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Century Geddes Framework PIC

Framework PIC
Text: We will defend all of the 1ac sans the framework. In other words, we are PIC/king out of the over-limiting and myopic framework attached to the plan.

A) Its legitimate the aff deliberately made the strategic and free choice to attach their plan and advantages to an exclusive framework, we should get to test whether the strategy is legitimate and best for the policy. They already developed ___ minutes of framework offense in the 1ac, we get to test this move, only the counterplan focuses the debate on framework inclusion 1.AFF CHOICE AND PREDICTABILITY- THE 1AC CHOSE TO MAKE A FRAMING ARGUMENTTHEY SHOULD WIN OFFENSE TO JUSTIFY THESE ARGUMENTS. ANY ALTERNATIVE WOULD JUSTIFY AFF CONDITIONALITY TO SEVER 1NC LINKS, MAKING DEBATE IMPOSSIBLE AND CREATES AN OVERWHELMING AFF BIAS 2.CHECKS AFF BIAS- THEY HAVE THE FIRST AND LAST SPEECH. THEY CHOSE TO INITIATE FRAMEWORK, WE SHOULD GET TO TEST IT HOWEVER WE CHOOSE. 3.NO GROUND LOSS- WE DONT SEVER PORTIONS OF THE 1AC FORCING THEM TO ARGUE AGAINST THEMSELVES- GENERIC PICS BAD ARGUMENTS DONT APPLY. THEY HAVE TO JUSTIFY FRAMEWORK BEFORE IT CAN HAVE NORMATIVE VALUE

B) Its competitive they cant just win their framework is a good one for interpreting the merits of the plan, they have to win its the only good framework to evaluate the plan any other framework is bracketed off by the 1ac move. C) Its net-beneficial any critical justification for the plan (feminist, anti-racist, anti-statist, etc) are bracketed out from the utilitarian consequences only move of the 1ac this move is not value neutral, but is soaked in conservative ideology that only privileges those already on top of the established order. Only the counterplan can solve, you ignore root causes for solely proximate causes to global disorder Meszaros 89 (Istvan, likes Marx not Adam Smith. The Power of Ideology, p 232-234)
Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality the self-proclaimed Wertfreiheit or value neutrality of so-called rigorous social science stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated

methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complications and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of methodological neutrality is bound to yield value neutral solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility or otherwise of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plans of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and meta-theory) is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the
criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of rational discourse. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from their rational discourse metaphysical, ideological, etc. The effect of circumscribing

in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the
right method are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated common methodological procedure succeeds in

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Century Geddes Framework PIC


transforming the enterprise of rational discourse into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point the new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for tits own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. Naturally, to speak of a common methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interests and pursuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ideal communication communities. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ideal types (or by putting into methodological brackets) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms from the Viennese version of logical positivism to Wittgensteins famous ladder that must be thrown away at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of little by little in the emotivist theory of value inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society of of bounds to the potential contestants, in the authority of the ideally common methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it out to be fairly obvious that to consent not to

question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of the order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the common identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded
hierarchical order by means of the reduction of the people belong to the contending social forces into fictitious rational interlocutors, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse would be nothing sort of methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational community, the

elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems not on the plane of selfreferential articulation of the relevant problems not on the plane of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would
be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of fact and value, theory and practice, formal and substantive rationality, etc. The conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of the ruling ideology. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable methodologically sanctioned credentials of procedural rules, models and paradigms? Once, though, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common

frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions upon the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constitution. This why the allegedly non-ideological ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying.
Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that lend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated at times completely bewildering mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical relationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

D) We solve best the affs attempt at a community that is monolithic and represents a singular voice, a singular style, a singular framework collapses on itself and does violence to the sub-altern Secomb 00 (Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney Fractured

Community Hypatia Volume 15 Number 2 Spring 2000 pg. 138-139 RC)


This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a
"reasonable agreement" can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities [End Page 138] so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common

goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational

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Century Geddes Framework PIC


conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are seen as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges. In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted
by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of diffrance indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976). While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and

decision-making because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

2NC/1NR Overview
We solve 100% of the AFF. We do their plan which means that if we win any risk that they create bad forms of community is probably a reason why we win this debate. This also means any of their arguments about why policy making is good etc are irrelivent because the counterplan engaging in the same type of policy making their AFF does however they should be responsible for their framing of the debate community. They have to win that their framework is the only good framework for debate which is probably just not true. We have two net benefits to the counterplan that dissprove this. The first is the conservatism DA (Mazeros evi) a. The neutral community that they propose gets filled in by conservative ideology because it becomes a guise for privlaged communication which brackets out other relivent discussions. b. This makes things like oppression, racism, patriarchy, and all the isms inevidable when the disucssuions are controled by elites that are the root of these problems. c. This is also a reason why there are other frameworks for discussion especially in context to policy making which is a reason you should reject their monoliphic view of the debate community. The second is the community DA (Secomb evi) a. Their framework arguments attemp to find a community founded upon sameness which destorys difference and fracture which are nessciary for the development of community. Sameness assumes all can participate in political discussions rationally which has emperically been used to deny minority groups to participate in policy making b. This is probably especially true in context to the debate community that is made up of a large ammount of unique individuals. Their interperation assures that only the most privalged of these views are seen as rational.

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

***EXTENSIONS***

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

MUST READ 1AC FRAMEWORK INTERPRETATION: THE AFF MUST ESTABLISH AN EXPLICIT FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE ROUND IN THE 1AC. 1. GROUND- THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE 1AC PRESCRIPTIONS AND NORMATIVE CLAIMS ARE KEY TO STABLE LINK GROUND BECAUSE OTHERWISE WE DONT KNOW WHAT PLAN MEANS OR HOW THEIR SPEECHES WILL RELATE TO IT. 2. EDUCATION- EVERY CLAIM HAS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS WHICH MUST BE DEFENDED FOR THOSE CLAIMS TO BE COGENT. THE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION OF THE 1AC IS KEY FOR EDUCATIVE CLARITY AND PRECISION ABOUT HOW THE AFF WILL BE DEFENDED. THIS IS KEY TO STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL THINKING. 3. FAIRNESS- THE AFF GETS TO CHOOSE THEIR 1AC AND ALL FACETS. ALLOWING THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF SHIFTING EVALUATION CRITERIA UNTIL AFTER THE 1AC PRECLUDES STRATEGIC NEGATIVES AND MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS, MAKING THE AFF FUNCTIONALLY CONDITIONAL. 4. UNDERSTANDING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF FACTUAL CLAIMS IS ESSENTIAL FOR PROBLEM SOLVING AND POLITICAL PLANNING Grdenfors 88 (Peter, Department of Philosophy at Lund University in Sweden. Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment. Google.)
In Section 3 we adopt a more constructive approach. It will be assumed that apart from the logical relations, a

knowledge set has some additional structure which makes it possible to determine the epistemic entrenchment of the facts in the system. The epistemic entrenchment of a fact represents how important it is for problem solving or planning on the basis of the knowledge system and in this way determines the database priority of the fact. We introduce a set of logical constraints for an ordering of
epistemic entrenchment.

that a revision method for a knowledge set satisfies the set of rationality postulates presented in Section 2, if and only if, there exists an ordering of epistemic entrenchment satisfying the logical constraints such that this ordering determines the retraction priority of the facts. We also prove that, due to the
The key result of the paper is a representation theorem which says, roughly, logical constraints on the ordering of epistemic entrenchment, the amount of information needed to uniquely determine the required ordering (and thereby also to determine the revision method) is linear in the number of atomic facts of the knowledge set. We conclude by some comments implementations of revision (and contraction) methods

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

MUST READ 1AC FRAMEWORK XTN- EPISTEMOLOGY KEY EPISTEMIC CLARITY AND KNOWLEDGE IS ESSENTIAL TO DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY EDUCATION. Colebatch 06 (H.K., Professor, Department of Public Policy and Administration at University of Brunei Darussalam. The Work of Policy: An International
Survey. P. 206)

we can identify particular affinities between types of policy actors and types of knowledge. For instances, we can suggest that policy analysts within government agencies will be mostly comfortable with epistemic knowledge. Practitioners and professionals, provider interest groups and those primarily involved in policy implementation and service provision are
On the basis of Flyvbjergs Aristotelian schema most likely to be producers of practical-technical knowledge. 20. The groups and organization most likely to prefer phronetic knowledge are citizen and community advocacy groups, and the promotional interest groups such as environmental organization or groups that define themselves primarily in terms of a particular value stance. Given the natural proclivities outlined above, one

way to deal with integrating different types of knowledge is to assign clean boundries between the production of different types of knowledge. These distinct inputs to the policy process could then be synthesized and integrated at a higher level. This would be broadly consistent with allowing different types of policy actors to focus their energies on the type of knowledge that fulfills a particular function in the policy process. This is a common idea in the policy studies literature. In the classic stagist approach to policy processes, phronetic knowledge is important for the problem definition and agenda-setting, epistemic knowledge is regarded as the cornerstone of the formulation of alternates and decision-making, and practical-technical knowledge becomes relevant at the stage of implementation.

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

MUST READ 1AC FRAMEWORK- POWER DISAD 1/2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS COME BEFORE ANY QUESTIONS ONLY WAY TO COUNTER ELITE POWER Zimmerman 94 (Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University. Contesting Earths Future. P. 96-7)
Critique of representational epistemology: Truth

does not consist of propositions that correctly "mirror" or "represent" an independent, preexisting reality. Instead, what passes for "objective" truth is a construction generated by powerinterested elites. Although emphasizing that marginal social groups are oppressed by virtue of these supposedly universal and objective truths, postmodern theorists influenced by Nietzsche {such as Foucault) insist that no one is innocent; everyone (including the deep ecologist) is concerned with defining truth as a way of acquiring and retaining power. To counter the power elite's hegemonic grip on truth, postmodern theorists maintain that "truth" should result from negotiations in which as many voices as possible are heard

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MUST READ 1AC FRAMEWORK- POWER DISAD 2/2 THE FAILURE TO DEAL WITH THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BIOPOLITICAL ORDER ENSURE PERPETUAL POLICY FAILURES AND AN INABILITY TO FORM AN ADEQUATE POLITICS Dillon and Reid 00 (Michael and Julian. Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency. Alternatives: Social Transformation and Human
governancei. Jan-Mar 25:1)

governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty,
As a precursor to global governance, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[34]

where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we
More specifically, may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy

Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems,"
problem. and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want.

Yet

serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global
governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both

thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.
locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence,

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Century Geddes Framework PIC

MUST READ 1AC FRAMEWORK- A/T IMPLICIT EPISTEMIC BASIS THEY CONFLATE THE EPISTEMIC VALUES THAT INFORM POLICY WITH THE PRESCRIPTIVE POLITICAL/FACTUAL CLAIMS OF THE 1AC. THIS IS NOT USEFUL FOR EDUCATION ABOUT POLICY-MAKING BECAUSE THE VALUES AND EPISTEMIC CLAIMS THAT INFORM THE POLITICS OF THE 1AC ARE FORMED BY A DISTINCT PROCESS. ONLY OUR INTERP SOLVES. Colebatch 06 (H.K., Professor, Department of Public Policy and Administration at University of Brunei Darussalam. The Work of Policy: An International
Survey. P. 206) Arguments for separating the realms of policy analysis and values have, of course, been a staple element of the rationalist policy analysis tradition. While many policy rationalists clearly recognize the importance of phronetic, value-based input into policy, they also typically argue that epistemic and phronetic knowledge (facts and values)

While values are an important input to the policy process, they must be decided prior to policy analysis and this must happen through quite distinct processes such as elections. A related principle for the institutional design of the public sector is the functional separation between policy-making and operations, a separation that splits the epistemic from the practical-technical within the public sector.22. The rationale for functional separation can be found in new institutional economics and public choice frameworks. Both emphasize the risk of provider capture (the risk that policy and organization power would be captured by implementers) and the importance of sticking to core business, whether this be the provision of policy advice or the provision of services to the public. FRAMEWORK SHELL 1/8
be strictly quarantined from each other.

THEIR FRAMEWORK ARGUMENTS BROACH A DISCUSSION OF THE COMMUNITY. THEIR RHETORIC OF PRESERVATION THROUGH STANDARDS AND EXCLUSION NECESSITATES THE SUICIDE OF THE COMMUNITY. COMMUNITY IS NOT A PRODUCIBLE OBJECT (BY THE BALLOT OR THEIR INTERPRETATION) BUT IS IMPOSSIBLE, ALLOWING US TO SHARE THIS EXPERIENCE OF IMPOSSIBILITY. THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE THIS PERSPECTIVE PROVES THE PERTINANCE OF OUR ARGUMENT. Noys 00 (Benjamin. Georges Bataille. P. 53-56)
He does not offer us a distanced safe Nietzsche, but offers us a community with Nietzsche which places us in the greatest danger. Batailles generosity is to make Nietzsche a gift to us outside of the appropriations that marked, and still mark, our understanding of Nietzsche. After Bataille Nietzsches Grand politics are no longer a Nazi or fascist politics but instead new chances for political thought. Batailles luck is to have found some of his best readers after his death, readers who can open some of these chances for a thought of Grand politics. He still catches readers today in sweet, shared slime as he failed to catch them during his lifetime. Jean-Luc

Nancy is

one of these readers, and he has brought out the depth of Batailles thought of community and the way that his thought responds to the exigency of community. In The Inoperative Community (La communaut dsceuvre),24 Nancy has proposed community as a demand that demands to be thought through Bataille. Nancy has also elicited a response from Batailles old friend, Maurice Blanchot, and the exchange between them helps to raise the question of community in its most demanding form. Community

is not treated by them only as a matter of intellectual debate but as a practical question, a question of how we live and how we die. Bataille is an essential figure in the thinking of community, which is never restricted to a theory opposed to praxis, because as Nancy remarks, No doubt Bataille has gone furthest into the crucial experience of the modem destiny of community. Community has been regularly invoked in contemporary politics, and a rhetoric of community has developed: of the decline of community, of the need to renew community, of community standards, and of the rights of communities for self-expression. This rhetoric of community has given rise to strategies for revitalising communities and to the political theory of communitarianism.26 The tendency in this politics of community is to suppose that we already know what community is and that all that needs to be applied are certain measures to save or restore it. Batailles thought of community is a practical interrogation of what is at stake in community, a rethinking of community itself. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that neither his work nor that of Nancy is referenced by these contemporary debates, because they would call into question any politics of community which supposes a knowledge of community. It also suggests that the war and the subsequent Cold War did not settle the political
debates initiated during the 1930s. Rather than the war violently resolving the political debates between proponents of fascism, democracy and communism, it violently put an end to those debates. The 1930s are not in fact over, in the sense that what was at stake, not least in relation to the question of community, is still to be thought. The continuing turning towards political thinkers of the 1930s, or thinkers who called the political into question, like Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger and Georges Bataille, are all indications that we are still living in the long 1930s. Nancy reopens these debates, where community is both a signifier and practice that was powerfully contested, by refusing to read Bataille as something belonging to the past. Instead Nancy finds in Bataille an opening of the thought of community. Not only is it the opening of community but it is also a thinking of community as open, in contrast to contemporary readings of community as relatively closed and static forms. In this way

Nancy is maintaining Batailles resistance to the

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unitary conception of community which underpins fascism and, disturbingly enough, which continues to dominate the thought of community (even in some of the most democratic or progressive thinking of community). Nancy uses Bataille against models of community for which community is closed, where community is thought of as fusion or communion. This is what he calls a immanentism because it thinks of community as immanent, present to itself, and so as closed to the outside.27 To think community as immanent has two effects: firstly, it blocks a thinking of the opening that makes communities possible; and secondly, it tries to bring about a purely immanent community and this is an impossibility which leads to the destruction of community: Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it.28 The Nazi community lived out this logic in the suicide of the Fhrer and the destruction of Germany, but it is implicit in any immanent model of community. In Bataille can be found a thought of community as open: Bataille is without doubt the one who experienced first, or most acutely, the modern experience of community as neither a work to be produced, nor a lost communion, but rather as space itself, and the spacing of the experience of the outside, of the outside-of-self. 2 Bataille does not reduce community to a work to be produced, and he resisted the idea of the labour of the negative which is at work in Hegel, Marx and Kojve. Community is not reduced either to a nostalgia for communion, although we have seen how that desire persists in
Bataille. In some sense the impossibility of communion animates Batailles critical thinking of community, while still remaining in it as a dream. Batailles resistance to communion is not only a resistance against fascism but also against contemporary revivals of community, because these revivals suppose that community can be produced rather than being an impossible possibility of an undefined throng of possible existences

[CONTINUED]

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FRAMEWORK SHELL 2/8 [NOYS 00 CONTINUED] (IE, 61). The lack of a thought of community as open is evident in how these revivals of community are all too often accompanied by a resistance to immigrants which, it is claimed, would destroy or contaminate community. Bataille absolutely resists this thought through his rethinking of community. But he also too faces difficulty in
conceiving of an open community, and Nancy is a careful enough reader to note the problems of some of Batailles formulations of community as communication. Although communication is an act of opening, Batailles description of a place of communication, of fusion of the subject and the object (lb. 9) can reduce the communication of community. As Nancy notes, The place of communication can in the last analysis still be determined as presence-to-self: for example, as the presence-to-self of communication itself, something that would find an echo in certain ideologies of communication. 30 Bataille is in danger of taking communication as a moment of fusion where community is produced as present, whereas his own reading of communication is of communication as the interruption and opening of community. This

is the impossibility of community as what makes community possible and as that which makes it impossible to achieve communion. THE AFFIRMATIVES QUEST FOR COMMUNITY IGNORES THAT A COMMUNITY OF CONTINUAL SACRIFICE FOR ABSTRATION PUSHES ITSELF TOWARDS SUICIDE. ONLY A RADICAL COMMUNITY OF BEING-WITH IS POSSIBLE. Isseks 03 (Fred, doctorate student in philosophy. Media Courage: Impossible Pedagogy in an Artifical Community. A dissertation submitted to the division of
media and communications. June 2003)

Batailles history through the Surrealists and his quest for an experience of community, one which he realized was impossible. However, he believed that it was possible to simulate the experience of community through the frenzy that would accompany the sacrifice of one of its members. What he and the members of the Acephale society imagined was a link to the notion of sacrifice that Bataille later developed in his theory of a general economy in The Accursed Share. Sacrifice removes the victim from the real order of things, and bestows upon him an intimacy and anguish, as he is about to lose his thing-ness, and be consumed profitlessly. It is the sacrifice that removes him - if only for an evening as the feast before the ritual sacrifice takes place from the degraded world of positivist, utilitarian relationships, and enters him into an exalted state. It is always the purpose of sacrifice to give
Wernick traces destruction its due, to save the rest from a mortal danger of contagion. All those who have to do with sacrifice are in danger, but its limited ritual form regularly has the

The point of sacrifice was to remove something from the chain of thing-ness and profitability, and to share in a communal bond. Sacrifice is heat, in which the intimacy of those who make up the system of common works is rediscovered. Violence is its principle, but the works limit it in time and space; it is subordinated to the concern for uniting and preserving the commonality. The individuals break loose, but a breaking-loose that melts them and blends them indiscriminately with their fellow beings helps to connect them together in the operations of secular time (Bataille 59) In this way, sacrifice serves the effect of bringing the sacrificers together in a spirit of commonality, or community, in that it reveals to them their intimate connections with each other.
effect of protecting those who offer it. Bataille and the Acephale group plotted such a sacrifice never realized as an example of this quest for community, or at least the experience of such a community. In its ecstatic signs and forms, and above all by living in the imminence of a voluntary human sacrifice, the group would try to realize in itself 140 - non-fusionally, and nonhierarchically - a fully headless, i.e. Acephalic, condition (Wernick). It was in this way that Bataille hoped to bridge that impossible gap between the lone individual on

Bataille, along with Nancy and others, realized communitys impossibility. Batailles contribution to this understanding was to seek the community without a head. As Nancy pointed out, there is no community of essence, for such an essence would imply a sacrifice of something. Concrete singularity is usually sacrificed in the name of an abstraction that supposedly pulls community together; or the Other is sacrificed in the name of the One, excluded because it does not fit in. In the case of the Acephale sacrifice, the head is offered up, so that headless, the group is unified without a principle, without a logos, or the imposition of any abstraction or essence on their primal sense of community. In this way, the individual partakes in community,
the one hand, and any sense of community with primal bonds of association, on the other. without having his or her freedom negated.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 3/8 THE LOGIC OF THIS COMMUNITY IS ONE MAKES OR DOES WORK. THE AFFIRMATIVES UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY PUTS DEATH TO WORK, IN THE NAME OF AN IMMANENT, OR SELF-EVIDENT COMMUNITY. THIS PUTTING DEATH TO TASK FORECLOSES ANY SPACE FOR ETHICS AND PUTS THE COMMUNITY TO SUICIDE. Luszczynska 05 (Ana. The Opposite of the Concentration Camp: Nancys Vision of Community. CR: The New Centennial Review. P. 167-205.)
For Nancy, the logic of a will to immanence is the logic of imbuing death with meaning or making a work out of it. In contrast, for the finite or mortal being (the being that is not an individual), death is that from which meaning cannot be derived. If immanence is the goal, then death functions as a work by moving being closer to an achievement of purity, unity, and ultimately immanence. In contrast, Nancy often stresses that true community is that which cannot make sense of death, as death is irrecoverable and unsublateable. But it certainly bears mentioning that Nancy also indicates that what is at stake here is death losing the senseless meaning that it ought to have and obstinately does have (Nancy 1991, 14). Thus a senseless meaning is formulated as proper for death whereas a meaning with the goal of immanence is not. Nancy

uses the example of Nazism to illustrate an empirical situation in which being is conceived from the point of departure of the individual and immanence is the ultimate goal. In this context of a will to immanence, death is instituted as a work; community herein is only slight and inaccessible (Nancy 1991, 35). In contrast, for the finite or mortal being, there is the unworkability of death and community. For the former, death has lost its senseless meaning, and for the latter, death is senselessly meaningful. If we do not think the question of community (which is the question of the being for whom death is irrecoverable or senselessly meaningful), death loses the senseless meaning that it ought to have (14). In other words, if we fail to think of death as that of which we can make no sense, we will lose our death, that death which is most properly our own or the death that Nancy calls the singular death. Thus it is evident that although Nancy repeatedly indicates deaths irrecoverable and unsublateable character he does not say that it is meaningless; in fact he asserts that it has senseless meaning which is a meaning beyond meaning (1991, 14). This
senseless meaning is crucial as it is that around which community emerges or upon which it is dependent. In other words, the senseless meaning of death has meaning insofar as it is an understanding of its own senselessness, its irrecoverability and resistance to institution that form the backdrop for the existence of being and community.

Being and community occur simultaneously, as there is no mediation between the two; thus, being is community. Being is
outside of being or being cannot recuperate, sublate, or make sense of its own possibility, that is, its singular death. Nancy first indicates the real ramifications of these issues in this context of a will to immanence and its relation to death. While in other essays he will cite other examples, the primary example used in this essay is that of Nazi Germany.5 Any

political, economic, or social program that assumes as its goal the will to a community of essence or immanence has as its work the work of death. Thus in Nazi Germany the desire for a pure Aryan being was nothing other than a desire for death. What this meant for the victims or those who were deemed neither Aryan nor pure is obvious. However, Nancy points out that the work of death extended to the victimizer, those for whom the community was to be achieved as this immanence. That is why political or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute immanence have as their truth the truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it (Nancy 1991, 12). Thus, we find that it was not only the other who was exterminated but additionally those within the Aryan community who were not deemed sufficiently pure. Furthermore, Nancy asserts that on a certain metaphorical level, Germany as a whole was self-exterminated. Interestingly, he maintains that it would be
reasonable to make such an assessment given certain aspects of the spiritual reality of this nation (12). Herein we find the death of both victim and the community that intends or wills immanence.

Any institution or regime, like Nazism, governed by a desire to achieve purity and banish the impure other is working according to a desire for immanence that is primarily ruled by a logic of death. In the end, despite the fact that death must be conceived in both literal and metaphorical terms, this empirical example powerfully demonstrates that a work toward immanence is the same as a work of death.6

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 4/8 THE CRITICISM PRECEDES THE CONCERN WITH EMPIRICAL POLITICS, BUT IT DOES NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT. AUTO-CRITIQUE WITHIN POLITICS FAILS. James 06 (Ian, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 158-9)
The published Opening Address to the Center, delivered jointly by Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, is laced with qualifications and precisions as to the task or mode of questioning which they propose. For instance they make it clear that they have no pretension to political theory: that is to say, to anything that could evoke a political science or a politology (RJ, RT, io8). They have no specialist knowledge or training in this area and claim no authority to make pronouncements within the discursive parameters such disciplines set themselves. They also underline the fact that they are working very specifically as philosophers engaged in a properly philosophical

neither Nancy nor Lacoue-Labarthe believe that their thinking of the political can occur as a direct empirical approach; nor do they believe that it is any longer possible for philosophy to directly approach the political in an empirical way. This is not in the least to say that something like a political science, theory, or politology that is empirically grounded is dismissed, ruled out, or held to be impossible. On the contrary, the claim Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe [appears] to be making (and this is a claim that many of their commentators seem to have ignored), is that any project of a theory or science of the political can only operate on the basis of fundamental concepts or forms of pre-understanding, and that these are properly philosophical in nature and need to be addressed as such, prior to their manifestation in the empirical field. 16 It is not enough, they claim, for political science to be vigilant and ever more critical about some of its founding assumptions, nor to assume that it can perform an auto-critique from within the parameters of its own discourse, and through such critique transcend some of the limitations or prejudices that it may have come to recognize in itself. This, indeed, would be all too hasty and, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe contend, ineffectual, given the grip exerted over the human sciences by a certain kind of anthropologism which is fundamentally
questioning which would have a properly philosophical value (RJ, RT, io8). As philosophers, then, incapable of calling into question its prior understanding of the human and of human subjectivity (i.e., precisely that which in this context needs to be placed in question).

The demand, here, is for a retrieval of a philosophical questioning of the political, which will not be too hastily subsumed into or engaged with the empirical field, since if a new concept of the political or something which one could present as such could become clear, then any such concept would, in our opinion, necessarily derive from the philosophical field (RJ, 109; RT, 109). Once again the key issue in all this is the question of how something new can emerge with within forms of human understanding, a something new which would necessarily, but in no way directly, have an impact upon future possibilities of human production.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 5/8 THEIR RHETORICAL PRAGMATIC QUESTIONS ARE NOT ARGUMENTS AGAINST OUR CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY BUT TESTAMENT TO THEIR HEIRARCHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE GRAMMAR OF THE COMMUNITY. WE NEED NOT ADDRESS SUCH CONCERNS PRESCRIBING A NEW METAPHYSICS, POLITICS, OR SET OF STANDARDS; OUR FLEAR FROM THEIR WILL TO ORDER IS PROFICIENT Strysick 97 (Michael, The End of Community and the Politic of Grammar, Cultural Critique, p. 195-215) Community gains nothing from attempting to build and rebuild immanent, avowable empires. Violence is at the root of the immanent mentality; its manifest destiny razes what it will, creating endless trails of tears. Incredulity confronts the immanent with itself, mirroring it in order to undo power, not usurp it. But this entails a change in foundation, in what Nietzsche refers to as grammar. Unless foundations change, what arises from them will not change demonstrably. Rather, we must engage a task to expose totalizing gestures within community. This is the approach that community's altered politics (la politique), by virtue of a new orientation of the political (le politique), must engage. And this approach marks not merely incredulity to metanarratives, but more importantly, incredulity toward the lingering shadow of the grammar of metanarratives. How will this grammar be broken? The importance of undoing this mentality arises not out of any search for truth, any metaphysical quest, or any religious pilgrimage; rather, it arises from the need for justice as manifest equality. Unavowability itself
defines a horizontal community. In the process, difference-on which avowability and inequality has for so long been based-is not erased but rather becomes the greatest

it requires a radical shift, an overturning of a prevailing mentality that prefers the one to the many, or even the many as mediated through the one. The challenge is to work to understand the many in terms of the many, mediated only by itself. But how could such radical changes take place? Who would take charge of this? Again, even asking the question in this manner belies the point to which empire is embedded in our very thinking, specifically if we seek to answer it through the concept of leaders and followers. Community need not shrink the world to a handful but enlarge it to the many. Rather than scheming about and theorizing on how to achieve such a horizontal structure, it is best to simply undo those vertical elements when they appear. Rather than describing an end point to be reached, with a specific program to that end, we can describe a point from which we wish to flee. Community has endured codes, laws, and plans promising paradise, redemption, and salvation; now, we must conceive of practical ways to move further away from self-created states of emergency. Such a notion of community will not be achieved by some revisionist undoing of past documents but by a real undoing of past practices- incredulity in its strongest form. After all, we cannot change the past, but we need not be anchored in its
challenge. Thus, mistakes nor chained to its insensitivities. We need go no further in thinking about undoing the grammar of community than Lyotard's first word in defining postmodernism: incredulity. Lyotard's term describes not merely a lack of belief, but even more, a lack of faith: an inability to invest trust in those past creeds and faiths that have preferred the homogeneous and total at the expense of difference and our shared elective affinities. Now, we must be motivated to create new myths in order to reinvest the notion of credibility. The relationship to the past is characterized purely by the necessity of rethinking and restating what has been said. But the post, while commenting on the past by naming a "post-also relates to the future, saying not only that we have lost faith in the past but also its modus operandi. At once, all three tenses are brought into play: at present, in large part because of the past, we do not know what to do in the future, into which we are forever propelled. Of course, progress is called into question in the process-Walter Benjamin states this so eloquently in his "Theses on the Philosophy of History." Despite the passage of time we are no better equipped to avoid the socalled state of emergency in which we persist nor to repair it nor to quell the storm blowing us further away from paradise. The continued proliferation of voices and visions in society, and concomitant ways of hearing and seeing those imaginings, have engaged the slow death of community by challenging its grammar. New endsstressing the plural over and against the singular, the total-are emerging, though perhaps very slowly. The degree to which they succeed will depend on the ability to undo totality and its grammar such that our differences alone are held in common, affinities are as important as facts, and our discourse marks this alterity. An

altered grammar, thus, directs itself toward nothing less than an expression of the inability to speak for all, an acknowledgment of the unspeakable manner in which we have tried to form and enforce such totalizing narratives, and an awareness of the ultimate demand that we speak and think otherwise. Change can occur but only to the degree that community begins to mark its end as not simply recognizing and allowing "other" voices to speak, and at the point when the grammar of the same and the bias of homogeneity is broken. This will only occur at the moment when we begin to realize that all are "other" and none are the same.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 6/8 OUR INTERPRETATION OF FRAMEWORK IS BASED ON THE IDEA OF BECOMING COMMUNITY. THIS IS NOT A PROJECT ONCE AND DONE BUT A PROCESS OF RESISTANCE TO THOSE ELEMENTS THAT WOULD DEFINE EXISTENCE, MAKE US SLAVE TO ORDER, AND ULTIMATELY HAVE US DESIRE OUR OWN SUFFERING. WE REJECT THIS KIND OF THINKING AND CHOOSE TO ENDORSE AN IMPOSSIBLE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY TO COME. WE UNDERSTAND THIS IMPOSSIBILITY BY READING BATAILLES SACRED CONSPIRACY WHERE HE IMAGINES A BEING WITHOUT A HEAD. DEBATE MUST COME TO TERMS WITH ITS OWN HEADLESSNESS BEFORE ANY CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CAN REVEAL ITSELF. WE SHOULD NOT BEGIN BY UNDERSTANDING OUR COMMUNITY AS A CALL TO SAMENESS, BUT RATHER AS A PETITION FOR THE RADICAL DIFFERENCE OUR ALTERNATIVE STYLE OF DEBATE CAN OFFER. JUST SO WERE CLEAR, THESE HERE ARE FIGHTIN WORDS! Bataille in 1936 (Georges, The Sacred Conspiracy) What we are undertaking is a war. It is time to abandon the world of the civilized and its light. It is to late to want to be reasonable and learned, which has led to a life without attractions. Secretly or not, it is necessary to become other, or else cease to be. The world to which we have belonged proposes nothing to love outside of each individual insufficiency: its existence is limited to its convenience. A world that cant be loved to death in the same way a man loves a woman represents nothing but personal interest and the obligation to work. If it is compared with worlds that have disappeared it is hideous and seems the most failed of all of them. In those disappeared worlds it was possible to lose oneself in ecstasy, which is impossible in the world of educated vulgarity. Civilizations advantages are compensated for by the way men profit by it: men of today profit by it to become the most degraded of all beings who have ever existed. Life always occurs in a tumult with no apparent cohesion, but it only finds its grandeur and reality in ecstasy and ecstatic love. He who wants to ignore or neglect ecstasy is a being whose thought has been reduced to analysis. Existence is not only an agitated void: it is a dance that forces us to dance fanatically. The idea that doesnt have as object a dead fragment exists internally in the same way as does a flame. One must become firm and unshakeable enough that the existence of the world of civilization finally appears uncertain. It is useless to respond to those who are able to believe in this world and find their authorization in it. If they speak it is possible to look at them without hearing them, and even if we look at them, to only see that which exists far behind them. We must refuse boredom and live only on that which fascinates.
On this road it would be vain to move about and to seek to attract those who have vague impulses, like those of passing the time, laughing, or becoming individually bizarre. One

must advance without looking back and without taking into account those who dont have the strength to forget immediate reality. Human life is defeated because it serves as the head and reason of the universe. Insofar as it becomes that head and reason it accepts slavery. If it isnt free, existence becomes empty or neuter, and if it is free, it is a game. The earth, as long as it only engendered cataclysms, trees, and birds was a free universe; the fascination with liberty became dulled when the earth produced a being who demanded Necessity as a law over the universe. Man nevertheless remained free to no longer respond to any necessity. He Is free to resemble all that is not he in the universe. He can cast aside the idea that it is he or God who prevents everything else from being absurd. Man escaped from his head like the condemned man from his prison. He found beyond him not God, who is the prohibition of crime, but a being who doesnt know prohibition. Beyond what I am, I meet a being who makes me laugh because he is headless, who fills me with anguish because he is made of innocence and crime. He holds a weapon of steel in his left hand, flames like a sacred heart in his right hand. He unites in one eruption birth and death. He is not a man. But he isnt a god, either. He is not I, but he is more I than I: his belly is the labyrinth in which he himself goes astray, led me astray, and in which I find myself being he, that is, a monster.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 7/8 THE BUILDING OF COMMUNITY CANNOT COME FROM SINGULARITY OR FROM BEING INCOMMON. ANY ATTEMPT AT PLACING RULES AS THE GROUNDWORK FOR COMMUNITY COMMITS US AND OUR COMMUNITY TO THE TOMB. WE SHOULD INSTEAD BE INVESTED IN THE PROCESS OF OPENING COMMUNITY TO OUR OWN FRAGMENTATION AND FIND OUR BEING INCOMMON ON THAT FLUID GROUND. Nancy in 1986 (Jean-Luc, The Inoperable Community.
Pg. Xxxviii-xli)

community is made or is formed by the retreat or by the subtraction of something: this something, which would be the fulfilled infinite identity of community, is what I call its work. All our political programs imply this work: either as the product of the working community, or else the community itself as work. But in fact it is the work that the community does not do and that it is not that forms community. In the work, the properly common character of community disappears, giving way to a unicity and a substantiality. (The work itself, in fact, should not be understood primarily as the exteriority of a product, but as the interiority of the subjects operation.) The community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, Leader) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a being of togetherness. The truth of community, on the contrary, resides in the retreat of such a being. Community is made of what retreats from it: the hypostasis of the common, and its work. The retreat opens, and continues to keep open, this strange being-the-one-with-theother to which we are exposed. (Nothing indicates more clearly what the logic of this being of togetherness can imply than the role of Gemeinschaft, of community, in Nazi
Finitude, or the infinite lack of infinite identity, if we can risk such a forumulation, is what makes community. That is, ideology.) If I had to attempt to state the principle guiding the analyses in these texts, I might do so by saying this: community does not consist in the transcendence (nor in the transcendental) of a being supposedly immanent to community. It consists on the contrary in the immanence of a transcendence- that of finite existence as such, which is to say, of its exposition. Exposition,

Community is presuppositionless: this is why it is haunted by such ambiguous ideas as foundation and sovereignty, which are at once ideas of what would be completely suppositionless and ideas of what would always be presupposed. But community cannot be presupposed. It is only exposed. This is undoubtedly not easy to think. But such thinking, which is perhaps inaccessible (inaccessible without the being-in-common of thinking, without the sharing of reading, without the politics within which all writing and reading are inscribed), forms a point of convergence and solidarity among the studies here dedicated to community properly speaking, to myth, to love, and to the retreat of the divine. By inverting the principle stated a moment ago, we get totalitarianism. By ignoring it, we condemn the political to management and to power (and to the management of power, and to the power of management). By taking it as a rule of analysis and thought, we raise the question: how can the community without essence (the community that is neither people nor nation, neither destiny nor generic humanity, etc.) Be presented as such? That is, what might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an essence? I shall not venture into the possible forms of such a politics, of this politics that one might call the politics of the political, if the political can be taken as the moment, the point, or the event of being-in-common. This would be beyond my competence. But I do enter into the bond (not only the social bond, as one says today, all too readily, but the properly political bond) that binds the political, or in which the political is bound up. When I speak, in the studies that follow, of literature, of a voice of interruption, of shattered love, of coming, of joy, and finally of places of dislocation, it is always of the same bond that I shall be speaking: of a bond that forms ties without attachment, or even less fusion, of a bond that unbinds by binding, that reunites through the infinite exposition of an irreducible finitude. How can we be receptive to the meaning of our multiple, dispersed, mortally fragmented existences, which nonetheless only makes sense by existing in common? In other words, perhaps: how do we communicate? But this question can be asked seriously only if we dismiss all theories of communication, which begin by positing the necessity or the desire for a consensus, a continuity and a transfer of messages. It is not a question of establishing rules for communication, it is a question of understanding before all else that in communication what takes place is an exposition: finite existence exposed to finite existence, co-appearing before it and with it. To think this point, or rather this limit that exposition is, is necessarily to think the point or the limit at which the moment of revolution presents itself. The idea of revolution has perhaps still not been understood, inasmuch as it is the [CONTINUED]
precisely, is not a being that one can sup-pose (like a sub-stance) to be in community.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

FRAMEWORK SHELL 8/8 [NANCY 86 CONTINUED] Idea of a new foundation or that of a reversal of sovereignty. Of course, we need gestures of foundation and reversal. But their reason lies elsewhere: it is in the incessantly present moment at which existence-in-common resists every transcendence that tries to absorb it, be it in an All or in and Individual (in a Subject in general). This moment cannot be founded, and no foundation, therefore, can be reversed in it. This moment- when the in of the in-common erupts, resists, and disrupts the relations of need and force- annuls collective and communal hypostases; this violent and troubling moment resists murderous violence and the turmoil of fascination and identification: the intensity of the word revolution names it well, a word that, undoubtedly, has been bequeathed or delegated to us by an ambiguous history, but whose meaning has perhaps still to be revolutionized. One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It will abandon us to political and technological economies, if it has not already done so. And this will be the end of our communities, if this has not yet come about. Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world entirely. Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we will wither away without a tomb- which is to say, without community, deprived of our finite existence. THE PROCESS OF THE PRODUCTION OF POSITIVITY WITH THE END OF REMOVING ALL NEGATIVE ELEMENTS LEADS TO CANCER AND CERTIFIES ITS OWN DEATH. Baudrillard 1993 (Jean, The Transparency of Evil; Essays on Extreme Phenomena.
Translated by James Benedict. Verso London New York. Page 106)

The uninterrupted production of positivity has a terrifying consequence. Whereas negativity engenders crisis and critique, hyperbolic positivity for its part engenders catastrophe, for it is incapable of distilling crisis and criticism in homeopathic doses. Any structure that hunts down, expels or exorcizes its negative elements risks a catastrophe caused by a thoroughgoing backlash, just as any organism that hunts down and eliminates its germs, bacteria, parasites or other biological antagonists risks metastasis and cancer in other words, it is threatened by a voracious positivity of its own cells, or, in the viral context, by the prospect of being devoured by its own now unemployed antibodies. Anything that purges the accursed share in itself signs its own death warrant. This is the theorem of the accursed share. IMPACT- INFINITE ACTS OF VIOLENCE THE TOP DOWN NOTION OF COMMUNITY PRODUCES INFINITE ACTS OF VIOLENCE. RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO OVERTURN THIS SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER VERTICAL STRUCTURE, WE SHOULD SIMPLY DESCRIBE POINTS OF FLIGHT BY RESISTING EVERY INSTANCE OF VERTICAL ORGANIZATION Strysick 97 (Michael, The End of Community and the Politic of Grammar, Cultural Critique, p. 195-215) Community, with the sense of the common seemingly implicit, has been thought for so long from a vertical standpoint, that is, top down. Perhaps the oldest term used to describe this verticalizing of community is "empire," what I believe Nancy means when he uses the term "immanentism." An emperor ruled from the pinnacle of the community, and the rest of the world was compartmentalized beneath him. Imperial grammar manifested itself so thoroughly, resulting in the creation of many empires, each smaller (but no less powerful) in nature and size. Community gains nothing from attempting to build and re- build immanent, avowable empires. Violence is at the root of the immanent mentality; its manifest destiny razes what it will, creating endless trails of tears. Incredulity confronts the immanent with it- self, mirroring it in order to undo power, not usurp it. But this entails a change in foundation, in what Nietzsche refers to as gram- mar. Unless foundations change, what arises from them will not change demonstrably. Rather, we must engage a task to expose to- talizing gestures within community. This is the approach that com- munity's altered politics (la politique), by virtue of a new orienta- tion of the
political (le politique), must engage. And this approach marks not merely incredulity to metanarratives, but more im- portantly, incredulity toward the lingering shadow of

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

How will this grammar be broken? The importance of undoing this mentality arises not out of any search for truth, any metaphysical quest, or any religious pil- grimage; rather, it arises from the need for justice as manifest equality. Unavowability itself defines a horizontal community. In the process, difference-on which avowability and inequality has for so long been based-is not erased but rather becomes the greatest challenge. Thus, it requires a radical shift, an overturning of a prevailing mentality that prefers the one to the many, or even the many as mediated through the one. The challenge is to work to understand the many in terms of the many, mediated only by itself. But how could such radical changes take place? Who would take charge of this? Again, even asking the question in this manner belies the point to which empire is embedded in our very thinking, specifi- cally if we seek to answer it through the concept of leaders and followers. Community need not shrink the world to a handful but enlarge it to the many. Rather than scheming about and theorizing on how to achieve such a horizontal structure, it is best to simply undo those vertical elements when they appear. Rather than de-scribing an end point to be reached, with a specific program to that end, we can describe a point from which we wish to flee. Com- munity has endured codes, laws, and plans promising paradise, redemption, and salvation; now, we must conceive of practical ways to move further away from self-created states of emergency. Such a notion of community will not be achieved by some revisionist undoing of past documents but by a real undoing of past prac- tices-incredulity in its strongest form. After all, we cannot change the past, but we need not be anchored in its mistakes nor chained to its insensitivities.
the grammar of metanarratives.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

IMPACT- NAZISM A COMMUNITY OF BEING-WITH RESISTS THE LOGIC OF IMMANENCE THAT GIVES RISE TO NAZISM Strysick 97 (Michael, The End of Community and the Politic of Grammar. Cultural Critique. P. 195-215. The New Centennial Review. Volume 5, Number 3,
Winter 2005) In "Of Being-in-common" in Community at Loose Ends, Nancy addresses the politics of community by distinguishing between types of communal orientation. For him,

community should be thought outside the bias of homogeneity and be based on what he calls "being-in-common," which
forms the basis of a question. "We are in common, with one another," Nancy writes, but "[w]hat does this 'in' and this 'with' mean? (Or, to put it another way, what does 'we' mean, what is the meaning of this pronoun which, in one way or another, must be inscribed in any discourse?)" (6). In other words, he continues, "Being,

or existence, is what we share. . . . But being is not a thing we could possess in common. . . . We shall say then that being is not common in the sense of a common property, but that it is in common. Being is in common" (1).Commonality, in other words, should not be understood here as singularity but instead as radical plurality. If singular, the tendency is toward totality and universality-what he calls immanentism. Nancy makes this clear in his preface to The Inoperative Community where he provides a poignant example of how this in and with should not be conceived: "The community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, Leader. . . .) Necessarily loses the in of the being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a being of togetherness. The truths of community, on the contrary, reside in the retreat of such a being." Nancy then gives an example of an in which is lost by saying, "Nothing indicates more clearly what the logic of this being of togetherness can imply than the role of Gemeinschaft, of community, in Nazi ideology" (Inoperative xxxix). This is the logic of totality that Levinas fears is bred by homogeneity and that Agamben warns results from prescribed formulations. Even more, this prescribed totality is the grammar that Nietzsche diagnoses as imprisoning us.

You sir and/or maam are a fucking fascist! :)

Century Geddes Framework PIC

IMPACT- WITCH HUNTS 1/2 THEIR ATTEMPTS AT EXCLUSION REPLICATE SOME OF THE WORST FORMS OF VIOLENT EXCLUSION IN HUMAN HISTORY INCLUDING THAT OF WITCHES IN PLACES LIKE SALEM AND HERETICS DURING THE SPANISH INQUISITION. IT IS NOT THE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT THAT PRODUCES VIOLENCE, BUT RATHER THE TOTALIZING DISCOURSES THAT ALWAYS SEE DIFFERENCE AS EVIL AND THUS DESERVING OF EXPULSION Marx-Wolf 06 (Heidi, University of California Santa Barbara, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.12.36. David Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic
Conspiracy and Ritual Abuse in History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Pp. 312; 10 halftones. ISBN 0-691-11350-5.)

myths of evil conspiracy emerge in contexts where local religious worlds encounter larger universal systems that produce totalizing discourses about evil. Within these local religious worlds, misfortune and danger are accounted for in terms of malicious or capricious spirits or specific marginal individuals on the fringe of communities. But with the introduction of a totalizing discourse, often by self-proclaimed experts who come into the local context from outside, these spirits are fitted into a universal structure that lends them an added significance and makes them dangerous in an ultimate sense. This totalizing discourse takes the form of a demonology, a discourse about the entire range of potentially malign spirits. In some sense then, demonology is "the collection, classification and integration of demons out of their immediate social context, as a function of religious centralization" (15). One example Frankfurter uses to demonstrate this encounter is the way Zoroastrianism recast older local spirits within a more universal framework and gave them a moral valence. These ancient spirits were no longer merely ad hoc, hostile or ambiguous beings. They became evil. The production of demonologies is usually done by self-defined experts acting under
In his Introduction and second chapter, Frankfurter presents one of his most compelling ideas, namely that the auspices of centralizing institutions. In Chapter Three, Frankfurter discusses the range of these experts who claim to have the ability to reveal the global system behind inchoate misfortune. These include prophets,

missionaries, inquisitors, witch-finders, social workers, police, psychologists and even the possessed or formerly possessed themselves. Frankfurter claims that these experts do not merely explain the experience of everyday misfortune, they fundamentally change it. Furthermore, through their activities of representing and projecting the conspiracy onto the local for others, experts gain charisma for themselves. Chapters
Four and Five explicate the common features of the stories that these experts convey to their audiences, the actual content of many of these myths of evil conspiracy. Frankfurter's argument is that the commonality of many of these features is neither accidental nor the reflection of some essential or universal psychological trait of human

their consistency derives from reflection about inversions of "prevailing notions of proper liturgy, sacrifice, sacrament, or ceremonial behavior" as well as a "deeper element of speculation about humanness and savagery, about local maleficence and a greater evil, and about ritual itself as an ambivalent aspect of society and tradition" (75). In other words, inversion is the mode through which human beings think about the Other in their midst. This is why child sacrifice, cannibalism and the use of impure substances figure so universally in many of these constructions. Frankfurter's treatment of early modern fantasies of the witches' Sabbat ritual reveals the way these fantasies brought together various notions of danger and may have even drawn on Protestant suspicion of ritual in general. Chapter Five takes this argument about inversion and otherness one step further. Here Frankfurter draws on psychoanalytic insights to account for the content of the "tableaus of perversion" produced in the course of the construction of myths of Satanic conspiracy. His argument is that these tableaus are not merely the result of groups attempting to clarify differences between themselves and the Other in their midst through modes of inversion. Rather, they are as much the outcome of voyeuristic participation. In other words, their construction allows for the imaginative participation in perversions and atrocities, a transgressive enjoyment. Frankfurter points to what he calls the "sheer pornographic inventiveness" of many of these tableaus, the graphic details of which cause many to ask: "who could think up such bizarre and horrifying things -- they must be true." On this point, he invokes Georges Bataille, the quintessential philosopher on transgression. Frankfurter writes, "imaginative inversion offers the experience of transgression from the vantage point of taboo, the projection of desires within a framework of censure" (154). One extreme example of this projection that the book explores is that of inquisitors in early modern witch trials. These clerics were able to observe, probe and subject naked female bodies to torture in the course of their investigations. These actions required a proximity and intimacy with women that would never be allowed these men in their usual roles, but were permitted in the context of censure during the witch trial. The question
nature. Rather,

[CONTINUED]
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IMPACT- WITCH HUNTS 2/2 [MARX-WOLF 06 CONTINUED] Remains, however, of why large groups of people come to believe in these tableaus and myths if they are only Imaginative constructions, and particularly perverse ones at that? According to Frankfurter, it is because these myths are performed. In other words, they gain reality through social acts and social experience. Chapter Six classifies various kinds of mimetic performances
and their performers. Some of these performers act directly, others indirectly, some performances are coerced, others voluntary. In the case of the SRA myth, performers include "survivors", television show hosts, their audiences, therapists, exorcists, and so forth. Furthermore, those who parody the myth in their roles as self-identifying Satanists, as a form of social deviance, also make a contribution to the performance by confirming stereotypical behaviors and appearances. In his final chapter,

the true evil that arises from myths of demonic conspiracy is that which is wrought when groups seek to purge supposed participants and culprits from their midst, be they Christians in the late Roman world, Jews or witches in any number of time periods. He saves his most dramatic demonstration of this point for the final paragraph of the book in which he documents recent cases of actual ritual abuse. A chilling footnote records at least nine cases, all children, who were either abused or killed in the course of mainstream Christian exorcisms over the past ten years.
Frankfurter returns to one of his most salient and, in this reviewer's opinion, most timely points, namely that

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***BLOCKS***

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A/T ELITISM 1. THEYRE MISSING A CRITICAL INTERNAL LINK- THERES NO CONNECTION BETWEEN DEBATE AND THE REAL WORLD. THERES NO WAY THAT EVEN IF WE DID PRECLUDE POLICY EDUCATION IN DEBATE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE REST OF THE WORLD. 2. THERE NO LINK- WE DONT PRECLUDE POLICY EDUCATION, WE RATHER ALLOW FOR ALL FORMS OF EDUCATION AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE EQUAL IMPORTANCE OF POLICY AND KRITIKAL EDUCATION. 3. TURN- WITHOUT EDUCATION ON ONTOLOGY, MORALITY, AND ETHICS, THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL SPHERE. IF THESE CRITICAL FACETS OF DEBATE ARE EXPUNGED, THERE WILL BE NO UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUSTIFICATION UNDERLYING THOSE DECISIONS. IF THEIR FRAMEWORK TRAINS US TO BE POLICYMAKERS THAT DONT REFLECT CRITICALLY, THAT MEANS WE BECOME BAD POLICYMAKERS. LITERALLY EVERY IMPACT WE READ FLOWS AGAINST THIS FORM OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION 4. TURN- THERE IS A NEVERENDING LIST OF FORUMS FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION, BUT AN INCREASINGLY MINISCULE LIST OF PHILOSOPHICAL HAVENS. DEBATE IS ONE OF THE LAST VENUES FOR PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION AND WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT AND EMBRACE IT

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A/T JUSTIFY CHEATING (RULES V. NORMS) 1. THERES A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RULES AND NORMS. RULES ARE THINGS THAT WE AGREE UPON SO THAT WE CAN COME AND COMPETE AGAINST EACH OTHER, LIKE SPEECH TIMES. NORMS ARE RESTRICTIONS THAT ARE CREATED IN THE OPEN SPACE OF DEBATE. IT IS NORMS THAT ATTEMPT TO PLACE A HEAD ON DEBATE. THERE IS NO RULE ANYWHERE THAT SAYS YOU HAVE TO HAVE A POLICY OPTION IN DEBATE. THERES NO RULEBOOK. 2. WHEN WE MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT DEBATE SHOULD BE HEADLESS, IT IS NOT OUR SUBJECTIVE INTENTION TO STAND UP HERE AND GIVE 20 MINUTE SPEECHES AND STUFF LIKE THAT. WE DONT ENDORSE THINGS LIKE THAT BUT THAT DOESNT MEAN THAT WE ENFORCE OUR DECISION NOT TO DO SO UPON THE DEBATE. HOWEVER, IF THE AFFIRMATIVE IS SUGGESTING THAT THEY ARE ABOUT TO STAND UP AND CHEAT AS AN ANSWER TO OUR ARGUMENT, THEYD BETTER BE PREPARED FOR RECIPROCITY. NEMSISPLOTSCH ALAFRANKA ON THE WAY.

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A/T NOT GOING FOR IT / NO OFFENSE 1. THEY CHOSE TO READ A FRAMEWORK IN THE 1AC INSTEAD OF WAITING TO DEPLOY IT AS AN ANSWER IN THE 2AC. THIS IS DISTINCT FROM OTHER ARGUMENTS BECAUSE IT DEFINES THE LENS THROUGH WHICH THE REMAINDER OF THE 1AC IS EVALUATED AND DETERMINES 1NC STRATEGY. THIS SHIFT MAKES DEBATE LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE. ANYTIME WE TRY TO GARNER OFFENSE THEYLL JUST SPIKE OUT OF IT. WE WONT CALL FOR THEIR REJECTION, BUT CONSIDER OUR OFFENSE CONCEDED. 2. ITS IRRELEVANT IF THEY GO FOR FRAMEWORK OR NOT. IF THEY KICK AN ADVANTAGE BUT CONCEED OFFENSE, THE NEG STILL GETS ACCESS TO THE UNANSWERED OFFENSE AS A REASON TO REJECT THE PLAN. OUR ARGUMENT IS THAT THEIR CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEBATE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO EVER EXTRACT POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES FROM A STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED IN THE NAME OF COMMUNITY. THEY MUST DEFEND THE 1AC IN LIGHT OF THE 1NC CRITICISM. 3. FRAMEWORK IS A SPEECH ACT. THEY WOULDNT BE ABLE TO SEVER IF THEY SAID THE N WORD AND WE READ OFFENSE ON IT. HOLD THEM TO THE SAME STANDARD FOR FRAMEWORK. IF YOU DONT BUY THAT, ITS AT LEAST TRUE THAT FRAMEWORK FUNCTIONS ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL THAN ADVANTAGES. ITS A STATEMENT OF THEIR ASUMPTIONS OF WHAT DEBATE SHOULD BE, MUCH LIKE VARIOUS ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS LIKE USING NATURE IS OKAY. IF WE READ HEIDEGGER THEY WOULDNT SEVER ALL OF THEIR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT NATURE. THAT DESTROYS OUR STRATEGY AND IS IRRESPONSIBLE AND WEAK. 4. THEIR ATTEMPT AT SEVERANCE IS A NEGATION. MUCH LIKE IF WE HAD PICD OUT OF ANY OTHER PART OF PLAN, THE PERM THAT SEVERS IS ONLY AN ARGUMENT THAT THE CP IS A GOOD IDEA AND THE 1AC IS INSUFFICIENT AND A BAD IDEA. VOTE NEG. 5. CROSS-APPLY THE #1 FROM THE COUNTERPLAN FLOW. THEY SAY AFF CHOICE MEANING THAT THEYVE MADE A DECISION ABOUT WHAT THE ROUND SHOULD LOOK LIKE AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TURN IT.

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A/T SHIVELY- RULES GOOD/KEY 1/ 1. NO IMPACT- THEIR ARGUMENT IS JUST AN INTERNAL LINK TO A PARTICULAR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW DEBATES COULD FUNCTION, NOT A DEFENSE OF THOSE RULES OR EXCLUSIONS AS INTRINSICALLY GOOD. THEY HAVE NO DEFENSE OF WHAT WERE CRITICIZING. 2. TURN- NOYS INDICATES THAT THE SHIVLEYS POLITICS SETS A GOAL TO RESTORE COMMUNITY BY EVOKING STANDARDS AND FEAR OF COMMUNITY DEATH. SUCH A REVIVAL TEACHES US TO EXCLUDE DIFFERENCE AND VIOLATE THE AGENCY OF A SUBJECT IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY. THEIR ARGUMENT IS WAR FOR PEACE, EXCLUSION FOR DEMOCRACY. 3. TURN- THEIR DEFENSE OF THEIR INTERPRETATION TURNS DEBATE INTO A FICTION OF PURE IMMANENCE. THEIR DESIRE FOR A DEMOCRATIC AGON IS A DESIRE FOR SUICIDE Luszczynska 05 (Ana. The Opposite of the Concentration Camp: Nancys Vision of Community. CR: The New Centennial Review. P. 167-205) Nancy extends this discussion to the citizens and militants ... Workers and servants who have bought into the dream of achieving immanence in and through an ultimate community that, although yet to come, will come and thereby provide the immanence so desired (Nancy 1991, 13). But by now,
In another gesture toward the empirical, he argues, there is a realization that the yet to come is not coming, which results in dissatisfaction and resignation. Nancy warns us against this realization (or consciousness) and likens it to the consciousness of the lost (immanent) community; in the same manner as community so envisioned

could never have been lost as it never existed, the immanence dreamed of being achieved through a community to come was never to come or never to take place. The nostalgia and dreaming are essentially two sides of the same coin. The former is a mournful looking back at an immanent community, and the latter is a hopeful looking forward to that which is yet to come. Both of them are fictions. It would be impossible for immanence to come, for the community that would come offering immanence would be nothing more than death. In other words, a perception of immanence or death as that which is yet to come is death existing as a means to something else, and death precisely denies such application or function being totally resistant to any kind of recuperation. Furthermore, as the community that would bring immanence, this community would again be the community of death, which is simply impossible because such a death (or death so conceived) cannot or could not come about or form a future (Nancy 1991, 13). What can come about and form a future, says Nancy, is the singular, irrecoverable death.
Communion or immanence is not what comes of death; properly speaking, nothing can come of death.

4. NOT CONCLUSIVE- EVEN IF SHIVELYS UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY IS GOOD, THATS NOT A REASON TO REJECT US. NOTHING ABOUT THE PRESENTATION OF OUR ARGUMENT THREATENS DEMOCRACY. 5. PREFER OUR CLAIMS A. CONTEXTUAL- SHIVELY DISCUSSES THE PUBLIC SPHERE, NOT COMMUNAL SELFREGULATION. THEIR EVIDENCE DOESNT SPEAK TO POLICY DEBATE, WHILE OUR EVIDENCE AT LEAST ANALYZES COMMUNAL REGULATIONS WHICH ARE MORE EXEMPLARY OF FRAMEWORK RATHER THAN THE TOPIC OF PUBLIC DEBATES. B. MORE REAL WORLD- THE WAY POLICY DEBATE OPERATES IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM PUBLIC DEBATES: SPEED, HEAVY USE OF EVIDENCE, ETC. ERR NEG BECAUSE THE WAY POLICY DEBATE HAPPENS IS MORE LIKELY TO AFFECT ITS PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT AFFECTING PUBLIC DISOURSE ON POLITICAL ISSUES

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A/T SHIVELY RULES GOOD/KEY 2/ 6. THEIR INSISTENCE ON FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED RULES FOR DEBATE HIDES IN ITS OWN SELF-EVIDENT NATURE. OUR RETREAT OF THE POLITICAL ALLOWS US TO QUESTION THE FUNDAMENTAL ARTICULATIONS, NOT A PARTICULAR POLITICS BUT THE POLITICAL AS SUCH James 06 (Ian, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 169) The retreat of the political must allow, or even impose, the tracing anew of the stakes of the political (RP, it.; RT, 131). This sense in which philosophy, for Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, withdraws from politics, from the empirical field of events and action, in order to displace, re-elaborate and replay the concept of political transcendence (RP, 193; RT 130). It is in this sense also that the withdrawal from politics and the concomitant retreating of the political is a deeply engaged gesture that does not intervene or make prescriptive/normative judgments about the present, but that demands that the present be thought The retreat of the political corresponds to its closureand by the
It is here that the key task of the Center proposes itself. same token to the opening of the following question: on the basis of what, against what, or along what, does this closure trace itself? It does not simply trace itself against the non-political. . . . On the contrary, the closure opens onto something ... Something which would be the politicalor the essence of the

since the political has retreated into a self-evidence or obviousness, since it now dominates our world as political economy (or what Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe also call the techno-social), philosophy must withdraw from politics in order that the political might be renewed as a question, as that which, in its essence, is in question, and as that which must be retraced and thought anew. Insofar as this question is a question of essence, it is philosophical and cannot be empirical. It is in this context that the distinction between le politique (the political) and la politique (politics), mentioned above, needs to be
politicaldrawn back from the total completion of the political in the techno-social. (RR 196; RT, 132) Or put in another way: understood. La politique is the empirical field of politics, the politics of the Chinese Emperors, the Benin Kings, of Louis XIV, or of German social

(the political) is a specific dimension of alterity (RP, 193; RT, 130), prior to politics per but fundamental to its possible modes of articulation or becoming.
democracy (RP, i86; RT, 125). Le politique

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A/T SWITCH-SIDE GOOD 1. NON-RESPONSIVE- WE DONT PRECLUDE SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE. OUR ARGUMENT OBVIOUSLY NECESSITATES A FORUM IN WHICH TO BE MADE. WE ONLY CRITICIZE THE UNPROMPTED DESIRE OF THE 1AC TO ESTABLISH FORM AND CONTENT LIMITS ON THE WAY THOSE DEBATES GO DOWN. 2. ERR NEG- IF YOU THINK THAT SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE IS GOOD, OUR COMMUNAL SUICIDE ARGUMENTS ARE GIVEN EVEN MORE WEIGHT. THIS IS LIKE READING AN IMPACT ADD ON FOR THE OTHER TEAM. LUSZCZYNSKA AND ISSAKS INDICATE THAT THE AFFIRMATIVES CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY PUSHES ITSELF TOWARDS INTERNAL POLICING AND SELF-DESTRUCTION BY SEEKING THE PUREST FORM OF IMMANENCE. DEBATE WITHOUT NON-POLICY ALTS, EXCLUSIVELY PLAN FOCUSED DEBATE, ETC. 3. TURN- OUR ARGUMENT MAKES POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT POSSIBLE. JAMES INDICATES THAT OUR RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE SPACE OF COMMUNITY IS A PRECURSOR TO ANY PRE-UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLITICS CAN CHANGE OUR SENSE OF BELONGING AND COMMUNITY 4. TURN- NANCYS COMMUNITY OF BEING-WITH DOES NOT PRECLUDE ENGAGEMENT BUT RECONCEPTUALIZES POLITICAL STRUGGLES TO SALVAGE THEM FROM THE DOMINATION THAT IS INEVITABLE IN THE WORLD OF THE AFFIRMATIVE. James 06 (Ian, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 168)
Despite the general thoroughness of her narrative account of the activity of the Center, however, it is arguable that she fails to take some of the qualifications

it is, for instance, made quite clear that the ruling out or sublimating of either class struggles or political struggles has never been what is at stake for us: these are the givens of the epoch of the domination of the political and technology or of the domination of political economy. But the stake could be one of no longer subjugating these struggles, in their finality, to this domination (RJ, 24; RT, 117). This seems to make it clear that Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe do not seek to rule out political debate, struggle, or engagement. Rather, they are insisting that there is a philosophical questioning which can and should occur with respect to the essence of the political, and that this questioning is engaged in a specific way with a specific responsibility This would not preclude either from dirtying their hands with struggles as citizens, professionals, or activists. As philosophers, however, they seek to rethink the determination of the political per se, such that diverse struggles, be they gender political, class-based, economic, or other wise are not subjugated the total domination they have described. Frasers demand that Nancy and LacoueLabarthe engage more directly in struggle and debate appears either to miss or to refuse key philosophical steps which they had made. Insofar as she misses them she does not do justice to the complexity and rigor of their argument. Insofar as she may refuse this argument she offers no alternative philosophical engagement which is clearly and systematically worked out.
given in the Opening Address seriously enough. In the text of this address,

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A/T YOU LINK TOO IT IS NOT A MATTER OF ACTING INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF A COMMUNITY BUT OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH YOU ATTEMPT TO DO WORK ON THAT COMMUNITY WHICH PRODUCES VIOLENCE. Willson 06 (Michele A., Technically Together: Rethinking Community Within Techno-Society, p. 153-4)
This argument posits the possibility of different social forms existing historically. Nancy also writes of community (in the inoperative sense) as following after modern society or as yet to come. Therefore, it seems that he wants to include consideration of historical influences and developments in his analysis. However, this emphasis on historicity is in tension with his positioning of community as existing or residing at the limit between singular beings and prior to social or political organization. Such

community, in Nancys sense, is always existent and underlying all social forms. The difference becomes then one of degreemore or less communityas a consequence of practices and projects. Community is given to us with being and as being, well in advance of all our projects, desires, and undertakings. At bottom, it is impossible for us to lose community. ... Only the fascist masses tend to annihilate community in the delirium of an incarnated communion. Symmetrically, the concentration campand the extermination camp, the camp of exterminating concentrationis in essence the will to destroy community. But even in the camp itself, undoubtedly, community never entirely ceases to resist this will. (Nancy, 1991b: 35)
positioning infers that

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A/T ROLEPLAYING GOOD 2/2 1. TURN- THE IDEA THAT PHILOSOPHY SHOULD LAY GROUND FOR A PARTICULAR POLITICS GIVES WAY TO METAPHYSICS WHICH CREATES VIOLENT POLITICS. OUR ARGUMENTS PROVIDE THE BEST WAY TO RECONCEPTUALIZE POLITICAL DECISION MAKING James 06 (Ian, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 152-3)
What is, or should be, the relation between philosophy and politics? How ought one to address the inevitable interconnectedness of thinking and the world of political struggle and decision, where empirical realities of state power, public policy, economy, and wealth distribution are paramount? This question dominates Nancys thought from its very beginning up to the present. An important relation of the philosophical to the political is implicit, for instance, in his early involvement with the Christian Socialist movement (and in particular with the review Esprit and the Confderation francaise democratique du travail), but it also informs his most recent writing around questions of war, state sovereignty, technology, and globalization. Yet despite the importance of this question for

Nancy, his thinking also refuses any straightforward movement between the order of philosophical reflection on the one hand and that of politics on the other. He refuses the notion that philosophy should lay theoretical grounds for a project or program which would then be conceived as the concrete effectuation, or completion of, the philosophical within the realm of the political. The expectation of such a movement from philosophical reflection to political project articulates, according to Nancy, the very essence of the metaphysical attitude within philosophy, and is deeply implicated in the recent history of European totalitarianism and the destructive, genocidal energies which that history unleashed. This is not to say, though, that thinking for Nancy is entirely divorced or removed from the political and ethical demands made upon us by the contemporary and possible future worlds. Nancys thought appears
to be responding to two contradictory impulses. On the one hand it resonates consistently with profoundly political implications and often quite directly, and specifically, addresses the political in both its historical and contemporary dimensions. On the other hand, as thought it makes no attempt to found or endorse a specific politics or political program. Such an apparent conflict or contradiction can be viewed within the wider debate surrounding the political dimension of those forms of French philosophy which have been associated with the labels poststructuralism, postmodernism, or deconstruction. For instance, the politics of deconstruction has been a source of considerable controversy over the past three decades, specifically in relation to the Heidegger and de Man affairs of the late 1980s, but also in relation to a more general questioning of the relation of Derridas thought to Marxism and to the politics of the left.2 As will become clear, Nancys thinking of the political develops specifically in response to the debates raised around the politics of deconstruction. More broadly this dimension of Nancys thought needs to be addressed within the context of what one might term the post-Nietzschean and post-Heideggerian thinking of the political. Recently a number of Anglo-American philosophers working broadly within the continental tradition have made significant interventions in this area. It is with this broader thinking of the political that Nancys philosophy has been most extensively engaged to date. This has meant that the majority of responses to or commentaries on his writing have addressed his political thought, and more specifically his writing on community. As will become clear, many of these responses have also been rather critical, most often on the grounds that his thinking seemingly ignores or misjudges the empirical realm of political events and struggles. What follows here will suggest that his

philosophy, while remaining inassimilable to political theory or science, offers an important rethinking of the relation between the philosophical, the political, and politics. I will also argue that, despite, or perhaps because of, the apparent withdrawal of this philosophy from the sphere of politics and its refusal to lay the ground for a political program, it does nevertheless open up new perspectives in which we might think about, and engage with, the world as a form of historical community and site of struggle and decision.

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A/T ROLEPLAYING GOOD 1/2 1. NON RESPONSIVE- EVEN IF ROLEPLAYING IS GOOD, IT DOESNT JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THEIR INTERPRETATION 2. NOT CONCLUSIVE- IT MAY REPUDIATE ROLEPLAYING BUT IT DOESNT MAKE ANY CLAIMS OF EXCLUSIVITY OR PARAMETERS WHICH IS THE LINK TO OUR CRITICISM. THE AFF HAS TO WIN A REASON WHY THEIR INTERPRETATION IS GOOD IN LIGHT OF OUR CRITICISM OF ITS EXCLUSIVITY OTHERWISE, THESE ARGUMENT HAVE NO IMPORT TO YOUR DECISION BECAUSE WITHOUT PROVING THEIR INTERP THEY DONT HAVE REASON WHY THE NEGATIVE TEAM PRECLUDES SOME FORM OF ROLEPLAYING BUT NONE OF THEIR ROLEPLAYING GOOD CARS ARE EXCLUSIVE TO A POLICY ONLY MENTALITY, THEY SIMPLY SAY SOMETIMES POLICY IS IMPORTANT AND WE DONT DISAGREE. NO IMPACT. 3. TURN- NOYS INDICATES THAT THEIR THINKING OF COMMUNITY PRODUCES THE EXCLUSION AND EXTERMINATION OF THE IMMIGRANT IN THE NAME OF THE PURITY OF THE COMMUNITY. THIS ERASURE OF AGENCY BY VIRTUE OF THE COMMUNITY, OF BEING-WITH OTHERS, FORECLOSES ANY POTENTIAL TO ROLEPLAY AND IMAGINE DIFFERENT WAYS BY WHICH TO ENGAGE THE WORLD (POLITICALLY OR ETHICALLY). THEIR INTERPRETATION MAKES ROLEPLAYING IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS YOU ARE EXCLUSIVELY WILLING TO PLAY THE SAME ROLE OVER AND OVER. 4. TURN- JAMES EXPLICITLY INDICATES THAT NANCYS IDEA OF COMMUNITY DOES NOT PRECLUDE EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED POLITICS BUT INSTEAD EMPHASIZES ITS RELIANCE ON BROADER TERMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF THE COMMUNITY. YOU EVALUATE OUR ARGUMENT FIRST BECAUSE OUR EVIDENCE IS THE MOST SPECIFIC, SAYING THESE [FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS] ARE PROPERLY PHILOSOPHICAL IN NATURE AND NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AS SUCH, PRIOR TO THEIR MANIFESTATION IN THE EMPIRICAL FIELD. 5. TURN- STRYSICK INDICATES THAT WE NEED NOT BE CONCERNED WITH MAKING PRESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS OR ESTABLISHING A HEIRARCHY OF DECISION MAKING BECAUSE POSING SUCH QUESTIONS HAVE THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD RELY ON A SHARED ESSENCE AND GRAMMAR. ANY PRESUMPTION OF THIS ARGUMENT IS DIRECTLY COMPETITIVE WITH OUR LINK STORY MEANING YOU SHOULD EVALUATE OUR CLAIMS COMPARATIVELY AND NOT HAND THEM THIS DEBATE UNLESS THEY WIN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CRITICISM.

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Oregon Debate
Framework PIC
Copenhaver WNPT 2011

33

A/T DEATH IMPACTS DEATH CANNOT BE ASSIMILATED TO WORK; WE CAN ONLY KNOW DEATH THROUGH THE DEATH OF OTHERS AND IT IS THUS SOMETHING PRECIOUS WHICH LIES OUTSIDE DIALECTICAL CONSTITUTION OF SUBJECTIVITY. James 06 (Ian, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 181)
At the heart of this conception of sacrifice lies an understanding of death which is both different and similar to that of Heidegger. Where in Being and Time the death

for Bataille it is in the death of others that our mortality is revealed. It is in seeing others die, and in our participation in that same potentiality for (or being-toward) death, that we encounter our own finitude. Death, then, in Batailles terms is not something which can be thought in isolation from community; indeed it is on the basis of the fact that
of others is the death of das Man and is never the same as my death (my own most possibility which each time is always and only my own), conversely and exclusively our mortality or finitude is always already shared that something like community can exist in the first instance. This is why sacrifice becomes such a privileged figure, since it represents a ritual in which the very structure of community, that is to say, a shared or collective relation to death, is experienced or affirmed. This is also why, for Bataille, those premodern societies organized on the basis of sacrificial practices or a sacrificial experience of the sacred are also given a privileged position in his various projects of the late 1930s. Importantly, sacrifice conceived as irrecoverable loss, wastage, or expenditure signifies that death is not a horizon that can be mastered. It is not something that can be directly encountered or grasped by consciousness and thus in any way triumphed over or overcome. In the Hegelian/Kojvian

death cannot be put to work, that is to say, incorporated into the dialectical activity of negation and determination which makes up the life of the subject.45 Since death, as the annihilation of subjectivity, is only ever encountered indirectly in the death of others, it is not something that is assimilable to the principle of identity, or, in Nancys words, to the resources of a metaphysics of the subject (CD, 41; IC, 14). In
terms used by Bataille this sense it is arguable that Bataille in fact repeats Heideggers understanding of existence, as a being-toward a horizon of death which cannot be grasped or mastered as such, but he situates this (non)relation or exposure to death on the level of the collective, of community, and not on the level of the singular Dasein. Batailles central importance in La Communaut dsauvre lies in the way he thinks this fundamental relation between community and death. The political dimension and impetus of Batailles thinking such as it developed throughout 1930S gives Nancy a framework within which he can rethink community outside of any figure of

An exposure to a potentiality for death, inassimilable to the logic of a subject, is that which is shared in community and not a principle of identity or communal essence. Nancy expresses this in the following terms:
identity or totality. Community. . . Is calibrated on the death of those whom we call, perhaps wrongly, its members (inasmuch as it is not a question of an organism). But it does not make a work of this calibration. The death upon which community is calibrated does not operate the dead beings passage into some communal intimacy; nor does community; for its part, operate the transfiguration of its dead into some substance or subjectbe these homeland, native soil or blood, nation, a delivered or fulfilled humanity, absolute phalanstery, family, or mystical body. Community is calibrated on death as that of which it is precisely impossible to make a work. (CD, 41; IC, 5)