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Kmt Us-china Aff

Kmt Us-china Aff


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Published by: AffNeg.Com on Jan 08, 2009
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1. Energy competition makes conflict inevitable – fosters mistrust and misperceptions emboldening
hardliners in both countries. This means even if it not rational, conflict occurs because each country
has decided the other is its enemy – cooperation is key to solve – that’s 1AC Lieberthal and Zweig

2. Relations key to a peaceful rise – even if no US-Sino war, cooperation is key to intergrate China into
the global system. A violent rise will destabilize Asia, resulting in global conflict overwhelming every
other scenario of war – That’s 1AC Schriver and Hodge.

3. Chinese collapse triggers the impact – alt. energy is key to prevent economic and regime collapse
that destabilizes the region causing nuclear war in Asia, this independently causes conflict – That’s

Conflict inevitable absent cooperation – mutual distrust creates a self-fulfilling cycle

Lieberthal, Michigan University Professor, January 2007
[Kenneth, “China’s March on the 21st

Century,” http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-


Remarkably comparable debates now rile policy in both Beijing and Washington. In each case, the argument is about how likely the other will be the biggest threat to national goals
within two decades. Nobody can say with confidence that the other country cannot become the biggest threat to core national goals. The “inevitable
threat”protagonists adduce realpolitik arguments about the rise of a challenger to the global hegemon to posit inevitable
antagonism and argue for measures to limit the other’s potential power and latitude. The “possible threat”protagonists argue that astute diplomacy and concerted efforts to build
constructive ties can lead to mutual advantage. The key issue in both cases is an assessment ofthe ultimate intentionsofthe other
country. The “inevitable threat”protagonists advocate military and other measures that essentially signal to the other side that a long-term constructive relationship is beyond reach.
The hardliners on both sides, therefore, strengthen each other, as each points to the rhetoric and policies of their
counterparts. In this way, advocates of this position can create self-fulfilling prophecies, promoting policies to deal with a
threat that in turn induce threatening behavior that was the basis for the policy advo- cacy in the first place. “Possible threat”protagonists tend more to point to
the types oflong-term interests noted above to say that attentive diplomacy and creative policy can produce an outcome much closer to a win-win situation. To further complicate things,
militaries are professionally required to make fairly pessimistic judgments about the long-term future and to invest in developing the pertinent capabilities to assure security. The
relevant timeframe for decisions on major new weapons systems is often 15 to 20 years. These military investments
themselves then become grist for the mill for pessimists about the chances oflong-term constructive U.S.-China
engagement. The unsurprising result ofthe above facts is that,despite the deep,wide ranging,complex,and rel- atively interdependent relationship that
now exists between the United States and China,mutual dis- trust concerning long-term intentions appears to have grown in recent years. A substantial body of elite
opinion in China argues that the United States simply will not allow China to become a coun- try of real wealth and international gravitas, even if China seeks to play by the rules and
allow for extensive cooperation. An equally substantial body of opinion in the United States cannot believe that China will not use its increasing
strength to challenge America’s interests,compete for resources in a zero sum struggle,and try to supplant it in the dynamic Asian region.
This mutual distrust about long-term intentions inevitably strengthens those who argue in each country that eventual antago-
nism is unavoidable and that it is therefore necessary to begin preparing for that eventuality. This type ofmindset makes it more difficult to
perceive common interests and interpret efforts to establish trust. It even affects our understanding of core Chinese expressions that define their basic strategy. For
example,Deng Xiaoping’s admonition that China should behave modestly and not take the lead internationally was misinterpreted in a Foreign Affairsarticle and has ever since been
regarded in the United States as calling for China to “hide its capabilities until it is ready to strike”– i.e.,as a strategy ofdeception and potential aggression rather than one ofsimple

China’s energy consumption could cause war with the U.S

Robert Burns-AP Military Writer, Energy Prices fuel US-China Strains, The Associated Press,
6/17/08,http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview, Bansal

Not quite an ally, not quite an adversary, China with its exploding appetite for energy is helping drive up world oil prices and putting still more strain on its
relationship with the United States
The importance stretches far beyond the gas pump, although that is where Americans are left wondering what's behind the run-up, why it can't be stopped and
who is to blame. China is just one factor. Also at play are worries about future supplies and production disruptions in Africa or the Mideast.
Still, the "China factor" is big. By some estimates, car ownership in China is growing so fast, with the expansion of its middle class, that by 2030 its traffic
will be seven times or more what it is today. China already is the world's second largest energy consumer, after the United States.
That explains why senior-level economic officials from Beijing and Washington are meeting in Annapolis, Md., this week to discuss a range of hot-button
issues, including the
$256.2 billion U.S. trade deficit with China an all-time high and prospects for increasing cooperation on energy issues.
Looming in the background to these and other discussions about U.S. competition with China is the prospect of armed conflict if not over China's
demand for the return of Taiwan, then over energy resources.
China has invested greatly in modernizing its military in recent years, although its budget
even by the Pentagon's high-end estimate is hardly one-quarter what the U.S. spends on defense.

SDI 2008


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