ARAGON, ZAINALI JOY D.

LABOR RELATIONS REGULAR CLASS CASE DIGESTS

JUNE 27, 2012

A. PHILIPPINE TODAY INC. VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 112965, JANUARY 30, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI) is the owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of national and international circulation. Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI in July 1986 as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star with a monthly salary of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00). He later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher. His monthly compensation was correspondingly increased to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further medical consultations abroad. Four days later, on October 24, 1988, he wrote a "Memorandum for File. On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a letter that they have accepted his resignation so he wrote petitioner back expressing his surprise over the acceptance of his resignation. On January 2, 1989, Alegre, through counsel reiterated that he never resigned. He accused petitioners of illegal dismissal as can be perceived allegedly from the discrimination against him in promotions, benefits and the ploy to oust him by considering his memorandum as a resignation. On May 17, 1989, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against herein petitioners. The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint in his decision of May 15, 1991. On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC. Thus, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the memorandum filed constitute voluntary resignation 2. May a Resignation Be Unilaterally Withdrawn?

RULING: 1. The said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation. We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are more in accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly deduced from Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what constitutes "resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the word without relating it to the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment.

A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one's superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. Furthermore, his memorandum was addressed to the chairman and chief executive officer of PTI and furnished all members of the board of directors. These officers which include the likes of the late Betty Go-Belmonte, Maximo V. Soliven and Arturo A. Borjal, longtime and well-respected journalists acclaimed locally and internationally, are themselves people of uncommon perception and intellect. They will not miscomprehend the meaning and intent of Alegre's memorandum, which was not by any means a simple way of seeking relief but well a way to get out of the company.

2. No, Respondent Alegre cannot unilaterally withdraw his resignation. The case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC is in point. The Court ruled against the employee. It held that resignations, once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

B. SERVIDAD VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 128682, MARCH 18, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner Joaquin T. Servidad was employed on May 9, 1994 by respondent INNODATA as a "Data Control Clerk", under a contract of employment Section 2 of which, reads:

Sec. 2. This Contract shall be effective for a period of 1 years commencing on May 10, 1994, until May 10, 1995 unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions hereof. On November 9, 1995, or after working for six (6) months, he was made to sign a threemonth probationary employment and later, an extended three-month probationary employment good until May 9, 1995. On May 9, 1995, petitioner was dismissed from the service on the ground of alleged termination of contract of employment. Such happening prompted petitioner to institute a case for illegal dismissal against the private respondent. In ruling for petitioner, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment finding Respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. On appeal thereto by INNODATA, the NLRC reversed the aforesaid judgment of the Labor Arbiter. It declared that the contract between petitioner and private respondent was for a fixed term and therefore, the dismissal of petitioner Joaquin T. Servidad, at the end of his one year term agreed upon, was valid. Thus, this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed RULING: YES. Indeed, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in construing the contract sued upon as one with a fixed term. To uphold such a finding would be to concede to the private respondent an advantage arising from its own mistake. The NLRC found that the contract in question is for a fixed term. It is worthy to note, however, that the said contract provides for two periods. The first period was for six months terminable at the option of private respondent, while the second period was also for six months but probationary in character. In both cases, the private respondent did not specify the criteria for the termination or retention of the services of petitioner. Such a wide leeway for the determination of the tenure of an employee during a one year period of employment is violative of the right of the employee against unwarranted dismissal. Decisively in point is Article 1377 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. Certainly, favorable interpretation of the contract in the case under scrutiny should be for petitioner and not for the private respondent which caused the preparation of said contract. According to the private respondent, the one-year period stipulated in subject contract was to enable petitioner to acquire the skill necessary for the job. In effect, what respondent employer theorized upon is that the one-year term of employment is probationary. If the nature of the job did actually necessitate at least one year for the

employee to acquire the requisite training and experience, still, the same could not be a valid probationary employment as it falls short of the requirement of Article 281 of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment, of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee. The rudiments of due process demand that an employee should be apprised before hand of the conditions of his employment and the basis for his advancement. It is abundantly clear that the petitioner was hired as a regular employee, at the outset. He worked as a "Data Control Clerk". His work was therefore necessary and important to the business of his employer. Such being the scenario involved, under Article 280 of the Labor Code petitioner is considered a regular employee of private respondent. At any rate, even assuming that his original employment was probationary, petitioner was anyway permitted to work beyond the first six-month period and under Article 281 an employee allowed to work beyond the probationary period is deemed a regular employee. C PAKISTAN INTERNATION AIRLINES CORPORATION VS. HON. BLAS OPLE G.R. NO. l-61594, SEPTEMBER 28, 1990 FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. The contracts became effective on 9 January 1979. This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties and that PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary. This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement. Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]." 2 On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and

Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted its position paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract. In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month salary. 4 The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5 In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and the Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been rendered without support in the evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts with private respondents. 1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases. Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment:

Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . . (b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied) Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination cases: Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied) Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of employment cases: Under PD 850, termination cases with or without CBA are now placed under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first time, are also placed under the Regional Director. Before PD 850, termination cases where there was a CBA were under the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while termination cases where there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section. In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its implementing rules and regulations with respect to termination and preventive suspension cases are: 1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for clearance, whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from receipt thereof. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) 2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction, still his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given serious

consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 7 There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the time the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional Director was required in such case to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 8 the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however strong." 3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code. 9 Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible by agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any time by giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, onemonths salary. A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. 10 The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. 11 Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.

As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held that paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was entered into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph 5. These Articles read as follows: Art. 280. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement. Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied) In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al., 12 the Court had occasion to examine in detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the above quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive examination of the history and development of Articles 280 and 281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing for employment with a fixed period was not necessarily unlawful: There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist e.g. where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore anathema Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"

As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. xxx xxx xxx Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. (emphasis supplied) It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement, or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to evade. Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative

one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, 13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. 14 We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages. Private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction. Should their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service putatively rendered. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Order dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or

qualification; and (2) should reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to one (1)-month's salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years putative service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13 September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

D. PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 118978 FACTS: Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. RULING: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

E. ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION VS. CA G. R. No. 144664. March 15, 2004 FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), issued an Explanatory Bulletin wherein it clarified, inter alia, that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9, 1993,whether unworked , which apart from being Good Friday [and, therefore, a legal holiday], is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday].Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to payits daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedureo f t h e C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g A g r e e m e n t ( C B A ) e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n petitioner and BATLU, thecontroversy was submitted for voluntary arbi t r a t i o n . T h e O f f i c e o f t h e V o l u n t a r y A r b i t r a t o r rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees 200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday.The Court of Appeals upheld the

findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator further adding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that there is no condition, qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not, Relief under Rule 65 is the proper remedy of the petitioner 2. Whether or not, the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an explanatory bulletin interpreting Art. 94 of the Labor Code. RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. Since the Court of Appeals had j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered plain, speedyand adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgmentand the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also aspeedy and adequate remedy. Technicality aside, this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a m o n t h l y o r d a i l y b a s i s . U n l i k e a b o n u s , w h i c h i s a m a n a g e m e n t p r e r o g a t i v e , h o l i d a y p a y i s a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive .In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that Nothing in the law or the rules shall justi fy an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. The provision of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.

[G.R. No. 146621. July 30, 2004]

RENE P. VALIAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION (Cebu City), WEST NEGROS COLLEGE, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated August 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133, and its Resolution[2] dated November 22, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and affirmed the Resolution dated July 7, 1999 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. V-000134-98 (RAB Case No. 06-01-10026-95), which sustained the Decision of Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez, directing private respondent West Negros College (WNC) to pay petitioner Rene P. Valiaos salary during the period of his preventive suspension and attorneys fees, while dismissing all other claims. The facts, as culled from records, are as follows: On February 5, 1990, petitioner Rene Valiao was appointed by private respondent West Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO) Director, with a starting salary ofP2,800 per month. On May 14, 1990, he was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni Affairs Office. On July 29, 1990, petitioner was transferred to a staff position and designated as Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a typist on June 24, 1991. The latest re-assignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected in the summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have been absent or late for work from a minimum of seven (7) to a maximum of seventy-five (75) minutes for the period March to October 31, 1991, and to have reported late almost every day for the period November to December 1991. Copies of his tardiness/absences reports were furnished petitioner, along with memoranda requiring him to explain but his explanations were either unacceptable or unsatisfactory. Subsequent reports also showed that he did not change his habits resulting in tardiness and absences. He was even caught one time manipulating the bundy clock, thus necessitating another memorandum to him asking him to explain his dishonest actuations in accomplishing the daily attendance logbook and in using the bundy clock. On December 10, 1991, petitioner received a suspension order without pay for fifteen (15) days effective January 1, 1992, because of dishonesty in reporting his actual attendance. After serving the suspension, the petitioner reported back to office on January 16, 1992. On June 15, 1992, another adverse report on tardiness and absences from the Registrar was made against the petitioner prompting WNC to send him another memorandum with an attached tardiness and absences report, calling his attention on his tardiness and absences for the period February to April 1992. On June 20, 1992, petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to the new college president, Suzette Arbolario-Agustin, who gave petitioner another chance. The petitioner was then appointed as Information Assistant effective immediately. However, the petitioner did not immediately assume the post of Information Assistant prompting the President

of private respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner finally assumed his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to augment his income. Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the union before the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of this victory but the petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground that such a press release would only worsen the already aggravated situation and strained relations between WNC management and the union officials. When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was relieved from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Records Evaluator. Not for long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to the Human Resources Manager complaining about the petitioners poor performance and habitual absenteeism, as shown in the daily absence reports. On January 18, 1993, petitioner was again absent from work without permission or notice to his immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and on January 28, 1993, the petitioner was one of those arrested during a raid in the house of one Toto Ruiz, a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the Bacolod Police Station along with four (4) other suspects. Upon further search and investigation by the Narcotics Control Division, the petitioner was found possessing two (2) suspected marijuana roaches (butts) which were placed inside his left shoe. The event was widely publicized, focusing on petitioners position as an Economics teacher of WNC, and considering further that one of his fellow suspects was a member of the Philippine Army, who was caught with an unlicensed firearm, a tooter and other shabu paraphernalia. The petitioner and other suspects were then charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended). Petitioner was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated as a result of the raid and the charges against him for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended. Petitioner allegedly was not able to answer immediately since he was in jail and received said memorandum only on January 30, 1993, although his wife had earlier received the memorandum on January 28, 1993. On January 29, 1993, the petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said memorandum. On February 1, 1993, the petitioner wrote to the President of WNC explaining his side and asking for due process. WNC cancelled its Notice of Termination dated January 29, 1993, and granted the petitioners request. The petitioner was notified through a memorandum about the grant of his request and that a hearing would be conducted. He was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation committee was organized to conduct the probe. On March 6, 1993, a notice of hearing/investigation was sent to the petitioner. After the investigation attended by the petitioner and his counsel, with proceedings duly recorded, the investigation committee recommended the dismissal of petitioner. A notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his termination from the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The petitioner received the notice on March 25, 1993, but did not file a grievance concerning the notice of termination. On January 19, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint against WNC for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits granted after his dismissal as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. In its Answer, WNC alleged that petitioner was dismissed on charges of serious misconduct, and gross and willful neglect of duty. WNC said his dismissal was effected after due notice and prior hearing. It claimed also that since petitioner was terminated for a valid cause after a due hearing, the latters claim for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees had no basis in fact and in law.

After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING respondent West Negros College to pay complainant Rene P. Valiao (a) P3,300.00 as salary for the period of his preventive suspension, and (b) P330.00 as attorneys fees, or the total amount of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P3,630.00). Further, all other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[3] The Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his employer or co-workers. However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner from WNC to be valid due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that the petitioner was formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that frequent absenteeism and tardiness of the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment. He stressed that the petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to the employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere rank-and-file employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the organization. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings on the apprehension of the petitioner for possession of prohibited drugs. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety. SO ORDERED.[4] Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals but this was dismissed for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution dated December 11, 1998 and July 7, 1999, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.[5] The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was validly dismissed for serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, which was aggravated by his arrest for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended [the January 28, 1993 incident] and that he was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and the opportunity to defend himself by the investigating committee. The appellate court noted that WNC had presented sufficient evidence to support petitioners termination from employment after taking into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment

and stressed that it properly exercised its management prerogative by observing due process. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the NLRC correctly denied the claim for damages and attorneys fees for lack of evidentiary support. Petitioner duly filed a Motion of Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition alleging that: A. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER WAS VALID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS CLEAR AND BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. B. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN (SIC) DISMISSING THE RELIEFS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[6] RULING: In our view, the only relevant issue for our resolution is whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism. Petitioner claims that his outright dismissal from employment was not valid and too harsh and that he was not dismissed from employment because of tardiness or absences but because he was among those apprehended in a raid. Also, he was not accorded due process because although his wife received the show cause notice, he did not have the proper mind to reply as he was in jail and was psychologically disturbed. Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us, we find the petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified. For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.[7] Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. [8] The Labor Arbiters findings that petitioners habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of employment are sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated acts of absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court has held that habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee.[9] However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or absences but for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is merely speculative. We find such contention devoid of basis. First, the decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred numerous and repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in reporting for work. These unexplained absences and tardiness were reflected on the summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter, but petitioner failed to controvert said reports. Second, contrary to petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not base its conclusions on the fact of the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 but on the totality of the number

of infractions incurred by the petitioner during the period of his employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus: In the case of petitioner Valiao, his services were terminated by private respondent after having been found guilty of serious misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duty which was aggravated by the January 28, 1993 incident. In exercising such management prerogative, due process was properly observed. Private respondent presented sufficient evidence to support its act in terminating the services of petitioner. Private respondent took into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment. Furthermore, it hardly needs reminding that, in view of petitioners position and responsibilities, he must demonstrate a scrupulous regard for rules and policies befitting those who would be role models for their young charges.[10] (Emphasis and italics supplied) Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis for terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. In one case, we held that where the records clearly show that the employee has not only been charged with the offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for absences without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of trust by an employee justify his dismissal and forfeiture of his right to security of tenure.[11] The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability separate and independent of each other.[12] Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.[13] Still, petitioner claims that he was not afforded due process so that his dismissal from employment should be declared invalid. This contention deserves scant consideration. The Court of Appeals held that the records reveal that petitioner was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and was likewise given the opportunity to defend himself before the investigating committee. We find no reason to set aside these factual findings of the Court of Appeals as they are supported by evidence on record. Besides, we may not review the appellate courts findings of fact in an appeal via certiorari,[14] since as a rule, the Supreme Courts review is limited to errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.[15] Judicial review of labor cases does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission based their determinations.[16] In this case, petitioner was asked to explain his several absences and tardiness on many occasions. A notice to explain was sent to him regarding the arrest incident wherein he was able to reply. An investigation committee was formed by WNC to investigate the arrest incident and the absences and tardiness of petitioner. It must be emphasized that proceedings of the committee were duly recorded, and petitioner actively participated therein by answering the various questions interposed by the panel members. Finally, a notice of his termination was sent to petitioner, although he claims to have received it late as he was in jail. It is an undeniable fact, however, that

his wife had actually received the notice in his house earlier, even before petitioners termination and this matter was later communicated to him. At any rate, petitioner was given enough opportunity to be heard, and his dismissal was based on valid grounds. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential, as the due process requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing.[17] Finally, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner is entitled to salary differentials for the period of his preventive suspension, as there is no sufficient basis shown to justify his preventive suspension. During the pendency of the investigation, the employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.[18] But in this case, there is no indication that petitioner posed a serious threat to the life and property of the employer or his co-employees. Neither was it shown that he was in such a position to unduly influence the outcome of the investigation. Hence, his preventive suspension could not be justified, and the payment of his salary differentials is in order. However, the award of attorneys fees to him cannot be sustained, in view of our findings that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment. Said award lacks legal basis and could not be granted properly in this case. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated August 22, 2000 and Resolution dated November 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.