. During the dinner, alcohol was served. One faculty member, who was acting under the influence of alcohol, was accused of verbally harassing Kitty Ba Than, General Ne Win's wife. And the General became so furious that he began punching and kicking the accused, as well as several young instructors from Rangoon University who happened to share the dinner table with the accused. General Ne Win's aides-de-camp joined their boss in beating up the already terrified guests. 30 This incident sealed the fate of this major educational project. Indeed there was no more annual Research Congress throughout the remainder of General Ne Win's rule. Another story involves the failure of the General's favorite daughter on an English proficiency test to secure admissions for further studies in England, which resulted in a major educational policy shift. As I already told the story, here I only recount its essentials. In the early 1980's, Dr. Sandar Win, General Ne Win's favorite daughter, twice made unsuccessful attempts to secure admissions to an advanced program in medicine in England. 31 This angered the General and prompted him to radically change the language policy in schools throughout the country. Reversing the policies of decolonization in the area of language instruction which General Ne Win's government had taken tremendous pride in, the General ordered teaching of English instruction back in all schools from kinder garden on. And the then Education Minister Kyaw Nyein went so far as to claim that the Burma Socialist
instructors were kept in custody at a Military Intelligence office and interrogated by Major Tin Oo, the General's most trusted man who later became the most powerful leader but General Ne Win in Burma. Having found no political motives behind alleged behavior, Major Tin Oo released them and asked Dr. Nyi Nyi to reinstate them in their teaching position. 31 It was widely known in Burma that children of top military leaders were accorded academic distinctions on annual examinations and were admitted to prestigious professional schools. For instance, Sandar Win, the favorite daughter of General Ne Win, was admitted to the Institute of Medicine in Rangoon, while the youngest daughter Kyeimon Win was given distinctions in all subjects on the national high school examination. Professors in medical school gave Sandar Win distinctions in various subjects as well.
30Those

197 Program Party's educational goal was to raise the standard of education up to the level of Britain's General Certificate of Education (O-level).

Summary Throughout Chapter 5, I have examined the ways in which the three influential educators who were differently situated within the country's web of power relations, operated in Burma's education. There were found a multiplicity of motives in their having played important roles, to varying degrees, in transforming education under General Ne Win's rule. While no doubt they were motivated, in part, by their desire to pursue career advancement, prestige, fame, and influence, or simply to eke out a living, their good intentions of contributing to educational development in particular and overall development of the country in general appear genuine. In spite of their different ideological orientations and differences in their proximity to the powers that be, the three educators were able to work in a radically new political order- even if it often meant putting on a public face and participating in the "lying game" which everyone within Burma's Education Ministry had to play. However hard these educators may have tried and how ever sincere their intentions may have been, in the final analysis, General Ne Win's government, like other dictatorial regimes, proved too preoccupied with perpetuating its stay in power to care about the country's educational development. Within such a political order even the most altruistic believers with impeccable moral character would (and did) end up being disillusioned, corrupt or destroyed, not to mention those who were non-believers and half-Socialists. Dr. Nyi Nyi, who rose to prominence in Burma's education during the formative years of the BSPP rule, was able to carve out a significant amount of professional autonomous space, thus having put many of his creative ideas into practice. Dr. Nyi Nyi's success in having secured a "free hand" must be attributed to a number of factors including

198 the intellectual and educational level of those political bosses for whom he had to work, the lack of confidence on the part of the Revolutionary Council in handling educational and student affairs on its own, and the RC's strategic use of a university-based educator, that is, Dr. Nyi Nyi, to deal with potentially disruptive universities. In contrast, Rector Dr. Chit Swe and Director Ohn Maung caught on much later, although the former did make himself known to the powers that be as early as 1968 by offering unsolicited professional advice in the form of submitting papers to high ranking officials in the Education Ministry and at the statesponsored seminars. As the Revolutionary Council government became more established and more entrenched and as their support base from the intelligentsia expanded, the bargaining power of these educators was reduced significantly. It is hardly surprising that their self-perception--"we were being used"--contrasted sharply with that of Dr. Nyi Nyi, who felt he was an active historical agent, rather than a victim. Intriguing is that in their effort to justify their various roles in education, all three of them -- Western-educated -- resorted to language of altruistic nationalism. As I pointed out in the previous chapter on educational policies and reform measures, the BSPP attempted to force an ideology on the basis of selected strands of nationalist thought, selected cultural practices and values, and selected versions of Burma's past. The selectivity of the BSPP ideology was inevitably both its weakness and strength. It was a weakness because it made the BSPP vulnerable to criticisms from those who were steeped in alternative hegemonies. But this was dealt with effectively by the use of intelligence and other repressive organs which were at the BSPP's disposal. It was a strength because it could bring in those who even remotely shared parts of the BSPP's vision and ideological articulation. Here the three educators who were educated in "the West" wanted to use their talents and new found ideas to modernize their country. Burmese Socialists in soldier uniform (or more accurately, soldiers in Socialist camouflage) articulated Socialist educational policies and used them to legitimate their vision of a Burmese society, and promised to bring development and

199 modernity. There were other important ideological underpinnings of the BSPP education -the cry for indigenization of schooling and knowledge, the nearly deified role of Aung San and his vision, the compatibility of socialism and the dominant indigenous culture, and the clarion call for building a modern Burmese nation -- all played a role in forging a political symbiosis between a select group of educators and the BSPP leadership. Like Socialist-soldiers or Soldier-socialists, the three educators had their own visions, however small and local they may be, their own public and personal agendas, and different priorities. The politics of education as experienced for those educators who walked in the corridors of power was a politics driven by factors as diverse as personal ambitions, altruism, ideological backgrounds, and a sense of realism. Their responses and reactions to political processes in education under General Ne Win's government were, at times, contradictory. Likewise, the narratives they pieced together during the interviews, were fragmented and filled with contradictions. Suffice to say, all three of them -- Dr. Nyi Nyi, U Ohn Maung, and Dr. Chit Swe -- played quasi-political roles in education. How did the majority of their educator colleagues, who were just "taking care of education" (that is, teaching) within the walls of their regular classrooms, fare under the BSPP government? In the next chapter, I will take a critical look at a group of educators who were not part of the educational decision-making circles with regards to how they handled their professional work within the Socialist educational policy framework of the BSPP government.

200 Chapter Six TEACHERS AS CADRES?: EDUCATORS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1962
"No matter how good educational policies and planning may be, the actual content of the curricula and wisdom, expertise, and ability of educators are going to determine the outcome of these policies." --U Tun Aung, Pyinnya Da Zaung, 1980 December

In Chapter 5 I have examined the ways in which the three influential educators from the "late nationalist generation" operated, in varying capacities, within the BSPP education system. I hope to have shown that these educators were motivated by a multiplicity of factors including personal ambition and the desire to carry out public service in their active involvement in educational decision-making and policy implementation. The present chapter is devoted to a critical analysis of how a group of educators who were from different backgrounds and lived experiences in terms of ethnicity, gender, class, and political orientation handled the socialist educational reforms. In so doing, I paint biographical sketches of 6 educators who largely informed this chapter. These are followed by an outline of institutional culture and history of the teaching profession in Burma. Then I discuss the efforts on the part of the BSPP authorities and educational leaders to create a new cultural definition of "teacher," which would aid the execution of the BSPP reforms. Also I take a look at the economic conditions under which these teachers had to work. Throughout the chapter I pay special attention to the formation of oppositional or counter-hegemonic practices. In the chapter I use the descriptors "teacher" "educator" and, to a lesser degree, "intellectual" interchangeably to refer to all educational workers who were employed and taught in high schools, professional institutes, and universities.

A note on the Sources In this chapter I draw on a number of various sources including personal interviews with 4 Burmese migrs who were teachers in various Burmese schools and universities. I

201 rely on my recollections of personal stories which I learned from my teachers throughout my years as a student, and later, as a private teacher of English as a Second Language. Some of my observations are based on personal knowledge about two teachers who I knew rather well. In order to protect their identities 1 I give these two teachers fictional names, Daw Hla (female name) and U Ba (male name) although the narratives about them remain factual. Furthermore, my analysis is informed by interview data which Rector Dr. Chit Swe and Director U Ohn Maung provided regarding the earlier professional life as university teachers. Last but not least, writings by some educators served as a window -- however small -- into the world of educators: many educators served to help popularize, parody, subvert, or critique BSPP's policies in writings. I therefore examine some relevant articles and speeches which appeared in a variety of professional, official, and popular publications. A word of caution regarding the sources may be in order here. As the political circumstances in Burma did not permit me to return to Burma to dialogue with a greater number of educators from a wider spectrum of society, my observations presented herein should by no means be taken as generalizations about how ordinary educators coped with reforms and educational measures. Rather they should be treated as how a group of teachers from different ethnic backgrounds, generations, and class locations functioned as educational workers caught in the whirlwind of socialist educational reforms. Fortunately, their experiences and backgrounds turned out to be relatively diverse in terms of their generation, their socio-economic background, ethnicity, gender, and political orientation. Five of the 6 educators on whose life stories I base this chapter belong to a generation younger than the influential educators such as Education Minister Nyi Nyi, Rector Chit Swe, and Director Ohn Maung. Their generation was schooled after independence and began their teaching career around the time of the 1962 coup. They will be refered to as the "post-independence"

1Both

of them still live in Burma under the current military junta named the State Peace and Development Council or SPDC.

202 generation. One educator, Ma Naing, belongs to my generation. We all grew up under the BSPP rule and joined the work force only several years prior to the end of the BSPP rule. Our generation may be labeled the "BSPP generation." The aspect of Burma's educational past reconstructed in this chapter remains, inevitably fragmented. I hope, however, that the readers may gain, through their stories re constructed herein, a glimpse of the politics of education in the world of teachers as the country reeled under the effects of the socialist revolution of 1962. First I present brief biographical sketches of the 6 educators in whose professional lives I want to ground my historical investigation of educational politics in the world of educators and teachers.

Biographical Sketches Daw Kyi May Kaung: Lecturer in Economics A Sino-Burmese, Kyi May Kaung came from a highly educated, urban wealthy family in Rangoon. The daughter of a well-known Burmese educator, namely the late U Kaung (education commissioner), Kyi May Kaung greatly benefited from her father's intellectual friends. After having earned her BA and MA in economics she joined the faculty in the Institute of Economics in Rangoon in the early 1960s. In the late 70s, the BSPP government sent her to the University of Warsaw (Poland) where she obtained her diploma in economics. Married to a Burmese entrepreneur from a similar socio-economic background, Kyi May Kaung lived rather comfortably in one of the expensive residential neighborhoods in Rangoon. She left Burma on a Fulbright Scholarship in 1981 and studied at the University of Pennsylvania, where she did her Ph.D. in political science. She decided not to return home after the completion of her studies and she now works as an analyst/programmer for Radio Free Asia's Burmese Program.

203 Dr. Aye Kyaw: Lecturer in History Ethnically Rakhine, Dr. Aye Kyaw was born in Rakhine State on Burma's western coast. He received his B.A., B.L., and M.A. in history from Rangoon University. Unlike Kyi May Kaung, Aye Kyaw came from an average Rakhine family and was schooled initially in a Buddhist monastery in his native town and, therefore, grounded in Buddhist educational thought and culture. At the time of the coup, he was already a young faculty member at Rangoon University's History Department. In the mid-1970s, he won a national literary award for his Burmese language book titled "History of Burmese National Education." Later the BSPP government selected him for further studies in history and sent him to Monash University where he obtained his doctorate. He is married to a fellow academic, who was, and still is, on the faculty of the Philosophy Department at Rangoon University. As a warden on Rangoon University campus, Dr. Aye Kyaw became entangled in an ethnically motivated conflict between the pockets of Burman and Rakhine students there. Subsequently he was removed from his lecturer position in the mid-1980s ostensibly for an alleged affair with a female student. He considered himself a Burmese nationalist, in a broad sense of the word, and wanted equality and fairness among the country's indigenous ethnic peoples and did not like cultural and historical domination by the Burmans. Dr. Aye Kyaw now lives in New York City and teaches at New York University.

Robert Byatchin: Chin Lecturer in English Robert Byatchin was born in Chin state, which shares the border with Burma's western neighbor India. Like many of his fellow educated Chin, he received his initial education from a Christian missionary school in Haka, the capital of Chin State. He belongs to a Chin ethnic group and is a devout Christian. He did not see himself as particularly

204 politically inclined. As a member of Chin ethnic community, who, in his judgment, had only education as their main vehicle for social mobility, education topped the set of personal values he held. In his Rangoon University student days, Byatchin won a national championship in tennis, which earned him fame nationally. Lecturer Byatchin did his undergraduate studies in English at Rangoon University where he also received an M.A. in the same field. He was awarded a Colombo Planning Scholarship to pursue advanced studies at the University of Lancaster (England). But immediately after the completion of his M.A. there, under order from the BSPP government he was hurried back home to resume his teaching duties despite the fact that the host university in England offered him a full scholarship to go on for his Ph.D. 2 In 1983, he quit his lecturer position at the English Department at Rangoon Arts and Science University after the authorities repeatedly failed to consider him for promotion. Subsequently he got a midmanagement position with UNICEF in Bangladesh. He now splits his time between Bangladesh and California where his immigrant family lives.

Ma Naing: Primary School Teacher Born in 1961, Ma Naing belonged to one of the best known Burman families in Burma. Her maternal grandfather U Hpo Sein, was a nationally reknown artist who modernized Burmese theater during the colonial period. Her fraternal grandfather Thayawadi Maung Maung, was a landowner and well-known constitutional politician during the 1920's and served on the British governor's cabinet. Although public figures both men were not involved in the country's independence struggle. Her father was a major in the Burma Army Medical Corps and family physician to Prime Minister Brigadier Sein Win.
2Many

Burmese students who studied abroad on BSPP government scholarships met similar fates of being ordered to return home by the whimsical authorities in Rangoon. Those who refused to comply with the directives from Rangoon were thrown into jail, if they ever returned after the completion of their studies.

205 Before his death in the mid-1980s, her father held the Director General post (i.e., third in command) in the Ministry of Trade. Her mother, a Western educated Burmese woman with a passion for teaching, taught primary school English. Having led a highly privileged life, Ma Naing never once took public transportation all her life, until she came to the United States in the late 1980s. Politics was something her parents discouraged her from getting interested in. Primary school teacher Ma Naing received her high school education in one of the elite schools in Rangoon. After her initial enrollment at Rangoon University she switched to a Rangoon University correspondence undergraduate program. She received her B.Sc. degree in zoology in 1983. A year later, Ma Naing embarked on her primary teaching job in Bahan Township, one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Rangoon of which residents included the BSPP General Secretary General San Yu, BSPP high ranking officials, and wealthy merchants. Having belonged to a wealthy family she saw teaching not as a career, but as a hobby which she was passionate about. Ma Naing left the country for the United States where she now lives with her sister's family.

U Ba: English as a Second Language Teacher U Ba was born in Shwe Bo, an ancient capital city in Upper Burma. He was ethnically Indo-Burmese and raised Muslim. He completed his undergraduate studies at Mandalay University in the early 1960s where he became active in leftist political activism. He was a disciple of the Red Flag Communist leader Thakhin Soe. He discarded his Muslim faith, remained atheistic, and married a Buddhist Burmese woman. He taught English in both rural and urban high schools. He had a good reputation as an English as a Second Language teacher. Economically he was a struggling teacher with 3 young children.

Daw Hla: History Teacher

206 Daw Hla was born into a well-to-do family in an Upper Burma town. She attended Mandalay University and earned her BA in the early 1960s. Like U Ba, Daw Hla was involved in student activism on campus although her level of involvement was peripheral compared to that of the former. She taught high school history at a prestigious school in her town. She was married to a classmate who became a local entrepreneur. Between she and her husband her family led a decent life. Having constructed the biographical portraits of these educators, in the following section I discuss the cultural terrain and institutional settings in which these educators encountered BSPP educational reforms and political work.

Teaching Profession: Institutional History and Culture Culture as "'a whole social process, in which men define and shape their whole lives" (Williams, 1994: 595) is an important terrain on which power relations among different actors in Burmese education are configured and reconfigured. Here the importance of political context and the role of these political actors and forces can never be overemphasized. 3 Foucault's (1981) comments on how these social relations or power relations are configured when he highlights:
relations of power, and hence analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of State. In two senses: first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations (p. 122; italics added)

the interview titled "Truth and Power" which appeared in 1977 Michele Foucault (1981) mentioned thus: "without the political opening created during those years (i.e., 1968 and after) I would surely never have had the courage to take up these problems again and pursue my research in the direction of penal theory, prisons and disciplines" (p. 111). However, Foucault eschewed addressing the role of historical agency and focuses instead on the power relations and the local effects of power and strategies which power employs. See Foucault, Michele (1981) Power/Knowledge: Selective Interviews and Other Writings (1972-1977). Colin Gordon (Ed.) New York: Random House. Hereafter Foucault (1981) Power/Knowledge.

3In

207 Burma under BSPP rule is a classic example of how political authorities or the State 4 employed Buddhist cultural notions of "the teacher" towards narrowly utilitarian and overtly political ends. Under highly authoritarian rulers who were determined to be authoritarian, meddlesome and censorious even in the realm of cultural politics, there was little room for cultural elites or intellectuals such as teachers to push their agenda in the BSPP-sponsored re-construction of education (and social order) which was to be in accord with the "Burmese Way to Socialism." The educators were allowed to help reformulate educational culture only insofar as it helped advance the BSPP agenda. As in many other societies, the educational profession in Burma was not the greatest venue for wealth or political power. Far from it. And many people who chose an educational profession as their career, were fully aware of the modest gains which were to be had from their chosen profession. Burmese Buddhist cultural expectations and perceptions people held toward the teaching profession and its members appear to have served the BSPP government. In Chapter 3 I discussed traditional notions of "the teacher" and the social relations which were integral to them. Here I shall mention briefly some salient features of "teaching profession" and "teachers" which were re-worked throughout various historical periods. In the old Burma the teacher was to be "bearer of the Ultimate Knowledge," that is, Buddhist teachings which would aid the individuals in their quest for Nirvana. Also the teacher was expected to defend morality and ethics by leading an exemplary life. 5 In the post
4Here

I use the term "State" in a hybrid sense. In a hybrid sense, the State is Foucauldian and at the same time Althusserian with its ideological and repressive apparatuses. The Foucauldian State "consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible" (p. 122). See Foucault (1981) Power/Knowledge. p.122. 5Cultural traditions in both the "East" and "West," with their roots in religious systems of thought held their educators in high esteem. With no exception both the founders of these religious systems and the early religio-educators who "transmitted" early religious teachings were all male. The entry of females into the rank and file of religio-educators led to important changes in religio-education including a close scrutiny of individual social conduct and behavior of female teachers. Needless to say, reflecting the entrenched patriachal domination in today's societies, female educators receive less respect vis-a-vis their male counterparts.

208 independence period the Burmese teacher was no longer expected to be the bearer of ultimate knowledge. The authorities by and large, decided what was most worthy as knowledge. But the teacher was still to be the enforcer of Buddhist moral values and function in accord with the traditional cultural role. But there are other important elements in the traditional notion of the "teacher" which appear to have been discarded by the BSPP leadership. To further explicate, unlike royal patrons and Burmese Buddhist society at large, the BSPP socialist patrons (of education and educators) hardly held educators in high regard, let alone sought their advise. This was indicated by the virtual absence of the representation of teachers on committees which made crucial educational decisions. On the contrary, the BSPP (i.e., military) leaders who prided themselves as "liberators of the people" held the country's civilian educators in contempt. This was, and still is, a common perception amongst military officers (and by extension, soldiers) which has been systematically nurtured and perpetuated since the inception of the Burma Independence Army. During my interview in New York, Dr. Nyi Nyi, one of the few civilians with no military service who made it to the top in the first half of the BSPP rule, recalled that he often overheard military officers -- big or small, making disparaging remarks about the civilian, educated urbanites. This characteristic contempt was more pronounced especially toward the great majority of educators who belonged to the "post-independence" and "BSPP" generations: the authorities judged them to be least patriotic. The postindependence generation was too young to remember the nationalist struggle or colonial experience while the BSPP generation was not born yet while the BSPP leaders were involved in nationalist struggles "having made sacrifices for the country." 6 Senior educators such as Dr. Nyi Nyi and Dr. Chit Swe who belonged to the "late nationalist" generation were
6In

the official publication Party Affairs, Party propagandists defended teaching both educators and students alike "political science" with a heavy dose of the BSPP's version of nationalism on the grounds that these generations needed to be injected with the righ patriotic thought and sentiment. See Naing Ngan Ye Theik Pan Bar Tha Yap Thinhya Ye (Teaching Political Science (1973 July) Par Ti Ye Ya. pp.38-43.

209 disliked by the authorities for a different reason: in the eyes of the authorities with their characteristic xenophobia, the West-returnees (as those who studied in Western Europe and the United States are usually called) were tainted with Western values and outlook. Furthermore, there was a utilitarian attitude towards the country's educators on the part of the BSPP authorities. As far as the authorities were concerned, educators, regardless of which generation they belonged to, were a tool to be employed in the top-down socialist revolution. 7 While having paid lip service to the needs of educators and displayed ostentatious sensitivity to, and empathy for, their aspirations as well as their poor working conditions, the authorities proved incapable of taking care of even the most basic necessities of educators and their families, let alone improve their life. 8 Also BSPP leaders were disdainful of educators who, in their opinion, were incapable of keeping the country's students away from oppositional politics. General Ne Win, for instance, assembled all the university teachers at Rangoon University shortly after the 1962 student protests on campus and scolded them for their failure to prevent campus unrests (Kyi May Kaung, 1998). It is crucial to stress that the lack of respect, in practice, on the part of the BSPP authorities stood in sharp contrast to the old cultural practices according to which the monarch would allocate resources to various religio-cultural projects including pagoda and temple building and taking care of the material needs of educator-monks. Additionally, under the BSPP authorities, even at the height of socialist educational reforms, government spending on social services (health and education, that is) did not exceed 20% of the national budget. 9

be sure there were influential educators in particular and ordinary educators in general who
were able to negotiate power relations with the authorities and entered symbiotic relations. But as
far as the military authorities were concerned, the educators were tools to be utilized for their social,
educational, and political projects. I am reminded of the remark made by Dr. Chit Swe and Dr.
Kyaw Thet that educators under the BSPP rule were "Khain Hpat" or literally, "helping hands."
8For a typical act of paying lipservice to the teaching profession, see San Yu, President (1983 Winter)
Naing Ngan Daw Tha Ma Da Gyi U San Yu E Pyin Nya Ye Hsaing Ya Lam Nyun Gyet Mya (Presidential
Guidance on Education) Pyinnya Ye Shu Gen 1: 1, 46-54.
9During the interview, Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi contended that 20% spent on social services was better
than many other countries in similar social, economic, and political situations.

7To

210 Economically, while teachers were asked to do more (for the BSPP) for little economic return a larger portion of resources at the BSPP's disposal was freed up for military spending and maintenance of lavish life-styles, relatively speaking, amongst the BSPP leadership and its underlings. Promoting the cultural tradition which specifically called on educators to make (financial) sacrifices for their invaluable services only served the political interests of BSPP authorities in that the social relations which teachers were instructed to help reconfigure fitted the political agenda of the BSPP. It is hardly surprising that the BSPP authorities (and scores of educational leaders and popularizers including Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi) found it politically expedient to revive a particular notion of "teacher" from the Buddhist Burmese past, put a new socialist spin on it, and construct discursively a new socialist teacher. Here it is illuminating to apply the conceptual tool which Raymond Williams (1994) called "selective tradition, or "a version of the past which is intended to connect with and ratify the present" (p. 601). Williams wrote that any selective tradition is "an aspect of contemporary social and cultural organization, in the interest of the dominance of a specific class (p. 601)." In a deeply Buddhist culture, invoking Buddhist cultural definitions or identifications seems to have been effective. (During its 17 months stay in power, the "Caretaker Government" of General Ne Win ran a highly effective anti-Communist campaign depicting the underground Communist parties and their politics as Daman Da Rae or the enemy of Buddhism). The next section examines the discursive construction of teacher as a "BSPP cadre."

Teacher as Cadre and More: The Multiple Roles of the Teaching Profession After 1962, educational nationalization which was undertaken in accord with new socialist educational policies resulted in the creation of a single, unified education system, for the first time, in the country's educational history. A great majority of teachers previously self-employed as private tutors and educators or working for religious schools,

211 became all of a sudden state employees. As the socialist state expanded itself, it assigned teachers new roles while asking them to retain the old ones. Not only did the new authorities expect the teachers to be "good educators," but they exhorted the teachers to be "cadres," versed in the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology. Additionally, they were to be "youth leaders" who would recruit future socialist cadres from amongst their pupils and to lead the latter by example. Educators were to play a significant role in transforming Burma into a modern, socialist nation. In short under the new BSPP rule not only was the teacher to be "an expert" he or she was expected to be "Red" (Nyi Nyi, 1976: 111-113). According to "The Moral and Ethical Responsibilities of Educators (Draft)" issued by the Director of Education, the educators, as public servants, must serve the "working people." Indeed educators must lead exemplary lives by observing strictly institutional norms and maintaining impeccable moral character (Ba Lwin, 1972). Educators, particularly those in grade schools, were instructed to observe the following four official pledges (Ba Lwin, 1972):
1) I pledge to make, out of my students, future experts who will participate in and make contributions to, various economic, social, and administrative projects that are aimed at building a new Burmese Socialist society; 2) I pledge to help equip my students with ethical principles and mental attributes in accord with the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology; 3) I pledge to help promote the intellectual progress and skill development of the working people who are constructing Burmese socialist society; and 4) I pledge to uphold moral and ethical obligations and promote the dignity of educators.

Here one can not fail to notice multiple responsibilities which were being assigned to the educators: educators as disciplinarians or moral agents who would instill a particular set of pre-dispositions and mental attributes which were to be of use in the political project of the powers that be, or educators as the agents of the state. In light of the fact that the country's students were perceived as a serious challenge to the new order (BSPP, 1966), it was a strategic move on the part of the authorities to exhort the teachers to revive the good old ways where the latter served as moral authority, disciplinarian, and spiritual guide. To what degree did educators meet these multiple expectations which the Burma Socialist

212 Program Party and educational leaders of the day held? In what ways did they carry out the assigned roles, both new and old? What was their life like? Let's take a critical look at the world of educators.

Glimpses of the World of Educators: A Critical Appraisal In this section I hope to offer the readers glimpses as to how the educators whose biographies I presented earlier coped with educational policies and reforms. Not unlike its counterparts in China or the former Soviet Union, the presence of the Burma Socialist Program Party was felt strongly in Burma. As pointed out earlier in the chapter Burmese teachers (and their profession) were assigned new roles to carry out: to be the implementers of the BSPP revolution, the cadres of the omnipresent party. In what ways did the educators handle the demands and pressure placed on them by the Burma Socialist Program Party?

Educators and the Party: Marching along the Burmese Way to Socialism? None of the interviewees or those educators with whom I came into contact during my 16 years academic journey as a student (Kindergarten-undergraduate years) was chosen for the elite cadre training at the Central Institute of Political Science, which Director Ohn Maung and Rector Dr. Chit Swe underwent. Perhaps a brief recounting of the successful public performance which these two influential educators staged with the Party involving their fake show of ideological support for the BSPP may help illuminate how the other educators who were never a part of the educational establishment handled the BSPP demands. A devout Catholic, Director Ohn Maung had no faith in any leftist doctrine including "the Burmese Way to Socialism," but he underwent elite cadre training at the Central Institute of Political Science simply because he knew it was a pre-requisite for his career advancement. Neither was Dr. Chit Swe a believer in the BSPP policies. But being sent to the Central Institute was considered prestigious, a form of reward and even a prelude

213 to further career mobility. In those days most educators felt compelled to fulfill, at least, minimal political responsibilities such as joining the party, attending class cell meetings held once or twice a year, or taking special political training courses for brief periods of time. Kyi May Kaung recalled that in the early years of the BSPP rule Dr. Aye Hlaing, head of the Institute of Economics and her mentor, distributed BSPP membership application forms amongst the 40 or so faculty members at the Institute with a verbal message saying that he had just joined the Party. In spite of the implicit urging by her mentor and Department Head, Kyi May Kaung did not file her application until after most of her faculty colleagues had done so. Somewhat politically aware, she felt "stupid" after she filed the application. And Kyi May Kaung "wanted to withdraw the application." But a friend of hers advised against the idea on the grounds that doing so "might draw the authorities' attention" (to her). Referring to the official Burmese Way to Socialism ideology, Kyi May Kaung remarked, "it sounded kind of OK. But I didn't really believe in it." Even after she was granted the status of "reserve member," she did not attend class cell meetings, which was expected of all members. 10 At work, party cadre-organizers from the Rangoon University local class cell would try to persuade her to apply for a full-fledged membership. Kyi May Kaung remembered her encounters with the Party and cadres thus:
They were really pushy. They asked me to come and attend the (class cell) meetings. Likewise, in our residential area, local organizers would come and invite me to attend local party meetings. If I declined to go having given various excuses, they wouldn't like it. My mother wished I went, at least out of a sense of civic duty. Then I felt rather unhappy about having had to deal with all of that. So I chose to lose the party identification number. When I had to fill out the State Scholarship application, I made up a number and nobody really checked. No one ever found that out.

10After

a BSPP party congress decided that it was time for the party to transform itself into a broadbased party, it launched the membership drive beginning in January 1969. Under this mass organizing scheme, there were three levels of involvement in the party. At the bottom were "friends of the Party" or party sympathizers. A new member whose application was approved was called a "Reserve Member." The next step for the reserves was to apply for "full-fledged" membership. Fullfledged membership was an important pre-requisite for promotion within one's respective profession or any government-sponsored organizational hierarchy excepting a handful of cases.

214 However, her next door neighbor, a BSPP Minister, would send his black Mercedes to induce Kyi May Kaung to begin attending local class cell meetings. In those days, the people were experiencing the effects of progressive decline of the country's economy caused, in large part, by the inept economic policies of the BSPP. And when she paid brief visits to her minister neighbor on her way to local Party meetings, she came to realize how wide the gap between the lives of the bulk of ordinary people and those BSPP VIPs was.
You know, he was the Minister of Transportation. Foreign companies wanted to sell their products to the government, so the guy would travel abroad in order to attend trade fairs or to check out, say, Diesel Engines for the railways department, in places like Paris. At his residence, I saw so many pairs of expensive footwear owned by his wife. Each pair cost half of the salary of an Assistant Lecturer, which I was at the time. Obviously they were high prized imported items which he brought back from his various overseas trips.

Lecturer Aye Kyaw had a different story to share. Unlike his wife who was very active in the BSPP mass organizational work, Dr. Aye Kyaw viewed the Party and its ideology with disdain. In his own words:
You know U Chit Hlaing (who was the party's principal ideologue) was a literary man. Naturally, what we had was a fine manifesto, and my wife was quite drawn to it. While we were on the faculty at Taunggyi College, she was doing a lot of organizing work for the local township party unit there. We had many heated conversations about the official ideology. My historian colleague Daw Ni Ni Myint and I were very much against my wife who believed that the BSPP was sincere in its espousal of the Burmese Way ideology. To me it was nothing more than a carefully crafted polemic. 11

Ideologically, Aye Kyaw described himself as neither a rightist nor leftist. He considered himself as a "genuine nationalist" who wished "equality and fairness" among the diverse group of indigenous ethnic peoples. His strong interest was to write Burmese history from a pluralist (i.e., multi-ethnic) perspective, not helping to refashion the social order in line with the "Burmese Way." It is quite plausible to argue that Dr. Aye Kyaw's questioning of the sincerity of the BSPP leadership is a concealed criticism of the monopolistic grip on history production by the BSPP's rigid ideological framework which was aimed at suppressing the emergence of various competing nationalist visions.
11Daw

Ni Ni Myint later married the BSPP Party Chairman General Ne Win. A new department called International Relations at Rangoon University was created and she was made its Chair.

215 Unlike Aye Kyaw and Kyi May Kaung, Robert Byatchin was far more acquiescent toward the new socialist order. Lecturer Byatchin obeyed "whatever laws, whatever powers." The rationale for his radical accommodation is easily discernible in his advise to the Chin students with whom he came into contact. Byatchin typically advised them thus:
Don't do anything against the (BSPP) government. You must do well in school. We are fewer and the land (in Chin State) is infertile. There are no potentials for commercial development in Chin State. Education is the only venue for our social mobility. Whether you like what is happening (in the country) or not just study.

Byatchin nonetheless had his own independent view toward leftist ideologies. Byatchin pointed out insightfully that the popularity of leftist ideologies which attracted many students on campuses across the country was to be accounted for by the youthful idealism of the time, in addition to the prevailing economic conditions of the country. 12 Byatchin noted thus:
When I was an undergraduate student at Rangoon (in the 1950s), there was this widespread sentiment among many students that communism was good. Students were attracted to egalitarian ideals. I however, did not vote in the student union elections then. If I did I probably would have voted for leftist groups.

High school ESL teacher U Ba had a story significantly different from the others. Having been a student activist who supported the Red Flag Communist group, a minority faction of the two underground Communist parties, U Ba was not impressed by the BSPP philosophy. A high school teacher, he was not involved in the BSPP in any significant ways
in the midst of the Cold War period in 1963, the American political scientists, more or less mainstream in their political orientation, explained away the left-influenced campus activism in Burma using "variables" other than idealism. For instance, Berkeley academic Josef Fischer described four categorical factors to account for campus activism: "the cleavage between geneations, the absence of authoritative models of conduct, the restricted range of opportunities for achievement and conviviality, and the scarcity of socially and economically rewarding opportunities for employment" (p.192). See Fischer, J. ( 1969) The University Student in South and Southeast Asia.pp.186-200. In Robert O. Tilman (ed.) Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia. New York: Prager. Likewise, Josef Silverstein, Rutgers University political scientist, offered a more nuanced and historically grounded analysis of the roots of campus activism in Burma (and Malaysia). According to Siliverstein, there were three "important variables" connected with student activism such as "the political environment, the educational system, and the students and their organization" (p.19). But Silverstein too, failed to make a mention of the idealism that was a key component of student politics at that time. See Silverstein, J. (1970 March) Burmese and Malaysian Student Politics: A Preliminary Comparative Inquiry. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1: 1, 3-22.
12Writing

216 and was rather tight-lipped about the new social order. He managed to evade the party recruiters all throughout the BSPP years. Perhaps the authorities left him alone simply because unlike many other Communists he remained silent under the BSPP rule. In addition, his Muslim background may have made him realize that if he were critical of the BSPP he would likely meet harsher punitive treatment by the BSPP regime, known for its strong antiIndian, especially anti-Muslim sentiment. 13 However, I remember several occasions on which he spoke quite favorably of life under North Korean Communist Party while chatting with a group of us students. One of his favorite stories which I remembered most vividly was that in spite of its relative lack of prosperity, the Communist Party in North Korea was able to provide every family a decent housing, that is, a house with indoor plumbing. His family was then living in an extended family arrangement in a large house with no indoor plumbing. Unlike U Ba, high school history teacher Daw Hla did not really hold any strong views toward the regime. But she would, with an air of nostalgia, shared with me the stories of her peripheral involvement in student activism at Mandalay University. Daw Hla did join the BSPP party although she did not really take part in any of its activities other than participating in the BSPP-sponsored mass rallies and other occasional (party) assignments. Those were the kinds of "professional" duties typically assigned to teachers by the authorities via the school administration as part of their "cadre" functions. According to my recollections of our conversations about her party activities, she would attend class cell meetings once or twice a year, sit through those meetings without saying a word, pay membership dues, and try to remain on good terms with local party officials and grassroots organizers. Her involvement in the party was rather typical of many school teachers, that is, minimalist.
Burma General Ne Win's dislike of Muslim is a poorly kept secret. His economic nationalization measures in the early 1960s drove over 100,000 Burmese citizens of Indian descent and foreign-born Indians out of the country.
13In

217 When the party began its mass outreach activities, as an act of policy, beginning in 1969, Daw Hla spoke somewhat admiringly about some of the local party cadres who, in her judgment, were genuine believers in socialism. When things were going poorly under the BSPP rule, she would often repeat the popular line that "the policies are fine, but the policymakers are bad." Unlike the educators whose responses to the Party and its ideology I have just discussed, Ma Naing belonged to our generation, that is, the "socialist or BSPP generation." Far from having been affected by the monopolistic BSPP propaganda work which we all were subjected to throughout our student years, she remained staunchly apolitical. After Ma Naing began her career as a primary school teacher in Bahan township in Rangoon she found herself in a "boot camp," as she put it, at Bo Ga Lay Teachers' Training College. This was indeed her first encounter with the Party. Here is how she remembered the experience:
Oh my God, I had to eat londi hsan (brown rice). The coffee they gave us was like cow's urine. At 4 in the morning, we all had to get up, put on PE (Physical Education) gear, and do the military-like drills. I had to share a room with 4 other teachers and we each were given beds made of bamboo. It was just like a real boot camp. It was too harsh for me to handle and I cried and cried. I immediately called home to complain about the situation. And my parents sent a good mattress, home-made food, and other eateries. Everyone had to go to the mess, dine there, and do the clean-up and other chores collectively. But I ate at the mess once. I just stayed in my room and ate the food from home. 14

The one-month long initial teaching training program was obviously designed to instill socialistic values which included collective decision making and a collective way of life. But it was not doing anything for Ma Naing. As a daughter of a VIP family, she got away with ignoring it. Included in the intensive teacher training course were Physical Education, Teacher Education courses in Math, History, and English as a Second Language, and the Party's version of political science. In response to my question of what she thought of the Burmese

matter how much nutrition value it has, brown rice has a very strong social meaning in that it has traditionally been the staple of the poor. Also prisoners and criminals covicts, as well as army recruits are fed brown rice.

14No

218 Way to Socialism, she said, with a laugh, "Don't ask me. I didn't understand a thing. It was just a head-ache." So far I have discussed the specific ways in which these educators with various backgrounds related to the party. It seems that the two male educators, Dr. Aye Kyaw and Robert Byatchin, responded to the BSPP recruitment and the assignments in different ways, in spite of the fact that they both belonged to ethnic minority communities. The country's ethnic history seems to shed some light on their various responses to the Burman-dominated BSPP, its policy, and recruitment. As I discussed in Chapter 3 the Rakhine have been one of the major players in Burma's political history and produced many pioneering nationalists who provided leadership during the earlier phases of Burma's nationalist struggle. The Chins as a political community were rather divided and there are 40 different dialects there. 15 The issue of forging a strong Chin political community was even more difficult than dealing with the dominant Burman. This difference in these political traditions of the Rakhines and the Chin seem to account for the fact that Dr. Aye Kyaw was concerned about ethnic issues while Lecturer Byatchin did not even think they were issues. For the latter it was social mobility of the Chins, not their nationalism or common ethnic identity. Byatchin's advise to his Chin students -- study hard and seek social mobility via education -- was rather telling. He himself accommodated the new assignments and party responsibilities obediently which were given to him. In addition his cultural background which valued communalism may have convinced him that the egalitarian views espoused by the BSPP were something that he could live with. Educators such as Ma Naing who came from a wealthy, influential family were not interested in the utopian vision which permeated BSPP policy pronouncements. Due to her
are two major groups -- Hakha and Tee-din --who are historical rivals. The Burmese language is spoken by both as the medium of communication as their dialects are radically different from each other.
15There

219 class location she was able to evade the Party's attempt to impress upon her socialistic values through teachers' "boot-camps." Neither social mobility nor nationalism was an issue which she would care to grapple with. Indeed she was a teacher out of passion for teaching. She was not in it because she wanted or needed a career or money. Her being part of the ruling circle kept her from being critical of the BSPP ideology or its shortcomings or discrepancies between the rhetoric and realities. In contrast, Kyi May Kaung who was equally affluent, was observant of the state of affairs in BSPP Burma and developed a critical attitude towards the BSPP. Accordingly she was always delaying her membership process. Her reluctance to join the BSPP may be accounted for by her critical thinking which she seemed to have developed through her exposure to her father's circle of intellectual friends. Furthermore, her affluent background may have reminded her that she needed no help from the Party to simply have a good life or material or career advancement. Daw Hla, the high school history teacher, joined the Party simply because of professional peer pressure. In addition, the BSPP ideology or more broadly, socialism, was not something which was too alien to her. After all she was attracted to left-leaning student politics during her university student days. These aforementioned stories seem to suggest that individual class location, ethnic background, oppositional ideologies and political outlook, and individual interests determined how individual educators responded to the attempts by the BSPP to recruit and coopt the educators. Clearly none of the teachers whose stories I reconstructed here, not even the ones with leftist and communalistic value orientations, operated as "socialist cadres." As a matter of fact , there developed a new institutional culture which was contemptuous of those educators who acted as anabya or BSPP cadres (Aye Kyaw, 1994). In the closing days of the BSPP rule, even the Minister of Education U Kyaw Nyein, who had been a Secretary of the BSPP Headquarters, would scorn publicly those educators who would place their party involvement and activities before their professional obligations (Ohn

220 Maung, 1995). This is to say, that even the BSPP leaders were no longer interested in transmitting their BSPP ideology to the country's students via teacher-cadres. Here a word is in order about the absence of the voices of educators who genuinely believed in the Burmese Way to Socialism and supported it sincerely through their writings. In the next section which I discuss how some of the educators were drawn to the policy objectives, in other words, the educational vision articulated by the BSPP authorities and educational leaders.

Support for the Revolution: Educators as BSPP Popularizers Socio-ideologically, ideals of socialism were by and large consonant with Burmese political and cultural values as pointed out by politicians and scholars alike (see, for instance, Ba Swe, 1955; Sein Tu, 1964). 16 During the initial phase of the reforms, some of the educators who helped popularize socialist educational reforms (and BSPP policies) seem to have believed sincerely in the intrinsic goodness of these new measures. One educator wrote that new educational policies would "ensur(e) every son of the soil climbs the educational ladder according to his ability, interest and aptitude from the lowest to top-most rung within the framework of the needs of the country for its social progress and economic development" (Ba Myint, 1967: 12). Regardless of where they were trained or what their disciplines were,
student of Cora Alis DuBois at Harvard in the 1950s, the Burmese psychologist Sein Tu built his analysis of "Burmese personality" on Freudian psychology. Although his grand observations are seriously flawed, his point about more or less egalitarian communal values being consonant with socialistic values is correct. Here is a typical and problematic argument of his: The Burman is above all other things, a cynic and a realist. He does not place much credence in the idealism, or reliability or loyalty of others (p.268). Regarding the match between communalism of Burmese culture and socialism, he later contradicted himself when he argues that "(t)he Burmese do not place faith in man's conscience or idealism or other such intrapsychic controls, being ready to believe the worst of anyone.... They are, in short, convinced of the depravity of man" (p. 269). Burmese culture being steeped in Buddhist ideals of ending all forms of individual sufferings through individual efforts alone , Sein Tu's observation strikes me as rather outlandish. See Sein Tu, Dr. (1964 December) The Psychodynamics of Burmese Personality. Journal of the Burma Research Society. XLVII: ii, 263-285. The Burmese nationalist leader U Ba Swe who helped popularize Marxism amongst the Burmese Buddhists pointed out the compatibility of Marxism and (essentially atheistic) Buddhist philosophy. See Ba Swe, U (1955) Bama Taw Hlan Ye Hnint Bama Lok Tha Htu (Burmese Revolution and Burmese Working Masses). Rangoon: Pyithu Sarpay. pp. 27-29. In the post-independence period U Ba Swe held various posts including Deputy minister, the Prime Minister, and Defense Minister.
16A

221 their writings echoed the cries of modernization, socialist economic development and nationbuilding. In a state-own Guardian magazine, U Ba Myint (1967), a London Institute of Education-trained educational researcher with the Ministry of Education wrote thus:
The Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma, after assumption of power on the 2nd March 1962, has infused new life into Education, vitalized it and put a new face on it, resulting in the whole nation looking at it from a different and more practical point of view. In consequence, Education has been elevated to the status of a powerful national tool to forge out social and economic transformation of the country towards a Socialist State as chalked out in the Burmese Way to Socialism (p.9).

Some managed to weave their own educational philosophies and pedagogical approaches into their statements legitimating the waves of educational reforms. Writings and speeches by Dr. Maung Phyu, a Berkeley-trained linguist and well-known writer-educator who pushed for Burmanization of education typify the support of the earlier crop of educators with their socialist orientation. Maung Phyu (1967) expounded his belief in the new policies thus:
Any education worth its name places training of character at the top. The Revolutionary Government is right in its emphasis on Socialist moral values of a high order (italics original)....A capitalist society has one set of moral values while Socialism demands other values. Ours has been a capitalist society and our children have been taught from time immemorial that a certain man has acquired two lakh of rupees in four months by the right use of a dead rat....Now, if one has the ability to see through the undesirability of this kind of teaching for the new society, then one can be considered to have been educated....Our Government's one desire is to build a socialist society of affluence according to the Burmese Way. And we must all subscribe to this and other aims of the Government (pp.42-43).

These educators were actively involved in the Revolutionary Council-sponsored national education seminars and gave their input in the socialist educational reform measures, as many educators did in the earlier days of the BSPP rule. In his paper presented at the Second Burma Research Congress (March 19, 1967) Dr. Maung Pyu (1969) even argued that the new educational policies of the Revolutionary Council government were not revolutionary enough as far as Burmanization of language was concerned. In his own words:
The Revolutionary Government for reasons only known to itself is for once not revolutionary enough. It is adopting an evolutionary policy with regard to the dropping of English in the primary departments of the newly acquired schools, to come into line with the nation's schools. If I were King, I would have the uniformity from the time we had the nation's schools teach English from the fifth standard nineteen years ago....Why in the world teach English from the fifth standard in the nation's schools, and to defeat its own purpose allow private schools to teach English from any class at any age? It is responsible for a mushroom growth of English schools at every street corner to exploit the situation (p.223).

222 At the time of their writings, the disillusionment with top-down socialist planning was not that widespread amongst many educators with socialist views. Once the prospect of collective decision making and de-bureaucratization in education which initially excited many educators failed to develop and the authoritarian tendencies of the BSPP rule became rather apparent public attitude towards the BSPP leaders and officials, as well as the official policies turned irreversibly sour. And yet nearly two decades after the 1962 coup there were plenty of educators including teacher educators, educational scholars, and various faculty members at all levels of education who went on popularizing the Burmese Way to Socialism policies. By 1981 socialism had already lost its mass appeal in Burma, the conventional wisdom which could be gleaned from the popular jokes and plays-on-words ridiculing the Party, its cadres, its policies and programs, and the leaders. There were those educators who simply spoke the socialist language and continued to sing the praise for the BSPP rule and its education; it was a sure way to secure a foot in the BSPP social order. U Tun Kywe (1981), Professor of Educational Management at the Institute of Education, found it OK to be repeating, in a series of articles which appeared in the official professional magazine Pyinnya Dazaung, the earlier theme of "Let's-use-our-education-towards-building-a-socialist-nation" using professional jargons from his specialty. As late as 1987--a year before the collapse of the Burma Socialist Program Party--Dr. Than Nyunt, Cambridge-trained economist, was broadcasting radio and TV lessons on "Socialist Economy" expounding the Economic Laws of Socialism (see Than Nyunt, 1987). The rhetoric of these educators rang hollow. Here readers should be reminded that as Dr. Nyi Nyi (1994) pointed out there was a mass audience for socialist policies in a post colonial society such as Burma. After all, socialism had been a major component of the mainstream Burmese nationalist thought, as well as the trade mark of all successive governments in Burma since the time of Aung San's cabinet during the immediate post

223 World War II. As a matter of fact, neither educational nor economic nationalization really affected the bulk of the peoples, as the economy was controlled largely by the Chinese and Indians, and Europeans (Mangrai, 1995). To the military take-over of 1962 and subsequent socialist revolution, the public response was hardly antagonistic, if not warm. 17 In 1962, the Burmese soil was still fertile for socialist seeds. But after 26 years under the BSPP's authoritarian rule, socialism with its humanitarian ideals had lost its potency and appeal amongst the Burmese public. Burma's educational politics under the BSPP rule stand to serve as a classic example of how wellmeaning attempts to realize humane ideals led to less than honorable conduct (on the part of the BSPP leaders initially and many government servants in due course). The country then began reeling under the effects of economic ills. Earlier in the chapter I have mentioned that the BSPP authorities made clever attempts to capitalize on the existing cultural relations and norms that traditionally existed amongst communities of teachers/educators in pre-colonial Burma. One of the essential qualities of the ideal teacher is Ahnit-na or self-sacrifice. It does have an economic dimension to it. In a modern cash economy with more career choices and more complex power relations, "self-sacrifice" seems to connote being underpaid and under-rewarded for one's services. In the next two sections I examine the economic realities which these teachers had to face. In doing so, I address the following question: how did they operate in the BSPP education system imposed by the BSPP authorities which called on the traditional cultural discourses to ask teachers to do more for few economic incentives and rewards?

17The

property-owning capitalists, both foreign-born and indigenous, as well as the old politicians including ethnic leaders, were most affected by the coup. See Mangrai, Sao Kawn Kio (1995) Unrecorded personal interview. Walnut Creek, California. And the majority of Burmese did not really seem to have cared about the change of guards at the time of the coup, contrary to the various revisionist interpretations of the events of 1962 which argued otherwise. According to Lecturer Robert Byatchin, student protests on Rangoon University campuses against General Ne Win's coup did not enjoy popular support even from amongst their fellow students. Byatchin, R. (1995) Unrecorded interview. Berkeley, California.

224 Economic realities and reward structures Perhaps with the exception of a few societies including Japan, educators in general are underpaid. It hardly needs any documentation to back up the claim that other helping professions, for instance, medicine, are far better paid than education. Within the education profession itself, the level of grade one teaches corresponds to the amount of salary. As economic conditions deteriorated progressively during the BSPP rule, educators had to endure not only economic hardships but also the gradual loss of social influence, respectability, and prestige in a culture which traditionally held their profession in high esteem. This decline in prestige, respect, and social influence cut across all levels of education. Burma under BSPP rule was a society dominated by military officers who entertained anti-intellectualism. As pointed out earlier in the chapter the leadership itself was disdainful of civilian government employees as they considered the latter not as patriotic or important in building and defending the modern Burmese nation. While the educational leaders and BSPP authorities continued to do their cheerleading to encourage teachers to work harder for the BSPP political and economic goals, economic prospects for the teachers declined progressively. To be sure, university educators were better paid than their counterparts in primary and secondary educational institutions. Noteworthy are several things that distinguish university educators in Burma from their counterparts in advanced capitalist countries, however. Outside academia, Burmese university educators did not have any viable career alternatives. There existed no consultant work for industries and other non-academic institutions such as Think Tanks; nor were there opportunities for viable self-employment as independent experts. As employees of the Burmese socialist state, their salaries were not differentiated on the basis of disciplines, but in terms of rank, seniority, and levels of educational attainment. Finally, faculty promotion was based not on academic or scholarly

225 accomplishments, but rather on seniority, political loyalty and cooperation, and certainly personal connections. Only professors and other senior members of the university community, which made up a tiny fraction of the country's educators, were provided with public housing on campus. Even the post of a high school principal which was a decently respectable position among the educators, did not bring transportation or housing allowances, generally speaking. Economic life of the educators, by and large, was rather bleak. In contrast, other government employees with comparable salaries (for instance, employees of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Customs Department, Police Force, Military Commands, Ministry of Trade, etc.), were faring better. What accounts for this phenomenon is the relative lack of non-official, and in many cases, illegal, structure of opportunities and rewards which were available to other government employees in non-education sectors. To illustrate this point, one needs only to compare the economic rewards between a Primary Assistant Teacher (P.A.T.) -- the official title of primary teachers -- and a clerk who earned a comparable salary from, say, the Ministry of Transportation, whose duty was to register or inspect old motor vehicles. Unlike the teacher, the clerk occupied a small, but significant slot in the ministry's machinery. More important, he or she was part of a Ministry-wide chain of bureaucratic command characterized by corruption. While the men (and women) who sat at the top of this bureaucratic structure enjoyed their lion's share, the lowly clerk was sure to receive his or her share, widely nicknamed as "tea money." In popular Burmese culture, this informal, differential redistribution of rewards was derisively expressed as "the low life bites the bones and other left-over bits and pieces while the higher-ups devour their gourmet meals." When one turns one's attention to the education sector, for a great majority of educators, especially those in the lower grades, there simply were no similar opportunities--if illegal--which would enable them to supplement their meager incomes. In her efforts to

226 discourage us from following her foot steps, high school history teacher Daw Hla used to say, with just a touch of irony, about her own profession:
Well, all government employees except us teachers 18 have varying degrees of opportunities to take bribes or embezzle state money, or in short, to be corrupt. As educators in grade schools, who is going to bribe us? What do we have which people would pay to get? Steal chalks and chalk boards? Textbooks? School uniforms? Well, that won't amount to much. Even if we wanted to we have few opportunities to be corrupt. 19

Let's look at the specific ways in which the educators whose narratives of their profession informed this study coped with the economic realities confronting them.

Politics of Economic Survival Amongst Teachers As the country was reeling under the ills of a rapidly declining economy, the BSPP authorities were instructing educators to embrace the old cultural norms delineated for teachers. It is interesting to look at the ways in which these educators dealt with the dilemma which confronted them as a community of moral agents; on the one hand, they were exhorted (by the BSPP) to lead an exemplary life while on the other hand, they had to support their families on a shoe string budget. Under these circumstances teachers came up with creative responses to address the day-to-day economic hardships. When the high school teacher Daw Hla made the aforementioned remark about the absence of opportunities to bring in extra money to make ends meet, she was only half-right. One of the few legitimate opportunities which ordinary educators, both from colleges and high schools throughout the country, seized to make extra money was to apply for various positions in grading examination papers. Every year teachers from around the

teachers she meant teachers like herself, not the policy wonks and other influential educators with decision making power over promotion, transfer, employment, and state scholarship. 19As a matter of fact, there were known incidences where school authorities such as principals and senior teachers who sat on various school committees were reputed to have sold government-issued better quality school uniforms to the black market, bought the poor quality ones for their pupils, and pocketed the difference.

18By

227 country who were chosen to be correctors of the national matriculation examination papers would come down to Rangoon during the summer break. They would earn 50 Pya (US $ 1= 670 Pya at the official exchange rate). Annually, more than 300,000 students took the Basic High School Examination and they were tested on 6 subjects. More important, the cumulative score a student obtained on this national examination was the sole criterion for college admissions and determined the life course of a student. There were limited slots available in programs which could either lead to employment in the government, the country's largest employer, or enable the young graduates to practice their own trade independently (e.g., medical doctors, dentists, and vet. doctors). Those who did not make it into any of those programs did not have a second chance. Parents used their wealth, political power, or personal connections--anything at their disposal, as a matter of fact--in order to ensure that their children got ahead within this sink-or-swim system. This created a window of opportunity for the educators to bring in extra rewards for themselves as the parents would bribe the teachers, offer political favor, and other politically and socially desirable goods in exchange for the "help" teachers provided in their children's education. High school ESL teacher U Ba had 3 children to support and his wife was a home maker. In spite of his past involvement with the Communist movement and his quiet distaste for the BSPP system which failed even to provide a decent housing for teachers, U Ba had to wrestle with the day-to-day economic needs of his family. Every summer U Ba gave up his summer vacation, traveled down to Rangoon, and earned extra money. For an economically struggling teacher such as U Ba the monies he earned, both legitimately and under the table, during those exam correction months went a long way in supporting his family and children's school expenses. The two lecturers, Dr. Aye Kyaw and Robert Byatchin, were not doing too well financially either. In their spare time they offered private tutoring classes to anyone who could afford to buy their services. Interestingly Lecturer Byachin, who recalled how the

228 egalitarian appeals of communism attracted him in his Rangoon University student days, delivered his home tutoring services, for a good extra pay, in Rangoon's wealthy suburban homes in residential quarters such as the Golden Valley, one of the richest neighborhoods in the country. Likewise, Dr. Aye Kyaw with his strong Rakhine ethnic sentiments against the BSPP leadership and distate for the Burmese Way to Socialism home-tutored a son of the Party General Secretary General Aye Ko. For the affluent teachers like elementary school teacher Ma Naing and lecturer Kyi May Kaung economic hardship was not an immediate issue. The salaries they earned from their teaching jobs were merely "pocket money" for them, as they put it. High school teacher Daw Hla was not outstandingly wealthy. But between she and her entrepreneur husband, they could afford to maintain a decent life -- relatively speaking -- for their children. Certainly there is nothing particularly unique or despicable about human beings doing what they need to do in order to survive. In a moral order which was crumbling even in high places dealing with moral dilemmas and contradictions does not seem to be as extraordinarily difficult as it appears at the first glance. These teachers were well aware of corruption and power abuses in the BSPP leadership. But it was the same group of leaders that exhorted the country's teachers to uphold traditional moral values and lead an exemplary life as teachers. Here it is instructive to quote the "Burmese Way to Socialism" when it declares:
The (Revolutionary) Council believes it to be possible only when exploitation of man by man is brought to an end and a socialist economy based on Justice is established; only then can all people, irrespective of race or religion, be emancipated from all social evils and set free from anxieties over food, clothing and shelter, and from inability to resist evil, for an empty stomach is not conducive to wholesome morality, as the Burmese saying goes (The Revolutionary Council, 1962; italics mine).

Indeed many educators, at least, the ones whom I came into contact with, were engaged in various types of conduct, which under normal circumstances and in morally healthy conditions, would be deemed criminal or unbecoming of an educator. But Burmese Buddhist culture offered some justification for dealing with contradictions. Many teachers

229 comforted themselves by having taken refuge in the Burmese saying "if there is a hole in the roof, water is going to seep downward (when it rains)." In other words, if the leaders of the land were themselves guilty of immorality it was inevitable that the immorality would spread and permeate all segments of the society under their rule. What was interesting however, was how the educators justified these apparently contradictory and even questionable acts. I now present a story of a teacher who violated her own professional code of conduct and the justification and reasoning she entertained for her conduct.

Caught in the Moral Dilemma: Professionalism under BSPP Rule Throughout the BSPP rule, the educators whom I interviewed or knew through my close association were torn between their desire to uphold their professional code of conduct, the economic hardships, and the pressure to be corrupt which arose from the deteriorating moral universe. The case of the high school teacher Daw Hla offers some insights into the internal, moral dilemma which many educators appear to have been confronted with Daw Hla taught high school history (k-10 school system) in one of the reputable schools in Mandalay. One year she had two children of hers in her history class. Daw Hla developed examination questions for the annual examination and she showed no favoritism toward her own children. Neither did she leak the questions to them nor did she raise their scores while correcting their exam papers. Daw Hla behaved as professionally as any selfrespecting educator would have. In 1981-82 the Ministry of Education held the last examination for those high school students who were taught with the old curriculum which was recently replaced by the new one. If the old system students failed, their dream of graduating from high school would become far more distant as they would have to deal with a rather different curriculum. Many old system students who were taking the examination had already failed before. Out of

230 economic necessities, many of them were already working as low level clerks or office assistants in various government departments. For them, a high school diploma would be a significant leverage for career advancement, a small but significant pay increase, a chance to get a college degree through correspondence courses, etc. Like many of her professional peers, Daw Hla had an assignment to administer the examination. Daw Hla shared with me stories about how some students begged her to allow them to look at their notes or consult with other students during the examination. That was something which would clearly be in violation of the examination codes. There arose a moral dilemma. On the one hand, she wanted to be fully professional and respect her role as an educator. (She knew that she was capable of acting in a highly professional manner, as her fair treatment of her own daughters indicated.) On the other hand, amidst the pleading whispers of these Old System students, many of whom were already working as peons and low level administrative assistants to make a living, she felt she wanted to help them by giving in to their desperate requests. After all, everyone under the BSPP rule lived in a general moral environment wherein many rich and powerful parents secured the best of not only all educational opportunities but also the outcomes for their children, by any means. Intriguing is how Daw Hla seems to have justified her having turned a blind eye to cheating by those old system students. Despite her role as a professional educator and as a state employee, she asked herself if she ought to penalize these poor souls simply because she felt compelled to act professionally out of her sense of being a self-respecting professional, as often exhorted by the BSPP authorities and educational leaders. Further, should she be concerned, she asked herself, about what was expected of her by the authorities who were themselves corrupt and immoral: act as their moral/state agent? Of course, she ought to put things in perspective and help, rightly or wrongly, these students

231 who were already disadvantaged severely by the prevailing order of things, Daw Hla reasoned. This line of reasoning helped solve, if momentarily, the moral dilemma which confronted her. She finally allowed these students to do their cheating. She therefore, found herself playing a new, if not honorable, role. She was on alert to watch out for any of her supervisors who made a usual round or two (of inspection) during this national examination. The story of Daw Hla brings to light what the American political scientist James Scott labeled as "everyday form of resistance" (see Scott, 1990). As I stressed earlier the BSPP imposed their educational and political agenda on the great majority of teachers and treated them as mere cogs in the entire BSPP machinery. In the process the authorities used the culture to discursively construct a 'cadre-teacher' and deployed an intelligence apparatus to enforce their political will and vision in education. It can safely be argued that teachers were cognizant of these manipulative acts by the powers that be and therefore resentful of the authorities and disliked the general direction in which the country's education system was moving. In other words, teachers like Daw Hla saw the entire education system as oppressive and corrupt. Drawing on Scott's elaborations of everyday forms of resistance, I would argue that the violation of professional norms when Daw Hla allowed students in her examination hall to cheat openly was not only driven by her compassion for the poor students who wished to better themselves a little in the BSPP social order, but it was also motivated by her resentment toward and distaste for the BSPP education system in particular and the political and economic order in general. All along Daw Hla had played the game as was expected of her: as a moral agent and self-respecting professional. Recall that she honored her professionalism even when she had a chance to exercise favortism towards her own children who were in her classrom.

232 Although there was no monetary gain nor incentive for professional advancement, the self-cognizant act of subversion directed against a system which Daw Hla had every reason to resent must have given her a fair amount of satisfaction. Needless to say, her lone action did not produce any earth-shattering impacts on the educational system as a whole. But there certainly were hundreds of Daw Hlas who were engaged in various "subversive" acts out of resentment and discontent having worked within a system which treated them as merely cogs, rather than professionals and intellectuals deserving of respect. As I pointed out the BSPP authorities repeatedly attempted to revive a selective tradition pertaining to "educators" and social relations in which they were urged to cooperate. The violation of professional norms and the momentary suspension of her role as a "moral agent of the BSPP" constitute an element of radicalism. Paraphrasing Barrington Moore, James Scott (1993: 92) writes:
The least radical step (in the interrogation of domination) is to criticize some of the dominant stratum for having violated the norms by which they claim to rule; the next most radical step is to accuse the entire stratum of failing to observe the principles of its rule; and the most radical step is to repudiate the very principles by which the dominant stratum justifies its dominance. Criticism of virtually any form of domination might be analyzed in this fashion.

There was no public space for expressing her criticism toward the socio-moral order in which her professional workplace was located. Although she did not articulate, out of fear of reprisal, a word of criticism, nor was she engaged in any collective act of interrogation of what was felt amongst the teachers as an authoritarian political and work climate, the minute she repudiated her own professionalism she undertook the most radical action an individual teacher could have taken under the then prevailing circumstances. There were numerous tales involving acts of subversion, sabotage, and resistance. Let's hear another voice of discontent and disgust with the system by one of the educators whom I interviewed. Dr. Aye Kyaw recalled bitterly how he and his educator colleagues had no choice but to put up with the BSPP agents whom he considered "idiots." In his own words:

233
They were busy bodies. Besides, there were also Party cadres from the Central Institute of Political Science who knew nothing about our trade, but who would use their political weight and interfere in history writing. We, the historians, had no choice but to put up with their interferences. Take U Thant Zin from the Central Institute of Political Science, for instance. He only had a B.Sc. degree, but he was a big shot in the Central Institute. And he sat on the History Textbook Revision Sub-committee of which I was a member. Even Lt. Colonel San Myint (who had genuine interest in education and who headed the Institute of Education at the time) was afraid of Comrade Thant Zin and had to listen to that idiot.

If Daw Hla's suspension of her role as a moral agent could be construed as "a radical action" then the fact that institutions such as school, economy, polity, etc. under a highly authoritarian government could, all of a sudden, collapse becomes much more comprehensible. Suffice it to say, as Director Ohn Maung pointed out, violations of ethical and professional norms permeated the entire educational community, which may be credited in part for the collapse of the BSPP education system. However, it is debatable whether these individual teachers were cognizant of the fact that their numerous and often creative forms of everyday acts of subversion were to lead to the destruction of an entire education system under the BSPP rule. Many of them probably did not entertain any visions alternative to the one the BSPP offered. To give an example, intellectually critical though she may be, Lecturer Kyi May Kaung admitted that although she knew the state of education was not great under the BSPP she felt she had no alternative other than to do her job, if minimally. But there were educators like Lecturer Byatchin who, either wittingly or unwittingly, were pushing for their own visions--however small and local -at their work place. I turn now to a brief examination of how some educators held on to their own local visions and, under trying circumstances, made serious efforts to realize them.

Educators at Their Best: Clashes of Visions As discussed in Chapter 4 on BSPP educational policies, the policies reflected an anti-intellectual and culturally protectionist nationalist vision. In a multi-ethnic society where such visions often meet with various forms of opposition and contestation, one finds

234 stories of individual educators who would push for their own local visions in a system which allowed no articulation of alternative visions, educational or otherwise. The case of Lecturer Robert Byatchin seems to shed some light on this issue of the clash of visions. Byatchin belonged to the Chin ethnic community. Modern education was brought to their community by American Baptist missionaries and a majority of the Chins were Christian and were taught to discard their local customs and languages and emulate European Christian cultural norms. Moreover, Chin script was invented by the Christian missionaries. To many educated Chin being educated was coterminous with having a good command of English language (Ban Vick, 1995). Although forced cultural conversion may generally be considered a bad thing, Lecturer Byatchin thought that the interactions with the European Christian missionaries largely brought benefits to the Chin communities. His first name "Robert" is indicative of this pro-English, Christian and alternative communal value system vis--vis the dominant Buddhist cultures of Burma. When the Burmanization policies were enforced in Burmese education which relegated the importance of English language Lecturer Byatchin formed his own, oppositional opinion and tried to do his best in order to save English instruction, to the extent he could. He considered himself an "obedient servant" of the government having carried out his professional work "dutifully." In his words, "you know I was doing the work of 4-5 people." He was participating in various academic committees in the English Department at Rangoon University and trying to push for better quality English instruction. Although he felt overworked he would not miss any opportunities to be involved in English curriculum development for major universities such as Mandalay and Rangoon. For he felt very strongly about maintaining the quality of English education in Burma, in spite of the official privileging of the study of the Burmese language and Burmese language instruction. Lecturer Byatchin recalled, "I didn't give up trying to persuade students to develop a serious interest in English."

235 Furthermore, when he found like-minded educators in the university, he teamed up with them and made special, but unofficial, arrangements to offer English courses. For instance, when the Head of the Forestry Department at Rangoon University showed an interest in having his forestry students being given additional tutoring, Byachin grabbed the opportunity and worked hard to keep English instruction alive, at least at his corner of the educational world. At first glance, the efforts of Lecturer Byachin may seem nothing more than the efforts by a "dutiful" and even overzealous educator to do his professional work under less than ideal circumstances. While the argument for dutifulness and professional ethics is legitimate and valid in and of itself, there appears to be more to his efforts for pushing for quality English instruction and persistent efforts to interest students in English studies. As a member of a Chin minority community which holds English language and culture in the highest regard, it can be argued that Byatchin's efforts are tantamount to pursuance of an alternative vision, however small, ineffectual, and local they might have been. However, most intriguing is the fact that while Lecturer Byachin may be pursing his own agenda, he was fulfilling, unwittingly, one of the missions of the BSPP education: production of competent graduates in technological fields which by definition requires a good command of foreign languages, especially English. He was teaching a new generation of foresters. Like Byachin there were other educators from ethnic minority communities. Some rejected the official knowledge of the BSPP, especially Burmese history. There were educators in remote, minority areas, who turned their classrooms into a place where students were encouraged to challenge textbook knowledge and the BSPP vision. I will say more about them in the next chapter on politics of education in the classrooms and amongst students. So far I have discussed what may be termed "vertical politics," that is, the political dynamics between educators/teachers and the BSPP authorities. The chapter on the world of educators will be incomplete however, without any mention of the politics of their

236 educational workplace or "horizontal politics." The following section is devoted to a critical discussion of "horizontal politics" of educators.

"Horizontal Politics" at the Educational Work Place Politics at professional work places is hardly new, be it in Burma's education system under the BSPP or in the United States academia. However, the political and moral climate which resulted from the BSPP rule had adverse ramifications for "horizontal politics" as it put a different spin on it. The kind of politics which deserves special attention here seems to have concentrated in higher education as opposed to primary and secondary educational institutions. The bigger the gain -- relatively speaking -- the nastier the politics got, or so it seems. Conversely, the smaller the pie, the less keen the competition at the work place. I turn now to some insightful observations which Lecturer Kyi May Kaung made. During her student years in the Department of Economics at Rangoon University, 20 Lecturer Kyi May Kaung came to learn about the dynamics that arose out of competitions and rivalries among some educators at her work place. To illustrate her point, Lecturer Kyi May Kaung told a story of a young and "brilliant" faculty member at the department who was passed over for promotion "on account of his Anglo-Indian ancestry and mixed marriage." Instead he was given a research professor post with no assistants, students, or resources. Someone far less qualified was promoted to the Rector post for the Institute of Economics. 21 Here I am reminded of a point which Director U Ohn Maung pointed out. U Ohn Maung observed that this type of racial discrimination did not necessarily originate from the higher authorities who made important decisions regarding personnel and career advancement. For anyone who was vying for the vacant rector post opportunities were wide
the New System Education which replaced the old higher education structure, the Department of Economics was separated from Rangoon University and elevated as an independent professional institute. 21Dr. Ronald Findley studied international economics with Paul Samuelson at M.I.T. He later left the country to take a position at Columbia where he now holds an endowed chair.
20Under

237 open to feed the authorities with negative information about Findley's Indian background. In light of the fact that the BSPP leadership did not conceal its anti-foreign ideology and antiIndian attitude that type of racial information would have been a sufficient cause to block career advancement of members of any target populations such as Indians or Chinese. As economic planning was a major component of the BSPP's reform initiatives, many economists from the Institute of Economics played an important political role as government advisors and quite a few were hand-picked for cabinet level posts (Kyi May Kaung, 1998). In a presumably intellectual and professional environment where personal and political connections should play little or no role, those with connections were getting ahead. Educators who either lacked those connections or refused to go out of their way to please the authorities were sidelined. As a consequence, many educators gradually became demoralized. Some educators such as Ronald Findley simply quit their position and migrated to greener pastures outside Burma. At work places educators learned that some were more equal before the law. Some university educators who were critical of the regime's policies were fired. The formal charges which were filed against them and which were heard by various disciplinary committees during questionable trials were usually the supposed violation of professional codes or social ethics. Dr. Maung Maung Gyi of Mandalay University, Dr. Aye Kyaw and Dr. Tha Hla of Rangoon University -- all accomplished academics -- were fired ostensibly for allegedly having had extramarital affairs (Kyi May Kaung, 1998; Aye Kyaw, 1994). But in the case of Dr. Than Nyunt, a Cambridge-trained economist who helped popularize Socialist Economics he was not only tolerated by the authorities; he rose steadily in spite of his well-known womanizing habits and untoward gestures toward women graduate students within the Institute of Economics (Kyi May Kaung, 1998). 22
22Dr.

Than Nyunt was made Minister of Education under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime which came into power after the bloody massacres in August and September of 1988.

238 Kyi May Kaung was hardly the only one who witnessed such practices at the work place. Lecturer Robert Byatchin recounted bitterly his first-hand experience of having been treated rather unfairly. In spite of all the hard work he was carrying out "dutifully" for two decades, his proven commitment to teaching, and his scholarly aptitude, he was not considered for promotion. Byatchin recalled thus:
Out of 800 applicants who competed for 8 State Scholarship Awards under Columbo Planning, I was selected. I passed all kinds of qualifying examinations. I was sent to the University of Lancaster in England for advanced studies in English. After I finished my master's degree, I was admitted to the Ph.D. program there on a full scholarship. But the government ordered me to return home, despite the fact that they did not need to spend a penny for my education. I sort of resigned to my fate and returned. But years later when time came for promotion, I was not even considered. I confronted Dr. Maung Di, who at the time, was the rector of Rangoon University. I said angrily to him, 'For many years, I have, most dutifully, performed my duties, and you didn't consider any promotion for me!?'

Lecturer Byatchin observed that some of his colleagues who knew "how to approach the right person" rose up the professional ladder in English education. Maybe so. But another plausible explanation is that Byatchin was a Chin and of Christian faith. And throughout the BSPP rule the air was filled with stories involving ethnically motivated actions at various work places. There was an unwritten policy of placing a ceiling regarding the career promotion of members of the ethnic and religious minorities. In some cases, the authorities pressured these minorities to convert to Buddhism (Ban Vick, 1995). There were even cases where the BSPP leadership plotted assassination of ethnic minority military officers who were up for promotion within the BSPP armed forces. One should not be surprised if the government's decision to bring Lecturer Byatchin home was ethnically motivated as the BSPP leadership wished to prevent the formation of ethnic non-Burman non-Buddhist elites. In one case, a Rakhine professor was made to drop his Christian first name before he was promoted to a rector post at Mandalay. It must be recalled that both the official ideology of the BSPP and the nature of leadership were nationalistic -- in the narrowest sense of the word -- and anti-intellectual. I would argue that the lack of appreciation for genuine intellectuals and professionals and

239 disregard for their intellectual and professional progress was rather consonant with BSPP general policy articulations and the anti-intellectual leaders. The rewards based on political loyaty and acquiescience of educators, instead of their professional talents and academic accomplishment produced adverse effects on the educational workplace. And those who could find greener pastures left the country for good simply because the overall environment in which they had to work became not only demoralizing and oppressive, but intellectually stifling. Of course only a handful of educators with advanced degrees from leading universities from the West were in a position to migrate. The country's great majority of educators, most of whom were primary and secondary school teachers, had no choice but to continue to work under authoritarian rule. In the case of other non-Burman teachers steeped in various non-dominant traditions and cultures they actively held on to their beliefs and local visions, which served as oppositional or counter-hegemonic forces. In the end the great majority of educators who were seemingly powerless, and did feel, powerless to change the educational situation were the ones who eventually helped end the BSPP education, through their witting or unwitting acts of sabotage, subversion, and active resistance as the case of Daw Hla indicated. In the next chapter I examine the educational politics as experienced by the smallest denominator within the entire educational system, that is, students.

240 Chapter Seven REVOLUTION, EDUCATION, AND STUDENTS

"I will try to be good for myself, my class, my school and my country." ---Students' pledge of allegiance "Dad, Fuck your nationalism!" --A son of Revolutionary Council Member and Prime Minister, Rangoon "Peasants, Wet your anuses!" --A student marcher

The previous chapter offers glimpses of the world of Burmese educators who had to cope with the politico-educational demands of the BSPP revolution in which they were to be youth leaders, government agents, BSPP cadres, and defenders of "official" culture and morality. Specifically I examine the ways in which teacher and university academic interviewees handled the top-down socialist educational reforms during the BSPP rule. In this chapter I discuss how the country's students responded to the educational reforms launched as part of the Burmese Way to Socialism revolution. Here a word about the organization of this chapter is in order. I discuss the ideal categories under which student interviewees were placed. Next I take a critical look at the ways in which the student interviewees (and my friends and I) responded to the BSPP curriculum and ideology and extracurricular activities. Then I discuss the ideological formation amongst the students. I also examine critically various sources of counter hegemonic ideologies, moments of seduction, cooptation, subversion, insubordination, and open revolts.

Student as Potential Enemy of the State and More: Social "Constructions" Throughout the study I have argued that the BSPP authorities and educational reformers capitalized on the existing web of social relations which manifested themselves in various cultural notions of students, educators, and education. In chapter 3 in particular, I discuss the significant changes, as well as the lasting components regarding these discursive

241 constructions from Burma's monarchical period through colonial era to the post-colonial days. The appropriation of culture towards various ends continued under the BSPP rule. Official publications of the BSPP government and the public speeches by the authorities were filled with a call to preserve the "good cultural tradition" according to which students (and youth) were to be obedient, disciplined, and respectful of adult authorities (See Appendix E). Primary level Burmese readers were filled with folktales, verses, and rhymes in which the nature of social relations pertaining to children and adults, students and pupils, citizens and the government, etc. was delineated (see Curriculum, Syllabi, and Textbook Committee,1965, 1968, 1977, 1979, & 1980). 1 Buddhist values were also included. For instance, a verse in the new Burmese kindergarten reader (Primer Curriculum, Syllabi, and Textbook Committee,1965: 31) published by the Burma Socialist Program government reads thus: The drum is being beaten. Cultivate no greed nor anger. A sermon will soon be delivered. Say "Well-done" when it's done. 2 What is unique about the BSPP education however, is the fact that this process of "socialization" of the Burmese young took a decidedly militant turn. No sooner did General

give the readers an idea, here are select titles from primary readers: "We will be obedient." "Respecting adults." "Duties and Obligations of a Human Being" "Model Lad" "Honest Pupil" "Duties and Obligations of Parents and Teachers" "Ungrateful Pupil" "Dutiful Gatekeeper" and "Advice to the Youth." See Curriculum, Syllabi, and Textbook Committee (1965) Kindergarten Primer ; (1977) First Grade Reader; (1980) Second Grade Reader; (1979) Third Grade Reader; (1968) Fourth Grade Reader Rangoon: Ministry of Education. Grade school students from kindergarten on were taught to sing youth pledges in lyrical form. One line reads: I will try to be good, for myself, my class, my school, and my country. See Ni Ni (1998) I was told: "there are many people like you, if it is so... " pp. 64 68. In The Thanakha Team (Ed.) Burma: Voices of Women in the Struggle Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN (Burma). 2In Buddhist philosophy and practices, there is no Creator God for the believers to thank, there is no "Praise the Lord or "Thank you, Lord." Therefore every religious ritual typically ends with people saying out loud "a good deed has just been done" or "well-done, well-done, well-done."

1To

242 Ne Win come to power than he declared that his government would respond to any future campus unrest "spade for spade" (Htun Aung Gyaw, 1994). His words proved more than empty rhetoric as the BSPP government dynamited the historic Student Union building on Rangoon University campus and cracked down violently on student protests (against his military coup) at universities in Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein, and Bassein (BSPP, 1966). 3 The use of violence on the part of the BSPP government in its response to any expression of campus political dissent became the hall mark of the BSPP government. In the political report of the General Secretary of the BSPP, the students were listed as one of two major "opposition groups to the Socialist Revolution" (BSPP, 1966: 60). 4
3The

destruction of the historic Rangoon University Student Union Building has been one of the most highly debated issues and a black spot in the history of BSPP rule. On July 26, 1988 in the midst of growing protest demonstrations in Burma General Ne Win gave a marathon speech televised to the country. The speech was so long that the general had to have one of his lieutenants finish off the pre-prepared speech. In the remaining portion which was read, the General denied vigorously that he ordered or knew of the dynamiting of the building and blamed it on his subordinates such as Brigadier General Aung Gyi. Aung Gyi too, denied that he had anything to do with it, and transferred the responsibility to the two other Revolutionary Council members Colonels Than Sein and Kyaw Soe. Regarding the killings on Rangoon University campus, Lecturer Kyi May Kaung, one of my educator interviewees, recalled that the killings of students were premeditated. At the time of the indiscriminate shootings there she was in a French class privately taught by U Chit Hlaing, the principal author of the BSPP doctrines and a member of General Ne Win's inner circle in 1962. She recalled that on that particular day her French teacher was acting very strange and nervously murmuring repeatedly "Oh, my god, they are going to do it. Kids are going to be dead, " just a short while before the explosion took place. Later she found out that the loud noise came from the dynamiting of the Student Union Building on Rangoon University campus. The date was July 7, 1962. 4The fear on the part of the new rulers was not unfounded. In the 1950s and '60s the most popular student unions were left-oriented and their leaders controlled by the Communist Party which enjoyed support from Mao's government in Beijing (Aung Saw Oo, 1993; cited in Htun Aung Gyaw, 1997: 19). See Htun Aung Gyaw (1997) Student Movements and Civil Society in Burma. Unpublished M.A. thesis. Cornell University. p. 18. Hereafter Htun Aung Gyaw (1997) Student Movements. Also see Josef Silverstein and Julian Wohl (1964) who observed: With the nation's (civilian) political leaders either in jail or unwilling to lead any active opposition to the military government of General Ne Win, and with the Revolutionary Council bent on administering the country without the aid of the other elites, the students remain as a potential force to fill the political vacuum. The Communist underground stands ready to reorganize its cadres and create new student leaders who might be able to convert the new student movement into a fullscale protest against militarism and authoritarianism....

243 There was potentially little threat from the traditionally political groups such as labor and peasant organizations as the key leaders from independent labor and peasant organizations dissolved their organizations and entered the Burma Socialist Program Party. 5 Whereas the BSPP resorted characteristically to the use of repressive state apparatuses to put an end to campus activism, they were also quick to transform the existing notion of students in order to suit the socialist projects. The BSPP made attempts to recruit students (and other youth) for its socialist nation building tasks (BSPP, 1972). Students were assigned a new role as "builders and defenders of modern socialist socio-economic order" (BSPP, 1972). 6 The General Secretary reported to the Party Seminar in 1965:
In order to enable genuine students who wished to study peacefully to do so without disturbance, to prevent them from following the wrong leadership, to develop students who were disciplined and educationally capable of serving the country, a new system of education suitable for modern needs was established (Italics added; p.61).

The discursive construction of "good students" was made concrete with the program called Luyechon or the "Outstanding Student Program." 7 As mentioned in Chapter 3, a select group of students (from 7th grade on up to professional and university level) were selected and sent to various resorts throughout the country at the government's expense during summer months. During his final year in college in 1975 a student interviewee was selected as an

5According

to the July 11, 1962 issue of The Guardian, 8 Central Committee members and a host of other second line leaders resigned from their Burma Workers Party in order to join the newly established BSPP, which was founded on July 4, 1962. On July 22, 1962 The Guardian reported that the Union Labor Organization dissolved itself and joined the Workers' Association established by the BSPP. See Htun Aung Gyaw (1997) Student Movements. 6All throughout out my grade school years every Friday all students in our school (K-10) had to assemble before the school authorities and the flag and recite out loud pledges one of which was "we will strive to become the builders and defenders of socialist economy and the new socialist society." This ritual was carried out uniformly at all schools under BSPP rule. 7During the period between 1964 and 1987, more than 7,500 students were selected for the Outstanding Student Awards. See Mya Wa Di (1987) Lu Ye Chun Hsa Yin (The List of Outstanding Student Award Recipients 1964-1987). Pyi Myan Ma p. 232.

244 Outstanding Student, a national honor for students under the BSPP rule. He recalled the experience thus:
We went on excursion trips and dined with the VIPs. The meals served were the best I ever had in my life. When we got back to Rangoon Outstanding Student headquarters, the BSPP General Secretary hosted a state dinner for us. I was in the limelight. My woman friends would send me "Congratulations!" notes. The whole thing made me heady. It felt great.

The state-controlled media portrayed these students as "model students" whose academic excellence, obedience, and discipline the rest of the student population ought to emulate. 8

Typologies of Students under the BSPP Rule The blanket label "student" says little about the ways students received schooling under the BSPP rule. Reflecting the pluralistic nature of Burmese society, the country's student body was highly stratified in terms of wealth, power (i.e., proximity to the BSPP inner circle), and ethnicity. Accordingly I have created the following ideal categories of students under which the interviewees are placed. All interviewees were schooled under the BSPP rule. Out of the total of 22 student interviewees, 4 were born in the 1950s (under the parliamentary democracy rule) and the rest were born in the '60s and '70s (under BSPP rule). With the exception of a few students all interviewees are Buddhists. The marker Buddhist has a
In the early 1980s a top-down re-invention of "a good citizen" was carried out by General Ne Win. According to the new definition of "a good citizen" which was widely publicized by the media, moral character of the individual comes before his or her intellectual caliber. In the BSPP's morality listening to BSPP authorities and compliance with the orders from above figured prominently. The production of selected elements and practices of the past as the tradition seems to be a universal practice by the powers that be. As such one can be sure that it will most likely meet challenges from those who remember the past differently than what is officially re-constructed. In the New York Times article "China's Leading University Celebrates and Ponders" one academic from China's top school Beijing University was quoted as saying," I just wanted to remind people that the most important contribution of Beida (i.e., Beijing University) to China is its liberal tradition....I'd like to use this chance to revive it." His comment was in response to the efforts by Chinese authorities to erase "the tradition of of a university that has long been the center of liberal thought in China. And whose students were the driving force behind the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square." See Rosenthal, E. (May 5, 1998) China's Leading University celebrates and Ponders. The New York Times. p. A.
8

245 political and cultural significance. In Burmese society, it is generally accepted that to be "full-blooded Burmese" is to be Buddhist. Buddhism is a foundational element of "official" Burmese national identity and culture. To a considerable degree, the following ideal categories do have explanatory power in terms of how the interviewees responded to the BSPP schooling (and the BSPP revolution itself) and why I must point out that there are three other categories of students which are absent here simply because I had no opportunities to learn about those ideal categories of students, either during my research on Burmese student migrs in the United States or throughout my student and teacher years in Burma. They are "Urban Poor Students," "Rural Poor Students," and "Rural Well-to-do Students." This was, in part, a reflection of the nature of modern education in the Burmese context that worked against the rural students (and communities), that is, the historical pro-urban-bias in Western education in Burma. 9 Needless to say, I have privileged such factors as wealth/socio-economic background, ethnic and racial background, and proximity to power (that is, the military and the BSPP party) in creating these ideal types. I had an opportunity to conduct in-depth interviews with the majority of the interviewees. Essentially, I asked them to tell their life stories, with special reference to their schooling. As most of my interviewees grew up in extended families, the stories of their extended family members such as uncles and aunts, grandparents, and cousins were also recounted.

A) VIP Students

9A

graduate student in Burma in 1955-56, Joself Silverstein noted that a great majority of students had urban (that is, residing in major cities such as Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein, Bassein, Prome, Toungoo, and Akyab) background. Almost all those who attended universities, regardless of whether or not they finished their degrees or found employment connected to their fields of studies, wished to remain in urban areas, and this included even those who had rural roots. See Silverstein, J. & Wohl, J. (1964 Spring) University Students and Politics in Burma. Pacific Affairs. 37: 1, 50-65.

246 There were only two VIP students whom I had an opportunity to interview and they were from the capital city of Rangoon. In the new social order under the BSPP rule, they were the most privileged and powerful of all students, thanks to their parents, usually fathers. The country's progressive economic decline hardly affected their lives as the BSPP government made sure that the material needs of those in the highest echelon were met. Many of their parents used their positions and influence to make sure that their children get ahead in the new BSPP order which they were helping to create. They were Burmese Buddhists.

B) Urban Wealthy Students There emerged generally two different sub-groups within this student category: 1) students from families that were anti-BSPP --albeit not publicly-- and 2) students from families who were acquiescent regarding the BSPP rule. They were enrolled in elite schools to which VIP students went. The discussion here was based on the interviews with two former Rangoon University students from very wealthy families.

C) Urban Well-to-do Students Most of my student interviewees (a total of 14) came from this background. This ideal type was perhaps most diverse as there were children from families with non-VIP political (i.e., BSPP and/or military) background, merchant/trader families, other government employees, and a combination of all of the above. Its ethnic composition was also diverse. Like their urban wealthy counterparts all interviewees under this category are Buddhists.

D) Minority Students My interviewees included 4 minority students from Chin and Karen communities. I also drew on my own recollections of the Mandalay University days during which I became

247 close to minority students from other states, mostly Shan and Kachin students on campus. Economically, all of them were from well-to-do families. Two of the interviewees were Christians. Most of my minority friends from college whose stories I drew on in writing this chapter were Buddhists. In the section that follows I examine how students from these ideal categories responded to the official knowledge and its curriculum.

Education, Ideology, and The Development of Critical Consciousness A) VIP Students While their parents, mostly fathers, were part of the party/military establishment they seemed to have been least affected by its discourses. Many of them were Burman students, reflecting the Burman-dominated political leadership. One interviewee from this VIP student circle recalled that when drunk, a Prime Minister's son verbally assaulted the BSPP ideology and its push for patriotism among the country's students. In his words, "Dad, Fuck your nationalism!" This echoes the attitude of the VIP students whom I interviewed. They were the least ideologically or politically interested of all the students. None of my interviewees from this group recalled feeling nationalistic or socialistic during the student days. 10
10It

has been found that even in the post-BSPP period which ushered in the free Burma movement both within and without Burma very few VIP students are involved in the popular struggle for democracy. Many of them left the country and allied themselves with the military junta which currently rules the country. A word may be in order here. Before the 1988 popular uprisings which shook the status quo, these students were afforded the claim of being "apolitical." Put differently, their lives and privileges were secure as there was no serious and immediate danger for them on the horizon. While they enjoyed the privileges which came with their parents having been a part of the political establishment they did not feel a need to take a side between the status quo and the opposition, simply because there was no organized and identifiable opposition, except the occasional campus protests every now and then. But after 1988 when there developed a popular opposition against the status quo, they realized that they couldn't claim to be apolitical anymore as a clear polarity was born. Even the issue of how one refers to the country, either the oppositional name Burma or the junta's Myanmar has become a significant marker, a signifier as to where one's loyalty

248 These students considered school subjects which had a heavy dose of BSPP ideology (for instance, Burmese history) "just a school subject." It didn't really carry any significance or meaning beyond that. One of the students remembered that she did very poorly on political science in college as she had little interest in politics. This is how she remembered the way she handled her schooling:
Well, I was able to answer only 1 out of 4 questions on the annual examination. So I called up one instructor from the math department whom my parents knew. And the teacher went over to the Political Science department and talked to the people there. Then he brought my answer paper to our house. And I copied from the political science notes whatever he said was the correct answer. At some point he felt sure that the (essay-type) answers would raise my failing scores to the passing score and asked me to stop.

When asked what they thought of the BSPP education or the official project of building a socialist nation according to the "Burmese Way" policies, the interviewees said that they neither cared about it, nor did they have any interest in the nation building business. "We just went about our business," said one interviewee. Their business was to enjoy themselves and to maintain their privileges. Readers may recall that part of the BSPP ideology was based on the cultural isolationism driven by the anti-Western and anti-intellectual attitude commonly held among the BSPP leaders. Whereas the rest of the student body was effectively shielded by the deliberate isolationist policies of the BSPP from "decadent" cultural influences from the West through very strict censorship, 11 the BSPP leadership's own children were the ones most exposed to the West having had the privileges to travel abroad, and import "alien" cultural goods and products such as music, films, books and magazines not accessible to the bulk of the country's students. One of the best known anecdotes was that at the country's famous Inya Lake Hotel located right across from the lakeside Presidential Palace of General Ne Win, the daughters of General Ne Win once had a (Western) dance party with a live

rests. That is why I described them as "apolitical, non-nationalistic, and non-socialistic" during the
period under study (1962-88).
11On the subject of censorship in Burma, see Allott, Anna (1993) Inked Over, Ripped Out: Burmese
Story Tellers and the Censors. New York: Pen American Center.

249 band. There were foreign diplomats and Rangoon's elites on the dance floor when the General came in and ended the party abruptly by smashing the drum sets. 12 These VIP students were neither adopting the official conception of the world (i.e., hegemonic discourses) the production and dissemination of which their fathers were responsible for; nor did they construct counter hegemonic discourses or critical awareness. The VIP students lived in their own world drawing on "Western" cultural trends. The interviewees were extremely individualistic and lacked any type of social concerns, the complete opposite of the goals of BSPP education. 13 In light of the fact that they were the principal beneficiaries of the BSPP rule there is little wonder why they did not feel a need to develop any type of critical consciousness.

B) Urban Wealthy Students The responses from this student group were more varied and more intriguing in comparison with those from their counterparts from the military/political VIP families. Pwint came from a very wealthy gem trading family in Rangoon. In spite of the fact that her family continued to accumulate wealth even after the BSPP came into power in 1962, her family was anti-BSPP, which allowed her to pick up anti-BSPP sentiment at home. Some of her relatives such as an uncle of hers were active politically during the parliamentary democracy period. Like the VIP students, Pwint had access to foreign publications such as Time and Life as they were able to subscribe to those publications at home. In addition, she was reading everything she could lay her hand on from a small collection of philosophical texts, as well as other Burmese literary works about Burmese history and politics at home. At home she learned about the pervasive surveillance. She

12The 13In

story was retold by a hotel manager friend of mine who was present at the scene.
my 10 years long involvement in Burma's democracy movement, I have as yet to meet a student
from a VIP background who would join the movement to dismantle the social order of which they
have been the principal beneficiaries.

250 recalled thus, "I knew there were spies everywhere. And I would not say anything critical about the BSPP ideology or education system in public (that is, at school)." In college, she had a private political science instructor with whom she would have critical discussions about BSPP policies and politics. Despite the fact that he would agree with her on various critical views towards the BSPP education and policies, he made her give "correct answers" (that is, official lines) on the annual college examination. For he feared that her non-official analyses might draw attention (from the authorities) to her. Accordingly, she digested and compartmentalized school knowledge solely to pass examinations all throughout her student career. This is how she remembered learning the BSPP's ideological subjects such as socialist economics:
The teachers really didn't explain what socialist economics was. I think teachers didn't really understand it either. They were teaching it because it was their job, and they were paid to teach that stuff. We were told to learn it by heart so that we would be able to reproduce it verbatim when examination time came.

Not surprisingly she considered socialist economics "nonsense." Apparenty the anti capitalist, socialistic policies of the BSPP made little impact on her as she rejected the official philosophy as a whole, to begin with. In comparison with the politically minded students such as Pwint, Hla, a student interviewee from a novae riche family, was rather naive politically. Hla recalled that his father, a wealthy, successful gold merchant, was actively involved in doing fund-raising and other local political work on behalf of the People's Council, the administrative wing of the BSPP regime. He never heard of any anti-government views at home or among his circle of friends, until the 1974-75 student uprising. As Hla put it:
We didn't think of anything against the (BSPP) government. None of us understood socialist democracy. When the word "socialist democracy" was thrown around, I thought it was OK, but, to be honest, I didn't understand its meaning. Nor did I care to know. My dad was not interested in political stuff. My mother was a homemaker with little formal education. I never talked about politics with anyone either at home or with my close friends. For the most part we were looking for ways to enjoy ourselves.

251 Hla mentioned that he was a top 10 student and he worked hard in school. He was also a teacher's favorite and often assigned to monitor his class mates lest they broke school regulations and rules or engaged in mischief. He considered himself a "very good student." Here is how he recalled his life experiences under the BSPP rule:
We watched imported foreign video-films as we learned to dress like those Westerners in high school. You know, T-shirts, bell bottom, and all that. I was growing my hair really long. One day I walked home from school, and there were armed security guards, soldiers, in the streets. One sergeant stopped me because he noticed my long hair, cut it short with his bayonet, and told me to go get a hair cut. I was kind of scared, but I couldn't complain. I heard similar stories from other people. It scared the hell out of me, but it didn't make me think that they were abusing power or I was dominated. Actually I felt that I did something inappropriate or wrong. Scared, I just went home quietly. My friends and I didn't even know we were oppressed under the BSPP rule. We all grew up like that and it was accepted as normal. No one (in our circle) questioned or challenged it. We didn't know that the government was bad. Everybody (in my social circle) accepted the BSPP.

It is tempting to construe some of the cultural expressions and activities described by Hla as traces of politically significant resistance. Wearing long hair, dressing in jeans and all, or watching smuggled foreign (video) films, all with their origins in the "decadent" West, at first glance, appears to have oppositional character, if only because the BSPP official policies were anti-West and culturally protectionistic. These policies made it possible for the sergeant in Hla's tale to cut the latter's hair arbitrarily. In this case, one must resist the temptation to read resistance or subversion into Hla's cultural/individual expression: Hla, himself a historical agency, did not consider his wearing long hair or watching foreign video films as signaling his opposition to the BSPP rule. I will return to the issue of at what point and under what circumstances seemingly subversive actions qualify as "acts of resistance, insubordination, or subversion." Paraphrasing Foucault James Scott (1990: 45) writes that "(r)elations of domination are, at the same time, relations of resistance." Reflecting on the aforementioned stories recounted by the two interviewees, however, it appears that the individuals do not necessarily resist or challenge simply because they are in unequal power relations. To further illustrate my observation, as Pwint was developing a critical awareness about the world in which she lived and was schooled -- thanks to counter hegemonic sources of ideology (that is, her

252 family, a private political science tutor, and close friends) which she was exposed to -- Hla, on the other hand, remained oblivious to the nature of the social order. In Hla's case, it was evident that the absence of critical consciousness or lack of opportunities to be exposed to oppositional views and cultures rendered him most vulnerable to the normalizing power of school and school knowledge. Let alone question the BSPP knowledge and schooling, he was unable to recognize that he was abused even when the army sergeant cut his hair without his consent. To Hla what he had experienced was not inconsonant with normative occurrences in a society ruled largely by coercion. To be sure, the BSPP regime assigned other institutions (or Althusserian apparatuses) including schools important normalizing functions. Out of this normalizing mission of schools (and other cultural institutions) the BSPP authorities intended to create a particular type of student endowed with particular characteristics and mental make-up. As suggested by the aforementioned narratives docile students could be expected out of this intentional work by the authorities, if there were no mediating agents and counter hegemonic sources of ideologies. Metaphorically speaking, fish were unable to recognize the medium in which they lived. 14 The BSPP schooling produced two distinctly different types of students: one highly critical of the regime and the other quiescent. Here it can be argued that there were other types of students in between or even the two types mentioned here may move along a continuum depending on their individual and group experiences living within the BSPP order. But the interview data regarding the political situatedness of the two wealthy students do not allow me to extend my arguments beyond the production of critical and quiescent students.

fish-water analogy is somewhat misleading although, viewed with caution, it gives the intended mental imagery of the immersion and lack of mediation. In contrast human-culture-society is meaning-laden, tension-filled, and contradictory. However, it is conceivable that certain groups of people are shielded from alternative views and exposures other than the ones they grew up with. For instance, I have met young white Americans who had never met or seen an African American in their lives until they left home and got to college.

14This

253 The questions that may be asked here are: are all power relations, without fail, met with resistance and insubordination dressed up in countless numbers of disguises, as has been argued by Foucault (and those who draw on Foucauldian insights) who made a central concern out of the production of subjects and "the hows of power"? Is it possible for the subjects to conceive of their own oppression if they are not aided by their own critical awareness (of one's own world)? Different responses by these two interviewees with radically different levels of critical consciousness seem to suggest critical consciousness appears to be a necessary precondition, if one is to be able to resist, subvert, or revolt against any type of domination, either in the more conventional, phyisical , and global sense of the word or in Foucauldian sense of the word "domination." In his reading of ideology, Althusser equated ideology and consciousness. For him, experience is not something internally comprehended. It is felt through cultural categories and frameworks (see Hall, 1994). Likewise Theravada Buddhism distrusts experience per se and offers the tool to see through the fundamental illusions of life and the "real" nature

of things as they are. Both required outside help in seeing through one's own conditions or dissecting one's own consciousness. Gramscian tradition explains this process as the development of critical consciousness about the objective external conditions in which the individual is immersed. Buddhism exhorts the individual to gain "penetrating realization" regarding inner forces that blind human beings to the non-existence of permanently fixed "ego" or "self." This realization can not be expressed verbally or shared with other human beings. Informed by these epistemological traditions, I am tempted to argue that without the development of any critical consciousness, domination -- however defined -- does not necessarily lead to resistance on the part of the dominated.

C) Well-to-do Burmese students

254 Not unlike the interviewees from other backgrounds, all interviewees from urban well-to-do families were rather focused on doing well in school or having fun. However, there were students who were historically minded and nationalistic. They were absorbing selectively official discourses from school textbooks, and curricular and extra-curricular activities, even if they disliked the BSPP rule. One student interviewee said, "I didn't really like history though. I couldn't match the dates and events, but I liked learning about the Burmese warrior-kings." Here it is important to point out that the BSPP textbooks constructed warrior-kings from the past as heroic Burmese and promoted the view that military institutions played the single most important role in the country's past. Even the students who developed critical consciousness toward the BSPP rule, did not escape the impact of those militaristic and marshal discourses during their school career. While many young male students aspired to become military officers their female counterparts would flock to the sites of military parades. One wealthy female student, who was one of the most critically minded of all interviewees, mentioned that she and her sisters would get up in the wee hours to go watch annual military parades held to commemorate the Resistance Day (March 27) in Rangoon. After 60 years (1886-1948) of slavery--as Burmese nationalists of the olden days would put it--under the British colonial rule which made illegal the bearing of knife longer than 4 inches (for the majority Burmans), the Burmans were ready for this type of militarism. The renewal of this militarism under the BSPP was a happy marriage between grassroots sentiment and the top-down ideological manipulation by the BSPP generals and their advisors. However, what they learned in the BSPP classrooms as knowledge--as far as the marshal spirit and roots of Burmese society and traditions -- was not abstract, but rather grounded in their immediate realities outside the classroom. As one student who considered himself critical of the BSPP government put it, "(w)ell, you saw all the military officers living lavishly. They were influential and powerful. Even if people didn't respect them

255 much they feared them and were envious of the influence and power those guys had. A career in the military was (and still is,) the surest way to power." In chapter 4 I have argued that the influential educators who entered a symbiotic relationship with the BSPP authorities did so out of multiple motives including patriotism, altruism, self-interest, pragmatism, etc. It is then to be expected that regardless of their critical consciousness, students who were far less experienced than these highly schooled and experienced educators would be attracted, in a twisted way, to the political establishment, that is, military. 15 As with the Burmese Way socialism, one woman student recalled:
I had been taught in school that Capitalism was bad and Socialism was good. That was put in my head since my earlier student days. So I believed it. The BSPP rhetoric was powerful and good. So we assumed things would turn out the way the government claimed they would. Once I got older I realized that there was a huge disparity between the official rhetoric and the realities.

Most of the interviewees gave similar responses to my question as to what they thought of the socialist content of the school curricula. But there were a few students whose critical consciousness was rather developed even before they completed their grade school careers. One interviewee, Htun, who was a prominent leader of the 1974-75 uprising came from this socio-economic background. Here he recounted how he acquired anti-BSPP sentiment:
Since I was a kid, my father talked about politics with me. My dad encouraged reading. I read just about everything I could get my hands on. In high school, I started reading philosophy, religious thoughts, communism, etc. Some of the reading really fostered in me a nationalist spirit. I learned from my parents about the parliamentary democracy period. I got my anti-BSPP government sentiment from home.

15Within

the 26 years rule of the BSPP, a career in the military became one of the most popular professions among college and high school students. And admissions to the Defence Services Academy and other officer training schools were highly competitive. Under the parliamentary democracy government the Ministry of Defense had to send out its Public Relations officers to recruit young high school graduates for officer training school, because the slots available for officer cadets were not filled due to the shortage of applicants. In due course under the BSPP rule, the trend was reversed and the supply exceeded the demand.

256 At the time of the military coup in 1962, he was 12 and enrolled in an elite Christian missionary school in Rangoon. General Ne Win's pronouncement that his government would respond to any future student protests "spade for spade" left a strong negative imprint on this 12 year-old. By the time he was in high school, he always wore a traditional cotton jacket, a symbol of Burmese nationalism, as a way of expressing his nationalist sentiment. Tun later became a student leader in the 1974-75 campus unrest. 16 As discussed earlier in the chapter, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the authorities to restore "discipline and order" amongst the country's students. One student recalled thus:
They taught you to obey and be respectful of your teachers and the elders. That was one constant message we got from our teachers and school. Looking back, it was more of the fear of teachers and elders, not necessarily respect for them, which kept us in line. We were more fearful of their power to reprimand and pass moral judgment regarding our behavior. As you know, the school authorities could expel you from school. And once you were expelled from a school, you could never hope to be enrolled in any other school. The expulsion was recorded on your school record permanently.

Indeed the social relations which the authorities were reworking appeared to be taking root amongst the students, but for different reasons. It was clear that respect toward adult authorities and obedience on the part of the students was strictly enforced through punitive actions such as expulsion from school. Their counterparts from the nationalist generation defied any type of authorities and thereby radicalized the official Burmese culture. 17 In contrast the student interviewees of the BSPP period were being turned into "good, docile students," owing largely to the real danger of punishment. This was reinforced by teachers and other authorities at school, who in turn suffered from an insidious fear of losing their jobs and, worse, imprisonment. For teachers knew that
16

Htun Aung Gyaw was arrested subsequently and spent 5 years in jail. In 1988, Htun fled the country to the Thai-Burmese border area and helped set up an umbrella student armed group called "All Burma Students' Democratic Front."

young nationalists sought to bring about radical cultural changes because they considered the existing Burman Buddhist culture unable to fulfill the dream of regaining the country's sovereignty. See Khin Yi (1988) The Dobama Movement in Burma: Appendix. Southeast Asia Program Monograph. Ithaca: New York.

17The

257 failure on their part to maintain "order" in school would invite wrath from the authorities. 18 Moreover, the knowledge that there were repressive state apparatuses such as the dreaded Military Intelligence (or MIs as they are widely known in Burma) and intelligence informers served the interests of the authorities with their policy objective of producing a docile student body. This appears to be true particularly of the urban-well-to-do students. Perhaps an explanation why this was so may be necessary here. In the preceding pages I recounted the tales of a VIP student who told his father to "fuck his own nationalism" or the wealthy student Pwint who considered socialist economics "nonsense" and did not think much of her teachers. These two groups vis--vis the urban well-to-do students were highly privileged, a class location which afforded them more life options. For instance, if VIP students chose not to do well in school or committed an offense, they knew that the parents would come to their rescue. There were even cases where systematic exceptions were made to accommodate the career aspirations of some of the VIP children. To give an example, the Officer Training School (OTS), which took high school graduates and trained them to be military officers, bent its institutional rule one year so that a son of the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces could become a pilot in the prestigious Air Force. Usually the OTS graduates trained only for the infantry units, not for the other two branches of the Armed Forces, that is, the Navy and Air Force. Likewise the wealthy students knew that they did not really need to conform to the system as they were not in school for money or a career. Their parents could afford to buy them opportunities including slots into various promising educational programs in the country or even better send them abroad for incomparably better schooling. The well-to-do students, who may be loosely considered Burmese equivalents of "middle-class" students in the Western, developed nations, valued and needed the schooling

18Each

time there was campus unrest, teachers would be the ones who would be summoned and scolded for their lack of failure to discipline their own students.

258 and, perhaps, more important, the credentials; many of their parents made their living as professional, technocrats and educators although some were traders and merchants with no substantial formal education. One thing they (the parents and children, that is) all shared is that they viewed formal education as not only a tool to build careers but also socially desirable goods, a cultural status symbol. The existence of differential opportunities more or less determined by their class location may help account for why the well-to-do students behaved the way they did; that is, acting as "docile and good" students, only if out of the threat of being expelled from school. The educational process is contradictory and open to contestation. And Burma's schooling under the BSPP rule was no exception. Some of the well-to-do student interviewees with a critical consciousness disliked the highly authoritarian BSPP rule. Towards the end of their (our) high school career, several well-to-do student interviewees came to realize that the country under BSPP rule was doing poorly. But some interviewees (and myself) did believe in the nationalistic, anti-capitalist rhetoric which dominated our school knowledge. Although we disliked the BSPP rule many well-to-do students were much affected by the nationalist rhetoric which the regime employed to mobilize public opinion and legitimate itself. Even more politically developed students did not see the fact that the glorious past of the Burmese nation, the unbroken linear chain of events that supposedly led to the creation of an independent Burma and the national culture were all but a careful construction by the producers of BSPP ideology from the Ministry of Education and the BSPP Headquarters. 19 And yet building or defending socialism was not part of our thinking. We learned to dislike capitalism and profiteering, but we were not transformed

BSPP reconstructed Burma's past as a nation constituted by an unbroken, linear chain of events and processes. Thanks to the European colonial powers that partitioned the world into a system of nation-states, the art of history writing took this nation-state turn. See Duara, P. (1995) Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

19The

259 into full-fledged socialists. For there were no exemplary socialists around us whose behavior or way of life we could conceivably have emulated.

D) Minority Students Like the student interviewees from politically aware Burmese families, indigenous minority students seemed to have developed a critical view of the BSPP early on in their homes and communities. Rollin, Chin student, was very resentful of the fact that Burman teachers and school administrators were not happy to come to Chin state because they considered relatively underdeveloped Chin state "Burma's Siberia." He mentioned, "Burmese teachers had a superiority complex. They didn't want us to develop, educationally or otherwise." This clearly was experienced by Rollin as a form of domination. Here Foucault's insight on differentiated struggles (against various forms of domination) proves instructive. According to Foucault (1982: 781), there are generally three types of struggles: "either against forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious); against forms of exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission)." While other elements of domination were present in Rollin's case, as an ethnic student he remembered the experience mostly as ethnicity- and religion-based domination. One other Chin student commented on the official knowledge which they had to learn growing up under the BSPP rule.
There were no indigenous, minority histories written from minority perspectives. In those official history textbooks, there may be two pages of Chin history, written from the BSPP perspective at that. While we were in school our elders were alive who knew the past historical processes and events which made it into the textbooks. So we could check with them the validity of the textbook history. We found out we were taught a distorted version of "national history." Once we knew there were lies in the official textbooks, we didn't believe any official stories anymore.

260 The two Chin students who were among the interviewees credited the Christian Church, among other counter hegemonic institutions, for their critical awareness. Thanks to the Baptist Christian missionaries the Chin students had their own national anthem. 20 Rollin talked about how he picked up oppositional knowledge thus:
Despite the isolationist policies of the BSPP government, we were able to maintain contacts with the outside world. The Christian church was a window to the outside world. It also served as the central institution in our Chin community. We were learning about democratic processes at church. Church provided community leaders with legitimacy. We had our own curricula which were developed by the Christian pastors, who emphasized Chin nationalism and the learning of English. We even had a Chin translation of Shakespeare.

Here for the Chin students such a fundamentally patriarchal and rigidly hierarchical institution as the church was a more liberal institution vis--vis the BSPP ideological apparatuses and institutions such as schools. Furthermore, as early as 6th grade Rollin got to know some of the Chin dissidents who were anti-BSPP. Rollin picked up an anti-Burman, anti-BSPP attitude early on and developed his "own" critical consciousness towards the order of things under the BSPP. What he learned from his church, his family, and Chin political dissidents ran counter to what was taught in BSPP classrooms as knowledge. Culturally, predominantly Christian Chin students did not want to emulate the dominant Burmese Buddhist culture. One of the ways ethnic students in general and Chin student interviewees in particular handled BSPP schooling was to consciously speak the dominant Burmese language with their indigenous accented voices and refused to become versed in the dominant language. Politically minded Chin elders scorned their children who spoke Burmese fluently. Here the old construction of "an educated man" was deliberately retained in these communities. To these Chin students, the educated person 21 was someone
unlike the rest of what is now Burma, the Karen, Chin, and Kachin communities were first exposed to western/modern schooling by the Christian Missionaries from the West, specifically American Baptists. My Chin interviewees described their communities as "90% pro-missionary." Also there was much resentment against the majority Burmans. 21There is a similar perception of "the educated person" in the dominant Burman society as well. However, the difference lies in the fact that there are two conceptions of "educatedness" amongst the Burman intelligentsia: the one who is thoroughly educated in the Buddhist cultural and intellectual
20Not

261 who was "fluent in English." To be educated was to be fluent in English, in short. Fluency in Burmese was portrayed by the elders as a sign of untrustworthiness and a stigma. This sentiment was openly conveyed to the Chin young. Hence the primary medium of instruction and communication itself became a site of contestation and subversion and assumed political significance. Similar sentiment toward educational Burmanization on the part of other indigenous minorities was justified in light of the fact that the BSPP authorities banned the teaching of indigenous languages and literatures in indigenous communities beyond the second grade. Rollin mentioned that he learned from his Chin teachers during his grade school years that General Ne Win was the one who was "ruining" the country. Noteworthy is that both teachers and students here were situated in the same cultural and political space, shared the common identity and spoke the same language. Out of this shared location with their teachers students learned oppositional/counter hegemonic discourses openly in the class rooms. Here it is noteworthy how categorically "public space" such as a classroom was being transformed into "an offstage," to borrow Scott's terminology, which was inaccessible to the BSPP authorities. James Scott's "hidden transcript" may be of help here. According to Scott (1990), the term "hidden transcript" "characterizes discourses that take place 'offstage,' beyond direct observation by power holders. The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript.... (It) is produced for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript" (pp.4-5).

tradition and the other schooled in Western intellectual thought (e.g., those who earned academic credentials, advanced and otherwise, from various modern universities either at home or abroad). Both traditions, new and old, remain strong. The indigenous minorities specifically Chin, Karen, and Kachin lacked these kinds of intellectual and literary traditions while other minorities such as Rakkhine, Mon, and Shan have vigorous traditions.

262 The Chin students (and teachers) used classroom, which by definition was official and public space, for oppositional purposes, 22 in a very oppositional manner. They were unpacking the official BSPP knowledge in classroom. This was not possible in classrooms in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other major urban centers as there was a strong general distrust and insidious fear of military intelligence in the predominantly Burman society in the plains. In addition, Burman students shared the dominant Burman Buddhist culture which was promoted by the authorities and they had less reasons to resist the educational Burmanization. Any kind of oppositional sentiment among the Burmans was not culturally based, but rather political and ideological. In due course the official project of national integration and construction of a common, national culture left little positive impact on the Chin. To these minority students (and other indigenous minority students) formal schooling meant little more than fulfilling the requirements the system imposed upon them if they were to move up the social ladder. The Chin students went through the entire schooling process having compartmentalized what to them was decidedly "Burman-centric" official knowledge. Instead of disengaging with the overpowering forces these students opted for accommodation as a pragmatic strategy in their schooling. This radical accommodation on the part of the indigenous minority students may be construed as an act pregnant with potentials for open resistance as soon as open political insubordination or contestation becomes a viable option (see Keesing, 1992: 216). One thing which struck me was this: while students from the well-to-do families within the dominant cultural and ethnic background, particularly those of us with strong nationalist sentiment and political awareness, were thinking of Burma as our nation and in terms of our national history, minority student interviewees were developing their own
22One

might point out that any Chin individual could be working for the BSPP authorities. However, from various conversations, it was evident that ethnic and clan loyalties were even stronger than the anti-BSPP and anti-Burman sentiment. My ethnic minority interviewees indicated that their friends and families may have held employment in the BSPP government, but they still retained strong loyal ties and provided reciprocal protection for one another.

263 conceptions of their political communities and nations. Foreign (and later local) Christian missionaries and their institutions served, both by default and by design, as counter hegemonic sources of oppositional ideologies to these students, especially Chin, Kachin, and Karen students. 23 The aforementioned discussion by and large appears true when the schooling experiences of other minorities are examined although the specifics differ. One Karen student recalled bitterly that being a Karen in Burma made him feel like a "second class" citizen. Invariably the interviewees (and my friends) from indigenous ethnic communities all wished to live free of domination by the military and the dominant Burman majority. To them the two were coterminous, as the military, as well as various branches of the military rule were in the hands of Burman officers. The colonial past which their communities remembered was radically different from what was officially produced as "the only significant past ," as Raymond Williams put it, which was taught as the knowledge. 24 Before I conclude this section on schooling as experienced by the indigenous minority student interviewees, I must point out that the categorical use of the ethnicity-based signifiers such as Chin, Shan, Karen, etc. is problematic and the lumping together of all who are generally labeled, for instance, Chin is misleading. These communities--like the dominant Burman community--were, and still are, stratified internally along the lines of
the BSPP authorities allowed "freedom of worship," they were by no means liberal in granting freedom of religion. For a long time, translation of the Bible in Chin language was prohibited using the informal pressure tactics against those who were capable of translating and publishing it. However, the mere existence of churches and rituals of worship were adequate to keep the sentiment of communal solidarity among various minorities, especially the pre-dominantly Christian communities such as the Kachin and Chin. 24This was attested to by the proliferation of literature on various ethnic-based topics such as their communal aspirations and visions couched in the discourses of nationalism, increasingly firmer assertion of their cultural identities, and the emergence of newly reconstructed "significant pasts" of their (ethnic) communities, all since the abolition of one party BSPP rule. These multiple national discourses have been propagated from what these ethnic freedom fighters call "liberated areas," that is, Burmese-Thai, -Indian, and -Bangladeshi border areas which are beyond the reach of the administration in Rangoon.
23While

regionalism, dialect-based communalism, class-based differences, and so on. 25

264 The minority

student interviewees, especially the Chin students, admitted rather honestly that there were different regional and language communities which bear the essentializing descriptor "Chin community" as there existed fierce internecine fights for representational power while the Karen students, on the other hand, held on to their belief that the Karens were one unified people and brushed aside any indication to the contrary as an exception to the rule.

Students as "Organic intellectuals" Upon entering college compliance, conformity, and acquiescence were, to a considerable extent, being replaced with the search for individual identities. It was not until after they (we) entered college that the politically minded interviewees began to discuss our own educational experiences. Some of my interviewees (and myself) began to think beyond passing examinations. We began to think about employment prospects or economic security. We began to notice "social class differences"--as an interviewee put it--varying degrees of freedom and privileges amongst students in their day-to-day experiences and activities, or lifestyle, if you will. College was a world unto itself (to us) and we were exposed to the more ethnically diverse student population as well. It was then that a majority of my interviewees started to see the larger picture of things from which they had been shielded from all throughout their grade school years. Here is how one well-to-do student interviewee reflected on the development of his awareness about the class differences:

issue of one unified ideological and ethnic community continues to haunt even the staunchest opponents of the present military junta. There are strong intra-communal politics among the categorically oppositional communities, such as Karen, Shan, Chin, etc. There are on-going internal struggles for the power to represent or to speak for the entire community.

25The

265
Once you got to college you suddenly saw class differences amongst students. I drove to school everyday. There were those who were driving nicer and better cars, especially the children of the VIPs from the BSPP government. You also saw some college students who were really poor. They would hang, dangerously, on the tails of the overcrowded buses. In high schools everyone wore green and white uniforms. In college, there was freedom of dress. Some could afford to have fancy clothes and fancy cars. Some had parents with political connections and influence. So if they got arrested for some mischief, their parents came to their rescue and bailed them out. You noticed that they could do whatever they wanted. Then you began asking questions: Why were they so powerful and affluent while many of us couldn't do things they could do or enjoy things they could enjoy? What does it take to be a VIP in the socialist government? Why? Why? Why? You began to feel less and less confident about yourself. You felt intimidated and inferior. And you started disliking these VIP children who thought they were something. It was real humiliating to feel that you were less than those privileged groups of students.

Likewise even prestigious students from the medical schools--that is, those who made it within the BSPP education system--began to realize that even they, as the most elite students within Burma's student hierarchy, did not escape the negative consequences of the BSPP rule. One medical student from an urban well-to-do family summed up the situations she saw:
There was a lot of corruption in our medical school. There was one student in my class whose father was General Ne Win's family doctor. He was not really smart, but he was getting very high scores. So some of us complained to our instructors. They responded to our complaints by saying that the guy was very bright and doing exceptionally well. In the 3 medical schools all throughout the country, you could buy questions. You could approach the faculty and you negotiate with them. Some even bought distinctions. We knew that there was a lot of unfair treatment and injustices. We felt angry and resentful. But there was nothing you could do to change the situation then. There were those Foreign Registration Card holders. They left the country for good to get professional education in other places.

During their college years, even students who came from wealthy and VIP families began to see the larger picture. When the 1974-75 anti-government student uprisings broke out, one wealthy student was about to begin his college. Like many other students in Rangoon, he and his friends would go listen to speeches by student organizers on Rangoon University campus every night. For them it was spectator sports and anti-government speeches were exciting. He remembered thus:
Well, everyone was expressing their anti-government views and feelings openly. First I was a bit scared, but then I got excited to hear students' views toward the government. That was the first time in my life I heard anti-government views. I began to understand what they were talking about as I began to see the gap between the official rhetoric and realities. But as a member of the Lanzin Youth Organization, I was thoroughly brainwashed. I just felt guilty for having had negative thoughts toward the BSPP. So throughout my undergraduate years, these views didn't really change me. But again our family never experienced economic

266
hardships. We made a fortune under the BSPP rule, as a matter of fact. We were oblivious to whatever political oppression may have existed in the country. My friends and I were always thinking of how to have fun.

As can be gathered from the above quotes, the most overt actions of political resistance opened up the eyes of this wealthy student; but it fell far short of politicizing this privileged student. To further explicate, the VIP students who claimed to be themselves apolitical remembered that they, too, got excited by the news or sight of other students engaged in actions in defiance of school (and political) authorities. One VIP student, for instance, was in 8th grade when the 1974-75 student unrest broke out. Her parents specifically asked their family driver not to take the children to Rangoon University campus. But out of curiosity, she forced the driver to take her to the campus. When the news of killings began to spread she got angry that the government was killing her fellow students. Out of the earshot of her parents who wanted them to have nothing to do with the student revolt, she would talk about student protests and the ensuing violent crackdown with her older siblings at home. Here one could see the shifting self-identity of the VIP student. On the one hand, she was part of the political establishment and had no reason to be unhappy about the BSPP rule. On the other hand, as a student she self-identified with the fellow students who were being killed by the troops. But as in the case of Hla, the wealthy, apolitical student, the experience did not lead to any radical transformation personally. 26 While the pre-occupation of many of my interviewees (and my friends and I) was with one's own question "what type of (economic and professional) future awaits me after I get out of this degree mill called university?," one could not stop seeing the more or less bleak prospect for the country. For the VIP students, employment was often a phone call away (by their parents) while wealthy students had family businesses which they were already managing. It was mostly the well-to-do students most affected by the discourses of

26More

than a decade or two after their schooling, they both remain aloof from the current democracy movement.

267 development/modernization and nationalism from schooling (among other things) who began asking a wide variety of questions: Where was our national glory? Where was the wealth of our nation? Where was modernity, that is, where were the cars, TVs, refrigerators, and other modern amenities? Where were the civil liberties which allowed our nationalist heroes to organize popular defiance against various forms of political and economic domination? Here it is instructive to quote Gramsci (1971) who observes:
Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political "hegemonies" and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one....Critical self-consciousness means historically and politically, the creation of an elite of intellectuals (p.323).

Gramsci was here referring to the development of "organic intellectuals." Former student leader Htun Aung Gyaw who came from an urban well-to-do background (1997) made the following observation, although without the theoretical elegance of the aforementioned remark by Gramsci:
The most challenging groups (to the BSPP authorities) were the students because they were young, mostly single, adventurous, and were traditionally political. The most important factor was that they were educated and had the ability to distinguish right from wrong governance (p.19).

Needless to say, the BSPP (formal) schooling was far from being conducive to the development of critical self-consciousness. Then what else, in addition to family and communities, accounts for this important development which guided the behaviors of political, yet unsophisticated minds? Where did the students learn the art of resistance in our schooling?

Teashop as the Site of Counter-Hegemonic Education There were signs that some of us were expressing our discontent with BSPP rule, albeit quietly. We shared this sentiment amongst our like-minded peers and our college teacher-friends. While not unlike those of our peers from other social and ethnic

268 backgrounds, our immediate concerns were what lay after college and economic security (i.e., a regular job which would feed us and our future families), some of us began thinking about our nation, her future, and her collective plight. Some of my friends and I were wearing the old nationalist dress since we no longer needed to don "green and white" school uniforms. Still others tried to express their political discontent in various forms. Some used their art to express their dissatisfaction and make ripples among their peers and beyond. The "new" cultural space student interviewees seized upon and turned into a primary site of counter hegemonic and intellectual life was the "traditional teashop." It is usually at the teashop where business deals are closed, homework done, drugs sold, bought, and (ab)used, politics discussed quietly, culture and history debated, talks of youthful romance conducted, experiences shared, and philosophies reflected upon. Unlike our high school days, we began socializing with some of the junior instructors. Some of them had been involved in the 1974-75 student uprisings. Those instructors who became good friends with us shared their first-hand stories about their experiences in the BSPP jails and torture centers and the ruthlessness of the BSPP government toward students who challenged the status quo. In due course, these instructors became our quasi-mentors politically. Whenever there were changes in education, we now had ample opportunities to discuss them critically with older students and our instructorfriends. Furthermore, among our peers some were more politically-minded or -mature than the others. Owing to these outside classroom interactions, we were making clear connections between the overall system and its implications for us as individual students as well as our nation. When there was no public space for political expression, politically minded students seized whatever moments and space they (we) could find in order to subvert authority--any authority. The holding of discussions of political and intellectual significance and the expanding role of teashops as "alternative" political sites may be considered a desperate (or

269 creative, depending on one's view) attempt on the part of the students (and their instructorfriends) to secure a place where they could vent their frustration, anger, discontentment, and despair, collective and personal. Or put more romantically, teashops were the sites where they engaged in creating impassioned oppositional discourses including the overthrow of the BSPP system. Some of us often got high on various drugs, 27 talked politics, at times went to the graveyard located next to Mandalay University, and shouted anti-government slogans such as "Down with Ne Win" and "Down with the BSPP." Because open political discourse of an oppositional nature was possible only at one's risk, some of us directed our verbal assualts or abuses at those teachers and administrators who were, in our judgment, sycophants of the BSPP establishments. One time, about 70 students got drunk and some of us stripped ourselves right in front of the main administration building on Mandalay University campus and urinated on the pillars of its gate. While these actions had no potential impact on the status quo materially, the actions per se may be construed as creative acts of defiance or desperate but safe acts of political expression. Some of the older students had the courage to express their genuine feelings against the BSPP through art. And in the next section I will discuss, as sites and moments of subversion and insubordination, political rallies which were mandatory and incorporated into the country's educational life, especially at the pre-college level.

Political Rituals as Sites and Moments of Subversion Throughout the BSPP rule, political rituals such as mass rallies, parades, and weekly school assemblies were incorporated into educational life in all schools throughout the

27At

the risk of romanticizing the dangerous connections between resistance and drugs, I would say that drug abuses among the BSPP generation carried some political meaning. Of course, not everyone who abused drugs would be thought of as politically motivated. For a good cultural analysis on the subject, see Willis, P. E. (1976) The Cultural Meaning of Drug Use. In Staurt Hall & Tony Jefferson (Eds.), Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain. pp. 106 118. London: Hutchinson.

country at the grade school level. 28

270 Participation in those rallies were made mandatory and

school authorities enforced attendance through various means including corporal punishment and failing in examinations. Among the most politically significant ones--significant to the BSPP authorities--were rallies held to commemorate various historical watersheds including Independence Day, the coup of 1962 strategically labeled as "Peasants' Day", May Day, Martyrs' Day (assassination of Aung San and his cabinet), and Union Day (the preindependence occasion of the signing of agreements between Burman nationalist leaders and some of the ethnic leaders to establish a federal union). These BSPP-sponsored rallies may be considered an invented form of ritual intended, among other things, to convey special (political) significance to students, that is, future cadres. The American anthropologist Nicholas Dirks has critiqued the work of James Scott (1986) who made an important plea for the study of everyday forms of peasant resistance, for "ignor(ing) the possibility that ritual could constitute an important site of resistance" (Dirks, 1994: 486). As Dirks puts it, "(r)ecent writing on everyday resistance has moved away from concentrating only on clearly 'political' moments and movements, but the definition of everyday experience typically excludes such activities as ritual" (p.486). Dirks argues that "ritual has always been a crucial site of struggle, involving both claims about authority and struggles against (and within it)....Resistance to authority can be seen to occur precisely when and where it is least expected" (pp.487-488). In this connection Scott (1990), in his recent work Domination and the Art of Resistance, addresses the issue of symbolization of domination in such ritual forms as mass rallies and parades orchestrated by the powers that be. Scott writes:
It is tempting to see displays and rituals of power as something of an inexpensive substitute for the use of coercive force or as an attempt to tap an original source of power or legitimacy that has since been attenuated. Effective display may, by conveying the impression of actual
28Given

the fact that any gathering of university students was viewed as potential dangerous, the BSPP authorities exempted all universities and professional institutes from these ritualistic political exercises.

271
power and the will to use it, economize on the actual use of violence.... The successful communication of power and authority is freighted with consequences insofar as it contributes to something like a self-fulfilling prophecy. If subordinates believe their superior to be powerful, the impression will help him impose himself and, in turn, contribute to his actual power. Appearances do matter....(T)he audience for such displays is not only subordinates; elites are also consumers of their own performance.... For those whose position is not inherited, on-the-job training is required to make them (selves) convincing in their roles as bosses, professors, military officers, colonial officers (pp.48-49).

The power of BSPP authorities to produce massive numbers of people for these events, many of whom were students from grade schools, was rather impressive, regardless of whatever means they resorted to. Recall that in the chapter on teachers and educational politics I discussed how teachers were instructed by the authorities to be drill-masters who would make their students get up at 4 in the morning to attend these BSPP-sponsored rallies and processions. The interviewees from all categories participated in the mass rallies. They (we) even liked those rallies as the dates were all marked as government holidays and therefore they did not have to attend classes. One urban well-to-do student interviewee remembered those rallies thus:
We didn't really know the meanings or the purpose of the rallies other than the ones officially proclaimed. The school authorities brought us brown-bag lunches. We ate them on the rally grounds. And we had so much fun.

I must say that I myself enjoyed marching in those rallies. Not that I found them meaningful, but simply because they gave me an opportunity to socialize with my friends outside classroom settings. Even before the BSPP authorities finished with their public speeches, my friends and I would sneak out and head off to various parks in our city to play. However, some of my interviewees, especially the ones who developed strong antiBSPP political sentiments early on, were engaged in activities which might be legitimately interpreted as "subversive." For instance, one student interviewee from Rangoon was parodying the official chants and slogans in public. He recalled thus:
Well, we were participating in the Peasant Day march (the BSPP government designated the day of their coup--March 2-- as Peasants Day). I was one of those who were assigned to take a turn to do the lead chant for a section of the procession. Instead of saying the official chant 'Peasants Unite' I was chanting 'Peasants Wet Your Anus with Oil.' One guy from the crowd control heard that and came to me and tried to correct me.

272 In Burmese the words "unite" and "wet your anus with oil" rhyme. The subtext of his parodied version of the chant was that the BSPP authorities were going to exploit and dominate them, and therefore the peasants had better be prepared. The message was doubly oppositional. At the cultural level, the content, as well as the space and timing of this symbolic act of covert defiance had a strong sexual imagery, which, expressed in public, was considered a breach of cultural codes or norms. Such imagery was read as vulgar and beneath "a good, docile student." Politically, it was a clear act of insubordination. I will return to this intentional act of resistance after the following tale which paints a similar subversive act. Likewise, I remembered once in our 10th grade year we were marched by the school administration that was, in turn, operating under the instruction from the BSPP authorities, down to a rally 3 blocks away from our school to celebrate the erecting of a new billboard with new BSPP propaganda. After the ceremony, instead of returning to school, all the high school students (about 500 of us between the 9th and 10th grade classes combined) proceeded, in a march, toward Mandalay Railway Station to greet the victorious Mandalay Division soccer team which won the national championship in Rangoon. There were plainclothed police and intelligence officers following us on the side walk, as we marched down having disrupted the city traffic along a major street. Here, further elaboration may be of help, lest one jumps to the conclusion that the breach of culturally and politically normative behavior manifested in the aforementioned examples qualifies automatically to be elevated to the level of subversion or insubordination. The key is whether there is an element of intentionality on the part of the actors who manipulated the sites and moments of these political rallies for purposes other than the official ones. The collective act of marching down to the railway station and having deviated from the officially scripted program does not automatically make it an act of resistance. Some students were conscious of their defiance against the authorities and what was, to

273 them, a nonsensical political measure imposed by the authorities. But there were others who might not have thought of the march necessarily as an act of defiance or resistance this way. Although on the surface, the march may have qualified to be labeled as an act of subversion/resistance, neither my friends nor I thought of our march that way at the time. To the latter, they (we) were just going along with the crowd and having fun, a mob response to the situational peer pressure. This element of intentionality which was present in the consciousness of some of the instigators of the march (to the rail station) differentiates their participation in the march from that of the rest of the student marchers. Theirs was an act of resistance, insubordination, and subversion while our participation was merely an act of conformity and a youthful impulse. Both tales--Htun's shouting of "peasants wet your anus with oil" and a group of high school students from Mandalay having left the BSPP-sponsored ceremony and marched down the streets to welcome the victorious soccer team at the local rail station--were born out of a ritual atmosphere and have elements of Bakhtinian carnival spectacles. In Rabelais and His World Bakhtin (1965) examines carnival acts brilliantly. Referring to the carnivals "externally linked to the feasts of the Church" during the Middle Ages, Bakhtin wrote:
(C)arnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions.... This temporary suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created during carnival time a special type of communication impossible in everyday life. This led to the creation of special forms of marketplace speech and gesture, frank and free, permitting no distance between those who came in contact with each other and liberating from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at other times (pp.199-200).

He singled out a rather important carnival act, that is, carnival laughter. Here it is instructive to quote Bakhtin at length:
(W)e can say that laughter, which had been eliminated in the Middle Ages from official cult and ideology, made its unofficial but almost legal nest under the shelter of almost every feast. Therefore, every feast in addition to its official, ecclesiastical part had yet another folk carnival part whose organizing principles were laughter and the material bodily lower stratum... Besides universalism and freedom, the third important trait of laughter was its relation to the people's unofficial truth. The serious aspects of class culture are official and authoritarian; they are combined with violence, prohibitions, limitations and always contain an element of fear and of intimidation. Laughter, on the contrary, overcomes fear, for it

274
knows no inhibitions, no limitations. Its idiom is never used by violence and authority. It was the victory of laughter over fear that most impressed medieval man.... (pp.208-209). However, medieval laughter is not a subjective, individual and biological consciousness of the uninterrupted flow of time. It is the social consciousness of all the people. Man experiences this flow of time in the festive market-place, in the carnival crowd, as he comes into contact with other bodies of varying age and social caste. This is why festive folk laughter presents an element of victory not only over supernatural awe, over the sacred, over death; it also means the defeat of power, of earthly kings, of the earthly upper classes, of all that oppresses and restricts. Medieval laughter, when it triumphed over the fear inspired by the mystery of the world and by power, boldly unveiled the truth about both. It resisted praise, flattery, hypocrisy. This laughing truth, expressed in curses and abusive words, degraded power (p.210).

Describing Htun's parody of the Party and its sexual explicitness I should have mentioned that I hardly failed to note his distinct air of satisfaction and glee on his face while recounting the moment, which he clearly considered a triumphant act of verbal/symbolic sabotage, humorous, but defiant nonetheless. It is quite conceivable that his loud chant "wet your anus with oil" which broke the "double taboo," must have drawn laughter from those in the same crowd. As he was not likely to be the only one who would feel disgruntled about life under the BSPP rule, there were, one can be sure, other students and marchers who joined Htun's chant, even if only in the form of an approving smile. If my reading of the situation is to be taken as correct, which I think it is, Htun had succeeded into transforming an official occasion and moment into a moment of insubordination. Likewise a similar reading can be made of the 500 high school students marching down the rail station. Even if students like myself who didn't think or feel anything political or oppositional during the march the occasion and moment may be construed as pregnant with transformative potentials and meanings. There are a few issues that beg further explanations here. Regardless of various forms of subversion one could possibly describe and document, did the mere fact that all students from all categories participated in those rallies--as instructed by the authorities- fulfill the official, strategic needs of the BSPP authorities who needed to stage a public show of mass support (to their underground opponents and for the public consumption)? Were the

275 architects of the Burmese Way to Socialism concerned genuinely about transforming Burmese students into committed socialists, through those rallies (among other things)? I would answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Among the BSPP establishment ideologues and political advisors, there were committed socialists and leftists. 29 All--to the best of my knowledge--became disillusioned with the generals who made ultimate decisions and lacked any ideological commitment other than perpetuation of their stay in power. General Ne Win, the chief architect of the BSPP system, was decidedly anti-profiteering and anti-exploitation. 30 But being anti-profiteering does not necessarily make one a leftist of some brand. I have argued, in Chapter 5 on the politics of education in high places, that it was not the ideological purity or commitment, but public display of ideological and political loyalty to the BSPP rule, which, in the final instance, mattered to the BSPP authorities. The BSPP regime, specifically General Ne Win, was desperate for legitimacy precisely because it (he) came to power through a military coup (Nyi Nyi, 1994). All throughout the 26 years of its official stay in power the BSPP and its legitimacy continued to be challenged by the existence of various ethnic and Communist insurgencies, 31 as well as the occasional but serious challenges by students, monks, and later urban laborers. Those rallies served a tremendously important political function for the BSPP authorities as they enabled them to stage impressive public shows of support whether or not the support of each individual participating in those events was genuine.

29The principal ideologue U Chit Hlaing was responsible for articulating General Ne Win's vision of Burma under the BSPP rule. U Chit Hlaing was reputed to be a genuine believer and "practicing socialist. " There were also leftist student leaders who entered the ideological and political alliance with the BSPP regime. But many became disillusioned in due course, as I have pointed out elsewhere. 30General Ne Win was one of the wealthiest men in the country. We used to joke that the BSPP leaders exempted themselves from anti-exploitative and anti-profiteering attitude or measures to curb them. They accumulated tremendous wealth during their tenure. 31I am using the term "insurgency" not in any pejorative sense, but as a descriptor, for lack of a better word.

276 "Speaking Truth to Power": Open Revolts and Moments of Overt Defiance Earlier I have discussed the holdings of critical political discussions offstage by politically minded students, or Gramscian "organic intellectuals." All of these oppositional discourses were carried on out of the earshot of the authorities, except during open revolts such as the 1974 campus uprising. In those rare moments "hidden transcripts" were no longer hidden and covert oppositions transformed into open confrontation. Subsequent to the violent crackdown during the 1974 U Thant Crisis or student unrest town hall meetings were held between the authorities including the Minister of Education Colonel Hla Han and students from various campuses. The purpose of those meetings was to placate the students and showed publicly that the government was sensitive to their grievances and needs. The discussions were usually led by the representatives from the Lanzin Youth Organization. Only pre-selected issues such as dirty toilets on campus, new paint and repair of old roofs for the dorms, etc. were addressed (Htun Aung Gyaw, 1997: 31). According to Htun Aung Gyaw, the well-to-do student from the pre-BSPP generation, one group of politically minded students spoke truth to power, at their own risk. Htun Aung Gyaw (1997) writes:
(We) met secretly to discuss ways to infiltrate the scheduled meeting at the Rangoon Institute of Technology....Our friends from RIT agreed to take action in their school. (Minister of Education) Colonel Hla Han arrived in his black Mercedes Benz and was escorted by faculty members to meet the students. But when the discussion started, a student...stood up and asked: "If the government could not promote economic development in Burma, would they consent to step down?" This was followed by many questions from other students, such as "What is the meaning of BSPP party membership? Is it a license to get a government job? Why do only party members have a chance to get jobs, while others are denied? How long is the (socialist) transitional period, for your whole life or for how many years?" Hla Han and his team lost face. When they left the meeting, they were booed by the students and their Mercedes Benz was spit upon (pp.31-32).

But that was an extraordinary action which students carried out only in times of open crisis in the country. Seen through the lens of Jame Scott's "hidden transcript," the delivery of that verbal challenge was "a declaration that breaches the etiquette of power relations, that breaks an apparently calm surface and consent, carr(ying) the force of a symbolic declaration of of war" (Scott, 1990: 8). To both the authorities and students this was a rather important moment which brought to light the dismal failure of the BSPP authorities in their efforts to

277 create disciplined subjects or "builders and defenders of the BSPP system," to borrow the official BSPP term. Unlike Mrs. Poyser from Scott's example who spoke truth to power "in a moment of anger" and out of spontaneity, 32 the open (symbolic) revolt by Htun's colleague was rather pre-meditated and collectively planned both in terms of the content of the confrontation and of its timing and place. When, how, and what was said were all reflective of what had been whispered offstage (e.g., teashops or dorm rooms) by the discontented students. Students had had it, so to speak. Here Scott (1990) is instructive:
An individual who is affronted may develop a personal fantasy of revenge and confrontation, but when the insult is but a variant of affronts suffered systematically by a whole race, class, or strata, then the fantasy can become a collective cultural product. Whatever forms it assumes--offstage parody, dreams of violent revenge, millennial visions of a world turned upside down--this collective hidden transcript is essential to any dynamic view of power relations (p.9).

Indeed the students' action was the realization of that collective dream (among the discontented student body). Some of the interviewees who had developed anti-BSPP sentiment in their grade school years dreamed of overthrowing the government, but very few of us had the courage to organize an underground movement or simply did not know if it was at all possible to organize any such thing considering the pervasive surveillance, imagined or real. It would be inadequate to conclude the chapter on the politics of schooling without any mention of the Lazin Youth Organization which served as the pool of potential cadres for the BSPP party and as an important marker for the country's student body.

Joining the Lanzin Youth Organization: Endorsement or Working from Within? The Lanzin Youth Organization (LYO) was the sole political organization for students created by the BSPP authorities. Ideologically, it was part of the State Ideological Apparatuses with a monopoly over training the Burmese young. It had a large presence in schools and universities throughout the country. Headed by the Minister of Education, LYO
was using as an example a story from George Elliot's Adam Bede of a tenant who no longer was able to contain her anger against her immediate oppressor/landlord. See Scott, James (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University. pp.4-9.
32Scott

278 initiated and sponsored many educational, recreational, and volunteer programs for students and other youth. LYO was integrated into BSPP schooling from its inception. It served as the gatekeeper for those who wished to enrich their educational experiences through such extracurricular activities as community services, various technical, art, and music summer programs, youth festivals, and so on. Membership in LYO was important political capital, an investment for future employment, and a prerequisite for various awards. There were students from all walks of life 33 and there were different motives on the part of those who joined LYO. None of my interviewees from VIP families was involved in LYO. However, several non-VIP interviewees who were LYO members mentioned that there were a very small number of VIP student members. The organization, one of whose official purposes was to instill socialist consciousness, gave those VIP students special treatment. One student interviewee who was very active in LYO recalled thus:
If VIP students wanted to join the Lanzin Youth or enroll in any of its programs it was like a breeze for them. They knew that they were a privileged class and they acted accordingly even in socialist camps. If a VIP student behaved that was news (among teachers and trainers) precisely because it was in sharp contrast with the norms among the privileged students.

My student interviewees from non-VIP backgrounds were by and large excited about having been Lanzin Youth members. They joined parades, music and other programs organized by LYO. One interviewee who was involved in various LYO programs remembered that those who were from either really poor or really affluent families did not get involved for different reasons. Poor students could not afford the time or energies as they needed to help their struggling parents make ends meet. With some exceptions, students from affluent families either did not think it necessary to invest in Lanzin activities for their future employment or were against the BSPP rule. One interviewee observed that many of the students were involved in various programs for social reasons: they wanted to feel they were part of a peer group. Some were
33Within

nearly a decade (1971-1980), the BSPP recruited 1,167, 718 (age 15-25), 390, 210 (age 10-15), and 308, 248 (age 6-10). See Mya Wa De (1980) Data on Youth Organization. Pyi Myan Ma p.117.

279 attracted to the idea of wearing uniforms. Here is how a student reflected on why he joined the Lanzin Youth in high school:
During my 10th grade year I joined the Lanzin Youth. When I first joined it I had absolutely no idea in terms of its mission. I was attracted to the Lanzin Youth because it was the parent organization for the Red Cross and Firefighters' Club in our town. I wanted to have medic training and learn firefighting. I also liked the idea of wearing a uniform. As a 16 year old, I thought it pretty cool to wear a uniform.

But there were those who became Lanzin Youth members for other reasons. One medical school graduate made a frank comment regarding his motives for joining the Lanzin Youth thus:
Unless you were either a member of the BSPP party or Lanzin Youth, you wouldn't have had a chance to volunteer in places and institutions of your choice. I wanted to volunteer at the Children's Hospital in Rangoon. And the first question they asked was if I had joined the Lanzin or was a BSPP party member. I told them that I had applied for the membership in Lanzin Youth and I was still waiting for the approval for my membership application.

Some students from politically minded families were prohibited by their parents from joining the Lanzin Youth. There were those who genuinely believed in the BSPP's Burmese Way policies. They tended to have parents who were government employees. When asked what the membership training and youth leadership programs entailed one student interviewee who had been involved with the LYO for several years remembered:
I was part of the Lanzin Youth and attended leadership training programs. They often lasted 2-3 weeks. We were taught the goals of the BSPP party. We learned the organizational structure of the State. At the end of a program we were tested on the subjects taught and given certificates of completion. The training was very much like a military boot camp. There were military drills also. The same commands and organizational structure were used within the Lanzin Youth Organization as in the military. One thing they tried real hard to drive home was compliance with the orders from above.

Regardless of their motives, being part of the sole state-sponsored youth organization was doing something to their psyche. The same student recalled:
I felt strong and arrogant. The attitude (toward the non-member peers) I had then was "holier-than-thou," of course. It was like being in a gang. They made you feel better and holier than those of your peers who were non-Lanzin Youth members.

Exercise of criticism in general and self-criticism in particular was also encouraged amongst the Lanzin members, theoretically. One former member told a popular joke on the

280 subject. "Well, we used to say when one was engaged in self-criticism, it's like rubbing oneself with a little feather. When criticism is directed against others it's more like rubbing them with a metal brush," said the student laughingly. And there were discussions on the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology, classes in Burmese society, the history of youth movements in Burma, etc. since the Lanzin Youth Organization was to be a site for instilling socialist consciousness (BSPP, 1971). However, these intellectual discussions were customarily a staged public performance. One student remembered those discussions thus:
Well, they normally planted some trusted students in discussion sessions. One of them would throw out a question and others would offer scripted answers. They said they practiced socialist democracy within the organization. One student would stand up and make a motion. And someone who was assigned to second the motion would raise his hand and did exactly what he was supposed to do.

But that was not always the case, according to Rector Chit Swe. Rangoon University Rector Chit Swe (1995) who chaired the Lanzin Youth Organizing Committee on campus mentioned that he encouraged his (trusted) students to study the BSPP ideology and employ the official rhetoric in order to raise "tough questions." He claimed that he was turning his students into "rebels." In due course some became disillusioned while some went on to think that Lanzin Youth membership was truly incredible. Earlier I have touched upon the triumph of marshal spirit at the grass roots level, especially among the more patriotic and nationalistic types. 34 The Lanzin Youth training reinforced that sentiment. In addition, the BSPP authorities drew some legitimacy from the fact that there were youth members, mostly students, from all walks of life. Besides the legitimation and propaganda functions, the organization served two other important functions. On the one hand, it provided authorities with an effective mechanism to

34I

doubt that the rural population, especially the communities which were located in areas not completely under the control of either the "insurgents" or BSPP government, shared similar marshal spirit. For there was an on-going armed conflict and they were the ones who were caught in between those parties scrambling for power.

281 keep a significant number of youth (between the ages of 6-25) 35 under their close surveillance, and away from the on-going recruitment by various armed insurgent groups such as the two Communist parties, Karen National Union, Shan State Army, Mon State New Party, and so on. On the other hand, it divided a great majority of students into two covertly adversarial camps: those who became part of the BSPP youth establishment and those who were becoming increasingly anti-BSPP. The latter (some of the interviewees and my friends and I) were quietly very critical of the BSPP rule and distanced ourselves from the organization and its activities. They (we) viewed their (our) peers in the Lanzin Youth Organization as opportunistic. In their (our) eyes the Lanzin members were busy-bodies. On their part Lanzin Youth members felt they were holier and better, as attested to by the remark made by one interviewee who I quoted earlier in the chapter. To them, the non-members were aimless, visionless peers. Even 10 years after the abolition of the BSPP rule and the Lanzin Youth Organization, some of us still have strong animosities toward our peers who were closely involved in the Lanzin Youth. Repressive regimes, foreign or domestic, deploy various technologies of governance, needless to say. The classic, time-honored practice of "divide-and-rule" seems to have been at work here. Membership in the Lanzin Youth Organization was a political and ideological marker. Both the BSPP educational policies and Lanzin Youth organization objectives shared as their ultimate goal the production of subjects who would "build and defend" the BSPP order. That was a mission which the BSPP regime failed to accomplish as evidenced by the fact that a great majority of Lanzin Youth members joined the popular revolt having been amongst the first to denounce publicly the regime and having thrown their membership cards into the bonfire on the streets of Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein, etc.
35Youth

were to be organized into three different age groups: "Teza Youth" to be made up of students and other youth between 6-10, "Shei Hsaung" or Forward Youth (age 10-15), and "Lanzin Youth" or Clear/Nobel Path (age 15-25). All youth groups were placed under the directives of the Lanzin Youth Organizing Committee, BSPP Headquarters. See BSPP (1971 June) Lanzin Lunge Hpwe Zii Myi (Lanzin Youth Organization to be set up). Pa Ti Ye Yar pp. 39-41.

282 Summary Throughout the chapter I have discussed the ideological formation amongst the diverse groups of students, both the interviewees (and my friends and myself) and, to a lesser degree, some concrete strategies which they employed in handling schooling under the BSPP rule. I have argued that those who had access to counter hegemonic ideologies were able to develop critical consciousness needed for creative defiance. For those who benefited from the BSPP rule in general, there was no reason for them to revolt against the BSPP schooling. If they did, it was out of reasons other than ideological or political. The Prime Minister's son who openly cursed his father for attempting to instill nationalist sentiment was most likely to have been motivated by individual, youthful rebelliousness as opposed to any politically enlightened consciousness. My VIP interviewees had suggested that neither they nor those within their social circles entertained concerns for those outside of their small communities. From the day the BSPP party (July 4, 1962) was established until it was officially dismantled (July 26, 1988), there were few VIP students who were known to have been involved in challenging the BSPP regime and its domination over the rest of the society, to the best of my knowledge. There were students who were thoroughly affected by nationalist/modernist discourses and whose concerns were beyond the traditional student issues of relaxed dormitory rules, longer vacations, cleaner toilets, and better meals. Indeed they had reformulated their own selective tradition. In this process the students who developed their own critical awareness were aided by intergenerational contacts with people with a critical consciousness, their class location, ethnic communal histories, oppositional memories, and, last but not least, individual lived experiences under the BSPP rule, all counter-hegemonic sources of worldviews. Like their counterparts in the 1920's and '30s they continued to curb

283 out a political role for themselves and the society once again came to pin its collective hope on those "organic intellectuals." Noteworthy is the fact their collective/social and individual concerns were shaped, in part, by the imported discourses of modernization and development, a strand of BSPP ideology. The reader may recall when a Chin student interviewee recounted bitterly about the Burman teachers who he believed did not want the minorities to develop either educationally or otherwise. The rhetoric of modernization/development proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it was the promise of development within the framework of the Burmese Way to Socialism which made up a major component of BSPP ideology. The BSPP authorities used the rhetoric of development monopolistically for mobilizing public opinion and legitimizing their domination. It, on the other hand, enabled subordinated groups such as politically minded students to question the legitimacy or competence of the BSPP power holders or challenge outright their authoritarian rule. I wish to point out the workings- - albeit disjointedly -- of the State Apparatuses, both ideological and repressive, in establishing new social relations characterized by "discipline and order." As Althusser (1971: 144-5) put it, "while there is one (Repressive) State Apparatus, there is a plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses... (T)he Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence,' whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function by 'ideology' Althusser pointed out that "an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material." (p.133). In his essays titled "Two Lectures" Foucault (1994) spelled out methodological precautions one of which was not to take "power...as a phenomenon of one individual's consolidated and homogeneous domination over others, or a group of class over the others" (p.214). As the experiences of schooling under the BSPP indicate there are clear cut cases in which power -- that is, sovereign-judicial -- needs be construed in its conventional, global sense. There was clear domination, physically and figuratively, by one group of military

284 leaders who were in charge of Burma's education system, having fired educators left and right and thrown students in jail as the authorities pleased. In a situation where subjects were confronted with this type of global, naked power, I am convinced that Foucauldian analysis of power is less helpful vis--vis Althuserian insights which direct us to look at the actors, their intentions, and the institutions which were called upon in their attempts to control and dominate any given political community. Indeed compliance was induced through the real threat of punishment although ideological manipulation by the authorities played a lesser role, especially among students who did not have strong counter hegemonic resources to fall back on. There have been attempts to re-examine how total or complete a particular totalitarian system was not in the abstract, but as it was lived by human agents. According to closer rereadings of events and processes under "totalitarian systems" such as the Stalinist USSR, there was found some space for resistance and the actual existing "totalitarianism" was not as watertight as it appeared to outsiders. The pioneering social historian of the Stalin era Moshe Lewin (1991; quoted in Getty & Manning, 1993: 5) argues, "For no matter how stern or cruel a regime, in the laboratory of history only rarely can state coercion be so powerful as to control fully the course of events. The depth and scope of spontaneous events that counter the wishes and expectations of a dictatorial government are not a lesser part of history than the deeds and misdeeds of the government and the state." However, it seems that the fact that there was space for contestation and resistance within such systems in no ways erases (or must not erase) concrete efforts made by the authorities to micromanage and tightly control social space--to the extent their ideological and repressive apparatuses allowed them. In the Burmese case, the BSPP authorities did attempt to extend their grip over all sites of cultural and ideological production although the task proved ever-elusive. The censorship committee was set up to ensure that production of every single cultural artifact or expression (for instance, art shows, photo exhibits,

285 publication of all literary genres, movies, songs, drama, and so on) for public consumption, pass through the censorship committee. 36 Even dictionaries donated by foreign agencies were to be endorsed by the same committee before they could be distributed among various educational institutions. Owing to the ever-present danger of imprisonment or worse, students (and teachers alike) were too fearful to hold any open political discussions remotely critical of the BSPP rule or educational measures, in public spaces such as classrooms. Such official moments and occasions as mass rallies were transformed into oppositional display of popular discontent, dissent, and ridicules. Of course, there were instances where public space such as classrooms and teashops served as a safe space or offstage for those who had critical consciousness and allowed them to subvert the official knowledge, as in the case of the Chin students and teachers engaged in counter hegemonic discourses in the classrooms in government schools. Also there were older pre-BSPP generation students who made attempts to pass on to the younger generation BSPP students their oppositional memories and narratives of their dealings with the powers that be. The empty spot where the historic Student Union Building (on Rangoon University campus) once stood, the chain-prints from tanks left on the streets on campuses, or bullet holes on dormitory walls told unofficial tales. Those memories which did not find their way into the selective tradition of the BSPP, (that is, official knowledge) or which the BSPP authorities attempted to erase from the collective memories of the

Win Pe, a nationally acclaimed film director and former principal of Mandalay School of Art, Music, and Drama, recalled that the Military Intelligence officers would spend hours questioning about less than a minute long scene in one of his movies which involved a bird flying away. The MIs wanted to known why he chose that particular bird and what message he intended to convey to the audience. Win Pe, U (1998) Unrecorded interview. Radio Free Asia. Washington, DC. There are many similar stories which lend further evidence to the close monitoring of any cultural and ideological productions which were not directly undertaken by the BSPP authorities.

36U

286 successive generations of embryonic organic intellectuals kept alive oppositional politics, memories, and traditions. 37 All throughout the BSPP rule (1962-88) social/power relations between students and teachers (and other adult school authorities) were reworked by various social agents including parents, teachers, and, ultimately, by the BSPP authorities. Indeed on the surface most of those who grew up and were schooled under the BSPP rule fitted the reconstructed definition of "the good student." With a few exceptions, we appeared, and were, more or less obedient students respectful of our teachers and school authorities. We had our priorities (of getting into college) straight, and everything else was secondary including expressing our discontent or rebelling against anything which we considered culturally imposing or factually incorrect. Many of us accepted--selectively, to be sure--, conformed, accommodated, subverted, or resisted the schooling under BSPP rule. 38 In the conclusion chapter I discuss some of the salient points of the politics of education under BSPP rule. From the standpoint of someone whose past is inextricably linked to the study, I reflect on the nature and process of knowledge production regarding schooling in Burma.

37Htun

Aung Gyaw mentioned that any monuments which students erected which would have served as a public reminder of "traditional" activism were removed by the authorities after 1962. See Htun Aung Gyaw (1997) Student Movements. 38Under order from the BSPP authorities teachers in high schools and colleges had to monitor at the very micro-level of public spaces including even birthroom walls or pieces of paper with some writings sitting in classrooms or dormitories.

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Chapter Eight CONCLUSION

Do not take something to be true just because such and such tradition says so, because I, Gotama Buddha say so, the Vedas (or Sacred Books of Brahminist India) say so, or the elders say so. Believe only when you come to your own realization that it is true. --Gotama Buddha's Advice to Karlama Villagers, Karlama Sutta

The role of historical agency in societal transformation is an issue which is central to any social and political investigation. In this study I hope to have shown that however powerless members of the educational community in Burma under the BSPP dictatorship might have seemed at first glance, various individuals managed to manipulate, subvert, resist, and revolt against the policy initiatives aimed at radically transforming the social order, normalizing the emerging status quo, and, to a lesser extent, constructing new citizensubjects out of the country's students and teachers. Paradoxical as it may seem, in this topdown trans-formative politico-educational process, the monopolistic exercise of power -- in the sovereign juridical sense -- (by the military authorities) weakened their own efforts and institutional mechanisms by having rendered their hegemonic order extremely vulnerable to various alternative and counter-hegemonic responses from numerous quarters. This was so, precisely because the will and educational vision of the BSPP authorities, as articulated in their policy documents, public speeches, and specific reform measures, could be realized only in local settings and by the local actors, be it the education ministry manned with Western-trained Ph.D.s, township education offices staffed by Western-educated administrators, or college-graduate teachers in classrooms. Rupert Emerson's argument (Emerson, 1962; cited Verdery, 1990) that "if a social actor depends upon another for a crucial resource or performance, it is not powerful, no matter how many means of coercion lie at its disposal" seems to explain, in part, the politics of the BSPP education. Owing to the fact that in their hegemonic process the authorities had to involve many social actors with conflicting national and local "visions," individual and communal interests, and material

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needs, there gradually arose a highly complicated interplay amongst various parties who deployed everything at their disposal to manipulate, resist, subvert, dilute, sabotage, support, defy, escape, and revolt against the will of the BSPP authorities. This political process applies to almost all spheres of life. 1 In this conclusion chapter I reflect on the substantive issues that I have dealt with throughout this historical and sociological investigation. Furthermore, I touch upon the process of "knowledge production" caught in the global history/culture/power nexus. I devote the last section to a more deeper, personal kind of discussion in order to make my arguments and myself a little clearer.

Educational and Cultural Formation BSPP educational reforms were carried out in the larger political and economic context and they were inextricably tied to the project of building a socialist, modern nation, in accord with the Burmese Way to Socialism policy framework. It is hardly surprising that the architects of the BSPP reforms crafted their cultural and educational policies using the conventional, conflict-free language of co-operative shaping of and common contribution to culture and attempted deliberately to downplay a crucial constituting and constituted component of any cultural formation, that is, contestation and resistance. This fact is most evident when one examines the manifesto of the Revolutionary Council government, "the Burmese Way to Socialism." The Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma (1962) declared on April 30, 1962:
As the Union of Burma is a country where many indigenous racial groups reside, it is only when the solidarity of all the indigenous racial groups has been established that a socialist economy which can guarantee the welfare of every racial group can be achieved. In striving towards fraternity and unity for all the races of the Union we will be guided by what General Aung San, our national leader, said at the AFPFL Conference held at the middle terrace of the Shwedagon Pagoda on January 20, 1946.

1I

am by no means prepared to extend an analysis of power or power dynamics -- in either Foucauldian or more global, Althusserian sense -- to all aspects of life or everything human. I plan to discuss the rationale for my reservation in the closing section of this conclusion chapter.

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A Nation is a collective term applied to a people, irrespective of their ethnic origin, living in close contact with one another and having common interests and sharing joys and sorrows together for such historic periods having acquired a sense of oneness. Though race, religion and language are important factors it is only their traditional desire and will to live in unity through weal and woe that binds a people together and makes them a nation and their spirit patriotic. We, the peoples of the Union of Burma, shall nurture and embrace a new patriotism as inspired by the words of General Aung San.

The country's past social and cultural processes continued to shape the subjectivity formation of individuals with different class locations, various ethnic identities, and conflicting ideological orientations. The failure on the part of the BSPP to sufficiently appreciate the twin nature of "conflict-cooperation" in political and cultural processes led them to treat individuals and communities as if they were military units in possession of precision skills and mental attributes and specially trained for a particular military mission, all cooperating under a commanding officer towards a common goal. The Revolutionary Council government assumed the vanguardist role in the march toward the Burmese Way revolution while having assigned the rest of the society various responsibilities. In the same "Burmese Way" manifesto, it declares that:
The Revolutionary Council has faith in the people and in their creative force.
The Revolutionary Council believes that the people will, with an active awareness of
their duties and responsibilities, play their part in full in this national Revolutionary
progressive movement and programme under the leadership of the Revolutionary
Council.
The Revolutionary Council reaffirms and declares again that it will go forward hand-
in-hand with the people to reach the goal of socialism.
Let us march toward socialism in our own Burmese way.

Any political regime that refuses, either out of sheer ignorance or other ulterior motives, to recognize the process-oriented, give-and-take nature of nation building in particular and of universal human interactions in general, is doomed to fail in the first place, regardless of how noble, sincere, and lofty its aims may have been. It is not that the BSPP was unaware of the challenges with which they were confronted. Quite the contrary, General Ne Win (BSPP, 1966: 10) delineated categories of individuals and groups who were potentially obstructive of the BSPP's agenda thus:

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We have received many applicants for Party membership... We find several categories of applicants. There are those who do not like our programs but attempt to enter the Party to sabotage it from within. There are those who wish to gain entry to further their own private interests. Some sincerely wish to serve the country and sincerely believe in our programs but they are as yet unable to rid themselves of the old thinking and erroneous attitudes and instincts which they have acquired from previous experiences. Finally, there are those who are heart and soul with the Party and are willing to work diligently for its sake.

The attitude and strategy which the BSPP adopted was that all these elements would be absorbed into the BSPP power structure having given them "an opportunity to mend and serve" (BSPP, 1966: 10). In the General's words," (e)ven if the saboteurs will not change their hearts we must first try to absorb and organize them before we take action against them " (p.10). As General Ne Win observed, numerous individuals -- from critically minded social science professors with their pro-West views (as in the case of Professor Maung Maung Gyi of Mandalay University) through a devout Roman Catholic educator with his non-belief in any Marxist-influenced policies (as in the case of Director U Ohn Maung) to highly ambitious Ph.D.s who held different worldviews (as in the case of Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi and Rector Dr. Chit Swe), from teachers and students who were differently situated within the BSPP social order to non-Burman ethnic minority students and teachers -- approached these top-down educational reforms with their own agendas. At the risk of reducing every engagement between the two recognizable groups -those who became part of the BSPP status quo and those who remained outside it -- to "rational action," the individuals had their own internal (i.e., individual-group) logic having been driven by a multiplicity of motives and desires. In spite of its heavy rhetorical emphasis on "democratic centralism" and cooperative spirit, the BSPP leaders declared to the country that it would respond "spade for spade" to any challenge to their legitimacy or policies. And with the killings of several hundred peaceful demonstrators and the dynamiting of the Rangoon University Student Union building on July 7th and 8th in 1962 respectively the BSPP substantiated their threat. The parameters of Burmese educational politics were thus

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set and remained in place for the ensuing 26 years. Theatrically speaking, social actors in Burmese society in general and the educational community in particular knew what kind of play which was to unfold and what roles they had to play. If all politics can be described using "drama" as a metaphor, the politics of Burma's education under BSPP rule was a highly pre-scripted drama. In the study I hope to have shown that it was a play with a central theme of fear, control, and lies. As we would say in Burmese folk expression, "if the background music is about Bilu or an 'evil giant," one has to dance to bilu hsai or "the music of the evil giant." One might ask "why then did the BSPP even bother with all the pomp and hype about their elaborate theoretical edifices?" It is true that along with other Burmese witnesses I have noted, in this study, that the playwright and director of Burma's socialist drama General Ne Win was "anything but ideologue." However, the issue here is not so much whether or not the general was an ideologue as to what extent the general was prepared to push for selective items on his ideological menu. I must stress here that just as the BSPP ideology was characterized by its inevitable "selectivity," the way in which the BSPP regime enforced its policies, or the timing of its enforcement was highly selective as well. Furthermore, reflective of the dictatorial nature of BSPP rule, its educational politics contained whimsical dimensions. I have provided more than one example of how major reforms could be prompted by how General Ne Win personally felt about a certain thing. Now back to the selectivity issue. Although one can make the argument that none of the BSPP leaders believed in their educational policy in its entirety, at least there were some aspects or components of their policy which the BSPP leaders believed more than the other (aspects). In addition, this selective belief in their own "selective tradition" shifted according to the changing times and circumstances. As General Ne Win (BSPP, 1966: 14) put it:
(i)t is not that people do not hold divergent views. It is not natural for everybody to like or dislike the same things. Even a single person holds differing views at different stages of his

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growth. His views and even his physical nature are different when he is a child, when he is adolescent, when he is mature, and when he is aged.

This essentially Buddhist perspective on the part of the powers that be -- everything is in flux -- coupled with personal, political, and ideological priorities or selective items led to a situation which allowed various social actors to carve out different roles for themselves in different locations within the overall educational order at different times. The comparative cases of Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi and Rector Dr. Chit Swe are a case in point. In the formative years of the BSPP rule, Dr. Nyi Nyi was able to enter into a symbiotic relationship with the BSPP authorities, not simply because he had a personal connection within the BSPP's political and educational leadership, but because he also knew what the regime's priorities were, in other words, what the selective concerns were, how to tailor his "advice" accordingly, and how to "negotiate" a position for himself within Burma's educational hierarchy. Such initiatives as structural reforms (i.e., splitting over-crowded schools) and ultra-nationalist programs (i.e., Burmanizing school curricula) were consonant with the selective ideological and political agendas of the BSPP leadership. As Dr. Nyi Nyi recounted, he needed to seek no formal approval from "Number One" when he launched such important initiatives as (instructional) language reform replacing English with Burmese as the main medium. In contrast, Dr. Chit Swe's push for reforming mathematics and science created a controversy amongst the educators themselves and did not get "selected" as a top ideological item. The BSPP in the 1960's was evidently more concerned about building its power base, laying its ideological foundation stone, and constructing a new set of social relations than transforming Burma into a "modern" nation. But when the BSPP felt a need for a more modern and higher quality education, people with a more specific professional agenda such as Dr. Chit Swe attracted the regime's attention. On the part of the members of the educational community, their acceptance or rejection was selective in nature. For instance, many minority and majority interviewees did

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not find economic nationalization by the BSPP or adoption of the socialist economic policies objectionable. But that was not the case with wealthy Burmese students. Likewise, the ethnically Burman students saw nothing wrong with promoting the dominant Buddhist Burman culture and identity as the official culture and the official national identity. But the Chin, Shan, Kachin, Karen, and other minority members of Burma's education system experienced it as a form of internal colonialism. Similarly the devout Roman Catholic educator Director Ohn Maung was a complete non-believer in the BSPP ideology all throughout the BSPP rule, but he was happy to help develop technological education which was on the BSPP's agenda and, by extension, his professional career. As pointed out in Chapter 4 on the educational policies, the BSPP regime on their part were very selective in forging a coherent, national ideology which was to serve as the ideological foundation for school knowledge and curricula all throughout the BSPP period. This selective nature of the official hegemonic discourses weakened the BSPP's efforts to establish their hegemonic role in society at large (via education, among other vehicles) as it laid open their official vision and reading of the country's past to oppositional readings by those with access to counter-hegemonic worldviews. Inseparable from this educational transformation initiated and imposed by a regime that was intolerant of any alternative truth claims and dissent is the invention of "selective tradition." Williams (1994: 601) highlights the vulnerability of this complex process when he writes:
(T)he hegemonic sense of tradition is always the most active: a deliberatively selective and connecting process which offers a historical and cultural ratification of a contemporary order. It is a very powerful process, since it is tied to many practical continuities--families, places, institutions, and a language--which are indeed directly experienced. It is also, at any time, a vulnerable process, since it has in practice to discard whole areas of significance, or reinterpret or dilute them, or convert them into forms which support or at least do not contradict the really important elements of the current hegemony. It is significant that much of the most accessible and influential work of the counter-hegemony is historical: the recovery of discarded areas, or the redress of selective and reductive interpretations.

While Williams' observations here are generally helpful, I must point out the need for further refinements and modifications, especially when one is dealing with a cultural formation

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involving many different language communities, many areas of recoverable past, and fundamentally irreconcilable world views. To further explicate, Williams had in mind a class-based capitalist European (British?) society where there was already an established capitalist hegemony. Williams pointed to the general conceptual direction -- Christian churches, families, places, and a language -- in investigating the process of creating "selective tradition" or cultural formation. This study suggests that as opposed to the dominant social classes in Western capitalist societies, the BSPP regime was at a real disadvantage for the following reasons. First, it attempted to use education and the educational community (among other institutions and social forces) not to maintain and reproduce the already existing hegemonic social and political order, but to forge a new order where the BSPP (and the military) were to be the vanguard, the hegemonic player in all spheres of society. As such, BSPP authorities had to carry out such additional tasks as dismantling the old order, to the extent they deemed necessary. It is by no means hard to anticipate that this task, by definition, is destined to meet insubordination, subversion, resistance, and, ultimately, open revolt. Second, in light of the fact that the military was hardly a hegemonic institution in Burmese society, the BSPP was not carrying out its revolution, from a position of strength. None of the BSPP leaders enjoyed the kind of popularity and respect which U Aung San and Prime Minister U Nu received. This naturally led to the almost exclusive utilization of Aung San 2 as the source of legitimation and affirmation of their policies, as well as the coup of 1962. Aung San is often compared with George Washington of the United States and "warrior-unifier monarchs" from Burma's past by various Burma commentators (see, for instance, Waint, 1982). In the case of the United States regarding the use of political symbols there are Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, F.D.R., Harry Truman, and J.F.K.
2After

independence in 1948 laws were enacted by successful civilian governments which banned the use of Aung San-symbolism during election campaigns.

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whose names can be evoked as part of the official political discourse. The comparison does not capture the potency of Aung San as a political discourse. To a great majority of Burmese, Aung San is literally one step below the Buddha. Considering the fact that the Gotama Buddha has nothing whatsoever to do with worldly affairs such as politics and therefore can not be used to justify political policies and programs, Aung San has, since his assassination 50 years ago, served as a demi-god by having been deified in both the political and popular culture of Burmese society. Third, Burma's plurality in terms of culture, language, and history made the efforts of the BSPP regime to establish and maintain their hegemonic role extremely vulnerable. The BSPP had crafted a national vision out of a multiplicity of visions held by diverse communities and social classes. In so doing the BSPP regime necessarily discarded, ignored, marginalized, diluted, and de-legitimized other traditions, cultures, and histories. Some communities of dissenters (for instance, the Karen National Union with its separatist aspiration and vision as formulated prior to Burma's independence) held visions and aspirations which were irreconcilable with the Burmese Way ideology and unacceptable to the BSPP leaders (and the majority of the Burmans). Fourth and last, the BSPP was confronted with such active armed groups as the Shan State Army, Karen National Union, the New Mon State Party, the Kachin Independence Army, and the two communist parties, one of which enjoyed both ideological and material support from Mao's China. Furthermore, there were politically-minded students and the Buddhist Order whose opposition to the BSPP was no secret in Burmese politics. All of these aforementioned factors made the BSPP regime feel both ideologically and politically vulnerable. The frequent use of Aung San and, having later reversed its original secularist position, of Buddhism as legitimating discourses -- the twin gods of Burmese politics --appears to have been necessitated by this felt vulnerability. When these symbolic/ideological sources alone proved insufficient the regime relied on extreme violence

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and the intelligence network in its attempts to deal with any form of public display of discontent and dissent. In addition, the BSPP regime had to deliver the goods which it had promised at the outset of the revolution. The opening passage of the Burmese Way to Socialism manifesto reads:
The Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma does not believe that man will be set free from social evils as long as pernicious economic systems exist in which man exploits man and lives on the fat of such appropriation. The Council believes it to be possible only when exploitation of man by man is brought to an end and a socialist economy based on justice is established, only then can all people, irrespective of race or religion be emancipated from all social evils and set free from anxieties over food, clothing and shelter and from inability to resist evil, for an empty stomach is not conductive to wholesome morality, as the Burmese saying goes, only then can an affluent stage of social development be reached and all people be happy and healthy in mind and body. Thus affirmed in this belief the Revolutionary Council is resolved to march unswervingly and arm-in-arm with the people of the Union of Burma towards the goal of socialism.

Having been unable to fulfill its promises -- as the BSPP drama unfolded and the country began to reel under the effects of poverty and political and cultural repression -- the BSPP had no other option but to turn a blind eye to moral decay in the form of bribery, corruption, power abuses, nepotism, and myriad of other unprincipled conducts which pervaded throughout the BSPP revolution and cut across all ethnic and class differences. Corruption in Burmese education even amongst the educators is an outstanding example of the moral and cultural degradation which came about as a result of a failed ideological and political experiment with its rigidity. Drawing on insights from such diverse works as Williams, Bakhtin and James Scott in Chapters 4, 5, & 6 I have presented a detailed discussion of how individual members of Burma's educational community handled BSPP educational reforms in their local settings. Here I will confine my comments to several salient themes. In spite of the predisposed cultural and religious values of the dominant Burmese society, which were, to a significant degree, in consonance with the Burmese Way to Socialism ideology, teachers and students alike came to be alienated by the BSPP regime

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which had no appreciation and respect for their profession or school life and refused to recognize the importance of schooling beyond a narrow utilitarianism. The British lads in Willis' ethnographic study actively appropriated and resisted the dominant ideology in the way they deemed fit and yet, ironically, reproduced the dominant social order. In the case of Burma's educators and students, owing to the dynamic interplay of the BSPP's efforts and a wide variety of their own creative actions -- cooperation, support, insubordination, subversion, resistance, contestation, manipulation, and open revolt -- they gave birth to a new social order. It was a society radically different from anything that was envisaged by the BSPP. Educators, especially the ones who were in high places in Burma's educational establishment, seem to have been driven by their personal ambitions although there is no denying that there were some altruistic elements that led them to make pragmatic choices, for instance, to cooperate with the BSPP or to work from within the system. But what they did not seem to be aware or (or chose to ignore) was the near impossibility of working to improve or simply save an education system which had been made into an ideological apparatus -- in the Althusserian sense -- of the BSPP regime. Although I did point out the space in which these educators could, and did, push for their agenda, be they public or private-professional, it was too closely monitored and regulated for them to be able to use their talents for the good of the educational community and by extension for the country, in the final analysis. These educators were less ideologically driven than was suggested by their public performance (for instance, active participation in the BSPP mass organizational affairs, and their generous use of BSPP language). Out of their pragmatic -- some might say opportunistic -- engagement with the BSPP revolution, they did gain fame, professional influence over their peers, and access to power and privileges accruing from their having endorsed, publicly, the BSPP educational reforms. They, too, were targeted by the BSPP regime for ideological conversion as the two

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educators, Rector Dr. Chit Swe and Director U Ohn Maung, were sent to the Central Institute for Political Science, the elite cadre training and a rite of passage for those who were to ascend the partys ladder. However, they were fully cognizant of the fact that the acceptance of the BSPP ideology was less of a factor than their public display of loyalty and, as educator-politicians, their carrying out orders from above. In return, their economic needs and professional and political aspirations were taken care of. It is on this economic level that these educational leaders became concretely tied to the maintenance of the political (and educational) system. In that sense they too, became part of the problem. Compared to the three influential educators, a group of university and pre-college teachers were the ones who felt most powerless to do anything to help change the situation. All the educators felt abused, used, and manipulated by the powers that be. They occupied a rather precarious position within the Burmese educational hierarchy. Those who wished to be fully professional and who were from economically secure backgrounds were able to withstand the corrupting environment which normalized immorality and which came to be characterized by the absence of professionalism. Those educators who had empty stomachs to fill as parents had to embrace normative corrupt behavior. Once again the powers that be had effectively split Burma's professional and intellectual community along the lines of public display of loyalty and support for the BSPP rule and policies. But again the BSPP authorities cleverly employed "carrot and stick" measures. These educators lived in the midst of the sad stories of their colleagues who were punished for having dared to express their critical views toward the BSPP and its educational policies. But they also witnessed the career advancement of their peers precisely because the latter publicly supported the BSPP rule and education system. Even if the educator interviewees were sympathetic to the egalitarian sounding BSPP policies, the attraction was short-lived, once their own economic and professional lives came to embody the injustices which the BSPP manifesto promised to erase from the lives of the majority of the Burmese peoples.

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Three of my interviewees had to resort to moonlighting and other economic practices simply because their salaries could hardly feed their families. When there emerged a discrepancy between the official ideology and the reality, it was to be expected then that the educators interviewed became members of the alienated segments of Burmese society. Those who could began looking for opportunities to escape from the educational environment. Some found refuge in burying themselves amongst books while others daydreamed about a life in exile. However one characterizes the nature of the relationships between the BSPP authorities and the educators, the fact remains that it was the former who laid down the ground rules for the BSPP game or drama from the outset. In order to fully appreciate and understand the complex nature of the dynamic interplay of social actors in essentially authoritarian (i.e., non-liberal) political contexts, one must be prepared to accept the power differential, in the physical sense. The power at work in Burmese educational politics is better explained from the perspective which treats power as "capacity to get things done" or, to put it another way, power as a thing, in the global, sovereign-juridical sense, not as "disciplinary power" the birth of which Foucault tied to the modern liberal bourgeoisie state.

Reflections Just a few days ago I spoke on the telephone with a long lost friend who now lives and attends a university in Australia. I have known him since high school. When I left Burma on the eve of 1988 pro-democracy uprisings, he was working for the government as a forester. He was very intelligent and studious. As a matter of fact, he was a Luyechon or BSPP's Outstanding Student. We talked about our school days and life under the BSPP. It pained us to talk about the present order of things in Burma. Naturally, we talked about the damages that the communities there have suffered, and continue to suffer. We talked about the future possibilities of re-building our communities.

300

During the course of our an-hour long conversation we each came to the following conclusion, independently: it was not the tradition of student activism nor people's commitment to pursuing lofty ideals such as democracy, human rights, or justice which have enabled the people to keep their individual dignity or hold their communities together. Rather it was, and still is, Buddhist philosophical tradition which helps them to endure their hardship and oppression by teaching them that, like everything else, their oppressive plight will pass. Conversely, the regime will have to go, sooner or later. Neither he nor I consider ourselves religious or other worldly-minded. We both studied science in college and we trained to think rationally and logically. There was no spirituality "thing" in our formal education. And yet we got a good dose of Buddhist religious thought from our upbringing. But during our youthful years we pretty much wrote our non-materialistic way of looking at the world (and ourselves) off. Then, why "spirituality" now?

Reflections continue. "You know, I don't have a philosophy to die. I have built my successful career on philosophies. Now that I have this cancer and I realize I don't have one to die with," lamented softly a friend whom I ran into in Memorial Library a year ago while doing my routine book searches for the study. He is a middle-age white American, a nationally wellknown professor and a good family man. He had led a rather enjoyable life, until the dreadful illness has, unfortunately, paid an unwelcome visit on him. Before we parted he said pointedly that all of a sudden everything that mattered to him -- talking and writing about critical education and about school reforms, giving public speeches at national professional conferences and gatherings, and so on and so forth -- stopped being of any importance, to him.

301

Now back to the study. I have examined critically the politics of schooling in the society of which I was, and still am (?), an "organic" member. In spite of the fact that my study is profoundly influenced by my own realization of Buddhist intellectual thought, I have relied heavily on Western social sciences, drawing particularly on post-structuralisms and structuralisms. In trying to rub the two fundamentally different, but seemingly complimentary materialist/rational paradigms in social sciences, I have managed to leave out Buddhist thought from the overt discussion, fearing that Buddhist epistemology and intellectual tools might be considered to be beyond the confines of the dominant rational, academic discourse. Now I am writing the last few pages of my study, and I feel as if my socio-historical analysis remains wanting. It feels as if there is something crucial is missing in this process. And all of a sudden, my recollections of the two aforementioned conversations which touched upon non-material, non-sociological, non-cultural (?) aspect of human existence seem to be directing me to something that has never been a part of my formal intellectual training. One needs to look beyond mechanistic, sociological, and historical models and explanations if one is to understand any processes involving human agency -- however defined. I reached out to a bi-lingual collection of essays "Burma: Voices of Women in the Struggle." All the pieces were written by a group of Burmese women, of all ages, ethnic backgrounds, and educational levels, who have been deeply involved with Burma's struggle for the past 10 years. Some hold academic positions in Western universities. Some are activists in various countries of the world. And yet still some are in Thai-Burma border camps armed with M-16s to fight the "enemy" in Rangoon. As I browsed through the essays one piece caught my attention and I began to read out loud:
At this moment you cannot write to me but when I was in Burma staying at a hostel as a student I always received your loving and encouraging letters. I always remember these letters. You said, as a youngster you have to train yourself to face life, become successful

302

and move forward. You need to generate lots of energy. Weeping is one way of giving up. So don't weep! Try hard in order to reach your goal, etc." All this love and tenderness. I have put all your words in my heart. At this moment, I believe that you will also miss me but you will abide by the law of Dharma (or Buddhist philosophy that nothing is permanent) in order to live with it. Then my big brother, my middle brother and I myself left the house to fight for democracy and the attainment of our ideals. Only father passed away 7 years ago. I still vividly remember the day I announced my decision to go to the revolutionary border area, as if it were yesterday... At the time I declare my decision to my Father and Mother they were silence for a while, and then Daddy said: "do not forget Lord Buddha, teachings of the Buddha (Dharma), the order of monks, your parents, and your teachers; strive until you attain your objectives and convictions. Do not worry about the family you left behind." After which my father sank into meditation all night. At that time I never thought it was to be the last day I would see my father (pp.87-88).

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306 __________ (1981). Power/Knowledge: Selective Interviews and Other Writings (1972 1977). (Colin Gordon, Ed. and Trans.). New York: Random House. Frank, C.E.S. (1989). Dissent and the State. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Furnivall, J. S. (1948). Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India . London: Cambridge University Press. _____________ (1957). An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma . Rangoon: People's Literature Committee. Getty, J. A. & Manning, R. (1993). Introduction. In J. A. Getty & R. Manning (Eds.), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (pp.1-20). New York: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, M. & T. Cheek (1987) Introduction: Uncertain Change. In M. Goldman et al. (Eds.), China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship (pp. 1 22). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Govinda, A. (1969) The psychological attitude of early Buddhist philosophy and its systematic representation according to Abhidharma tradition . London: Rider. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. The Guardian (1962, August). The Student Problem: Editorial. The Guardian , 9: 8, 6-7. ___________ (1964, March). In the Interest of Culture: Editorial. The Guardian, 11: 3, 6-7. ___________ (1964, April). Teaching in Private Schools: Editorial. The Guardian , 11: 4, 7. ___________ (1964, May). Extended Nationalization: Editorial. The Guardian , 11: 5, 6-7. ___________ (1964, July). In the Full Tide of History: Editorial. The Guardian , 11: 8, 5. ___________ (1964, August). In the Full Tide of History: Editorial. The Guardian , 11, 8: 5. ___________ (1965, May). Take Over of Schools: Eidtorial. The Guardian., 12: 5, 4-5.

307 Guyot, J. (1969). The "Clerk Mentality" in Burmese Education. In R. O. Tilman (Ed.), Man, State and Society (pp. 212-227). New York: Praeger. Hall, S. (1994). Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms. In N. Dirks, G. Eley, & S. Ortner (Eds.), Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory (pp. 520-538). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hamrin, C. L. & T. Cheek (Eds.) (1986). China's Establishment Intellectuals. London: M.E. Sharpe. Hann, C. M. (1993). Introduction: social anthropology and socialism. In C. M. Hann, C. (Ed.), Ideals, Ideologies, and Local Practice (pp. 1-26). Association of Social Anthropologist Series No. 31. New York: Routledge. Harding, S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hill, H. (1984, March). Industrialization in Burma: Historical Perspective. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 15: 1, 134-149. Hla Myint. (1962). The Universities of Southeast Asia and Economic Development. Pacific Affairs , 40: 2, 116-127. Hnin Mya Kyi. (1975). The Development of Higher Education in Burma . Rangoon: Ministry of Education. Htin Aung. (1967). A History of Burma . New York: Columbia University Press. Isreal, J. (1986). Foreword. In C. L. Hamrin & T. Cheek (Eds.), China's Establishment Intellectuals (pp. ix-2). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Janwotiz, M. (1964). The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Jay, M. (1998). Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time . Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts.

308 Johnson, J. (1962). The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Johnstone, W. (1963). Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Karenni Provisional Government. (1991, May). Focus on Successive. Colonialist Burman Government and the Independent Karen State Issue . Thailand-Burma Border. Kawlthangvuta. (1983). A Brief History of the Planting and Growth of the Church in Burma Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, Chicago. Keesing, R. (1992). Custom and Confrontation: The Kwaio Struggle for Cultural Autonomy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Kelly, R. D. G. (1992, June). An Archaeology of Resistance. American Quarterly, 44: 2, 292-298. Khin Mya, Ma. (1961). The Impact of Traditional Culture and Environmental Forces on the Development of the Kachins, A Sub-cultural Group of Burma Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. Khin Yi. (1988). Dobama Movement . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. King, W. (1964). A Thousand Lives Away: Buddhism in Contemporary Burma . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ko Ko Lay. (1962, June). Hail the Revolution. The Guardian, p.6. Kristof, N. (1998, February 17). Asians Worry That U.S. Aid Is a New Colonialism. The New York Times. Kyaw Min. (1957). The Arakan State. (The expanded version of the Speech given at the Chamber of Deputies). Rangoon. Law Yone, E. (1975, April 2). Written Testimony before Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research & Development Committee on International Relations, the United

309 States Congress. Walinsky papers. Echols Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Lewin, M. (1991). The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation . Berkeley: University of California Press. Machiavelli, N. (1981). The Prince. New York: Penguin. Marks, J. E. (1917). Forty Years in Burma. London: Hutchinson & Co. Maung Maung. (1930). The Beginnings of Christian Missionary Education in Burma 1600 1824. Journal of the Burma Research Society , 20 (Part II), 59-75. Maung Maung Gyi (1983). Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism. New York: Praeger. Maung Phyu. (1967, November). Education for a Socialist State (Burmese Way). The Guardian, 14: 11, 42-43. ____________ (1969, January). Education: Bilingual or Unilingual. Union of Burma Journal of Literary and Social Sciences, 2: 1, 219-225. Mehta, U. (1997). Liberal Strategies of Exclusion. In F. Cooper and A. Stoler (Eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colinial Cultures in A Bourgeois World (pp. 59-88). Berkeley: University of California Press. Miller, J. (1993). The Passion of Michel Foucault . New York: Simon and Schuster. Morrow, R. & Torres, C. (1995). Social Theory and Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Cultural Reproduction . New York: SUNY Press. Nash, M. (1969). Burmese Buddhism in Everyday Life. In R. O. Tilman (Ed.), Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (pp. 103-114). New York: Praeger. Ne Win. (1963, April). Preserving and Enriching National Culture. Forward , pp.6-7. Ni Ni (1998). I was told: "there are many people like you, if it is so..." In The Thanakha Team (Ed.), Burma: Voices of Women in the Struggle ( pp. 64-68). Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN (Burma).

310 Office of the Superintendent. (1945, October). Syllabuses for Primary and Post-Primary Schools: Burma. Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary. Petry, J. L. (1993). The Sword of the Spirit: Christians, Karens, Colonialist, and the Creation of a Nation of Burma . Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rice University, Houston, Texas. Po, S. C. (1928). Burma and the Karens. London: Elliot Stock. Prakash, G. (1994, December). Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism. The American Historical Review , 99: 5, 1475-1490. The Revolutionary Council. (1962, July). The Burmese Way to Socialism. The Guardian, pp. 29-31. Rose, N. & Miller, P. (1992). Political power beyond the State: problematics of government. British Journalist of Sociology , 43: 2, 173-205. Rosenthal, E. (1998, May 5). China's Leading University celebrates and Ponders. The New York Times p. A. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism . New York: Vantage. _______ (1993). Representation of Intellectuals. London. Saito, T. (1996, November). Labour Issues in the Mining Industry in Burma: A Historical Review. Asian Studies Review , 20: 2, 121-142. San Yu. (1963, April 7). Brigadier San Yu's Speech on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day. Forward , 1: 17, 17-22. Schrift, A. (1995). Nietzsche's French legacy : A Genealogy of Poststructuralism . New York: Routledge. Schlesinger, J. (1997, June 17). G-7 Summit to Unveil Policies That Aim To Stave Off Global Financial Crises. The Wall Street Journal. Sein Tu. (1962). The Lokaniti . Mandalay University Research Council Publication No. 9. Mandalay: Tetnaylin Press.

311 Selth, A. (1997). Burma's Intelligence Apparatus . Working paper. Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Astralian National University Shwe Wa, et al. (1963). Burma Baptist Chronicle . Rangoon: Baptist Convention, Board of Publications. Ranasinghe, C. P. (1957). The Buddha's Explanation of the Universe. Colombo: Lanka Bauddha Mandalaya Fund. Stargardt, J. (1990). The Ancient Pyu of Burma . (Volume One). Cambridge, UK: Publications on Ancient Civilization in South East Asia, Cambridge University. Scott, A. (1997). Between autonomy and responsibility: Max Weber: Scholars, academics and intellectuals. In J. Jennings & Kemp-Welch, A. (Eds.), Intellectuals in Politics (pp. 45-64). London: Routledge. Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. ______ (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press. Scott, J. (1991, Summer). The Evidence of Experience. Critical Inquiry, 17: 771-797. Sein Tu. (1964, December). The Psychodynamics of Burmese Personality. Journal of the Burma Research Society , XLVII: ii, 263-285. Silverstein, J. (1970, March). Burmese and Malaysian Student Politics: A Preliminary Comparative Inquiry. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , 1: 1, 3-22. Silverstein, J. & Wohl, J. (1964, Spring). University Students and Politics in Burma. Pacific Affairs , 37: 1, 50-65. Smith, D. (May 30, 1998). Philosopher (??) Gamely In Defence of His Ideas. The New York Times, pp.A 13 & 15. Spivak, G. (1987). In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics . New York: Methuen.

312 Stoler, A. & Cooper, F. (1997). Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda. In F. Cooper & Stoler, A. (Eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colinial Cultures in A Bourgeois World (pp. 1-56). Berkeley, CA: University of California. Tambiah, S. J. (1976). World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against A Historical Background. New York: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, R. (1987). The State in Burma . London: Hurst.
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Modern Asian Studies , 29: 1, 45-63. Than Nyunt. (1987, August). The Socialist Economy. Pyin Nya Da Zaung, 36: 8, 19-22. Than Tun, Dr. (1960, December). The Influence of Occultism in Burmese History with Special Reference to Bodawpaya's Reign 1782-1819 . Paper read at the Seventh Anniversary Celebration of the Kanthasanelai Group. Rangoon. The Thanakha Team (Eds.) (1998). Burma: Voices of Women in the Struggle Bangkok: ALTSEAN (Burma). Tin Htway. (1972, December). The Role of Literature in Nation Building. Journal of Burma Research Society , VLV. i & ii. pp. 19-45. Trager, F. (1965). The Impact of Marxism: Historical Overview and Judgment. In Frank Trager (ed.) Marxism in Southeast Asia: Astudy of Four Countries (pp.240-300). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tun Aung Gyaw. (1997). Student Movements and Civil Society in Burma , Unpublished master's thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Tun Pe. (1949). Sun Over Burma. Rangoon. von der Mehden, F. (September, 1960). Burma's Religious Campaign Against Communism. Pacific Affairs 33: 3, 290-299.

313 Verdery, K. (1991). theorizing socialism: a prologue to the "transition". american ethnologist, 18: 3, 419-439. Vumson. (1986). Zo History. Aizawl, India. Walinsky, L. (1969). The Role of the Military in Development Planning: Burma. In R. O. Tilman (Ed.), Man, State, and Society in Contemporary South East Asia. New York: Praeger. Wallerstein, I. (1990). Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern WorldSystem. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), Global Culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity (pp. 31-55). London: SAGE. Weiner, T. (1998, May 2). A Rebellion Against History's Fuzzy Future. The New York Times , p. Wiant, J. (1982). Lanzin Ideology and Organization in Revolutionary Burma Unpublished Manuscript. Echols' Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Williams, R. (1976). Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory. In R. Dale et al. (Ed.), chooling and Capitalism (pp.202- ). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Willis, P. (1976). The Cultural Meaning of Drug Use. In S. Hall & Jefferson, T. (Eds.), Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain (pp. 106-118). London: Hutchinson. _______ (1977). Learning to Labor. New York: Columbia University Press. Yoon, W. Z. (1973). Japan's Scheme for The Liberation of Burma: The Role of the Minami Kikan and the "Thirty Comrades." Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies. Zane, L. and Rantala, J. (1977). A Report on the Establishment of Regional Colleges in the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Rangoon: Ministry of Education.

314 II. BURMESE LANGUAGE SOURCES

Aung Gyi. (1988, May 9). Open Letter to Former Colleagues. Xeroxed copy. Rangoon.
_________ (1988, June 8). "Dear General" Xeroxed copy. Rangoon.
Aung San. (1960-61). Kyaungtha Wuttaya. (Student's Responsibility). Rangoon University
Magazine. Fortieth Anniversary Special Publication. (pp.14-16). __________ (1971). Bogyoke Aung San Meink Hkun Mya (1945-1947). (Collected Speeches of General Aung San). Rangoon: Sarpe Beikman. Aye Kyaw. (1970). Myanmar Naing Ngan Amyo Tha Pyin Nya Ye Tha Mai. (History of National Education in Burma). Rangoon: Pa Le Ban Sarpe. Aye Thi Da. (1980, January). Ta Htaunt Koe Ya Ma Tai Mi Myanmar Naing Ngan Dwin Tho Hso She Lit Sar Pe Pyanhnan La Gyin (The Spread of Socialist Literature in Burma before 1930). Tetkatho Pyinnya Pa De Tha Sar Zaung. 14: Part II, 47-54. Ba Lwin. (1972, June). A-chay-khan Pyinnya Ye Sahnit hnint Saya Mya Ta-wan . (New System Basic Education and Educators' Responsibilities). Myawadee 20: 8, 109-115. Ba Swe. (1955). Bamah Taw Hlan Ye Hnin Bamah Hluk-tha-lu-htu. (Burmese Revolution and Burmese Working People). Rangoon: Peoples Press. Ba Thaung. (1961, March). Bama Seitdat Thamai . [History of Burmese (Patriotic) Spirit]. Myawade v. 9: 5, 37-44. Ba Tin. (1967). Myanma Hsarpay Lawka. (The World of Burmese Literature). Mandalay: Gaba Khit Press. Ba U. (1971). Amyotha Aung-pwe-ne. (National Victory Day.) Oway Magazine's Golden Jubilee Selections. (pp.9-19). Bagyi Thu. (1970). Mei Hpan Mya Zaga Ya (The more one asks the more one learns). Rangoon: Pyinnya Dahkun Sarpe.

315 Basic Education Curriculum, Syllabus, and Textbook Committee. (1983, 1987). Burmese History Readers. Rangoon: Ministry of Education, Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Buddhist Thathana Council of Burma. (1974). Inguthto Pali Daw. Rangoon: Department of Religious Affairs. BSPP. (1964). Tai Yin Tha Lhu Myo Mya A-ye Hnin Pak Thak Ywe Taw Hlan Ye Kaung Si E Amyin Hnin Khan Yu Chak. (The Revolutionary Council's Attitude and Perspective Regarding the Indigenous Nationalities). Rangoon: Sar Pe Beik Men. esp. (pp. 33 62). ______ (1965). Party Seminar (Speeches of Chairman General Ne Win and the Political Report of General Secretary). Rangoon. ______ (1970). Amyotha-ne Hnin Amyotha Pyinnya-ye Hloke-sha-hmu Thamai Aakyin. (A Concise History of the National Day and National Education Movement). Rangoon: BSPP Headquarters Organizing Committee. Chit Thwe. (1976). Aung San Lei La Gae Dae Sarpe Mya (The types of literature Aung San was exposed to). In Sa Nei Sarpe Wai (Ed.), Sarpe Hnin Yin Kye Hmu (Literature and Culture), (pp. 129-146). Mandalay: Hanthawadee Newspaper Press. Curriculum, Syllabi, and Textbook Committee. (1965). Kindergarten Primer. Rangoon: Ministry of Education. _____________________________________ (1968). Fourth Grade Reader. Rangoon: Ministry of Education. _____________________________________ (1977). First Grade Reader. Rangoon: Ministry of Education. _____________________________________ (1980). Second Grade Reader. Rangoon: Ministry of Education.

316 _____________________________________ (1979). Third Grade Reader. Rangoon: Ministry of Education. Department of Religious Affairs. (1982). Milanda Pyinsa Palidaw . (Milanda Pyinnya Pali). Rangoon: Department of Religious Affairs. Directorate of Education (1967). Mhu La Dan Hnin Ahle Dan Achay Gan Pyinnya Ye Sahnit Thit Thin Yo Martika Athay Seik Ah-nyun Mya. (Syllabi for Primary and Middle Standards). Rangoon. Doh-bama Asi-ayone (1976). Doh-bama Asi-ayone Tha Mai (History of We, the Burmese Confederation). Volume I. Rangoon: Sarpei Beik Hman. Maung Htin. (1936). Myo-chit Seik Hta Kywa Bwe Sar Pe (The Literature that arouses nationalist sentiment). Oway 6: 1, 77-84. _________ (1972). Yaw Min Gyi U Bo Hlaing YeYaza Dama Thin Gaha Kyum. (A Treatise on Kingly Art and Behavior Written by Yaw Minister U Bo Hlaing). Rangoon: Htein Win Sarpe. Hla Shwe. (1982, April) Speech by U Hla Shwe, Deputy-Minister of Education on the Occassion of the Opening of the 19th Outstanding Youth Camp. Pyinnya Da-zaung. Khin Khin Sein. (1977). Bagan Khit Amyo Tha-mee Mya (Women of the Pagan Period). Naing-ngan Thamaing Thu Te Tha Na Sar Zaung , Part I. Khin Maung Htun. (1979, March). Tekkatho Sar Pei Sar Yu Thin Dan. (University Correspondence Prorgam). Tekkatho Pyinnya Pa De Tha.. 13: part II. pp.1-24. Khin Maung Nyunt. (1979, May). Ci-bwa-ye Tekkatho Hmaik-hset (Introduction to the Institute of Economics). Tekkatho Pyin-nya Padetha Sa-zaung. V. 13. Part 3., pp. 1 11. ____________________ (1987, September). Socialist Economy: Radio Lesson. Pyinnya Da-zaung. 9: 36, 19-22.

317 Khin Maung Win. (1974, July). Transcript of Opening Address by Education Minister Dr. Khin Maung Win on Education Seminar. Pyinnya Lawka Sar-zaung. 5: 3, 2-4. Khin Yi. (1988). The Dobama Movement in Burma: Appendix. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Ko Ko Gyi. (1970). Shei-khit Hsay-kyaung-tha. (The Medical Students from the By-gone Era.). Rangoon University Fiftieth Anniversary Publication. (pp. 131-143). Ko Ko Maung, (1964, August). Hso-shei-lit Pyinnya-ye Hso-da Ba-le (What is Socialist Education?) Myawade , 12: 10, 33-34. Ma Kyan. (1979, May). Pyin-nya Thin Lu Sar-rin Phaya (List of State Schoalrs). Journal of the Burma Research Society, LXII, (Parts i & ii), 95-102. Kyaw Nyein. (1984, June). Speech by U Kyaw Nyein, Minister of Education on the occassion of the Openning of the 24th Outstanding Youth Camp. Pyinnya Da-zaung. 33: 6, 5-7. Kyaw Sein. (1988, May). Speech by Dr. Kyaw Sein, Minister of Education on the occassion of the Openning of the 25th Outstanding Youth Camp. Pyinnya Da-zaung, 37: 5, 3-5. Kyaw Thet. (1968). Ahtet Myanmar-pyi ko Theim-paiksa ka Myanmar-yoya Minpai Soepai ahlwa Apaw Byi-ti-sha to-ei Thabaw-htar. (The British Policy toward Burmese Traditional Elites at the outset of the Annexation of Upper Burma). Union of Burma Literature and Social Science Journal, 1: 396-405. Kyaw Win et al. (1991). Myanmar Naing Ngan Ye (1958-62). (Burmese Politics, 1958 62). Volume III. Rangoon: Universities Press Kyaw Zaw. (1959-60). Kyaung Tha Hnin A-Myo-Tha-ye. (Students and National Cause). Rangoon University Magazine, pp.17-23. Thirtieth Anniversary Publication. Lanzin Thadin. (1987, April 1). Pyi Htaung Su Seik Dak Pyi Wa Swa Hpyint. (With the Solid Union Spirit). Lanzin Thadin. 23: 7, 8-9. __________ (1988, January 7). Pyinnya ye Ahsint Myint Mar Toe Tek Ye

318 (To raise the quality of education). Lanzin Thadin. 24: 13, 6 & 10. __________ (1987, July 1). Ashint Toe Myint Lei Kyint Pe Ne The. (Training by higher standards). Lanzin Thadin. 23: 3, 3 & 6. Mandalay Division Education Department. (1968). 1966 Achay Hkan Pyinnya Ye Oo-pa-de Aya Pyu Pyin Si-yin Yay-Swe HthawThin Yo Martika Ahle-dan Hnin Ah-htek Tan. (Syllabi for Middle School and High Schools Developed in Accordance with the 1966 Basic Education Law). Mandalay. ________________________________ (1970). Achay-khan Pyinnya Ye Sa-hnit Thit Ahle dan Hnin Ah-htek Tan Thin Yo Martika. (New System Basic Education: Midde and High School Syllabuses). Mandalay. Maung De. (1979, September). Weik Zar Hnin Theik Pan Tekkatho Meik Hset. (Introduction to Arts and Science University Part I). Tekkatho Pyinnya Pa De Tha Sar Zaung. 13: 5, 1-9. Maung Kyaung Thaa. (1959-60). Myanmar Lo Thin Kya Myi. (Using Burmese as the Language of Instruction). Rangoon University Annual Magazine. (pp.159-60). Maung Maung. (1971). Bogyoke Ne Win E Tetkatho Kyaungtha Bawa (The Student Life of General Ne Win). Golden Jubilee Selected Articles from Oway Magazine., pp.58-61, Rangoon: Htu Sarpe. Maung Wa. (1976). Sarpe Yin-kye-hmu.. (Literature/Culture). Mandalay: Lu Htu Press. Mya Han & Thein Hlaing. (1991). Myanmar Naing Ngan Ye (Burmese Politics: 1958-62). Volume IV. Rangoon: Universities Press. Mya Ke Tu. (1954, February). Pwe-kyaung Tekkatho Mya. (Universities for Secular Learning.) Myawade. 2: 4, 142-149. _________ (1970). Byu-ro-ka-yak Kaw-leik Kyaung Tha Ba-wa. (Life of a BureacratStudent.) Rangoon University Fiftieth Anniversary Publication. Part I. (pp. 188-196).

319 Myat Aye. (1972). Lanzin Lu Nge A-Kyaung Thi Kaung Za Ya. (On Lanzin Youth.) Myawade. 20: 11, 80-83. Myawade. (1980). Data on Youth Organization. Pyi Myan Ma p.117. ________ (1987). Lu Ye Chun Hsa Yin (The List of Outstanding Student Award Recipients 1964-1987). Pyi Myan Ma p. 232. Ne Win. (1971, June). Openning Address by Chairman Ne Win, Burma Socialist Program Party, First Party Congress. Lanzin Thadin. _______ (1983, Winter). Thamada Gyi U Ne Win E Myanmar Sarpe Hsai Ya Lem Nyun Gyet Mya (Presidential Advice by Nu Win on the subject of Burmese Literature and Language). Pyinnya-ye Shu Hkinn. 1: 1, 33-41. Ngwetayi. (1987, July). Amyotha Gaung Zaung Gyi E Lan Nyun Gyet (Our National Leader's Guidance): Editorial. Ngwetayi. Nyi Nyi (1976). Sahnit Thit Pyinnya Yei (New System Education). Rangoon: Pagan Sarpe. _______ (1978). Myanmar Naing Ngan Amyo Tha Maw Gwan. (Burma's National Record). Rangoon: Bagan Sarpe. _______ (1970, October). Pyinnya-ye Hmu Wada Ahdika Pyaung Le Gyet Mya. (Fundamental Changes in Educational Policy.). Pyinnya Lawka. 1: 4 _______ (1972, March 3). Sa-hnit Thit Pyin-nya ye Ahna-gut Ka-yi. (Future Course of New System Education). The Working People's Daily. _______ (1973, January). Text of Deputy Minister Dr. Nyi Nyi's Opening Address on the occassion of the 25th Anniversy of Rangoon Teacher's Training College (December 20, 1972). Pyinnya Lawka. 4: 1. Nu. (1951). Convocation Address at Rangoon University, December 22, 1951 Nu Nu Yi. (1973). Bagan Khit Thathana Yon-kyi-hmu. (Religion in Pagan Period). Thamai Maggazin . p.30-40.

320 Nyo Mya. (1971). Myanma Naing Ngan Dwin Thakhin Khit Ko Ti Htwin Khe Thu Thakhin Ba Thaung Ni Dan. (Introducing Thakhin Ba Thaung, the Usher of Thakhin Era in Burma). Golden Jubilee Publication Selections from Oway Magazine. Rangoon., pp.50-57. Parti Ye Ya. (1965, August). Pyi Thu Paing Kyaung Tho (Toward Public Schools.) Parti Ye Ya. pp.42-46. _________ (1964, September). So-she-lit Te-Hsauk Ye Hnin Tekkatho Pyinnya Ye. (Socialist Construction and Education). Parti Ye Ya pp. 17-22. _________ (1967, December). Achay Hhan Khaing Mar Lar Myi Phyit Thaw Achay Khan Pyinnya ye. (Basic Education which is bound to be solidified). Parti Ye Ya. (pp. 141-156). _________ (1971, June). Amyu Te Parti Hma Pyi Thu Parti Tho Ku Pyaung Ye Thamaing Hpyit Sin Akyin Gyoke. (A Concise History of the Party's Transition from Nucleus Party to Mass Party). Parti Ye Ya. (pp.42-50). _________ (1971, October). Lanzin Lu Nge Bar Gyaunk Hpwe Ze Ya Tha Ne. (Why was Lanzin Youth Organization formed?). Parti Ye Ya. (pp. 43-48). _________ (1972, July). Kyaung Thu Kyaung Tha Mya E Loke Ar Pe Loke Ngan Mya A-sin Shin Than Toe Tek Ye (To foster the growth of Students' Volunteer Projects). Parti Ye Ya. (pp.61-68). _________ ( 1973, May). Lanzin Lu Nge Thin Dan Mya E Ye Ywe Gyek Aung Myin Ye. (To realize the goals of Lanzin Youth Programs). Parti Ye Ya, (pp. 43-46). _________ (1973, July). Naing Ngan Ye Theik Pan Batha Yap Thin Kya Ye (Instruction in Poltical Science). Parti Ye Ya , (pp. 38-43). __________ (1974, May). Hkit Pyaung Taw Hlan Ye Hnin Lu Nge. (Youth and Revolution). Parti Ye Ya, (pp.41-44).

321 __________ (1977, May). Dei Tha Kaw Leik Mya Ba Gyaungk Hpwint Hlit Ya Tha Nei (Why were Regional Colleges established?). Party Ye Ya , (pp. 32-38). __________ (1977 July). Detha Caw Keik Hnin Lanzin Le Nge Si Yone Ye (Regional Colleges and Lanzin Youth Organization). Parti Ye Ya , (pp. 41-48). __________ (1980, May). Lu Nge Loke Ar Pei Loke Ngan Mya Po Mo Aung Myin Ye (To bring more success to Youth Volunteer Projects). Partu Ye Ya , (pp. 42-48). Post-Primary Education Committee (1962). Thin Yo Matika Thit. (The New Syllabus, 1961 62). Rangoon: Ministry of Education. Pyinnya Da-zaung. (1956, August ). Kya-nuk Toe E Wa-da Lanzin. (Statement of Principles: Editorial). Pyinnya Da-zaung. 5: 8, 1. Rangoon District Students' Union. (1954). Ya-ne Pyin-nya-ye hnin Kyaung-tha Bawa. (Present Day Education and Students' Life). Rangoon District Students' Union. San Nyein & Myint Kyi. (1991). Myanmar Naing Ngan Ye (1958-1962). (Burmese Politics 1958-1962). Volume I. Rangoon: Universities' Press. San Yu. (1983, Winter). Naing Ngan Daw Tha Ma Da Gyi U San Yu E Pyin Nya Ye Hsaing Ya Lam Nyun Gyet Mya (Presidential Guidance on Education) Pyinnya-ye Shu Hkinn 1: 1, 46-54. Than Oo. (January, 1975). Zar-reit-ta Myint Hmar Ye-Tit. (To Uplift Morality). Part I. Pyinnya Lawka. 6: 1, 1-4. Than Tun. (1964). Khit Haung Myanmar Razawin (Old Burmese History). Rangoon: Maha Dagon Press. Than Tut. (1980). Myanmar Naing-ngan Hpon-daw Gyi Kyaung Pyinnya-ye Thamai. (A History of Monastic Education in Burma). Rangoon: Thein Min Hlaing Sarpe. Thant. (1961). Pyi Daw Tha Hka Yee (On the way to Welfare State). Volume I. Rangoon: Sarpe Beikman. Thein Pe Myint. (1970). Sit Ahtwin Awe Akyon Mya (War Time Experiences). Rangoon.

322 Thiha. (1965, August). Sa-hnit Thit Tekkatho Meik-sak. (Introduction to the New System University). Ngwe Ta Yi., 62: 20-24. Thu Ta. (1970). Sar Hso Daw Mya Ahtuk Patti. (Biographical Sketches of Literary Figures). Rangoon: Zwe Sarpe. Tin Ohn. (1971, April). Ca-hnit Thit Tekkatho O-ba-de Pyin-nya Thin Kya Ye. (Teaching Law in New System University). Myawade, 19: 6, 104-107. Tin Ohn. (1977). Tekkatho Caw Leik Mya Dwin Pyinnya Ye Sa Hnit Thit Thamaing Thin Kya Ye Mya. (History Instruction at Universities under the New Education System.) Journal of the Burma Research Society, LX: i & ii, (pp. 72-81). Tun Kywe. (1981, December). Pyinnya Hpyin Naing-ngan-daw-thit Te-hsauk Kya-zoe. (Let's use our education for building a new nation). Pyinnya Da-zaung, 30: 12, 35 38. __________ (1982, Feburary). Pyinnya Hpyin Naing-ngan-daw-thit Te-hsauk Kya-zoe. (Let's use our education for building a new nation). Pyinnya Da-zaung, 31: 2, 42-45. Win Mon. (1967). Inn Wa Hkit Pyinnyaye Shei Hsaung (A Pioneer in Education during Ava Period). Tekkatho Pyinnyaye Pedetha Sarzaung, Part II, 2: 193-200. Wun. (1975). Myanma Zagar (Burmese Language). In Editorial Committee of the Burmese Tradition Series (Eds.), Myanmar Hmu. Volume I. pp. 1-28. Rangoon: Universities Textbook Compilation and Publication Committee.