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INTENTIONALLY LEFI BLANK
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Managing System Integrty of Gas Pipetines

ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31 Supplement to ASME 831.8

".;",:ll'"'li3.":l',i'i"i':#li:il:i"i.;:i;'li:::i::li:;,,u&

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Date of lssuance: June 1, 2010

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The next edilion of ths Code is scheduled for publcation in 2012. There will be no addenda written interpretations of the requirements of this Code issued to this edition.

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ASIE ]s the registered lrademark of The American Society of i\4echanical Engineefs.
ThiS code or standard was developed under procedures accredited as meeting the criteria for American National Stndards. lhe Siandards Committee that approved the code or standard was balanced to assure that individuals from competent and concemed interests have had an opportunity to parLicipate. The proposed code or 5tandard was made available for public review and comment tht provides an opportunity for additioal publc input from ndustry, academia, regulatory gencies, and the public-t-lrge. ASI\4E does not "approve," "rate," or "endorse" any item, construction, proprielary device, or actlvity. ASI\4E does not take any position wilh respect to the validity of any patenl rights asserted n conneclion wilh ny iterns meniioned ln this document, and does not undertake to insure anyone utilizing a standard aganst liability lor infringement of any applicable letters plent, nor rssume ny such liability. Users of a code or standard are expressly advsed that determination of the validity of any such patent rights, nd the risk o[ infingement of such rights, is entirely their own responsibility. Participatio by federl agency reprcsentative(s) or perso(s) affiliated wilh industry s noi lo be interpreted as government or lndustry endorsement of thi5 code or standard, AS[48 accepts resposibiliy for only those interpretations of this document issued in accordance wiih the establshed ASME procedures and policies, which precudes the issuance of interprelations by individuals.

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No part ol this document may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retdevl system or otherwise, without the pror writlen permission of the publisher.

A1"eri.rn Sociely ol [,lechnkal Fngineers lhree Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990
The

Copyrghl @ 2010 by
THE AIIIERICAN 50CIEry OF ]\CHANICAL ENGINEERS Al1

rights reserved

Prinled in iJ.S.A.

No

Copyright O 20I 0 by the Anericn Society of Mechanical Engincers be rnade ofthis rateial without writte conselt of ASME.

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CONTENTS
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Forcworcl ......... Commttee Rostor

............

Summ.rry of Clranges
7

vi ix
1

lntroduction

2 3

lntegrty Management Program Overvew.

Consequences

..........

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4
5

Gatherng, Revewng, and lntegratng Data ., . . . ., ., ., . ..

Rsk Assessment.

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11

6
7

lntegrty Assessment.

.................

16 20 26

Responses to lntegrity Assessments and Mtigaton (Repar and Preventon). . . . . . . . . .

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5

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9 10

lntegrity Management Plan.

Performance Plan

..

27 32

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Management of Change Plan Quatity Control Ptan.....

....
.

33

.......

34
34

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Terms, Defntions, and Acfonyms References and Standards

.......

40

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tigures

I 2 J 4

tntegrity ManBement Program Elements Integrity Mngement PIan Pocess Flow Diagrm

4
9

l'otenliJl lmpact Area fimirg for Scheduled

Responses: Time-Dependent Threats, Prescriptive 24

35

5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10

In(c8riLy \4dna8emenl. PIin .... Hierarchy of 'l'erminoogy for lnte8rity Assessment Dta Elements for Prescriptive Pipeline Integrity Program .......... Typicl Dat Sources for Pipeine lnlegrity ProBram Integrity Assessment Intervalsr Time-Dependent Threats, Internal nd Extenal Corrosion, Prescriptive Integrity Mngement PIan Acceptable ThreaL Prevention nd Repair Methods .... Example of lntegrity Mngement Pln for Hypotleticl Pipeline Segment (Segment l)ata: Line 1, Se8ment 3) !xampe of lntegrity Maa8ement Pln for Hypothetical Pipeline Segment (lntegrity Assessment PIan: Line 1, Se8ment 3) Exmple of Inlegrity Management Plan for Hypothetical Pipeline Segment
.

e-

Tables

10 10
1.4

22

28 29

(Mtgtior PIan: Line 1, Segment 3) Performance Measues

Perfomnce Metrics

...........
llr

30 30
31

Overall Performance Measures

Coplright O l0l0 by lle Socrery ol Mechanicll ^merrcn No repro<luction rnay be made ol tlrrs nralcrral wilhoul wfllrcn conset of

Lnginecrs. f& 'CQx

^SVF.

Nonmandatory Appendces A Thleat Process Charts and Prescriptive Intetrity Marajement Plans B Direct Assessment Process ... C Preparatior of Technicl Inquiries .

...

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66

Copyr ight O 20lo by lhc Ancricn Socicry of \4cchancal No rcproductior may bc made o l tl,lsDaterial wrlhoulllrillcnconscnrofASMF.'GDl

Engrneers. fft

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FOREWORD
m

Pipeline system operators continuously work to mprove the safety of their systems and oPerations. ln the United States, both iquid arrd gas pipeine operatos have been working with their regulators for several years to develop a moe systemtic approach to piPeline safety integrity maragement. 'Ihe gas pipelne incuslry needed to address mary teclnical concerls before an integrity management standard could be writben. A number of initiatives were undertaken by tle industry to answer tlese questions; as a result of 2 yr of intensive work by a number of tecllical exPets in lheir fields,20 r'eports werc issuecl that provided the lesponses required to comPlete the 2002 edition of this Code. (The ist of these reports is included in the refcrence section of this Code.) This Code is nonmandatory, ancl is designed to supplemenl 831.8, ASME Code fo Ptessurc Piping, Gas Transmission and Dstribution Piping Systems. Not all oPerators or countries will decide to implement this Code. This Code becomes mandatory if and when pipeline regulators include it as a requirement in tleir regulatiens. This Code is a process code, whicr describes the process an operator may use to deveoP n

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integrity management program.

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also provides two approcles for developing an integrity

mngement progrm: prescriptive approach and a performance or risk-based apProch. PiPeline operatos in a numbe of countries are currently utilizing risk-based or tisk-maIBement principles to improve the safety of thei systems. Solne of the international standards issued on this subject were utilized as resources for writing ths Cocle. Particular recognition is given to API and their liquids integrity managcment stndad, API 1160, which was used as a model for the format of this Code, 'Ihe ntent of this Code is to provide a systematic, comprehensive, and ir'tegated aPProach to managing the safety and integrity of pipelile systems. The task foce thaf developed this Code hopes that it has achieved that intcrt. 'fhe 2004 Suppement was appoved by tlc 831 Standards Committee and by the ASME Road on Pressure lechnology Codes ard Strdards. It was approved as an Americn National Slandard

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on Mrch 1Z 2004. Tlis Supplemer't was approved by the 831 Standards Corrmittee and by the ASME Board on Pressue Technology Codes and Standards. II was approved as an American National Standard on .pril 20,2010.

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Copyrght O 2010 by the Anerican Society ol'Mcchanical rcDroduclion my bc ll)ade ofrhis rnalcrral wrtlloul r+rillcn conscnl

Engrneers.

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ASME 831 COMMITTEE Code for Pressure Piping

(the following is the roster of the Committee at the time of approval of this Code.)

1
d

STANDARDS COMMITTEE OFFICERS

M. L. Nyyer, Chlr K. C. Eodenhamer, Ye Chlr N. Lobo, .Seclerry STANDARDS COMMITTEE PERSONNEL
R.

L
j.
o_

T, Appteby, Exxontvlobil lJpstream Research Co.

R. A,

Appteton, Conlribulng MenbeL Refrgeration Systems

Co.

C, Secht

lV Becht Engineering

Co.

A, E. eyer, Fluor Enterprlses K, C. Bodnhemer, nterprise Products Co. C. J. Campbell, Air Liquide ,. S. Chn, TransCanada Pipeline U.S. D. D. Chrstian, Victaulic D. L. Coym, WorleyParsons R. P. Deubler, Fronek Power systems, LLC I, A. Drke, Spectra Energy lransrnission P. D. Flenner, Flenner Engneering Services J. W. Frey, Stress Egineering Service, 1nc, D. R. Frikken, Becht Engineering Co. R. A. Grchuk, tluor Corp. R. W. Haupt, Pressure Piping Engineering Associates, lnc. L. , Hayden, lr., Consultant B. P. Holbrook, Babcock Power, lnc. G, A. lolly, Vogt Valves/Flowserve Corp.

Koves, E(-Ortclo, UOP LLC N. Lobo, The American Society of lvlechanical Engineers W r. Mauro, American Electric Power C. l. Melo, Alternote, WorleyPargons J. . Meyr, Louls Perry and Associates, lnc. E. Mchaloporilos, University of i\4acedoni M. L. Nayyar, Bechtel Power Corp. R. G. Payne, Alstom Power, Lnc. I, T. Powers, WorlevParsons W.

l.

A.

P. Rangus, Ex.Olicio, Bechlel

E. H. Rnaca, Dominion Resources, lnc.

M. l. Rosenfeld, k;etne' rnd Ascociales, ln(. R. r. Slva, Process Engineers and Constructors, lnc. So1, Delegte, Engineers lnda Ltd.

^, l. Sperko, Sperko ngineering Services, lnc. W. F. W. ftar, FM Global K. A, vtmlnot, glack and veatch A. L. Watkns. First Energy Corp. K. H. Wooten, ConocoPhlllps Pipe Line Co.

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831.A GAS TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPING SYSTEMS SECTION COMMITTEE
l. A. Dke, Choir, Spectra Energy Transmission
M. J. Rosenfeld, Vce Chah, Kielner and Associates, lnc, R, l. Horvath, lr. Secretory, The Amercan Society of ,{echanical
Engineers D. D. Arderson, NSource Gs Trnsmission and Siorage R. ,. T, Appleby, ExxonlMobil tlpslream Research Co. R. C. Becken, Energy Experts lnternational C. A. Bullock, Centerpoint Energy

,. S. Chi,lran5Canada Pipeline

U.S.

S. C, Chrstense, ConsuLtant A. M. Ctarke, Spectra Energy Transmission P. M. Dcklnson, Forerunner Corp. I, W. Fee, lJnlversal Pegasus D. l. Fetzner, BP Exploration (Alska), lnc.
E. N. Freeman, T. D. Williamson, lnc. R. W. Galng, Southern Caifornla Gas Co.

M. W. Gragg, ExJ(onMobil Development Co. S- C. G1lpa, Delegate, Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd, M. E. Hovs, Panhandle Energy M. D. Huston,0NEOK Partners, LP 0. L. lohnson, Panhandle Energy K. B. Kaplan, KBR R. W. Kveta, Spectra Energy Transmission M. P. Lamontagne, Lmontagne Pipelie Assessment Corp,

K. G. Leews, P'PIC, LLC R. D, Lewis, H, Rosen tl.S.A., lnc. C. A, Mncuso, Exxontvlobil Producton Co. W. l. Manegold, Pacific Gas and Electrlc M. I, Mechlowcz, Southern California Gas Co C. r. Mtler, Fluor Enterprises lnc. D. K. Moore, El Paso Pipeline Group R. A. Muelbr, lC/Ml Technologies G. E. Orteg3, ConocoPhillips B. ,. Powell, NiSource, lnc. C. G. Roberts, Fluor R, A, Schmdt, Hackney Ladish, lnc. A. Soni, Delegale, Engineers lndia Ltd. C. l. Tatosan, Gs 5yslem Engineerig. rnc. P. L, Vaughn,0NEOK Partners, LP F. R, Votgstdt, Volgstadt and Assocates, lnc w. ,. Walsh, EN Engineerng D. H. Whtley, 4ATE l. K, wtson, Williams R, A. Wolf, Consultant K. F. Wrenn, Jr., Wrentech Services, LLC D. W. Wrght, Wright Tech Services, LLC M. R. zere[a, National Grid I. Zhou, TransCanada Pipelines Ltd, l. S. Zurcher, P-PLC. LLC

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Copyrighl O 2t,10 by lhc A rcrican Socicly of Mcchrical No reproducuon rnay be rnadeoflhis rnalerial uilhour wrtlcr conscnl

ErgiDeer.. fft

of^SME. '(y

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831.8 SUBGROUP ON DESIGN, MATERIALS, AND

l. S. Chin, Chair, TransCanada Pipeline U.5. R. l. T. Appleby, xxonMobil upstream Research Co. R. C. gecken, nergv xperts lnternational A, M. Clarke, Spectra Energy Transmission P. M. Dlcknson, Forerunner Corp. D. J. Fetner, BP Exploraiion (Alaska), lnc. R. W. Gallng, Southern Callfornia cas Co. M. D. H(ston,0NEOK Partners, LP K. B, Kaplan, KBR M. r. Mechlowcz, Southern California Gas Co. C.l. Mtter, tluor Enterprises, lnc.
E, K.

CONSTRUCTION
Gs Co.

l{ewtofl, Southern Cliforia

G. E. Ortega, ConocoPhilllps C. G. Roberts, Fluor

M. J, Rosenfeld, Kelner and Assocites, lnc. R. A, Schmdt, Hackney Ladish, lnc. C. J. Tatosan, Gas SVstem Lnq;reeri"g, l1c. P. [. Vaughn,0NE0K Parlners, LP R. Votgstadt, Volgstadt and Assocites, lnc. W. r. Walsh, EN Engieering D. H. Whttey, /VATE l. Zhou, Transcanada Pipelines Ltd.

s-

831.8 SUBGROUP ON EDITORIAL

D. K. Moore, ChaL El Paso Pipeline Group R. C. Becken, Energy Experts lnternaiional R. W. Gaitng, Southern Callornia Gas Co.

REVIEW

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K. B. Kaplan, KBR K. G. Leews, P-PIC, LLC R. D. Lews, H. Rosen U.S.A., lnc

831.8 SUBGROUP ON

OFFSHORE PIPELINES

K. B. Kapbn, Chir, KBR R. J.T. Appleby, ExxorMobil Llpstream Reserch Co. M. W. Gragg, El Paso PipelLne Group

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831.8 SUBGROIJP ON OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

D. D. Anderson, Call., NSource Gas Transmission and Storage D,, Adler, Co esponding l\4enbeL Colombia Gas Transmission C. A, Aultock, Centeeoint Energy A. lvl, Ctarke, Spectra Energy Transmission D. M. Fox, Atmos Energy E. N, Freeman, T. D. Williamson, lnc. M. E. Hovis, Panhndle Energy M. lsran, PHMSA/DOT D. L. ,ohnson, Panhndle Energy R. W. Kveta, Spectr Energy Transmisson

M.

P.

lamontagne, Lamontgne Pipeline Assessment

Corp,

K. G. Leews, P-PIC, LLC R. . Lws, H. Rosen U.5.4., lnc. C, A. Mancuso, ExxonMobil Production Co. W. l. Manegotd. Pacific Gas nd Eectric D. K, Moore, El Paso Pipeline Group R. A, Mueller, McMl Technologies B, l. Powell, Nisource, lnc. ,. K. Wlson, Williams D. W. Wrlght, Wrlght Tech Services, LLC M. R. zeretla, National Grid l. S. Zurcher, P-PIC, LLC

9:

831

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE B. P. Holbrook, Babcock Power, Lnc. G. A. ,olty, Vogt Vaves/Flowserve Corp. W. ,. Koves, UOP LLC E. Mchalopoulos, Universily of l\4acedonia lVl. L. Nayyar, Bechtel Power Corp, R. G. Payne, Alstom Power, lnc. . P Ragus, Bechtel W r. Sperko, Sperko Engineering Servces, lnc K. H. Wooten, ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co.

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N. Lobo, Secretary, The Arerican Society of !,lechanical Engineers C, B. Becht lV Becht Engineering Co, K. C. Bodenhmer, Enterprise Products Co.

A. Chrstan, Victaulic l. A, Drake, Spectra Energy Transmission P. D. ttener, tlenner Engineering Seruices
D.

D, R. Frlkken, Becht Engineering Co, R, W Haupt, Pressure Piping Engineerig Assoclates, lnc. L. E, Hayden, lr., Consultat

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831 FABRICATION AND EXAMINATION TECHNICL COMMITTEE

A, P. Rangus, Cholr Bechtel
R, J.

W. W. Lews, E. L DuPont

Howath,,r., Secreoy, The American Society of [,lechanical

S. P. Licud, Weirich Co'rsull;ng Services, l1(.

Engineers

A,0. Natbndan, Thelsch Engineering,

R. R,

lnc.

,. P Eltenberger, WFI Division, Bonney torge

R. lnc. P. D. Flenner, Flenner Engineering Services l. W. Frey, Stress Engineering Service, nc.

l, seals, Consultanl

l. Ferguson, Metalurgist D.l. Fetzner, BP Exploration (Alaska),

w l. sperko,

l. Sitvia,

Process ngineers and Constructors, lnc. Sperko Engineering services, lnc.

Co.

lr,, Babcock and Wilcox Construction B L. Vaughan, ONEOK Parlners, LP

E. F. Summers,

Copyright O 2010 by fhe A,nerican SocieLy of Mechanical No repoduclio rnay be rnade ol lhis rnaler ial wirhoul wrirtcn consenl ol ASM E.

Erginccrs.

&

!
831 MATERIATS ECHNICAI COMMITTEE
R. A. Grchuk, Chol,; Fluor Corp,

W tl.

N, Lobo, Secretary, The American Society oF Mechanical Engineers M. H. Barns, Scntec, lnc, l. A, Cox, Lieberman Consulting LLC R. P. Deubbr, Fronek Power Systems, LLC

Z. Dilali, Contributnq MenbeL

BEREP

Eskrdge, Jr, Aker Kvaerner E and C C, l-. Henley, Black and Veatch D. W. Rahoi, [,letallurgist R. A, Schmdt, Hackney Ladsh, lnc. H. R. Slmpson, lndustry and Energy Associates, l. L,smth, lacobs Engineering Goup

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LLC

9.

831 MECHANICAL DESIGN

W. J. Koves, Cbtl, UoP LLC G. A. Antak, Vce Choir, Bechl Englneering Co., lnc.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
R. W. Haupt, Pressure Piping Engineering Assocites B. P. Holbrook, Babcock Power, lnc.

C. E. O'Ble, Secrctary, The American Society of Mechancal ngineers C. Becht lV Becht Engineering Co.

,. P Breen, Becht Engineering

N.

Co.

F. Consumo, GE Energy (IGCC)

,.

P. Etlenberger, WFI Division, Bonney Forge D, J. Fetzner, BP Exploration (Alaska), lnc.

J. A, Grazano, Tennessee Valley Authority

L D. Hart. sSD, lnc.

G. D, Mayers, Alion Science and Technology T' Q. McGwley, Tachry l-rgineer:rg Co'porlion R. ,. Medvck, swagelok J. C. Mnchlello, Bechtel National, lnc. A. W. Pauln, Paulin Resource Group R. A, Robleto, KBR E. C. Rodabaugh, Honordry Member, Consullanl M.l. Rosenfeld, Kiefner and Associates, lnc. G. Stevck, Berkeley Egineering and Reserch, lnc. E, A. Was, wais and Associates, lnc.

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831
A. Bell, Bonneville Power Administration R. A. Coomes, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Departrent of Housing/Boiler Section D. H, Hnrath, Consultant C. r. Haruey, Alabara Public Service Comiss:on D. T. Jagger, Ohio Department of Commerce M. Kotb, Rgie du Btiment du Qubec K.l Lau, Alberta Boilers Safety Association R. G. lvlarn, New Hampshire Public Utililies Cornmission l. W. Meult, Manitoba Departmenl of Labour A, W. Melrng, Fire and Bulding Boiler and Pressure Vessel Division/fndiana R. F. lrilulhney, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Branch/ CONFERENCE GROUP
P. Sher, Stte

ls. of Conecticut DepIre1t of Labor

M.
D.

E, Skrd, Arknss

D. R,

A. Starr, Nebraska Department of Labor l. Stursne, lowa UtiliLies Board P Sullvn, The Nalionl Eoard of Boiler and Pressure Vessel
lnspectors
E.

Troppma, Divlsion of Labor/Stte of Colorado Boiler lnspections C, H, Walters, Naiioal Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel lnspectors V. . M, Vest, Lghthouse Assistnce, Inc. T. F. wckham, Rhode lsland Deparlment of Labor

I,

I I

831 QUALITICATION OT PIPEI.INE PERSONNEt TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

J. T. Schmtz,

:
f
a
Co.

Choit Southwest cas

Corp.

T. T.

j. Kasprzyk, leco Peoples Gas

D. K. Moore, vice Choit El Paso Pipeline Group P D. Stumpf, Secretoly, The American Society of /Mechanical Egineers
B, Ables, EPCO, lnc. W Bnister, BP Pipelnes (North Arneric), lnc.

M. Ldel, Conttibuting Membe,; ConocoPhillips Pipe Line A. r. Lvlngston, El Paso Pipeline Group

q.

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D. D, Lykken, Washlngton lllilities and Transporlation Comrission W. B, Mccaughey, Jr., Conttbutng LiembeL U.S. DOT/PHMSA '1. Meek, Contributing Nlember, El Pso Corp.

M. Brkhart, Nicor

Gas

G. E. Crter, State of California/Public Utilities Committee 1.5. Chn, TransCanada Pipeline U.S. M. R. Comstock, Contributng Member, City of l\ esa/Gas Division G. M. Cowden, Equtable Resources K, Dent, Spectra Energy Transmission R. Evafls, PHi\SA/DOT M. A, Gruenberg, Soulhwest Gas Corp. S, C. Guqtd, Delegate, Bharal Peiroleum Corp. Ltd. O. Halnelgh, Flinl Hills Resouces l-P L, M. Haynos, Knsas Co'porlion Com11ission B. A, Heck. lMiller Pipeline Corp. L, L. Hughes, Lecet S. Kemnska, Shell Pipeline Co.

W. ltler, PHI\4SA L, P. Mwy, Contributing ll4embeL MidwesT Energy Assocites I.liyets, Contrbutng l\emret EPCO, lnc. K, Riddle, Contributng Merber, agelln lvlidsfeam Partners, L. P D. Rstg, Cerler Doin Fnergy Gds lranen'issiol R. L. Ryan, T. D. Willarson, lnc. R. E. Senders, ConLribu\ing lllember, U.S. DOT/PHMSA E. W. Scott, Ameren R. C. Smth, AGL Resources R. L. Stump, Consumers Energy D. . Thacker, Klnder organ, lnc. T. L Tgr,0klahoma Corporation Commission A. N. Welker, lnfrasource Underground K. WesterHayes, Contributing Member, Explorer Pipeline Co.

Copyn8ll @ 2l,l 0 by rhc A rcdcan Socicry of Mcchanical No rcnroduclion ray be made oflhrs rnarerial witbout $rtrcn conscnr

Enineers. f& of^SM[. '{r

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9I

ASME 831.85-2010 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

Foowing approval by the ASME 831 Stndards Committee, the ASME Board on Pessure Teclnology Codes and Stanclards, and ASME, and after public levieq ASMF U31.85-2010 was approvcd by the,American National Standards lnstitute on ,Apil 20,2010.

ASME Il31.85-2010 consists of B3i.85-2004; editorial chages, revisiors, nd correctiorsi as well s tle followirg changes identified by a margin note, (10).

Poge 1 3

Locatiotl
1.1

Chttllge

o_

Second sentence of first paragrapll deleted (1) Paragraphs (b)(2)(a) and (c)(1Xb) revised (2) Penultmate paragraph deeted (3) Last pagraph added Equatiors ind nomenclature rcvised to include metric values
:s.

2.2

3.2

9 14, 15

Figure 3 'Ible 3

Metric vaues added

(1) Fleadings for third, fourtl, and fifth columns revised (2) Values in fourth and fifth columrs
revised

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(3) Note (4) revised s.7(k)

Metric values aclded to first and second

paragraphs
Refeence information added lo first

5
-l
3

19 20

6.3.2 6.4.2

paragrapr (1) Last sentence of third paragraph revised (2) Last paragraph deleted (3) Relerence information added Ievised Aclded

L j
,f)

6.4.3 6.4.4

21, 22 24 25

7.2.1,

First paragraph revised

Revised Revised General note added Specified minimum yield strength reviscd Second and third paragraphs revised and moved to para. 7.5

7.2.2

lable 4 Figurc 4
7.4.1,

i)

7.4.2 7.4.3

Added

Copyrighr O 2010 by rhc Amcrican Socicry ofMccharical

fngireers.
^SME.

\orrl]rorluctiomaybemadeoflhi5nalcrial willoul wrillcn conscnl o f

f& '(qE

L.acatiotl

Chitlge

7.5 27
28 30

Added; subsequenl paragraphs

enumbered accordingly
Last paragraph revised

Talle 5

Revised; metric values added

Ihble 8 'Iabe 10
e.4(b)(1) 9.4(c)

Metric ults added

Revised in its entrety Revised Revised Reference information added Revised in its er'tiety Revised Revised Revised Refeence information addecl Revised in its entirety Revised

3l

32 34 35 40 45 47 48 49
50
51
61

10.1 13

Figure 5
14 A-2.1

A-2.5(b)

A-3 Figure A-3 'llle A-1

Tabe A-2 A-9.1

Added
Added
Secold paragraph revised Revised in its entircty

65

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Copyright O 2010 by the Anencan Society ofMechanical Enginee,s. No reproduction my be made oflhis Dlaterial without written consent on^SM.

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ASME 831.85-2010

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MANAGING sYsTEM INTEGRITY OF GAs PIPELINES

1
INTRODUCTION the areas of inspection intervals, tools used, and miti8a-

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1,1 Scope
This Code applies lo orshore pipeline systems constructed with ferrous materials and that transporl gas. Theprinciples and processes embodied in integrity management are applicable to all pipeline systems. This Code is specifically designed to provide the operato (s defined in sectior 13) with the information necessary to develop and implement an e{fective integrity management program utilizing proven industry practices and pocesses. The processes ald approaches within this Code are applicable to the entire pipeline
system.

tion technjques employed. An operator cainot proceed

with tle performance-based integrity prolram until adequate inspcctions re performed that provide the
information on tle pipeline condition required by the
prescriptive-based program. 'l-he level of assurance of a performance-based program or an alternative international standad must meef or exceed tlat of a prescrplive program. TIe requiements for prescriptve- and performancebased integrity maragement pro8rarns e povided in

each

of the sections in tlis Code. h additio,

Nonmandatory Appendix A provides specific ctivities,

X.2 Purpose and Obectves

Managing the integrity of gas pipeline system is the primry goal of every pipeline system operator. Operatos wnt k) continue providing safe and reliable delivery of natural Bas to their customers without adverse
effects on employees, the public, customers, or the ervironment. Incident-free operation has been and continues

by tlreat categories, that an operabr shall follow in order to produce satisfactory prescriptive ntegrity
mnagement ProSram.

l o
=.

to be the gas pipelire industly's goal. The use of this Code as r supplement to the A.SME 831.8 Code will allow pipeline opeators to move close to that goa.
A comprehensive, systematic, and integrated integrity

This Code is intended for use by individuals and teams charged with planning, implenentil9, and improving pipeline integrity management program. Typically, a tcdm will include manrgers, engint'ers, operatng persolnel, technicians, and/or specialists with specific expcrtse n prevention, detection, and mitigation activities.

1.3 lntegrty Management Principtes

A sel of plincples is the bsis for the intent nd specific details of this Code. They are enumerated here so that the user of tlis Code cn understand tle breadth and depth to which integrity shall be an integal nd continuing part of the safe operation of a pipeline
system.

I
3

management program provides the means to improve tle sfety ofpipeline systems. Such an integrity management pogram provides the information for an operaLor to effectively allocte resources for appopiate prevention, cetection, nd mitigation activities that will result in improved safety nd a reduction in the numbe of
incidents.

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3
0.

Functional requirements for inteBrity mnagement

shall be engineered into ncw pipeline systems from initial panning, desgn, mteial selection, and consfruction. lntegrity management of a pipcline starts wth souncl design, mteial selection, and construction of the pipeine. Guidance for these ctivities is primalily provicled in ASME 831.8. There ale also a number of corsensus standards tht my be used, as well as pipeline jurisclictional safety regulations. If a new line is to become a part ol an inteBrity mnagement pogram, the

This Code descrjbes a process that an opelator of a pipeline system can use to assess and mitigate risks in order to recluce both thl] ikelihood and consequences of inciden[s. It covers both a prescriptive- and a performance-based integrity mragement program. The pesciptive process/ when ollowed explicitly, will provide all the inspection, prevention, detection, and mitigation activities necessry to produce a stisfactoy integrity marla8elelt pogrm. TIs does not prc-

clude colformance with the requirements of

ASME 831.8. The performance-based ntegrity management program lternative utilizes more data and more extensive isk analyses, which enables the operator to chieve a grealer degree of flexibility in oder to meet o excecd the requirements of this Code specifically in

functional requirements for tle line, including prevention, detection, and mitigaton activities, shall be considercd in orcler to meet tlis Code. Complete ecods of material, design, and construction for the pipeline are essential for the itaton of a good integrity angement program.

I
Copyrihr O )010 by lhc Arncricar Socicly ofVcchanical Erineers. Norcproducliormaybernadeoflhisrnateril withoul $riltenconsc"l ofASML.

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ASME 831.8S-2010

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3

System iltegrty requires commitment by all

operating persornel using comprehensive, systematic, and iltegrted processes to safely operate and maintain pipeline systems. ln order to have an effective integrity management program, the program slrall address the opetor's olganization, processes, and the physical
system.

ancl analyses that in turn may require adjustments to the system integrity plan.

9L

Ar i1tegrity management program is continuously cvolvilg and must be flexible. An integrity management program should be customized to meet each operator's unique coiditiens. The program slrall be peliodically evaluated and modified to accommodte changes in pipeJine operation, changes irr thl: operating cnvironment, ard the influx of rew dat nLl irformatior bout the sysfem. Periodic evaluation is reqtrred fo ensule the pogrm takes ppropriate advntge of improvecl technologics and that the program utilizes the best set of prevention, detection, ancl mitigation activities that areavailabe fo the conditjons at lhat time. Additionally, as the integrity manaBement program is implemented, the effectiveness of the activities slall be ressessed and modified to ensure the contnuing effectivcness of the program and all its activities. Information integration is a key component for managing system integrity. A key element of tle itegrity managenent framewok is the integration of all pertinent irformation wren performing risk assessments. Information tlat cn impact an operator's undelsLanding of the important risks to a pipeine system comes from variety of soulces. Thc operator is in the best positior to gather and analyze this informLion. By nalyzing all of the pertinent information, tle operator can
determine where the risks of an incident are tle greatest, and make prudent decisions to ssess ancl reduce tlose risks. Risk assessment is an analyticl process by which an operator defermines the types of adverse events or conditions lhat miBht jmpact pipeline integrity. Risk assess-

New technology should be evaluated and implemented s appropriate. Pipeline system operators should avail themselves ofnew techrology s it becomes proven rnd prJctical. New tcchnologics mdy improve an operator's ability to prevent certain types of failures, detect risks more effectivcly, or impove tle mitigtion of risks.
Peformance measurement of tll] systern and the progrm itself is an integl part of a pipeline irtegrity managemenl program. Each operator slll choose significant perormance mesures at tle beginnng of the

z
9-

program and then periodically evaluate lhe resuts of tlese measures to monitornd evaluate tle effectiveless of the program. Peiodic reports of the effectiveress of n operator/s integrity malagement program shall b(} iss(ed nd evaluated ilr oder to continuously improve the program. Integrity management activities shall be communicated to tle appropriate stakeholders. Each operato shal ensule that all appropriate stakeholders ale given

:^
a.

9.

the opportunity to participate in the risk assessment

o
5

process and that tle results are communicated

effectively.

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM OVERVIEW

z
5

2.1 General 'lhis section describes the required elements of an integrity management program. These program elements collectively povide thebasis for a comprehensive,

ment also determines the likelihood or probability of those events or conditions that wll led to loss of integrity, anc{ tle natue ad severity of the consequences that might occur folkrwing a failure. This nyt-

systematic, and integrated integrity management program. 'he program elements depicted in Fig. 1 ar required for all interrity managenent programs. This C<lde requires that the opeator document how its integrity management progm will ddress the key pogram elements, This Code utilizes recognized industry practices for developing n integrity managelnent Program. The process shown in Fig. 2 povides a common basis

? g 6

o
'

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3

ical process involves the integration of design,

construction/ operatin8, mainteluncc, testng, ilspcc-

tion, and other informatior bout a pipeline system,

Risk assessments, which are the vey fourdation of n in(egrity mnngemert prBrdm, c.rn vary in scope or complexity and use different methods or teclniques. The ultimate goal of assessing risks is to idertify the most significant risks so lhat an opertor can develop an effective and prioritized pevention / dctection / mitig.tion pl.n to addrcss tle rsks. Assessing rsks to pipeline integrity is a conlinuous process. The operator shall peiodically gather new or additional information n.l system opelating experience. These shall become part ofrevisecl risk assessmelts

to develop (and periodically reevaluate) an operaLorspecific pogrm. In developing the program, pipeline operators slll corsider their companies' specific integrity management goals nd objectives, and tren apply the processes to ensure that these goals are achieved. This Code details two approaches to inlegrity management: a prescriptive method and a performance-based metlod.
'l'he prescriptive iltegrity management method
requires the east amount of dt and ar'alysis, and can be successfully implementcd by followin8 tle steps pro-

vided in lhis Code and Nonrandatoy Appeldix A.

The prescriptive metlod incorporales expected worstcase indication growth to establish inteNals betweer successive jntegrity assessments incxchange for reduced data requirements and less-extensive anaysis.

Copyright O 2010 by lhc Sociery ofMechanical Lngineer, fb ^nrerican No rcproduclion naybemaJcoflhisrnalerial wrtlout writrenconscnlofASM[. '(gx

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ASME 831.8S.2010

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lntegrty Management Program Elements

l_

l-.-,',"*t I I management
I

program elements

I I

t
I

Ouality control
p

lan
12)

:' q

lsection

The performalrce-based integtity mngement

method lequires more knowledge of the pipeline, and consequently more data-irfelsive risk assessments and analyses can be completed. The resulting performancebased integrity managemenf program can contiin more options for jnspectior intervls, inspeclion tools, mitigation, nd prevention metlods. The results of the performance-based method must meet or excced the esuts of the prescriptive method. A performance-based progam cannot be implemented untl the operator has performed adequate integrity assessments tlat provide the data fo a performance-based program.,\ performancebased integity management pogrm shall include the following in the integrity management plan:

The process of managing integrily is an integrated nd itertivc process. Although tle steps depicted n Fig.2 are shown sequentially for ease of illustrati, there is a significnt mount of information ilow and
interction mong the different steps. For example, tle selection of a risk assessment pproch depends in part on what ntegrity-related data and information is available. While periorming a risk assessment, additional clata reeds may be identifed to more ccurtely evaluate potentia tlreats. Thus, the data gathering ard risk assessmenl steps are tighlly coupled and may require severl iterations unti an opertor has confidence tht a satisfactory assessment has been achieved. A brief overview of the individual pocess steps is provided in section 2, as well as inslructions to the r1ore specific and detilcd dcscription of the individual elements that compose the remainder of this Code. Ilefer ences to the specific delailed sections in this Code are shown in Figs. 1 and 2.

5-

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5.

s:

U 6

(r) a description
employecl

of tle risk analysis

metlod

=
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3
110)

(b) documentation of 1 of the appicable data fo

each segment and wlee it ws obtained

(c) a documented analysis fol deteminirg integrity assessment intervals nd mitigation (repair and preven-

2.2 lntegrity

Threat Ctassfication

tion) methods (d) a documented performance mtrix tltat, in time, will confirm the performance-based options chosen by
the operator The processes for developing and implementing a performance-based integity mangement program are included ir this Code. There is no single "best" pprocl tlat is applicable to allpipeline systems for all situations. l'hisCode recognizes the importance of flexibility in designing integrity manrgement pograms ancl providcs ltclnatives commcnsurate with this nced. Operators may cloosc eithe a prcsciiptive- or performance-based appoach for their entire system, individul lines, segmelts, or itrdividual

'Ile first step ir maraging integrity is id'rntifying

potentia threats to integrity. All threats to pipelile ntegity shall be consdered. Gas pipeline incident data has been analyzed and classified by tle Pipeline Researclr Committee Inlernational (l'RCl) irrto 22 root causes. Ech of the 22 cases represents tlret to pipeline integtity that slall be managed. One of the causes reported by operators is "unknown"; tlat is, no root cause o causcs were identifiecl. Tle rcmining 21 threats Ltave been gouped into nine categories of related failue types ccording to lheir nature and growth charcteristics, and further clelineafed by tlree tirne-rclated defect types. Tle nine categories are useful in identifying potential
threats. Risk assessment, integrity assessmenl, and miti-

f
,"

tlreats. The program elements showt in Fig. 1 are required lor al integrity mangement ptograms.

gation ac[ivities shall be correcty addressed accordirg to the timc fclors and iailurc modc groupin6.

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lntegrty Management Plan Process Flow Dagram

All threts
evaluated

lntegrity assessmenl
(section 6)

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ASME 831,8S-2010

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(n) Tine-Depcnc[ent 11) external corosiol (2) internal corroson (3) stress corrosion cracking (l)) Stnble (1) manufacturing-related defects (d) dcfective pipe sem (b) clefective ppe (2) welding/fabrication related (a) defective pipe girtl weld (circ um ferentia l) including branch and T joints () defective fabrication weld (c) winkle bend o buckle (d) stipped threads/lroken pipe / coupl1g failure (3) equipment (4) gasket O-inB failure (r) contro/relief equipment malfunction (c,) seal/pump packing failtrre

2.3 The lntegrty Management Process

'Ihe integrity management process depicted in Fig. 2 is described below.

SI

2.3.1 ldentfy Potental Ppeline lmpact by Threat. 'lhis program element involves tle identificaton of potential threats to the pipeline, especialy in aeas of
concern. Each iclentified pipeline segment shall hve the threats considered individualy or by the nine catego ies.
See

1
9-

para.2.2.

(l) miscellaneous
(c) Tine-ltepctule nf

(l)

lhird partylmechanical damage

(n) darnage inflicted by first, second, or third parties (irstntaneous/immediate failure) () previousy damaged pipe (srrch as dents and/ or gouges) (delayed failure mode) (c) vandalism (2) incorrect operationl proccdure (3) weather-related and outside ferce (n) cod weathe

(ll) lightrting
(c) heavy rains or floods (d) earth movenents The iuteractive nature of tlrets (i.e., more than one threat occurring on a section of pipeline at the same time) slall also be considered. An exampie of such an interaction is corrosion at a location that also has third-

2.3.2 Gatherng, Revewng, and lntegratng Data, The first step in evaluating tle pofential treats for a pipeline system or segnert is to define and gather tle necessay data and informa[ion that claracterize the segments and the potenlial lhleals to tht se8ment. In this step, the opeator performs the initial collection, review, and integrtion of elevnt data and information tht is needed lo understand the condition of the pipe; identify the location-specifc threats to its integrity; ard understand the public, envionmental, and operatonal consequences ofan jnciclent. The types ofdata tosupport a risk ssessment wil vary depeirding on the threat being assessed. Informtion on the operation, maintennce, patrolling, desiBn, operting history, and specific failures and coicens tht are unique to each system and se8ment wil be needed. Relevant data and inlormation also include those conditions or actions tat affect defect growlh (e.9., deficiencies ir cathodic protection), reduce pipe properties (e.g., field weldng), or reate to the introduction of new defects (e.fl., excavation work near a pipeine). Section 3 provides information on consequences. Section 4 provides details for data gatheirg, review, and integration of pipeline data. 2.3.3
Risk Assessment. fr this step, thc dLa assem-

q.
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5.

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g

9:

party dmage,
The operator shall consder each lhreat irrdividually or in the rine ctegories when lollowing the process seected for each pipeline system or segment. The pre-

scriptive approach delineted in Nonmandatoy

Appendix A enables the operator to conduct tle threat analysis ir lhe con[ext of the nine categories, All 21 theats shall be considered when applying the performance-basecl approach.

If the operational mode changcs nd pipeline segmcnts are subjected to sigr'ificant pressure cycles, pressure differertial, rd rates of change of pressue fluctuations, fatigue shallbe considered by the opertot
including any combinecl effect from othe filure mechanisms tlt are considered to be pesenf, such as coll.osior. A useful eference to help tlle operator with this colsidcration is GRI 04-0178, "Effect of Pressure Cycles on Gs Pipelines."
5

bled frorn the previous step are used to conduct a risk assessment of tl-e pipeline syslem or se8ments. Through the integrated evaluatior of tle information nd data collected in the previous step, the risk assessmert process identifes the location-specific events and/o corditions that could lead to a pipeline failure, and povides an understanding of the likelihood and consequences (see section 3) of an event. The output of a risk assessment should include the nature and ocation of the most significnt risks to the pipeline. Under the prescriptive approach, vailable data are compared to pescribed criteria (see Nonmandatoy Appenclix A). Risk assessments are required in order to ral.lk the segments for integrity assessments. The pelfomance-based approach relies on detailed risk assessments. 'Ilee re vr'iety of risk assessment methods that can Lre applied based on the available dat rd the laturc of the tlreats. l'he opeator shoulcl taio the method to meet tle needs of the system. An initial screenil8 risk ssessmert car' be beneficial in terms of focusing resources on the most important arcs to be addressed and wlere additional data may be of value.

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a.

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ASME 831,85"2010

Section 5 provicles details on the criteia selecbion fo

The mitigtion lternatives nd implementaLion Lime-

sl

the prescriptive approacl ld risk assessmenL for the

performarce-based approach. The esults of this step enable the operator to prioritize tle pipelille segments for appropriate actions that will be clefined in the integrity management plan. Nonmandatory Appendix A provides the steps to be followed for a prescriptive program.

frames for perfornance-based integrity naBement

programs may vary frorn the presc iptive requirements. ln such instnces, the performance-based analyses tht lead to these conclusions shall be documer'ted as pal t of the integity nanagement program. Section 7 provides detils on repair and prevention techniques.
m

z L

2.3.4 lntegrty Assessment. Based on the risk

assessment made in the previous step, tle appropriate inte8rity assessments are selectecl and conctucted. Te

2.3.6 Update, lntegrate, and Revew Data. After the nitial integrity assessments have been performcd, the
operator has improved and updated information about tle codition of the pipeline system or segment. This information shall be retrined and added to the dtbase of information used to support future risk assessments and integrity assesslents. Furthermore, as the system continues to opelte, dditiona operating, mainLenance, and othe infomation is collected, thus expanding and

integrity assessment metlods are in-line inspection, pressure testing, diect assessmenl, or other integrity assessmelt rnethods, as defined in para. 6.5. Integrity
assessmelt method selection is based oir tle threats tht havc been identified. More thn one integrity assessment method may be lequired to acldress all tle threats to a pipeline segment.

q.

improving the historica databse oi operating

A performance-bascd prograrn may be able, through appropriatc cvluation and analysis, to determine alternative courses of action and time frames for performing ntegity assessments. lt is the operators' responsibility to document the nayses justifying tle alternative courses of action or time frames. Section 6 provides detils ol't tol :,elcction nd inspection. Data ard irfomation irom integrity assessments for a specific threat may be of value when considering the presence ofother threats and perfoming risk assessment for those threats. For exmple, a dent my be identified when running a magnetic flux leakage (MFL) tool while checking for corroson. This data element should be integated with other data elements for othcr tlreats, such as third-party or constmction damage. Indications that ae .liscovered during inspections shall be examined and evaluated to determine if they are actual defects or not. Indications may be evauated using an appropriate examination and evluation tool. Fo local internal o externl metl loss, ASME Il31G or similar analytical methods may be used.

exPerience.

2,3.7 Reassess Risk. Risk assessrnent shall be performed periodically within regular intervas, ancl when substantial chnges occur to the pipeline. lhe operto shall conside recent operatin8 data, consider changes to the pipeline system design and operation, analyze the impact of any external changes that may have occurred since the lst risk assessmenL, and incorporate
daLa from risk assessment activities for olher threats. Tre results of integrity assessmenL, such as internl inspcction, shall also be factorcd ilto fture risk assessmerts, to ersure that the nalyticl process reflccts tle Iatest underslndinE of pipc codirin

o
=.

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zs

2,4 lntegrity Management Program Tle essential elemerts of an integrity management

program ae depictecl in FiB. 1 and are described below

J g I

2.3,5 Responses to lntegrty Assessment, Mtgaton (Repair and Preventon), and Settng lnspection lntervats. In this step, schcdules to espond to indications from ilspcctions are developed. I{epair activities for the nomalies discovered during inspection are identified nd niliated. Repairs are performecl in accordance with accepted industry standards and pactices. Prevention prctices arc lso implemeted in tlis step. For thid-party dmge prevention nd ow-stress pipelines, mitigation may be an appropriate alternative to inspection. Iror example, if clamge from excavation was identfied as a significant risk to p.1ticular system or segment, te opertor may elect to conduct damageprevenlion activities such s increased public communication, more effective l}xcavation notification systems, or increased excavator wareness in conjunction witl
inspectior.
()

2.4.1 lntegrty Management Plan. The inlegrity mangementplan is the outcome ofapplying the pocess clepicted in Fig.2 and discussed in section L The plan is the documenttion of the execution cf each of the steps nd the supporting analyses that re corducted. The plan shall include prevention, detection, nd mitigation prctices. The plan shall also have a schedule estabished that considers the timing of the pactices deployed. Tlose sys[ems or segments with the li8hest
risk shoud be addressed fjrst. Also, tlte plan shall consider those practices tlat may address more Lhn one
For instance, a hydroslatic test may clemonstrate a pipeline's integrity for both time-dependent threats
tl-reaL.

-l l

like internal and external corrosion

as

wel

as static 3

threts sucl s seam wcld defects and defective fbricafior weds. A performance-based integrity mlagement plan contains the same basic elemcrts as a prescriptivc plar. A perfornnce-based plan requires moe cletailed informatior and analyses based on more extensive knowledge about tle pipeline. This Code does lot require a

No

Copyright O 20t0 by the,{merican Society ofMechanical Engineers. be mde ol tllis material wrthout written conseDt of ASME

&

o
831.85-2010 3

s4

specific risk arlaysis rnodel, ony that the risk modcl used car be slowr fo be cffcctive. Ihe deLaiied isk anlyses will provide bcttcr understanding of itegtity, which will enable an operator to have a greater degree of flexibiity in the timing and methods for the implementation of a performance-based integrity manage-

quality control puryoscs. That section outliles tle recessary documentatior for the integrity maragemelt pro-

9I

gram. The section also discusses auditing of thc

program, incuding the processes, inspections, mitigation activities, ancl prevention activities,

ment plan. Secton 8 provides details on pln

development. The plan shal be periodically updated to reflect new informtion and tle currelt undestanding of inLegrity threts. As new risks or r'ew marilestations of previously known risks are identified, addirional mitigative actiois to address these risks shll be performed, as appropiate. Furthermore, the updated risk asscssrnenL results sha alst be usecl to support scleclulitg of future

3
3.1

CONSEQUENCES

General

inteBrity ssessments,

Risk is th(] mthematicl product of lhe likelihood (probability) and tlc colsequer'ccs of events t-at tesult from a filure. Risk may be decrcascd by teducing eitler the likelihood or the consequences of a failure, or both. Tlis section specifically addresses the conscquence portior of tle lisk equation. The operator shall consider
consequences of a potential failure when prioritzing inspectiors ancl mitigation activities. 'l'he 1J31.8 Code manages risk to pipeline integrity by adjusting design ancl safety factors, and inspection nd maintenalce frcquencies, as the poteltial consequences of a failue increase. This has been done on an empirical basis without quantifying the consequences of a filure. Paragraph 3.2 desclibes how to determine tle rea

5'
o_

2.4.2 Performance Ptan, Tle opeator slall collecl performance information and periodically evluate the success of its integrity assessment teclniqucs, pipeline
repair activities, and the mitigative risk control activities. Ihe opertor shall also evalute tlte effectivcncss of its managemenl systems and pocesses in supporting sound integrity management decisiols. Section 9 provides the infomation required for developirg performarce measures to evlute program effectiveness. Tle application of new technologies into the irtegrity maragement progrm shall be evaluated for furtler use

o
:s.

that is affected by a pipeline failure (potential impct area) in order to evaluate the potentia consequerces of sucl an event. Tle are impacted is a function of the pipeline diameter and pressure.

z
z

n the program.

2,4,3 Communicatons Ptan. The operator shall

develop and implernent a plan for effective communications with employees, the public, emergency responders, local officials, and jurisdictional authorities in ordel to keep thc publc informecl about their integrity management efforts. This plan shall provide infolmatiol to be communicated to each stkeholder about the integtity plan and the results achieved. Section 10 provides further irformation about communictions plans.

3.2 Potentiat lmpact

Area

(10)

The refined radus of impact for natul gas is clculatecl sing tle formula

9:

t = 0.6,) . d.t (/ = o.oo31s . d\,[)

where

(1)

d = outside diameter of the pipeline, in. (mm) p = pipeline segment/s maximum allowable
r'

2.4.4 Management of Change Plan. Pipelire systems and tle ervironment in which they operate ate seldom static. A systematic process shall be used to ensure tlat, pior to implementation, changes to the pipeline system design, operation, or minterance arc evaluated fo tleir potential risk impcts, and to ensue that changes fo the environment in which thc pipeline operates are evluated. Aftet these changes are rlade, tley shall be ircoporated, as approprite, into future risk assessments to ensure tt the risk assessment process addresses the systems as currenliy configured, operated, and maintained. The results of tle pan's mitigative acfivities slould be used as a feedback for sys[ems and facilities design and opeation. S(]ction 11 discusses the important aspects of managilg clwrgcs as they relate to integrity lnagement.
2.4.5 Quatlty Control Plan. Section 12 discusses thc eval(ation of the integrity management program for
7

operating pressure (MAOP), psig (kPa) radius of the impact circle, ft (m)

-l
3
a.

UXAMPI"I1r A

30 n. cliameter prpe ra'itl a mximum allowable opertjng pressure of 1,000 psig las potertral impct radius of

approximtely 660 ft.

:
:
=

o.6e.dli
0.(r9 (30 i.)(1,000 lb/in.'?)r/'? 654.6

ft - 660 ft

IIXAMI'I"D 2r A 762 D diameter pipe witl a maximurn allowablc opertiig pressure of 6 900 kPa his a potertial impact ndiLs of approximately 200 m.

f=
=

0.00315. d!6
0.0031s (762 mnr)(6 900 kPa)r/'? 199.4 m = 200 n

Use of tlis equation slows that failure of a smaller dameter, Iower pessure pipl]line will affecl a smaller

Copyright O 2010 by the ,American Society ofMeclnical No reproduction my be mde ofthis mterial without written conseDt

Engineers.
olASME.

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ASME 831.85-2010

6
3

aca than a larger diameter, higher pressure pipeline.

(See GRI-00/0189.)

(i) property damage () envircnmenta clmage

er

NOTII:

0.69 is tle factor lor rahrl Bas using U.S. Customary units and 0.00315 $ tle factor usng metric ruits. Oter gses or rich natural gas shall use dilferent factors.

effects of unignited gas releases (g) security of gas supply (e.9., impacts resulting from irteruptiol of service)

f)

Eqtion (1) is derived from

(/r) public conve[ience and necessity

failues Note tht the consequences may vary based on the ichness of thc gas trnsported and as r result of how te gas decompresses. The richer the gas, the more ilportant defects and material properties ae in modeling the characteristics of the failure.

z
9.

li) putcntial h'r 'ccrrndry

where sonic velocity of gs = discharge coefficient

lne diameter
Ieat of combustion theshold heat flux
gas molecular weight

4
4.1
rr

GAHERING, REVIEWING, AND INTEGRATING

DATA

live pressure

Generat

Q=

flow fctor

= yl 7+ ,l r7
\

/ 2 \?r"-

= = = = = = l,q =

T / I ,

gas constant

refined adius of impact gas tempelaturc specific heat ratio of gas elease rate decay factor combustion efficiency fctor

This section provides systematic process for pipeline operators to collecl and effectively tilize the data elements necessary for risk assessment. Comprehensive pipeline and facility knowledge is an essential component of a performance-based integity mangement program. In addition, information or opetionl hislory the ervironmenL aound the pipl]line, mitgation tech niques ernployed, and process/procedure reviews is lso necessary. Data are a key element in the decision-making

.)
5

s:

emissivity factor

In a pelformance-based program, the opertor may

consider alternate models that calculte impact areas and conside additional factors, such as depth of burial, tht may reduce impact areas. Tle opertor shall count the numbe of houses and indvidua units in buildings witl.ti the potential impact area. The potential ilnpact area extends from tle center of the first ffected circle to the center of the last affected circle (see Fig.3). This Iousirg unit count car then be used to help determine tle elative consequences of a upture of the ppeline
segment.
Tl-e

process required for program implementation. When tle operator lacks sufficient data or where data quality is below requrements, the operatol shall folow the prcscriptive-based processes as shown in Nolmldatory Appendix A. Pipelire operator procedues/ operation ar'd maintenarrce plans, incdent informatior, and other pipeline

opertor documents specfy and require collecton of data that are suitable fo inte8rity/risk assessmelt. [ntegration of the dat elemelts is essential in order to obtain complete and accurate infolmation needed for an integ-

rity

-l
3

angeDent program.

ranking of these areas is an i-rportart element of

risk assessment. Determjning the likelihood of failure

is the other impotant elemenl <f risk assessment (see sections 4 and 5).

4.2

Data Requrements

3,3 Consequence Factors to Consder

Wlcn evaluating the consequences of a failure within tle impact zone, the opeato shall consicle at leasl the

following: (/r) popution densjty () p|oximity of the popultion to the pipeline

(including consideration of marrmade or natural barriers that may provide some level of profeclion) (c) proximty of populations with limited or impaired mobiity (e.9., lospitais, schools, child-care cenLers, etirement commulities, pisons, recreation areas), particularly in unprotected outside areas
8

'I'he operator shall have a comprehensive plan for colecting all data sets. The operator must first collect lhe data required to perform a risk assessment (see section 5). Implementtion of the rtegrity maragement program will drive tle collection and prioritization of addilional data elements required to more fully understld nd pevent/mtigate pipeline theats.

5
F

4.2.1 Prescrptive lntegrty Management Programs.

Lmited data sets slall be gathered to evaluate
eacl-r

threat for prescriplive integrity managemenl program applictions. These data lists ae provided il Nonmandatory Appendix A for each threat nd smmarized in Tble 1. All of the specified data elements shall be available for ech threat in order to perform tle risk ssessment. If such data ae not available, it shall be

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f&

c)

ASME 831,8S-2010

F9.

Potental lmpact Area

(10)
1,000 ft 1305 m)
m

Potental impact area (withln dashed lines)

660 ft (200 m) 300 fr (90 m)

z q

Pipeline

GENERAL

NoTE: Ths diagram represents the results lor a 30 in. (762 mm) pipe with an [440P of 1,000 psig (6 900 kPa).

o
assumed tht the particuar tlreat pplies to the pipeline segment being evaluated.

4.2,2 Performance-Based lntegrity Management Programs. TIee is no standrd list of required data ele-

nd to detemine if significnt .lata .teficicncies exist. If cleficiencies are found, action to obtain the data can be planned ancl initiated elative to its importance. This may require dditional inspections nd field data collec-

ments that pply

to all pipeline

systems

for.

performance-bsed integrity mangement programs.

Flowever, the operato shall collect, t minimum, those data elements specified in rhe prescriptive-based program requiremer'ts. Tle quantity and specific data elements will vary betweer operators and within a given pipeline system. fncrcsilrgly complex risk assessment methods applied in performance-basccl integrity man-

tion efforts. Existin8 management information system (MIS) or

geographic information system (GlS) databses and the results of any prior risk or threat assessments are also

useful data sources. Significait insight cn also be obtained from subject mdtter experts nd those involved in the risk assessment and integrity management progam processes. Root cause analyses of previous failues are a valuable data source. l'hese may reflect dditional needs in personnel trailing or qualifications.

Sement programs require lnore daLa elements than those listed in Nonmandatory Appendix A. Initially, the focus shall be on collecting the data necessary [o evaluate areas of concern and other specific areas of high lisk, The opeator will collect the data equired to perform system-widc integrity assessments, alrd any additional data required for general pipeline and facility

Valuable dara for integrity management pogram implementation can also be obtained from external
sources. These may include jurisdictiolal agency reports nd databases that nclud(] i1formatior sucl as soil dta, demograplics, and hydroogy, as examples. Research

'-1

risk assessments. This data is then integrated into

as lhe plan is implemented ove years of operation.

Lhe

orgalizatiors can provide background ol many

pipeline-elated ssues Lrseful for applicaton in an integrity managemenI program. fndustry consorta rd other operak)s can also be usefu information sources. The dat sources listed in Tble 2 are necessary for integrity management program initiation. As the integ-

L
5
."

initial data. The volume and types of data will expand

4.3

Data Sources

The data needed for integrity management progams can be obtained from within tle opeating company and fom externa sources (e.g., industry-wide data). Typically, the documentation containing the required data elements is located in design arrd colstruction documenttion, and current operational ald mainteince records.

rity mnagemcnt progam is dcvelopcd and irnplemcrted, ddifional dta will becomc avalable. This wiLl inclucle inspectior, examnation, and evaluation data obtained from the integrity management prograrn and dat developed for the peformance metrics covered in section 9.
the

A survey of all potential locations that could

these records may be required to document wlat is

ble, its form (inch.tding lhe units or referencc

system),
9

house 4.4 Data Cottecton, Review, and Anlysis avail- A plan for colectng, reviewing, ancl nalyzing

data shal be created and in place from the conception

Cop) nglrt O 20 l0 by rhc A rneflca Soctely ol' Mechanical No reproduclior my bc rrade oi'llrs r)alcrial wirhourwritrcnconscnlofAS\4L.'()l

EDgirecrs. fft

.)

ASME 831.85'2010

Table

Data Etements for Prescriptive Pipeline lntegrty Program

Pipe wall thickress

Tabte

Typical Data Sources for Pipeline

lntegrity Program
Process and instfumenttion drwngs (P&lD)

Attribute dt

Pipeline alignrent drawings

Diameter Seam type and iont faclor l\,lanufacturer 1\'lanufacturing date l,aterial properties Equipmenl propenieg Construction
Year

0rigi.lal Lolslructiol inspeclo' notes/records Pipeline aerial photogphy

Fcility drawings/maps

z
-

As-built drawings [lerial .ertifi.tions

Survey reports/drwings Safety related condition reporlg Operator slandards/specifications lndustry standards/specifications O&lvl pocedures Emergency response plans lnspection records 'fest reporls/records

of installation

Bending method Joining method, process and inspection results Depth oi cover Crossings/casings Plessure lest Field coating methods

9-

5oil, backfill
lnspection reports
Cathodic protection installed Coaling type 0perational
Gas
q

lncident reports
Compliance records Desi g/engineering reports Technical evaluations l\anufacturer equip ment data

uality

o
:_
for the pipeline or facility. Generalized i1tegrity assumptions used in place of specific data elements should be avoided. Another data collection consideration is wlethe the age of the data invalidales its applicability to the threat. Dt pertning to time-dependent threats such s corrosion o stress corrosion cracking (SCC) may lot be relevant if t was collected many years before the integrity manaBement potram was developed. Stable and timeindependent threts do not have mplied time dependence, so earlier data is applicable. The unavailability of identified data elements is not a justification for excusion of a threat from tle integrity

Normal maxirum and minimum operatng ptessures Leak/failure history Coating condition CP (cathodic protection) system performance Pipe wall temperature Ppe inspection reports OD/lD corrosion moitoring Pressure fluctLlations Regulator/relief performance
Encroachments Repirs

5
a.

Vandalism Extemal forces nspection

Pressure tesls

g o
6

ln-line nspections Geometry too inspections Bell hole ispections CP inspections (ClS) Coating conditon nspections (DCVG) Audits and review

mana8ement program. Depending on the impotance of the data, additional inspection actiors or field dta collection efforts may be required.

_-l

f L f

4.5

Data lntegraton

Individual data elernents shll be brought together and analyzed in fheir context fo ealze the full value
of the data collection effort. These processes are needed to verify the quality and consistency of the data. llecords shall be maintained tlroughout the process that identify whee aDd how unsubstanlited data is used in the isk assessment process, so its pote[tial impct on tle variability and ccutacy of ssessment results can bc consideed. Tlris is often refered to as rrclldit0 or i^Iormation about the data. Data resolutiol and units shall aso bc determiled. Consistency in units is essential for jntegration. Every effort should be madc to utilize all of the actual data
IO

of integrity maragemenL and risk assessment. A major stength of an effective integrity mana8ement program lies in its ability to merge and utilize multiple data elemenfs obtained from several sources to provide an improvecl confidence tlat a specific threat ray or may not pply to a pipeline segment. It can also lead to an improved analysis of overall risk. or integrity mangement pogrm applicatiors, one
of the first dat integration steps inclucles development
of a common reference system (ar'd consistent measurement units) that wil allow daL elements fom vaious sources to be combined and accurtely associted with

common pipcline locations. or instnce, in-line

(opyrighl O20lUbytheArnericansocietyofVechanrcal

No rcproduclion rnay bc madc ofthis malerial \,\illout $riltcn conscnr ol'ASMI

Engineers. fft . '(dy

o
!!

ASME 831.85-2010

l
!I

ispectior (ILI) data may refeence the distance lraveled

For performance-based programs, risk assessmenls

serve the following purposesr (f) to organize data ad information to help opelators

along the irside of the pipeline (wheel count), which can be difficult to directly combine wifl over-the-line
surveys such as close inlerval survey (CIS) that ac referenced to engireering station ocations. lble 1 describes data elements that can be evauatecl in a structued manne to determine if prficul threat is applicable to the re of corce or the segment being considered. Initially, tls can be accomplislred without the benefit of ilspecton dat and may only inclucle the ppe attribute ald constructior data elements shown in Table 1. As othe information such as inspection dat becomes available, an additional inlegration step can be perfomed to confirm the pevious irlference concerning LIe validity of the presurned threat. Such data integration is lso very effective fo assessing the need and type of mitigation measures to bc used. Data integration can also be accomplished manually or graplically, An example of manu integration is the superimposing of scaled potential impact rea circlcs (see section 3) on pipeline aerial photograply to dcfermine the extent of the potential ipact area. Graphical irtegration can be accomplished by loading risk-relatccl dat eements into al MIS/G[S systern ancl graphically overlaying them to establish tle location of a specifc threat. Depending on tle data resolution used, this coud

prioritize and plan activilies

(r) to deternne wlicl 1spectior, prevenLiot, and/or mitigatol activifies will be perfomed and

a.

when

5.2 Defntion
Tle operalor shall folow section 5 in its entirety to conduct a performance-based inteBity malagernent pogm. A prescriptive-based integrity management plogram shall be conducted using the requirements

iclentifiecl

in this

section nd ir Nonmandatory

Appendix .4. Ilisk is typiclly described as the procluct of two primry factors: the failure likelihood (or pobabiity) tlat
some adverse event will occur and the resulting consequences of Llat event. One method of describing risk is
Riski

-'
o

P
9

C for a single threat

Risk = !

(P

C,)

for thrcat categories 1 to 9

Ce

o
5.

rotut sogil'l.'t .irt

=Pr x Cr +
where

P2

x C2+... + P9 x

be applied to ocal aeas or larger segments.

q:

Moe-specific data integraton software is also available tlt facilitates use ir cobined analyses. The benefits of clat integation cn be ilustrated by the following

C = failure consequence P = failue ikelihood 1to9 = failure thet category (see para. 2.2)
The risk analysis metlod used shall addess al nine tlret categories or each of the indvidual 21 threats to tle pipeline system. Risk consequerces typically consider components such as the potential impct of lhe event on idividuals, property, business, and the environment, as shown in section 3.

hypothetical examples:
EXAMPL,ES:

(1) ln reviewirg Il.,l data/ ar operator suspccts meclanicadam8e n the top quadr;t of a pipeline in cultivated fielci. It is lso know that the farmer hs bec plowjng il t1is area and that tle depth of cover may be rc.luccd. llch of these fcts taker individully providessome indication of possible mechallical damage, bLrt as a group ile reslt is more defintive. 12) Ar operator suspects that possible corosrcn problcmexists on a large'diame ter pipelire loc;rtec in a populted area. Howcvet a CIS idicates good catlrodic protectror coverage jn the rea. ^ direct c rfert voltage grdient (DCVC) coating condition inspec, ti js performd )d rveals tlat tle welds \,ree tape-coated ncl are in poor condition. Tle CIS rsults did not irdicate a potentia inte8rrty issue, tlut dt irtegrtion preventcd possjrly incorrect

5.3

Risk Assessment Obiectves

-1

For application to pipelines and fciities, risk assessment has the followirg objectives: (d) proritizfion of pipelnes/segmenfs for schedr.rling integrity assessmer'ts and mitigatilg action (,) assessment of the benefits clerivecl from mitigating actin

3
a,

l.) dctcrmintion ol lhc mosl

cffcctive mitigti()n

RISK ASSESSMENT

5.1 lntroducton
Risk assessments shall be conducted fo pipelines and related faclites. llisk assessments are required for both prcscriptive- nd performance based inteBrity management programs. For prescriptive-bsed programs, risk ssessments re prinarily utilized to priolitize irtcgity management plan ctivities. TIey help to orgarize dfa ard iformation to make decisions.
11

rneasures for the identified threats (rl) assessmen[ of the integrity impact fom modified inspection i1tervals (e) assessment of the use of or need for lternative inspectior rnethodologies f) moe cffective resouce allocation Risk assessment provides a measure that evaluates both the potent impact of different ircident types ard the likelihood tht such events may occur. l-laving sucl a measure supports the integrity management pocess by facilitating rationl and consistent decisions. Risk

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,gineers. fft

ASMI- '(l

as48 831,8S-20X0

results are uscd to idertify loctions for integrity assess-

ments and resulting mitigative ction. Examin;ng both

primary risk factols (likelihood and consequences)

avoids focusing soely ot the most visible or frequently occurring poblems while ignoing potential events that could cause significantly greater damage. Conversey, tle process also avoids focusng on ess likely catastoplic events while overlooking more likely scenarios.

5.4 oevetopng a Risk Assessment Approach

As an integal part of ny pipeline integrity manageent program, an effectve risk assessment process shal provide risk estirltes to facilitate decision-making. When propelly implemented, risk assessment methods can be very powerful analytic metlods, using a vriety of inputs, that provide at improved undetstanding of the natLre nd loctions of risks along a pipeine or within a facility. Risk assessment methods alone shoud not be completely relied upon to establish risk estimates o to address or mitigate known risks. Risk assessment methods slroud be used in coljunction with knowledgeable, experienced persolnel (subject matter experts and people familia with the facilities) that regularly review the data input, ssumptiors, nd esults of the risk assessments. Such experience-based reviews should validte isk assessment output with otler relevant factors not included in the process, the impact of assumptions, or the potential risk variability causecl by l'tissirg or estimted data. Ihese processes and tleir results shall be documentecl in the iltegrity mangemelt pln. An inteBral part of tle risk assessment procetis is the incorporation of additional data eements or changes to facility data.'Io ensure regular updtes, the operato slall incorporate lhe risk assessment process itto existing field reporting, engineering, and facilty mapping proccsses and incorporate additional processes as required (see section 11).

approaches are listed in a hierarchy of increasing complexit, soplistication, ancl data requiements. '[ hese risk assessmet approaches are subject mattcr experts, reative assessments,scenario assessments, ald probabilistic assessments. The following paragraphs describe risk assessment methods for the four listed approaches: (1) Subjec! Mattet .xpetts (SMs). SMEs from the operating compry or consultants, combined with information obtaincd from technical liteature, cn be used to provide a relative lumeric vluc describing the likelihood of failure for eacl threat ard thc resulting conse-

!l

'

'
9,

quences. The SMEs are tilized by the operator to analyze each pipelinc segmert, assigr' relative likelihood and consequence vlues, nd calculte the relative isk. (2) l<elntiae Assessment Models. This type of assessment builds on pipeline-specific expeience and more extensive data, and includes the development of risk models addressing the known threts tht ave historiclly impact(rd pipeline operations. Such elative or
dat-based methods use models that identify nd quantitatively wcigh tle mjo threats and consequences relevant to pst pipeline operations. I'hese approaches are consiclcred relative risk models, since the risk esrlts are compred with results flenerated from the same model. They provice a risk ranking for the integrity mangement clecisior-r pocess. These models utilize lgorithms weigling the major threts and consequences, and provide sufficienl data to meaningfully assess them. Relative fsessment modes arc more complex ard require more specific pipeline system dat tln subject matte expert-bsed risk assessment approaches. The relative risk assessment approach, the mode, and the results obtaired shall be documented in the integrity management pro8ram. (3) Scetnria-Bnsecl Morlls. I'his risk assessment apploach creates models tlat geneate description of an event or series of events leading to a cvel of isk, and includes both the likelihood and consequences from sucl events. This method usually includes construction of event trees, decisior' trees, and fault trees. From these constructs, risk values ae determined. (4) I\'obnbilistic Molls. This approach is the most compex and demanding with respect to data requite-

q.

:=.

z
2f

I I
6'

5.5 Risk Assessment Approaches

(n) ln order to organize integrity assessments for pipeline segments of concern, a risk priorily shall be estab-

f
o.

lisled. This risk vaue is composed of a numbe

eflecfing the overlI Iikelihood of faiure and a number reflecfing the conseqlrences. The risk analysis can be fairly simple with values ranging from 1 to 3 (to reflect high, medium, ancl low lkclihood and consequences) or can le more complex and involve a ltger rnge to provide greater diffeentiation between pipeline segments. Multiplying the relative likelihoocl and corsequence numbers togetler provides tle operatol.with a relative risk for the segment and a relative prioity for its assessment. (r) An opertor shall utilize one o nor.e of the folowjig risk assessment approches consistent witl tle objectives of the integity mnagement program. Thcse
12

ments. The rsk output is provided in a format that is compared to acceptble risk probbilties established by the operator, ratler than using a comparative basis. It is the operator's responsibility to apply the level of integrity/risk analysis methods llat meets the needs of the operator's integrity managemenI progrm. Morc Lhan one type of model may be used throughout an operator's system. A tloougl understnding of the strelgths and Iimitations ofeach risk assessmcnt method is necessry before long-term strategy is adopted. (c) All risk assessment approaches described above have the following comlon comporents: (i) they identify potentil events or conditiors that coud threatcn system integrity

f I

Copyriglt O 2010 by lhe An)ericn Socrety of MechaDical E'gineers N be made ofthis ratcrial wiihout written coDsentof^SME.

&

o 9
asME B31.aS-2010

(2) tley evalLrate likelihood of failure and consequcnces

5,7 Characterstics of an Effectve

Approach

q
Rsk Assessment

(3) they permit risk ranking ard idertification of

specific theats that primarily influelce or drivc tle isk

Considerilrg the objectives summarized in para. 5.3,

a r'umber of general characteristics exist lhat wil contibute to the overall effectiveness of a risk assessmert

(4) they lead to the identificatior of integity assessment and/or mitigation options

for eitle presciptive or pelfolmance-based iltegrity

management programs. These characteristics shall i1clude tle following: (n) Afh'ih fes. Any risk assessment approach shall
contain a definecl logic and be structured to provice a complete, accuraLe, ald objective analysis of risk. Some risk methocls require a more rigid strucfure (and considerably more input data). Knowledge-based methods are

(5) they provide for dt feedback loop

meclanism

z q
q

(6)

they plovde structure and contir'uous updatnfl

for risk ressessmcnts

Some risk assessmelt pproches colsider the likeli-

hood and consequences of damage, but they do not consider whetler failure occurs as a leak or rupture. Ruptures hve more potential for damage than leaks. Consequently, wher a risk assessment approach does not consicler wletler a failure may occr as a leak or rupture, worst-cse assumption of rupture shall be
mde.

5.

Rsk Analyss
Rsk Analyss for Prescrptve

5.6.1

lntegrity Manage-

ment Ptogfams. The risk analyses developed for a prescriptive integrity management program are used to

prioritize tle pipeline segmelt integrity

assessments.

Once tle integrity of a segment is estblishecl, the reinspection intervl is specified in Table 3. The risk anayses for prescriptive integrity managemenL progrms use miriml data sets. Ihey cannot be used to increse the reinspection intervas. Wlcn the operator follows the prescptive reir'spection intevals, the moe simpljstic risk assessment

approaches provicled
appropriale.

in para. 5,5 are considerecl

5.6.2 Risk Analyss for PeJformance-Based lntegrity Management Pfogfams. Perfomnce-based integrity margement programs shall prioritize initil integity assessments utilizilg any of the methods descibed irr
para.5.5. Risk analyses for pcrformnce-based integrity mangement programs may also be usecl as a basis for estab-

less rigolous kr apply and require more input from subject-matter experts. They shall all follow an cstabIished structure and consider the nine categories of pipeline threats and consequences. (b) ResoLLrces. Adequte personnel ind time shll be lotted to permit implementation of the selectecl approach and future considertions. (c) Operotittg/Mitigatia Hislotll. Any risk assessment shall conside the frequency and .onsequences of past events. Preferably, this slould include the subject pipeIine system or a similar system, but othe industry clata can be used where sufficient data is iitially not availble. In addtior, tle isk ssessment method sll account fo ny corective or risk miti8ation action tlat has occured prcviousy. (cl) Prcdictiae Capnl:i/ify. To be effective, a risk assessment method should be able to identify pipeline integrity blreats previously nol colsidered. It shall be able to make use of (or irtegrate) the data from various pipelne inspecfions to provide lisk estimates llat llay result from threats lhat have not been previousy recognized as polential problem areas. Another valuabe approach s the use of trending, whcre the esults of inspections, examinations, and evaluations are collected over time in order to predict future conditions. (c) Risk Cotficlcnce. Any data applied in a risk assessment process shall be veified and checked for accuracy
(see

o
:s.

z
4

z g
+

o 6
6

-l f
9

section 12). Inaccurate data will produce a less accu-

Iishing inspection illevals. Sttch risk analyses will equie more data elemenls than required in
Nonmandatory Appendix A ncl more detailed analyses. The results of these analyses may so be used to
evaluate alteative mitigation and prevention methocls

rate isk re$ult. For missing or questionable dta, the opeato shoulcl determine and document te default
values lhat will be used nd wly they wee chosen. The operator should choose defLt vlues llat conservatively reflect the values of otre similar segmenls on the pipeline or in tle operator's system. These colservative values may elevte the risk of the pipeline and encouge ctiol to obtail accurate data. As the data are obtained,

t
F

and tleir timing,

An initial strategy for ar operator with minimal experience using structued risk analysis methods may include dopti\g a more simple approarch for tle shot Lerm, such as knowledge-based or a screening relative lisk model. As additional daf ald cxperience are
Saired, tl(] opeatorcan transition to more comprehen-

sive ethod.

lhe uncerlainties will be elimir'ated and the rcsultant risk values may be reduced. (f) Feedbock. One of tre most important steps in an effective risk analysis is feedback. Any risk ssessment metlod shall not be considered as sttic tool, but as a process of continuo!s improvement. Hffective feedback is r essential process component in contintou!
13

( opyrighl O 20tU by lhe

Sociely olMcchanical

tgineero.

^mcricar No reproduclion may bc rndc ofrhis rnrL.ridl

\irhour$rillcnconserlolASME.'Cqx

f&

o
ASME 831.8S"2010

f
(10)

Table

lntegrty Assessment lntervals:

er

Time-Dependent Threats, lnternaI and External Corrosion, Prescrptive lntegrity Management Plan
6.

Opeting Pressre lnterval, yr

nspecton Technque Hydro5tatic testing tNote (1)l
5

Opetating Pressure Above 50% of SMYS

Above 30% But

Exceedng 50% of

Not SMYS

Operating Pressure Not Exceedng 30% of SMYS

TP TP

IP to 1.?5 times
INote (2)l

I!4AOP

lP to 1,39 tlres IAOP

INore (2)l

to 1.65 times
lNote (2)l

g
I,IAOP [,\AOP

10
15

P to 1.39 times
[Note (2)] Not allowed Not allowed

MAOP

fP to 1,65 times

440P

to 2.20 times

)o

[Note (2)] TP to 2.00 times MAoP lNore (2)l Not allowed

INote (2)l TP to 2.75 times MAOP lNote (2)l

TP

to 3.33 times
lNore (2)l

IMAOP

ln-line inspection

Pf above 1.2 5 times

Pf above

1.39 tires

]MAoP [Note (3)] 10 15

Pf above 1.19 times rMAoP lNote (3)]

IMAOP [Nole (3)] P bove 1.65 times

Pf above 1.6 5 tmes IMAoP lNote (3)]

Not allo!^/ed Not allowed

20

MAoP [Note (])l P/ above 2.00 iimes IIAOP [Note (3)] Not allowed

2.20 times MA0P [Note (3) Pr above 2.75 times NIAOP {Note (3)l Pf above 3.31 tires IVAoP lNote (3)]
Pf above

o
5.

Direct ssessmenl

5
LO

Sample of indicatons examined [Noie (4)] All indications examined Not allowed Not allowed

L5 20

Sample of rndictions examined INote (4)l Smple of indications examined lNote (4)l A indicatios examined Not allowed

Sample of indications exanrined [Note (4)] Sample of indcatons examined INote (4)l All indications exmined All indications exmined

z
5

-s.

NOIES:

(1) lnleruls are maxmum and may be less, depending on repairs made and prevention activites instituted. ln addition, certain lhrets
cn be extremely aggessive and may significantly reduce the interval belween inspectlons. Occurrence of a time-dependent failure requires immediate reassessment of the intelval.

(2) lP is test pressure. (3) P is predicted failure pressufe as determined from

(4) tor the Direct Assessment

ASIME B31G or equivalent. Process, the intervals ior direct examnaton of indications are contalned within the process. These inlervals provide ior sampling of indications based on their severity and the results of previous examiations. lJnless all indications are examined and repaired, the maximu interval iof reinspection is 5 yr for pipe operting above 50% SI,IYS nd 10 yr for p]pe operating up to but not exceeding 50o/o of sMYS.

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isk model validation. hr addition, the modcl shall be

adaptable and changeable to accommodate new thteats. (g) DocuDtctltatoa. The risk assessment process slall

be thoroughly and completely rlocumented, to prvide the background and technical justification for the metlods and procedures used and their impact on decisions based on tre risk estimates. I-ike the risk process itscl{, such a documclt should be periodically updated as modifications or risk process changes are incorporated. (h) "WhaL f' Deterninntions. An effective isk model should contain the structure recessy to perform "what if" calcultions. This structure ca provide estimates of thc effects of charnges ove time and the risk recluctiol bcnefit fom maintennce o remedial actiors. (i) Weighlittg Fnctots. l\ll threats and consequences contained in a relative risk assessment process sroulcl
not have the same level of i1flucrce on the risk estimate.
14

Iherefore, a structured set of weighting factos shall be included that indicate the value of each risk assessment component, including both failure probability and consequences. Such factors can be l:ased on operationl experience, the opinions of subject malter experts, or

L
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industy experi(]ncc.

(j) Sftuclne. Any risk

asscasment process shall pro-

vidc, as a mirimum, the ability k) co|npre d rank tle risk results to support the irtegrity Danagement program's decision process. [t should aso provide for
several types of dat evaluation and comparisons, esfabIishing which particulal threats or factors have tle most influence on the result. The risk assessment process shal be structured, documented, and verjfiable. (k) Segtfiefntiatl. An effective risk ssessment proccss

(10)

shall incorporate sufficient resolution of pipeline

seg-

ment size k) anayze clat as it exists long tle pipeljne.

Cofyright @ 2010 by rhc Socicly of Mechanrcal ^nrcncn No reproduclon rny bc nadc ol rhis rnlcral $irhout r\rilrcn corserl

tnuincers. f& '(r

ol^SME.

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ASME 831.8S-2010

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St.rch analysis will facilitate location of local higlr,risk ares that may need immediate attettion. For risk assess-

mcnt purposes, setmetl lengtts can rnge from units of feet to miles (m to km), depending on tre pipeine
ttributes, its environment, and otler dta. Another requiemclt of the model jnvolves the ability to update the rsk model Lo ccount for mitigation or otler action that changes the dsk in a particular length. This can bc illustrated by assuming tlat two acljcent mile-Iorrg (1.6 km-long) segments have been identified. Suppose a pipe replacement is completed foln the midpoirt of one segment to sone pont within the other ln order k) ccount for tle rsk reduction, tle pipeline length comprising tlese two segments now becomes four isk analysis segmets. Ihis is clled r/l/rdic
seg rcntotiol1.

The processes and risk assessment methods used shall be periodically reviewed to ensure they continue to yield relevant, accurate results consistenL with tle objectives of the opeator's overall integrity management profram. Adjustments and inprovements to the risk ssessment methocts wilL be necessary as more complete ard accu-

rte informtion concerning pipeline system attibutes and history becomes available. These adjustments shall require a reanalysis of the pipeline segments included

9-

il the integrity mnagcment program, lo ensute that equivalent assessments or comparisons are macle.
5.9 Data Collection for
Rsk Assessment Data colection issueshavebeen discussed n section 4. When analyzing lhe esults of the risk assessmerts, the operator may find lhat additional data is requircd. Iteration of the risk assessment process may be equired to improve the clarity of the results, as well as confim the reasonableness of the results. Determining the isk of pqtential threats will esult in specifiction of the minimum data set required for implementation of the selectecl risk process. Ifsignificant daLa elements are not avaiable, modifications of tl're

5.8 Risk Estimates Usng Assessment Methods

A descriptior of various details nd complexities associated witl different risk assessment processes Is been povided in paa. 5.5. Operato that have not previously initiated a iormal isk assessment process may fird an

initia screening to be bereficial. The esults of lhis

scrcening can be inplemented withn short time frame and focus given lo tle most important areas. A screening risk assessment may not include the entie pipeline system, but be limited to res with a history of problems o whee failure could esult in fhe most severe consequences, such as areas of concern. Risk assessment ald clata collecton may then be focusecl on the most likely threats without requiing excessive detail. A scrceilrg risk assessment suitable fol tlis pproach can include subject matLer experts or simple reltive risk models as described in pata. 5.5. A group of subject-matter experts

a
5

proposed rnodel may be required after carefully reviewing the impact of missing dt nd taking into account the potential effect of uncertainties created by using required estimated values. An altertive could bc to use related data elements in order to make an
irfereltial threat estimate.

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5

5.10 Priortzaton for Prescrptive-Based and

Performance-Based lntegrity Management Programs

z s

A first step in prioritization usually involves sorting

prtcula segmenl's risk results in decreasing order of overall risk. Smilar sortilg can aso be achieved by sepamtely considerirg decreasing consequences ot failurc probability levels. The lighest risk level segment shall be assigned a higher priority when deciding where to implement integrity ssessment and/or mitigation actions. Also, the operator should assess risk factos that cause higher isk levels for paticular segments. Tlcse factors can be applied to help select, pioritize, and schedule locations for inspection actions such as hydrostatic testing, inline inspection, or direct ssessment. For example, a pipeline segment may rnk extremely high for a singe threat, but rank much lower for the ggregate of thrcats compared to all othe pipeline segments. Timely resoution of lhe sirrge highest threat segment ay be more appropriate tlan resolutol of the highest aggegate threat segment. For initia efforts and screening purposes, risk results could be evaluated simply on a "high-medium-low" basis or as a mrmerical vaue. When setments being comprcd lave similar risk values, the failure probability ald conscqueices should be considered separately.
ech

epresenting pipelne operatios, engineering, and

others knowledgeable of threats tht my exist s assem-

bled to focus on the potential tlreats and risk reduction measures tlat would be effective ir the ntegrity mtagement pogram. Application of any type of risk allalysis methoclology shal be consideed as n clemenl of continrcus pocess and lot a one-time evenL. A specified period defined by tle operator shall be esrablished fo a system-wide risk reevaluation, butshll rot exceed the required maximum r'terval in Table 3. Segments coltairing indicatiorls thl are scheduled for exmination or that ar(3 to bc monilored must be assessed witlin time intervals that will maintain system integrity. The frequency of the system-wide eevaluation must be t least annully, but may be mote freqrLent, based on the frequency arrd importance of clata modifications. Such eevalualion shoulcl include all ppeines or segments included in the risk analysis process, to ensute tht the mosl recent inspection resuts and information are reflected it the rcovJlutior arrd .rny risk compalis('ns ire on n equal basis.
15

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i
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This rnay lcad to rhe highest consequence segment being

Copyrighf O 2010 by the ,Americn Society ofMechanical No reprcductror rnay be made oflhis nraterial wrthout written consenl

EDgineers. fS

ofASME. 'le)l

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ASME 831.8S-2010

6
given a l.righer prioily. lactors including line availability and system tloughput requirements can also influence
!)_

such s irLl]rnal corrosion and SCC, may not be immedi-

pioritization. The integrity plan shall also provide for the elimintion of any specific lhrcat from tle risk assessment. For a prescriptive irtegrity mr'agement program, the minimum data requircd and the ctiteria for risk assessment

ately cvident and cn become a significnt thret even aftcr exterded operating periods.

5.11 lntegrty Assessment and Mitgaton

The process begins with examining tle nature of the most significant risks. The risk drivers for each highisk segmert should be considered in determining flc most effective integrity assessment and/or mitigtior' optior'. Section 6 discusses integrity assessment nd section 7 discusses optiors that are commonly used to litiBte threts. A recalcuation of each segment's risk fter integity assessment arrd /or mitigation acfiols is required to ensue that the segmcnt's ilrtelrity can be maintained to the next inspectior interyal. It is necessay to consider a variety of options or combinations of integrity ssessments and mitigation actions that directly address the primary threat(s). It is also prudent to consider the possibility of using new technologies that cn provide a mole effective or comprehensive

s.

are specified in Nonmandtory Appendix A.

Peformance-basecl integrity anagement programs that use more comprehensive alralysis methods should consider the folowirg ir oder to exclude a threat in a segmentl (a) therc is no history of a threat impacting the particular segment or pipeine system (ll) tlc threat is not supported by applicable industry data or expeience (.) the threat is not implied by related dat elements

in order to eliminate a tlreat from furtler corsideation

q.

:.
d

(d) tle theat is not supported by like/sirnilar

analyses

() tle threat is not applicable to system o segment

risk mitigation approach.

operating conditions

Morc specificaly, para. (c) considers the application of elated data elements to provide an indication of a threat's pl]seice when otler data elements may lot be available. As an example, for the external corrosiol tlreat, multiple dat eements such as soil type/nosture level, CP data, CIS data, CP cuer't demand, and coating condition can l be used, ol if one is unavailabe sbset may be sufficent to determine
whether the thret shall be considered for tht scgment. I'aragraph (d) considers the evaluation of pipeline segments wifh known and similar conditions that can bc used as a basis for evaluatirg tlc existence of threats on pipelines with rissirg data. Pargrph (e) alows for the fact that some pipeline systems or segments ac not vulnerable to some tlreats. For instance, based on industry reseach and experience, pipelines operating at low stess levels do not develop SCC-related failures. The unavailability of identified data elements is rot a justification for exclusion of a thret from lhe integrity mangement program. Depending on the importance of the dat, additional inspection actions or fielct data collection effots may be required. h additiot, a threat canot be excluded without consideration given to the likelihood of interaction by other threats. For ir'stance, cathodic potection shielcling in rocky terrin whee impressed currert may not pevent corrosiol in areas of damaged coating must be considered.
When corsideing threat exclusion, a cautionry lote

5.12 Valdaton Validation of risk anaysis lesults is one of the most important steps in any assessment process. Ths shal
be done lo ensule that the metlods used have produced results that are usable and are consisLent witl the operator's and irdustry's experience. A reassessment of and rnoctificatirn to the risk assessment process shall be

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required if, as a result of maintenance o other activities,

areas are found that are iaccurately reprcsented by the lisk assessment process. A risk validation process slall

q o 6

be identified and documented in the irtegrity mangc-

ment Progrm. Risk esult validations can le successfully performcd by conclucting inspections, examinations, and evluations at locations that re indicted as either high risk or low risk, to cletemine if thc methocls a)e correctly characterizir-r8 the risks. Vlidtion can be achieved by considering another location's information regarding tle condilion of a pipeline segment and the condition determined during maintennce ction orprior lemedial efforts. A specia risk assessment performed using klow data prior to the maintenance activity can indicate f mcningful results are bejng generatecl.

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6
.1

I
INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT

General

llsed on the priorities determined by risk ssessment,

apples to threals classified as time-dependent.

Although such an event my roL lave occurecl in any given pipeine segment, system, or facility, the fact that the tlret is collsidered time-dependent slould require very storg justificatiol for its exclusion. Some threts,

tl(: opetor shal conducI integrity assessments usiltg the appropriatc integity assessment methods. The integrity ssessment methods that cat be used are inline irNpection, pressue tcstilg, direct assessment, or other mellodologies provicled r' para. 6.5.l'he integrity assessment metlod is basecl on the threats t which the

No

Copyright O 2010 by the Atedcan Soclety olMechanicat Engineers rnay be made ofthis matcrial wilhout wriltcn consent ol'ASME

lt!

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asME Bi1.8S-2010

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segment is susceptible. More tlan one method and/or tool may be required to ddress all tle threats in a pipeline segment. Conversely, inspection using any of the integrity assessment mtlods r'ay not be the appropriate action for the operator to take fo cetain threats. Other actions, such as prevention, lny provide better

.2.1 Metat toss Toots for the lnternal and External Corroson Threat. For these threats, the following tools
canbe used. Thei effectiveness is limited by the technology tle tool employs. (a) Mngnetic FIux Leakoge, Stndiftl l<esolulioll 'lbol. 'Ihis is better suitl]d for detcctior' ol melal loss than for sizing. Sizing accuracy is limited by sensor size. It is sensitive to cerlain metallurgical defects, sLlch as scabs
m

integrty malagement results. Section 2 provides a listirg of threats by thrce groups: fime-dependent, stable, and time-idepeldent. Timedependent thleats can typically be addresscd by utilizing any ole of tle iltegrity assessrelt metlods discussed in this section. Stble tlreats, such as dcfects that occulred duling manufacturrg, ca1 fypclly be rddessed by pressure testing, while constluctiol nd equipment threats carr typically be addressed by exami[tion nd evaluation of the specific piece ofequipment, component, or pipe joirt. Random threats typically cannot be adclressed through use of any of tle integrity assessment methods discussed in this sectior, but are

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subject to tle prevention measures discussed in

section 7.
Use of a prticulr integrity assessment method may

find indications of fhreats other than tlose that the

ssessment was intended to addrcss. For example, the

third-party dmage threat is usually bcst addressed by

implementation of prevention activities; however, an inline inspection tool may indicate a dent in the top half of tle pipe. Examination of the dent may be an appropite actior in order to determine if the pipe was damaged due to tlird-party activity. ftis important to note thatsome of the integity ssessme1t rnethods discussed in section 6 only provide indicatiors of defects. Exmination using visual irspection and a variety of nondestructive examination (NDE) techliques are rcquired, followed by evalution of these inspection results in order to characterize the defect. Tle operator may cloose to go directly to examination and evaluation for tle ertire length of the pipeine segment being assessed, in lieu of conducting inspections. for example, the opertor may wish to conduct visual examination of aboveground piping for the external corrosion tlreat, Since the pipe is acccssible for this technique and cxternal conosion can be readily evaluated, performing inline inspection is not neccssry.

and slivers. It is not reliable for detectior or sizing of most defects other thn metal loss, and not relialle for detection or sizilrg of axially alignecl metal-loss defects. Higll inspection speeds degrade sizinB ccuracy. (b) Mngnetic FIux Leaknge, Higll l?.esolLttioll 7bol. This provicrles better sizing ccuracy tlan standard resolution tools. Sizing accuracy is best for geometricly simple defect shapes. Sizing ccuracy degrades where pits are present or defect geometry becomes complex. I'here is some ability to detect defects othe tlal metal loss, but ability vries witl defect geometries and claracteristics. It is not gencally reliable for axily aligned defects. Higl irspcctior' speeds degrade sizing ccurcy. (c) Ullrnsottic Cottptcssiott Wnoe Too. This usually requires a liquid couplant. It provicrles no detection or sizing capability wlere return signals are lost, whicl-l can occur indefects with rapidly changing profiles, some bends, and wlen a defect is shielded by a laminator. It is sensitive to debris arcl deposits on the inside pipe wll. High speeds degradc axial szir'g resolution. (tl) Ultrnsonrc Sllenr Wnue Tool. This equires a liquid couplant or a wheel-couplecl systern. Sizing accuracy is limited by the numler of sensors and the complexity of tle defect. Sizing accuracy is degraded by tle peser'ce of incusions and irnpuities in the pipe wall. High spceds degrade szilg resolutiol. k) Tt nnstersc FlLtx Tool. This is moe sensitive to axially aligned metal-loss defects than standard anc higl resolution MFL tools, It may also be sensitive to otle axially aligned defects. It is less sensitive than standard

-t

and high resolution MFL tools to circumferentilly

ligncd defecfs.It generally provides lcss sizing accuracy than high resolution MFL tools for most defect geometries. High speeds can degrade sizrg ccuracy.

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5

6.2

Ppetine ln-Lne lnspecton

L-line irspection (ll,l) is an integrity assessment melhod used fo loc[c nd preliminarily characterize
ildications, sucl as rnctal loss or deformation, in a pipeline. 'I le effectvelcss of the ILI tool used depends on the conditior of the specific pipeline section to be inspected and how well the Lool lnatches thc requirements set by tle inspectior-r objectives. API Stardard 11,63, I tl-Li11e [lspectian S,:jstents Qual ificatiort, provrdes additional guidance on pipelrre in-line inspection. Tle following paragraphs discuss the use of ILI tools for certin threts.

6.2.2 Clack Detecton Tools for the stress Corroson Crackng Threat, or this threat, tle following tools car be used. Their effectiveness is limited by the technology
the tool employs.

(n) Ultrnsonic Slter Wae Too/. "l'his requires a liqLrd couplant or a wheel couplecl system. Sizing accurcy is Iimited by the numbe of sensos and the complexity of the crack colony. Sizing accuracy is degradecl by the presence ol inclusions and impurities in the pipe wall. High irspection speeds degrade sizing accuracy ald resolution. (b) Trnusaetse F/rx T0o/. Tlis is able to detect some axially aligned cracks, not incucling SCC, br-rt is not l7

Copyrglt O 2010 by the ,4nlerican Society of Mechanical Engineers No my be mde ol'this natcril without wriften consent of SMfj

&

ASlvlE 831,85-2010

cor'sidered ccurate for sizing. Higl inspectio speeds can degrade sizinB accuracy.

(5) RequienettlsJltr Defect Assess1lte11!. Resultsof ILI hve to be adequate for thc specific opeator's defect
ssessment ProSram-

!I

6.2.3 Metat Loss and Caliper Tools for Third-Party

Dmage and Mechanical Damage Threat. Dents and areas of metl loss are the only aspect of these fheats for which Il,l tools cal be effectively used for detection

() Typically, pipelne operators provide ar'swcrs to

a questionnaire provided by the ll-t vendor that should

and sizing. Deformation or geometry tools re most often used for dctecting damage to the line involvilg defolmatiol of the pipe cross sector, which can be caused by construction dalnage, dentscaused by the pipe settling onto rocks, thircl-prty damage, and winkles or buckles caused by compressv(] ioding or uneven settlement of tlc pipeline. The lowest-resolution geometry tool is tle gagjrg pig or single-channe calipcr-type tool. l'his type of tool is adequate for icentifying nd locating severe defomation of tll pipe cross section. A higher resolution is provided by standard caliper tools that record a channel of data for each caliper arm, typically 10 o 12 spaced aound the circumference. This type of tool can be used

list ll tle signifcart parameters and claracteristics of the pipelile section to be nspected. Some of the more inportart issues tlt should be consideed are as
follows:
('1) Pipelirrc Quesfiotttnire. TIe questionnaire provides a review ofpipe claracLerisLics, such as steel grade, type ofwelds, Iength, diameter, wall thickness, elevafior

9.

profiles, etc. Also, the questionnaire identifies any

restrictions, bends, known ovalities, valves, unbarred tces, coupirgs, and clill ings the ILI tool may need to
negotiate.
a.

to.tiscern deformation severity and overall shape

aspecls of the cleformation. With some effort, it is possi-

(2) Lo nclters td lin,'s. These items slould be reviewed for suitability, since ILI tools vary in overall Iength, complexit, geometry and rnaneuverability. (3) Pipe Cleanlitrcss. The cleanliness can significantly affect data colection. (4) "lype of Fluid. l'le type of phase - gas or iquid affccts the possible choice of teclnologies.

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ble to identify s}rarpness or estimate strains associated with the deformation using the star'dard caliper too
output. High-esoution tools povicle the most detailed informatior about the deformation. Some also ildicate slope or change in slope, which can be useful fot identifyitrg bending or setllement of the pipeline. Third-party damage tht has rerouded unde the influence of intenal pessure in the pipe may challenge the lower limits of eliable detection of both tle standard and ligl-resolution tools. There las been limited success identifying tlrd-pty damage using magnetic-flux

(5) Flozo llalc, Prcssu|c, ntul Telpcrollte. Fow rte of the gas will influcnce the speed of the ILI tool inspection. [f speeds are outside of the nomal ranges, resolution can be compromised. Total time of inspection is dictated by irspection speed, but is limited by tlc total capacity of btteries and data storage available or the tool. High tempeatures can affect tool opeation quality
and slrouid be considered.

(6) Ilrodlct Bypnss/Supplentent. Ieduction of gas flow and speed reduction capability on tle ILI tool may
be a consideration in higher velocity lines. Conversely, the availability of suppementary gas where the flow rte is too ow shal be consideed. (c) Thc operatol sral assess the general reliabiity of

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leakage tools. MFL tools are rot usefu fot sizing

dcfomations.

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6.2.4 All Other Threats. Inline jnspection is typically not tle appropriate inspecton method to use fo all otler tlrets listed in section 2.

the ILI method by looking at the following: (1) confidence level of the ILt method (e.g., probability of detecting, clssifying, and sizing the anomaies) (2) history of tle I[,] method/tool

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6.2.5 Specat Consderatlons for the Use of ln-Lne

lnspecton Toots

(3) success rate/failed surveys (4) bility of the tool to irspcct the full length

ancl j

(n) The folkrn'ing shall also be considered when

selecting the appropriate too: (1) Dctcclon Senstti?if MriDlum defect size specified lol rhe ILI tool should be smalle thn the sze of the defect sought to be detected, (2) Clossificaliou. Classification allows differentiatjon among types of anomalies. (3) Sizilg Accurncy. Szing accuracy enables prioritization and is a key to a successful ilttcgrity manage-

full circumfeence of tle scction

(5) ability to indicate te pesence of multiple cuse anomalies Generally, representatives from the pipelile opcrtor and the ILI service vendor should analyze tle gol nd objectve of the inspection, and match signficant factors known about the pipeline and expected aromalies with tlc capbiities and performance of tle tool. Choice of tool will depend on the specifics of tlre pipeline section and the goal set for the inspection. The operator shll outline the process used in the integrity management plan fo the selection and implcmentation of the ILI
inspections.
18

mcnt plan.

(4) Locoliott Accr'ncy. Location accuracy enables

location of omlies by excavation.

Copyrighl O :01 0 by rhc A mcricn So( iety of Mectanical Engi fQh No rcproducrion rnay be made ofthis mtcrial $ithourwriltcnconsenrol'SMli.'lg)r

eers.

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ASME 831.8S"2010

6.2.6 Examlnatlon and Evaluaton, lesults of inline inspection only provide ildications of defecls, with some claracterization of the defect. Screening of this information is required in order to determine the time framc fol examination ard evluation. Ihe time frame is discussed in section 7. Examination consists of variety of direct inspection

0,-

prior to the effective

clate

of this Cocle), pessure testing "eam

is5ue.

Pessure testing shall be in accordnce with ASME 831.8, to at least 1.25 times tle MAOP
ASME 831.8 clefines how to conduct tests for botl postconshuction and in-service pipelines.

must be perf.rrmed tU addresq the

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teclniques, including vsual inspectiol, inspcctions usirg NDE equipment, and taking lneasurcments, in order to characterize tle defect in confirmatory cxcavat;ois where anomalies are detected. Or'ce te defect is claracterizcd, the operator musL evuate the defect in order to determine the approprite rnitigaton actions.

6.3.3 Atl Other Threats, Pressure testing is typiclly 1ot the appropite iltegrity ssessmelt method to use for al other tlets lsted in sectior 2.

Mitigation is discussed in section

7.

6.3 Pressure Testng lolg been an industry-ccepted method for validatirB the ntcgrity of pipelines. 'Ihis
Pressure testir-rg has

6,3.4 Examnaton and Evatuaton. Any section of pipe that fails a pressure test slall be examined in oder to evaluate tlat tle failure was due to the thrcaf thal the test was irtendecl to acldess. lf the failure ws due to another threat, tle test failure infomrtior must be intetrated with otler infolmation rative to tle otlcr threat ancl tlle segment [eassessed lor risk.

integrity assessment method can be bolh

strength test

6.4

Direct Assessment

nd a leak test. Selectior of tls method shall be appropri,te for the threats berg sscs{cd. ,^.SME 831.8 contairs details ()1 conducting pressure tests for both post-corstucton tcsting and for subsequent testing after a pipeline has been ilr sevice for a period of time. The Code specifies tle test pressurc k) be attained and the test duration ir oder to ddrcss certain tlrets. It also specifies allowable test mediums

Direct assessment is ar integrity assessment metlod utilizint a structured proccss thlough which the operator is able to jntegrate knowledge of lhe physical characferistics and operating history of a pipeline system or segmert with the results of inspectioir, examinatio, ad evaution, in order to determine the intcgrity.

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6.4.1 External Corrosion Drect Assessment

(ECDA)

and unde what conditions the various test mediums

can be used.

The operator should consider the results of tle isk assessmentand the expected types ofanomalies to determine when to conduct inspections utilizil-tg pressue
testing.

6.3.1 Time-Dependent Threats. Pressure testing is appopite for use when addressing time-dependelt
threats. Time-dependent threats are external corrosion, internal corrosion, stess corrosion cracking, and otler envionmentlly assisted corrosion mechanisms,

for the E(ternal Cooson Thfeat. xtenal corrosion direct assessment can be used for delerminin8 integrity for the external corrosion threat on pipeline segments. The process integrates facilities data, and curent and historical field inspections and tests, wilh te physical charctcristics of a pipelile. Nonintrusive (typically aboveground or indirect) inspections are usecl to estimate tle success of the corrosion protection.'lhe ECDA process requires direct examinations and evaluations.
Drect examilators and evalutions confim tle ability of tle indirect ilspections to locate actve ard pastcorro-

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sion locations on the ppeline. Post-assessment

is

6.3.2 Manufacturng and Related Defect Threats.

Pressure testing is appropriate for use wher ddressir'g the pipe sem spect of the manufcturing threat. Pres-

sure tesfing shall comply with the requirements of

ASME 831.8. Tliis will define whelhe air or water shll be used. Seam issues have bcen known to exist fo pipe with a joint factor of ess than 1.0 (e.9., lap-welded pipe, hammer-welded pipe, and butt-welded pipe) or if the pipeline is cornposed of ow-frequency welded electric resistance welded (ERW) pipe or flash-welded pipe. tef ercnces for determinng f a specific pipe is susceptible Lo seam issues arc ltltegrity Clt]tictcrisLics of Vl1lage Pipelitrcs (The INGAA Foundation, Inc.) and Histoty of L,ine Pipc Mn fncturittg irt Not lh Anrcrica (ASME rcsearch report). When raising tlc M,{OP of a steel pipeline or wer

required to detelmne a corrosion rate to set the reilspectio irterval, ressess the perforilance metrics and their current applcabilty, nd ensure the ssumptions made il the previous steps remin corect. 'lhe ECDA process therefore has the followirrg four comPonents:

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(d) pe-assessment
(?)

ir'spections

(c) exmintiorrs and evalr.r(ions

'l'he focus of the ICDA approach described in this Code s to identify locations where external cor'osion defects may have formed. It is recognized that evidence of othe threats such as mechnicl damge and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) may be dctected during the ECDA process. While implementing ECDA ancl wherr
the pipe is exposed, lhe operator is advised to conduct examinations for nonexternal corlosion threats.

lf) post-assessment

rising the operating pressure above the historical

operating pressure (i.e., highest pressue recorded in 5 yr

l9
( opynf,hl O 2Ul0 by the,Arnericr Socicry ofMcchnicl
No repDduclion rnay bc madc

oflhis rntcrial $ithoutwrtlcncon:enlolASMF. '(qx

InU,inccrs. fft

ASME 831.aS-2010

al least two jnspecton rnetlods, verification checks by exmination alc evaluatiots, and post-ssessmelll
validtion.

'Ihe prescriptive ECD^ process equires the use of

pipeine scgmcrts by (rvalualing the SCC thet. Note

9I

inte8rity assessment method,

Appendix B, section
(10)

Ior more informaton on the ECDA process as al see Nonmandatoty

B-1.

that NACE RP0204 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) Direct Assessrert Mcthodology provides detailed guidance and proccdures fo conducting SCCDA. The
SCCDA pre-assessrneit process integrtes facilities data, cuuent and historical ficld inspections, ancl tests with the physcal chacteristics of a pipeine. Nonintrusive (typicaly tenain, aboveground, and/or indirect) observations and inspectiors are used k) esfimate the absence of corosior protection. Tle SCCDA process requires

I
m

q.

6.4,2 lnternaI Cofrosion Drect Assessment

(ICDA) for

Process

the lnternal Corroson Thteat, llrernl corro-

sion direct ssessment can be used for determiling interrity for the internal corrosion tlreat or pipelile segmets that uormally carry dry gas but may suffcr
from slort-tcrm upsets of wet gas or free watet (or other electrolytes). Exminations of low points or at inclir'cs alol.g a pipeline, which force an electrolyte sucl s water to first accurulate, provide informatiol about the remining lengtl of pipe. lf tlese k)w pojnls have not coroded, then othcr locations futthe dow\stream are Iess likely to accumulate electolytes and tlerefore can be considered free from corosion. These downstrcam locations woulcl rot equirc examination. Internal corrosion is most likely to occur.wlere water firsl accumulates. Peclicting the locations of water accu-

di)ect examinations and evlutions. Direct examinations and evaluations corfirm te ability of the indirect inspections to ocate evdcnce of SCC on the pipelinc. Post assessment is required to set the re-nspection intetval, re-assess the performance metrics ar'd tleir current applicability, plus confirm the valdity of the assumptions macle in tle previorrs steps remai colcct. The focus of the SCCDA approach described in this Code is to identify locations where SCC may exist. It is recognized that evidelce of other tlreats such as external corosion, interna corrosion, or mechanical damage

may be detected during the SCCDA process. While

inplementing SCCDA, and when tle pipe is exposed,
the opertor is advised to colduct examinations fo rorSCC threts. For cletailed information on the SCCDA process s an integrity assessment metlod, see especially

o
ts.

ulation (if upsets occur) serves

as a methocl for prio-

ritizin8 local examinatior's. Predicting where water first accumultes requires knowledge about the multiphase

flow behavio in the pipe, requiring certai data

(see

NACE RP

0204,

section 4). ICDA applies between any feed points until a new input or output clanges thc polential for electrolyte entry or flow characteristics.

6.4.4 Att Other Thfeats. Diect assessment is typiclly not the appropriate integrity ssessmenl metlod to use for all oder threats listed ir' sectiol 2.

110

s
5

Examintions are perfotmcd at locations where electroyte accumultjon is ptedicted. For most pipeines it is expected Lhat examinaliol by radiography or ultrasonic NDE will be required to measure the remaining wall thickness at those locations. Oncc site has been exposed, internal corrosion rnonitoring method(s) [e.g., coupon, probe, ultrasonic (UT) sensorl may allow an opertor to extend the leinspectiol interval and beefit from real-lime monitoring in the locations most susceptible to internal corrosion, There may also be some appl! cations where the most effective appoach is lo conduct

6.5 Other lntegrity Assessment Methodotoges

Othe. proven intcgrity ssessment methods may exist use in mlagng the irtegrity of pipelines. For the purpose of tlis Code, it is acceptable for an operator to use these inspections s an alternative to tlose listed

z s

for

above.

For prescriptive-based integrity mnagement programs, the altelnative itegrty ssessment shall be an industry-recognized rnethodology, and be approved and

I f
L

published by an rdustry consensus stanclarcls

in-line inspcction for a portion of pipe, and use the results to ssess the downsleam intertal corrosion
where inle inspection cannot be conducted. If the ocatiors most susceptible k) coltosiol are determiled not to cortain defects, the integrity of a large portion of the ppeline has been ensured. For.moe itformtion on tle ICDA pocess as n ittegity assessment metlod, see Normandfory Appendix B, section B-2, nd the
NACE 0206-2006 Stndard Prctice, Lter.nal Corrosior Direct Assessment Methodology for Pipelines Carrying Nomaly Dry Ntul cas (DclCDA).

organization. For pelformance-based integrity management programs, techriques other than tlose published by consensus standards organizations may be utilized; however, the operabr slall follow the performance requirements of this Code and shall be diligert in colfirming and

docunenting the validity of this approach to confirm tht highe level of integrity or integrity ssurnce
was achieved.

6.4.3 Stress Coffosion Crackng Direct Assessment the Stress Corroson Crackng Threat. Stress coroson cracking dject assessrncnt can be used to determine the likely presence or brencc of SCC on
(SCCDA) for
20

RESPONSES TO INTEGRITY A55E5SMENT5 AND MITIGATION (REPAIR AND PREVENTION)

7.1 General
Tlis section covers the schedule of resporses to lhe iidictons obtained by illspection (see sectiol 6), repair

Copyright O 2010 by the,American Society ofMechanrcal E No reproduction may be ladc ofthis materal witltout wrilten consent

gineers.

ol'ASME. \E

ffr

o
asME 831.aS-2010

activities tlat can be affected to remedy or eliminate an unsfe condition, preventive actors tlt can be taken to reduce or eliminate a threat to the integrity of a pipe'
ljne, nd estabishment oftle i1spection interval. Inspection intervals are based on tlte clracterizatio of defect indictions, the level of mitigatior achieved, the preventio methods employed, and the uscful life of the data, with consideration given to expected defect growth. Examination, evaluation, and mitigative actions shll

be selected and scheduled to aclieve isk rcduction where appropiate in each segmelt witlin thc ntegity lnanagement progtam, 'l'he integity management program slral provide
aralyses of existing and newly implemented mitigtion

take ction on tese inclications by either examiring them or reducir-rg the operating press.lre k) provide au addilional margin of safety, within a period not to exceed 5 days following determintion of tle condition. If the examination cnnoL be competed within tle lequited 5 clys, tle opertor slall temporaily reduce the opertinB pressure until the indiction is examined. Figure 4 shall be used to determine the reduced opeating pressure based on tle selected response time. After examination and evaluation, any defect found to require repair or removal sha be promptly remediated by repair or removal unless the operating pressure is lowered to mitigate the need to repair or remove tlte
dcfect.

9I

z
9-

actions to evaluate tleir eflectiveness atd justify their use in the uture. ]ble 4 incldes a summary of some pleventior and repair rnethods and their applicability to eacl thret.

7.2 Responses to Ppe(ine ln-Lne lnspections

An operator shall complete the response ccoding to

a prioritized schedule established by considering the re$uts of a risk assessment and the severity of in-line
inspecton ildications. Tle required response schedule intelva begins at the time the condition is discoveed.

Indicatiors il the scledued group are suitable for coltirLrcd opeatior without imediate response provided they do not gow to criticl dimensions prior to the scheduled esponsc. hdicatons characterize.l with prcdictcd failure pressure greater tlan 1.10 times the MAOP shall be examined and evaluated according to a schedule establishecl by Fig.4. Any defect found to require repair or removal shall be promptly remediated by repair or removal unless tle opertng pressure is lowered to mitigate the need to repair or rcmove the
defect.

.s'

When eslablishing schedules, responses can be divided into the following three groups: (n) immediate: indicalion shows that defect is t falure poit

Moritorecl inclications are the least severe and will

() scheduled: ir'dication shows defect is significant but not a[ failure poirt (c) monitored: indication shows defect wil not fail
before next inspection

not require examiration and evaluation until bhl] next schedued integrity assessment interval stipulted by the integrity manatement plan, provided that they are not expected to grow to critica dimensions prior to the
next scheduled assessment,

z
1

a
g

7.2.2 Ctack Detecton Toots fof Stress Corroson

Crackng, It is Lhe responsibility of the operator to deveop and document applopite assessmett,
response, and repair plans when inJine iirspection (lLI)

(10)

Upon receipt of the characterization of indicafions discoveed during a successful inJine inspcction, the operator shal promptly review tle results for mmedite esponse indications. Other indictions shall be eviewed within 6 mo and a respolsc plan srall be developed. The plan shall include the metlods and timig of the response (examination and evlution). For screduled or monitoed responses, an opeator may reinspect ralher than exmine and evaluate, provided

is used for the detection and sizing of indications of

stress corrosion cracking (SCC). In lieu of developing assessment, response, and repair

J
3

tle reinspection is conducted and results obtained wthin the specified time frame,

7.2.1 Metal Loss Tools for lnternaI and External Cofrosion. Indications requiring immediate response
are those tlat might be expected to cause immediate o near-term eaks or ruptures bsed on their known o peceived effects on the strengtl of the pipeline. This would include any corroded arcas that have a predicted failure pressure level less tlan 1.1 tmes the MAOP as determined by SME B31G or equivenf. Also in this

plans, an operator may elect to treat all indications of stfess corfosion cracks as requiring immedite response, lcludinfl examintioll or pressure reduction within a period nof to exceed 5 ctays following determinatioi of tle condition. After exlnination nd evluation, any defect found to require repair o removl slal be promptly temeciated by repai, removal, o lowering the operating pressure urtl such tirne as emovl or repai is completed.

7.2.3 Metal Loss and Caliper Tools for Thrd-Party

Damage and Mechanical Damage, Indications requirilg

immediate responsc re those tht might be expected

to cause immedite or nea-Lerm leks or ruptures based 3

group woud be any metal-loss indicaton ffectirg a cletected longitudinal seam, if tlat seam ws fotmed by direcl current or low-frequency electric resisttce wedinB or by electric flash welding. lhe operator shall
21

on their known or perceived effects on the sfrength of the pipeline.'Ihese could include den with gouges. Tle operafor slll exmirc these indications within a period not to exceed 5 days following determination of
the conclition.

Copyright O 2010 by the American Socicly ofMechnicl Engineers rnay be mde of this mteral witllout wntten coDsent ol ASME

&

(1o)

Table
Ihid-Party Damage
Preventon, Detdon,

Acceptable lhreat Preventon and Repar Methods

Coroson Relted
Gsk/

PD0 PDP Vand El lnl

lncorect $leather nvionqupment Operaton Relled llnlfactre Constructo Gfo.ce met Pp rh Strp/ Conl/ SeaU BP Rel Pck lO Cl{ L HR/f San Pipe Gwld weld coup lvB/B

^
a

vsual/mechanical nspedion

=o

De5ig specifictions Mlerials spechcatons Mnufacturer inspedion

XX

transportation jnsperlion
Construction in5peclion Preservice pressure test

i
X

-a
a]

XXXX
Operlor (rining lncrease ma'ker rrequency

;
3
P

5train monfong

s.q
.9

lncreased wall thckness

CP monitolmainlan

Lkate conrol measules Pig-GP5/strain measurement Reduce extemal stress

lnstall het tracing Rehabilitalio

x x

..

..

Coatns repair lncrease rover dpth

Opeling lemperture reducton Eiocide/inhibting injection ln5rall themal protertion

le

-a\

;: xx
X X

x
X

EC recoat Grind pair/ECA Direct deposition ,rld

i
c

x x x
c

i
c

Table
Ihid.PartyDana6

tuceptable Threat Preventon and Repar Methods (Cont'd)

Corosd
Rlated Prevntion, Detection, and Repr Methods
Rpars (cont'd)

ln(orr.t lyther operton Reltd

Gask/ stdp/ cont/

:1.

IPD(IO PDP Vnd EIt lnt

Orng 8P

Rel

sel/
Pack

to

cw L

flR/f

Mnfactre Ppe sem Pp Gwld XXXX XXXA/D XXXA XXXA

Costrcton fab

O-for.e

nenl scc

Weld Coup wE/8

Type 8, pressurized lleeve Type A, rinforcg sleve Epoxy tlled sleeve Annlar flled sddle Mechanical leak (lamp

I = these

these may be used to pair straighl pp but may nol be usd to rcPair brnch and I ioins. my be used to rpair b6nch and Ijoints but may not be used to Gpair stright pipe.

a
=

:.
9.

when welding on presszed ines. Guidance can be found in publications by W-4. Bruce, e\ al-, tPc2oo2-27737, \PC2OO6-10299, and IPC 2008-64113.

:. 9

slios at gidh welds, fttings, nd !o heavy wall pipe require addtionl care to ensure the hoop caftyng cpcty s efectvely nored. GENERAL NO-lEr fh abbrevations found n Tabl 4 relale to the 21 rhrats discussed in secton 5. plamtions of the abblviaion re s fotlows:

conRcl = control/relief eqrpmnt malluncton coup = couplint failure

CW Direct deposition weld
ECA

{
!l
at q:.

= =

= =

EM
Fab Weld

Et =

Gask/Oing
Gweld

H8/r

= = sasret or = detective

cold wether a very spcalzed repair tchnique lhal rcqures deliled materials infomaton and procedure valdation to void possible cracking on lve lines Engneerint Critical Assessment s an engneeng anlysis suppoled by tesls lhat estimar lhe interul of continued safe opertons. Erth movnent external coosron delective fabclion weld includint bBnch and f jonts O.rins
pe sidh weld (circurnfrential)

lnt = internl corosion

hvy rans or floods operations

l0 = incorect
L

ffi

pDp Pipe Pipe seam sCC

= lighhint = prviousy

= = = seal/Pack =
Srrip/BP
'IPD(I Vand

=
= =

WB/B

dmaged ppe (delyed railu' mod such as dents and/or souges) (prvously dmased PPe); see ASME Bl1-8 para. 851.4.2 and Nonmandatory APpndix R'2 defective pipe dfective PiPe seam stress corc5ion crckint seal/pump p.kins failure stipPed lhred/broken Pipe damase inaitted by first, scond, o' thifd parties fnstnraneous/immedra! failu.e) vandism /nnkle bnd or buctle

!
ASME 831.85-2010

3 F9.

4
3.6 3,4
3.2 3

o_

Tmng for Scheduled Responses: Time-Dependent Threats, Prescrptve

lntegrty Management Plan

d
m

30% SMYS

2.4 2.6 2.4

2.2

s,

o2 5 1.8
1.4
1.2

Above 30% but not exceeding 50% SMYS

,/1

\bove 50%
SMYS

q.

I
0.8

0.6 0.4
0.2 0

510

15
Response Time, yr

20

25

x
z

GNERAL

NoTE: Predicied iaiure pressure, P s calculated usng a proven engineering method for evaluating the remaining strength of

coroded pipe. The failure pressure ratio is used to categorize a defect as imredite, scheduled, or monitored.

lndications requiring a scheduled lesponse would ilrclude any indication on a pipeline opeating at or
bove 30% of specified minimtrm yield strength (SMYS)

of a pain dent tlat exceeds 6% of the nominl pjpe cliameter, mechanical damage with or wittout concurrent visible indentation of tlc pipe, dents with cracks, dents tht affect ductile girth o seam welds if tle depth is in excess of 2% of the nominal pipe diaml]ter, and dents of any depth that affect nonductile welds. (For
additionl infolmation, see ASME 831.8, pra.851.4.) 'lhe operator shall expeditiously examine these indictiors witlin a period not to exceed 1 y following determiltion of tle condition. After examilation atd
cvaluation, any clefect founcl to require repair or temovl shall be promptly remediated by lepair or removal, unless the operating pressure is lowered to mitigate tlte rccd to rep.ir or rcmovc thc detcct.

operaling conditions may require a reduced examination and evaluation inteval, This may include lhird-party damage or construction threats in pipelines subject to pressure cycling or external loding tlat may promote incresecl defect growth lates. For pescriptive-based programs/ the inspection intervals are conservative for potential defects that could lead to rrptue; however, this does not aleviate operators of the responsibility to

evaluate the specific conditions and changcs in

operating conditions to ensure the pipeine segmert

-l

does not warrant specjal consideration

GRI-o1/0085).

(see
e_

If the analysis shows that the time to failure is too short in relation to the time scheduled fo the repait tle operator shall appy lemporary measures/ such s pressure rcductior, unlil a pl]rmanent repar is completed. In consideing projected repai intervals and
metiods, the operator should cor-rside potential
deaying factors, such as access, envirormenlal permit issues, and gas supply equiements.

7.2.4 Lmitatons to Response limes for PrescrptiveBased Program. When time-clependent anomalies suclt as infernl corrosion, external cotrosion, or stress corrosiol cacking are being evalted, an analysis utilizing appropriate ssumptions about growth rates shall Ie used Lo ensure tht the defect will not attain citica dimensiols prior to the scheduled repair o next inspection. GRI-00/0230 (see s(}ction 14) contains additional guidance for these analyses.

Whel determining repair infervals, the operalor

should conside that
certrir-r

tlueats to specific pipeline

24

7.2.5 Extendlng Response Tmes for PerformanceBased Program, An enBineering critical assessment (ECA) of some defects may be performed to extend tlc repir or rejnspection interval for a performnce'bsed proglam. ECA is a rigorous evaluation of the data dat leassesses tle cdtcality of the anomaly and djusts thc projected gowth rates based on site-specific parameters.

Copyrighr O )0t0 by lhe Anrerican Society olMecllanrcal Nu reproduction nray be rnade oflhis rlcril willoul wrirlcr consc,,t

En8jrecrs. fft

ofASMD. 'l)l

ASME 831.85-2010

f 'llhe operator's integtity managemert program shall nclude documentation tlat descrbes grouping of specific defect types and the EC^ methods used for such
nalyses.

the irteval shall be 10 yt provided n analysis is perfomed to ensure all remainilg defects will not grow to faiure in 20 yr (af an 80% confidence level). The interval between determiation and examination slall be cor'sistent

!I

7.3 Responses to Pressure Testng

Any defect tlat fails a pressue test shall be promptly renediated by rcpair or removI. 7.3.1 External and lnternal Corroson Threats. 'the interval betwecl tests for the cxtenalnd interna corrosion thleats shal be corsistent with lable 3.

witl Fig.

4.

7.4.2 lnternal
within

Corroson D:rect Assessment (ICDA).

(10)

1
s.

For the ICDA prescriptive program, exmination and evaluation of all selccted ocations must be performed
1

yr ofselection. The interval between subsequelt

4.

examintiols slall be consistent wth Fig.

7,3.2

Stfess Corroson CfackngThreat. Ihe intervl

betwr:en pressule tests for stress corrosion cracking shall be as follows:

(n) If no failures occurred due to SCC, the operato shall use one of the folowing options to address tle Iong-term mitigation of SCCI (1) a clocr"rmented hydostatic retest pogrm with technically jrstiliable inteval or (2) alr cngineering ctitical assessmelt fo evaute the risk and dentify futher mitigation methods (b) If a failure occurred due to SCC, the operator shall perform the following: (i) implement a documented lydrostatic retest program for the subject segment atd (2) technically justify the retest interval in the writLen retest program

7.4.3 Stress Corrosion Cfackng Direct Assessment (SCCDA). l-or the SCCDA prescriptive poBram, e\mintion ar'd evaluation of all selected locations mLrst be performed within 1 yr of selection. ILI orpressure testrg (hydrotestirg) rnay rot be warranted if signilicant and extensive crackirg is not present on pipcline system. 'lhe inlerval betweer' subsequent exmiratiolls shall provide similar safe interval between periodic integrity assessments corsistent with Fig.4 and section A-3 il Nonmandatory Appendix A. Figure 4 nd section 4,3 in Nonmandatory Appendix A are applicble to prescriptive-based programs. The intervals may
in para.
7.2.5.

5-

re

o
5.

extended for a perfornance-bsed progtam as provided

7.5 Tmng for Scheduled Responses Figure 4 contains three plots of tle allowed time to
respond to an indication, based ()1 the predictive fiure pressure P divided by the MAOP of tle pipeline. Tle three plots correspond to

z
? 4

7.3.3 Manufacturng and Related Defect Threats. A subsequent pessure test for Lhe manufacturing threat is not requied unlcss the MAOP of the pipeline has been aised or wlen te opetating pressure has been
rised above the historical operating pressure (highest pressure recorded in 5 yr prior to the effective date of tlis supplement).

() pipelines operating at pressures above 507. of

SMYS

q =

(b) pipelines opeting at pressures above 30% of

SMYS bnt not exceeding 50% of SMYS
(c,) pipelines

I
3.

7.4
(10)

Responses to Direct Assessment lnspectons

opeatint at pressures not exceeding

-l
3 9

30% of SMYS

7.4.1 ExternaI Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA). For the ECDA precriptive program for pipelines
opertirg above 30% SMYS,

gram. 't'he intervls may be extended for the

performance-based program as provided in para.7.2.5.

fhe figLrre is applicable to the prescriptive-based pro-

if the operator

clooses to

examine and evaluafc all the indications four.rd by inspection, and repairs all defects tlt could grow to failure in 10 yr, then the einspection inteval shall be 10 yl. If the operator elects to examine, evluate, and
repair a smaller set of indictions, then the inferval shall be 5 yr, provided an analysis s performe<l to ensue all ren,aining clefects will not grow to filute in 10 yr.. The ir'terval between determintior' and examinati<l shall be corsistent with Fig. 4. Fo tle ECDA prescriptive pogram for pipeline segmelts operating up to but not exceeding 30% SMYS, if the opeato chooses to examine and evaluate all the

7.6

Repar Methods

Table 4 provides acceptable repair mctlods fot each

of the 21 threats.
Ech opertor's iltegtity maagement program shl incude documcnted repair procedures. AII repair.s shal be made with matelials and processes tlat are suitable

for the pipelire operating conditiols rd

ASME 831.8 requircnents.

meet

7.7 Preventlon Strategy/Methods

Preventio is an irnportnt proactive eement of an integrity management program. Integrity management program prevention strategies shoulcl be based on data gathering, threat ide)tification, and rsk ssessmerts conducted per the requirements of sectiols 2,3, 4, and
25

indications found by inspections and rcpair all defects

that could grow to failure in 20 yr, tle reinspection interval shal be 20 yr. If tle operator elects to exmine, evaluate, and repair a smaller set of indicatiols, tlen

No

Copyright O 2010 by the AnteicaD Society of Mccharical ngieers. be nrde of this material without writtel consent of ASME.

&

o
a

ASME 831,8S-20r0

l
9I

5. Prevention measlrres slown to be effective in the

il the irtcgrity management program. Plevention strategies (including intervals) shorLld also cousider the classifctioll of identified threats as time-clepeldent, stable, or time-independent
past should le contiuued in order to ensure lhat effective prevention methods are

The first part is the repair of the pipeline. Repair activities shall be macle in accordance with ASME 831.8

I
m

and/or otler accepted inclusty repar techniques.

Repair may include replacing defectivc piping witl new pipe, installation of sleeves, coating repair, or otler rehabilittion. These activites sh11 be identified, priolitized, ancl scheduled (see section 7). Once the repair activities are determined, the opet aLor slrall evaluarte prevention [echniques that pevent future

utiized.
Operators who opt for pescriptive programs slould use/ at a minimum, the preventior-t metlods indicated

in Nonmncltory Appendix A under "Mitigation." For operators who choose performance-based progams, both the peventive methods and time intervals employed fo each threat/segment should be determined by analysis using systcm attribrtes, information

deterioration of the pipeline. These techniques may include providin g additional cthoclic protection, injectng corrosion inhibitors anrl pipeline cleaning, or
changing the opeating conditions. Prevention plays a major role in reducing or eliminating lhe lhreats from tlid-party damae, exlernal corrosion, jnternl conosion, stress corrosion cracking, cod weather-related fail-

about cxisting conditions, and industry-prover risk

assessment methods.

'

7.8 Preventon Optons An operator's integrity mnagcmerrt program shall

include applicable activities to pevett and minimize the consequences of unintended releases. Prevention
activjties do not necessarily require justfication tlrough

ures, eartl movement failures, probems caused by levy rails and floods, and failures caused by incorrect
operations.

dditional inspection data. Prevention actions cn be

dentified during normal pipeline operafion, tisk asscssment, implementation of the inspection plal, or duing
repair.

TIe predominant prevention activities presented in section 7 ncLude informtion on the lollowing: (a) preventilg tlrd-party damage
(D) controllingcorrosion

(c) dctccting !nintended rellJases (d) minimizing the conscquences of unintended

reeases

(e) operating pressue reduction

There are other prevention activities that the operator may conside. A tbulation of prevention ctivities nd thei elevance to the threats iclentified in sectior 2 s presented in lhble 4.

All tlreats cnlot be dealt witl through inspection and repair; therefore, preventior fo thcse threats is a key element il tle pll. These actvties may include, for example, prevention oftlird-party damage and monitoring for outside force damge. A performance-based integrity lnanagement plan, containing the same structue s tle prescriptive-based plan, requires more detailed analyses based upon more complete data or information about the line. Using a risk assessment model, a pipeline opelator cn exercise a variety of options for integrity assessments and preventior cl.ivities, Js well as their timinB. Prior integrity assessnents and mitigatiol ctivities shoulcl only be incuded in te plan if they were as rigorous as those identified in this Code. 8.2 Updating the
Ptan

o
5.

-l
3

Data collected during the inspection and mitgation activities shall be anayzed and integrated with previously collected data. This is in addition to other types of integrity management-related data that is constantly
being gathered lhrough normal operations ald maintenance activities. Tle additionof thisnew data is a continuous process that, over time, wil improve the accuracy

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PIAN

(t
c-

8.1 General The integrity ma1gement plan is devebped after

gathering the data (see secton 4) and completing the risk assessment (see section 5) for each threat and fo each pipeline segmelt or systcm- Al appropriate integrity assessment metlod shall be identified for each pipeline system or segment. Integrity ssessmett of each system cn be accomplished tlrough a pressule test, an irline ispection using a vatiety of tools, direct assessment, or use of other proven teclnologies (sec section 6). In some cases, a combjnation of tlese metlods may be appropriate. The highest-r'isk segments shal bc given

assessments via jts integration (see section 4), This ongoing data inlegration and periodic risk

of futurc risk
ssessment

f
,"

will result in coltinual revision to the integrity asscssment and mitigation aspects of the plan. In

priorty for inlegrity

assessment.

ddition, changes to the physical and operating aspects of the pipeline system o segment shall be properly managed (see section 11). This ongoing pocess will most likely result in a series of additionl integrity assessmenLs or review of previons integrity assessments. A series of addtional mitigation activilies or follow-up to previous mitigation ctivities may also be required. The plan shallbe updated periodi-

Followirg the integrity assessment, mitigation activi

ties sll be undertaken.

cally as additonal information is acquired ancl

incorporated.
26

Mitigation consists of two parts.

Copyght O 2010 by the Anericn Society of lt4echanical Engineers

No
rnay be made

offhis n)atenal wrthout writteD consent ofASME

&

o
'
ASME 831.8S-2010

Tabte
Measurement Catgory Process/activty

q
Performance Measures
Lagging Measures Leading Measures Number of excavation notif icaton requests, number of patrol detects
New rectifiers and ground

measures

Pipe damge [ound per locat;o excavated

'
m

9-

Operationl

measures

Number of significant lLl corrosion anomalies

beds installed, cP current demand change, reduced CIS fault detects chnge in leaks per nrile (km)

Direct integrity

measures

Leaks per mile (km) in an integrity management pfogram

Table

Performance Metrics
Performance lvletrcs for Prescrptive Proglams

x
z

Extetnal cotoslon

Number Number Number Number Number Number Numbet Number

of of of oi of of of of

hydrostatic test failures caused by external corrosion repair actions taken due to in-line inspection resulis repait actions taken due to direct assessment results externa coosion leaks hydrostatic test failures caused by nternal cooslon repair actions laken due to inline inspecton results tepair actions taken due to direct assessment resuls internal corosion leaks

lnternal coro5ion

Stress corosion cGcking

Number of in'selvice leaks or failures due to scc Number ol repair replacements due to 5cc Number of hydrostatic test falures due to scc Number of hydrostatlc test failures caused by manufacturing defects Number of leaks due to ranufacturng defects Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number of leaks or lailures due to construction defects ol girth welds/couplings reinlorced/removed of wrinkle bends removed of wrinkle bends inspected of fabrication welds repaired/removed

l\4nufacturing

Consltuclion

-l
3

e_

Equipment

of regulator valve iailures

of relef valve failures ol gasket or 0-ring failures of leaks due to equipment failures

..

fhird"pariy damge

of leaks or failures cused of leaks or failures caused of eaks or lalures caused ol repars implemented as

by third'party dmage by previously dmaged pipe by vandlisr a result of third'pa(y damge prior to a leak or failure

lcorrect operations

of leks or failures caused by incorrect operations of audits/reviews conducted of findings per audii/review, classfied by severity of changes to procedures due to audits/revews

Weather related and out5ide iotces

Number of leak5 that are weather related or due to outside force Number of repair, replacement, or reocaton actions due to weatherrelated or outside-force threats

30

No

Copyrfht O 2010 by the Americn Society of Mechanical Engineers may be tade of this tnaterial without writte consent of ASM

,G).
riH

o
ASME 831.8S.2010

It is recognized tla t certain integity assessment ctivties may be one-time events and focused on elimintion of certain threats, such as manufacturilg, construction, ard equipment theats. For other threats, such as timedcpendent thets, periodic irspection will :e required. The plan shall remain flexille and itrcorporate any new information.

for future integrity assessments at the required irtervls.

The plan shall idertify required integrity assessment

actions and at wlat estblished intervals lhe actions will take place. All i1tegrify assessments shall be prioritized and scheduled. thble 3 provides tll] integrity assessmenL schedules
m

1
=

fo the extenal corosion and internal corrosion timedependent threafs for prescriptive plans. Tle assessment schedule fo the shess collosior crackirg threat is discussed in Normar'dtory Appendix A, para. A-3.4. The ssesslnent schedules for all other threts re identified in appropiate chaptes of Nonmandatory Appendix A under the heading of Assessment lnterval. A currert plioitizatiol-r listing and schedre shall be conLained in tlis section of the integrity management plan. The specifics for selecting integrity assessment methods ltd performing the inspections are covered ir scctiol 6. A performance-based inte8rity management plalt cal provide alternative integrity assessment, repair, and prevenlion metlods with different implelrertation times llan those required undcr thc prcscriptive ptogram. These decisions shall be fully documerted.

8.3

Plan Framework

Tle integrity mnagement pan shall contar delailed

infomtion regrding eacl of tle folowirg clemeDts

for each threat analyzed and each pipelirre segment or
systcl1.

8.3.1 Gatherng, Revewng, and lntegratng Data. The first step in the integrity management process is to collect, integrale, orgalize, and review all pertinent ard available data fer each threat and ppelir'c segment. Ihis Process step is rcpeated aftet integtty assessment and mitigtion activities have been implemented, and as ll]w operation nd malntenance informatiotl about the pipeine system o scgment is gathered. This information review shall be contained in tlte plr o in a database that is part of the plan, All data will be used to support future risk assessments nd integrity evalutiors. Data gathering is covered in section 4.
8.3,2 Assess Rsk. Risk assessment shorlld be performed periodically to incude new information, consider changes made to the pipeire system or segment, incorporate ny external cltangcs, and consider new scientific techniques that lave been developed and corercialized since the last assessmclt. lL is recommended that this be performed anlrually but shall be perforrned after substantil changes to the systcm are made and before the end of the currert intetval. The results of this assessmenL are to be reflected il the mitigalion ard ittegrity assessment activities. Char'ges to the acceptance criteia wil aso necessitatc reassessment. The integrity mangement plan slall contain specifics abouL Iow risks are assessed and the frequency of reassessment. The specifics for assessitg risk re covered in
section 5.

o
=.

8.3.4 Responses to lntegrty Assessment, Mtgaton (Repair and Prevention), nd lntervals. The plan shall specify how and wlen fhe opcrator wil respond to
integrity assessments. The responses shall be immediate, scheduled, or monitored. The mitigation element of the plan consists of two parts. The fist part is the repair of the pipelire. Based ()1 tlc results of the integty ssessments and the threitbeing addressed, appropriate repir activities shall be determined and conducted. These repairs shall be performed ir accordance with accepted standards ald opertirg practices. The second part of mitigation is prevention. Prevention can stop o slow down future deterioration of the pipeline. Prevention is also an appropriate activity for tme-independent threats. All mtigation activities shall le prioritized and scheduled. The prioritization and sciedule shall be modified as new infomation is obtained and shall be a realtime aspect of tle plan (see sectior 7) Tables 5, 6, and 7 provide an exarnple of an integrity manaBement pan in a spreadsheet format for a hypotletica pipeline segmert (lire 1, segment 3). Ths spreadshect shows tle segment data, the rtegrity assessent plan devised based on Lhe risk assessment,

?s

=.

+
6

o
6'
--l

'

8.3.3 lntegrty Assessment.

IJsed

on the

assess-

ment of risk, the apptopriate intcgrity assessments shall be inplemented. Integrity assl]ssments shll be conducled using inline inspection tools, pressure testing, and/or direct ssessment. Fo certain threats, use of

and the mitigation plan tl.rat would be implcmentecl,

il'cuding the reassessment interval.

these tools my be inapproprite, Implementation of prevention activities or more frequent maintennce ctivities may provide a more effective solution. lnteg-

rity

ssessment methocl selection is based on the threats

PERFORMANCE PLAN

for whiclt lhe inspection is being performed. More than one assessment method or more tlan one tool nly be required to address all the threats. After each integrity assessmert, this portior of the plan shal be rodified to reflect ll ncw information obtained and to provicle
27

9,1 lntroducton
This section provides the performance plan requiements tht apply to both prescriptive- and performancebased integrity management pograms. PIan evaluations

( opyright O20lUbylhc^ocricnSocielyoIMechanicalI-ngrnccrs. fft No rcproductrorr may be rndc ofrhis rnarerial willoutwrillcnconscnlofASME.'(l

o
asME 831.85-2010

Table

Example of lntegrity Management Ptan for Hypothetical Ppeline Segment (Segment Data Lne 1, Segment 3)
Type

)_

Segment

Data
Pipe grade
Size

Plpe attrbules

wall thickness
l1anulacturer

API 5L-X42 (290 /MPa) NPs 24 (oN 600) 0.250 in. (.15 mm) A. O. Smlth 1965 Electric resistnce weld

ln

q.

Manufacturet ptocess Manufacturig date Seam type Design/construction Operating pressure (high/low) 0perating stress Coating type Coating condition Pipe lnstall date Joining method Soil iype Sol stability Hydrostatic test Operational Comptessor discharge temperture Pipe wall temperture
Gas quality Repair methods

630/sso psig (4 340/3 79o kPa)

72%
Sl\,lYS

Coal tar

tair
1966
Submerged rc weld clay
Good None

q.
d

120.F (49.C) 5.F (1S.C) cood

5O i\4MSCFD (1.42 MSms/d)

z o
:s.

Leak/rupture history
Pressure cyclig
CP effectiveness SCC indications

Replacement None
Fir

z
g

l\,lnor cracking

Table

Example of lntegrty Management Plan for Hypothetcal Ppelne Segment (lntegrity Assessment Plan: Lne 1, Segment 3)
lnterual, Critera/Risk Assessnent

f, g

s
I

lntegrty Assessmenl
Conduct hydrostatic Lest, perlorm in"llne inspectlon, or peform direct assessment Conduct hydrostaiic test, perform inline inspection, or perform direct assessmenl Conduct hydrostatic test

4itgation

External colfosion

Some external coosion history, no inline inspectlon

Repce/repair locations where CFP below 1.2 5 times the MAOP

I f
a.

Intemal cofiosion

No history ol lC issues, no in' line inspecton

Replace/repair locations where CFP below 1,2 5 times the tllA0P

Replce pipe at tesl

scc
11anufacturng

Have found SCC ol near critical d imension

ERW

l5

failure locations
Conduct hydrostatic test
Replace plpe at test

pipe, joint factor <1.0,

no hydrosttic test
Construction/fabrication Equipment No construction issues No equipment issues
No third-party damage issues No opeations ssues No Lleather or outside force related issues

falure locations None requred None required

fhird.party damge
lncorrect operatons Wether nd ourside for.e

3
None required None required None required

28

No

Copyrighl O 2010 by the Amencan Society of Mecha icl Engineers be made of lhis material willlot written consent of ASME

&

o
asME B31.aS-2010

Table

Example of lntegrty Management Plan for Hypotheticat Pipeline Segment (Mtigation Plan: Line 1,segment 3)
Description

indicators. Change shal be monitored so the measures will remain effective over lime as the pln mtures.'l'he lime requ;red to obtain sufficient data for analysis shall also be colsidered when selecting performance measures. Methods shll be implemented to permt both
short- and lonB-term performance measure evluations. lntegrity mana8ement plogram performance measures can generally be ctegorized irto groups.
Pfocess orActvty Measures. Process or activity measures cn be used to evaute prcvcntion or miti-

!l

rn

Repair

Any hydrostatic lest iailure will be repaired by replacement of the entire joint of pipe. Prevention activties wll nclude further monitoring for SCC ai susceptible locations,
revew of the cathodic prolection design

'

z
g
s

Prevention

9.2.1

and levels, and nronitoring for selective seam corrosion when the plpeline s
exposed, lnterual

for The nterval for reinspection wil be 3 yr reinspection if there was a failure caused by SCC. The
intervalwill be 5 yr if the test was
successful. Test failutes for reasons other ihan extemal

gtior ctivties. Thesc rneasures detemine how well ar opcto is rnplcmenting various elcments of the integity rnr'agecnt program. Measues relating to process or ctivity shall be selected caefully to permit performance evaluatio within a realistic time frame.

q.

Data itegraton
NOTE:

or internal corrosion, SCC, or seam delect must be considered when perlorming risk assessment for the associated threat,

9.2.2 OperatonatMeasures. Opeationalmeasurcs include operational and maintenance trenc{s lhat measure how well the system is esponding to the integty manatement program. An example of such a mesure
might be the changes in corosion rates due to tle implcmentation of a more effective CP program. The numbe of third-party pipeline hits after the implementation of prevention ctivities, such as improving the excavatiot

pipeline segment, hydrostalic tesllng will be conducted. Selection of this method is appropiate due io its ability to ddress the inlernal and external corrosion threats as well as the manufacturing threat and the SCC lhreat. The test pressure will be t 1.19 times the IMAOP
GENERAL For thrs

o
=.

notification process within the system, is another

example.

z
j'

9.2.3 Drect lntegrity Measures. Direct integrity

shall be performed at leastannually to provide a continuilg measure ofintegrity management pogram effectiveness over time. Such evauations shoulcl conside both measures include leaks, ruplures, injuries, and fataities,

In addition to the above categories, performance measures can also be categorized as leadng mesures or lagging measures. Lagging measures are reactive in tlat they provide an indication of past ir'tegrity mana8ement program performance. Leading mesures are proctive;

threat-specific and ggregate improvements. Thteatspecific evaluations may apply to a patticlar area of concern, while overall measues appy to all pipeines under the integrity management progtam. Program evaluaton will help an opeator answe the

they provicle an indication of how the plan may be

expected to perform. Several examples of performance measures classified as described above are illustrated in
llabe 8.

folowing questiors:
(n) Were all integrity matagement progrn objectives
accomplisred?

-l
3

(D) Were pipeine integrity ncl safety cffectively improved tlough the integrity mnaBement program?

9.3

Performance Measurement Methodotogy opek)r car evaluate

system's integity manage-

A1

9,2

Performance Measures Charactefstics

Performance measures focus attention on the ntegrify

mclt program performa|rce within ther own sysLem and also by compasor witl othe systems on an industry-widc bass.

L f

management progam results Lhat demonstte

improved safety las been attained. Ihe measures provide an inclication of effectveless, but ate not absoute. Performance measure evaluation and trending can also lead to recognitior of ulexpecled results that may include the recognitior of threats not previously identified. All performance measues shll be simple, measurable, ttainble, relevant, and permit tmely evaluations. Proper selection and evaluaLiol of performance mea-

9.4

Performance Measurementr lntrasystem

(n) Performance metrics slall be selected ancl applied

on a periodic lasis for te evaluation of both

prescriptive- and performance-based integrty management programs. Such metrics shall be suitable for cvaluation of local and threat-specific conditions, and o evaluation of overall integrity management program
performance.

sures is an essentia activity in determning irtegrity m.rnBement progrm (,f fecliveness. Performance rneasurcs should be selected carefully k) ensure that they are reasonable program effectiveness

() Fo operalors implemcnting prescriptive pogrms, pcrformncc measuremelt slall include all of the theaf-specfic metics for ech threat in Nonmandatory Apperdix A (see Table 9). Additionally, tle following

( opynghl O 201 0 by rhc Socicry of Mcchnicl ^mcricen No reroduclior may be nrde ofthis materral wilhout wntlen consent

LnBiDecrs. fft
ofASMh.

'(Od

o
ASME 831.8S-2010

f
Table

10

Overall Performance Measures

(10)

l_

Miles (km) inspected vs. integrity management program requiremenl Jurisdictional reporiable lncidents/safety-related conditions per unlt of tire Fraction of system included in the integrlty management progrrn
Number of anomalies lound requiring repair or m]tigation Number of leaks repared Number of pressure test failures and test pressures [psi (kPa) and

%S4YS

Numbe. of third'party damage events, near misses, damage detected Risk or probability of failue reduction achieved by integrity managernent program Number of unauthorized crossings Number of right'of-way encroachments: Number of pipeline hits by ihid parlies due to ack of notificaton as locate reqirest through the one-call ptocess Number of aerial/groud patrol incursion detections Number of excavation notifications received and their disposition Number and types of pubic comnunications issued Integrity maagement program costs Unscheduled outages and impact on cuslome

E.

overll program measurements shall be deternned ard

documented:

that may compare a segment agaist another adjacent

segment or those from a different are of the same pipeline system. The information obtained may be used to

o
:s.

(1) numbe of miles (kilometers) of pipeline

inspected versus progam requirements (2) numbe of immediate repairs cornpleted as a result of the integrity management inspection program (3) number of schedulecl repairs completed as a result of the integrity mnagement inspection program (4) number of leaks, failures, and incidents (classified by cause) (c) For operators implementing performance-based

evaluate the effectiveness of prevention activities, mitigation teclniques, or performance validation. Such comparisons can provide a basis to substantite metric analyses and identify areas for improvernents in the integrity management program. () A third technique tlat will provide effective infor-

pogrms, the threat-specific metrics slow1 ill Nonmandatory Appendix A shall be considered,
altlough others may be used that are more appopriate to tle specific performance-based program. [n addition to the four rleLrics above, tle operator slould choose three o four metrics tht measure Lhe effectiveness of the performance-based program. Table 10 provdes a suggested list; lowever, the operator may develop their. own set of lnetrcs. It may be appopriate and useful for opelators to norrnalize the findings, events, and occurrences listed in Tabe 10 utilizing notmalization factors meaningful to thc operator for that event and their system, and that would help Lhem evaate trencls. Such

mation is internal auditing. Operators shall conduct periodic audits to validate the effectiveness of their irtegrity mnagement programs and ensure that they have been conducted in accordance with tle written plan, An audit frequency shall be established, considering the established peformance metrics ard their particular time base in addition to changes or modifications made to the integrity mngement progrm as itevolves. Audits may be performed by internal staff, preferably by personnel r'ot directly involved in the administration

z g

I
T

-l
3

of tle inte8rity mana8ement pogram, or othe tcsources, A list of essential audit items is provided
below as a startng point indeveloping company audit Progrm.

L j

normalization factors may inclLrde covered pipeline

rnileage lenglh, nurnber of customers, time, or a combi-

ntion of these or otles. Since performance-based

inspection intervals

will be utilized in a perforrnance-

(1) A written integrity mnagement policy ancl program for all the elements in Fig. 2 shail be in place. (2) Writtcn integrily management pan procedures and task descriptions are up to date atd readily
availarle.

based integrily managemenf program, iI is essenti that

sufficicnt metric data be collccted lo support those

inspection inteNals. Evalua[ion shall be performed on at leasL an anual basis. (d) In addition to performnce metic clata collected directly from segmelts covered by the integrity management program, 1ternal benchmarking can be conducted
31

(3,) Activities are perormed i accordance with the plan. (4) A responsible individual has been assigncd for eacl element. (5) Appropriate references are available to respoltsible indivicluals.

Copyright O 2010 by the Arnerican Sociely ofMechaicl No rcprcductio0 lnay be lnade ofthis mteril without written consett

ngineers. fft

ofASME. Y{

asME 831.85-2010

l
q

(6) lndividuals have eceived proper qulification, which has been documented. (Z) The integrity mana8ement pogam meets tle
requirements of this documenl,

(8) All required activities are documentec{. (9) All ction items or nonconformances are closed in a timely manne. (10) Ihe risk citeria used have been reviewed and
documented. (11) Prevention, mitigtion, arlcl repai criteia lave been establshed, met, nd documented. ance metrics, results of intenal benchmarking, ancl

upon request. Use of irdustry jurisdicton, ard com pany wcbsites rray be an effectve way to conduct these commnication efforts. Communications should be conducted as often as necessary to ensure lhat appropriate indviduals and autlorities lave currcnt nformatior about tle opeator's system ard thei jntegrity lnalagemet efforts. It is ecommended that communcatols take place periodically ad as often s recessary to corunicate significnt changes to thc inteyity malgemer't plan. API
Recommended Prctrce7762,

9.

blic Aruiretlcss Prograt

f)

Data developed from program specific perform-

for Pipcltrc Opcrotors, provides additional gudance.

audits shall be used to provide an effective basis fo evaluation of tle ntegity maragemenl program.

10.2 External Communcations

Tle followirg items should be considered for commu-

lication to the various intercsted parties, as outlined

9.5

Perfofmance Measurement: lndustry Based

below:

In addition to intrasystem comprisons, exterral comprisons cal provide a basis for performance measuremer't of tle integrity management program. This can

(n) Iandotoners nncl Tetntlts Aloug the Rghts-o-Wly

(1) company name, location, and contact

informaton (2) general location information and wher more specific location informatiol or maps can be obtained (3) comrnodity transported
5-

nclude comparisons with other pipeline operators, industry data sources, and jurisdictiola dta sources.
Benchmaking witl ote gas pipeline opeators can be useful; however, any performance measure o evauation derived from such sources shall be carefrrlly evaluated to ensure tht all comparisons mcle re valid. Audits conducted by outside entities can also provide useful evaluation clta.

o
=.

(4) how to recognize, report, nd respolrd to a leak (5) contct phonc numbers, both routne ard
emcrgcncy

(6) general informatior bout the pipeline operator's prevention, inlegrity measures, ard cmergency pre paredness, and how to obtin a summary of the integrity management plan

\,

9.6

Performance lmprovement

The resulls of tlre performance mesurements and udits shall be utilized to moclify the integrity mnagement program as part of centinuolrs improvement
process. Inlernal and external audit resr"rlts are performance mesures that should be used to evaluate effective-

(Z) damage prevention informtion, including

excavation notification numbes, excavation notilication cenLer requirements, and who to contact if there is any damage (b) Pul:lic Officinls Oflrcr TInt Energettcr llespotders (1,) periodic distributior to each municiplity of maps and company contct informtiol

ness in addition to other measues stipulated in tle integrity mnagement program. Recommendations for cranges ald/or improvements to the integrity management program shall be based on analysis of the performance measues nd audits. Te results, recommendations, and resulfant changes made lo the integrity management program shll be documented.

(2) summary of cmergency preparedncss and

ir'tegrity lnanlcment pogram (c) Locnl ttl Regiotlnl , tergetrcy llespotlders

-l
3
c.

(1) operator should maintain contnuing liaison with all emergency responders, includirg local emergency planning commissiols, regional and area plannng committees, juisdictionl emergency planning
offices, etc.

1O
(x0)

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN General

1O.l

The operator shall develop and implemerlt a communications plan in order to kcep appropriate company personnel, jurisdictoral authorites, nd the public informed about their tegity mr'agement efforts and the esults of their integrity management activities. The

(2) company name and contact numbers, both routjne and emergency (3) ocal maps (4) facility description aid commodity transported (5) how to recognize, report, and respond to a leak (6) general infomation about the operator's prevention and integrity measures, ancl how to obtai a summary of the integrity manatement plal (7) statio locatioDs and descriptions (B) summaly of operator's emergency capabilities
32

information may be communicated as part of other

required commulications. Somc of tle informtion should be communicated routinely. Other information may be communicated

CoplrightO2ulUb) rhe^mellcallsocrelloIMechanicalEnginee|s.
No repoductio, rnay bc nradc ol-this matcrial wilhour wrirrcn consenl

f& of^SM. '(Ex

o
asME Bl1.as-2010

f
brt are by no meals allo_

(9) coordination of operator's emergency preparedness witl loc officials

re Bs-pipeline specific,

inclusive.

(tl) Generl Pullc (1) information regarclilg opeator's efforts to support excvatior rotification and otler damge prevention initiatives (2) company rame, cor'tact, and emergency reporting information, including general business
contact

(1) If a change in lnd use would affect eitlcr the cortsequence of an incident, sucl as increases in populatior near the pipeline, or a change in likelihood of ar incident, such as subsidence due to undeBround mir'ing, the change must be reflected in the integrity rnalgemenl plan and the threats reevaluated accordingly. (2) If the results of an integrity maragement progarn inspectiol indicate tle leed for chnge to tle systeln, such as changes to lhe CP progrm or, otler than temporary, reductions ir operating pressue, tlese shall be communicaled to operators and eflectecl in an updated integrity mana8ement pro8ram. (3) lf an oper.rtor decides to increasu pressure in the system from its listorical operating pressure to, ot

a.

It is expected that some dialogue ray be uecessary betyr'een the operato ld the public in orcler to convey the operator's confidence in the integrity of the pipeline, as well as to corvey the operator's expectaliols of the
public as to wlere they car hep maintain integrity.
Such opportunities should be wecomed in order to help protect assets, people, and the envitonment.

10.3 lnternal Communications

OPerator management and othe approprate opetator pesonnel must understatcl and spport the integrity management program. This should be accomplished

closer to, the alowable MAOB that clange slall be reflected n tle integrity plan and the threats shall be
reevaluated accordingly. (4) lf a line has been operatirg 1 a steady-stte mode and ne\4 load on tle line clangcs the mode of operatiol to more cyccal load (c.g., daily changes in opeatlg prcssure), fatigue sha be consideted in eacll of the threals where it applies as an dclitional stress
factor'.

through the development and implementation of an irlernal communications aspecf of fhe plan. Petformnce mesLlres eviewed on a pcriodic basis and resultirg adjustments to the integrity mngement program should also be part of the intenal communications plan.

o
:s.

11

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PLAN

(n) Formal management of clange procedues srall bc developed i:r order to identify and consider the impact of changes to pipeline systems nd their integrity. These procedures should be flexible enough to accommodate both major and minor changes, and must be understood by the persolnel that use them. Management of cltange
shall adcless technical, physical, procedural, and

organi

ztional changes to tle system, whethel permanent or. teporary. The process should incorporate planning for each of these situtions and considel the unique circumstances of each.

(c) Along with management, the review procedure should require involvement of staff that can assess safety impct nd, if necessary, suggest controls or modifications. The operator slall have the flexibility to mair'tain continuity of operation within established safe operating limits. (d) Malagement of change ensures that the integrity managemclt process emains viable and effeclive as clalges to the system occu and/or new, revised, or corrected data becomes available. Any change to equipment or procedures has the potentia to affect pipelile integrity. Most chnges, however small, will have cor'sequent effecton a\otleraspect of the system. Forexam-

e
o

ple, many equipment changes will requie a corresponding technica or procedural change. All
changes shall be dentifiecl and revicwed before imptementatior. Malgement of change procedures provides
a mens of maintairing order during periods of change

A mngement of change process includes thc

following: (1) reason for change (2) authority for approving changes (3) analysis of implictions (4) acquisition of required work permits (5) documenlrtion
(6) communication of change to ffecled parties (7) time limitations (8) qualifictiol of staff (b) The operator shal recognize lhat system chnges can require changes in the integrity managemett program ald, conversely, results from the progran can cause system clnges. Ihe following are examples that
33

in the system and helps to peserve confidence in the

integrity of tle pipeline. (c) In order to ensue the integrity of a system,
a

documented recod of changes should be developed and

mintained. This information will povide better understandig of the system and possible threats to its integrity, It should include the process and design informatior both before and after the canges wee put into pace. (, Corlmuncaton of tle clrges cried out in tle
pipeline system to any affected parties is imperative to tle safety of tle system. As providcd in section 10, communictions regading the ir'tegrity of the pipeline

9-

Copyright O
No

201 0 by the Society of Mechnical Engee, s ^mrican lnay blr ntade ofthis nterial without wntten consent of SM

&

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asME B31.aS-2010

should be conducted periocicaly. Any changes to the system slould le included il the information provided i commuricatioi from the pipeline opetor to affected
prties. (,9) System clnges, particularly in equipmelt, may require qualficafion of personnel for the correct operation of the new equiprnent. ln addition, efresher training should be providcd to elsute that facility personnel unclestand and adhec to the fcility's current operatig

management pLan, integrity maragement reports, and clata documents. (2) the responsibiilies ancl authorities uncler this program shall be cearly and folmally defined.

!L

(3) esults of the integrity management program nd the quality control program shall be reviewed t
predelermined intervals, making recornmendations fol impovemelt. (4) the personne involved in the integrity management progrm slall be competent, aware of the program ancl all of its ctivities, and be quailied to execute tle activities witlin the program. I)ocumentation of such competence, waleness, and qualificaton, and the processes for their achevement, slall be pt of tle quality control plan. (5) the operator shall determine how to monitor the inteBrity management pogram to show tlat it is being implernented accordng to plan and docunent these steps. Thcse control points, criteria, and/or performance metrics shall be definecl. (6) periodic internal audits of tle iltegrity mnagement pogrm rd its quality plan are recommended. An indeperdent thid-party eview of the entire proBrm may also be useful. (7) correclive actions to inprcve the integrity management program or quaity plan shall be documerted

z
q.

() Ihe application of new rechologies in the integrity management program and thc resuts of such applictons should be clocumented and cornmunicated to
ppopriale staff ancl stakeholders.

Pocedlres.

12

QUALITY CONTROL PLAN

Tlis sectior describes the qulty coltrol activities that shall be part of an acceptable integrity management Program.

12.1 General
Quolitr cottttol as defined for this Code is tle "doculnented proof that tle operator meets all tle requirements of thei integrity management program." Pipeline operators tlat hve a quality control pogrm that meets or exceeds the requirements in this sectior

o
's.

z
t

can incorpoate the inlegrity mnagement program activities withil their existing pln. For those operators who do not have a quality program, this section outlines the basic requiremelts of such a program.

nd tle effectiveness of thei implemerttion

12.2 Quality Management Control

(d) Requirements of a quality control program include documenlation, implementation, and mairtenance. fhe following sx activities are usually required: (1) ictentify tle processes tht will be ilcluded in the quaily program (2) determine the sequence ald interaction of these
Processes

monitorecl. (c) When an operator clooses k) use outsicle resources to coduct any process (forexample, pigging) thatffects tle quality of the i1tegrity malgement program, the opC]rafor shall ensure control of such processes and document theD within the quality prograrn.

s
6

13

TERMs, DEFINITIONS, AND ACRONYMS

Fig.5 for the hierarchy of terminology for integrity

(10)

3
-l l
q.

See

assessmenl. ncLio nble nllotlrily: anomalies that may exceed acceptable

(3) determine the citera and methocls needed to

ensure that both tlc operation ancl control of these processes re effcafiv (4) provide the resources and infomation necessaly to support the operatiol and monitorirg of these
Processes

limits bsed on the operatorb anomaly and pipelir'e

clata analysis.

nctiae corrosor1: corlosior tht is cortiruing or not

arrested. ntttulnr flcd snddle: an external steel fabrication, similar to a sleeve, except one half is pierced and forged to provide a cose fit around a hot tp "T." Thc other half away from thc "T" is jorcd with seam welds like a type A sleeve. The annular space between the pressure containin8 pipes ancl the sadclle is filled with an incompressible material to provide mechanical support to the

(5) moritot measure, and analyze tlese processes (6) implement actiots necessaty to chieve planned esuts and contilued improvement of these processes
() Specifically, activities that shoud be incuded in

(1) dctermine the documentaton required and include t r the quaity program. "fhese documents shll
be contolled and maintaited at app.opriate loctiols fo the duratior' of tlre prograrn. Examples of documented activities ilcludc risk assessnents, tle integrity
34

the qulity control program are as follows:

welded "l'."

ollomIly: at\ uncxmined deviation from the norm in pipe material, coatings, or welds.

Copyright O 2010 by the mericn Society o f Mechanical Engineers No nlay be rnde ofthis rnaterial without written conscnt ofASME.

&

c)

'
ASME 831.85^2010

Fig.

Herarchy of Terminology for lntegrty Assessment Result

(10)
Category
m

9-

l
o
'

ntlot nlll t1d ppel1e dati ,?nlysisr the process through which anomaly and pipelir'e data are integated and analyzed lo further cassify and characteize anomalies.
nrc ueltling ar nrc zoeld: group of welding processes that produces coalesccnce by heatjng them with an arc. The pocesses are used with or without the application of

pressure and with or wtlout filler metal.

lsnckfll: matetial placed in a hole or trench to fill excavated space around a ppeine or other pputenances.

torsional loads acting alone or in combination with lydlostalic pressure. cnllrntion dE: exploratory excavation lo vaidate findngs of an in-line ilspection tool witl the purpose of lnproving data interpretation. caliper tool or geoteLry fool; an instrumenled ir-line inspection tool designed to record conditions, such as
dents, wrinkles, ovlity, bend rdius, nd angle, by sens-

a
-.1

f
9.

in8 the shpe of the internal surfce of the pipe.

anbotl tlioxide: a heavy, colorless gas that does not support combustion, clissolves in water to form carbonic cid, and is fiund in some natural gas stleams. llorii unqualified term "cst iron" shal pply to gy cast iron, wlich is a cast ferous material in whicl a major part of the carbolr contelt occus s free cabon in tlc fom of flakes inlerspersecl throughout tlc metal.
cds

volume of liquid that flows ell masse in a pipelinc physically scparated from adjacent volume(s) of liquid or gas. [Sealing (batching) pigs are typically used fo
Dntc,; a

separation.]
Del/,fol: excavation

that minimizes surface distubance yet provides sufficient room fo examinatior o repair of buried fcilities.
rucklr

condition in which the pipeline has undetgole

sufficient plastic deformation k) cause permanent wrinkling in the pipe wall or excessive ctoss-sectional defo-

citllotlic ptotcctio| (CP)j techr'que to reduce lhe corrosion of a metal surface by mkin8 tlat surfce tle cathode of an electomechanical cell. ccrtificatiotl: written testimor'y of qualification.
35

mation causcd by bending, axial, impact, and/or

Copyrighr O 2l)lU by llre Socicty ofVeehanical Engirrcers. f& ^rncrican No rcproduclion rnay be rnadc oflhis rnatcfll wilhut wnrlell consent of '(g)r

^SME.

asME 831-8S"2010

chnlIcterize: to qualify the type, size, slape, oientation, nd location of r anomaly.

close tltetanl sutaelJ (CIS): inspection technique that ncludes a series of abovegrour'cl pipeto-soi potential

o_

NPS 24 pipe has

specified outside dmeter of 24.000 in.

(609.90 mm).

easurements taken at predetermiled increments of a few to several feet (meters) along rhe pipeline and used

to povide infomation on fle effectiveness of the

catlodic protection system.
contl4: liqvrd, Iiquefiable, or mastic compositon that,

dilecl cruletlt aoltngc gndient (DCVG)] inspection fechnique flaf includes aboveground electical measurements taker t predetermined increments along the pipelr're and is used to provide infotmtion on the effectiveress of the coating system.
docut etltctl: condition of being in written form.
double subutrged-c ueldecl pipe (DS.4W pipc)r pipe that l-ras a strai8ht longitudinal or helica seam containrg

after applicatior to a suface, s converted into a solid protective, clecorative, or fulrctional aclherent film. Coaling also includcs tape wrap.
contig sysfem: complete number and types of coats applied to a substrate in a predctermined order. (Wlen used il a broader sense, surface preparation, pretrcatmerts, dry film tlickness, and manner of application are included.) conlpotletll or pipelitle co lponent) n individual item or element fittec in lie with pipe in a pipeline system, such as, but not limited to, valves, elbows, tees, flanges, and closures.
cotnposite repnif s/)i permanent repir method using composite sleeve mteria, which s applied with an

fiile metal deposited o both sides of the joint by tle submerged-arc welded process.
drcirfyi esure of the capability of a materil lo be defolmed plasticalLy before fracturing.
C,4i en8ineering nalysis supported by tests that estimte tle interval of contir'ued safe operations. EC^ is often used to evaluate defects as it is less consetvative

than traditional criteria and supports an extension of the repair or replace interval. ECA offers constuctive guida|ce for automtic (ltrasonc testing qualifications
such as flaw type, equipmenf typc, flaw detection uncer-

tainties, and flaw sizing.

electric resistntrce uekled pipe (IlW pipe)r pipe that has straight orgitudinal seam produced without the addi tior of file metalby the application ofpressure and het obtained from electrical resistance. EIW pipe forming is

:,
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?
5-

adhesive.

pipeline failure coulcl have on the public, empoyees, property, and tle environment. co'rosro,li deterioration of a material, usually .r etal, tlat results from an electroclemical eaction with its elvironmelt.
collsequetlce: \mpact tht a

distinct from flsl welded pipe and furnace butt-welded pipe as a result of being produced in a continuous forming process frorn cols of flat plate.
elec!tulyle: meclium containing ions that migrate

iullil)ifor: chemical substnce or combnation of substaices that, wlet present in the environment or 01
co1'tosiotl

in

an

eectric field.

surfcc, prevents or roduces corro,i(n.

corrosiotl rate: rate t which corroson proceeds.
c?c&i

etloirolnlenl: surroundings or conditions (physical, chemical, mechanical) in whch a mateial exists.

po.yyi

I
-l
3
q.

very narrow elongated defect caused by mecln!

cal splitting into two parts. ctrent: flow of electric charge.

dntl

type of resin formed by the reaction of aliphatic or aromatic polyols (like bisphenol) with epichlorol.rydril and characterized by tle presence of reactive oxirate end groups.

lnlyss: tle evaluttion process through which inspection indicatiors are classifiecl and chaacterized.

a pl\ysiclly examined a1omly with dimensions or clarcteristics that exceed acceptable limits.
.lefect: dcnf; permanent

eualuntiolL a tevrew, following the characteiztion of an ctionable anomal, to determine whether the ar'omaly meets specified acceptnce criteia.

deformation of the circular cross-scction

a decrease

of the pipe tlat produces is concave inward.

dfcr Lo

in tle cliameter and

cxu1i1ltio\: drrect plysical ilspection of pipeline that may include tle use of nondesfuctive examination (NDE) techniques or methods.
expeticce:
sior.r

work actjvities accomplishecl in a specifc

senseor obtain measurable wallloss indications from an anomaly in sfeel pipeline using inline jnspection or otler technoogies.

NDI rnethod under the direction of qualificcl supervi

including fhe performance of the NDT method and related activities but not includi[g time spenf in organzed training pro8rms. fnilure: general term used to imply that a part in service has become completely inopeble; is still operable but is incapble of satisfactolily performing its itencled iunction; or las deteriorated seriousy, to the point that is has become unrelable or unsafe for contitued use.
36

clinntetet or tominal oufside dinnrefer as-produced or asspecified outside diameter of the pipe, not tobeconfused witl lhe dim'rnsionless NPS (DN). lor example, NPS 12 (DN 300) pipe has a specified ou tside diameter of 12.750 in. (323.85 mm), NPS 8 (DN 200) pipe has a speci-

fied outside dimeter of 8.625 in. (219.08 mm), and

Copyright O 20t0 by the Anerican Society ofMechanical No reDroduction mav be nade ofthis nterial wthout writtcn const

nginecrs. q
ofASME.

ASME Bl1.85-2010

f
fafigue: process of development of or enlagemenl of a crack as a result oi repeated cycles of stress.
JenLtre: any

attack (i.e., surface decarburization and chemical rec-

!r

tion with lydrogen).

hydragen sulficle (HzS): toxic gaseors impurity found in some wel gas streams. It also can be geneted in situ as a result of microbiologic activity,
m

p\ysical object detected by an inline inspection syslem. Features my l:e anomalies, components,

nearby metallic objects, welds, or some other item.

filtn: t6in, not necessarily visible layer of material. gnlunnic corrosio : acceleated corosion of metal
because of an electrical contact with moe r'oble metal

IlytltosliLic lest or hlldralesL: a pessure test using water as the test medium.
iltlpetfcctiotl: a a\onaly with characteristics tlat clo not exceed acceptabe limits.
ir?cirlrfl unintentioial rclese of gas duc to the failure of a pipeline.

z
s

9.

and/or a more noble localized section of the metal or

nonmetllic conductor i1 a corrosve electrolyte.
gnsr as used

ir this Code, any gas or mixture of

gses

suitable for domestic or industrial fuel and tr1srnitted or distibuted to the user through a piping system. 'Ihe common Lypes are natural gas, manufactured gas, and Iiqttefied petrolem gs distrbuted as a vapor, with or without the admixtre of ir
gns processitlg

lrcfuslol: nonmetallic phase such as an oxide, sulfide,

or silicate particle in a metal pipeline.

q.

f\r.dr g of rondestuctive testing techniqlre or mcthod that devites from the expected. It may or
i11licnlioll:

plnnt: facility used fo exttacting comme-

cia products from gas.

gntlrcrttg systen: one o rnore segments of pipeline, usu-

lly interconnected to form a netwotk, that ttanspots gas from one or more production fcilities to the inlet of a gas processng plant. If rlo gas processing plant
exists, the gas is tlanspoted to the most downstream

may not be defcct. tt-litrc ittspection (ll,l)i steel pipeline inspection technique that uses devices known in the jndustry as intelligent or smart pigs. "Ihese devices run insde the pipe nd provide indications ofmetal loss, deformatiol, nd otler
defects.
itrscro ice p ipeline: clefined here as a pipeline lhat contaits

of eitler of the following: (a) the point of custocly transfer of gs suitable for deivery to a clistribution system (lt) the poirt where accumulation ald pepraton of gas from seprate geographic production fields in reasonable proximity has been completed
geographic irrornatiotl systenl (GIS): system of computer software, hardware, data, nd personnel to help manipu-

natural gas be flowing. method.

Lo

be transpoted. The gas may or may noL

z
of a nondestructive testing technique or

inspecL11l: use i?fSr.lfy:

defned lere as the capability of the pipeline to withstard ll anticpated loads (including hoop stress

due to operating pressure) pltts the mrgin of safety established by tlis section. itltegrly issess teut: pocess that includes inspection of pipeline lacililies, evaluating the indications resulting
from the inspections, examining the pipe using a vaiety of techniques, evaluatilg the results of the examinations, charcteizing theevaluationby defect type and severity, nd determining the resulfing integrity of the pipeline

late, alalyze, and present information that is tied to a geographic location.

girth weld: compete circumferential butf weld joining

pipe or components. globIl positioniilg slsten (GPS): system used to identify

3
q.

the latitude and lolgitude of locatos using GPS

satellites.
gonle: mechanically indr.rced metal-oss, whch causes

through nysis.
Iautcher: pipeline facility used to insert pig into a pressurized pipeline, sometimes referrcd to as a "pig trap."

localized eongated grooves or cavities n a rnetal

pipeie.
higlt-prcssu'e distributiotl s:lste t: gas distributior piping system that opertes at pressure higher than tlte standard service pressure deliveecl to the customer. h sucl a systcm, a service regulator is required on each service

unintentional escape of gas from the pipeline. The source of tle leak rnay be holes, cacks (include propa/k:

gatilg and norpropagating, longitudnal, rd circumfererti), separation or pullout, nd loose connections.

Ieg t: a piece of pipe of the length delivered from the mill. Each piece is called a lengtlr, regardless of its actual dimension.'1'his is sometimes caled a "joint," but "lengtl" is preferrcd.
liquefied peholeunr gns(es) (LPC):

line to control the pressure delivered to tle customer.

hydragen-ittclucecl clntlnqe:

form of clegradation of metals

caused by exposure to environments (lquid or gas) that

allows absorption of lydrogen iltto the material. Examples of hydrogen induced damage are formation of interlal cracks, blisters, or voids in steels; embrittlemett (i.c., loss of ductility); and high-temperature hydrogen
37 No

liquid petrolcum gases composed predominantly of the following hydlocarbons, eilher by themselves or as mixtures: butne (norrnl butar'e or isobutane), butylcne (including isomers), proparre, propylene, nd ethnc. LPG can be stored as

Copyright O 2010 by the Arerlcn Socety of Mechanical Engileers be made ofthis rnaterial without writlen conse't of ASMIT.

&

o
ASME Bl1.aS-2010

liquids under' noderate pressures (approximately 80 psig [550 kPa] to 250 psig [l 720 kPa]) t ambient
temperatures.
lotu-pt esvu e clstributio systenl: gas distribution piping system in which the gas pressue in the mins nd ser-

operatig strcss: strl]ss

in a pipc or structural member

under norlal operating colditions.

oper1tor or operntitlg co 1pa11y: rdvidual, patnership, corporatior, public agelcy, owle, agent, or other entity
'
m

vice lines is substantially the same s that deliveted to the customer's appliances. In ruch a system, a setvice cgulator is not required on tle individual service lines.
lou sttcss pipel1e: pipeline lhat s operat(rd in its entirety at a hoop stress level of 20% or less of the specified mirimum yield strentsth ol (he lire pipc.
t1i0g'teLc

currently responsible fo tle desigl, consLtuction, inspection, testing, operation, and mirtenrce of the
pipeline facilities.
pctfannatrce-bnsed tcgrity tIiiogeie l prog,'r17r

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ir'tegrity

nique that incluces a magnetic field in a pipe wall

bctween two poles of a mgnet. Sersol.s record status in leakage in this magnetic fux (flow) outside the pipe wall, which cn be correted to metal loss. nlngtlctic pitticle hlspcctioil (MPI): nondestuctive test method utilizing magnetic lekage fields nd suitable indicting materias to clisclose surface and nea-surface discontinuity indications. latingetle\t of cln,tger process tlat systemalically recog-

flur

lcoknge

(MFL): n in-line inspectior tech-

management process tlat utilizes risk managemer't principles and risk assessmerts to determine preveltion, detection, and mitigation acLions and tlei timing. p: device run iiside a pipeline to clean or inspect the pipeline, or to batch fluids. pig.gigr usc of any independent, self-contained device, tool, or vehicle tlat moves through tle interior of tle

pipeline for inspecting,

clrying.

imensioning, ceaning, or'

pipe: a tubular product, irclucing tubing, made for se

as a poduction item, used primarly for conveying fuid and sometimes for storage. Cylinclers formed from plate during the fabrication of auxilary equipment e

o
3',

nzes and communicates to tle necessary ptties

changes of a techncal, physical, proccdural, or organiza-

not pipe as defined helein.

ppe grcde:

tional nature lhat can impact system nfegrity.

potlio

of the material specification for pipe,

tlxit

which includes specifiecl minimum yield strength.

piplirr: all parts of

0Ilollb\e opernting ptesuu,e (MAOP): maximum

pressure at which a pipeline system may be operatcd in accordancc with the provisions of the ASME 831.8 Code.

ntrclnicol dntuoRt: Lypc of met.tl dm,gc in .r pipe or pipe coatinB causecl by tle appliction of an extetnal foce. Mechanical darnage can jnclude clentirj, coating
emoval, metal removal, metal movement, cold working

of the underlying meta, punc[uring, alld tesidual

rl?lnl /ossj types of anomalies il pipe in which meta has been removed from the pipe surface, usually due to corrosion or gouging,

physical facilities through which gas moves in trlsporttion, incuding: pipe, valves, fittings, flanges (inclucling bolting nd Baskets), reguators, pessurc vessels, pulsation dampeners, relief valves, appurterances attached to pipe, compressor units, metering facilities, prcssure regulating stations, pressure elief statiorN, and fabricated assemblies. Included within this defirition ac gas transmission and gathering ines, which transportgas from production faclities toonshore Iocations, nd gas storage equipment of the cosed-pipe type, which is fabricated o forged from pipe or fabricated from pipe a1d fittings.
pipelille

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5

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(MIC): corosion or deterioration of mefls resulting ftom the metabolic activity of microorgnisms. Such cottoson may be initiated or ccclcrated by microbal activity. lltitigatian: limitation or reductior of the probability of occurrelce or expected consequence for a particulaa
nic robologicall
i

y nflwtcerl

corrosot.r

ficilit!!: new and existirg pipelines, rights ofway, and any equipment, facility, or buildirg used in the transportation of Bas or in the treatmer't ofgas duril-rg the course of transportalion.

pipelit sectioll: cot'tfinuous run of pipe between adjaccnt compressor stations, between a compressor station atd a block valve, or between adjcent block valves.
pipc-to-oil potctrti0l: electric potential differencc between tle srface o buried or strbmerged metalic structure

event,
1unicpnliLy: city,

courtt or ny othe political subdivi-

sion of State.
notldcsh uct ioe exntlli nnLion (N D F-) or nondcstruct iae testi t1 g (NDT)r testing method, sucr as ladiography, ultrasonic,

nd th(] electrolyte that is measured with eference to

n electrode in contact with tle electrolyte. ppitrg otrtl instr nletlldtot1 diagrnm (PlD): drawing showing the piping and irstrumentation for pipeiine or pipelirre facility.

magnetc testing, iquid penetrant, visual, lcak testing, eddy current, and acoustic emission, or a testing teclique, such as mgnetic flux leakage, magnctic prticle

inspection, shear-wave ultrasonic, and contact

compression-wave ultasonic.
38 No repmduction

pittilry: Io. Iized coosion of a metal surface tlat

is

confined to small area and takes the form of cavitics cal(d pits.

Copyright O 2010 by tbe Arnerican Society of N4echanical Engileers. f"q be radc oflhis material wtlhout writteu cousent of,4SMB. "!X

'ay

ASME 831.85-2010

f
9L

prcdicted

filurc prcssut?, Pt: an internl pressure that is used to prioritize a defect s immediate, scheduled, or monitorecl. See the detai explanation with Fig. 4. the failure pressure is calculted utilizig 831G or simila method when tle design factor, is set to unity.

rtsk: measure of potentil loss ir terms of botl tlte incider't probability (likelihood) of occurrence arrd the magr'itude of the consequences.

prcsctiplipr

illtegriy i0n0:!e tenf prcg1.nflrr integrity managemenL process thal ollows peset conditions tht result in fixecl irspectiol-t nd mitigatiol ctivities and timelines.

risk nsscsstltcil!: systematic process it whicl potential hazads forn fcility operation ae identifiecl, atd the likelihood and col'sequences of potential dverse everts re estimtcd. RisL cscsbmcnls cn Ive v.rryirrg scopos,

1
6

and cn bc performed at varying leve of cletal

depending on the operator's objectives (see section 5).

pr'ssr/r"r u1less

olherwise stated, pressure s (]xpressed in pounds pcr square inch (kilopascals) above atmospheric pressure (i.e., Bage pressure), and is abbreviated as psig
(kPa).

ptcssure test: mcans by which the ittegrity of a piece of equipmelt (pipe) is assessed, in wlich the item is filled with a fluid, sealed, and subjecled to pressure. It is used to validte integrity and detect construction defects and

tisk nllqgenterf: overall program colsistilg of identifying potential threats to an area or equipment; ssessig tle risk associated with those tleats ir' terms of incident ikelihood and consequencesi mitigting risk by educing the likeihood, the consequences, or both; and measurng the risk reduction results acheved.
toot c0 se nllolysis: family of processes implemented to determire the primary cause of an evert. These pocesses all seek to exmine a cause-and-effect reltionship through the organiztion and analysis of data. Srrch processes are often used in failurc anayses. rupturc: complete failure of any portion of the pip(]line tht llows the poduct Lo escape to the envirorment.
'llsfj corrosion poduct consisting of various iron oxides

defective aterils probnbility: likelihood of , evenf {ccurrirg.

quilficntiotl: cemonstration and documented knowedge, skills, and abilities, along with documented train-

o
:<.

ard/or experience required for personnel to properly perform the duties of a specific )b or task. l?ci?,,'j pipcline facility used for removing a pig from a pressurized pipelinej sometimes referred to as a "pig trap."
irg
rcsid nl shess: stress presett in an object in tl.e absence of any exlernal loading, typiclly resulting from marrufacturing o constructiot processes.
rcsistiaitll:

and hydrated iron oxides. (This term propery applies only to iron and ferrous aloys.)
senltt weld:

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5

longitudinal o helical seam in pipe, which is made in tle pipe mill for the purpose of rnaking a
pipeline or part of the system that hs unique chaacteristics in a specific geograpltic location.

complete circular cross-section.

sgrlrfr length of

9:

(n) resistance per unit length of

form cross-section

a substance

wi[l un-

ssllsotir clevices that receive a response to a stimulus (e.g., an ultrasoiric sensor detects utrasound).
shall: "slall" or "shal not" are used to indicate tht a provision is mandatory.
s/rielr/i?.gr

s
q -l l
q.

() measure of the ability of al electolyte (e.g., soil) to resist the flow of electric charge (e.g., catlodic protection curent) Resistivity data are used to design a groundbed for a cathodic prolection system.
significant mounts of hydocarbons o components tht are heavier than meLlane ancl ethane. Ilich gascs decompress in a differ.ent fashiol than pure methane or ethane. tight-of-wny (llOW): strip of lalrd on wlrich pipelines, railroads, power lines, roads, highways, and other simiIar facilities are constucted. The ROW agreement secures tle right to pass througl property owned by others. ROW agreements generally allow the right of ingress and egress for the opeation and mailtenarce of the facility, and tle instlltion of the facility.'Ihe ROW widtl can vry with the construction nd maintenance requirements of the facilityt operak)r and is usually deternincd based on negotiation witl the afiected landowner, by legl action, or by permittirg authority.
39 t'iclt gns: gas that contails

prevelfing o diverting tle flow of catlodic

protection currcnt from its natural path.

"should," "should nof," or "it is recommcnded" are used to indicate that a provision is not mandatory but ecommended as good practice.
sftorld:

sizing nccurocy: give by tle interval within which a fixed percentage of all metal-loss featues wil be sized. 'I'he fixed percentage is stated as the confidence level.
sl]7rilf prg; industry term fo type of

ILI device.

soil IiLucfncliou: soil condition, typically causecl by dynamic cyclic loading (e.g., earthquake, waves) where tle effectivc slear strength of tlre soil is cduced sucl that tle soil exhibits the properties of liquid.

nittnut yield sttetlgth (SMYS): expressed ir.r pounds per square inch (MPa), ririmum yied stength prescribed by the specificatior under whch pipe is purchased from the manrrfacturer
specified

Copyright O 2010 by the Amcrican Society of Mecha ical Engineers No reproduction my be made of this material without written consent o ASME

&

ASME 831,85-2010

6
s!otge

field: geographic field cortaining a wei or wells fhat re completed for and dedicated to subsurface stor-

agc of large quantities of gs for later recovery trnsnission, nd end use.

processing pr't, o a storage fied to hig- or lowpressure distrbutior system, large-volumc customet or anotler storage fied.
ntpot0tio11 af gos: gatheting, trnsmission, or distribution of gas by pipeline or the storge of gas. ultrnsottic: \tgh-frequency sound. Ultrasonic examinatio is used to determir'e wall thickness r'd to detect
h

o_

sfai?i clan8c il length of a materil in response to an applied force, expressecl on a unit length basis (e.g., inches per incl or millimetets per millmeter),
srssr

z
'
g.

ilternal resistalce of a body to an external applied force, expressed n units of force per nit area (psi or. MPa). It may also be Lermed "urit sLress."
sfress cortosa1r crncktlg (SCC): for of environmental attack of the metal involvilg an ntectiot oi a local corosive environment and tensile stresscs in tle metal, resulting in fo mation and growth of cracks.

the preence of defects.

tprnfil?gj quaifying of an existing pipelne or man for a higher maxmum allowable operating prcssuLe.
zoeld:

strcss leucl: level of tangential or loop stress, usually expressed s perc(]ntage of specified Dilimum yield streDgth. subject tltottet expctts; individuals tlat have expertise il
,r

localtzed coalescence of mefals or nonmetas ptoduced by hl]tilg the materials to tlc weldilg temperture, witl or without tle ppliction of pressure, or by the applction of pressurc ole ard with or without tle usc of filler mterial. taelclitrg procedu'esj detailed methods and pactices involved in the production of a welclment. inkla lcttd: pipr: bcnd produccd by field macline or controled process tlt lny rcsult ir' prominent contour discortiruites or the inler radius. The wrirkle is delibertely iltroduced as mens of slortcning the inside meridian of the benc{. Note that this defnton does not apply to a pipeine bend in whicl incidental minor, smooth ripples are presenL.
ttu

a.

'

spc(ific re of oper.tion or cnBincerinB.

nlc ruelr/ing; alc welding process that uses an

sul)nrctgcd

arc or arcs between a bae metal electrode or electrodes and the weld pool. The ac and molLen metalare shielded

o
5

by a rlanket of granular flux on the workpieces. Thc

process is used without pressure and with fille metal from the electode ar'd sometimes from a supplemental source (n'elding rod, flux, or metal granules).
s//?V. measurements, irpections, or observations intended to discove and identily everts or conditions

is a list of publications tlat suppot or are cferenced in this Code.

14 REFERENCES 'le following

AND STANDARDS

110

that indicate a deparlure from nomal opeation or undmagecl condition of the pipelile.
sllstetn at pipelille syscrlr either the operatot's ettire

ANSI/lSO/ASQ Q9004-2000, Quality Ma1agement

Syslems (Spanish Language Version): Guidelincs for Perf ormance Improvements Publisher: American Society for Quality (ASQ), PO. Box
3005, Milwaukee, WI 53201

= s:

pipeljne infrastructure or large potions of that infrastructute that have definable starting and stoppirg poirts.
tcl11pcnturc: expressed in degrees Farenheit ('F) [degrees

o
6
6-

,API 1160, Managing System Integrity fo Hazardous

Cesius ('C)1.
tensilc stress: applied pulling force divided by the oiBinal cross-sectional area.

tltid-pnrty dnnnge: dmge to a gas pipeine fcility by an outside party othcr thar those perfo|ming work for the operator. For the puposcs of this Code, this also ilrcludes clamage caused by the opcrator's personnel or
the operatort contractors. fool; Beneric tcrm signifying any type of instrumented

Liquid Pipelines API 1162, Recommendecl Prctice, Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline C)perators API 1163, In-Line lnspection Systems Qualifications Publisher: American Pctroleum Instit{te (API), 1220 L Street, NW Waslingbn, DC 20005
831.8, Gas Transmissior and Distribution Piping

-l f L f

^SME Systems
ll31G, Manual for Determining the Remaiing ^SME Strength of Corroded Pipelines: A Supplement k) ASME 83l Codc for Prcs'urc Pipirrg
ASME CRTD-VoI. 40-1, Risk-Based In-Service Testing

tool or pig.

ltoittittg: organized program developed to impart tle krrowledge and skils necessary for qualification.
tnfilstissiott l|rc: segment of pipeline installed in a trals-

Developmert of Gudelines, Volume 1: General

I

mission system or betweer storage fields.

hitrsttlisson syssr?r ole or more segmenls of pipeline,

usully interconnected to fom a netwotk, tha[ ttnsports Bas from a gathering system, the outlet of gas
40

ASME Research Report, History of Lic Pipe Manufacturing il North America ASME STP-PT-O11, Integrity Management of Stress Corosion Crackilrg in Gas Pipeline High
Consequence Areas, October 31, 2008

Document

Copynghl O l0l0 by rhc Arncficn Socrcty ofMccharical No rcproducrion nay bc rnade ofllis rnaleflal $ilhout wrilrcn conscnt

Ergineers.

olr\SME. '(r

fjgb

o
83l.85-2010
3

ASME

IPC2002-27131, Qlualification of Pocedures for Weding

Onto In-Service Pipelines IPC2006-10163, Method fo Estblishing I{ydrostatic lle-Test htervls for Pipelines With Stress Corrosion Clacking
IPC2006-10299, Comparison of Methods for Predicting Safe Parametcrs for WeldingOnto In-Service Pipelines

GRI-O1/0085, Schedule of l{esponses to CorrosionCaused Metal Loss Revealed by Integrity-Assessment

Resulfs

GRf-01/0111, Dctcrmining the Full Cost of a Pipelre Incidenl

GRf-01/0154, Ntural Gas Pipeline Integrity

Mnagement Committee Process Oveview Report GRI-04/0178, Effecr of Pressure Cycles on Gas Pipelines GRI-95/0228.1, Natural Cs Pipclire Risk Managenent, Volume I: Selecred lechnical lerminology CRI-95/0228.2, Natural Gas Pipeine Risk Management,

z
'

IPC2008-64353, lmproved Burnthrough Prediction Moclel for In-Sevice Welding Applications

Publisher: The Americat Society

of

Mechalicl

Engineers (ASME), Three Pak Avenue, New Yor NY 100i6'5990; Order Dept.: 22 l-aw Drive, Box 2300, Fairf ield, NJ 07 007 -2300

Volume Il: Sech of Literature Woldwide orr Rsk

Assessment/ Risk Management

Containment

for Loss

of
.

Common Ground I Study of One-Cal Systems and

D.mge Prcvcntion lJest Prctices Publisher: C)ffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs Administrtion, U.S. Department of
TrnsportaLion, 400 Seventh Street, SW Waslirgton,

GRI-95/0228.3, Natral Gas Pipelir'e Risk Management, Volume III: hdustry Practices ^nalysis Gltl-95/0228.4, Natul Gas Pipeline Risk Maragement,

Volume IV: Identfication of Risk ManaBement

Methodologies Irublishe: Gas Teclnology Llstitute (GTI), 1700 Soth

DC 20590
GPTC 2000-19, Iechnical Report- Review of Integrity Mr'gement for Natural Gas Trarsmission Pipelines Publisher: Gas t)iping Technology Committee (GPIC) of the American Gas Association (AGA),400 N. Capitol Strcet, NW, Washilgfon, DC 20001

Moult Prospect Road, Des Plaines, IL 60018

;
=.

Guidelines for'lchnical Management of Chemical

Process Safety

Glll-00/0076, Evaluatior of Ppelinc Design -actors GRI-00 / 0077, Safety Performance of N tural Gas 'hansmssion and Gathering Systems Regulated by
Office of Pipeline Safety GRI-00/0189, Model for Sizing High Consequence Aeas AssociaLed With Natural Gas Pipelines

'ublisher: Center for Clremical Process Sfety (CCPS) of tle Aml:rican Institute of Chemical Engineet s (AIChF), 3 l'ark Avenue, New Yok, NY 10016 Integrity Claracleristics of Vintage Pipelines Publisher: The INGAA Foundtion, Inc., 10 G Street,
NE, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20002
Juran's Quality Control Handbook (4th Edition) I'ublisher': McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020

q o

GRI-00/0192, GRI Guide for Locating and Using

Pipeline Industry Research GRI-00/0193, Natural Gas Transmission lripelines:

Prevention, f)etectior', & Mtigation Practices Gl{l-00/0228, Cost of Peiodically Assuring Pipeline lnte8rity in High Consequerrce Areas by In-Line
Inspection, Pressure Testing and Direct Assessment

Ppcline lnte8rity

NACE RP0169, Conlrol of Extenal Corosion on

Underground or Submeged Metallic Pipirg Systems NACE RP0204, Stress Corosion Cacking Diect .Assessmert (SCCDA) Methodology

t
3
9.

GRI-00/0230, Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for

Higl-r-Consequence Areas GRI-00/0231, Diect Assessment and Validator CRI 00/0232, Leak Versus Rupture Considerations for Steel Low-Stress Pipelincs GRI-00,/0233, Quantifying Pipeline Design t 72% SMYS as a Pecursor to Increasing the DesiBn Stress Level

NACI

SP0106-2006, Control

of Internal Corrosion in

Steel Pipelines and Piping Systems

N^CE

SP0206-2006,

Intelnal Corrosion Direct

f

CRI-00/0246, Implementation Plan

for

Periodic

Assessment Metlodology for Pipelines Carrying Normally Dry Natual Gas (DGJCDA) Publishe: National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACFI) fternational, 1440 South Ceek Drive, Houston, TX 77084 Pipeline Risk Management Manual (2ncl Edition) Publishc: Gulf Publishing Company, I,.O. Box 2608, llouston, TX 77252
PR-218-9801, Analysis of 1985-1997

Re-Verification Intervals for High-Consequetce Acas GRI-00 /0247,Introduction to Smart Pigging in Natural Gas Pipelines GRI-01/0027, Ppr:line Open Data Stndard (PODS)

Gl{l-o1l0083, Review of Pressure Retestirg for

Trarslnission Pipelines

Gas

GRI-01/0084, Proposed New cuidelines for ASME 831.8 on Assessment of Dents and Mechancal Damac 4
Copyright O 20
No
10

DOt Reportabe Incdents for Gas l'rarsmission and Gathering System Pipelines,

may be made

by the A'erica society of Mechanrcal Engineers ofthrs material without written collseut ofASM

&

ASME 831.8S-2010

l:'R 268-9823, Guidelines for the Seismic Design ard of Natural Gas and Liquid Hycltocarbon ^ssessment Pipelines Publisher: Pipeline Research Council Itte ational, lnc. (PRCD, 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Arlingtor, VA 22209

42

\o

Copyriglr O 20 t 0 by lhr merican Socict y of Mcchalical ^ reproduction nlay be made ofthis nralcrial without wflrten conscnl

Fngrreers. ffr
ofAS\4.

YgX

o
ASME 831.8S.2010

NONMANDATORY APPENDIX A THREAT PROCESS CHARTS AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PLANS
'l'his Nonmalrdatory Appendix provides process
charts and the esscrtials of a prescriptive inteBrity mangement plan for tle nne categories of threats isted in the main body of this Codc. The required ctivities and intervals are not applicablc for severe conditions thaf tle operator may encountc. In tlose instances, more rigorous analysis and morc frcquent inspection may be
necessary.

1
9.

For this tlreat, the data is used primarily for proritization of integrity assessment and/or mitigatior' ctivities. Where the operator s missing data, conservativc assumptions shall be usecl when performing te risk assessment or, alternatively, the segment shall be prioritized higher'.

A-1.3 Crtera and Rsk Assessment

For new pipelines or pipeline segments, the opertor may wish to use the originl mteril selectiol, desigl conclitions, and construction inspections, as well as tle current operating lisbry to estblish the conclition of the pipe. For this situation, the opertor must determine that the construction inspections lave an equal or greater rigor thn that provided by the prescribed integrity assessment in this Code. In no case shall the interval between constuction and the first requied ressessment of integrity exceed I0 yr for pipe operting bove 60% SMYS, 13 yr for pipe operting above 50% SMYS rd at or below 60% SMYS, 15 yr for pipe operating at or above 30% SMYS and at or below 50% SMYS, and 20 yr for pipe operating below
30% SMYS.

A-1

EXTERNAI CORROSION THREAT

A-1.1 Scope
Scction A-1 provides an integrity management plan to addess the thret, and methods of integrity assessment and miti8ation, of external corrosion (see Fig. .A-1). External corosion is defined in this context to incluclc galvaric corrosiond microbiologically influelced corrosion (MlC). This section outines the integrity management process for extelnl coosion in general and also coves some specific issues. Pipeline incidenl analysis has identified external corrosion among tle causes of past incidents.

o
:<.

z
5

A-1.2 Gathering, Revewing, and lntegrating Data

'['he following minimal data sets should be collected for each segment and leviewed before a risk assessment can be conducted, This clata is collected n support of pelforming risk assessment and for special considerations, sucl as identifying severe stuatiors requiring

r-or all pipeline segments older than lhose stated above, iltegrity ssessment shall be conducted using a metloclology, within the specified response interval, as provided in pra. A-1.5. Pevious irtegrity assessments cal bc colsideted as meeting tlese requirements, provided tre inspectiors have equal or geater rigor LIn tllat provided by the

I
-l
3
9.

more or additional activities. (a) year of installation () coatirg type (c) coating condition (d) years wirh dequate cathodic protection (s) years with questiorable cathodic plotection f) years witlout cathodic protection (.9 sol characteristics (ir) pipe inspeclion reports (bell hole) (l) MIC detected (yes, no, or unknown) f) leak history

prescribed nspections il this Codl]. Tle interv

between the previous integrity assessment and fhc next integrity assessment cannot exceed the interval stated

in this Code.

A-1.4 lntegfty Assessment

The operator has a choice of tlec integrity assessment

methodsr il-line irspeclion with a tool capable of detecting wall loss, such as an MFL tool; performing a presslrre testi or conductilg direct assessment. (n) Itt-l-itrc lnspection. The operator shall consult sector 6 of this Code, whicLr clefines the capability of various ILI devices and provides criteria fol running of the

(k) wal thickness

(/) diamete
(n) operating stress level fl, SMYS) l) pst hydrostJtic test information
43

tool. The opertor selects the appropiate tools and

inspection.

he/she or his/her represenlative perforns the

Copyrighr O 2010 by llre Arnerican Sociely ofMcchnical No rcrorJuerron may be nade ofrhis narcril wilhoulr!'illenconscnlofASM[.'ldy

ngitlcers. fgl

Fg.

A-1

lntegrty Management Ptan, External Corroson Threat (Smptfied Process: Prescriptive)

Gatherng, reviewing, and integratng data

Criteria and risk assessmenl

Determine assessment

interval

lntegrity assessmenl (lLl, DA, hydrotest,

or other)

Responses and (repar and/or Drevent)

mitigation

Other nformation

to other threats

Performance

metrics

44

Copyright O 2010 by tle Arneican Sociely ofMcchnical

Noreproductionnaybe deofthisnaterilwjthoutwrttenconsentofASME.'(dy

Engineers. ffr

o
ASME 831,85.2010

(b) Ptcsstuc Test. 'lhe operator shal consult section 6 of tis Code, which defines how tc ccnduct tests forboth
post-constructon and in-ser!ice pipclines.'l'he operator selects tle appropriate test and he/she o lis/her representative performs the test. (c) Dircct Assess lenf. Tle opeato shall consult sec tion 6 of this Code, which defines the process, tools, and inspections. The operator selects the appropriate toos

Changes to tle scgment may also require reassessment. Chnge malgernert is ddressed in this Code ilr section 11.

)_

A-1.8 Performance Measures

The following performance measures shall be docurnentecl for the external corrosion tlreat, ir' order to estbish the effectiveness of the ptogram ad for corrfimation of the integrity ssessment irterval: (a) number of hydlostatic lest filures caused by external corrosion

6
m

z
'

and he/she o his/her representaLive performs the

inspections.

A-1,5 Responses nd Mtgaton

Responses to integrity assessments are detailed below

() numbe of repair actiors taken due to in-line

inspection esults, immediate nd scheduled (c) number of repair ctions taken clue to direct assessment results, immeciate and scheduled (d) numbcr of external corrosion leaks (for low-stress pipelies it rnay be beleficial to compile leaks by leak
classificatc)l)
q.

(n) ln-Line lnspectioll. The response is dependent or the severity of corrosion s determined by clculating critical faiure pressure of indications (see ASME B31G or equivalent) and a reasolably anticipated o scientifi-

cally proven rate of corrosion. Refer to section 7 fo responses to integrity assessment.

(b) Direct Assessfictr. The response is dependent or the number of indicatons exarined, evaluated, and repaired. Refcr to section 7 for responses to integrity
assessll1elt, (c) Prcssure Tsli?.g,

A-2

INTERNAL CORROSION HREAT

A-2.1 Scope
Section A-2 provides an inte8rity mnagement plan to address the thret, and methods of integrity assessment nd mitigalion, of internal corrosion. Internal coroson is defined il this context to include chemical corosion nd intcrnal microbiologically influenced cor.rosion (MIC, see Fig, A-2). Section ,{-2 provides a general oveview of the integrity margement process for interna cotrosion in gen-

ll o =.

Ihe interval is dependent on tle tesl pressure. lf the test pressure was al least 1.39 times MAOP, the interval shall be 10 yr. If te test pressure
was t least 1.25 times MAOP, the interval shll be 5 yr (see section 7). If the actual operating pressure is less that MAC)q the factors shown above can be applied to tlte actual opeating pressure in lieu ol MAOP for ensuirg integrity at the reduced pressu:e only. Tre operator shall selecb the appropriate repir methods as outlined n section 7 The operator shall select the appropriate prevettion practices as outlined in secton 7,

z
=

eral and aso covers some spccific issues. Pipeline

incident analyss has idertifed nternal corrosion arong the causes of pst incidents.

q
+

A-2.2 Gathering, Reviewing, and lntegratng Data

'Ihe following minimal data sets should be collected
for each segment and reviewed before a isk assessment canrb-e conducted rhis dat is collected in suPPort of perlorminl risk assessment nd nor special considera-

d
--l

A-1.6 Other Data

During tle inspection rctivities, the opentor m.y discover orher dara rhar srould b" r."J;"h;;;;;;;;

3
c.

A-1.7 Assessment lntervat The operator is required to

rrr ssessments tor other threats. .t *rr"i more orrdditionl 'tivities' "-",i... conducting an ILI with Ir,lrr- t..r,-J""'"-"f " (c) year of instalation detected othe rop hatf of ". pipe. inis ;"; h^;;; rhe (') PiPe,inspection rePorts (bell hole) caused by third'prry da-ug". Ii i" uppr.,pJ;ate then io use this informaion wren ionrluctirie risk asscssment {') lek history {/) wall thickness for the thircl-party clamage threat. " l) diatete

tions, such is identifying severc :'ituations

'equiring

assess ittegrity periodi,

caly. TIe nterval for assessments is dependent on the responses tken as outlined in para. A-1.5. 'Ihese intervls are mxirtum ntervas. Tle operatol. must incorporate new data into the assessment as data
beccmes available nd that may requie mote frequent integrity assessments. For exmple, a leak on the seg-

hydrosttic test informaton (.9) gas, liquid, or solid analysis (particularly hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, oxygen, free wte, and chlolides) (/) bacteria cuture test results (i) corrosion delection devices (coupons, probes, etc.) (7) operating parameters (particularly pessue alcl flow velocity ard especially periods where there is no
pst

(,

ment that may be caused by external corrosion shoud recessittc immediate reasessmcnl
45

flow) (k) operating stress level (% SMYS)

CopyriBht O:0 tu b) rlle socicty of Mcchanical E ^nterican No rcproducrron nray be nradc ofthis natcrial withour wrillen col.ent

ginecrs.

fg of^SME. '(Sl

Fig.

4"2

lntegrty Management Ptan, lnternal Corroson Threat (Simptfied Process: Prescriptve)

Gatherng, reviewng, and integrating data

Crtera and risk assessment

Determne assessment interval

lntegrty assessment (lLl, DA, hydrotest,

or other)

Other information to other threats

46

c)

ASME 811.8S-2010

f
Fo this tlct, the data is used primarily fo prioriti_

A-2.5 Responses and Mitgaton

Rcsposes to intcgrity assessmcr'ts are detailed below,

zation of intcgrity assessment and/or mitigation activities. Where thc operator is missing data, conservative assumptior's shall be used wheir performing the r.isk assessmert or, lterntivey, the segment shall be prioritizec li8her.

(n) In-Line Inspectioll. lhe response is deper'dent on the severity of corrosiol, as determined by calcuting critical failure pressure of indications (see ASME 831G or equivalent) ard a rcasonably articipated or scientifi-

A-2.3 Crteria and Rsk Assessment

For 1ew pipelines or pipeline segments, tle operator may wish to use tle originl material selection, desigl corditions, nd constnrction inspections, as well as the curent operating histort to cstablish the condition of the pipe. For this situtioir, the operator must determine

cally proven rate of corrosior. Refer to section 7 for responses to integrity assessments. (lt) I)irect Assessnterf. The response is dependent on the number of indications examined, evaluated, and repaired. llefer to section 7 or responses to integrity assessment. An acceptable method to address dly gas
internal corrosior is NACE SP0206. (c) Pressure'festing. The inteNal is dependent on the hydrostatic test pressure. If the test pressure ws at least 1.39 times MAOP, the interval is 10 yr If the test pressure was at least 1.25 times MAOP, the interval is 5 yr (see secto 7). If the actual operating pressure is less than MAOP, the factors shown above can be applied to the ctul operating pressure in ieu of MAOP for the purposes of insurinl integrity at the educed pressure only. The operator shal select the appopriate repair metlods as outlired in section 7. The operato shal select the appropriate prever'ton prctices s outlined in section 7. Dta corfirming tl-tat corrosive envionment exists should prorpt the design of a mitigtion pln of action and immediate implementtion sloud occu. Dat suggesting tht corrosive

(10)

flat the construction inspections have an equal or

greater rigor tln that provided by the prescribed integrity assessments in this Code. [n addition, the operator slall determile tlat a cortosive envitonelt does )ot
exist.

L
d

In 1o case may the inteval between construction and the first required reassessment of integrity exceed l0 yr for pipe opeating above 60% SMYS, 13 yr for pipe operatirg above 50% SMYS and at or below 60% SMYS, and 15 yr for pipe operating at or below 50% SMYS.

z
o
5.

For all pipeline segments older than those stated

above,

i[tegrity

assessment shll be conducted using a

melhodoogy wifhir the specified response interval, as provided in para. A-2.5. Previous irtegrity assessments can be considered as meetilg these requirements, provided the jrspections
have equal o greater rigor than that provicled by the prescribed irspectiols in this Code. The interval between tle previous integrity assesslenI and the next intetrity assessment cannot exceed the interval stated in this Code.

z
5

environment may exist should prompt n immediate reevluafion. If tle dta shows that no corosive cordition o environment exists, tl-en the operator should identify lhe conditions that would prompt reevluation.

r.

o
6

A-2,4 lntegrity Assessment

The operator has a choice of three integrity assessment

A-2.6 Other Data

During the inspection ctivities, tle operalor my discover otler data that should be used when performing risk assessments for otle tlrets. For example, ra,hcn corducting an ILI with an MFL tool, dents may be clled out on the top half of the pipe. This may have been caused by tlird-party damage. It is appoprite then k) use this data wlen conducting intcgrity assessnent for the third-party damage tlreat.

methodsr in-line inspection with a tool capable of detccting wall loss, such as an MFL tool; perfotming Prcssure test; or conducting direct assessnent.

-l

f
9.

(0) It1-LitE lfispecton. For in-line inspection, the operator must consult section 6 of this Cocle, wlich defines tle capability of various ILI devices and provides criteria for rumring of the tool. The operator selects the appropriate tools and he/she or his/ler representtive peforms tle inspection. (b) Pressure Test. The operator shall consult section 6 of this Code, whicl defines how to ccnduct tests forbotl-t post-construction and in-service pipelines. Tle opertor selccts tle approprite test and he/sle or lis/her repesertative performs the test, (c) Ditcct Assessretif. The operator slall consult section 6 of this Code, which defines the process, tools, and inspections. The operator selects tle appropriate tools and he/she or his/her representative peforms tle
inspections.
47

A-2,7 Assessment lnterval

Tle opeato is requred to assess integrity perioclically. TIe intervl for assessment is dependenl on the
responses tken, as outlined in para. A-2.5. These intervals are mximum interuals. Thc operator shal incorporte new data into tle assessmenl s data becomes available, and that may equire more frequcnl

integrity assessments. For example, a leak on tle segment that may be caused by intenl corrosion would
no.c5sltc i mmcc i,tc redssessmcnl.. Changes to the segment my also drive reassessmeltt. This change mnagement is addressed in section 11.

CopyriBhr O 2{)10 by ll,e Anrericar Sociery ofMccllnical ngr No reproluclion nray bc madc oflhis malcridl wilhoul $ri cl coDserrl ol

ccrs.

ASMI-. '(l

fft

a)

ASME 831.8S.2010

A-2.8 Pefformance Metrcs

l'he following performance metics shall be docmented for the internal corrosion tleat, in order to
establish tle effectiveness of the program and for confirmation of the integrity ssessment intervall

A-3.3 Crtera and Risk Assessment

9L

(n) numbe of hydrostatic test failures caused by intenl corrosi)n () r'rumber of repair ctions taken due to in-line inspection results, immediate and scheduled
(c) number of repair actions taken due to diect
assess-

4.3.3.1 Possbte Threat of SCC. Each segmcnt should be assessed for risk for the possible tlret o( SCC if all of the folbwing criteri re present: (n) opcrating stress level >60% SMYS (') 8e of PiPe >10 Yr
NOTE:
Age of prpe coatrng may be used if tle pipelinc se8rnent has been assessed for SCC.

1
=

ment results, imnedite and schedulec{ (d) number of intenl coosion leaks (for low stress pipeines, it may be bereficial lo compile leaks by leak
grade)

(c) All cor'osion coating systems otler tlan plant applied ol field applied fusion bonded epoxy (FBE) or liquid epoxy (when abrasive surface prepation was used during field coatinB applicaton). Field joirt coatirg systems should also bc considerecl Ior their susceptibility using the criteria in this section. A-3.3.2 Possbte Threat of High pH SCC. Each segment should be assessed for lisk for the possibe threat of high pH SCC if the above criteria are present and al of the following criteria are presentl

q.
d

A-3

STRESS CORROSION CRACKING THREAT

A-3.1 Scope
Section A-3 provides al integrity managemenl plan to address the threat, nd metlods of integrity assessrnent ard mitigation, for stess colosion cracking (SCC) ol gas line pipe (sce Fig. A-3). Ihis pln is pplicable

to botl rear neutral pH and high plI SCC. Integrity ssessment and mitigation plans for both phenomen
are dscussed in published researcl literature. This sec^ tior does ot ddess all possible means of lspecting for mitigatior of SCC. As new tools and technologies are developed, they ca be assessed and be avalable for use by the operator. Addtiolal guidance for manage-

ment of SCC can be fourd in ASME STP-PT-011,

Integrity Management of Stress Corosion Cracking in Gas Pipelinc High Consequence Aeas.

(n) operating tcmperature >100"F (38"C) (b) distance from compresso sttion <20 mi (32 km) In addition, ech scgmer't in which one or more setvice ir'cidents or one or more lydostatic test breaks or leaks has bce caused by onc of the two types of SCC shall be cvaluated, unless the corditions that led to the SCC have been corected. WIen a servicc ir'cident o hydostatic test break s attibutable to lear-ncutral pH SCC, or when conditiors conducive to near-leLrtra pH SCC are tlought to exist, lle 20 mi (32 km) criterion for distance from compressor station slall be disregarded

f.

o
5

for the pipe

segment as

a criterion to

f.
9:

define

SCC susceptiblity.

A-3,2 Gatherng, Reviewng, and lntegratng Data

Thc folowng miniml data sets should be collected for each segment and reviewed before a risk assessment car be conducted. This data is collected for performilrg risk assessment and for special consideratiorls, such as identifying severe situations requiring more or additional activities. (n) age of pipe
NOI Er ABe of pipe coati1g mry be used has leen assessed f<r SCC.

For this threat, thc risk ssessment consists of comparing the data elements to lhe crileria. lf lhe conditions of the criteria are met or if the segment has a previous SCC history (i.e., bell hole inspection indicting SCC, hyclrotest failures caused by SCC, in-service failures caused by SCC, o leaks car.rsed by SCC), the pipe is considered tobe at risk for tle occurrence ofSCC. Othcwise, if ole of the conclitions of the criteria is rot met and if the segment does not lave a history of SCC, no ction is requied.

-.1

f
q.

if the pipeline se8mert

A-3.4 lntegrty Assessment

If conditions for SCC are present (j.e., meet the criteria

() operating stress level (% SMYS)

(c) operating temperature (d) clistrce of the segment downstream from a comprl]ssor station () coating type f) past Iydrolest informtion

in pala. A-3,3), a written inspection, examination, rd

evaluation plan shall be prepared. The plan should give consideration to integrity assessment fo other threats and pioitzator mong otle segmelts tht are at risk for SCC. lf the pipeline experjences an in-service leak or rupture that is attribLrted to SCC, the prticLllar segment shall be subjected to a hydrostatic test (as described below) within 12 mo. A documented hydrostatic retest program shall be developed for {hs segment. Note tlat
48

Where the opeator is missing dfa, conservalive

assumptions shall be used when performing the risk analysis o, lternatively, lle segment shall bc prioritized
higher.

No reproduclion rnay bc rnadc

Copyrighr O lUltJ by rhe Anrencn Socicry ofMcchanical Engincc's. f& oflhis rnalcrial wrthoul wrirlen conselll olASMF. '(gy

3
!

Fg.

A-3

lntegrity Management Program, Stress Corroson Crackng threat

(Smptfed Process: Prescrptve)

(10) 6

9.

Fail para. A-3.3 criteria

q.

9-

ln-servce leak or failure occurrence due to SCC

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I I
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:s.

I
I

Ir
I I I
I

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I
-l l

I
I

I I I I

lntegrity assessment, mitigation (repair and/or Drevent), and ntervals

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rnsPectron

T I
I

prosram

*.t_-l T^;;;l I I
reoured
I

-"tri*

to ortrer

rnrears
I

49

ighl O 20lU by lhc A merican Socrery o[ Mecharical Engincers. fb Noreproductionrnaybcmdeofthisnrcrial wirhoul\arirlcnconscnl ofASMf '(gx
Copyr

o
ASi\4E

Br1.8S-2010

f
Tabte

A-1

sCC Crack Severity Criteria

Crack Severty Remainng Life

9I

Crack of any length having depth <10%

Wl

or crack wth

Exceeds 15 yr m Exceeds 10 yr Exceeds 5 yr Exceeds 2 yr Less than 2 yr

2 in. (51 mm) mximum length nd depth less than

30% wl Predicted failure pressure >110% SltYS 110% SMYS > predicted failure pessue >125ol. lvlAoP 125% i\440P > predicted failure pressure >110o/o MAOP Predicted failure pressure <110% IMAOP

hydrostatic pressure testirg is required. Use of other test mecliuls s lot permitted. Acceptable inspection and mitigation activities {or addressing pipe segments at risk for SCC are coveed in pars. A-3.4.1 ard A-3.4.2.

An engireering critical assessment may be conclucted to evaluate thc rsk and identify alternative methodologies. {See para. A-3.4.2(dX3).1

q.
9-

A-3.4.2 Hydrostatc festng for SCC. Hyclrostatic

testirg conditions for SCC mitigation have been developed through industry research to optimize the remova of citical-sized flaws whle mnimizing growth of subcritical-sized flaws. Hydrosttc testilg utiizjng tle criteria in this sectiol is corsiclered n irtegrity assessment fo SCC, Recommelded hydrostatic test criteria are as

A-3.4.1 Bett Hole Examnton and Evaluaton Method. Mgnetic particle inspection methods (MPt),
or other cquivalent nondestructive evalution methods, shall be used when disboded coatirg or bare pipe is encountered during integrity-elated excavation of pipeline segmeits susceptiblc to SCC. Excavations where the pipe is 1ot completely cxposed (e.g., ercroachments,

:o
.s'

exotlermically weldecl attaclments and foreign line crossings wherc the opeator may need only to remove soil from the top portion of the pipe) are not subject to the MPI requiremclt as described unless tlere is a prior
history of SCC in the segment. Coating condition should
be assessed and documented. All SCC inspection acfivi-

follows: (a) ligh-point test pressure equivlent to minimum

of 100% SMYS.
(r) target test pressue shall be maintained for a minimum period of 10 min. (c) upon returning the ppelile to gas service, n instrumented leak survey (e.9., a flarne ionization suvey) shall :e performed. (Alternativcs may be considered for lydrostatic test filue cvcnts due to causes other thn SCC.)

q:

ties shal be conducted using documented procedures.

Any indications of SCC shall be addressecl using guidance fom Tabes A-1 and A-2. Stess collosion cracking direct ssessment (SCCDA) is a forma process to assess a pipe segment for tle presence of SCC primarily by examning with MPl, or equivlenl teclnology, selected joints of pipe within that

(d)

Rcsulls
Test Lenk

(1) No SCC llydtostntic

or lluptrLre.

lf io

leaks or ruptures due to SCC occurred, the operator shall

= -l
3
9.

use one of the following two options to address long-

segment afler systematically gathe ng and analyzng data for pipe having similar operationl characteristics and residing ir a similar plysical envionment. lhe SCCDA process provides guidance for operators to select appropriate sites to conduct excvations for the purposes of conducfirg SCC integrify assessment.

term mitigation of SCC: (n) implement a written hydrostalic retest progrm with a technically justifiable interval o
(D) perform engineering critical assessment to evluatc the isk and identify furtler mitigation methocls [see para, A-3.4.2(dX3)] (2) SCC Hvdtostafic Tes Leak o Rupt rc. 11 a \eak or rupture clue to SCC occurred, the operator shal estblish a written hydlostatic retest progrm and proceciute with justification for the retest intcval. An example of

Detailed guidance for this process is provided in NACII RP0204, Stress Corosion Cracking Direct
(SCCDA I Metlodology.

^sscssment Tle severity of SCC indications is characterized by Table A-1. Several altetnative fracture mechanics approaches exist for operators to use for crck sevcrity assessmenL. The values in Table A-1 have been developed for typical pipeline attributes and representative SCC growth rates, using widely accepted fracture
mechancs analysis methods,

an SCC hydrostatic retest approach is founcl in IPC2006-10163, Method fo Establishing Hydrosttic

Re-Test [ntervals for Pipelines With Stress Corrosion Crackilg. (3) [,tlgit.ctitrg Ctiticol Assess rcnt, TIisisawritten document llat evaluates the risks of SCC ard provides
a

'lhe respolrse requirements applicabe to the SCC

technically defersible plan that demonstrates satisfac-

crack severity categories ate provided in Table A-2. I'he csponse requrements in Table A-2 incorporate conser-

tory pipeline sfety performalce. 'he document slall consider tle deiect growth mechanisms of the SCC
Process.
50

vtive assumptions regarding remaining flaw sizcs.

Copyright O 2010 by the Arerican Society of Meclarical No rcproduction may be made ofthis mateflal without writtlrn consent

Ergineers. rlel
ofASME. \OF

ASME Bl1,85-2010

6
3

Tabte
Crack Severty No SCC or Category 0

4.2

Response to Bett Hote sCC lndications

Respon5e ReqLrrement

(10)

Schedule SCCOA as appropriale. A single excvation for SCC ls adequte. Conduct a minimum 1f the largest flaw is lf the largest flw is appicable to that

m 4.

Category

of two additional excvations.

Category 1, conduct next assessment in 3 yr.

Calegory 2, 3, or 4, lollow the response requirement

category.

Category 2

Consider temporary pressure reducton unlil hydrotest, lLl, or lMPl completed Assess the segment using hydrotest, lLl, or 100% [,1P] examnation, or equivalent, within 2 yr. lhe type and iimlng of furiher assessment(s) depend on the results of hydotest, lLl, or lMPl. lmmediate pressure reduction and assessment ol the segment using one the followingl (d) hydrostatic test (b) tL1 (c) 100% NlPl, or equivlent, examination

Category 3

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o_

Category 4

lmmediate pressure reduction and assessment of the segment using one of the lolowing:
(a) hydrostatic test (b) tLl (a) 100% MPl, or equivalent, exarination

o
5.

4"3.4.3 ln-Lne Inspection for sCC. Recent ndusty experience has indicated some successful use of in-lne inspection (lLI) for SCC in gas pipelines. No specific guidance is offered in this document until greater industry expeience is eslabished. It is the resporsibility of the operator Lo develop appropriate assessment and response plans when ILI is used fol SCC.

TIis section outlines the integrity mnagemcnt poccss for manufacturilg concerns in general and also coves sorne specific issues. Pipeline incidert analysis has identfied marufacturing among tle cuses of past ilcidents.

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A-4,2 Gatherng, Reviewing, nd Intgrating

Data

g
s:

A-3.5 Other Data

Durir'g the integrity ssessment and mtgation activites, the operator may discover other data that may be

petinent lo olher lhreats. This data shoulcl be used wherc appropriate for performing risk assessments for
other fhreats.

The following minimal data sets should be collectcd for each segment and reviewed before a risk assessmert can be conducted. This data is collected for perfolming risk assessment and for special considerations such as idenlifying severe situations requiring more or addi-

tional activities.
(d) pipe material () year of installation (c) manufacturing process (age of manufacture s alternative; see note below)

-l
3
9.

A-3.6 Performanc Measures

The following performance measures slrall be documented for tle SCC tlrct, in oder to estabisl the effectiveness of tle program and for confirmation of the inspection intervali (n) number of in-service leaks/failures due to SCC (b) number of repair or replacements due to SCC (c) number of hydros[tic test failures due lo SCC

(d) seam type

(c) joint factor f) operaling pressure history
j

A-4

MANUFACTURING THREAT (PIPE SEAM AND

PIPE)

Whele the operator is nissing clata, corservative assumptions shall be used when pelforming the risk assessment or, alterntively, the segment shall be plioritized higher.
NOTD| When pipe data is Lnknow, the operator may refer to Hrstory of l-ine Pjpe MarLrf;tcturirg ir North America by
l. l] Kieer nd E. Il. Clrk,
1996,

A-4.1 Scope
Section A-4 provides an irtegrity mr'gemenl plan to address the threal, and methods of integrity assessment and mitigation, for manufacturing concerns. Mnufacturing is defincd in this context as pipe sem nd

^SM[.

A-4.3 Ctera and

Rsk Assessment

pipe (see lig. A'4).

51

Fo cast iron pipe, steel pipe greater thn 50 yr old, mechanically coupled pipelines, or pipelines joined by means of cetylene girth welds, where low temperates

\o

Coplrighr O 2UlU by ll,e Anreflcan socicry ofMechanical Lng rcproduction nlay bc rndc ofthis rtcrial uithout wrirlc0 conscDr of

eers.

fft AS\,,1E \@)l

F9.

A-4 lntegrity Management Ptan, Manufacturng Threat (Pipe Seam and Ppe; 5imptified Process: Prescriptive)
Gatherng, reviewing, and integrating data

Crtera and rsk assessment

Determine
assessment nterval

Responses and mitgaton

52

o
ASME 831.8S-2010

3 are experienced or wlere the pipe is exposed to move-

(n) number of hydrostatic test failures cused by man-

ment such as land movement or removal of supporting backfill, examination of the terrain is required. If and moverrrert is observed or can reasonably be anticipated,

ufacturilg defects (l) number of leaks due to manufactuir'g defects

6
m

a pipeline movetent rnonitoring program should be established and appropriate intervention actvities
un.lertaken. lf the pipe has a joint factor of less than 1.0 (such
s

A-5

CONSTRUCTION THREAT (PIPE GIRTH WELD, FABRICATION WEtD, WRINKLE BEND OR BUCKLE, STRIPPD THREADS/BROKEN PIPE/

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9-

weldecl pipe) or if the pipeline is composed of lowfrequency-welded ERW pipe or flash-welded pipe, a manufctuing threat is corsidcred to exist.

lap-welded pipe, hamrner-wclded pipe, and butt-

couPLrNG)

A-5.1 Scope
Section A-5 provides an integrity managemelt pln to address the threat, and methods of integrity assessment ld mitigation, for construcLion concerns. Cotstructio is defined in this context as pipe girfh weld,

A-4.4 lntegrty Assessment

For cst iron pipe, the assessment sltorrld include eval-

q.

uaton as to wlether or not the pipe is subject to lnd movement or subject to removal of support. For steel pipe seam concerns, when raising tle MAOP of a pipeline or when aising the operatirg pressure above the listorical operating pressure (highest pressue recoded in the past 5 yr), pressure testing nust be performed to address the sem issue. Pressure testing shall be in accordance with ASME 831.8; to at least 1.25 times the MAOP. ASME 831.8 defines how to conduct tests fo both post-construction and in-selvice
pipelines.

fabication weld, wrinkle bend or buckle, stripped

tlreds, broker pipe, or coupling (see Fig. A-5). Tlis section outli[es the integrity mangement process for construction concerns in gener1, and also covers

some specific issues. Pipeline incident analysis has identifecl consfruction among the causes of past inciclents.

A-5.2 Gatherng,

5Revewng, and lntegratng Data

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A-4.5 Responses nd Mtigation

For cst iron pipe, mitigtion options include replacement of pipe or stabilization of pipe. For sfeel pipe, any sectior that fails the ptessure test must be replaced. 'l'he operator shall select tlte appropriate prevention praclices. For tlis threat, tle opcrtor should develop pipe specifications to be used wlcr orclering pipe tht meets or exceeds the requiements of ASME 831.8.

The folowing minimal data sets shculcl be collected for each segmenl ard reviewed before a risk assessment can be conducted. This data is collected to support performirg risk assessment nd for specil considerations,
such as identifying severe situtions roquiring more or

dditional activities. (n) pipe material

() wtinkle bend identification (c) coupling identifiction (d) post-construction coupling reinforcement

f g
6

(r) welding procedures

A-4.6 Other Data

Durirg the inspection activities, tle operator may discover otler data that sloud be used when performing risk assessments for other threats. For exarnplc, certain seam types may be more susceptible to accelcrated corrosior. It is approptiate to use this infomaton when conductng risk assessments for external ol nterral corrosiolt.

f) post-corstruction girth weld einforcement (,9 NDT information on welds (ir) hydrostatic test information (i) pipe inspection reports (bell role) 0) potentia for outside forces (see section A-9)
bends

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3

(k) soil properties and depth of cove fo wrinkle

A-4.7 Assessment lnterval

Periodic integrity assessment is not requircd, Changes to the segment my clrive ressessment, such as uprating

the pipeline's operting pressure, or chnBes in operating conditions, such as significant pressure
cycling. Change managemenf is addressecl in section
11.

temperture ranges for wrinkle beuds () berrd radii and degrees of angle change for wrinkle belds (,r) operating pressure hstory and expecLecl opcration, including significant pressure cycing and fatigue mechaism Whee the opertor is missilg data, conservative assumptiors shall be used when performing the risk
assessment or, alternativel, the segment shall be

ll) maximum

I
9

priori3

tized hgher.

A-4,8 Performance Measures

The following performnce measures shall be documented for the manufacturing threat, in order to cstabconfirmation of the inspection interval
53

Iish the effectiveness of tle program and for

A-5.3 Crtera and Rsk Assessment For girth weds, a eview of tle weidilg procedures and NDT irforation is lequired to ascetain that the
welds e adequate.

('opy right O 201 0 by rhe A rerican Socicty of M cchanrcal fQh No rcproducrion nay be nrade ofrhis rnrcrial wilhoutwri encorsenlof^SME.'()d

Ergi'ccrs.

Fg. A-5 lntegrty Management Plan, Construction Threat (Ppe Grth Wetd, Fabrication Wetd, Wrinkte Bend or Buckte, Stripped Threads/Broken Pipe/Coupting; Simptfed Process: Prescriptve)

Critera and rsk ssssmenl

Determine assessment

Responses and

interval

mitgation

Other informaton to other threats

54

Copyright O 20l0 by lhc Anerican soci(ly of MeclraIical No reproducrion my be made ofthis material wirhour wrillcr consert of

Fnginerrs. ffr
ASMll.

'(4)d

ASME 831.8S"2010

For fabrication weds, a review of the welding procedures and NDT information, as well s a review of forces

(n) number of leaks or failures due k) constuction

defects

o-

required to sccrtir that the welds te dequate. For winkle bends and buckles as well s couplings, leports of visual inspection should be reviewecl kt ascertain tlei continued integrjty. Potential movement of the pipeline may cuse dditiona lateral and/or axial shesses. Information reative to pipe movement slould be reviewed, such as temperature range, bend radius, deglee ofbend, depth ofcover, and soil properties. These are important factors in determining whether or not bends aIe being subjected to injurious s[resses or strains. The cxistence of tlese construction-related threats alone does not pose an integrity issue. The presence of fhese threats in conjunction with the potentil for outsi<le foces significantly increases the likelihood of an event. The data must be ir'tegratecl and evaluated to
determine where these c01struction charactcristics coexist with external or ortside force potertial.

due to Brourd settlement or other outsicle loads, is

() nunber of girtl welds/couplings reinforced/

removed

(c) number of winkle lends removed (d) nunber of wrinkle bend inspections (e) numbe of fabrication wclds repaired/removed

A-6

EQUIPMENT THREAT (GASKETS AND O-RINGs, CONTROL/REtIEF, SEAL/PUMP PACKING)

A-6.1 Scope
Section A-6 provides an integrity management pln to ddess the threat, rnd methods of integrity assessnent nd mitigation, for pipeline equipment failurc. Equipment is definecl in tlis context as pipeline fcilities other thn pipe and pipe components. Meter/reguator and compressor stalior's ae typical equipmert locations (see Fig. A-(r. This sectien outlines the iitegrity mangement process for equipment in general and also covers some specific issues. Pipeline incident analysis has identified pressure control and relief equipment, Baskets and O-rings, alrd seal/pump packing arnong tle cuses of past incidents.

A-5.4 lntegrty Assessment

For construction threats, the inspectiot should be by dat integration, exmintion, and evaluation fot tlreats tlat are coincident witl the potential for ground movement o outside forces that will impact the pipe.

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A-5.5 Responses and Mtigaton

TIe operator shall select tle apptopriate prevention practices. For tls fhret, the operator should develop excavation protocols to ensue the pipe is noL moved and additiolal stresses introduced. In addition, the opertor

A-6.2 Gatherng, Revewng, and lntegratng Data

'The following miniml daf sets should be collected for each segment and reviewed befoe a isk assessment

should conduct examinatior's and evaluations every time the pipe is exposed. Potential threats should be mitigated by proactive pocedures that require inspection, repait replacerent, or reilforcement when the need to inspect the pipelile fo other maintenance reasons occurs,

can be conducted. 'l'his data is collected in support of performing risk ssessment ald fo special considerations, such s identifyilg severe situatiolrs requiing more or additional actvities. (/r) year of installation of failed equipment
(t)

s
.

A-5.6 Other Data

During the inspection activities, the operator may discover other data that soulcl be used when performing risk assessments fo other thets. For example, certain seam types may be more susceptible to acceleraLed corrosion. It is appropriate to use this information when conductilg risk assessments for external o intenal

regultor valve failue ilformation (c) r'elief valve failure infomation (r?) flange gasket failure information () regulator set point drift (outside of manufacturer's
tolerances)

6'

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3 0

f)

relief set point ctrift (g) O-ring failure irformator

(/t) seal/packing informalior Where the opelator is missing dat, conscrvative assumptions shall be used when performing the risk assessment ot altelntively, the segment shall be prioritized higher.

A-5.7 Assessment lnterval

Peirdic assessment is not requied. Clanges to the segment or chalges in land use may drive reassessment. Change management is addressed in section 11.

A-6,3 Criteria and Risk Assessment

Certain relief and regulato valves are known to have
Lheir set points

A-5.8 Performance Measures

The folowing performance measures shall be documented for the constuction threat, il order to establish lhe effectiveness of the program:
55

drift. These equipment types my require

extra scrutiny. Certain gasket types are prone to premature degradation. These equipment types may require more^frequent leak checks.

No

Copyright O 2010 by lhe Americn Sociefy of Mecharical Engineers be nrade of this rnaterial wrthout written consent of ASl\48

r& '(qx

Fg. A-6 lntesrity Management Plan, Equipment Threat (Gasket and O-Rng, ControURetiel Seat/Pump Packing; 5imptified Process: Prescriptive)

Integrity assessment {O&M procedures)

Determine
assessment

Responses and

Other nformaton

interval

mitigaton

to other threats

56

copyrihr O 2r,10 by rhe Arnerican Society ofMechanical No eproduclion may bc rnadc of rlis mrcrial wirhout \ rittcn conscnl of ASN4E. "@X

EnBincers. r&

o
a5E 831.85-2010

l
9l

A-6.4 lntegrity Assessment

The inspections for this treat are normlly conducted Thesc proceclures delail when inspections and mar'telance of

A-7.2 Gatherng, Revlewing, and lntegrating Data

per the requirements of the O&M procedures.

equipment shall be perlormed and wlat specific acton is requirecl. Additional or more-frequenL inspections may be necessry if the equipment has a leak and failue
histoy.

lhe folowing minima data scts should be collectecl for each segment and reviewed before a risk assessment can be conclucted. l'his data is collected in support of performing risk assessment and for special considertions, such as idertifyir'g scverc situtions requiring
more or additional activities. (d) vandalism incidents () pipe inspection reports (bell hole) where tle pipe
has been lit (c) leak reports resulting frorn immediale damaBe (d) incidents involvirg previous damage () inline ilspection results for dents alcl gouges al

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9.

A-.5 Responses and Mitgaton Replccmert or repair of the equipment my be

requircd.

A-.6 Other Data

During lhe inspection activities, the operator may discover other data that sl-orrld be used wel performig risk ssessments for other threats. For example, when inspecting gaskets at aboveground facilities, it is cliscovered that there has been a lightnirg strike. It is appropriate to use this iformatior-r wlen conductilg rsk assessments for tle weather-eated and outside force
threat.

top half of pipe

f)

one-call records (g) encroaclment recods

a I

A-6.7 Assessment lnterva(

TIe inteval for assessme[t is contained witlin the operation and maintenance procedure fo the specific types of equipment.
Chnges to the segment may drive reassessment. This change management is addressed n section 11.

A-7.3 Crtera and Risk Assessment Review of clata may show susceptibility to certain types of third-party inflicted dama8e. Deficiences in these areas require mitiga tion as ou tlined below Because tlird-prty clamage is a time nclependent tlreat, even witl the absence of ny of these indicators, thid-party damage can occur t ry time and strong prevention measures are necessat especially in areas of concern. Specific land uses, such as agricultural lands witl-r shallow deptl ofcover, may bc moresusceptible to thirdparty damage.

o
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5

A-7.4 lntegrity Assessment

Observance of ercoaclments or third-party damage is ccomplished during ptrols ancl leak surveys con clucted as required by the operations and maintelnce procedures. However, in the case of incidents ilvolving previously darnaged pipe, it is frequently found afte tle fact tlat tle defect was levealed indirecty even

A-6.8 Performance Measures

The folowjrg performance measures shall be documeted for the equipment threat, in orde to establsl the effectiveness of the program and fo confirmation of the inspection interval: () rrumber of regulalor valve failures (l) number of relicf valvc filurcs (c) number of gasket or O-r'ing failures (/) r'rumber of leaks due to equipment filures

A-7

THIRD.PARTY DAMAGE THREAT ITHIRD-PARTY INFLICTED DAMAGE (IMMEDIAT, VANDALISM, PREVIOUSLY DAMAGED PIPE]

tlough it may have leen adequalely described by a previous inspection such as an inline inspectiol. Tlerefore, tle operator should investigate suspicious indications discovered by inspections thal cannot be directly irterpreted, but may be correaled with known excavation activities revealed by one-call ecords or other
encroachment records,

Q,

A-7.1 Scope
Section A-7 provides an integrity margement plan fo address the theat, ard methods of integrity assess-

A-7.5 Responses and Mtgation

Mitigation of third-pfy dama8e is tlrough preven-

tive ctions or repair of damage found as a esult of

inspectios, examinations, or lests performed. Thc oper-

ment and mitigation, for third-party dmge. Thirdprty damage is defined in ths context s third-party inflicted damage witl immedite failure, vandalism, and previously damaged pipe (see Fig. A-7). 'I'his section outiles tle integrity managemert process fo tlird-party damage in general and also covers some specific issues. Pipeline incident analysis has identfied tlird-party damage arnong the causes of past
incidents.
57

ato shall ensure tlat third-party damage prevention programs are in pace and functioning. Additional prevention ctivities may be warranted as provided in scction 7, such as deveopment of a damage prevention
plan.

A-7.6 Other Data

During the inspection and examination activities, tle operator may discover other data that should be usecl

Cop) r i8b{ O 201 U by lhe Arnerican Society of Mechalical Engi No rcprocluctrorr rnay bc rnadc oIrhis rnaterial wilhoul \rrirren conscnt

eero.

ofASN4E. '(qX

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Fig.

A-7

lntegrty Management Ptan, Third-Party Damage Threat [Third-Party lnfticted Damage (lmmedite),
Vandtsm, Prevousty Damaged Pipe; Simptified Process: Prescriptvel

Gathering, reviewng, and ntegrating data

Crtera and risk assessment

lntegrty assessment {O&M Drocedures)

Determine assessmenl ntervEl

Responses and mitgaton

58

Copyriht O 20lU by thc Arncr ican Socrcry of N4 echanical No rcproduc(iorr rnay be made of lllis material withoul \rrrillcn!onserlol^SME.

EnBireers. fft

'(l

c)

asME 831.aS-2010

wlel performing risk assessments for othe threats. For example, whe monitoring n encroachment, exposed pipe may indicate active exfernal cortosion. It is appr.opriate to use this ifornatior wlen conductiltg risk assessrents for extetnal cortosion.

the reqLLirenents of the procedure, no additional assess-

!L

ment is reqrired. Deficiercies n these areas rcquirc miti. gation as outlined below.

q
m

A-8.4 lntegrity Assessment

Thc audits and reviews are normally conducted on ar ongoilg basis. These inspections are condLrcted by cor1pany personnel and/or by third-party experts.

A-7.7 Assessment lnterval

Assessment shall be performed periodically. It is recclnmended that it be performed annualy. Changes to the segment may drive rcassessment, Change management is addessed in section 11.

1
9-

A-8.5 Responses and Mitigation

Mitigtion in this instance is prevention. The operator shall ensue tht procedures ae current, the persor'rnel are adequtely qulified, and that the following of procedues is enfoced. The operator should have a program to qualify operation and maintenance personnel for each ctivty that they perform. This program should include initial qualification and periodic reassessment of qualification. Certification by recognized orgniztions may be included

A-7.8 Performance Measures

Tle folowing performance measures shall be documer'ted for the third-prty threat in order to establish Lhe effectiveness of the program and for confimation of thc inspection intervl: (n) numbel of leaks or failues caused by third-party
damage

5
o_

() numbe of leaks o failures caused by previously

damaged pipe

(c) number of leaks or faiures caused by vandalism (d) nurnber of repairs implemenfed s result of third-parfy damage prior to a leak o fah.re

in this progrm.
In addition, a strong internal review or audit program

o
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by inhouse experts or third-party experts is neccssry.

4.8

INCORRECT OPERATIONS THREAT

A-8, Other Data

During tle inspection activities, lle operator may discover oLher data that should be used when performing risk assessnents for other threats. For exarnple, when reviewing records required by procedures, it is discovered that there have leen several unreported elcroachments by third parties. lt is appropriate to use this information whcn conducting risk assessmelts fo

A-8.1 Scope
Section A-8 provides an integrity mnagement plan to address the threat, and methods of integrity assessmenl nd mitigation, or incorect operatons. Incorrect

e q.

operations e defined in tlis context as incorect opeatirg procedures or failure to follow a procedure
(see Fig. A'8).

third-party damage. A-8.7 Assessment lnterval

Assessment shall be performed periodically and is

Tlis sectior outlines the ntegrity mnagement process for ircorrect opl]ations it general ancl also covers some specific issucs. Pipeline ncident analysis has iden-

tified incorrect operations amorg the causes of past

incidents.

A-8.2 Gathering, Reviewing, and lntegratng Data

ts should be collected for each segment and reviewed before a risk assessment cn be conducted. This clata is collecled in support of
se

The following minima data

recommended to be performed annually. Changcs to the segment may drive revision of procedues and additional training of personnel. Change mangcmcrt is addressed in section 11.

3
e.

performing nsk assessment ald for special considera' tions, such as identifying severe situations requiring more or additional activities. (n) proccdure review infomation () audit information (c) faiures caused by incorrect operation

A-8,8 Performance Measures

'I'he following performance measures shall be documented fo the incorrec[ operations thrcat, in order to cstablsl the effcctiveness of trc program and for confir-

A-8.3 Crteria and Rsk Assessment If the data shows thl] operation and mainter'nce

are

performed in accordance with operation and maintenance procedures, the procedues are correct, and tl-at operating personnel are adeqLratcly qualified to fulfill
59

mation of tle inspection r'teval: (n) numbe ol leaks or failures caused by ir'correct operations lD) number of auclits/reviews conducted (c) numbe of findings per audit/review, classified by severity (d) number of changes to pocedures due to audits/

\o

Copyri8hr O 201 0 by lhe American Socicry o f Mcchnicl reprcrluclron nay be rrade ofrhis nlcrial uithoul \lriltcn conscnr

UngiDccrs. ffr

ofASVE. '(Qy

Fig.

A-8

lntegrty Management Ptan, lncorrect Operations Threat (Smptified Process: Prescriptve)

Criteria and risk assessment

lntegrity assessment
(O&M procedures, audts/reviews)

Determine assessment

Responses and (personnel qualifcation and procedures)

mitigation

Other nformation

intervl

to other threats

60

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ASME 831.8S.2010

A-9
(t o)

WEATHER-RELATED AND OUTSIDE FORCE THREAT (EARTH MOVEMENI, HEAVY RAINS OR FLOODS, COLD WEATHER, LIGHTNING)

A-9.1 Scope
Section A-9 provides an integrjty managemcnt plan to address the tleaf, and methods of integrity assessmert ncl mitigaton, for wethe-related and outside force concerns. Weatl'rer-elrted and oulside force is definecl in this cor'text as earlh movement, heavy rairs or floocls, cold weathcr, and lighhinl (see Fig. A-9). 'fhis section outlines the integtity managemelt pocess for weather-relted and outside fotce tlrets r' gen-

(c) where blasting ner tle ppelire is occurring f) wre the pipe is at or above tle frost lne (,9) wlere tle soil is subject to liquefaction (/) where grourd accelertio1 exceeds 0.29 At locations meetirg any of the abovc, the tlreat shall be evauatecl. At locations wlere facilities are prone to ligltning strikes, the threat slall be evaluated.

z d

4"9.4 lntegrity Assessment

Fo weather-related and outside force fheats, infegssessments, includilg irspectior's, cxamintions, and evaluations, aIe normally conducted per the rcquiements of tle O&M procedures. Additional or mor.efrequent inspections may be necessary, depending otr leak and faiure information.

rity

eral, alld also covets somc specific issues. t-or seismic threats, PR 268-9823, Gr-Lidelines for the Seismic Design

and Assessment of Ntural Gas arrd Liquid

Hydrocarbon Pipelines, or siilar rrretlodologies may be used. Pipeine incident analysis has identified weather-related and outsidc force damage among tle
causes of past incidents.

A-9.5 Responses and Mtigaton

Repairs or replacernent of pipe shall be in accodance 1/itl th'r ASMII 831.8 Code nd other applicable irrdustry standrds. Other methods of mitgation may ilclude stabiliztio of the soil, stbilization of the pipe or pipe joints, elocatio of the pipeline, lowering of the pipelre below tl(] frosl line fo cold-weather situations, and pro-

4"9.2 Gathering, Reviewing, and lntegrting Data

The following miniml data sets should be colectecl for eacl segment and reviewed before a risk assessment can be conductecl. This dat s collected in support of perforning risk assessment and for special considerations, such as identifying sevete situations equiring more or aclditional activities.

o
5',

() joirt method (rnechanical couplg, acetylene weld, arc weld) (/') topography and soil conditions (unstabe slopes, wter crossings, wate proximity, soi liquefactions susceptibility) (c) erthquake ft (d) profile of ground accelertion near fault zones (greater than 0.29 acceleration) () depth of frost line f) yer of installation (g) pipe grade, diameter, and wal thickness (intena stess calculation added to external loading; total stress not to exceed 100% SMYS) Where the operaLor is missing drLt. conservative assumptions shall be used when performing the risk
assessment or, alternativel, the segment shall be prioritizcd in a higher category based on the expectcd worst case of the missing data.

tection of boveground facilities from lightning. Preventior activities are most appopiate for tltis threat. Ifa pipeline flls within the listed susceptibilities, line patrolling should be used to perform suface assessments. ln certain locations, such as known slide areas or areas of ongoing subsidence, the proBress of the movement should be monitored.

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A-9.6 Other Data

During tle irspection activities, the operator may cliscover oLhe data tlt slould be used when performing isk assessmelts for other threts. For example, when a pipeine is patrolled, evidcnce of third-party encroachment may be discovered. It is appropriate to use this information when conducting risk assessments for lhe third-party damage threat.

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A-9.7 Assessment lntervat

Changes to the segment, or bhe land use around the segment, may drive reassessment if thc changes ffect pipeline integrity. If no changes are experienced, reas-

sessment is not required. Change maragement is

addessed in section 11.

A-9.3 Critera and Risk Assessment Pipe may be susccptible to extreme loading at the
following locatiots: (n) where the pipeline crosses a fault lirre () whee the pipeline traverses steep slopes (c) where the pipeline crosses wate or is acljacent to wJter, r)r where tlc rvcr bottom is m,rving (d) where the pipeline is ubject to extreme surface locls lhat cause settlement to underlying soils
61

A-9.8 Pefformance Measures

The folowing performance measures shall be documented for the weather-related and outside foce threat, ir order to estblish the effectiveness of the program

ald for confirmation of the inspectol intelval

() number of leaks tlat are weathe-related or due to outside force

(b) number of repair, replacement, or reloction

actiols due to weatler-related or outside force tlreats

Copyrighr O 2UlU by thc Arc'ican Socicly ofMcchnical EDgineers. No rcproduclioD rnaybc nradeot thisrnitcrial \ailhout $fl en cotscnt ofASME.

rg

Fig. A-9 lntegrty Management Plan, Weather-Related and Outsde Force Threat (Earth Movement, Heavy Rains or Floods, Cotd Weather, Lightnng; Smptified Process Prescrptve)

Determne assessmenl interval

Responses and

mitigation

Other nformaton to other threts

62

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5ME 831.85-2010

f
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I
NONMANDATORY APPENDIX B DIRECT ASSESSMENT PROCESS
This Nonmandatory Appendix provides informtion about the direct assessment process. Direct assessment is one integrity assessDlent methodology that can be used withir the integity management program. inspection of a pipeine segment. In addition, it cn be modified for a performance-based plan.
m

B-1.1 Pre-Assessment
'Ihe pre-assessment step povides guidance for selection of each pipeline segment beilg considered and then the appropriate indirect examinatior method. Data integration and analyses arc also uscd to identify or define ECDA regions alon8 tle pipeline being An 'rvaluted. ECD^ region s r' area witlil a pipeile segment(s) that th( daf ildicates s suitble for thc sme indirect exarnilatior methods. Dfferent ECDA regions car use clifferent sets of complementaly indirect exrnination metlods. An operator rust begir by iltegrating the listorical knowledge of lhe pipeline, including facilities informa-

:.
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B-1

EXTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT

-'

Externa corrosion direct assessment (ECDA) is

structlred process that is a methoc{ for establislng tle integrity of underground pipelines. s described herein, it applies to extenal corosion on pipeline segments. The process integratcs facilities data, and curent and listoical fied inspections and tests, with the plysical characteistics of a pipeline. Nonintrusive (typically aboveground or indiect) examin.ltions are used to estimaLe the success of the coffosiol protection. The ECDA
process requires that some excavatiols be made. Excava-

5-

o 5

tion, operating history, and the results of pior

aboveground indirect examinations and direct examinations of the pipe, to assess the integrity of the pipe. Normandatory Appendix A lisls the minimum set of pipelile data that shal be reviewed for external corrosion tleats, but additional dta may be collected to improve effectiveness. Tlese clata should be analyzed to estimate the extent and likelihoocl of priol corrosion. Other lactors, such as adjacent pipelines, encroaching stluctures, oI significant operational chantes that my impede ECDA, should also be considered. This pre-assessment step estimates locations of prior

tions confirm tle abjlily of the indirect examntions to locte active and pasLcorrosion Ioctions on tle pipelire, as well as areas of significnt coting dmage at which corrosion could occur. In thc overall ECDA process, such evaluations ac defined as direc[ exmintions. Postassessrrelt is equired to de[ermine a corosion rate to set the reinspectior intervI, essess tle performance measues and their current applicability, plus etsute the ssumptions made in the previous steps remain correct. The ECDA process, therefore, has rhe following four
comporents:

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(n) pre-ssessment (D) indirect examinations (c) direct exminations

'lhe focus of the ECDA approach described in this

Standacl is to identify locations where external corrosion defects may have fomed. It is ecognized that evidence of other threats, sucl as mechanical damage and stress corrosion crcking (SCC), may be detected duting

(d) post-assessmenf

and active corlosion, The operator must deternine if the ECDA processes can be used in these locations. After ECDA regions are defined, the operato is to select at least two indirect examination methods: one primary and a second complementaly examination
method. Two tools are required, because no one metlod reliably locates indications of defects unde all conditions. The secondary (complementry) mefhod is to be selected based on the expectation that it should validate lhe first and possibly identify aeas that nay lave been

the ECDA process. While implementing ECDA, the operator is advised to conduct examinations that will also dctect nonexternal corrosion Lhets. The prescriptive ECDA process requires the use of t least two indirect examnaton methods, verification checks by excavation and direct examir'tion, and postassessment vaidaton (sorne indirect examination tools
can be used to defect corrosion on uncoted pipe;

missed by the pimary method. A tetiy method

shoulcl be consideed for aes wlere the first two methocls provide conflicting results.

I :

B-1,2 lndirect Examnatons

The primary and complemetary indiect examilations are used to detect coatir'g defects. Fist tle operator

issue). 'Ihe process has been designed to allow it to be used as an initial baselire

futher

work is being pursued on tlis

pelforms the primary examintion of the regions identi fied abtve. The secend step is examination of the same region with the complementary method. Loctions for
63

No

Copyright O 2010 by lhe Arericn Society ofMechanical ngiueers rndy bc rnade of lhrs malerial r\ ilhoul wriller conser of AS\41-

-a!

ASME 831.85-2010

complcmertary examintion should include tlose that may lave preserted some difficulty clurng primary
examinafion, ll areas ofspecial concen, or wlere recent changes (as indicated by historicl data) have occurred. This secondary metlod must evaluate at least 25% of each CDA region. Primary and complementary examination results ae compared to detemine if new [aults have been identified. lf new coating fault locations ae identified durirg

Tabte

B-1

Corrosion Rates Related to Sol Resistvity

Soit Resistivty, ohm-cm >15 000 and no active corrosion 1000-15 000 and/or active co(osion <1 000 (worst case)

9r

Coroson Rate, mils/yr

)
6

s-

r2

tle complemenfary exmination, the operator nust explir the cause of tle cliscrepalcy and/or conduct addifional (tertiary) indirect examinations. If adclitional coating fauJts are identified by the terliary examination and/or the additional corrosion faults identified during
complemenfary examintion are not readily explained, the operator must return to the pre-assessment stage ard select l alternative assessment method. Within each ECDA region, tle coting faults should be characterized (e,g., as isolated or contiluous) and prioritized based on expected coosion severity from the indirect examinafion data. or exarnple, based on pipeline history, thc operator may use the corrosion sfate (e.9., anodic/anodic, anodic/cathodic, or cathodic/ cathodic) to determine which coating fults are most likely to correspond to the sevetely cotroded areas. Those.rre.rs wherc the potelt(ial lor sevele corrosion is highest should receive excavation priority. Evaluations of al wall losses found are to be used to establish appropriate reinspection nd/o retcsting irtervals. The same indirect exmination methods may not be ppropriate for evey pipeline or segment being evaluated. Clnges to lhe metlodologies ny be waranted, depending on lhe inspection results.

dircct cxminatiol resuremelts, the actu rte can be used in lieu of those shown in the above table. The seveity of all coosion clefects at the excavated coating fault areas should tlen be determired using ASME B31G or a similar method. The maximum dmensions of possible corlosion at unexamined coating defcct loctions must be estimted as follows: (n) if no othe data re available, it must be assumed tht the mximum defect dimensions are twice tht of the largest defect depth and length measured during
direcl examination. (D) altematively, statistical aralysis results of defect severity from tle corlosion measuremelts performed during direct examination can be used to eslimale the defect severity at otler coating faults, h this case, the operator must excavate and perform direct examirations on lrge enough sample of coating faults to make a

;'
o_'

:s.

sttistical estimte of tle stucturl inteBrity of

emaning corrosion clefects at an 807o confidence level. The operator is k) continue excavations, measuements, categoriztion, and repairs unti the remaining defects with their associated growth rates e such tat there will be ro structully significnt defects in the pipeine segment before the next integrity assessment is
performecl.

s:

0
6'

B-1.3 Drect Examnatons

This stage requires excavations to expose the pipe
surface for metal-loss measurements, estimated corrosion growtl ates, and measurements of corosion mot-

r.
6

B-1.4 Post-Assessment
Post-ssessment sets renspection intevals, provides a vlidation cleck o the overall ECDA process, and provdes performance measures for integfy management programs. The reinspectiol ilteval is a function of the validtion and repir activity. For tlc ECD^ prescriptive prograrn, if tle operator chooses to excavate all tle indications found by indirect examination and repairs ll defects that could grow to failure in 10 yr, then the reinspection inteval shall be 10 yr. lf tle operator elects to excavate a smaller set of indicatiors, then tle inteval shall be 5 yr, provided arr evaluatior is performed to ensue all defects that could grow to failure in 10 yr (at an 80% confidence level) are

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3

phology estimated during indirect exmination. The

goal of these excavalions is to colect enough nformation to characterize lhe coosion defects that may be present on the pipeline segment being assessed and validate tle indirect examintion methods. Direct examilatiols are to be made aL one o more Iocations from eacl ECDA regio inwhich coating faulls have been found and one o more locatiots where para. B-1.2 found no anomalies. Al corosion defects found during each direct examination should be measured, documented, and remediated as required. At each excavation, the operator should measure and lecord Bereric elvironmental characteristics (such as soil resstivit, hydrology, drainage, etc.). This data can be used to estimate corrosien ates. Average corrosion rates reted to soil resistivity are provided in lable B-1,

L j

repaired,

In the ECDA prescriptive program for pipelne segments operating at or below 30% SMYS, the reinspection
interval is also determined by the level of repair and correspondig interval, and the rnuch thicker pipe wll, as follows. lf the operator chooses to excavte all the indications found by indirect exarnintion and repairs
64

If

tle operatol can provide a sourd fechnical bsis

for using other corrosiol ates or estimates based on

Copyright O 2010 by the A,erican Society ofMcchanical Engiecrs No ron rnay bc rndc oflhis rndrcrial \lilhout wntten co'scrl of ASMI_

&

ASME 831,aS-2010

3
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all defects tlt could grow to failure in 20 yr, the reinspection iltelvl shall be 20 yr. If the operator eects to
excavate a smaller set of inclications, then the interval slal be 10 yr, provided ar evalution is performecl to ensure al defects tht coud grow to failure in 20 yr (at

an

80o/o

conficlence level) are repaired.

Tle validation check on tle overall ECDA process consists ofperforming t least one additional excavation.
Tis excavation is lo be peformed t the coating defect Iocation that was esLimated to cotain the next most sevee defcct not previously subjected to a direct exami-

nation. Corosion severity at this location should be

determned and compared wi[l the maximum severity predicted duing the direct examinations. (n) If the actua corrosior defect severty is less thn half of the maximum pdctcd sevcrit, validtion is
complete.

reevaluate and rcset the Browth rate prediction. The operator must tlen perfom additional diect exaninatiorrs as required and repet the post-assessmert evaluation. (c) If the actual corrosior severity is greater thn the maximum predicted severity, tle ECDA process may not be appropriate and the operator must reevaluate ad reset the gowth te predicton. The opl]rator must perform additional direct cxminations as rcquired and repeat the post-assessment cvaluatiol. ECDA. validatior rnay also be performcd usjng histolical data from prior excavtions on fhc same pipeline. Prior excvation locations must be assessed to determine tlat tley are equivalent to the ECDA region bcing consideed and such a comparison is valicl. If validity is establisled, then maxmum corosion depths may be estimated from tle por data.

I
m

z
s,

(b) If the actual corosior severity is between the maximum pedicted severity and onealf of the raximum

predicted severity, double tle preclicted maximum severity and do a second recaliblaton dig. If the actual corrosion is gin less than the maximum predicted severity, then validation is complete. Il nol, the ECDA
process may not be appropriate alrd the operator must

B-2

INTERNAI. CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT

r10l

Tlis section has been rcmovecl with publicator of NACE SP0206 DCICDA. Operators are encourgcd to use the appropriate NACE standard practice or an alternate and teclnically justified lnethodology.

o
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9:

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65

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Copyright O 2010 by the Amencan Socity of Mechanical Engineers. ay bc rradc of rhis rnarcrial wirlout wriltcn conscnr of ^SMI-.

ASME 831.8S.2010

3
_

NONMAN DATORY APPENDIX C PREPARATION OF TECHNICAL INQUIRIES

C-1
(b) Bockgrourtd. State the purpose of lle inquiry, which would be eilher to obtain an ir'terprelation of Code rules or lo propose considertion of a revision to the present rules. Provide concisely the information needed for the Commitlee's understanding of the
nquiry, being sure to include reference to the applicable Code Section, Edition, Addenda, paragraphs, figures, and lables. If skefces are provcled, they shall be limited to the scopc of the inquiry.

6
INTRODUCTION

Tle ASME 831 Committee, Code fo Prcssure Pipin1,

will consider written lequests fo interpretafions and rcvisions of lhe Code rules, and develop new rules if dictated by teclnoogical developent. Th': Committee's activities i this regard are limited strictly to interpretations of the rules or to the consideration ofrevisions to the present rules on the basis of new data or teclnology. As a matter o published policy, ASME does not pprove, certify, rate, or endorse any item/ construction/ proprietry device, or activity, and, accordingly, inquiries reqrtirirg such consideration will be returned. Moreover, ASME does not ct as a cotsultart on specific en8ineering problems or on the general applicatior or unde$tnding oi lle Code rues. lf, based or the nquiry

q.

(c) lnqtity ShttcLwe

('I) Propose.l Queslion(s). The inquily shal be stted in a codensed and precise question format, omitting superfluous background informatio[, ancl, where pproprite, composed in such a way that "yes" or "no"
(perhaps wilh provisos) would be an acceptable reply. Thc inquiry statement should be technically and editorially correct. (2) Proposed Replll(ies). Provide a proposed reply stting wlat it is believed tlat the Code requires. If, in the inquier's opinion, a revision to the Code is needed, recommended wording shall be proviclecl in addition to information justifyir'g the chnge.

<-

o
5.

information submitted,

it is the opnon of tlc

Committee tl-at the ir'qurcr should seek professional

assistance, the inquiry will be returned with the recommendation that such assistance be obtained. Inquiries that do not povide the infomation neected for the Commjttee's full understandr'rg will be eturled.

C-2

REQUIREMENTS

C-3

SUBMITTAL

9:

hquiries shall be limited stictly to interpretations of the rules or to the consideration of evisions to the present rules on tle bsisofnew data or technology. lnquiries shall meet the following requirements:
(n) Scopc. Involve a single rule or closely related rules n the scope of the Code. An inquiry letter concerning unelatcd subjects wil be returnecl.

Inquiries should be submitted in typewritten form;

however, legible handwitten inquiies will be considered. They shall include the name and mailing address of the inquiret and be mailed to the following address:
Secretay

ASME 831 Committee Three Park Avenue New York, NY 100i6-5990

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Copyrighr @ 2010 by rhc Arncrican Sociely ofMcclanical No rcproduclio[ ay be rnade oltlris rnleflal wilhoul lrritlen conserr of

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