CASES IN LEGAL ETHICS

A.C. No. 7297

September 29, 2009

IMELDA BIDES-ULASO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The decisive question to be resolved in this administrative proceeding is whether or not the notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the initiatory pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her own signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the notary-counsel. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, the notarycounsel, guilty of gross negligence and of a violation of the Notarial Law; and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for six months.1 She now pleads her cause before us.2 Antecedents The respondent was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides) when the latter filed a civil action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City against complainant Imelda Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso), her own niece; Alan Ulaso (Ulasos husband); Bartolome Bides (Ulasos father and Bides brother); the Register of Deeds of Region II, Metro Manila; and the Revenue District Office of San Juan, Metro Manila. The action was docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 2481 and raffled to Branch 167 of the RTC. Bides amended the complaint on June 23, 2003 to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale dated May 27, 1996 pertaining to the parcel of land situated in San Juan, Metro Manila of which Bides was the registered owner. Bides averred that Ulaso had taken her owners certificate of title during her absence from her residence and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer of the property to herself through the fraudulent execution of the deed of sale.3 The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature preceded by the word "for" above the printed name "IRENE BIDES." The signature bore a positive resemblance to the respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.4 Seeing the defective execution of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 22, 2003,5 citing the defect as a ground, along with another. Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss on August 6, 2003, claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing above the printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a "sample-draft" intended to instruct Irene Mallari, the respondents new secretary, on where Bides, as affiant, should sign. Bides also claimed that the respondents signature above the printed name of the affiant had not been intended to replace the signature of Bides as the affiant; that the correct

amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping to be appended to the amended complaint had been executed only on June 23, 2003 due to her (Bides) delayed arrival from her home province of Abra; and that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document with the correct amended verification and affidavit of nonforum shopping.6 The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even declared Ulaso and her co-defendants in default. The RTC ultimately decided the action in favor of Bides, granting reliefs like the nullification of the deed of sale between Bides, as seller, and Ulaso, as buyer.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment.8 Bides and the respondent brought other proceedings against Ulaso. On September 26, 2003, Bides sued Ulaso and others for ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in San Juan, Metro Manila, to evict them from the premises of Bides property subject of the RTC case.9 She next formally charged Ulaso and two others with falsification of a public document in the Manila Prosecutors Office for the execution of the nullified deed of sale, resulting in the criminal prosecution of Ulaso and the others before the MeTC, Branch 17, in Manila.10 The respondent actively prosecuted the criminal charge against Ulaso after being granted by the MeTC the express authority for that purpose pursuant to the Rules of Court.11 The respondent herself commenced disbarment proceedings in the IBP against Atty. Yolando Busmente, Ulasos counsel; and proceedings for usurpation against Elizabeth de la Rosa, for appearing as Ulasos other counsel although she had not been a member of the Philippine Bar.12 The disbarment proceedings against Atty. Busmente were docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1462. To counteract the aforestated moves of Bides and the respondent, Ulaso initiated this proceeding against the respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for the latters disbarment due to her act of signing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the amended complaint of Bides and notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides and despite the non-appearance of Bides before her.13 On July 21, 2005, Bides and Ulaso entered into a compromise agreement to settle the criminal case for falsification, whereby Bides agreed to drop the criminal charge against Ulaso in exchange for, among others, Ulasos withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against the respondent.14 The MeTC, Branch 17, in Manila approved the compromise agreement. The agreement on the dropping of the criminal case notwithstanding, the complaint for disbarment continued against the respondent. The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Patrick M. Velez as Investigating Commissioner. After due hearing, Atty. Velez submitted his report and recommendation dated December 8, 2005,15 in which he rendered the following resolution and findings, viz: IV. RESOLUTION AND FINDINGS We are not impressed with the excuses presented by the respondent. The lapse committed by the respondent is clear based on the facts and pieces of evidence submitted in this case. The respondent admits signing the questioned verification and there is also no dispute that she notarized the same. Even if her tale is true, the fact that she notarized her own signature is inexcusable. It cannot even be pardoned as a simple act of negligence as the standards set by notarial law are stringent enough to require all notaries public to exercise caution in order to protect the integrity and veracity of documents. We also cannot understand the fact that all the pleadings submitted to the court do not bear the corrected verification and certification. It may be easy to convince us that she is really innocent of the charges if at least one of those documents or even that one copy furnished to the other party in that case would bear at least

one such corrected verification. But no, there was none at all. This certainly militates against the position that respondent lawyer took. We have already stated earlier that lawyers may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public, and now emphasize that the respondent can not even hide behind the mantle of good faith or throw blame to her secretary. Even as the Supreme Court stated that: "If the document he notarized turned out to have been falsified, without the fact being known to him at the time, he may still be admonished for not taking pains to ascertain the identity of the person who acknowledged the instrument before him." (Cailing vs. Espinoza, 103 Phil. 1165) Indeed, we may even consider her being grossly negligent in allowing her secretary to commit that error. She gave her secretary blanket authority where she should have exercise sufficient prudence to protect the integrity of her documents. "The burden of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsels shoulders, not on the messenger" (Tan v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 765 [1998]) and not even on the secretary.1avvphi1 Besides, even if the story she tells us is true, it would appear that the document was pre-notarized based on the very averments made in Irene Mallaris Affidavit of Merit when she stated that: "3. Atty. Lacsamana was scheduled for an out-of-town trip on Monday, June 23, 2003, thus she hurriedly notarized another prepared set of Amended Verification dated June 23, 2003, and repeatedly told me to file the amended complaint not later than that afternoon to this Honorable Court after replacing its old June 18, 2003-Amended Verification;" "4. Irene Bides arrived only after lunch and after her niece cause her to sign the amended verification, I replaced the last page of the sets of the Amended Complaint without knowing that I missed its original copy and the copy I hurriedly sent to the counsel for the respondent." Respondent was not around when the document was signed by the respondents client. That is a violation of notarial law and deceitful conduct of the part of a lawyer, since he is notarizing a document which he did not actually witness being signed in his presence. Even page 8 of the respondents notarial register will not help her in this case. All that it shows is the alleged document no. 36, but what about document no. 35 which should appear in page 7 of Book no. 1? The second document was notarized on another page and it is incumbent on the respondent to show that the same was really not recorded as such. The failure of respondent to present such evidence should be treated as disputable presumption that the same would be detrimental to his interests if so presented. Thus, when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all facts as they existed and rebut the inference which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that proof if produced, instead of rebutting, would support the inference against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion (Herrera, Remedial Law, VI, 1999 ed p. 63 citing Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42). This commission feels that respondent is not being truthful with her defenses. The problem with using such unjustified excuses is that one lie will pile up over the other. Somewhere along the way, the story will leak out its sordid details exposing the excuse as a mere concocted tale and nothing more. We have the impression that respondent is trying to mislead this Commission, which we cannot allow.

The issue in this case is really limited and focused on the signature and the notarization of the verification and certification against forum shopping for "Irene Bides". Does it constitute actionable misconduct? The other matters raised by the respondent have little bearing herein because it refers to other cases which she has against the complainant. But the causes of action are different so we will deign to entertain such other matters. The practice of law is a privilege and respondent has gravely abused the same: "The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which courts and clients must, by necessity, repose in him or unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional privilege. His misconduct justifies disciplinary action against him or the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law." (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 Ed., 392; citation of cases omitted.) What is far worse is that the respondent has taken a habit of making such excuses for similar mistakes she committed. This Commission notes that the respondent herein is also a complainant in a different case against Atty. Yolando Busmente docketed as CBD case no. 05-1462. In that case, again no certification against non-forum shopping was made in that case, but instead of admitting the lack thereof (as it is not absolutely required in CBD cases) she went on to create a different story that her lawyer was negligent. Unfortunately said lawyer is already dead and cannot answer her accusations. She tried to pass off another set of certification which allegedly was not included with the original documents. What is however telling is that in all the seven (7) copies submitted to the CBD and that one (1) copy furnished to the respondents in that case, no such certification appears. This unacceptable pattern of behavior compels us to recommend stricter measures to ensure that respondent lawyer is reminded of her solemn duty and obligation to be truthful and honest. WHEREFORE, it is hereby recommended that the respondent lawyer, Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of not less than two (2) years and that she be required to take three (3) units of MCLE required legal ethics before she may be allowed to practice law again.16 In its Resolution No. XVII-2006-272 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification,17 to wit: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for notarizing a verification which she has executed, gross negligence and violation of the notarial law, Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration On August 29, 2006, the respondent came to the Court to seek the overturning of the IBP resolution, contending that: I.

THE METED 6-MONTH SUSPENSION FROM THE LAW PRACTICE OF THE RESPONDENT IS REPUGNANT TO THE FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINANT TO SHOW PROOF OF HER ALLEGED GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND VIOLATION OF THE NOTARIAL LAW, AS EVENTUALLY SELF-MANIFESTED BY THE COMPLAINANT, WHO, ABSENT KNOWLEDGE OR INVOCATION OF THE RESPONDENT, WITHDREW HER INSTANT COMPLAINT, AS EMBODIED IN THE JULY 22, 2005-DECISION OF HON. GERMANO FRANCISCO D. LEGASPI OF BRANCH 17, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. II. THE BLEMISH CAUSED ON THE MORE THAN 26-YEARS OF UNSULLIED REPUTATION OF THE RESPONDENT AS A LAWYER IS COMPELLING HER TO ENTREAT THE HONORABLE BAR CONFIDANT TO ASSESS AND RECONSIDER THE UNJUST AND SPECULATIVE PORTRAYAL OF INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER PATRICK M. VELEZ IN HIS DECEMBER 8, 2005-REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE IBP, THAT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF DISHONESTY AND/OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE, WITH AN "UNACCEPTABLE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR", WHICH ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFIED, IS COMPATIBLE WITH A DEROGATORY CONCLUSION THAT SHE LACKS THE REQUIRED CANDOR, INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL DECORUM OF A MEMBER OF THE BAR, IN REPUGNANCE TO THE MANDATE IN MANUBAY VS. GARCIA, 330 SCRA 237, THAT: The lawyers guilt cannot be presumed. Allegation is never equivalent to proof and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability. III. THE FALLACIES OF THE COMPLAINANT WERE MISSED, DELIBERATELY OR OTHERWISE, IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, PARTICULARLY ON THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT IS CONFINED ON A REHASH OF THE QUESTIONED AMENDED VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING, TWO (2) YEARS AFTER ITS DISPUTE WAS SETTLED AT THE LOWER COURT AND AT THE COURT OF APPEALS, THUS, FILED OUT OF RANCOR OF THE COMPLAINANT FOR HAVING LOST ALL HER CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS PRO BONOCLIENT, THUS, SHE WAS UNJUSTLY DENIED OF THE RULE IN SANTOS VS. DICHOSO, 84 SCRA 622, THAT: "The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons and particularly disgruntled opponents may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the bar." (underscoring supplied) Ruling We affirm the findings against the respondent. A. Preliminary Considerations The respondent argues that this proceeding should be abated by virtue of its withdrawal by Ulaso pursuant to the compromise agreement concluded in the criminal case and approved by the trial court. The respondents argument is unwarranted.

The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case against the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present administrative proceeding against the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,18 viz: The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. xxx. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. xxx. The respondent next contends that we should reject the disbarment complaint because it was filed only after the lapse of two years from the occurrence of the cause; and that personal vendetta impelled its filing. The respondents contention cannot be upheld. Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the complaint diminished the Courts inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar whenever appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar.19 Indeed, such proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law.20 The proceedings, which the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors. The public interest is their primary objective, the true question for determination being whether or not the respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges appurtenant to such memberships.21 B. Basis for Disciplinary Action Ulaso insists that the respondents act of signing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping for Bides as plaintiff-affiant violated the penal law, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Notarial Law. In contrast, the respondent maintains that her signature was made not to fool the trial court, but only to illustrate to her new secretary how and where Bides should sign the form; and that the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, merely a "sample-draft," was wrongly attached. Investigating Commissioner Velez found that the respondent had deliberately and with malice led the trial court to believe that her signature in the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had been that of Bides. We regard the finding of deliberation and malice to be unjustified. The admitted precedence by the word "for" of the signature on the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an indicium that the respondent did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that of Bides. The apparent resemblance of the signature after the word "for" with the respondents signature as the notary executing the jurat rendered improbable that the respondent had intended to deceive, considering that the respondent would have instead

written the name Irene Bides or forged the signature of Bides had she wanted to pass the signature off as that of Bides. The respondent, by notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides, was only anticipating that Bides would subsequently sign, because, after all, Bides had already signed the original verification and affidavit. Ostensibly, the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was intended to replace the original one attached to the initiatory pleading of Bides. Thus, bad faith did not motivate the respondent into notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping. The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we nonetheless concur with the findings of Investigating Commissioner Velez that the respondents notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable.22 The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act,23 the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct.24 Specifically, the notarial certification contained in the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of nonforum shopping "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this 18th day of June 2003, affiant IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475 issued on November 21, 2002, in Manila"25 indicated both the necessity for the physical presence of Bides as the affiant and the fact that the signing was done in the presence of the respondent as the notary. The physical presence of Bides was required in order to have her as the affiant swear before the respondent that she was that person and in order to enable the respondent as the notary to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily and freely executed the affidavit.26 Thus, the respondent, by signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity. Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial Law.27 It was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and legal processes.28 She was expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer.291avvphi1 In imposing the penalty upon the respondent, however, we opt to reprimand her instead of suspending her from the practice of law for three months, as the IBP recommended. This we do after we take into account, firstly, the absence of bad faith in her notarizing the unsigned document; secondly, the fact that the infraction was the first lodged against her in her long years of membership in the Bar; and thirdly, her recuperating from the debilitating stroke that had left her unable to perform any work since July 11, 2007.30 ACCORDINGLY, we modify the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by reprimanding respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 5955 September 8, 2009

JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, Respondent. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: Before this Court is a letter-complaint1 dated June 3, 2002, filed by complainant John Christen S. Hegna with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) against respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents, which caused delay in the execution of the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip. Herein complainant was the lessee of a portion of Lot No. 5529, situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, which was owned by the heirs of Sabina Baclayon. The heirs of Baclayon, through their representative Gema Sabandija, entered into a contract of lease with complainant for a period of ten (10) years, commencing from June 26, 1994, with a rental of P3,000.00 per year, or P250.00 per month. On September 26, 2001, complainant filed a complaint for forcible entry against therein defendants docketed as Civil Case No. R-45146, entitled John Hegna v. Mr. & Mrs. Eliseo Panaguinip, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 8 of Cebu City. In said complaint, he alleged that in about the second week of March 1996, therein defendants entered the vacant portion of the leased premises by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; destroyed the barbed wire enclosing the leased premises of complainant, then built a shop on the said premises without complainants consent. He averred that despite his demands upon therein defendants to vacate the premises and demolish the structure built thereon, the latter failed and refused to comply.2 When therein defendants failed to file their Answer, complainant filed a motion that judgment be rendered in default. On December 21, 2001, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of complainant, ordering therein defendants to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation and use of the subject property, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, this Court directs judgment against Defendants MR. & MRS. ELISEO PANAGUINIP and directs them to vacate Lot No. 5529 over the portion in an area of 1,596 square meters thereof, as leased to herein Plaintiff, situated at Barangay Quiot Pardo, Cebu City, and to pay Plaintiff the sum of PESOS: ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) per month from the second week of March 1996 until the present date by way of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation and use of the contested property, subject to 12% annual legal interest until fully paid, and thereafter pay the same amount per month until they vacate the subject property hereof, and to further pay Plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 by way of Attorneys Fees, and the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.3 On February 8, 2002, the MTCC granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by complainant, and issued a Writ of Execution on February 18, 2002.

On February 21, 2002, Sheriff Edilberto Suarin of the MTCC, Branch 8 of Cebu City levied on certain personal properties of therein defendants.4 On March 1, 2002, therein defendants requested the complainant to move for the dismissal of the complaint against them so as to prevent the issuance of the writ of execution thereon. While therein defendants wanted to amicably settle the case, however, they failed to mention the proposed settlement amount stated in the decision dated December 21, 2001. Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim5 dated March 5, 2002 before Sheriff Suarin, the sheriff executing the judgment in the said civil case. In the said affidavit, respondent claimed that he was the owner of Lot No. 3653-D-1 and a FUSO (Canter series) vehicle, which he bought from therein defendants on November 27, 2001,6 and December 12, 2001,7 respectively, both of which could be erroneously levied by a writ of execution issued in the civil case. On April 3, 2002, Sheriff Suarin tried to levy therein defendants parcel of land and motor vehicle, but failed to do so because of the third- party claim filed by respondent.8 Subsequently, on April 24, 2002, respondent filed a Complaint9 for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) with damages against complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cebu City, docketed as Case No. CEB-27614, entitled Mr. Eliseo Panaguinip, Mrs. Ma. Teresa Panaguinip and Goering G.C. Paderanga v. John Hegna, Mila Hegna, Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales and Edilberto R. Suarin. In an Order10 dated May 13, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MTCC to desist from further proceeding with the civil case, and the Sheriff to desist from conducting a public auction of the levied properties of therein defendants. The RTC subsequently dismissed respondents complaint for annulment of judgment in its Decision11 dated June 29, 2006. In a letter dated June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC, complainant alleged that he was filing a complaint against respondent for "deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice to be served in Civil Case No. R-45146." He alleged that after the decision in the said civil case was rendered, therein defendants called him on the telephone, requesting the stay of the execution of judgment, as the latter would be settling their accounts within ten days, but they failed to comply. On March 14, 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint12 for falsification of public documents against respondent; false testimony and perjury against therein defendants; and falsification under paragraph 6, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against Atty. Elena Marie Madarang, notary public, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City. Anent the complaint against respondent, complainant averred that the third-party claim was full of irregularities, to wit: (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot No. 3653-D-1, covered by TCT No. T-11127, dated November 27, 2001, had no record of transfer in the Register of Deeds of Cebu City; (b) the registration of the motor vehicle allegedly owned by respondent by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 21, 2001 did not reflect any change of ownership from May 4, 2001; (c) the two Deeds of Absolute Sale dated November 27, 2001 and December 21, 2001 showed that both were notarized under Series of 2000 of the notary public; (d) Notarial Register No. 177 on page 37, Book II showed erasures and tampering done by substituting the intended entry of Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Person to a Deed of Absolute Sale under the names of the spouses Eliseo and Ma. Teresa Panaguinip, therein defendants, representing the sale of Lot No. 3653-D-1 under TCT No. 11127; and Notarial Register No. 188 on Page 39, Book II of Atty. Madarang also had tampering and erasures, as the entry of Affidavit of Loss was substituted with a Deed of Absolute Sale under the name of Ma. Teresa Panaguinip representing the sale of the FUSO (Canter series); and (e) the Community Tax Certificate number appearing in both Deeds of Absolute Sale was actually issued to another person, not to therein defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip.

On April 28, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against respondent for lack of prima facie evidence of guilt, as the allegations therein were similar to the instant administrative complaint.13 In his Comment14 dated April 29, 2003 on the administrative complaint filed against him, respondent argued that he did not falsify any document and maintained that he had already satisfactorily explained the irregularities before the Office of the City Prosecutor. He added that the genuineness and due execution of the deeds of sale had not been affected by the fact that he failed to register the same. Also, he alleged that the MTCC Decision dated December 21, 2001 was unjust and void due to lack of jurisdiction, and for being based on spurious claims. In a Resolution15 dated July 9, 2003, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record. On November 21, 2003, the parties appeared in a mandatory preliminary conference and, upon termination thereof, were ordered to submit their respective verified position papers within ten (10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.16 Complainant and respondent submitted their position papers on December 11, 2003,17 and December 2, 2003,18 respectively. On June 1, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP submitted his Report and Recommendation, which contained the following observations: III. FINDINGS: Based on the resolution of the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the complaint against the Panaguinip spouses and Attys. Paderanga and Madarang (the notary public) was dismissed for lack of prima facie of guilt. Such resolution is accorded great weight but certainly not conclusive considering the administrative nature of this instant complaint. In criminal prosecutions, a prima facie evidence is necessary but in this instant case, substantial evidence is all that [is] necessary to support a guilty verdict. According to the Respondent, it was perfectly normal for him to obtain properties without registering the same under his own name. In his Position Paper, he even cited several other transactions where he merely possessed Deeds of Sale but not Certification of Registration or Transfer Certificates of Title. He alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner. The alleged discrepancies in the notarization were fully explained as well. The notary public explained that the erasures in her Notarial Register were made to correct mistakes so that entries will speak the truth. These corrections include the entries under entry number 177 to indicate the correct entry which was the Deed of Sale executed [by] the spouses Panaguinip. The original entry, Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons, was actually notarized but was later cancelled at the request of the same affiants. The full explanation of these affiants, very doubtful and highly suspect, was nevertheless taken into consideration by the Prosecutor for reasons known only to him. The Respondents also managed to convince the Cebu Prosecutor that the discrepancy in the Residence Certificates was due to human error! Not necessarily disagreeing with the findings of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, the Resolution dismissing the case for falsification is not entirely convincing. There were certainly evidentiary matters which could have been better addressed by a judge, namely, the affidavit of the secretary of the notary public, the explanation in the incorrect entries in notarial register, the affidavit of the two (2) witnesses who sought the cancellation of their original affidavit, and the explanation of Paderanga himself regarding the difference in the dates.

Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper unaided by counsel while Respondent is a lawyer. Nevertheless, Complainant managed to present one (1) piece of evidence not squarely addressed by Respondent Paderanga: the letter handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano, asking the Complainant for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties owned by the Panaguinip spouses to their lawyer, Respondent Paderanga. This letter, attached to the Complaint, was never refuted in any way by Respondent Paderanga who may have skirted the issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter dated March 1, 2002 indicates that the Panaguinip spouses still believe and assert ownership over these properties despite the existence of a Deed of Sale allegedly dated March 5, 2002. Complainant also went further by attaching an Affidavit by a Third Person who stated that the Panaguinip spouses still assert ownership over the parcel of land and vehicle. Moreover, Complainant alleged that Respondent invited him consecutive times after the issuance of the writ of execution in the lower court; the first was at the Majestic Restaurant, the second was at Club Cebu at Waterfront Hotel. There was an offer to settle the judgment award of P100,000. During the first meeting, the offer was P3,000, on the second meeting, this time with the Panaguinip spouses, the offer was P10,000. When Complainant refused to settle with Respondent, he received a copy of the Affidavit of Third-Party Claim a few days later. The parties did not stipulate this particular issue; however, this Commissioner feels that for the final disposition of this case, it is worthy to mention Article 1491 of the Civil Code. It specifically states that: Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: xxx (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigations or levied upon execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. xxx This is a classic case where a lawyer acquired the interests of his client in certain properties subject for execution. Regardless of the courts apparent lack of jurisdiction, Respondent Paderanga acquired the two (2) matters subject for execution in the forcible entry case in violation of [the] Canon of Legal Ethics. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also the moment that becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. x x x In all likelihood, although Complainant failed to get a favorable resolution from the City Prosecutors office in Cebu City, the Affidavit of Third Party Claim was simulated to defeat the rights of Complainant herein. It is immaterial that the decision of the lower court granting a judgment award was subsequently reversed or nullified. It is immaterial that the City Prosecutor did not find a prima facie case of falsification. The fact remains that there was a MULTITUDE of irregularities surrounding the execution of the Affidavit and, coupled with the letter sent by the Panaguinip spouses left unrebutted by Respondent Paderanga, there is substantial evidence that the Affidavit of Third Party Claim was purposely filed to thwart the enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case.

It is worthy to note that the proceedings before the prosecutors office did not take into consideration the handwritten letter from the Panaguinip spouses. For whatever reason, Complainant did not present such letter, which if he did, the prosecutor may come up with a different resolution. IV. RECOMMENDATION While Complainant cannot fully prove the existence of falsity in the execution of the Affidavit of Third Party Claim, this Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his client which is in litigation. x x x Respondent necessitates a heavy penalty since the circumstances surrounding the transfer of ownership of properties tend to indicate an anomalous transfer aimed to subvert the proper administration of justice. The numerous discrepancies in the transfer document, some dismissed as clerical errors and other explained by incredulous stories by way of affidavits, compounded by the letter left uncontested by Respondent Paderanga, inevitably lead a rational person to conclude that Paderanga may not have acquired the properties prior to the judicial action of execution. Even if the City Prosecutor found no prima facie case of falsification, this Commissioner finds substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Respondent Paderanga committed an ethical violation and should be meted the penalty of suspension of five (5) years from the practice of law.19 In a Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz: x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that a lawyer ought to know that he cannot acquire the property of his client which is in litigation, Atty. Goering Paderanga is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.20 On March 23, 2006, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and, on August 18, 2006, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated August 23, 2006, the Court referred the motion for reconsideration to the IBP. On December 11, 2008, the IBP issued a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and affirmed its Resolution dated December 17, 2005. Under Section 27 of Rule 13821 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. In the present case, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. Although respondent denied having acted as counsel for therein defendants, the Spouses Panaguinip, in the forcible entry case filed by complainant, his involvement in the said case was still highly suspect. After the writ of execution had been issued on February 18, 2002, he went with defendants-spouses to amicably settle with complainant on two separate occasions, ostensibly to protect his own interests. Complainant claimed that during those two meetings, respondent did not disclose his ownership over the properties in question, leading the former to believe that respondent was, in fact, the counsel for defendants-spouses. He averred that respondent and defendant spouses initially offered a settlement of P3,000.00, which he refused as he had already spentP10,000.00 on court expenses. On their second meeting, the offer had been raised to P25,000.00, which again complainant declined, as the latter had, at that time, spent P25,000.00. Complainant maintained

that it was only after said meetings had transpired that he received the affidavit of a third-party claim executed by respondent, stating that the latter was the owner of the property and motor vehicle. On the other hand, respondent claimed that the meetings took place in April 2002, after he had filed a third-party claim. Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor vehicle that were still registered in the name of defendants-spouses, he should have immediately disclosed such fact immediately and filed a thirdparty claim, as time was of the essence. Moreover, in their letter dated March 1, 2002, defendants-spouses did not mention any transfer of ownership of the said properties to respondent, as the former still believed that they owned the same. The continued possession and ownership by defendants-spouses was also attested to by a certain Brigida Lines, who executed an Affidavit22 in favor of complainant. Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that when complainant and defendants-spouses failed to reach an agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,23 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has been construed not to pertain exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties.24 In previous cases,25 the Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor; or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Notably, in the falsification case earlier filed, complainant was able to cite several irregularities in the documents evidencing the deeds of sale in question: the non-registration by respondent of the sale transactions; a Community Tax Certificate number appearing on said deeds which was different from that issued to defendant Ma. Teresa Panaguinip; and the erasures of the entries pertaining to said deeds from the Notarial Register. Of these irregularities, only one can directly be attributable to respondent his non-registration of the sale transaction. He argues that the sales were valid despite non-registration, and maintained that it was perfectly normal and regular for a lawyer like him to choose not to register and cause the transfer of title of the land and the FUSO jeepney after the execution of the Deeds of Sale, so the transactions would not appear in the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office. He added that he had also bought four lots, which had not yet been transferred to his name, for estate planning or speculation purposes. He claimed that he found it legally wise not to immediately register after buying so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death.26 While the act of registration of a document is not necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the parties, requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that a recorded instrument exists and is genuine.27 However, while the RTC was correct in holding that said omission on respondents part may not be considered falsification, he had shown an intent to defraud the government, which had the right to collect revenue from him, as well as from other persons who may have an interest in said properties.1avvphi1 Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.28Respondents act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a lawyer are greater than those of a private citizen. He is looked up to in the

community.29 Respondent must have forgotten that a lawyer must refrain from committing acts which give even a semblance of impropriety to the profession. In cases wherein lawyers have similarly engaged in deceitful and dishonest conduct, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law ranging from six (6) months to one (1) year. In Spouses Donato v. Asuncion, Sr.,30 where therein respondent lawyer filed a complaint for reformation of instrument to obtain financial gain, and prepared a contract which did not express the true intention of the parties, he was found guilty of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. In Yap-Paras v. Paras,31 where therein respondent lawyer applied for free patents over lands owned by another person and not in the formers physical possession, he was found guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors recommended a penalty of suspension to be imposed upon respondent for five (5) years and one (1) year, respectively. The Court, however, believes that a penalty of one (1) year is more commensurate to respondents deceitful and dishonest conduct. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga is found guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009

ROLANDO SAA, Petitioner, vs. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY and ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA, Respondents. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases1 against him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.2 In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance4 with the February 17, 1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that

Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,5 Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Consequently, we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution6 requiring Atty. Venida to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution. Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment7 on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries.8 The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997, Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.9 It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.10 The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating commissioners report and dismissed the complaint.11 Saa filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.12 Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.13 He ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According to him, the investigating commissioners report did not at all mention the dismissal of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by the parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures. We disagree. Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.14 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.15 A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party affected disagrees with it. There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand. Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes.16 Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 1217 and Rules 1.0318 and 12.0419 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our May 17, 2004 resolution.20Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum,21 he still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually ignored our directives for him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.22

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his omissions. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 We reiterate our ruling in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa:24 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.1avvphi1 Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1 As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.2 This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5 For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots." The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place: x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1 No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide: Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts. As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. Iam nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.) A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them. At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.) The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things: (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; xxxx (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9 In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines: x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts." Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that: A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,

to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13 The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14 Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.16 This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition. We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that

the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21 Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court. WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 161390 April 16, 2008

RAUL H. SESBREO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PROVINCE OF CEBU, GOV. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, THE PROVINCIAL ENGINEER PATROCINIO BACAY (sued both in their official and personal capacities), respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution2 dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287. The assailed decision reversed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Cebu City in Civil Case R-19022 insofar as the RTC held the Province of Cebu liable for damages to petitioner Raul H. Sesbreo. The assailed resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On January 26, 1970, Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros4 hired the petitioner to prosecute Civil Cases Nos. R-109335 and R-11214,6 evidenced by an Agreement,7 the terms of which read as follows: AGREEMENT WE, the undersigned, hereby agree to pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that we may recover in the mandamus and other cases that we are filing or have filed against the Province of Cebu, the Provincial Governor, etc., whether or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by final judgment. We shall take care of all expenses in connection with the said cases.8 During the pendency of the aforesaid cases or on April 17, 1979, petitioner registered his charging/retaining lien based on the Agreement.9 The camineros obtained favorable judgment when the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their original positions with back salaries, together with all privileges and salary adjustments or increases.10 Aggrieved, the Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer filed certiorari cases before this Court where the petitioner willingly rendered further legal assistance and represented the camineros.

When respondent Eduardo R. Gullas (Gov. Gullas) assumed the position of governor of Cebu, he proposed the compromise settlement of all mandamus cases then pending against the province which included Civil Cases Nos. R-10933 and R-11214 handled by the petitioner. On April 21, 1979, the camineros, represented by the petitioner, and the province of Cebu, through then Gov. Gullas, forged a Compromise Agreement,11 with the following terms and conditions: 1. The respondent Province of Cebu represented in this act by Gov. Eduardo R. Gullas, duly authorized by proper resolution of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, hereby agrees to immediately appropriate and pay full backwages and salaries as awarded by the trial court in its decision to all the private respondents-employees from and after July 1, 1968, the date of their termination, up to the date of the approval of the herein Compromise Agreement by the Honorable Supreme Court, except for those who are qualified for compulsory retirement whose back salaries and wages shall be limited up to the effective date of their retirement. xxxx 9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned represented by Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo is subject to said lawyers charging and retaining liens as registered in the trial court and in the Honorable Court of Appeals. xxxx 11. That upon request of the employees concerned, most of whom are in dire actual financial straits, the Province of Cebu is agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to each employee payable through their counsel, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, deductible from the total amount that each will receive from the Province of Cebu, effective upon confirmation by the Honorable Solicitor General, the Supreme Court and the Philippine National Bank where the JJ (now infrastructure funds) are now in deposit under trust.12 Apparently, the camineros waived their right to reinstatement embodied in the CFI decision and the province agreed that it immediately pay them their back salaries and other claims. This Court adopted said compromise agreement in our decision13 dated December 18, 1979.14 In view of the finality of the above decision, the camineros, through their new counsel (who substituted for the petitioner), moved for its execution. The court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing the payment of only 45% of the amount due them based on the computation of the provincial engineering office as audited by the authority concerned.15 The court did not release the remaining 55%, thus holding in abeyance the payment of the lawyers fees pending the determination of the final amount of such fees.16 However, instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.17 Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru Breach of Contract) and Attorneys Fees against the Province of Cebu, the provincial governor, treasurer, auditor, and engineer in their official and personal capacities, as well as against his former clients (the camineros).18 Petitioner anchored his claim on the provision of the Civil Code, specifically Article 1919 thereof. He alleged that by directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate their written contract for attorneys fees.20 He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the Court by computing the camineros money claims based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate which, consequently, yielded a lower amount.21 Petitioner went on to say that although he

was not a party to the above contracts, by virtue of the registration of his charging lien, he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal standing to institute the case below.22 On August 23, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case against the camineros after he had entered into an agreement with them and settled their differences.23 The case, however, proceeded against the respondents. On October 18, 1992, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent province of Cebu, the pertinent portion of which reads: Wherefore, for all the foregoing, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Province of Cebu to pay the plaintiff the following sums: (a) P669,336.51 in actual damages; with interest of 12% per annum from date of demand until fully paid; (b) P20,000.00 in moral damages; (c) P5,000.00 in litigation expenses; and (d) To pay the costs.24 While maintaining the validity of the compromise agreement, the trial court found that the petitioners money claims should have been computed based on the national and not the provincial rate of wages paid the camineros. Accordingly, the court declared that the petitioner was prejudiced to the extent of the difference between these two rates. The court further upheld the petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging lien. However, it did not give credence to the petitioners claim that the respondent public officials induced the camineros to violate their contract, and thus, absolved them from liability. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint.25 The appellate court concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced the caminerosto violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to respondents act of directly paying the camineros the amounts due them.26 Hence, the instant petition. In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: 1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION DUE TO LONG DELAY IN DECIDING CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287. 2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 43287 FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND DUE TO THE FATALLYDEFECTIVE APPELLANTS BRIEF. 3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION BY DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT FIX THE ATTORNEYS FEES OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS CLEAR THAT WHAT WAS ADJUDGED WAS THE DECLARATION THAT THERE WAS BREACH OF THE COMPROMISE CONTRACT AND DAMAGES ARE TO BE AWARDED THE PETITIONER.

4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING RESPONDENTS GULLAS, RESENTES, SANCHEZ AND BACAY AS PERSONALLY LIABLE AND THAT THEIR PERSONAL LIABILITY IS SOLIDARY WITH THAT OF RESPONDENT PROVINCE OF CEBU. 5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE TO PAY TO PETITIONER ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY, MORAL, EXEMPLARY, NOMINAL, TEMPERATE DAMAGES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND LOSS OF EARNINGS AND INTERESTS.27 The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner insists that the CA should have affirmed the trial courts decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and should have denied the appeal because of the formal defects in the appellants brief.28 Petitioner cites the cases of Malacora v. Court of Appeals29 and Flora v. Pajarillaga30 where this Court held that an appealed case which had been pending beyond the time fixed by the Constitution should be "deemed affirmed." We cannot apply the cited cases to the one at bench because they were decided on the basis of Section 11 (2), Article X of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: SEC. 11. x x x (2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the applicable maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the corresponding decision or resolution because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from shall be deemed affirmed x x x. That provision is not found in the present Constitution. The court, under the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated to decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it for determination within specified periods.31 Even when there is delay and no decision or resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirming the RTCs decision. While we do not tolerate delay in the disposition of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely because they had been pending in court for a long period, especially when the appeal is highly meritorious as in the present case. Likewise, we cannot agree with the petitioner that the appealed case be dismissed on account of the formal defects in respondents appellants brief filed before the CA. The requirements laid down by the Rules of Court on the contents of the brief are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case.32 However, despite its deficiencies, respondents appellants brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case, as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the same.33 Thus, we sustain the CAs decision to rule on the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing it on mere technicality. Now, on the main issue of whether or not respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract. Petitioner clarifies that he instituted the instant case for breach of the compromise agreement and not for violation of the agreement for attorneys fees as mistakenly concluded by the appellate court. He also cites Calalang v. De Borja34 in support of his right to collect the amounts due him against the judgment debtor (the respondents).35Lastly, petitioner argues that the respondent public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority when they directly paid the camineros their money claims and failed to withhold the petitioners

fees. There is, according to the petitioner, a showing of bad faith on the part of the province and the public officials concerned. After a careful scrutiny of the record of the case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts conclusion. We would like to stress at this point that the compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court. Its validity, therefore, had been laid to rest as early as 1979 when the Court promulgated its decision inCommissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos.36 In fact, the judgment had already been fully satisfied by the respondents. It was precisely this full satisfaction of judgment that gave rise to the instant controversy, based primarily on the petitioners claim that he was prejudiced because of the following: 1) the wrong computation in thecamineros money claims by using the provincial and not the national wage rate; and 2) the mode of satisfying the judgment through direct payment which impaired his registered charging lien. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay the former "thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed." Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use of the word "whatever" shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court. And since the compromise agreement had assumed finality, this Court can no longer delve into its substance, especially at this time when the judgment had already been fully satisfied. We cannot allow the petitioner to question anew the compromise agreement on the pretext that he suffered damage. As long as he was given the agreed percentage of the amount received by the camineros, then, the agreement is deemed complied with, and petitioner cannot claim to have suffered damage. Petitioner likewise claims that he was prejudiced by respondents act in directly paying the camineros the amounts due them, as it rendered inutile the charging lien duly registered for his protection. To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been retained by the client.37 Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides: Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the

plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.38 In this case, the existence of petitioners charging lien is undisputed since it was properly registered in the records. The parties even acknowledged its existence in their compromise agreement. However, a problem arose when the respondents directly paid in full the camineros money claims and did not withhold that portion which corresponds to petitioners fees. When the judgment debt was fully satisfied, petitioner could have enforced his lien either against his clients (thecamineros herein) or against the judgment debtor (the respondents herein). The clients, upon receiving satisfaction of their claims without paying their lawyer, should have held the proceeds in trust for him to the extent of the amount of his recorded lien, because after the charging lien had attached, the attorney is, to the extent of said lien, regarded as an equitable assignee of the judgment or funds produced by his efforts.39 The judgment debtors may likewise be held responsible for their failure to withhold from the camineros the amount of attorneys fees due the petitioner. In the instant case, the petitioner rightly commenced an action against both his clients and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because, according to him, the computation of the camineros money claims should have been based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference. While the respondents may have impaired the petitioners charging lien by satisfying the judgment without regard for the lawyers right to attorneys fees, we cannot apply the doctrine enunciated in Calalang v. Judge de Borja,40because of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case. In Calalang, this Court stressed that the judgment debtor may be held responsible for his failure to withhold the amount of attorneys fees in accordance with the duly registered charging lien.41 However, there is a disparity between the two cases, because, in this case, the petitioner had withdrawn his complaint against the camineros with whom he had a contract for legal services. The withdrawal was premised on a settlement, which indicates that his former clients already paid their obligations. This is bolstered by the certification of the clerk of court that his former clients had deposited their passbooks to ensure payment of the agreed fees. Having been paid by his clients in accordance with the agreement, his claim against the respondents, therefore, has no leg to stand on. Neither can the petitioner rely on Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, etc.42 where this court declared that satisfaction of the judgment, in general, does not by itself bar or extinguish the attorneys liens, as the court may even vacate such satisfaction and enforce judgment for the amount of the lien.43 However, the satisfaction of the judgment extinguishes the lien if there has been a waiver, as shown either by the attorneys conduct or by his passive omission.44 In the instant case, petitioners act in withdrawing the case against the camineros and agreeing to settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. No rule will allow a lawyer to collect from his client and then collect anew from the judgment debtor except, perhaps, on a claim for a bigger amount which, as earlier discussed, is baseless. Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.45 Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract against the respondents, even on the basis of Articles 119146 or 1311.47 Although we sustain his status to

institute the instant case, we cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no breach of contract. Even if there was such a breach, he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those who were primarily liable to him. Thus, no liability can be imputed to the province of Cebu or to the respondent public officials, either in their personal or official capacities. Lastly, we cannot ascribe bad faith to the respondents who directly paid the camineros the amounts due them. The records do not show that when they did so, they induced the camineros to violate their contract with the petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their obligation in order to cause prejudice to the petitioner. The attendant circumstances, in fact, show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they willingly fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 23, 2003 and its Resolution dated January 12, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43287 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ADM. CASE NO. 6876 March 7, 2008

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY FALAME,petitioners, vs. ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191. In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3 Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case.4 Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.5

However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case, entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order.6 Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.7 Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,9 complainants asserted further. Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.11 In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the case.13 Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.14 Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.15 In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.18

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the dismissal of this administrative case, thus:19 x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail. In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility"cannot be countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.) x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases. xxx Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them. While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney. It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and Lydio Falame's defense in Civil Case No. A-2694. xxx The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the Court that at one time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.

xxx It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint against the respondent. xxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20 Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case was filed on 23 October 2000.22 In addition, in their Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada24to support their contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not prescribe.25 In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.28 There is merit in the petition. At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit: The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)30 This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada31where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.32 Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated.

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants' position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions. The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.33 Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.37 The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 39 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.40 In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.41 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.42 In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the

fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for.44 As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.45 Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.46 And while complainants have never been respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio's ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case. For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleigh's supposed coownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.47 Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client.48Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.49 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008

WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter

ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside. Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her. The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7 According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8 SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied) According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied) For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10 We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision. Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local Government Officials Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs: SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and (4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13 Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties. On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes. While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16 Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides: Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or professionor be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied) As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied) For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied) Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.19 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008

MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]."5 Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits. Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s] files.6 Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9 Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper." Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed. Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance. In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10 In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months. The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved: [T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.14 We affirm with modification. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic. The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.17 The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.20 An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done. A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22 The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements. The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument: Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25 The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which stated: When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business

done, to require the exhibition of the residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx. In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo. On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied) Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action. Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order: 1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him; 2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument; 3. witnesses, if any, to the signature; 4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument; 5. fees collected by him for his services as notary; 6. give each entry a consecutive number; and 7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27 In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez. A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register. Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.33 Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35 In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided: Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission: xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law. xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36 These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41 While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.43 The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then is that

disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49 Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.51 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law. Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commissionREVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of respondent. SO ORDERED. A.M. No. P-07-2343 August 14, 2007 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-2416-P) ATTY. ALFONSO L. DELA VICTORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIA FE ORIG-MALOLOY-ON, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court, Davao City, respondent. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: The Court will never shirk its responsibility to impose discipline upon erring court employees and magistrates, nor hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve only to disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice.1 We demonstrate the force of this pronouncement in the instant administrative case. In a sworn letter-complaint2 dated November 21, 2005, Atty. Alfonso L. Dela Victoria (Atty. Dela Victoria), a former judge, charged Atty. Maria Fe O. Maloloy-on (Atty. Maloloy-on), Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with gross ignorance of the law for her refusal to accept the cash bond being tendered by his clients. Atty. Dela Victoria alleged that, on November 12, 2005, a Saturday, he went to the Office of the City Prosecutor, Davao City, because his clients, Butch and Excel Verano (Veranos) were being detained by virtue of a warrantless arrest and after an inquest; that he learned that the criminal information against the Veranos,

which recommended a bail of P2,000.00 each, had not yet been filed with the proper court as it still lacked the signature of the City Prosecutor; that he went to see the MTCC Executive Judge who suggested that a motion to set bail pursuant to Rule 114, Section 17(c)3 should be filed; that he then immediately called his secretary, dictated the contents of the motion, and instructed her to immediately bring the motion to court so that the Executive Judge could act on it; that before he left the MTCC, he passed by the Office of the MTCC Clerk of Court offering to post a cash bond ofP4,000.00; that Atty. Maloloy-on was out of the office, and so, he simply instructed his daughter-in-law, a relative of the Veranos, to wait for Atty. Maloloy-on and pay the P4,000.00 cash bond; but that later that day, his daughter-in-law reported that Atty. Maloloy-on did not accept the cash bond because no information had yet been filed. He then added that his clients could not avail of the remedy under Rule 114, Section 17(c) because, on Saturdays, the offices of the City Prosecutor and the MTCC Clerk of Court are open only until 12 noon. Atty. Dela Victoria further alleged that on Thursday, November 17, 2005, he went to see Atty. Maloloy-on to inquire why she refused to accept the cash bond, but that instead of giving a proper explanation, Atty. Maloloy-on "lectured" him, claiming that she could not accept the bond because there was no information to be used as basis, and that the City Prosecutor might quash the information prepared by the inquest Prosecutor; that even as he tried to explain that he had "already made an arrangement with the Executive Judge," Atty. Maloloy-on still insisted and tried to justify her refusal to accept the offered cash bond. This, according to Atty. Dela Victoria, constituted gross ignorance of the law, even as he said that he would not have filed this complaint if only Atty. Maloloy-on "apologized for her procedural lapses." In her Comment,4 Atty. Maloloy-on clarified that the Office of the Clerk of Court holds office from 8:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m., on Saturdays, and that she was present on November 12, 2005. She narrated that at about 11:30 a.m. that day, she went out of the office to buy lunch; that when she returned ten minutes later, the Veranos, then accompanied by a police officer told her that they were posting a cash bond for their temporary release, and handed her a piece of paper with the amount of P2,000.00 scribbled on it; that after learning that the case was still with the City Prosecutor's Office, she personally went to said office to verify the status of the criminal information; that she was told that it was probably with the City Prosecutor who had already left because it was already noontime; that she went to the Office of the MTCC Executive Judge, but the latter was no longer in the office; that she inquired from Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Zenia Villariza (Atty. Villariza) if Atty. Dela Victoria filed a motion to fix bail, but was informed that there was none. It was then that she returned to the Veranos and told them that she could not accept the cash bond, and instead, to come back Monday, assuring them that she would give priority to the case. Atty. Maloloy-on further averred that in the morning of November 14, 2005, an information for Resistance and Disobedience to an Agent of a Person in Authority was filed with their court; that since the rules provide for summary procedure for the offense, she told the Veranos to go to the Executive Judge for interview; that after the interview, the judge issued an order5 for the Veranos' release, without them posting any bail bond; and that the Veranos were even thankful for her assistance. Atty. Maloloy-on presented a different version of the incident of November 17, 2005: that Atty. Dela Victoria barged into her office, in a demanding and high-handed manner, inquired why she refused to accept the cash bond; that she told him she was present then and tried to explain her side, but Atty. Dela Victoria kept cutting her short and lectured her on Rule 114, Section 17(c); that when she insisted on explaining, Atty. Dela Victoria arrogantly told her, "You should listen to me. I am a former judge and I know the law better than you do;" that she explained that there was no refusal to accept the bond but merely a failure to post bond because of the absence of an order from the Executive Judge granting bail; that Atty. Dela Victoria stood up, shouted at her, and as he made for the door, he turned around and shouted, "What kind of a Clerk of Court are you? You are ignorant of the law. Bullshit!"

In a letter-reply6 dated June 17, 2006, Atty. Dela Victoria reiterated that he was able to make arrangements with the Executive Judge regarding his motion to pay cash bond, but Atty. Maloloy-on refused to accept the cash bond purportedly on the ground that she is the only one who can determine the amount of the bond to be deposited before she accepts the same. He said that because of the refusal of Atty. Maloloy-on, the motion to tender the cash bond could not be filed before the Executive Judge for appropriate action. Atty. Maloloy-on, in her Rejoinder,7 denied any knowledge of the supposed agreement between Atty. Dela Victoria and the MTCC Executive Judge, as she had not received any advice or instruction, verbal or written, about it. She stated that what was given her on November 12, 2005 was merely a piece of paper on which was scribbled the amount of P2,000.00, and which turned out to be in the handwriting of Atty. Dela Victoria. She also denied the charge that she arrogated unto herself the power of determining the amount of bond to be posted in criminal cases. To support this, she submitted a certification8 to this effect dated June 28, 2006 executed by MTCC Executive Judge George E. Omelio. The OCA, in its Report9 dated July 11, 2006, recommended that the subject administrative complaint against Atty. Maloloy-on be dismissed for lack of merit, finding that she was justified in not accepting the cash bond being offered for the temporary release of the Veranos because the guidelines for the application of Rule 114, Sec. 17(c) had not been complied with. The OCA noted that Atty. Dela Victoria failed to substantiate his allegation that he truly filed a motion/petition to fix bail and that the court granted the same. The OCA further recommended that Atty. Dela Victoria be ordered to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for filing a baseless harassment complaint against Atty. Maloloy-on. In our Resolution10 of August 16, 2006, we (1) noted the sworn letter-complaint of Atty. Dela Victoria, the comment of Atty. Maloloy-on thereto, and the report of the OCA; (2) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit; and (3) directed Atty. Dela Victoria to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined as an erring member of the bar for filing his baseless harassment complaint. This directive to Atty. Dela Victoria was reiterated in our October 25, 2006 Resolution.11 Atty. Dela Victoria filed by registered mail on October 31, 2006, an undated letter-explanation12 which merely restated the allegations in his letter-complaint. He also requested that an investigation be conducted to verify the allegations in his complaint. He then filed an undated Compliance,13 stating that he merely invoked the Rules of Court when he filed his complaint. He reiterated his request for an inquiry and insisted that Atty. Maloloy-on exceeded her authority in arrogantly claiming that she knows the Rules and the law regarding the posting of bail bonds. In support of this, he narrated that Atty. Maloloy-on once refused to accept a petition for execution of a compromise agreement entered before the Lupong Tagapamayapa filed by a patron of his radio program, and instead advised the petitioner to file a complaint before the court to vindicate her rights. It was allegedly only after a lengthy discussion with a regional state prosecutor, a member of the panel of the radio program, that Atty. Maloloy-on acceded to the filing of the petition. In a letter14 dated January 24, 2007, Atty. Maloloy-on replied that the additional allegations of Atty. Dela Victoria deserve no explanation because they are irrelevant to the issue, false, misleading, and merely intended to cast a bad image on her person not in accord with legal ethics. In our Resolution15 dated February 26, 2007, after noting the letters of both parties, we referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. The OCA, in a Memorandum16 dated April 11, 2007, found Atty. Dela Victoria's explanation unacceptable and "scant of any consideration." Being a former judge and now a practicing lawyer, he is expected to be fully aware of the requirements before invoking Rule 114, Section 17(c) of the Rules of Court. The OCA found Atty. Maloloy-on to have acted within her authority when she refused to accept the offered cash bonds in the

absence of an order from the court granting the same. It also noted that there was no evidence on record to support the allegation that Atty. Dela Victoria really filed the proper motion and that the court allowed it. For filing a frivolous complaint, the OCA recommended that Atty. Dela Victoria be found guilty of Contempt of Court, meted a fine of P2,000.00, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same offense in the future shall be more severely dealt with. Accordingly, the OCA recommended the denial of his request for an investigation in view of the dismissal of his complaint. The Court's Ruling We agree with the OCA. Considering that he was a former judge and had been engaged in the practice of law for thirty (30) years, Atty. Dela Victoria is expected to be conversant with the scope and application of Rule 114, Section 17(c) of the Rules of Court which he invokes. He should have known that he could not insist on the acceptance of the cash bond in favor of his clients without the necessary order from the court granting his motion to post the same. In fact, his assertion that he had already made arrangements with the MTCC Executive Judge when there was actually no proper court order amounts to an attempt to mislead Atty. Maloloy-on into processing the unauthorized temporary release of his clients. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of their litigation and their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel and the courts.17 They are duty bound to avoid improprieties, which give the appearance of influencing the court.18 Atty. Dela Victoria failed in this regard. Further, as correctly pointed out by Atty. Maloloy-on and affirmed by the OCA, if Atty. Dela Victoria insists that he filed his motion to fix the amount of bail with the MTCC Executive Judge and the same was granted he should have attached copies of the motion and the Court Order to his complaint. He did not. Furthermore, there is nothing on record that refutes the statement of Atty. Maloloy-on that she inquired from Atty. Villariza, Branch Clerk of Court of the MTCC Executive Judge, and was informed that no petition to fix bail had been filed. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.19 Atty. Dela Victoria failed to substantiate this burden. In stark contrast, Atty. Maloloy-on proved truthful her defense when she submitted a copy of the entire court records involving the criminal case against the Veranos,20 including the certification21 of Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Villariza that Atty. Dela Victoria did not file any motion to set bail and the certification22of the MTCC Executive Judge Omelio that she did not arrogate unto herself, at any time in her capacity as clerk of court, the authority of determining the amount of bail to be posted. Culled from his very own complaint, it was the failure of Atty. Maloloy-on to apologize to Atty. Dela Victoria that drove him to institute this administrative case, especially after being "lectured" on why she could not accept his tendered cash bond. Obviously, he considered this an affront, given that he is a former judge and has been engaged in the practice of law for three (3) decades. Thus, he filed his complaint for alleged gross ignorance of the law, even without competent evidence to support it. We cannot overemphasize that a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. He should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct, or prevent their

realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice by Canon 1223 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.24 Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, this right must be exercised in good faith. A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.25 Such filing of baseless complaints is indeed contemptuous of the courts.26 Ordinarily, lawyers who file unfounded complaints are disciplined by imposing upon them a fine in an amount commensurate to the gravity of the offense to be determined by this Court as the disciplining authority.27 On various occasions, this Court has imposed a fine ranging from P2,000.00 to P5,000.00 for cases similar to the one at bench. In this case, the OCA recommends a fine of P2,000.00. We agree. As to Atty. Dela Victoria's request for further investigation, the same must be denied, it having become moot under the circumstances. WHEREFORE, for filing his unfounded complaint against Atty. Maria Fe O. Maloloy-on, Atty. Alfonso L. Dela Victoria is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is meted a FINE of P2,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. For having become moot because of the dismissal of his administrative complaint, the request of Atty. Dela Victoria for an investigation isDENIED. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda. The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion. According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission. Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice. In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the complaint. In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read: 5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document. 9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover where she has a child . Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records . Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS. On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with aReport and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the

Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant. On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED. We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said inBurbe v. Magulta,6 A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.7

With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer. The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality. IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is alsoSTERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent. RESOLUTION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality. Complainant alleged the following: Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties. On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly. Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was

wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car. In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows: Sent by complainant At 5:33:46 pm replied by respondent at 6:16:11 pm sent by complainant at 6:17:59 pm Follow-up message Sent by complainant At 6:29:30 pm Replied by respondent At 6:32:43 pm - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer - "does this mean I can not c u anymore" (Does this mean I cannot see you anymore) - I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of the situation. - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont have relationship with her. - "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of feeling) - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will you still see me so I can show you my sincerity)

Follow up message by respondent at 6:42:25 pm

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo). Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2 In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him. By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky

Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant. A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005. On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.5 The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON I x x x Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xxxx Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral

character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that: This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10 In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12 In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips. In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus: 27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car. xxxx 35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment." During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA: That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, thats it. COMM. FUNA: February 10 iyan. xxxx ATTY. MACABATA: Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again. COMM. FUNA: Pardon? ATTY. MACABATA: I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.) It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct: In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred." In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondents disbarment. In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar. In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law. Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32 Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out. Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same. All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension. The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public. The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first offense, reprimand would suffice. We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence. WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 3569 February 23, 2007

FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE, Respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: This is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De Enriquez against respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence. Complainant alleged that on August 28, 1989, she hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against one Rugerio Alipante, who defaulted in the payment of monthly rentals on complainants property in Taban, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. According to the complainant, respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to him of P2,000 attorneys fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from respondent. She demanded the return of the pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the documents. As a result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed. Complainant alleged further, that her daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary. Complainant prayed that Atty. San Jose be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. In his Comment,2 respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from the complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the filing of an unlawful detainer case had become unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not file the case even before receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Libmanan-Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He claimed that he informed complainant that the case could not be filed until a new judge was appointed, but he promised to file the case before the action

prescribed. Respondent claimed further that the attorneys fee was P3,000 and that he had paid complainants daughter P700 per month. The Court referred3 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The investigating officer found that respondent was indeed remiss in the performance of his professional duties as counsel. According to Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to his client was sending a demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days from receipt of the demand letter. The Commissioner also found respondents explanation for his failure to file the case unsatisfactory and concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer for abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months.4 The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Commissioner finding respondent liable for negligence but only imposed the penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law.5 On December 17, 1997, respondent filed a petition seeking the dismissal of the case against him and prayed that he be exonerated. He denied being negligent. He claimed that the IBP Board of Governors misinterpreted the complainants letter, which stated that the complainant and her lessee came to an agreement for the latter to vacate the leased premises. He claimed that he relied on that letter thereby negating the necessity of further filing a case for unlawful detainer. In our Resolution, dated December 6, 1999, we resolved to remand the case to the IBP which, in turn, assigned the case to the IBP-CBD for further investigation. The Investigating Commissioner in her report, dated August 5, 2004, recommended that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Said recommendation was adopted by the IBP, which passed a resolution to that effect, and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on October 7, 2004. After a thorough review of the records in this matter, we are in agreement with the IBP that respondent Atty. San Jose be held liable for negligence; thus, his petition for exoneration should be denied for utter lack of merit. The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.6 A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.7 In Santos v. Lazaro,8 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. Until the lawyers withdrawal is properly done, the lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the interest of the client.9 In this case, respondent fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. It is undisputed that respondent was hired by the complainant on August 28, 1989, and that respondent sent the notice to

vacate to the lessee before the appropriate unlawful detainer case could be filed. However, after nine months, respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.10 However, respondent in this case failed to file the appropriate civil case after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent.11 Moreover, this Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.1awphi1.net Respondent aggravates his misconduct by blaming the courts. Respondents excuse that the MCTC having jurisdiction over the case was vacant; that filing of a case would be useless; and that the best thing to do was to wait for the vacancy to be filled, finds no support in the practice of law. The vacancy in court did not suspend the courts official existence, much less render it functus oficio. Respondent also relies in vain on complainants letter dated August 16, 1990, wherein complainant informed respondent of her decision to withdraw the case. According to the complainant, she resorted to the letter so she could retrieve the records she previously handed over to the respondent, but he continued to refuse to return them. It may be noted that the letter was sent to respondent a few days before the lapse of the oneyear prescriptive period. If respondent had earlier filed a case, there would have been no need for complainant to resort to that letter to get the records in line with her plan to have the Public Attorneys Office assist in filing the appropriate case. Needless to stress, because of the respondents failure to file the appropriate case, and his refusal to return the documents, time ran out and the action for unlawful detainer case was barred by prescription. Damage and prejudice to the clients cause was undeniable. Finally, we find the recommended penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law too light. In previous cases, we have imposed six months suspension for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession. In Reyes v. Vitan,12 for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his clients case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from his client. Considering precedents, in the light of circumstances in this case, we find no reason to deviate now from the penalty meted previously for similar infractions. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution. He is ordered to return to complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000 with 12% interest per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution until the full amount shall have been returned. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into respondents personal records as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar, and furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2 The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution. Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months. In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year. We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as to the recommended penalty. On serving as counsel for contending parties. Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7 In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,8 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK. But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her

husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17 One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18 The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19 An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23 We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26 In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required. In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29 Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30 From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK. Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32 On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence. Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times. Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 38He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.41 >On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees. Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling. As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42 Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling. We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52 In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession. Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability. ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records. SO ORDERED.