Special Proceedings Finals

Special Proceedings Finals
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC RULE ON ADOPTION A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino children. Section 2. Objectives. (a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in accordance ith Philippine la s, the !nited "ations (!") #onvention on the Rights of the #hild, !" $eclaration on Social and %egal Principles Relating to the Protection and &elfare of #hildren ith Special Reference to Foster Placement and 'doption, "ationally and (nternationally, and the )ague #onvention on the Protection of #hildren and #ooperation in Respect of (nter*country 'doption. (b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall+ ho is a foundling, neglected,
(i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided ith love, care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. ,nly hen such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption ithin the child-s e.tended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered. (ii) safeguard the biological parents from ma/ing hasty decisions in relin0uishing their parental authority over their child1 (iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents1 (iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption1 (v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption in0uiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption*related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post*adoption education and counseling1 (vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child-s identity and culture in his native land, and only available shall inter*country adoption be considered as a last resort1 and (vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their adopted child. 'ny voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or 2udicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as 3legally available for adoption4 and his custody transferred to the $epartment of Social &elfare and $evelopment or to any duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, hich entity shall be authori5ed to ta/e steps for the permanent placement of the child. Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule+ (a) 3#hild4 is a person belo eighteen (67) years of age at the time of the filing of the petition for adoption. hen this is not
(b) 3' child legally available for adoption4 refers to a child ho has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the $epartment or to a duly licensed and accredited child*placing or child*caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of adoption, his guardian or adopter(s). (c) 38oluntarily committed child4 is one hose parents /no ingly and illingly relin0uish parental authority over him in favor of the $epartment. (d) 3(nvoluntarily committed child4 is one hose parents, /no n or un/no n, have been permanently and 2udicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment1 substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse1 or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. (e) 3Foundling4 refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child hose parents, guardian or relatives are un/no n1 or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution ith un/no n facts of birth and parentage and registered in the #ivil Register as a 3foundling.4 (f) 3'bandoned child4 refers to one ho has no proper parental care or guardianship or least si. (9) continuous months and has been 2udicially declared as such. hose parents have deserted him for a period of at
(g) 3$ependent child4 refers to one ho is ithout a parent, guardian or custodian or one hose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent upon the public for support. (h) 3"eglected child4 is one by his parents or guardian. hose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or inade0uately attended to, physically or emotionally,
(i) 3Physical neglect4 occurs hen the child is malnourished, ill*clad and ithout proper shelter. (2) 3:motional neglect4 e.ists hen a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, e.ploited, over or/ed or made to or/ under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in moral danger, or e.posed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices. (/) 3#hild*placement agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the $epartment to provide comprehensive child elfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption home study report. (l) 3#hild*caring agency4 refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the $epartment that provides ;<*hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed children. (m) 3$epartment4 refers to the $epartment of Social &elfare and $evelopment. (n) 3$eed of 8oluntary #ommitment4 refers to the ritten and notari5ed instrument relin0uishing parental authority and committing the child to the care and custody of the $epartment e.ecuted by the child-s biological parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the child-s legal guardian, to be itnessed by an authori5ed representative of the $epartment after counseling and other services have been made available to encourage the biological parents to /eep the child. (o) 3#hild Study Report4 refers to a study made by the court social or/er of the child-s legal status, placement history, psychological, social, spiritual, medical, ethno*cultural bac/ground and that of his biological family needed in determining the most appropriate placement for him. (p) 3)ome Study Report4 refers to a study made by the court social to provide a home that meets the needs of a child. (0) 3Supervised trial custody4 refers to the period of time during both adopters and adoptee in stabili5ing their filial relationship. or/er of the motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents
hich a social
or/er oversees the ad2ustment and emotional readiness of
(r) 3%icensed Social &or/er4 refers to one ho possesses a degree in bachelor of science in social or/ as a minimum educational re0uirement and ho has passed the government licensure e.amination for social or/ers as re0uired by Republic 'ct "o. <=>=. (s) 3Simulation of birth4 is the tampering of the civil registry to ma/e it appear in the birth records that a certain child is not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his true identity and status. (t) 3?iological Parents4 refer to the child-s mother and father by nature. (u) 3Pre*'doption Services4 refer to psycho*social services provided by professionally*trained social or/ers of the $epartment, the social services units of local governments, private and government health facilities, Family #ourts, licensed and accredited child*caring and child* placement agencies and other individuals or entities involved in adoption as authori5ed by the $epartment. (v) 3Residence4 means a person-s actual stay in the Philippines for three (=) continuous years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption and hich is maintained until the adoption decree is entered. Temporary absences for professional, business, health, or emergency reasons not e.ceeding si.ty (9@) days in one (6) year does not brea/ the continuity re0uirement. ( ) 3'lien4 refers to any person, not a Filipino citi5en, travel documents and visa. Section 4. Who may adopt. The follo ing may adopt+ (6) Any Fi i!ino citi"en of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude1 ho is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least si.teen (69) A:'RS older than the adoptee, and ho is in a position to support and care for his children in /eeping ith the means of the family. The re0uirement of a 69*year difference bet een the age of the adopter and adoptee may be aived hen the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee-s parent1 (;) Any # ien !o$$e$$in% t&e $#'e ()# i*ic#tion$ #$ #+o,e *stated for Filipino nationals+ PR,8($:$, That his country has diplomatic relations ith the Republic of the P)(%(PP(":S, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (=) #,"T("!,!S A:'RS prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allo s the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the re0uirements on residency and certification of the alien-s 0ualification to adopt in his country may be aived for the follo ing+ (i) a former Filipino citi5en ho see/s to adopt a relative ithin the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or ho enters and remains in the Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or as born to a person ho
(ii) one ho see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or
(iii) one ho is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
ith his spouse a relative
ithin the fourth (<th) degree of
(=) The %)#-.i#n /it& -e$!ect to t&e /#-. after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his financial accountabilities. )usband and ife shall 2ointly adopt, e.cept in the follo ing cases+ (i) if one spouse see/s to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse1 or (ii) if one spouse see/s to adopt his o n illegitimate child+ Provided, ho ever, That the other spouse has signified his consent thereto1 or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. (n case husband and ife 2ointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the other, 2oint parental authority shall be e.ercised by the spouses. Section 0. Who may be adopted. The follo ing may be adopted+ (6) 'ny person belo eighteen (67) years of age ho has been voluntarily committed to the $epartment under 'rticles 6B<, 6BB and 6B9 of P.$. "o. 9@= or 2udicially declared available for adoption1 (;) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse1 (=) 'n illegitimate child, by a 0ualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of legitimacy1 (<) ' person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their o n child since minority1 (B) ' child hose adoption has been previously rescinded1 or
(9) ' child hose biological or adoptive parents have died+ Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six ( ! months from the time of death of said parents. (>) ' child not other ise dis0ualified by la or these rules. Section 6. Venue. The petition for adoption shall be filed ith the "amily #ourt of the province or city here the prospective adoptive parents reside. Section 1. Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be verified and specifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleading hether the petition contains an application for change of name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as abandoned, dependent or neglected. 6) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ # Fi i!ino citi"en2 t&e !etition $&# # e%e t&e *o o/in%3 (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) That the petitioner is of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights1 is of good moral character1 has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude1 is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children1 is at least si.teen (69) years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee-s parent1 and is in a position to support and care for his children in /eeping ith the means of the family and has undergone pre* adoption services as re0uired by Section < of Republic 'ct "o. 7BB;. ;) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ #n # ien2 t&e !etition $&# # e%e t&e *o o/in%3 (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) Sub*paragraph 6(b) above1 (c) That his country has diplomatic relations ith the Republic of the Philippines1 (d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country and his government allo s the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child and reside there permanently as an adopted child1 and
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(e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (=) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition and he maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. The re0uirements of certification of the alien-s 0ualification to adopt in his country and of residency may be aived if the alien+ (i) is a former Filipino citi5en ho see/s to adopt a relative ithin the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or
(ii) see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or (iii) is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. ith his spouse a relative ithin the fourth degree of
=) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ t&e e%# %)#-.i#n of the adoptee, the petition shall allege that guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financial accountabilities. <) I* t&e #.o!te- i$ '#--ie., the spouse shall be a co*petitioner for 2oint adoption except if+ (a) one spouse see/s to adopt the legitimate child of the other, or (b) if one spouse see/s to adopt his o n illegitimate child and the other spouse signified ritten consent thereto, or (c) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. B) I* t&e #.o!tee i$ # *o)n. in%, the petition shall allege the entries hich should appear in his birth certificate, such as name of child, date of birth, place of birth, if /no n1 se., name and citi5enship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage. 9) I* t&e !etition !-#y$ *o- # c&#n%e o* n#'e, it shall also state the cause or reason for the change of name. (n # !etition$, it $&# be # e%ed+ (a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee as sho n by his record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and school records. (b) That the adoptee is not dis0ualified by la to be adopted.
(c) The probable value and character of the estate of the adoptee. (d) The first name, surname or names by hich the adoptee is to be /no n and registered in the #ivil Registry. ' certification of non*forum shopping shall be included pursuant to Section B, Rule > of the 6CC> Rules of #ivil Procedure. Section 4. Rectification of $imulated %irth. (n case the petition also see/s rectification of a simulated of birth, it shall allege that+ (a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth1 (b) The simulation of birth as made prior to the date of effectivity of Republic 'ct "o. 7BB; and the application for rectification of the birth registration and the petition for adoption ere filed ithin five years from said date1 (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of the adoptee1 and (d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and treated by petitioner as his o n child. Section 5. Adoption of a foundling& an abandoned& dependent or neglected child. (n case the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child, the petition shall allege+ (a) The facts sho ing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent or neglected1 (b) The names of the parents, if /no n, and their residence. (f the child has no /no n or living parents, then the name and residence of the guardian, if any1 (c) The name of the duly licensed child*placement agency or individual under hose care the child is in custody1 and (d) That the $epartment, child*placement or child*caring agency is authori5ed to give its consent.
Section 10. #hange of name. (n case the petition also prays for change of name, the title or caption must contain+ (a) The registered name of the child1 (b) 'liases or other names by hich the child has been /no n1 and (c) The full name by hich the child is to be /no n. Section 11. Annexes to the 'etition. The follo ing documents shall be attached to the petition+ '. ?irth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and school records sho ing the name, age and residence of the adoptee1 ?. 'ffidavit of consent of the follo ing+ 6. The adoptee, if ten (6@) years of age or over1 ;. The biological parents of the child, if /no n, or the legal guardian, or the child*placement agency, child*caring agency, or the proper government instrumentality hich has legal custody of the child1 =. The legitimate and adopted children of the adopter and of the adoptee, if any, ho are ten (6@) years of age or over1 <. The illegitimate children of the adopter living ith him ho are ten (6@) years of age or over1 and B. The spouse, if any, of the adopter or adoptee. #. #hild study report on the adoptee and his biological parents1 $. (f the petitioner is an alien, certification by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country and that his government allo s the adoptee to enter his country as his o n adopted child unless e.empted under Section <(;)1 :. )ome study report on the adopters. (f the adopter is an alien or residing abroad but 0ualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoption agency duly accredited by the (nter*#ountry 'doption ?oard1 and F. $ecree of annulment, nullity or legal separation of the adopter as ell as that of the biological parents of the adoptee, if any. Section 12. Order of (earing. (f the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue an order the follo ing+ (6) the registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and the names by the caption1 (;) the purpose of the petition1 (=) the complete name hich the adoptee ill use if the petition is granted1 (<) the date and place of hearing hich shall be set ithin si. (9) months from the date of the issuance of the order and shall direct that a copy thereof be published before the date of hearing at least once a ee/ for three successive ee/s in a ne spaper of general circulation in the province or city here the court is situated1 Provided, that in case of application for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be ithin four (<) months after the last publication of the notice nor ithin thirty (=@) days prior to an election. The ne spaper shall be selected by raffle under the supervision of the :.ecutive Dudge. (B) a directive to the social or/er of the court, the social service office of the local government unit or any child*placing or child*caring agency, or the $epartment to prepare and submit child and home study reports before the hearing if such reports had not been attached to the petition due to unavailability at the time of the filing of the latter1 and (9) a directive to the social or/er of the court to conduct counseling sessions adoptee and submit her report before the date of hearing. ith the biological parents on the matter of adoption of the hich the adoptee has been /no n hich shall contain
hich shall be stated in
't the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also be furnished the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral through the provincial or city prosecutor, the $epartment and the biological parents of the adoptee, if /no n. (f a change in the name of the adoptee is prayed for in the petition, notice to the Solicitor Eeneral shall be mandatory.
Section 13. #hild and (ome $tudy Reports. (n preparing the child study report on the adoptee, the concerned social or/er shall verify ith the #ivil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. (f the birth of the adoptee as not registered ith the #ivil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the social or/er to register the adoptee and secure a certificate of foundling or late registration, as the case may be. The social or/er shall establish that the child is legally available for adoption and the documents in support thereof are valid and authentic, that the adopter has sincere intentions and that the adoption shall inure to the best interests of the child. (n case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must sho the legal capacity to adopt and that his government allo s the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child in the absence of the certification re0uired under Section >(b) of Republic 'ct "o. 7BB;. (f after the conduct of the case studies, the social or/er finds that there are grounds to deny the petition, he shall ma/e the proper recommendation to the court, furnishing a copy thereof to the petitioner. Section 14. (earing. !pon satisfactory proof that the order of hearing has been published and 2urisdictional re0uirements have been complied ith, the court shall proceed to hear the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must personally appear and the former must testify before the presiding 2udge of the court on the date set for hearing. The court shall verify from the social or/er and determine hether the biological parent has been properly counseled against ma/ing hasty decisions caused by strain or an.iety to give up the child1 ensure that all measures to strengthen the family have been e.hausted1 and ascertain if any prolonged stay of the child in his o n home ill be inimical to his elfare and interest. Section 10. $upervised Trial #ustody. ?efore issuance of the decree of adoption, the court shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of at least si. (9) months ithin hich the parties are e.pected to ad2ust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the social or/er of the court, the $epartment, or the social service of the local government unit, or the child*placement or child*caring agency hich submitted and prepared the case studies. $uring said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter. The court may, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, reduce the period or e.empt the parties if it finds that the same shall be for the best interests of the adoptee, stating the reasons therefor. 'n alien adopter ho ever must complete the 9*month trial custody e.cept the follo ing+ a) a former Filipino citi5en ho see/s to adopt a relative ithin the fourth (<th) degree of consanguinity or affinity1 or
b) one ho see/s to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse1 or c) one ho is married to a Filipino citi5en and see/s to adopt 2ointly consanguinity or affinity. ith his or her spouse the latter-s relative ithin the fourth (<th) degree of
(f the child is belo seven (>) years of age and is placed ith the prospective adopter through a pre*adoption placement authority issued by the $epartment, the court shall order that the prospective adopter shall en2oy all the benefits to hich the biological parent is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed ith him. The social or/er shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trial custody ithin t o ee/s after its termination.
Section 16. Decree of Adoption. (f the supervised trial custody is satisfactory to the parties and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and the evidence adduced that the adoption shall redound to the best interests of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be issued hich shall ta/e effect as of the date the original petition as filed even if the petitioners die before its issuance. The decree shall+ '. State the name by hich the child is to be /no n and registered1 ?. ,rder+ 6) the #ler/ of #ourt to issue to the adopter a certificate of finality upon e.piration of the 6B*day reglementary period appeal1 ithin hich to
;) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree of adoption and the certificate of finality to the #ivil Registrar here the child as originally registered ithin thirty (=@) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. (n case of change of name, the decree shall be submitted to the #ivil Registrar here the court issuing the same is situated. =) the #ivil Registrar of the place here the adoptee as registered+ a. to annotate on the adoptee-s original certificate of birth the decree of adoption certificate of finality1 ithin thirty (=@) days from receipt of the
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b. to issue a certificate of birth hich shall not bear any notation that it is a ne or amended certificate and hich shall sho , among others, the follo ing+ registry number, date of registration, name of child, se., date of birth, place of birth, name and citi5enship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage, hen applicable1 c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registry records hich can be opened only upon order of the court hich issued the decree of adoption1 and d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of adoption proof of compliance receipt of the decree. ith all the foregoing ithin thirty days from
(f the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the #ivil Registrar here the foundling as registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the foundling certificate and a ne birth certificate shall be ordered prepared by the #ivil Registrar in accordance ith the decree. Section 11. %oo) of Adoptions. The #ler/ of #ourt shall /eep a boo/ of adoptions sho ing the date of issuance of the decree in each case, compliance by the #ivil Registrar ith Section 69(?)(=) and all incidents arising after the issuance of the decree. Section 14. #onfidential *ature of 'roceedings and Records. 'll hearings in adoption cases, after compliance ith the 2urisdictional re0uirements shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. 'll records, boo/s and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the $epartment, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be /ept strictly confidential. (f the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for security reasons or for purposes connected ith or arising out of the adoption and ill be for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper motion, order the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for hich it may be used. Section 15. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. The petition shall be verified and filed by the adoptee ho is over eighteen (67) years of age, or ith the assistance of the $epartment, if he is a minor, or if he is over eighteen (67) years of age but is incapacitated, by his guardian or counsel. The adoption may be rescinded based on any of the follo ing grounds committed by the adopter+ 6) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling1 ;) attempt on the life of the adoptee1 =) se.ual assault or violence1 or <) abandonment or failure to comply ith parental obligations. 'doption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be sub2ect to rescission by the adopter. )o ever, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in 'rticle C6C of the #ivil #ode.
Section 20. +enue. The petition shall be filed ith the Family #ourt of the city or province here the adoptee resides. Section 21. Time within which to file petition. The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption ithin five (B) years after he reaches the age of ma2ority, or if he as incompetent at the time of the adoption, ithin five (B) years after recovery from such incompetency. Section 22. Order to Answer. The court shall issue an order re0uiring the adverse party to ans er the petition ithin fifteen (6B) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The order and copy of the petition shall be served on the adverse party in such manner as the court may direct. Section 23. ,udgment. (f the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render 2udgment ordering the rescission of adoption, ith or ithout costs, as 2ustice re0uires. The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the adoptee, if /no n, or the legal custody of the $epartment shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated and declare that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the adoptee to each other shall be e.tinguished. The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, as of the date of 2udgment of 2udicial rescission. 8ested rights ac0uired prior to 2udicial rescission shall be respected. (t shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or foundling certificate. The court shall further order the #ivil Registrar his original birth or foundling certificate. here the adoption decree as registered to cancel the ne birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate
Section 24. $ervice of ,udgment. ' certified true copy of the 2udgment together ith a certificate of finality issued by the ?ranch #ler/ of the #ourt hich rendered the decision in accordance ith the preceding Section shall be served by the petitioner upon the #ivil Registrar concerned ithin thirty (=@) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. The #ivil Registrar shall forth ith enter the rescission decree in the register and submit proof of compliance to the court issuing the decree and the #ler/ of #ourt ithin thirty (=@) days from receipt of the decree. The #ler/ of #ourt shall enter the compliance in accordance ith Section 6> hereof.
Section 20. Repeal. * This supersedes Rule CC on 'doption and Rule 6@@ of the Rules of #ourt.
6. INTER-COUNTR7 ADOPTION
Section 26. Applicability. The follo ing sections apply to inter*country adoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and Filipino citi5ens permanently residing abroad. Section 21. Objectives. The State shall+ a) consider inter*country adoption as an alternative means of child care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot, in any suitable manner, be cared for in the Philippines1 b) ensure that the child sub2ect of inter*country adoption en2oys the same protection accorded to children in domestic adoption1 and c) ta/e all measures to ensure that the placement arising therefrom does not result in improper financial gain for those involved. Section 24. -here to "ile 'etition. ' verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed by a foreign national or Filipino citi5en permanently residing abroad ith the Family #ourt having 2urisdiction over the place here the child resides or may be found. (t may be filed directly ith the (nter*#ountry 'doption ?oard. Section 25. -ho may be adopted. ,nly a child legally available for domestic adoption may be the sub2ect of inter*country adoption. Section 30. #ontents of 'etition. The petitioner must allege+ a) his age and the age of the child to be adopted, sho ing that he is at least t enty*seven (;>) years of age and at least si.teen (69) years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless the petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent, in hich case the age difference does not apply1 b) if married, the name of the spouse ho must be 2oined as co*petitioner e.cept hen the adoptee is a legitimate child of his spouse1
c) that he has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national la s, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his country1 d) that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude1 e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national la 1 f) that he can provide the proper care and support and instill the necessary moral values and e.ample to all his children, including the child to be adopted1 g) that he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied under Philippine la s and the !. ". #onvention on the Rights of the #hild, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of Republic 'ct "o. 7@<=1 h) that he comes from a country ith hich the Philippines has diplomatic relations and hose government maintains a similarly authori5ed and accredited agency and that adoption of a Filipino child is allo ed under his national la s1 and i) that he possesses all the 0ualifications and none of the dis0ualifications provided in this Rule, in Republic 'ct "o. 7@<= and in all other applicable Philippine la s. Section 31. Annexes. * The petition for adoption shall contain the follo ing anne.es ritten and officially translated in :nglish+ a) ?irth certificate of petitioner1
b) Farriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the divorce decree, or 2udgment dissolving the marriage1 c) S orn statement of consent of petitioner-s biological or adopted children above ten (6@) years of age1 d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician and psychologist1 e) (ncome ta. returns or any authentic document sho ing the current financial capability of the petitioner1 f) Police clearance of petitioner issued ithin si. (9) months before the filing of the petitioner1 ho have /no n
g) #haracter reference from the local churchGminister, the petitioner-s employer and a member of the immediate community the petitioner for at least five (B) years1
h) Full body postcard*si5e pictures of the petitioner and his immediate family ta/en at least si. (9) months before the filing of the petition. Section 32. Duty of #ourt. The court, after finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance and a proper case for inter*country adoption, shall immediately transmit the petition to the (nter*#ountry 'doption ?oard for appropriate action. Section 33. .ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on 'ugust ;;, ;@@; follo ing its publication in a ne spaper of general circulation.
Special Proceedings Finals 8.R. No. 143545 9) y 142 2003 406
6@
ISA6ELITA S. LA:OM2 petitioner, vs. 9OSE MEL;IN SI6ULO <!-e,io)$ y -e*e--e. to #$ =DR. MEL;IN S. LA:OM=>2 respondent. ;ITU82 J.3
The bliss of marriage and family ould be to most less than complete ithout children. The reali5ation could have li/ely prodded the spouses $r. $iosdado %ahom and (sabelita %ahom to ta/e into their care (sabelitaHs nephe Dose Felvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their o n. 't the tender age of t o, Dose Felvin en2oyed the armth, love and support of the couple ho treated the child li/e their o n. (ndeed, for years, $r. and Frs. %ahom fancied on legally adopting Dose Felvin. Finally, in 6C>6, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. ,n @B Fay 6C>;, an order granting the petition as issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Felvin. (n /eeping ith the court order, the #ivil Registrar of "aga #ity changed the name IDose Felvin SibuloI to IDose Felvin %ahom.I ' sad turn of events came many years later. :ventually, in $ecember of 6CCC, Frs. %ahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#), ?ranch ;;, of "aga #ity. (n her petition, she averred J I>. That . . . despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to %ahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made /no n his desire to revo/e respondentHs adoption, but as prevented by petitionerHs supplication, ho ever ith his further re0uest upon petitioner to give to charity hatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. ... ... ...
I6@. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records ith the Professional Regulation #ommission sho ed his name as Dose Felvin F. Sibulo originally issued in 6C>7 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection ith his practice of his profession, he is Dose Felvin F. Sibulo. ... ... ...
I6=. That herein petitioner being a ido , and living alone in this city ith only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and sho of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and ould only come to "aga to see her once a year. I6<. That for the last three or four years, the medical chec/*up of petitioner in Fanila became more fre0uent in vie of a leg ailment, and those ere the times hen petitioner ould need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent to ards petitioner hich is not e.pected of a son. I6B. That herein respondent has recently been 2ealous of petitionerHs nephe s and nieces henever they respondent alleging that they ere only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner. ould find time to visit her,
I69. That in vie of respondentHs insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship bet een him and petitioner, the latter has suffered ounded feelings, /no ing that after all respondentHs only motive to his adoption is his e.pectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly sho n by his recent filing of #ivil #ase "o. CC*<<9= for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection to ards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for hich reason there is no more basis for its e.istence, hence this petition for revocation,I6 Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on ;; Farch 6CC7, Republic 'ct (R.'.) "o. 7BB;, also /no n as the $omestic 'doption 'ct, effect. The ne statute deleted from the la the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 6C of 'rticle 8( of R.'. "o. 7BB; no reads+ ent into
IS:#. 6C. /rounds for Rescission of Adoption . J !pon petition of the adoptee, ith the assistance of the $epartment if a minor or if over eighteen (67) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardianGcounsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the follo ing grounds committed by the adopter(s)+ (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling1 (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee1 (c) se.ual assault or violence1 or (d) abandonment and failure to comply ith parental obligations. IAdoption& being in the best interest of the child& shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s!. (owever& the adopter(s! may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 010 of the #ivil #ode.I (emphasis supplied) Dose Felvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no 2urisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in vie of the afore0uoted provisions of R.'. "o. 7BB;. Petitioner asseverated, by ay of opposition, that the proscription in R.'. "o. 7BB; should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases here the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then 'rticle =<7;of the #ivil #ode and 'rticle 6C;= of the Family #ode. (n an order, dated ;7 'pril ;@@@, the trial court held thusly+ I,n the issue of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of the suit, Section B(c) of R.'. "o. 7=9C confers 2urisdiction to this #ourt, having been designated Family #ourt in '.F. "o. CC*66*@> S#.
66
I,n the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is hether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the #ourt could render a valid 2udgment in accordance ith the prayer of said complaint ( De ,esus& et al. vs. %elarmino& et al ., CB Phil. =9B). I'dmittedly, Section 6C, 'rticle 8( of R.'. "o. 7BB; deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family #ode. #onformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lac/ of cause of action. IPetitioner ho ever, insists that her right to rescind long ac0uired under the provisions of the Family #ode should be respected. 'ssuming for the sa/e of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on Fay B, 6C>;, said right should have been e.ercised ithin the period allo ed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and /no n to petitioner for more than five (B) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on $ecember 6, 6CCC, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. B, Rule 6@@ Revised Rules of #ourt) I&):R:F,R:, in vie of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.I <
+ia a petition for revie on certiorari under Rule <B of the 6CC> Rules of #ourt, petitioner raises the follo ing 0uestions1 vi2+ 6. Fay the sub2ect adoption, decreed on @B Fay 6C>;, still be revo/ed or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.'. "o. 7BB;K ;. (n the affirmative, has the adopterHs action prescribedK ' brief bac/ground on the la and its origins could provide some insights on the sub2ect. (n ancient times, the Romans undertoo/ adoption to assure male heirs in the family.B The continuity of the adopterHs family as the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There as hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. 9 #ountries, li/e Ereece, France, Spain and :ngland, in an effort to preserve inheritance ithin the family, neither allo ed nor recogni5ed adoption. > (t as only much later hen adoption as given an impetus in la and still later hen the elfare of the child became a paramount concern. 7 Spain itself hich previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman la concept of adoption hich, subse0uently, as to find its ay to the archipelago. The 'mericans came and introduced their o n ideas on adoption hich, unli/e most countries in :urope, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. C (n the early part of the century 2ust passed, the rights of children invited universal attention1 the Eeneva $eclaration of Rights of the #hild of 6C;< and the !niversal $eclaration of )uman Rights of 6C<7,6@ follo ed by the !nited "ations $eclarations of the Rights of the #hild, 66 ere ritten instruments that ould also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The #ivil #ode of the Philippines6; of 6CB@ on adoption, later modified by the #hild and Aouth &elfare #ode6= and then by the Family #ode of the Philippines,6<gave immediate statutory ac/no ledgment to the rights of the adopted. (n 6C7C, the !nited "ations initiated the #onvention of the Rights of the #hild. The Philippines, a State Party to the #onvention, accepted the principle that adoption as impressed ith social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent as geared to favor the adopted child. R.'. "o. 7BB; secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Fost importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his ne family but also in the society as ell. The ne la ithdre the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. Petitioner, ho ever, ould insist that R.'. "o. 7BB; should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its 2urisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the #ivil #ode and the Family #ode, the la s then in force. The concept of Ivested rightI is a conse0uence of the constitutional guaranty of due process 6B that e.presses apresent fixed interest hich in right reason and natural 2ustice is protected against arbitrary state action1 69 it includes not only legal or e0uitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also e.emptions from ne obligations created after the right has become vested. 6> Rights are considered vested hen the right to en2oyment is a present interest,67 absolute, unconditional, and perfect6C or fi.ed and irrefutable. (n Republic vs. #ourt of Appeals,;@ a petition to adopt Dason #ondat as filed by Lenaida #. ?obiles on @; February 6C77 hen the #hild and Aouth &elfare #ode (Presidential $ecree "o. 9@=) allo ed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. 'fter the trial court had rendered its decision and hile the case as still pending on appeal, the Family #ode of the Philippines (:.ecutive ,rder "o. ;@C), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, too/ effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Frs. ?obiles alone and ithout being 2oined by the husband. The #ourt concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt ,ason& having been filed with the court at the time when '.D. *o. 34 was still in effect , the right of Frs. ?obiles to file the petition, ithout being 2oined by her husband, according to the #ourt had become vested. (n Republic vs. 5iller,;6 spouses #laude and Dumrus Filler, both aliens, sought to adopt Fichael Fadayag. ,n ;C Duly 6C77, the couple filed a petition to formali5e FichaelHs adoption having theretofore been ta/en into their care. 't the time the action as commenced, P.$. "o. 9@= allo ed aliens to adopt. 'fter the decree of adoption and hile on appeal before the #ourt of 'ppeals, the Family #ode as enacted into la on @7 'ugust 6C77 dis0ualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the ithdra al of the adoption decree. (n discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme #ourt ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. (t as months after the effectivity of R.'. "o. 7BB; that herein petitioner filed an action to revo/e the decree of adoption granted in 6C>B. ?y then, the ne la ,;; had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the #ivil #ode and the Family #ode to rescind a decree of adoption. #onsistently ith its earlier pronouncements, the #ourt should no hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.'. "o. 7BB; had come into force, no longer could be pursued. (nterestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is sub2ect to the five*year bar rule under Rule 6@@ ;= of the Rules of #ourt and that the adopter ould lose the right to revo/e the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The e.ercise of the right ithin a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the re0uirements of a vested right entitled to protection. (t must also be ac/no ledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. ;< &hile adoption has often been referred to in the conte.t of a Iright,I the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. ;B (t is a privilege that is governed by the stateHs determination on hat it may deem to be for the best interest and elfare of the child. ;9 Fatters relating to adoption, including the ithdra al of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are sub2ect to regulation by the State. ;> #oncomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be ta/en a ay at anytime before it has been e.ercised.;7
6;
&hile R.'. "o. 7BB; has un0ualifiedly ithdra n from an adopter a conse0uential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases here the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the #ourt to apply the la . Dura lex sed lex ould be the hac/neyed truism that those caught in the la have to live ith. (t is still note orthy, ho ever, that an adopter, hile barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can al ays for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits other ise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recogni5ed by la , an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a ill and testament, may freely e.clude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. &):R:F,R:, the assailed 2udgment of the court a 0uo is 'FF(RF:$. "o costs. S, ,R$:R:$.
Davide& ,r.& # ., .& 6nares7$antiago& #arpio and A2cuna& ,, .& concur.
Special Proceedings Finals 8.R. No. 114410 M#-c& 252 1556 200
6=
NERISSA ?. PERE?2 petitioner, vs. T:E COURT OF APPEALS <Nint& Di,i$ion> #n. RA7 C. PERE?2 respondents. ROMERO2 J.:p
Parties herein ould have this #ourt duplicate the feat of Ming Solomon ho as hailed in ?iblical times for his sagacious, if, at times unorthodo., manner of resolving conflicts, the most celebrated case being that hen his authority as invo/ed to determine the identity of the real mother as bet een t o omen claiming the same infant. Since there could only be one mother, the daunting tas/ that confronted the /ingG2udge as to choose the true one. (n the instant case, e are faced his person both their genes. &hile there is a provision of la opposite conclusions. (t has fallen upon us no ith the challenge of deciding, as bet een father and mother, ho should have rightful custody of a child ho bears in
s0uarely in point, the t o courts
hose authority have been invo/ed to render a decision have arrived at diametrically
to li/e ise act as 2udge bet een the trial court, on the one hand, and the appellate, on the other.
,n the issue of custody over the minor Ray Pere5 ((, respondent #ourt of 'ppeals ruled in favor of the boyHs father Ray #. Pere5, reversing the trial courtHs decision to grant custody to "erissa L. Pere5, the childHs mother. Ray Pere5, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in #ebu hile "erissa, his ife ho is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They ere married in #ebu on $ecember 9, 6C79. 'fter si. miscarriages, t o operations and a high*ris/ pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Pere5 (( in "e Aor/ on Duly ;@, 6CC;. Petitioner ho began or/ing in the !nited States in ,ctober 6C77, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Fandaue #ity, #ebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in "e Aor/. She became a resident alien in February 6CC;. Private respondent stayed ith her in the !.S. t ice and too/ care of her visa and as not employed. hen she became pregnant. !nli/e his ife, ho ever, he had only a tourist
,n Danuary 6>, 6CC=, the couple and their baby arrived in #ebu. 'fter a fe ee/s, only "erissa returned to the !.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five* ee/ vacation and that they all had round*trip tic/ets. )o ever, her husband stayed behind to ta/e care of his sic/ mother and promised to follo her ith the baby. 'ccording to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once "erissa as in "e Aor/, she changed her mind and continued or/ing. She as supposed to come bac/ immediately after inding up her affairs there. &hen "erissa came home a fe days, before Ray ((Hs first birthday, the couple as no longer on good terms. That their love for each other as fading became apparent from their serious 0uarrels. Petitioner did not ant to live near her in*la s and rely solely on her husbandHs meager income of PB,@@@.@@. 1 She longed to be ith her only child but he as being /ept a ay from her by her husband. Thus, she did not ant to leave RD (Ray Dunior) ith her husband and in*la s. She ished for her son to gro up ith his mother. ,n the other hand, Ray anted to stay here, here he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. )e maintained that it ould not be difficult to live here since they have their o n home and a car. They could live comfortably on his P6B,@@@.@@ monthly income 2 as they ere not burdened ith having to pay any debts. Petitioner as forced to move to her parentsH home on Eui5o Street in Fandaue. $espite mediation by the priest couple failed to reconcile. ho solemni5ed their marriage, the
,n Duly ;9, 6CC=, "erissa L. Pere5 filed a petition for habeas corpus 3 as/ing respondent Ray #. Pere5 to surrender the custody of their son, Ray L. Pere5 ((, to her. ,n 'ugust ;>, 6CC=, the court a 8uo issued an ,rder a arding custody of the one*year old child to his mother, "erissa Pere5, citing the second paragraph of 'rticle ;6= of the Family #ode hich provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order other ise. The dispositive portion of the ,rder reads+ &):R:F,R:, foregoing premises considered, ,rder is hereby issued ordering the respondent to turn over the custody of their child Ray #ortes Pere5 ((, his passport and round trip tic/et to herein petitioner ith a arning that if he ill escape together ith the child for the purpose of hiding the minor child instead of complying ith this ,rder, that arrant for his arrest ill be issued.
S, ,R$:R:$. 4
!pon appeal by Ray Pere5, the #ourt of 'ppeals, on September ;>, 6CC<, reversed the trial courtHs order and a arded custody of the boy to his father. 0 PetitionerHs motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 she filed the instant petition for revie no three years old. here the sole issue is the custody of Ray Pere5 ((,
Respondent court differed in opinion from the trial court and ruled that there ere enough reasons to deny "erissa Pere5 custody over Ray (( even if the child is under seven years old. (t held that granting custody to the boyHs father ould be for the childHs best interest and elfare. 1
6<
?efore us is the unedifying situation of a husband and ife in marital discord, struggling for custody of their only child. (t is sad that petitioner and private respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each other and live together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they no see/ the #ourtHs assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority over the child. The isdom and necessity for the e.ercise of 2oint parental authority need not be belabored. The father and the mother complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care hich ta/es into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. ?y precept and e.ample, they mold his character during his crucial formative years. )o ever, the #ourtHs intervention is sought in order that a decision may be made as to hich parent shall be given custody over the young boy. The #ourtHs duty is to determine hether Ray Pere5 (( ill be better off ith petitioner or ith private respondent. &e are not called upon to declare hich party committed the greater fault in their domestic 0uarrel. &hen the parents of the child are separated, 'rticle ;6= of the Family #ode is the applicable la . (t provides+ 'rt. ;6=. (n case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be e.ercised by the parent designated by the #ourt. The #ourt shall ta/e into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. *o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother . unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise . (:mphasis supplied). Since the #ode does not 0ualify the ord IseparationI to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples petitioner and private respondent, are covered ithin its terms. 4 ho are separated in fact, such as
The Revised Rules of #ourt also contains a similar provision. Rule CC, section 9 ('doption and #ustody of Finors) provides+ Sec. 9. Proceedings as to child hose parents are separated. 'ppeal. &hen husband and ife are divorced or living separately, and apart from each other, and the 0uestions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a #ourt of First (nstance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall a ard the care, custody, and control of each such child as ill be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose hich parent it prefers to live ith if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . *o child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother& unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (:mphasis supplied) The provisions of la 0uoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order other ise. The use of the ord IshallI in 'rticle ;6= of the Family #ode and Rule CC, section 9 of the Revised Rules of #ourt connotes a mandatory character. (n the case of 9acson v. $an ,ose79acson, 5 the #ourt declared+
The use of the ord shall in article =9= 10 of the #ivil #ode, coupled ith the observations made by the #ode #ommission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. (t prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child belo seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. 11
The rationale for a arding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their mother as e.plained by the #ode #ommission+
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy here a mother has seen her baby torn a ay from her. "o man can sound the deep sorro s of a mother ho is deprived of her child of tender age. The e.ception allo ed by the rule has to be for Icompelling reasonsI for the good of the child1 those cases must indeed be rare, if the motherHs heart is not to be unduly hurt. (f she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) ill ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Foreover, moral dereliction ill not have any effect upon the baby ho is as yet unable to understand her situation. (Report of the #ode #ommission, p. 6;) 12
The Family #ode, in reverting to the provision of the #ivil #ode that a child belo seven years old should not be separated from the mother ('rticle =9=), has e.pressly repealed the earlier 'rticle 6>, paragraph three of the #hild and Aouth &elfare #ode (Presidential $ecree "o. 9@=) hich reduced the childHs age to five years. 13 The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d:;tre in the basic need of a child for his motherHs loving care. 14 ,nly the most compelling of reasons shall 2ustify the courtHs a arding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to e.ercise sole parental authority. (n the past the follo ing grounds have been considered ample 2ustification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority+ neglect, abandonment, 10 unemployment and immorality, 16habitual drun/enness, 11 drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sic/ ith a communicable disease. 14 (t has long been settled that in custody cases, 15 the foremost consideration is al ays the elfare and best interest of the child. (n fact, no less than an international instrument, the #onvention on the Rights of the #hild provides+ I(n all actions concerning children, hether underta/en by public or private social elfare institutions, courts of la , administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.I 20 #ourts invariably loo/ into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their material resources, social and moral situations. 21 (n the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they have ample means.
6B
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of or/ in the !.S.'. and has ta/en this point against her. The records, ho ever, sho that she is employed in a "e Aor/ hospital 22 and as, at the time the petition as filed, still abroad. 23 She testified that she intends to apply for a 2ob else here, presumably to improve her or/ environment and augment her income, as ell as for convenience. 24 The #ourt ta/es 2udicial notice of the fact that a registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the !nited States. !nli/e private respondent, a doctor ho by his o n admission could not find employment there, petitioner immediately got a 2ob in "e Aor/. #onsidering her s/ill and e.perience petitioner should find no difficulty in obtaining or/ else here, should she desire to do so. The decision under revie casts doubt on petitionerHs capability to ta/e care of the child, particularly since she or/s on t elve*hour shifts thrice ee/ly, at times, even at night. There being no one to help her loo/ after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to him. This conclusion is as un arranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present or/ schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of 0uality time for Ray ((. Nuite a number of or/ing mothers ho are a ay from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family ell, applying time management principles 2udiciously. Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her o n mother or relative to 2oin her abroad, providing the latter ith plane tic/ets and liberal allo ances, to loo/ after the child until he is able to ta/e care of himself. ,thers go on leave from or/ until such time as the child can be entrusted to day*care centers. $elegating child care temporarily to 0ualified persons ho run day*care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter e.ercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids or IyayasI under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third, private respondentHs or/ schedule as not presented in evidence at the trial. 'lthough he is a general practitioner, the records merely sho that he maintains a clinic, or/s for several companies on retainer basis and teaches part*time. 20 )ence, respondent courtHs conclusion that Ihis or/ schedule is fle.ible (and h)e can al ays find time for his sonI 26 is not ell*founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitionerHs or/ schedule cited in the respondent courtHs decision is not necessarily permanent. )ospitals or/ in shifts and, given a motherHs instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner may be e.pected to arrange her schedule in such a ay as to allocate time for him. Finally, it does not follo that petitioner values her career more than her family simply because she ants to or/ in the !nited States. There are any number of reasons for a personHs see/ing a 2ob outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the familyHs benefit and elfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a fe . (n the instant case, it has been sho n that petitioner earned enough from her 2ob to be able to construct a house for the family in Fandaue #ity. The record describes s/etchily the relations bet een Ray and "erissa Pere5. The transcripts of the three hearings are inade0uate to sho that petitioner did not e.ert earnest efforts and ma/e sacrifices to save her marriage. (t is not difficult to imagine ho heart*rending it is for a mother hose attempts at having a baby ere frustrated several times over a period of si. years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The motherHs role in the life of her child, such as Ray ((, is ell*nigh irreplaceable. (n prose and poetry, the depth of a motherHs love has been immortali5ed times ithout number, finding as it does, its 2ustification, not in fantasy but in reality. &):R:F,R:, the petition for revie is ER'"T:$. The decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals dated September ;>, 6CC< as ell as its Resolution dated Danuary ;<, 6CCB are hereby R:8:RS:$ and S:T 'S($:. The ,rder of the trial court dated 'ugust ;>, 6CC= is hereby R:("ST'T:$. #ustody over the minor Ray L. Pere5 (( is a arded to his mother, herein petitioner "erissa L. Pere5. This decision is immediately e.ecutory. S, ,R$:R:$.
Regalado& 'uno and 5endo2a& ,,.& concur.
Torres& ,r.& ,.& is on leave.
Special Proceedings Finals 8.R. No. 15500 9#n)#-y 212 1545 IN T:E MATTER OF T:E PETITION FOR A @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS OF MINOR AN8ELIE ANNE C. CER;ANTES2 NELSON L. CER;ANTES #n. ?ENAIDA CARREON CER;ANTES2 petitioners, vs. 8INA CARREON FA9ARDO #n. CONRADO FA9ARDO2 respondents. 6olanda ". 9im for petitioners. +oltaire #. #ampomanes for respondents. R:S,%!T(," PADILLA2 J.:
69
This is a petition for a rit of (abeas #orpus filed ith this #ourt over the person of the minor 'ngelie 'nne #ervantes. (n a resolution, dated B ,ctober 6C7>, the #ourt resolved to issue the rit returnable to the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial #ourt of Pasig at the hearing of 6; ,ctober 6C7> at 7+=@ a.m. Said Dudge as directed to hear the case and submit his report and recommendation to the #ourt. ,n = $ecember 6C7>, said :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial #ourt of Pasig submitted to the #ourt his report and recommendation, also dated = $ecember 6C7>. (t appears that the minor as born on 6< February 6C7> to respondents #onrado Fa2ardo and Eina #arreon, ho are common*la husband and ife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Eina #arreonHs sister and brother*in*la , the herein petitioners Lenaida #arreon*#ervantes and "elson #ervantes, spouses, ho too/ care and custody of the child hen she as barely t o (;) ee/s old. 'n 'ffidavit of #onsent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, as also e.ecuted by respondent Eina #arreon on ;C 'pril 6C7>. 1 The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. "o. @B>*?) as filed by herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial #ourt of Ri5al, Fourth Dudicial $istrict, ?ranch 9> hich, on ;@ 'ugust 6C7>, rendered a decision 2granting the petition. The child as then /no n as 'ngelie 'nne Fa2ardo. The court ordered that the child be Ifreed from parental authority of her natural parents as ell as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from no on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, /no n as 'ngelie 'nne #ervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate .I 3 Sometime in Farch or 'pril 6C7>, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners "elson and Lenaida #ervantes, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@, other ise, they ould get bac/ their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. 's a result, on 66 September 6C7>, hile petitioners ere out at or/, the respondent Eina #arreon too/ the child from her IyayaI at the petitionersH residence in 'ngono, Ri5al, on the prete.t that she as instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Eina #arreon brought the child to her house in ParaOa0ue. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but Eina #arreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had e.ecuted as not fully e.plained to her. She sent ord to the petitioners that she ill, ho ever, return the child to the petitioners if she ere paid the amount of P6B@,@@@.@@. Felisa Tansingco, the social or/er ho had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial #ourt of Ri5al in the adoption case, testified on ;> ,ctober 6C7> before the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial #ourt of Pasig in connection ith the present petition. She declared that she had intervie ed respondent Eina #arreon on ;< Dune 6C7> in connection ith the contemplated adoption of the child. $uring the intervie , said respondent manifested to the social or/er her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4 (n all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latterHs elfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (B) years of age, ill not apply here the #ourt finds compelling reasons to rule other ise. 0 (n all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social elfare of the child concerned, ta/ing into account the resources and moral as ell as social standing of the contending parents. "ever has this #ourt deviated from this criterion. 6 (t is undisputed that respondent #onrado Fa2ardo is legally married to a oman other than respondent Eina #arreon, and his relationship ith the latter is a common*la husband and ife relationship. )is open cohabitation ith co*respondent Eina #arreon ill not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere here she can gro and develop into an upright and moral*minded person. ?esides, respondent Eina #arreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man ith hom she lived for almost three (=) years but ho eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (li/e 'ngelie 'nne #. #ervantes) to gro up ith a sister hose IfatherI is not her true father, could also affect the moral outloo/ and values of said minor. !pon the other hand, petitioners ho are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than hat the natural mother (herein respondent Eina #arreon), ho is not only 2obless but also maintains an illicit relation ith a married man, can most li/ely give her. ?esides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners ith the full /no ledge and consent of respondents. ' decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, e.cept here the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in hich case, parental authority over the adopted shall be e.ercised 2ointly by both spouses. 1 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 4 and e.ercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 5 '##,R$("E%A, and as recommended by the :.ecutive Dudge, Regional Trial #ourt of Pasig, )on. :utropio Figrino, the Petition is ER'"T:$. The custody and care of the minor 'ngelie 'nne #ervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to hom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately e.ecutory. S, ,R$:R:$.
5elencio7(errera (#hairperson!& 'aras& $armiento and Regalado& ,,.& concur.
Special Proceedings Finals 8.R. No. L-16104 Octo+e- 312 1562
6>
TRUSTEES:IP OF T:E MINORS 6ENI8NO2 AN8ELA #n. ANTONIO # $)-n#'e. PERE? 7 TUASON2 P:ILIPPINE NATIONAL 6ANA2 9).ici# 8)#-.i#n o* 6ENI8NO PERE?2 ANTONIO M. PERE?2 2udicial guardian*appellant, vs. 9. ANTONIO ARANETA2 trustee*appellee. Alfonso "elix& ,r. for judicial guardian7appellant. Araneta and Araneta for trustee7appellee. CONCEPCION2 J.:
This is an appeal by rit of error from an order of the #ourt of First (nstance of Ri5al denying a motion of appellant, 'ntonio F. Pere5, as 2udicial guardian of his children, the minors ?enigno, 'ngela, and 'ntonio, all surnamed Pere5 y Tuason. (n pursuance of the provisions of the ill of the late 'ngela S. Tuason J hich as probated in Special Proceedings "o. B7B of said #ourt J appellee D. 'ntonio 'raneta as on Farch ;<, 6CB@, appointed, in Special Proceedings "o. N*>= of the same #ourt, as trustee of property be0ueathed by the deceased to some of her heirs, including her grandchildren, the aforementioned minors. ,n ,ctober <, 6CB@, appellee moved for the approval of accounts and the fi.ing of his compensation as such trustee. 'ppellantHs ife, 'ngela (. Tuason, hereafter referred to as Frs. Pere5, as ell as the mother and guardian at the time, of said minors, ob2ected thereto and urged the court to remove appellee as trustee and appoint the Philippine Trust in his place and to revo/e, not only certain sale made by him, but, also, an order of the court dated Farch ;<, 6CB@, granting him the po er to sell trust properties ithout special 2udicial authori5ation therefor. Subse0uently, appellant 2oined his ife in see/ing this relief. 'fter appropriate proceedings, said #ourt issued on $ecember ;=, 6CB@, an order approving said accounts, deferring action on the compensation of the trustee, modifying in part said order of Farch ;<, 6CB@, and denying the motion of Frs. Pere5. The pertinent part of the aforementioned order of $ecember ;=, 6CB@, reads as follo s+ (t being established that the trust as e.pressly created by the deceased, e shall no e.amine hether the trustee comes under the active supervision of the #ourt and hether our order of Farch ;<, 6CB@, granting to said trustee authority to sell the trust res ithout the need of 2udicial authori5ation erroneous or not. The #ourt accepts in vie urged by the trustee that only hen the testator Ihas omitted in his ill to appoint a trusteeI may the #ourt appoint one. This is in a accordance ith Section ;, Rule CC, of the Rules of #ourt. &hen an e.press trust has been created, the po ers of the trust shall be determined by the trust instrument itself. (n this particular case, the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta as given Iamplios poderes de vender los mismosI. The testatri. emphasi5es her desire that the trustee shall have ample po ers hen in another part of her ill she states that the po ers of said trustee shall be Ilos poderes mas amplios permitidos por la leyI. There is nothing against the la for a trustor to grant to the trustee ample po ers, and hen the deceased 'ngela S. Tuason granted said po ers to the trustee, she emphasi5ed her intention that in the e.ercise of said po ers by the trustee, there should be no court supervision. I?y the terms of trust, it may be left to the discretion of the trustee hether or not to e.ercise a po er, or here he is directed to e.ercise the po er, the time and manner of its e.ercise may be left to his discretion. To the e.tent to hich the trustee has discretion, the #ourt ill not control his e.ercise as long as he do not e.ceed the limits of the discretion conferred upon him. The court ill not substitute its o n 2udgment for his . . . . The cases are numerous in hich it has been held that here discretion is conferred upon the trustee ith respect to the e.ercise of a po er, the court ill not interfere ith him in his e.ercise or failure to e.ercise the po er so long as he is not guilty of an abuse of discretion. (Scott on Trusts, 8ol. ;, Sec. 67>)I Such being the case, there is no reason for the court to intervene in the e.ecution by the trustee of the po ers granted to him by the trustor. &e conclude, therefore, that our order of Farch ;<, 6CB@ granting authority to the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta to sell the trust res ithout 2udicial authority is correct. For the purpose, ho ever, of safeguarding the interests of the beneficiaries of this trust, said order is hereby amended as follo s+ (a) That the bond of the trustee is hereby increased from P6@,@@@.@@ to P=@,@@@.@@ and the premium for the bond (P=@,@@@.@@) shall be for the account of the trust1 (b) That the Trustee may sell, encumber or other ise dispose of any of the trust res ithout the need of 2udicial authori5ation1 provided, that if the amount involved e.ceeds P=@,@@@.@@, the trustee shall notify the natural guardians or the 2udicial guardian in case there be one appointed by the #ourt of the beneficiaries ten (6@) days before the proposed sale or encumbrance is e.ecuted, and in case the amount involved be P=@,@@@.@@ or less, the trustee shall advise said guardians ithin ten (6@) days after e.ecuting a deed of sale or encumbrance. &):R:F,R:, (6) the accounts filed by the trustee as per 'nne.es ', ?, and # attached to his motion of ,ctober B, 6CB@ are hereby approved1 (;) the petition of trustee to fi. his compensation is hereby deferred until such time as he shall present it again1 (=) the petition filed by the parents of the minors for the removal of the trustee D. 'ntonio 'raneta is hereby denied. %i/e ise, their petition that the Philippine Trust #o. or 'tty. Fran/ &. ?rady be appointed co*trustee denied1 <) the petition that the sale of the bed in favor of 'ntonio Tuason, Dr. be revo/ed is hereby denied1 and (B) the petition that the order of this court, dated Farch ;<, 6CB@, giving the trustee po er to sell ithout the need of 2udicial authori5ation be revo/ed is also hereby denied. ' reconsideration of this order having been denied, P Frs. Pere5 filed ith the Supreme #ourt a petition E.R. "o. %*967; thereof J for certiorari, ith preliminary in2unction, to annul said orders of Farch ;< and $ecember ;=, 6CB@. ' rit of preliminary in2unction as issued this by #ourt soon thereafter. (n a decision promulgated 'pril 6=, 6CBB, e denied said petition and dissolved said rit of preliminary in2unction.
67
(n pursuance of the aforementioned orders of Farch ;< and $ecember ;=, 6CB@, appellee rote on Dune ;=, 6CBC, to appellant, as the then 2udicial guardian of said minor a letter informing him of a proposed sale to ,rtigas P #o., %td., of several lots under trusteeship, located in Fari/ina, Ri5al, and aggregating <;.9@C6 hectares, at the rate of P;.C= a s0uare meter. &e 0uote from said communicable petition+ Pursuant to the order of the #ourt of First (nstance of Nue5on #ity in trusteeship proceeding "o. N*>=, ( ith to advise you that ten (6@) days after your receipt of this letter, (, in my capacity as trustee in said proceedings, shall e.ecute deed of sale ith mortgage in favor of ,rtigas P #ompany %imited Partnership, the follo ing lots located at Fari/ina hich form part of the trust estate+
T.#.T. *o. (Ri2al! ;;=CB I I I I ;;=C9 I I
9ote *o. <C*#*=*'*=*#*6*'*; <C*#*=*'*=*#*;*'*;*? <C*#*=*'*=*#*6*'*6 <C*#*=*'*=*#*;*'*;*' <C*#*=*'*=*#*;*'*> <C*#*=*'*=*#*=*'*=*6*< <C*#*=*'*=*#*=*'*=*'*<*'*6 <C*#*=*'*=*#*=*'*=*'*<*'*=
'sd. ;CC9B I I I 67;<> ;CC9B I I
Area ($8 m.! ;<C 6=7,97; ;>= 6BC,@B< ;6,@7C ;<,@<@ >,C97 ><,>=9
The price is P6,;B@,@@@.@@ payable under the follo ing conditions+ 6. !pon acceptance of the proposal, the sum of P;@,@@@.@@. ;. !pon signing the deed of sale ith mortgage, the sum of P=@@,@@@.@@. =. The balance shall be paid ithin a period of one and a half*years, ith interest at 9Q per annum. <. The property must be sold from all liens and encumbrances, particularly a guarantee that there are no s0uatters. B. ?ro/erHs commission shall be for buyerHs account. Three (=) days later, appellant informed appellee by letter (:.hibit #) of his (appellantHs) ob2ections to the proposed sale. Foreover, on Duly 6, 6CBC appellant filed, in the trusteeship proceedings, a motion praying for a rit of preliminary in2unction to restrain appellee from proceeding ith the sale. Subse0uently, the Philippine "ational ?an/, as guardian of the estate of ?enigno Pere5 y Tuason, one of the heirs of 'ngela (. Tuason, deceased, adopted said motion of appellant herein as its o n. 't the instance of appellant, a notice of lis pendens as, on Duly ;C, 6CBC, annotated on the original certificates of title to the property in 0uestion. 'fter due hearing, the lo er court issued an order, dated ,ctober 6B, 6CBC, denying appellantHs motion and petition for a rit of preliminary in2unction. )ence, this appeal by 'ntonio F. Pere5. The Philippine "ational ?an/ has not 2oined him in the appeal. Subse0uently, appellee effected the sale aforementioned to ,rtigas P #o., %td. The main issues are+ (6) hether or not the sum of P;.C= per s0uare meter agreed upon ith ,rtigas P #o., %td., is the fair mar/et value of the property aforementioned1 and (;) hether the sale thereof ould be in2urious to the interest of the beneficiaries or cestui 8ue trust. &ith respect to the first issue, appellant maintains that the fair mar/et value of the property above referred to is PB.@@ a s0uare meter, as stated in the report (:.hibit :) of his realty estate e.pert, Fr. '. 8arias. (t appears from this report that the conclusion therein reached by Fr. '. 8arias is based upon (a) some offers to sell properties located in the vicinity of the one involved in this case1 and (b) certain sales of real estate specified in the report. )o ever, offers to sell are not competent evidence of the fair mar/et value of a property. Said offers to sell are no better than offers to buy, hich have been held be inadmissible as proof of said value. (#ity of Fanila :strada, ;B Phil. ;@71 Fanila Railroad #o. vs. 'guila =B Phil. 6671 #ity of $avao vs. $acudao %*=><6, Fay ;, 6CB;.) (ndeed, . . . To imagine a sale ithout a buyer ould be absurd, for if there is no buyer the commodity ould bring nothing . . . .
6C
(n discussing the term Imar/et valueI the author of a ell*/no n treaties on the sub2ect of damages observes that to ma/e a mar/et there must be both buying and selling1 and the Imar/et valueI says he, is that reasonable sum hich the property ould bring on a fair sale by a man illing but not obliged to sell to a man illing but not obliged to buy. (Sedge ic/ on $amages, sec. ;<B1 cited in #ompagnie Franco*(ndo #hinoise vs. $eutsch*'ustraliache, =C Phil. <><.) The aforementioned report relies, also, upon the sale a lot of C,9>C s0uare meters at PB.>@ a s0uare meter and t o (;) sales each of lot of ;@,@@@ s0uare meters and a sale of a lot of ;76,<B; s0uare meters, at P<.@@ s0uare meter. These transactions can not serve as basis for the determination of the value of the property in dispute for the lands involved in the former are much smaller than the latter, the area of hich is <;9,@C6 s0uare meters, and it is a matter of common /no ledge that the price becomes lesser as the si5e of the property sold becomes bigger. Foreover, the lands covered by said transactions do not appear to be in the vicinity of the property in litigation. &hat is more, no effort has been made to prove that the nature and condition of the former are analogous, or at least, comparable to those of the latter. (n 5anila Railroad #o. vs. 5itchell (<C Phil. 7@6), this #ourt held+ . . . The e.hibits ere clearly inadmissible in evidence and properly re2ected by the (lo er) court. (n order that such evidence may be admitted, it is necessary that the properties sold be in the immediate neighborhood or ithin the 5one of the commercial activity ith hich the condemned property is identified. (:mphasis supplied.) !pon the other hand, it appears that in 6CBB the !niversal Te.tile Fills bought a lot of 66@,@@< s0uare meters near the trust properties in 0uestion at P;.B@ a s0uare meter, hereas a land of ;6=,<B7 s0uare meters, situated in the same neighborhood, as, in 6CB9, ac0uired by the Fanila ?ay Spinning Fill, at P6.B@ a s0uare meter. 'gain, prior to the sale of said trust properties to ,rtigas P #o., %td. offers to purchase the same neighborhood ere made by !nited %aboratories, (nc. and one Fr. Philipps at P;.B@ and P;.>@, respectively, a s0uare meter. (t ould thus appear that the price of P;.C= a s0uare meter agreed upon ith ,rtigas P #o., %td. is fairly representative of the mar/et value of said land, and this is borne out by the testimony of 'rturo Ruis and %auro Far0ue5, the real estate bro/ers ho too/ the itness stand for herein appellee. (t is ne.t urged that the sale of the property in 0uestion is not only unnecessary, but also in2urious to the minors represented by appellant herein, by reason of possible devaluation, and high income ta.es. This pretense is predicated, ho ever, upon sheer speculation. Furthermore, the last ill and testament of 'ngela S. Tuason, in pursuance of hich the trust as established, provides that+ #uarta. J (nstituyo como mis unicos herederos a mis mencionados tres hi2os a ra5on de una novena parte del caudal hereditario 0ue de2are para cada uno de rellos. %ego a mi hi2o 'ntonio otra porcion e0uivalente a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. %ego asi mismo a mis nietos 0ue fueren hi2os de mi hi2a "ieves, otra porcion e0uivalents a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. A finalmeinte lego a mis nietos 0ue fueren hi2os de mi hi2a 'ngela otra porcion e0uivalente a dos novenas partes del caudal hereditario. $ichos tres legados, sin embargo, estansuietos a la manda 0ue se menciona en el parrafo siguiente %os dos legados a favor de mis mencionados nietos seran administrados por mi 'lbacea D. 'ntonio 'raneta (y en defecto de este, su hermano, Salvador 'raneta), con amplios poderes de "ender los mismos, y con su producto ad0uirir otros bienes, y con derecho a cobrar por su administracion, honorarios ra5onables %os poderes de dicho administrador seran los de un trustee con los poderes mas amplias permitidos por la ley $ebera sin embargo, rendir trimestral mente cuenta de su administracion a los legatarios 0ue fueren mayores de edad y a los tutores de los 0ue fueren menores de edad A asimismo debera hacerles entrega de la participacion 0ue a cada legatario corresponda en las rentas netas de la administracion. %a administracion sobre un grupo cesara cuando todos mis nietos de dicho grupo llegaren a su mayoria de edad, y una mayoria de los mismos acordaren la terminacion de la administracion. Por nietos debe entenderse so nolamente a los nietos varones sino tambien a los nietos mu2eres. Referring to this provision of said ill, e had occasion to say in E.R. "o. %*967;+
. . . throughout clause < of the ill, one can see that the testatri. placed implicit confidence and trust in 'raneta hom she designated as trustee, and for him to continue for a long time, not only until the minor children of 'ngela S. Tuason including those yet unborn, attained the age of ma2ority but only hen a ma2ority of them decided to end the trust. (n short, the trustor had such faith and confidence appellee that she relied fully upon his 2udgment and discretion. The e.ercise thereof by appellees should not be disturbed, therefore, e.cept upon clear proof of fraud or bad faith, or unless the transaction in 0uestion is manifestly pre2udicial to the interest of the minors aforementioned petitioned. Such is not the situation obtaining in the present case. &):R:F,R:, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, ith costs against the appellant. (t is so ordered.
%eng2on& #.,.& 'adilla& %autista Angelo& Reyes& ,.%.9.& %arrera& 'aredes& Di2on& Regala and 5a)alintal& ,,.& concur.
;@
A.M. No. 03-02-00-SC RE3 PROPOSED RULE ON 8UARDIANS:IP OF MINORS R:S,%!T(," 'cting on the letter of the #hairman of the #ommittee on Revision of the Rules of #ourt submitting for this #ourt-s consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Euardianship of Finors, the #ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. The Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6, ;@@= follo ing its publication in a ne spaper of general circulation not later than 'pril 6B, ;@@=. 'pril 6, ;@@=. Davide& ,r. #.,.& %ellosillo& 'uno& +itug& 5endo2a& 'anganiban& <uisumbing& 6nares7$antiago& $andoval7/utierre2& #arpio& Austria75artine2& #orona& #arpio75orale2&#allejo $r.& A2cuna& ,,.& concur RULE ON 8UARDIANS:IP OF MINORS Section 6. Applicability of the Rule. = This Rule shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor. The father and the mother shall 2ointly e.ercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their unemancipated common child necessity of a court appointment. (n such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family #ode on guardianship. ithout the
Sec. ;. -ho may petition for appointment of guardian. = ,n grounds authori5ed by la , any relative or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the Family #ourt for the appointment of a general guardian over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the Secretary of Social &elfare and $evelopment and by the Secretary of )ealth in the case of an insane minor ho needs to be hospitali5ed. Sec. =. -here to file petition. = ' petition for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor may be filed in the Family #ourt of the province or city here the minor actually resides. (f he resides in a foreign country, the petition shall be flied ith the Family #ourt of the province or city here his property or any part thereof is situated. Sec. <. /rounds of petition.7The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person or property, or both, of a minor are the follo ing+ (a) (b) (c) (d) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents1 suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority1 remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter (s found unsuitable to e.ercise parental authority1 or hen the best interests of the minor so re0uire.
Sec. B. <ualifications of guardians. = (n appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the guardian-s+ (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) moral character1 physical, mental and psychological condition1 financial status1 relationship of trust ith the minor1 availability to e.ercise the po ers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship1 lac/ of conflict of interest ith the minor1 and ability to manage the property of the minor.
Sec. 9. -ho may be appointed guardian of the person or property& or both& of a minor. = (n default of parents or a court*appointed guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor, observing as far as practicable, the follo ing order of preference+ (a) (b) (c) (d) the surviving grandparent and (n case several grandparents survive, the court shall select any of them ta/ing (nto account all relevant considerations1 the oldest brother or sister of the minor over t enty*one years of age, unless unfit or dis0ualified1 the actual custodian of the minor over t enty*one years of age, unless unfit or dis0ualified1 and any other person, ho in the sound discretion of the court, ould serve the best interests of the minor.
Sec. >. #ontents of petition. = ' petition for the appointment of a general guardian must allege the follo ing+ (a) (b) (c) (d) The 2urisdictional facts1 The name, age and residence of the prospective ard1 The ground rendering the appointment necessary or convenient1 The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation or suspension of their parental authority1
;6
(e) (f) (g) (h)
The remarriage of the minor-s surviving parent1 The names, ages, and residences of relatives ithin the <th civil degree of the minor, and of persons having him in their care and custody1 The probable value, character and location of the property of the minor1 and The name, age and residence of the person for hom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. )o ever, no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship. Sec. 7. Time and notice of hearing. &hen a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fi. a time and place for its hearing, and shall cause reasonable notice to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition, including the minor if he is fourteen years of age or over, and may direct other general or special notice to be given. Sec. C. #ase study report. The court shall order a social or/er to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social or/er may intervene on behalf of the minor if he finds that the petition for guardianship should be denied. Sec. 6@. Opposition to petition. = 'ny interested person may contest the petition by filing a ritten opposition based on such grounds as the ma2ority of the minor or the unsuitability of the person for hom letters are prayed, and pray that the petition be denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition. Sec. 66. (earing and order for letters to issue. = 't the hearing of the petition, it must be sho n that the re0uirement of notice has been complied ith. The prospective ard shall be presented to the court. The court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations. (f arranted, the court shall appoint a suitable guardian of the person or property, or both, of the minor. 't the discretion of the court, the hearing on guardianship may be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released ithout its approval. Sec. 6;. -hen and how a guardian of the property for non7resident minor is appointed? notice. = &hen the minor resides outside the Philippines but has property in the Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any one interested in his property, in e.pectancy or other ise, may petition the Family #ourt for the appointment of a guardian over the property. "otice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the minor by publication or any other means as the court may deem proper. The court may dispense ith the presence of the non*resident minor. (f after hearing the court is satisfied that such non*resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or convenient, it may appoint a guardian over his property. Sec. 6=. $ervice of final and executory judgment or order . The final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order shall be served upon the %ocal #ivil Registrar of the municipality or city here the minor resides and the Register of $eeds of the place here his property or part thereof is situated shall annotate the same in the corresponding title, and report to the court his compliance ithin fifteen days from receipt of the order. Sec. 6<. %ond of guardian? amount? conditions.7%efore he enters upon the e.ecution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardian may be re0uired to post a bond in such sum as the court shall determine and conditioned as follo s+ (a) To ma/e and return to the court, ithin three months after the issuance of his letters of guardianship, a true and complete (nventory of all the property, real and personal, of his ard hich shall come to his possession or /no ledge or to the possession or /no ledge of any other person in his behalf1 (b) To faithfully e.ecute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the property according to this rule for the best interests of the provide for his proper care, custody and education1 ard, and to
(c) To render a true and Dust account of all the property of the ard in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by this rule and such other times as the court directs1 and at the e.piration of his trust, to settle his accounts ith the court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and monies remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person la fully entitled thereto1 and (d) To perform all orders of the court and such other duties as may be re0uired by la .
Sec. 6B. -here to file the bond? action thereon. = The bond posted by a guardian shall be filed in the Family #ourt and, (n case of breach of any of its conditions, the guardian may be prosecuted in the same proceeding for the benefit of the ard or of any other person legally interested in the property. &henever necessary, the court may re0uire the guardian to post a ne bond and may discharge from further liability the sureties on the old bond after due notice to interested persons, if no in2ury may result therefrom to those interested in the property. Sec. 69. %ond of parents as guardians of property of minor . lf the mar/et value of the property or the annual (ncome of the child e.ceeds PB@,@@@.@@, the parent concerned shall furnish a bond (n such amount as the court may determine, but in no case less than ten per centurn of the value of such property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. ' verified petition for approval of the bond shall be flied in the Family #ourt of the place country, in the Family #ourt of the place here the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be doc/eted as a summary special proceeding (n general guardian shall be heard and resolved. here the child resides or, if the child resides in a foreign
hich all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations of a
Sec. 6>. /eneral duties of guardian. ' guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ard and the management of his property, or only the management of his property. The guardian of the property of a nonresident minor shall have the management of all his property ithin the Philippines.
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' guardian shall perform the follo ing duties+ (a) (b) To pay the 2ust debts of the ard out of the personal property and the income of the real property of the ard, (f the same is sufficient1 other ise, out of the real property of the ard upon obtaining an order for its sale or encumbrance1 To settle all accounts of his ard, and demand, sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, ith the approval of the court, compound for the same and give discharges to the debtor on receiving a fair and 2ust dividend of the property and effects1 and to appear for and represent the ard in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person is appointed for that purpose1 To manage the property of the ard frugally and ithout aste, and apply the income and profits thereon, insofar as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ard1 and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, to sell or encumber the real or personal property, upon being authori5ed by the court to do so1 To consent to a partition of real or personal property o ned by the ard 2ointly or in common ith others upon authority granted by the court after hearing, notice to relatives of the ard, and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action1 To submit to the court a verified inventory of the property of his ard ithin three months after his appointment, and annually thereafter, the rendition of hich may be re0uired upon the application of an interested person1
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f) To report to the court any property of the ard not included in the inventory hich is discovered, or succeeded to, or ac0uired by the ard ithin three months after such discovery, succession, or ac0uisition1 and (g) To render to the court for its approval an accounting of the property one year from his appointment, and every year thereafter or as often as may be re0uired.
Sec. 67. 'ower and duty of the court The court may+ (a) (b) Re0uest the assistance of one or more commissioners in the appraisal of the property of the and subse0uent inventories1 ard reported in the initial
'uthori5e reimbursement to the guardian, other than a parent, of reasonable e.penses incurred in the e.ecution of his trust, and allo payment of compensation for his services as the court may deem 2ust, not e.ceeding ten per centum of the net income of the ard, if any1 other ise, in such amount the court determines to be a reasonable compensation for his services1 and !pon complaint of the guardian or ard, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the property at the ard, re0uire any person suspected of having embe55led, concealed, or disposed of any money, goods or interest, or a ritten instrument belonging to the ard or his property to appear for e.amination concerning any thereof and issue such orders as ould secure the property against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance.
(c)
Sec. 6C. 'etition to sell or encumber property.7 &hen the income of a property under guardianship is insufficient to maintain and educate the ard, or hen it is for his benefit that his personal or real property or any part thereof be sold, mortgaged or other ise encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe and productive security, or in the improvement or security of other real property, the guardian may file a verified petition setting forth such facts, and praying that an order issue authori5ing the sale or encumbrance of the property. Sec. ;@. Order to show cause. = (f the sale or encumbrance is necessary or ould be beneficial to the ard, the court shall order his ne.t of /in and all personGs interested in the property to appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified and sho cause hy the petition should not be granted. Sec. ;6. (earing on return of order? costs. = At the time and place designated in the order to sho cause, the court shall hear the allegations and evidence of the petitioner and ne.t of /in, and other persons interested, together ith their itnesses, and grant or deny the petition as the best interests of the ard may re0uire. Sec. ;;. #ontents of order for sale or encumbrance and its duration? bond. (f& after full e.amination, it is necessary, or ould be beneficial to the ard, to sell or encumber the property, or some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance the proceeds of hich shall be e.pended for the maintenance or the education of the ard, or invested as the circumstances may re0uire. The order shall specify the grounds for the sale or encumbrance and may direct that the property ordered sold be disposed of at public sale, sub2ect to such conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security here a part of the payment is deferred. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale or encumbrance, but the court may, if deemed e.pedient, re0uire an additional bond as a condition for the sale or encumbrance. The authority to sell or encumber shall not e.tend beyond one year, unless rene ed by the court. Sec. ;=. #ourt may order investment of proceeds and direct management of property. = The court may authori5e and re0uire the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other money of his ard in his hands, in real or personal property, for the best interests of the ard, and may ma/e such other orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the property and effects, as circumstances may arrant. Sec. ;<. /rounds for removal or resignation of guardian. = &hen a guardian becomes insane or other ise incapable of discharging his trust or is found thereafter to be unsuitable, or has asted or mismanaged the property of the ard, or has failed to render an account or ma/e a return for thirty days after it is due, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him as such and re0uire him to surrender the property of the ard to the person found to be la fully entitled thereto. The court may allo the guardian to resign for 2ustifiable causes. one. ard and the court
!pon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the court shall appoint a ne
"o motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has submitted the proper accounting of the property of the has approved the same.
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Sec. ;B. /round for termination of guardianship. = The court motu proprio or upon verified motion of any person allo ed to file a petition for guardianship may terminate the guardianship on the ground that the ard has come of age or has died. The guardian shall notify the court of such fact ithin ten days of its occurrence. Sec. ;9. $ervice of final and executory judgment or order. = The final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order shall be served upon the %ocal #ivil Registrar of the municipality or city here the minor resides and the Register of $eeds of the province or city here his property or any part thereof is situated. ?oth the %ocal #ivil Registrar and- the Register of $eeds shall enter the final and e.ecutory 2udgment or order in the appropriate boo/s in their offices. Sec. ;>. .ffect of the rule. This Rule amends Rules C; to C> inclusive of the Rules of #ourt on guardianship of minors. Euardianship of incompetents ho are not minors shall continue to be under the 2urisdiction of the regular courts and governed by the Rules of #ourt. Sec. ;7. .ffectivity. 7 This Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6, ;@@= follo ing its publication in a ne spaper of general circulation not later than 'pril 6B, ;@@=.
Special Proceedings Finals E.R. "o. 6697=B Farch B, 6CC7
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'"T,"(:TT' E'R#(' 8$'. $: #)!', petitioner, vs. #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S (Special :ight $ivision), ),". D'P'% F. E!('"(, RT#, ?ranch 6<, 6;th Dudicial Region, #otabato #ity, and F%,R(T' '. 8'%%:D,, as 'dministratri. of the :state of the late Roberto %. #hua, respondents.
M'P!"'", ,.@
'ssailed before us in this 'ppeal by #ertiorari under Rule <B of the Rules of #ourt is the decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*ER Sp. "o. ==6@6, promulgated on 6C 'pril 6CC< affirming the decision of the Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch 6<, of #otabato #ity in Special Procedure #ase "o. ==6. 's culled from the records, the follo ing facts have been established by evidence+ $uring his lifetime, Roberto %im #hua lived out of edloc/ ith private respondent Florita '. 8alle2o from 6C>@ up to 6C76. ,ut of this union, the couple begot t o illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson 'lon5o and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o. ,n ;7 Fay 6CC;, Roberto #hua died intestate in $avao #ity. ,n ; Duly 6CC;, private respondent filed ith the Regional Trial #ourt of #otabato #ity a Petition 1 hich is reproduced hereunder+ (" R:+ P:T(T(," F,R $:#%'R'T(," ,F ):(RS)(P, E!'R$('"S)(P ,8:R T): P:RS,"S '"$ PR,P:RT(:S ,F F(",RS R,?:RT R'FS," '%,"L, SP. PR,#. ",G ==6 and R!$A'R$ PR($: '%,"L,, all surnamed #)!' and (SS!'"#: ,F %:TT:RS ,F '$F("(STR'T(,". F%,R(T' '%,"L, 8'%%:D,, Petitioner '.TATAO* #,F:S ",& the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this )onorable #ourt most respectfully states+ 6. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and residing at Nue5on 'venue, #otabato #ity, Philippines1 ;. That sometime from 6C>@ up to and until late 6C76 your petitioner lived ith Roberto %im #hua as husband and ife and out of said union they begot t o (;) children, namely, Robert Rafson 'lon5o #hua ho as born in Eeneral Santos #ity on 'pril ;7, 6C>> and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o #hua ho as born in $avao #ity on 'ugust =@, 6C>7. ' .ero. copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as anne. I'I and I?I, respectively. =. That the aforementioned children #otabato #ity1 ho are still minors today are both staying ith herein petitioner at her address at Nue5on 'venue,
<. That Roberto %im #hua, father of the above*mentioned minors, died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; in $avao #ity. B. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and personal orth PB,@@@,@@@.@@ consisting of the follo ing+
a) %ot in Ma/ar, #otabato #ity covered by T#T "o. T*6;7=B ith an area of ;C@ s0. m. estimated at PB@,@@@.@@ b) %ot in Ma/ar, #otabato #ity covered by T#T "o. T*6;7=< ith an area of =;= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@ c) %ot in $avao #ity covered by T#T "o. T*6;9B7= ith an area of =@= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@
;B
d) %ot in $avao #ity covered by T#T "o. T*6;9B7< ith an area of =@= s0. m. B@,@@@.@@ e) Residential house in #otabato #ity valued at =@,@@@.@@ f) Residential house in $avao #ity valued at 9@@,@@@.@@ g) #ar, #olt %ancer ith Fotor "o. <E==*= 'F9=C= ;6@,@@@.@@
h) #olt, Ealant Super Saloon ith Fotor "o. <E=>*E?@69B B<B,@@@.@@ i) #ar, #olt Ealant ith Fotor "o. <EB;*B;$>B;<7 66@,@@@.@@ 2) Reo (su5u $ump Truc/ ith Fotor "o. $'9<@*7=79=B =B@,@@@.@@ /) )ino $ump Truc/ ith Fotor "o. :$6@@*T<>6<7 =B@,@@@.@@ l) Stoc/holdings in various corporations ith par value estimated at =,==B,@@@.@@ Total PB,@@@,@@@.@@ 9. That deceased Roberto %im #hua died single and ithout legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o #hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o #hua, his children ith herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. ('rticle C77 of the #ivil #ode of the Philippines). >. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the follo ing, to it+ *ames Relationship Ages Residence 6. #arlos #hua !ncle 9@ Nue5on 'venue, #otabato #ity ;. 'ida #hua 'untie BB Rosary )eights, #otabato #ity =. Romulo !y !ncle <@ cGo ,verseas Fishing :.poration #o. (nc., Fatina, $avao #ity 9. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of la are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto %im #hua under the provisions of 'rticle C77 of the "e #ivil #ode of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and interest of Robert Rafson 'lon5o #hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o #hua, both minors and heirs of deceased Roberto %im #hua, a guardian over the persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this )onorable #ourt. >. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is also competent and illing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o #hua and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o #hua both staying and living ith her1 that petitioner possesses all the 0ualifications and none of the dis0ualifications of a guardian. &):R:F,R:, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed+ 6. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring minors R,?:RT, R'FS," '%,"L, #)!' and R!$A'R$ PR($: '%,"L, #)!' as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased R,?:RT, %(F #)!'1 ;. That %etters of 'dministration be issued to herein petitioner for the administration of the estate of the deceased R,?:RT, %(F #)!'1 =. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of minors R,?:RT R'FS," '%,"L, #)!' and R!$A'R$ PR($: '%,"L, #)!'1 <. That after all the property of deceased Roberto %im #hua have been inventoried and e.penses and 2ust debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto %im #hua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of 'rticle C77 of the "e #ivil #ode of the Philippines.
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B. 'nd for such other reliefs and remedies this )onorable #ourt may consider fit and proper in the premises. #otabato #ity, Philippines, Dune ;C, 6CC;. (Sgd.) F%,R(T' '%,"L, 8'%%:D, (Petitioner) The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 6< 'ugust 6CC; and directed that notice thereof be published in a ne spaper of general circulation in the province of Faguindanao and #otabato #ity and or $avao #ity. ,n ;6 Duly 6CC;, herein petitioner 'ntonietta Earcia 8da. de #hua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto #hua, filed a Fotion to $ismiss 2 on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedentHs death $avao #ity as his residence, hence, the Regional Trial #ourt of $avao #ity is the proper forum. Private respondent filed an opposition to the Fotion to $ismiss 3 dated Duly ;@, 6CC; based on the follo ing grounds+ (6) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner ho are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto %. #hua and under Section 6, Rule C; of the Rules of #ourt the venue shall be at the place here the minor resides1 (;) That the above*named minors are residents of #otabato #ity+ (=) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors Robert Rafson 'lon5o and Rudyard Pride 'lon5o, all surnamed #hua. (<) That deceased Roberto %. #hua died a bachelor. )e is the father of the above*named minors ith the petitioner in this case1 (B) That movantGoppositor 'ntonietta #hua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto %. #hua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage ith any oman until he died. ,n 9 'ugust 6CC;, private respondent 8alle2o filed a Fotion for 'dmission of an 'mended Petition 4 Iin order that the designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsuli5e in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings1 thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition.I The amended petition 0 contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus+. (" R:+ P:T(T(," F,R T): S:TT%:F:"T ,F T): ("T:ST'T: :ST'T: ,F R,?:RT, %. #)!', $:#%'R'T(," ,F ):(RS)(P, E!'R$('"S)(P ,8:R T): P:RS,"S '"$ PR,P:RT(:S ,F F(",RS R,?:RT '"$ R!$A'R$, all surnamed #)!' and (SS!'"#: ,F %:TT:RS ,F '$F("(STR'T(,". F%,R(T' '%,"L, 8'%%:D,, Petitioner. Paragraph < of the original petition as also amended to read as follo s+ <. That Roberto %im #hua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of #otabato #ity and died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; at $avao #ity. The petition contained e.actly the same prayers as the original petition. Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said motion on ;< Duly 6CC;, private respondentHs counsel allegedly admitted that the sole intention of the original petition as to secure guardianship over the persons and property of the minors. 6 ,n ;6 'ugust 6CC;, the trial court issued an ,rder 1 denying the motion to dismiss for lac/ of merit. The court ruled that 'ntonietta Earcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as ife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased as #otabato #ity, and even assuming that there as concurrent venue among the Regional Trial #ourts here the decedent had resided, the R.T.#. of #otabato had already ta/en cogni5ance of the settlement of the decedentHs estate to the e.clusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order read+ 't the hearing of the motion to dismiss on 'ugust 6C, 6CC;, counsel for movant 'ntonietta E. #hua presented 67 :.hibits in support of her allegation that she as the la ful ife of the decedent and that the latter resides in $avao #ity at the time of his death. :.h. I6I as the .ero. copy of the alleged marriage contract bet een the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely ob2ection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy hich the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the follo ing+ a certification from the %ocal #ivil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract as ever registered ith them1 a letter from Dudge 'ugusto ?an5ali, the alleged person to have solemni5ed the alleged marriage that he has not solemni5ed such alleged marriage. :.hibit I;I through I67I consist among others of Transfer #ertificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto %. #hua married to 'ntonietta Earcia, and a resident of $avao #ity1 Residence #ertificates from 6C77 and 6C7C issued at $avao #ity indicating that he as married and as born in #otabato #ity1 (ncome Ta. Returns for 6CC@ and 6CC6 filed in $avao #ity here the status of the decedent as stated as married1 passport of the decedent specifying that he as married and his residence as $avao #ity. Petitioner through counsels, ob2ected to the admission in evidence of :.hibits I;I through I67I if the purpose is to establish the
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truth of the alleged marriage bet een the decedent and 'ntonietta Earcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not ob2ect to the admission of said e.hibit if the purpose is to sho that $avao #ity as the business residence of the decedent. Petitioner through counsels, presented :.hibit I'I through IMI to support her allegation that the decedent as a resident of #otabato #ity1 that he died a bachelor1 that he begot t o illegitimate children ith the petitioner as mother. 'mong these e.hibits are (ncome Ta. Returns filed in #otabato #ity from 6C97 through 6C>C indicating therein that he as single1 birth certificates of the alleged t o illegitimate children of the decedent1 Resident #ertificates of the decedent issued in #otabato #ity1 Registration #ertificate of 8ehicle of the decedent sho ing that his residence is #otabato #ity. (t is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she as the la ful ife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract hich the movant failed to produce. Transfer #ertificates of Title, Residence #ertificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so hen the petitioner has submitted a certification from the %ocal #ivil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage as not registered and a letter from the 2udge alleged to have solemni5ed the marriage that he has not solemni5ed said alleged marriage. #onse0uently, she has no personality to file the sub2ect motion to dismiss. ,n the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country here he usually stays to supervise and pursue his business ventures. $avao #ity is one of them. (t cannot be denied that #otabato #ity is his actual residence here his alleged illegitimate children also reside. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of ill, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter. (t is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. #', %*<@B@;, "ovember ;C, 6C>9). :ven assuming that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial #ourts of the places here the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial #ourt first ta/ing cogni5ance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall e.ercise 2urisdiction to the e.clusion of all other courts (Section 6, Rule >=). (t as this #ourt hich first too/ cogni5ance of the case hen the petition as filed on Duly ;, 6CC;, doc/eted as Special Proceeding "o. ==6 and an order of publication issued by this #ourt on Duly 6=, 6CC;. &):R:F,R:, in vie of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lac/ of merit. ,n =6 'ugust 6CC;, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing Romulo %im !y, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedentHs estate. 4 ,n the same day, the trial court, li/e ise, issued an ,rder appointing Florita 8alle2o as guardian over the persons and properties of the t o minor children. 5 Thereafter, petitioner filed a Fotion dated ;B ,ctober 6CC= 10 praying that the letters of administration issued to 8alle2o be recalled and that ne letters of administration be issued to her. She, li/e ise, filed a Fotion dated B "ovember 6CC= 11 to declare the proceedings a mistrial. ?oth motions ere denied by the trial court in its ,rder dated ;; "ovember 6CC=. 12 PetitionerHs motion for reconsideration of the order as denied by the trial court in an ,rder dated 6= $ecember 6CC=. 13 'ssailing the last t o orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 9B) doc/eted as #' E.R. "o. Sp. ==6@6, alleging that the trial court acted ith grave abuse of discretion in+ ith the respondent #ourt of 'ppeals,
(6) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding1 (;) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings ithout 2urisdiction and ithout any notice to herein petitioner hatsoever1 and (=) issuing the 0uestioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SP% Proc. "o. ==6 0uestioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex7parte by the public respondent R.T.#. ithout notice to the petitioners. Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her opposition to petitionerHs motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship1 hence, the trial court acted beyond its 2urisdiction hen it issued letters of administration over the estate of Roberto %. #hua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, ithout the amended petition being published in a ne spaper of general circulation as re0uired by Section =, Rule >C. The #ourt of 'ppeals, in its decision promulgated on 6C 'pril 6CC<, 14 denied the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed as one for guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as ell as for administration of his intestate estate. &hile private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition as for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmista/ably sho ed a t in purpose+ (6) guardianship1 and (;) issuance of letters of administration. 's such, it as unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a ne spaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition as filed for the only reason stated in the motion for leave+ so that the Icase title can properly and appropriately capture or capsuli5e in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings1 thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this petition,I hich as for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent ho as their father. (n other ords, there being no change in the material allegations bet een the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in a ne spaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance ith the legal re0uirements of notice. Foreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitionerHs remedy is appeal from the orders complained of under Section 6(f), Rule 6@C of the Rules of #ourt, not certiorari and prohibition. "ot satisfied ith the decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals, petitioner comes to this #ourt contending that the appellate court committed the follo ing errors+
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( T): P!?%(# R:SP,"$:"T #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S ER'8:%A '"$ S:R(,!S%A :RR:$ (" ),%$("E T)'T T): ,R(E("'% P:T(T(," ('nne. F, Petition) &'S F,R ' T&(" P!RP,S:, T, &(T+ F,R E!'R$('"S)(P '"$ F,R ("T:ST'T: :ST'T: PR,#::$("ES1 (( T): P!?%(# R:SP,"$:"T #,!RT 'PP:'%S S:R(,!S%A :RR:$ (" ),%$("E T)'T T):R: (S ", "::$ T, P!?%(S) T): 'F:"$:$ P:T(T(," F,R '$F("(STR'T(," ,F T): ("T:ST'T: :ST'T: T):R:?A #,"TR'8:"("E T): R!%:S ,F #,!RT '"$ T): R!%("ES ,F T): S!PR:F: #,!RT. ((( T): P!?%(# R:SP,"$:"T #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S S:R(,!S%A :RR:$ (" ",T "!%%(FA("E T): ,R$:RS ('nne. IPI to ITI) PR:#(P(T'T:%A (SS!:$ .B7'ART. ?A T): P!?%(# R:SP,"$:"T R:E(,"'% TR('% #,!RT (" T): ("T:ST'T: PR,#::$("ES &(T),!T PR(,R ):'R("E ,R ",T(#: T, ):R:(" P:T(T(,":R T):R:?A $:PR(8("E T): %'TT:R ('"T,"(:TT' E'R#(' 8$'. $: #)!' ) ,F $!: PR,#:SS '"$ ,PP,RT!"(TA T, ?: ):'R$. (8 T): P!?%(# R:SP,"$:"T #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S ER'8:%A :RR:$ (" S&::P("E%A ),%$("E T)'T P:T(T(,":RHS R:F:$A (S 'PP:'%. 10 (n support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the #ourt of 'ppealsH conclusion that the original petition as one for guardianship and administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand, asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the 2urisdictional facts re0uired by the Rules of #ourt in petitions for administration of a decedentHs estate, such as+ (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death1 (b) names, ages and residences of the heirs1 and (c) the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private respondentHs alleged admission that the original petition as one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of administration, pointing to the ,pposition to the Fotion to $ismiss dated ;@ Duly 6CC;, here the private respondent alleged. 6. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner ho are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto %. #hua and under Section 6, Rule C; of the Rules of #ourt the venue shall be at the place here the minor resides. 16 as ell as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the ;< Duly 6CC; hearing on the motion to dismiss+ 'TTA. R:"$,"+ &e filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is a petition for guardianship of minors& not for intestate proceedings . So this is a case here the mother anted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the litigant here. ?ecause henever there is an intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and under the Rules of #ourt in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is at the place here the minor is actually residing. 11 The petition is devoid of merit. The title alone of the original petition clearly sho s that the petition is one petition reads+ hich includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said
(" R:+ P:T(T(," F,R $:#%'R'T(," ,F ):(RS)(PS, E!'R$('"S)(P ,8:R T): P:RS," '"$ PR,P:RT(:S ,F F(",RS R,?:RT, '%,"L, '"$ R!$A'R$ '%,"L,, all surnamed #)!' and (SS!'"#: ,F %:TT:RS ,F '$F("(STR'T(,". 14 %i/e ise, the prayer of the petition states+ ;. That %etters of 'dministration be issued to herein petition for the administration of the estate of the deceased R,?:RT, %(F #)!'. The original petition also contains the 2urisdictional facts re0uired in a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Section ;, Rule >C of the Rules of #ourt reads+ Sec. ;. #ontents of petition for letters of administration J ' petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must sho , so far as /no n to the petitioner+ (a) jurisdictional facts1 (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedentH (c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate1.
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(d) The name of the person for hom letters of administration are prayed1 %ut no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration . (emphasis ours). The 2urisdictional facts re0uired in a petition for issuance of letters of administration are+ (6) the death of the testator1 (;) residence at the time of death in the province here the probate court is located1 and (=) if the decedent as a non*resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province here the court is sitting. 15 &hile paragraph < of the original petition stating+ (<) That Roberto %im #hua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; in $avao #ity. failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the omission no reads+ as cured by the amended petitions herein the same paragraph
(<) That Roberto %im #hua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of #otabato #ity and died intestate on Fay ;7, 6CC; at $avao #ity. 20 (:mphasis in the original.) 'll told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts re0uired to be stated in the petition for letters of administration. #onse0uently, there need to publish the amended petition as petitioner ould insist in her second assignment of errors. as no
?e that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as creditor or other ise. The Rules are e.plicit on ho may do so+ Sec. <. ,pposition to petition for administration J 'ny interested person, may by filing a ritten opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of the person for hom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestantHs o n right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.. ,nly an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. 'n interested person is one ho ould be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one ho has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor1 his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent. 21 Petitioner as not able to prove her status as the surviving ife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage bet een man and ife is a marriage contract hich 'ntonietta #hua failed to produce. The lo er court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate hich she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together ith other orthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its ;6 'ugust 6CC; ,rder that+ . . . Transfer #ertificates of Title, Residence #ertificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so hen the petitioner has submitted a certification from the %ocal #ivil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage as not registered and a letter from the 2udge alleged to have solemni5ed the marriage that he has not solemni5ed said alleged marriage. . . . 22 !nder her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its orders, 'nne.es IPI to ITI depriving her of due process. ithout prior hearing or notice to her, thus,
The orders referred to by petitioner are+ ,rder dated =6 'ugust 6CC; appointing Romulo %im !y, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the estate1 ,rder dated =6 'ugust 6CC; appointing private respondent as guardian over the person and property of the minors1 ,rder dated B 'ugust 6CC=, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from $avao #ity to #otabato #ity1 ,rder dated 9 September 6CC= directing petitioner to turn over a Fitsubishi Eallant car o ned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator1 and ,rder dated ;7 September 6CC=, authori5ing the sheriff to brea/ open the deceasedHs house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the properties found therein, after the sheriff as refused entry to the house by the driver and maid of petitioner. 'part from the fact that petitioner as not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the deceased, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or other ise, petitioner categorically stated in the instant petition that on ;B ,ctober 6CC= she filed a motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial court and another motion dated B 'ugust 6CC= praying that the proceedings conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions ere denied by the trial court in its ,rder dated ;; "ovember ;6, 6CC= and that on =@ "ovember 6CC= she filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial hich in turn as denied by the trial court on 6= $ecember 6CC=. $ue process as designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual hearing should al ays and indispensably be held. 23 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 24 )ere, even granting that the petitioner as not notified of the orders of the trial court mar/ed as :.hibits IPI to IT,I inclusive, nonetheless, she as duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a Imistrial,I hich motions ere denied in the ,rder dated ;; "ovember 6CC=. 20 ' motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial as also duly heard by the trial court but as denied in its ,rder of 6= $ecember 6CC=. 26 $enial of due process cannot be successfully invo/ed by a party ho has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 21 's to the last assignment of errors, e agree ith the #ourt of 'ppeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in said court as an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari1 hich can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and ade0uate remedy in the ordinary course of la . :.cept
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for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal prohibition is arranted.
ould be inade0uate, nothing on record
ould indicate that e.traordinary remedy of certiorari or
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the #ourt of 'ppeals treating the Special Proceeding "o. ==6 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling in /ome2 vs. Amperial, 24 hich the petitioner 0uotes+ The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding hich the heirs are at liberty to initiate. PetitionerHs reliance on said case is misplaced. (n the /ome2 case, the action before the lo er court as merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the 2urisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. &hile in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court as both for guardianship and settlement of estate. (" 8(:& ,F T): F,R:E,("E, the petition of petitioner 'ntonietta #hua is hereby denied. S, ,R$:R:$.
*arvasa& #.,.& Romero and 'urisima& ,,.& concur.
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E.R. "o. 6B6;<=
'pril =@, ;@@7
%,%(T' R. '%'F'AR(, petitioner, vs. R,FF:%, :%F:R, :R&(", R,(%:R and 'F'"$', all surnamed P'?'%:, respondents.
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?efore this #ourt is a Petition for Revie on #ertiorari 6 under Rule <B of the Rules of #ourt filed by petitioner %olita R. 'lamayri ('lamayri) see/ing the reversal and setting aside of the $ecision,; dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. #8 "o. B76==1 as ell as the Resolution, = dated 6C $ecember ;@@6 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned $ecision. The #ourt of 'ppeals, in its assailed $ecision, upheld the validity of the $eed of 'bsolute Sale, dated ;@ February 6C7<, e.ecuted by "elly S. "ave ("ave) in favor of siblings Rommel, :lmer, :r in, Roiler and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (sub2ect property) in #alamba, %aguna, covered by Transfer #ertificate of Title (T#T) "o. T*==6> (;>9@<)1 and, thus, reversed and set aside the $ecision, < dated ; $ecember 6CC>, of the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of Pasay #ity, ?ranch 66C in #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#. B The ; $ecember 6CC> $ecision of the RT# declared null and void the t o sales agreements involving the sub2ect property entered into by "ave ith different parties, namely, Sesinando F. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings1 and ordered the reconveyance of the sub2ect property to 'lamayri, as "ave-s successor*in*interest. There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined by the #ourt of 'ppeals to be as follo s+ This is a #omplaint for Specific Performance ith $amages filed by Sesinando F. Fernando, representing S.F. Fernando Realty #orporation RFernandoS on February 9, 6C7< before the Regional Trial #ourt of #alamba, %aguna presided over by Dudge Salvador P. de Eu5man, Dr., doc/eted as #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*# against "elly S. "ave R"aveS, o ner of a parcel of land located in #alamba, %aguna covered by T#T "o. T*==6> (;>9@<). RFernandoS alleged that on Danuary =, 6C7<, a hand ritten ICasunduan $a 'agbibilihanI (#ontract to Sell) as entered into by and bet een him and R"aveS involving said parcel of land. )o ever, R"aveS reneged on their agreement hen the latter refused to accept the partial do n payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not ant to sell her property to him anymore. RFernandoS prayed that after trial on the merits, R"aveS be ordered to e.ecute the corresponding $eed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorney-s fees, litigation e.penses and damages. R"aveS filed a Fotion to $ismiss averring that she could not be ordered to e.ecute the corresponding $eed of Sale in favor of RFernandoS based on the follo ing grounds+ (6) she as not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper RFernandoS handed to her for her signature on Danuary =, 6C7<. &hen she as informed that it as for the sale of her property in #alamba, %aguna covered by T#T "o. T*==6> (;>9@<), she immediately returned to RFernandoS the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. )er repudiation as further bolstered by the fact that hen RFernandoS tendered the partial do n payment to her, she refused to receive the same1 and (;) she already sold the property in good faith to Rommel, :lmer, :r in, Roller and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale Rthe Pabale siblingsS on February ;@, 6C7< after the complaint as filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Foreover, she alleged that RFernandoS has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.F. Fernando Realty #orporation ho is not a party to the alleged #ontract to Sell. :ven assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still, RFernandoS cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being no evidence to sho that he as duly authori5ed to do so. Subse0uently, Rthe Pabale siblingsS filed a Fotion to (ntervene alleging that they are no the land o ners of the sub2ect property. Thus, the complaint as amended to include Rthe Pabale siblingsS as party defendants. (n an ,rder dated 'pril ;<, 6C7<, the trial court denied R"ave-sS Fotion to $ismiss prompting her to file a Fanifestation and Fotion stating that she as adopting the allegations in her Fotion to $ismiss in ans er to RFernando-sS amended complaint. Thereafter, R"aveS filed a Fotion to 'dmit her 'mended 'ns er ith #ounterclaim and #ross*claim praying that her husband, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo be impleaded as her co*defendant, and including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she as made to appear as ido hen in fact she as very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. $espite the opposition of RFernandoS and Rthe Pabale siblingsS, the trial court admitted the aforesaid 'mended 'ns er ith #ounterclaim and #ross*claim. Still unsatisfied ith her defense, R"aveS and 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a Fotion to 'dmit Second 'mended 'ns er and 'mended Reply and #ross*claim against Rthe Pabale siblingsS, this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on $ecember ;, 6C7B by $ra. 8irginia P. Panlasigui, F. '., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same as denied by the court a 8uo. R"aveS filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in #riminal #ase "o. 6=@7*7B*# entitled IPeople vs. "elly S. "aveI she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all hether the contract entered into by R"aveS ith respect to the sub2ect property is null and void, the Second 'mended 'ns er and 'mended Reply and #ross*claim against Rthe Pabale siblingsS should be admitted. ?efore the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in this case as suspended sometime in 6C7> in vie of the filing of a Petition for Euardianship of R"aveS ith the Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch =9 of #alamba, %aguna, doc/eted as SP "o. 6<9*79*# ith 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo as the petitioner. ,n Dune ;;, 6C77, a $ecision as rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of hich reads+ I!nder the circumstances, specially since "elly S. "ave ho no resides ith the ?rosas spouses has categorically refused to be e.amined again at the "ational Fental )ospital, the #ourt is constrained to accept the "euro*Psychiatric :valuation report dated 'pril 6<, 6C79 submitted by $ra. "ona Dean 'lviso*Ramos and the supporting report dated 'pril ;@, 6C7> submitted by $r. :duardo T. Faaba, both of the "ational Fental )ospital and hereby finds "elly S. "ave an incompetent ithin the purvie of Rule C; of the Revised Rules of #ourt, a person ho, by reason of age, disease, ea/ mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot ithout
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outside aid ta/e care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and e.ploitation, said condition having become severe since the year 6C7@. She and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship. 'tty. %eonardo #. Paner is hereby appointed as her regular guardian ithout need of bond, until further orders from this #ourt. !pon his ta/ing his oath of office as regular guardian, 'tty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the pending cases of "elly S. "ave ith the end in vie of protecting her interests from the pre2udicial sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure made by Fs. Eilda Fendo5a*,ng, and in recovering her lost 2e elries and monies and other personal effects. S, ,R$:R:$.I ?oth RFernandoS and Rthe Pabale siblingsS did not appeal therefrom, hile the appeal interposed by spouses Duliano and :vangelina ?rosas as dismissed by this #ourt for failure to pay the re0uired doc/eting fees ithin the reglementary period. (n the meantime, R"aveS died on $ecember C, 6CC;. ,n September ;@, 6CC=, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo, R"ave-sS sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, e.ecuted an 'ffidavit of Self*'d2udication pertaining to his inherited properties from R"aveS. ,n account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a rit of e.ecution of the $ecision dated Dune ;;, 6C77 in SP "o. 6<9*79*# (petition for guardianship) as filed by 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo on February 6<, 6CC9 ith the court a 8uo. RThe Pabale siblingsS filed their ,pposition to the motion on grounds that (6) they ere not made a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the $ecision therein1 and (;) that the validity of the $eed of 'bsolute Sale e.ecuted by the late R"aveS in their favor as never raised in the guardianship case. The case as then set for an annual conference. ,n Danuary C, 6CC>, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a motion see/ing the court-s permission for his substitution for the late defendant "elly in the instant case. "ot long after the parties submitted their respective pre*trial briefs, a motion for substitution as filed by %olita R. 'lamayre (sic) R'lamayriS alleging that since the sub2ect property as sold to her by 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo as evidenced by a $eed of 'bsolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. (n refutation, 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo filed a Fanifestation stating that hat he e.ecuted is a $eed of $onation and not a $eed of 'bsolute Sale in favor of R'lamayriS and that the same as already revo/ed by him on Farch B, 6CC>. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied. ,n Duly ;C, 6CC>, the court a 8uo issued an ,rder declaring that it cannot ma/e a ruling as to the conflicting claims of R'lamayriS and 'tty. 8edasto Eesmundo. 'fter the case as heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its $ecision on $ecember ;, 6CC>, the dispositive portion of hich reads+ I&):R:F,R:, 2udgment is hereby rendered as follo s+ 6. $eclaring the hand ritten #ontract to Sell dated Danuary =, 6C7< e.ecuted by "elly S. "ave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect1 ;. $eclaring the $eed of 'bsolute Sale dated February ;@, 6C7< e.ecuted by "elly S. "ave in favor of the RPabale siblingsS similarly null and void and of no force and effect1 =. Recogni5ing Fs. %olita P. R'lamayriS as the o ner of the property covered by T#T "o. 666;<C of the land records of #alamba, %aguna1 <. ,rdering the RPabale siblingsS to e.ecute a transfer of title over the property in favor of Fs. %olita P. R'lamayriS in the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and void1 B. ,rdering the RPabale siblingsS to surrender possession over the property to Fs. R'lamayriS and to account for its income from the time they too/ over possession to the time the same is turned over to Fs. %olita R'lamayriS, and thereafter pay the said income to the latter1 9. ,rdering RFernandoS and the RPabale siblingsS, 2ointly and severally, to pay Fs. R'lamayriS+ a. attorney-s fees in the sum of P=@,@@@.@@1 and b. the costs.9 S.F. Fernando Realty #orporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal ith the #ourt of 'ppeals, doc/eted as #'*E.R. #8 "o. B76==, solely to 0uestion the portion of the ; $ecember 6CC> $ecision of the RT# ordering him and the Pabale siblings to 2ointly and severally pay 'lamayri the amount of P=@,@@@.@@ as attorney-s fees. The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in #'*E.R. #8 "o. B76== averring that the RT# erred in declaring in its ; $ecember 6CC> $ecision that the $eed of 'bsolute Sale dated ;@ February 6C7< e.ecuted by "ave in their favor as null and void on the ground that "ave as found incompetent since the year 6C7@. The #ourt of 'ppeals, in its $ecision, dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, granted the appeals of S.F. Fernando Realty #orporation and the Pabale siblings. (t ruled thus+
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&):R:F,R:, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. F. Fernando Realty #orporation, represented by its President, Sesinando F. Fernando as ell as the appeal interposed by Rommel, :lmer, :r in, Roller and 'manda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby ER'"T:$. The $ecision of the Regional Trial #ourt of Pasay #ity, ?ranch 66C in #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*# is hereby R:8:RS:$ and S:T 'S($: and a ne one rendered upholding the 8'%($(TA of the $eed of 'bsolute Sale dated February ;@, 6C7<. "o pronouncements as to costs.> 'lamayri sought reconsideration of the afore*0uoted $ecision of the appellate court, invo/ing the $ecision, 7 dated ;; Dune 6C77, of the RT# in the guardianship proceedings, doc/eted as SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, hich found "ave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 6C7@1 and thus appointed 'tty. %eonardo #. Paner as her guardian. Said $ecision already became final and e.ecutory hen no one appealed therefrom. 'lamayri argued that since "ave as already 2udicially determined to be an incompetent since 6C7@, then all contracts she subse0uently entered into should be declared null and void, including the $eed of Sale, dated ;@ February 6C7<, hich she e.ecuted over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings. 'ccording to 'lamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RT# in its ;; Dune 6C77 $ecision in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, having participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Dose Pabale. She pointed out that the RT# e.plicitly named in its orders Dose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on =@ ,ctober 6C7> and 6C "ovember 6C7> in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#. 'lamayri thus filed on ;6 "ovember ;@@6 a Fotion to Schedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence so she could mar/ and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Dose Pabale. 'tty. Eesmundo, "ave-s surviving spouse, li/e ise filed his o n Fotion for Reconsideration of the 6@ 'pril ;@@6 $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'* E.R. #8 "o. B76==, asserting "ave-s incompetence since 6C7@ as found by the RT# in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, and his right to the sub2ect property as o ner upon "ave-s death in accordance ith the la s of succession. (t must be remembered that 'tty. Eesmundo disputed before the RT# the supposed transfer of his rights to the sub2ect property to 'lamayri, but the court a 8uo refrained from ruling thereon. (n a Resolution, dated 6C $ecember ;@@6, the #ourt of 'ppeals denied for lac/ of merit the Fotions for Reconsideration of 'lamayri and 'tty. Eesmundo. )ence, 'lamayri comes before this #ourt via the present Petition for Revie assignment of errors+ on #ertiorari under Rule <B of the Rules of #ourt, ith the follo ing
( T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S :RR:$ (" ),%$("E T)'T T): F("$("E T)'T ":%%A S. "'8: &'S ("#,FP:T:"T (" SP:#('% PR,#::$("E ",. 6<9*79*# ," D!": ;;, 6C77 #'"",T R:TR,'#T T, 'FF:#T T): 8'%($(TA ,F T): $::$ ,F S'%: S): :T:#!T:$ ," F:?R!'RA ;@, 6C7< (" F'8,R ,F R:SP,"$:"TS P'?'%:S. (( T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S :RR:$ (" ),%$("E T)'T T): $:#(S(," (" SP:#('% PR,#::$("E ",. 6<9*79*# $'T:$ D!": ;;, 6C77 (S ",T ?("$("E ," R:SP,"$:"TS P'?'%:S. ((( T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S :RR:$ (" $:"A("E P:T(T(,":R-S F,T(," T, S#):$!%: ):'R("E T, F'RM $,#!F:"T'RA :T)(?(TS (" :8($:"#: T, :ST'?%(S) T): ($:"T(TA ,F D,S: P'?'%: 'S T): F'T):R ,F R:SP,"$:"TS P'?'%:S. C (t is 'lamayri-s position that given the final and e.ecutory $ecision, dated ;; Dune 6C77, of the RT# in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# finding "ave incompetent since 6C7@, then the same fact may no longer be re*litigated in #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of 2udgment. This #ourt is not persuaded. Res judicata literally means Ia matter ad2udged1 a thing 2udicially acted upon or decided1 a thing or matter settled by 2udgment.I Res judicata lays the rule that an e.isting final 2udgment or decree rendered on the merits, and ithout fraud or collusion, by a court of competent 2urisdiction, upon any matter ithin its 2urisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other 2udicial tribunal of concurrent 2urisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 6@ (t is espoused in the Rules of #ourt, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section <>, Rule =C, hich read+ S:#. <>. :ffect of 2udgments or final orders. The effect of a 2udgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having 2urisdiction to pronounce the 2udgment or final order, may be as follo s+ .... (b) (n other cases, the 2udgment or final order is, ith respect to the matter directly ad2udged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive bet een the parties and their successors in interest by title subse0uent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity1 and
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(c) (n any other litigation bet een the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been ad2udged in a former 2udgment or final order hich appears upon its face to have been so ad2udged, or hich as actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The doctrine of res judicata thus lays do n t o main rules hich may be stated as follo s+ (6) The 2udgment or decree of a court of competent 2urisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a ne action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal1 and (;) 'ny right, fact, or matter in issue directly ad2udicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in hich a 2udgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein and cannot again be litigated bet een the parties and their privies hether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or sub2ect matters of the t o suits are the same. These t o main rules mar/ the distinction bet een the principles governing the t o typical cases in hich a 2udgment may operate as evidence.66(n spea/ing of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and hich corresponds to the afore*0uoted paragraph (b) of Section <>, Rule =C of the Rules of #ourt, is referred to as Ibar by former 2udgmentI1 hile the second general rule, hich is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is /no n as Iconclusiveness of 2udgment.I The Resolution of this #ourt in #alalang v. Register of Deeds provides the follo ing enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of 2udgment+ The doctrine res judicata actually embraces t o different concepts+ (6) bar by former 2udgment and (b) conclusiveness of 2udgment. The second concept J conclusiveness of 2udgment J states that a fact or 0uestion hich as in issue in a former suit and as there 2udicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent 2urisdiction, is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity ith them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action bet een such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent 2urisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, hile the 2udgment remains unreversed by proper authority. (t has been held that in order that a 2udgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action bet een the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. (f a particular point or 0uestion is in issue in the second action, and the 2udgment ill depend on the determination of that particular point or 0uestion, a former 2udgment bet een the same parties or their privies ill be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or 0uestion as in issue and ad2udicated in the first suit (*abus vs. #ourt of Appeals, 6C= S#R' >=; R6CC6S). (dentity of cause of action is not re0uired but merely identity of issues. Dustice Feliciano, in $mith %ell D #ompany ('hils.!& Anc. vs. #ourt of Appeals (6C> S#R' ;@6, ;6@ R6CC6S), reiterated 9ope2 vs. Reyes (>9 S#R' 6>C R6C>>S) in regard to the distinction bet een bar by former 2udgment hich bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of 2udgment hich bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation bet een the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or 0uestions hich ere in issue and ad2udicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected ith the sub2ect matter of the litigation. Thus, it e.tends to 0uestions necessarily implied in the final 2udgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters ere directly referred to in the pleadings and ere not actually or formally presented. !nder this rule, if the record of the former trial sho s that the 2udgment could not have been rendered ithout deciding the particular matter, it ill be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions bet een the parties and if a 2udgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the 2udgment itself.6; 'nother case, Orope2a 5ar)eting #orporation v. Allied %an)ing #orporation, further differentiated bet een the t o rules of res judicata, as follo s+ There is =+#- +y !-io- B).%'ent= hen, as bet een the first case here the 2udgment as rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$2 $)+Bect '#tte-2 #n. c#)$e$ o* #ction . (n this instance, the 2udgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. ,ther ise put, the 2udgment or decree of the court of competent 2urisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation bet een the parties, as ell as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a ne action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. ?ut here t&e-e i$ i.entity o* !#-tie$ in the first and second cases, +)t no i.entity o* c#)$e$ o* #ction, the first 2udgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata /no n as=conc )$i,ene$$ o* B).%'ent.= Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly ad2udicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in hich 2udgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the 2udgment therein and cannot again be litigated bet een the parties and their privies hether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or sub2ect matter of the t o actions is the same.6= (n sum, conclusiveness of 2udgment bars the re*litigation in a second case of a fact or 0uestion already settled in a previous case. The second case, ho ever, may still proceed provided that it ill no longer touch on the same fact or 0uestion ad2udged in the first case. #onclusiveness of 2udgment re0uires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action. #ontrary to 'lamayri-s assertion, conclusiveness of 2udgment has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues bet een SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# and #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#. No identity of parties SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# as a petition filed ife "ave alleging her incompetence. ith the RT# by 'tty. Eesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late
' guardian may be appointed by the RT# over the person and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person Isuffering the penalty of civil interdiction or ho are hospitali5ed lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb ho are unable to read and rite, those ho are of unsound mind,
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even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, ea/ mind, and other similar causes, cannot, ithout outside aid, ta/e care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and e.ploitation.I 6< Rule C= of the Rules of #ourt governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to R) e 53 APPOINTMENT OF 8UARDIANS SECTION 1. -ho may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. 'ny relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent ho has no parent or la ful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having 2urisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. 'n officer of the Federal 'dministration of the !nited States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ard thereof, and the $irector of )ealth, in favor of an insane person ho should be hospitali5ed, or in favor of an isolated leper. SEC. 2. #ontents of petition. ' petition for the appointment of a general guardian must sho , so far as /no n to the petitioner+ (a) The 2urisdictional facts1 (b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient1 (c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care1 (d) The probable value and character of his estate1 (e) The name of the person for hom letters of guardianship are prayed. The petition shall be verified1 but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship. SEC. 3. #ourt to set time for hearing. *otice thereof. &hen a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fi. a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 6< years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given. SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. 'ny interested person may, by filing a ritten opposition, contest the petition on the ground of ma2ority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for hom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition. SEC. 0. (earing and order for letters to issue. 't the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be sho n that the re0uired notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in 0uestion is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, ith the po ers and duties hereinafter specified. .... SEC. 4. $ervice of judgment. Final orders or 2udgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city here the minor or incompetent person resides or here his property or part thereof is situated. ' petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, ithout the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. 'ccordingly, SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# bears the title+ An re@ /uardianship of *elly $. *ave for Ancompetency& +erdasto /esmundo y %anayo& petitioner , ith no named respondentGs. Sections ; and = of Rule C= of the Rules of #ourt, though, re0uire that the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing ithin the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition. The ob2ectives of an RT# hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule C= of the Rules of #ourt is to determine, first, hether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent ho has no capacity to care for himself andGor his properties1 and, second, ho is most 0ualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people ho best could help the trial court settle such issues ould be those ho are closest to and most familiar ith the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living ithin the same province andGor the persons caring for him. (t is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be li/e ise identified and notified. The reason is simple+ because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. (t is almost a given, and understandably so, that they ill only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and /eep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply there ith. it+
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)ence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings ere given notice and actually too/ part in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#. They are not "ave-s relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. 'lthough the rules allo the RT# to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it as not established that the RT# actually did so in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#. 'lamayri-s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# rests on t o ,rders, dated =@ ,ctober 6C7> 6B and 6C "ovember 6C7>,69 issued by the RT# in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, e.pressly mentioning the presence of a Dose Pabale, ho as supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. )o ever, the said ,rders by themselves cannot confirm that Dose Pabale as indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he as authori5ed by his children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf. 'lamayri decries that she the Pabale siblings. as not allo ed by the #ourt of 'ppeals to submit and mar/ additional evidence to prove that Dose Pabale as the father of
(t is true that the #ourt of 'ppeals has the po er to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling ithin its original and appellate 2urisdiction, including the po er to grant and conduct ne trials or further proceedings. (n general, ho ever, the #ourt of 'ppeals conducts hearings and receives evidence !-io- to the submission of the case for 2udgment. 6> (t must be pointed out that, in this case, 'lamayri filed her Fotion to Schedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence on 21 No,e'+e- 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Dose Pabale, not only after #'*E.R. #8 "o. B76== had been submitted for 2udgment, but #*te- the #ourt of 'ppeals had already promulgated its $ecision in said case on 10 A!-i 2001. The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for 2udgment. ,nly under e.ceptional circumstances may the court receive ne evidence after having rendered 2udgment167 other ise, its 2udgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein ith further evidence. 'lamayri failed to provide any e.planation hy she did not present her evidence earlier. Ferely invo/ing that the ends of 2ustice ould have been best served if she as allo ed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to 2ustify deviation from the general rules of procedure. ,bedience to the re0uirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to e.pect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot 2ustly be rationali5ed by har/ing on the policy of liberal construction.6C Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the ad2udication of cases. #ourts and litigants ali/e are thus en2oined to abide strictly by the rules. 'nd hile the #ourt, in some instances, allo s a rela.ation in the application of the rules, this, e stress, as never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules ith impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under 2ustifiable causes and circumstances. &hile it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is e0ually true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance ith the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of 2ustice. ;@ Foreover, contrary to 'lamayri-s assertion, the #ourt of 'ppeals did not deny her Fotion to Schedule )earing to Far/ :.hibits in :vidence merely for being late. (n its Resolution, dated 6C $ecember ;@@6, the #ourt of 'ppeals also denied the said motion on the follo ing grounds+ &hile it is no alleged, for the first time, that the Rherein respondents Pabale siblingsS participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Dose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, Rherein petitioner 'lamayriS submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind Rthe Pabale siblingsS as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he represented them before the #alamba #ourt.;6 's the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence 'lamayri anted to submit do prove that the Dose Pabale ho attended the RT# hearings on =@ ,ctober 6C7> and 6C "ovember 6C7> in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# as the father of the Pabale siblings, they ould still not confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. &orth stressing is the fact that Dose Pabale as not at all a party to the $eed of Sale dated ;@ February 6C7< over the sub2ect property, hich as e.ecuted by "ave in favor of the Pabale siblings. &ithout proper authority, Dose Pabale-s presence at the hearings in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the sub2ect property. Since it as not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, then any finding therein should not bind them in #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#. No identity of issues "either is there identity of issues bet een SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# and #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*# that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of 2udgment, from ruling on "ave-s competency in 6C7<, hen she e.ecuted the $eed of Sale over the sub2ect property in favor the Pabale siblings. (n SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, the main issue as hether "ave the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate. as incompetent at the time of filing of the petition ith the RT# in 6C79, thus, re0uiring
(n the cross*claim of "ave and 'tty. Eesmundo against the Pabale siblings in #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#, the issue as hether "ave as an incompetent hen she e.ecuted a $eed of Sale of the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings on ;@ February 6C7<, hence, rendering the said sale void. &hile both cases involve a determination of "ave-s incompetency, it must be established at t o separate times, one in 6C7< and the other in 6C79. ' finding that she as incompetent in 6C79 does not automatically mean that she as so in 6C7<. (n #arillo v. ,aojoco,;; the #ourt ruled that despite the fact that the seller as declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the e.ecution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she as so hen she e.ecuted the contract. )ence, the significance of the t o*year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since "ave-s mental condition in 6C79 may vastly differ from that of 6C7< given the intervening period. #apacity to act is supposed to attach to a person ho has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved1 that is, that at the moment of his acting he as incapable, cra5y, insane, or out of his mind. ;= The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person ho alleges it1 if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity ill be presumed.;<
=>
"ave as e.amined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 6C79, hen the RT# started hearing SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#1 and she as not 2udicially declared an incompetent until ;; Dune 6C77 hen a $ecision in said case as rendered by the RT#, resulting in the appointment of 'tty. %eonardo #. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 6C79, "ave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the $eed of Sale over the sub2ect property, hich she e.ecuted in favor of the Pabale siblings on ;@ February 6C7<. The burden of proving other ise falls upon 'lamayri, hich she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the ;; Dune 6C77 $ecision of the RT# in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#. 'lamayri capitali5es on the declaration of the RT# in its $ecision dated ;; Dune 6C77 in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# on "ave-s condition Ihaving become severe since the year 6C7@.I ;B 6)t t&e-e i$ no +#$i$ *o- $)c& # .ec #-#tion. The medical reports e.tensively 0uoted in said $ecision, prepared by+ (6) $r. "ona Dean 'lviso*Ramos, dated 6< 'pril 6C79, ;9 and (;) by $r. :duardo T. Faaba, dated ;@ 'pril 6C7>, ;> both stated that upon their e.amination, "ave as suffering from Iorganic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis ith psychotic episodes,I hich impaired her 2udgment. There as nothing in the said medical reports, ho ever, hich may shed light on hen "ave began to suffer from said mental condition. 'll they said as that it e.isted at the time "ave as e.amined in 6C79, and again in 6C7>. :ven the RT# 2udge as only able to observe "ave, hich made him reali5e that her mind as very impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions hen "ave visited the court from 6C7> to 6C77. )ence, for this #ourt, the RT# $ecision dated ;; Dune 6C77 in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# may be conclusive as to "ave-s incompetency from 6C79 on ards, but not as to her incompetency in 6C7<. 'nd other than invo/ing the ;; Dune 6C77 $ecision of the RT# in SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*#, 'lamayri did not bother to establish ith her o n evidence that "ave as mentally incapacitated hen she e.ecuted the ;@ February 6C7< $eed of Sale over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed void. 'll told, there being no identity of parties and issues bet een SP. PR,#. "o. 6<9*79*# and #ivil #ase "o. 9>B*7<*#, the ;; Dune 6C77 $ecision in the former on "ave-s incompetency by the year 6C79 should not bar, by conclusiveness of 2udgment, a finding in the latter case that "ave still had capacity and as competent hen she e.ecuted on ;@ February 6C7< the $eed of Sale over the sub2ect property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the #ourt of 'ppeals did not commit any error hen it upheld the validity of the ;@ February 6C7< $eed of Sale. @:EREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Revie is hereby DENIED. The $ecision, dated 6@ 'pril ;@@6, of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. #8 "o. B76==, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. #osts against the petitioner %olita R. 'lamayri. SO ORDERED.
MINITA ;. C:ICO-NA?ARIO 'ssociate Dustice
=7
E.R. "o. %*7B=;
,ctober 66, 6CB>
Euardianship of Dames :. Stegner, et al., minors, D!'"(T' T. ST:E":R, petitioner. P)(%(PP(": TR!ST #,., guardian*appellee, vs. #'T):R(": ST:E":R and F(%$R:$ ST:E":R, oppositors*appellants.
"eria& 5anglapus and Associates for appellee. 5arcelino 9onto) and 5arcelino 9onto)& ,r.& for oppositors.
F:%(T, ,.+
This is an appeal from an order of the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila approving the consolidated statement of accounts filed by the Philippine Trust #ompany as guardian of the properties of the minors Dames, )enry, Ruth, #atherine and Fildred, all surnamed Stegner, and releasing said guardian from its responsibilities. The facts of the case are as follo s+ &.'. Stegner, a citi5en of the !nited States, provisions+ as at the time of his demise a resident of Pamplona, #agayan. )e left a ill containing the follo ing
(, &. '. Stegner, a la ful age, a resident of the municipality of Pamplona, Province of #agayan, Philippine (slands, and a citi5en of the !nited States of Finnesota, !nited States of 'merica, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting under undue influence or restrained of any /ind, do hereby ma/e, publish, and declare this to be my last ill and testament, hereby revo/ing all other ills and testamentary dispositions by me made. ... ... ((( ( give, devise and be0ueth unto the e.ecutor and trustee hereafter named absolutely and in fee simple and of my property, real, personal and mi.ed of every /ind, nature and description hatsoever, of hich ( may sei5ed or possesses or to hich ( may be in any manner entitled, or in any manner interested at the time of my death in trust ho ever, for the use and purposes hereinafter set out and same other, giving unto my said e.ecutor and trustee full po er and authority to sell any of the property, real or personal, sub2ect to the trust hereby created, and to invest and reinvest the proceeds of any said sales, in such manner as my said e.ecutor and trustee my deem proper, all ithout the legal restrictions other ise applicable to trustee1 to borro money for the benefit of the trust1 to sell, lease, mortgage, pledge, improve or e.change any property, real or personal, hold hereunder for such price and upon such terms and conditions as may be seen advisable1 and to deal on behalf of the trust ith any subsidiary or affiliate, ithout increase of liability and as freely as though dealing ith an independent third party. ... ... (8 ( nominate and appoint the Philippine Trust #ompany e.ecutor of the trustee under this my last ill and testament to serve ithout bond and as guardian of my children Dames of my children Dames :. Stegner, )enry E. Stegner, Ruth ). Stegner, and #atherine Stegner. This testator seems to have left the follo ing properties+ #ash #ert. "o. @9=79, Serie I#I, for 6 share of I%a !rbanaI at P;@@ per share #ert. "o. @9CC9, Serie I#I, for 6 share of I%a !rbanaI, at P;@@ per share #ert. "o. @>6<@, Serie I#I, for 6 share of I%a !rbanaI, at P;@@ per share #ert. "o. @C696, Serie I$I, for three shares of I%a !rbanaI, at P;@@ per share ('ccount receivable)* ?alance of Promissory "ote dated Fay 6@, 6C=B, e.ecuted by I%a Eran2a, (nc.,I in favor of &. '. Stegner T,T'% 'SS:TS P67,C>;.79 ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ ;@@.@@ 9@@.@@ 6@,@@@.@@ P;9,9>;.79, ... ...
and in addition thereto, the minors ere to receive monthly pensions from the !. S. 8eterans 'dministration. 'lthough there is no evidence on record, the decision of the trial #ourt states that the said ill of &. '. Stegner as duly admitted to probate and this statement as never refuted by any of the parties. ,n "ovember 66, 6C=9, Duanita T. Stegner, ido of the deceased and mother of the minors, petitioned the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila for the issuance in her favor of letters of guardianship over the person and properties of her children, hich petition as granted by the #ourt in its order of "ovember 6=, 6C=9, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in the sum of PB@@. The 8eterans 'dministration, ho ever, recommended that the guardianship over the properties be placed in the hands of a solvent trust company doing business in Fanila.
=C
The Philippine Trust #ompany thereafter filed a petition, hich as later amended, praying that in vie of the ill of &. '. Stegner appointing said company as guardian for the estates of the minors, letters of guardianship for the properties of Dames, )enry, Ruth, #atherine and Fildred Stegner be issued upon in its favor, and upon agreement of the parties, the #ourt set aside its previous order and appointed Duanita T. Stegner as guardian over the persons of the minors and the Philippine Trust #ompany as guardian of their properties. Dames :. Stegner reached the age of ma2ority and as conse0uently released from guardianship by order of the #ourt of Farch ;7, 6C<6, but it appears that he and his sister Ruth ere /illed by the Dapanese in 6C<B. The remaining ards under guardianship having reached the age of ma2ority, the Philippine Trust #ompany on Fay ;9, 6CB=, filed a final consolidated statement of account and petition for discharge containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursement made covering the period from Dune 6, 6C<;, to Fay ;@, 6CB=, in the case of )enry Stegner1 from Dune 6, 6C<6 to Fay ;@, 6CB= in the case of Ruth, #atherine and Fildred Stegner. (t also sho ed that the amount of P6B,66>.;C in Dapanese military notes hich as invalidated by :.ecutive ,rders "os. ;B and <C as deducted from the balance of P69,;7;.=; remaining in favor of the ards1 that the participation in the notes of the %a Eran2a, (nc., had been eliminated upon discovery that the balance of the same as duly paid for on Danuary <, 6C<@, and as correspondingly noted in the inventory account of Duly 9, 6C<@, hich as approved by the #ourt on 'ugust ;C of the same year1 that the value of the participation in the %a !rbana as reduced from P=,;@@ to P<@@ in vie of the fact that P;,7@@ had already been paid on 'pril 6;, 6C=7, as stated in the inventory account dated Dune ;C, 6C=7, and duly approved by order of the #ourt of "ovember =, 6C<71 that the company as entitled to B per cent of the total amount received by said guardian as fees. (t as, therefore, prayed that the statement of accounts be approved1 that it be authori5ed to collect the sum of P<67.>> as fees or commission and the amount of P<=>.=6 as attorneyHs fees1 that it be authori5ed to deliver the state of the deceased Ruth Stegner to her brother )enry and sisters #atherine and Fildred, in e0ual shares1 that the residuary estates of the ards be delivered to them1 that it be relieved from further responsibility as such guardian, and that the proceedings be declared closed and terminated. #atherine and Fildred Stegner opposed this petition alleging, among others, that although the guardianship commenced in 6C=>, the consolidated statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust #ompany started only from 6C<61 that it did not e.plain hy the minors should be pre2udiced by the sum of P6B,66>.;C allegedly invalidated1 that despite the absence of previous 2udicial authori5ation, the company invested the funds of the ards in the mortgage loans1 that said loans ere not contested by the ards hen they ere informed of the same because they ere still minors at the time1 that as the loans ere in the name of the Philippine Trust #ompany and not in the names of #atherine and Fildred Stegner, these ards should not be pre2udiced by the payments made by the mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P6B,66>.;C hich as declared invalidated. They also assailed the validity of :.ecutive ,rders "os. ;B and <C on the ground that they ere illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, oppositors ob2ected to the items listed as the companyHs commission, attorneyHs fees, the miscellaneous disbursements allegedly incurred for the ards1 and charged that the Philippine Trust #ompany did not e.ercise the diligence of a good father of a family to protect the interests of the minors ith respect to the participation in %a Eran2a and %a !rbana and hich negligence resulted in the loss of PC,C@@ belonging to said minors. Thus, they as/ed the #ourt to disapprove the statement of accounts submitted by the company and that it be ordered to present a ne one ith the ob2ected items eliminated. ,n Duly ;C, 6CB<, the #ourt issued an order finding the opposition interposed by #atherine and Fildred Stegner as groundless and approved the statement of accounts submitted by the Philippine Trust #ompany, authori5ing the collection of its commission and attorneyHs fees1 and delivery to the ards )enry, #atherine, and Fildred Stegner of their respective residuary estates. The motion for the reconsideration of said order filed by oppositors having been denied for lac/ of merit, the matter as brought to this #ourt on appeal. #onsolidating the related 0uestions raised by oppositors, the main issue in the instant case is hether the Philippine Trust #ompany could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the ards made ithout securing the previous authori5ation of the #ourt and hich resulted in the loss of P6B,66>.;C. (n defense of its actuation, petitioner*appellee contends that it relied on the provisions on trust corporations, specifically Section 6=C of the #orporation %a (repealed by Republic act "o. ==>, /no n as the Eeneral ?an/ing 'ct) hich provides that deposits or moneys received by a trust corporation as guardian or trustee can be loaned and invested in accordance ith the provisions governing loans and investments of savings and mortgage ban/s, unless other ise directed by the instrument creating the trust. 'ppellants, on the other hand, maintain that the properties of the ards ere received by the guardian in a fidei commissary capacity hich parta/es of the nature of aI commodatumI for the benefit of said minors, thus re0uiring court authori5ation before said funds could be invested. 'lthough the conte.t of the ill of &. '. Stegner unmista/ably conveys the testatorHs intention to create a trust and ma/e the Philippine Trust #ompany a trustee, it must be remembered that upon said companyHs application and by agreement of the parties, the #ourt in its order of February ;=, 6C=>, appointed the Philippine Trust #ompany as guardian (not as trustee) of the properties of the minors, and there is no sho ing either that hen the ill of &. '. Stegner as presented and allo ed to probate in case "o. <C6>@ of the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila, appellee as appointed as such trustee. )aving assumed office as IguardianI of the properties of the ards, the company should be governed, in the management of the funds of said minors, by the provisions of the Rules of #ourt on guardianship and not by the rules on trust corporations under the #orporation %a . Petitioner*appellee, ho ever, asserts that although it did not secure previous 2udicial approval of those investments, they ere included in the annual accountings hich ere passed upon by the court from time to time. (n support of such contention, the 8ice*president of the Philippine Trust #ompany too/ the itness at and and testified that for the investments made in the mortgage of the Tambunting ?rothers, the 8eterans 'dministration hen notified offered no ob2ection and recommended approval thereof, and such investment as approved by the #ourt on Duly ;;, 6C=C1 that the investments in the mortgages of #adsa an and T. de 8era ere included in the inventory of Duly 9, 6C<@ and duly approved by the #ourt on ,ctober ;C,6C<@ ithout ob2ection from the 8eterans 'dministration1 that on Farch 7, 6C<6, the guardian filed a final accounting and a petition for discharge ith respect to Dames Stegner himself confronted in riting. This final accounting hich included the investments in the mortgages of Tambunting, and D. Pic/ering and #o. as approved by the order of the #ourt on Farch ;7, 6C<61 that on Duly 66,6C<;, an inventory as again filed ith the ritten conformity of the 8eterans 'dministration in it appeared that certain amounts ere invested in the mortgage of the Servants of the )oly Ehost and that of D. Pic/ering P #o., hich inventory as approved by the #ourt on 'ugust <, 6C<61 and that on Dune 6;, 6C<= an inventory ith respect to )enry Stegner as filed herein it sho ed that he had been paid his share of the investments in the mortgages and hich accounting as duly approved by the #ourt on Dune >, 6C<=. The itness testified that in all these cases the mother and guardian over the persons of the minors, Duanita T. Stegner, as duly furnished copies of the accounting and apparently she offered no ob2ection hatsoever. (t as further brought out that the interests accruing out of such investments ere duly credited to the ards and formed pact of their funds from hich they made ithdra als every no and then. :vidence as also presented to prove that the corresponding mortgage participation certificates, specifying the amounts invested, ere issued in the names of the ards (:.hibits '*6, '*;, '*=, ?*;, #*6, $*6, $*;, :*6). (t is to be noted in this connection that the mortgages of #adsa an and Pic/ering ere settled and paid prior to the outbrea/ of the ar and they are not 0uestioned in this case. The mortgages of the Tambunting brothers, Servants of the )oly Ehost, T. de 8era, )ermoso and Francisco, hich ere also e.ecuted before the ar ere not yet due hen the Dapanese forces invaded the Philippines, and soon after their occupation of Fanila the Dapanese
<@
Filitary #ommand ordered the mortgage debtors of almost all ban/s herein established to settle their obligations immediately. This, undoubtedly, cause the mortgagors mentioned above to pay the balance of the respective debts in Dapanese military notes, hich as then the legal tender, amounting to P6B,66>.;C, hich after the liberation of the island as declared invalidated by :.ecutive ,rders "os. ;B and <C. Section B, Rule C9 of the Rules of #ourt, provides that+ S:#. B. #,!RT F'A ,R$:R ("8:STF:"T ,F PR,#::$S '"$ $(R:#T F'"'E:F:"T ,F :ST'T:. J The #ourt may authori5e and re0uire the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his ardHs money in his hands, in real estate or other ise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may ma/e such orders for the management investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may re0uire. 'lthough the authority reffered to in this Section may not have been secured prior to the investment of the properties of funds of the ard, yet &e believe that the courtHs approval of the annual inventories and accounts submitted by the guardian, ith the conformity andGor ac0uiescence of the !. S. 8eterans 'dministration and the mother of the minors, herein the 0uestioned investment as mentioned and accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance ith the provisions of section B, Rule C9 aforecited. Passing upon the same 0uestion arising out of practically the same set of facts, this #ourt, spea/ing through #hief Dustice Ricardo Paras, held+ (t is not necessary for us to pass upon the applicability of section 6=C of 'ct "o. 6<BC, because e hold that, under section B of Rule C9 of the Rules of #ourt, the investments in 0uestion ere valid and binding upon appellantHs ard. (t is note orthy that in the four previous inventory accounts filed by the appellant ith the lo er court , the mortgage loans e.tended by the appellant and the interest collected thereon ere plainly reported1 . . .&e are the opinion that this approval had the effect of impliedly validating appellantHs acts and ma/ing them binding upon its ard J (Philippine Trust #o. vs. ?allesteros, C7 Phil., 6@@>). 'side from the fact that the participations in %a Eran2a and %a !rbana ere duly included in the accounts approved by the #ourt and hich &e hold to be unassailable, &e find no merit in the imputation of negligence on the guardian ith respect to said assets after ta/ing into consideration the satisfactory e.planations made by said guardian. &herefore, the order of the #ourt, a 8uo of Duly ;C, 6CB<, appealed from is hereby affirmed, ithout pronouncement as to costs. (t is so ordered.
%eng2on& 'aras& #.,.& 'adilla& 5ontemayor& Reyes& A.& %autista Angelo& 9abrador& #oncepcion and .ndencia& ,,.& concur.
<6
CA.M. No. RT9-55-1441. Se!te'+e- 212 2000D S!o)$e$ LEONARDO DARACAN #n. MA. TERESA DARACAN2 petitioners2 vs. 9UD8E ELI 8.C. NATI;IDAD2 RTC2 6-#nc& 442 S#n Fe-n#n.o2 P#'!#n%#2 respondent. RESOLUTION 7NARES-SANTIA8O2 J.3 ,n $ecember 67, 6CC7, the ,ffice of the #hief Dustice received from the Spouses Fa. Teresa $aracan and %eonardo $aracan a letter* complaintR6S against Dudge :li E.#. "atividad, Presiding Dudge of the Regional Trial #ourt of San Fernando, Pampanga, ?ranch <7 for gross ignorance of the la , oppression, gross partiality and /no ingly rendering an un2ust order for issuance of a rit of preliminary attachment R;S relative to Special Proceedings "o. <67= entitled 3(n the Fatter of the Petition for Euardianship of the Spouses %oren5o E. Francisco and %oren5a $. Francisco.4 R=S The complaint receipt.R<S as indorsed to the ,ffice of the #ourt 'dministrator (,#') hich re0uired respondent to comment ithin ten (6@) days from
(n compliance ith the ,#' directive, respondent filed his comment on Fay ;7, 6CC7 RBS praying for the dismissal of the complaint. Respondent Dudge alleges that the rit is the sub2ect of a petition for certiorari filed in the #ourt of 'ppeals hich as doc/eted as #'*E.R. SP "o. <969C. Respondent Dudge also claims that contrary to the allegations of complainants*spouses, they ere made involuntary parties of the proceedings prior to the issuance of the rit of attachment by the filing of the Fotion to #ite Spouses $aracan for :.amination dated "ovember ;6, 6CC>. R9S The records disclose that in a decision dated Farch <, 6CC7 R>S in #'*E.R. SP "o. <969C, the #ourt of 'ppeals held that the lo er court clearly e.ceeded its 2urisdiction in issuing the rit of preliminary attachment since the case pending ith the respondent court as for guardianship and not an action falling under any of the grounds enumerated in Section 6, Rule B> of the 6CC> Rules of #ourt. R7S ' petition for revie as subse0uently filed ith the #ourt doc/eted as E.R. "o. 6=<@;> entitled 3 5a. .lissa +ele2& et al. v. #A& et al.E )o ever, the same as thereafter dismissed and the decision therein became final and e.ecutory on Danuary 6=, 6CCC. (n its evaluation and report dated 'pril 6;, 6CCCRCS the ,#' recommended that * 6.S the case be doc/eted as a regular administrative case1 ;.S the parties be re0uired to manifest if they are illing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed1 and thereafter, should they e.press their illingness that the same be done1 =.S respondent Dudge :li #. "atividad be declared guilty of Eross (gnorance of the %a and that he be fined in the amount of P=,@@@.@@1 and <.S respondent be en2oined to e.ercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a 2udge of a similar offense ill be dealt ith more severely. ith a arning that a repetition
(n a Resolution dated Dune ;=, 6CCC, R6@S the #ourt resolved to+ aS doc/et the case as a regular administrative matter1 and bS re0uire the parties to manifest if they are illing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed ithin ten (6@) days from notice. (n a Fanifestation dated ,ctober 6;, 6CCC,R66S respondent Dudge manifested his illingness to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. )o ever, earlier in a Resolution dated ,ctober 9, 6CCC, R6;S the #ourt considered its Resolution dated Dune ;=, 6CCC served upon complainants hen the same as returned unserved by the postmaster ith a notation 3moved.4 (n a Resolution dated "ovember ;C, 6CCC,R6=S the #ourt noted respondent-s manifestation of ,ctober 6;, 6CCC and referred the case to #ourt of 'ppeals 'ssociate Dustice Salvador D. 8alde5, Dr. for investigation, report and recommendation ithin ninety (C@) days from notice. Thereafter, Dustice 8alde5 submitted a Report and Recommendation dated 'pril 6;, ;@@@ summing the facts thus+ The spouses Fa. Teresa and %eonardo $aracan charged Dudge :li E.#. "atividad, Presiding Dudge of the Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch <7, San Fernando, Pampanga, ith gross ignorance of the la , oppression, gross partiality and /no ingly rendering RanS un2ust order, all for issuing a rit of preliminary attachment in Sp. Proc. "o. <67=, entitled 3(n the Fatter of the Petition for Euardianship of the Spouses %oren5o E. Francisco and %oren5a $. Francisco.4 The complainants alleged that on "ovember ;6, 6CC>, upon motion of the court*appointed guardian, %ina Francisco*8ele5, the respondent Dudge issued the sub2ect rit of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are not parties to the guardianship proceedings. (n pursuance of the rit, an order to brea/ open as issued and, thus, $eputy Sheriff :dgardo Labat of RT#, San Fernando, Pampanga, forced open their department store at midnight on "ovember ;9, 6CC> and once inside, ransac/ed, looted and appropriated the merchandise found therein ith a value of not less than P9 million ithout ma/ing an inventory. The complainants furthermore averred that 3rumors had it that the issuance of the rit of attachment as ... for a consideration.4R6<S Subse0uently, on Farch <, 6CC7, the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. SP "o. <969C, entitled+ 3 $pouses 9eonardo Daracan and 5a. Teresa Daracan& 'etitioners vs. (on. .ly (sic! /.#. *atividad& etc.& et al.& RespondentsE declared null and void the rit of preliminary attachment on the finding that the respondent 2udge 3clearly e.ceeded (his) 2urisdiction4 in issuing it. R6BS ' petition for revie on certiorari as thereafter filed ith the Supreme #ourt but the same as dismissed.R69S :.plaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondent 2udge pleaded R6>S that he thought all along that under Section 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of #ourt, he could issue the 0uestioned rit to protect and preserve the rights of the ards in the light of the s orn assertion of the guardian, %ina Francisco*8ele5, that the complainants ere indebted to her ards, ho ere already senile, to the tune of PB million1 that even as the complainants had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to re0uire them to appear for e.amination as debtors of her ards and against hom she (guardian) had initiated the filing of si. (9) informations for violation of ?.P. ?lg. ;;, they (complainants) did not appear to oppose the issuance of the rit of preliminary attachment1 that the department store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same, R67S as located at the Franda Fall, a building o ned by the ards1 and that the opening of the store and the attachment of the items found therein, hich ere all inventoried, contrary to the claim of the complainants, ere done in the presence of a senior police inspector and a )agawad of the barangay.

R6CS
<;
Respondent 2udge vehemently denied having committed any fraud, dishonesty or corruption. )e put for ard the submission that, if at all, he merely committed an error of 2udgment and set forth the prayer that+ &):R:F,R:, it is respectively prayed, and considering that the Respondent Dudge ill be retiring on "ovember ;7, 6CCC and ho has reached the age of al/ing under the shado of death and has no other means in life to support his remaining years of his life e.cept the benefits he may be given by the government for his duties or services, and for humanitarian reasons, the case be dismissed.4 R;@S 't the ensuing investigation, the complainants never appeared despite substituted service R;6S and service by mailR;;S on them of the notices of investigation. ,nly the respondent 2udge appeared and after his oral motion to dismiss R;=S had been denied,R;<She adduced evidence as heretofore recapped. Dustice 8alde5 differed ith the findings of the ,#' that respondent 2udge be fined and arned that similar transgressions in the future dealt ith more severely and instead recommended that the charges against him be dismissed for lac/ of merit, reasoning thus+ Re+ The charges for gross ignorance of the law and or !nowingly rendering un"ust order or "udgment. Section 9, Rule C9 of the 6C9< Revised Rules of #ourt under hich the respondent 2udge issued the 0uestioned rit of preliminary in2unction provides+ ould be
Sec. 9. 'roceeding when persons suspected of embe22ling or concealing property of ward. 7 !pon complaint of the guardian or ard, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ard as creditor, heir or other ise, that anyone is suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed a ay any money, goods or interest or a ritten instrument, belonging to the ard or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for e.amination, touching such money, goods, interest or instrument and ma/e such orders as ill secure the estate against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance. (n the leading case of #ui vs. 'iccio&FGHIthe foregoing rule as construed as follo s+ . . . its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed a ay any personal property of the ard. (n such proceeding the court has no authority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. (f after the e.amination the court finds sufficient evidence sho ing o nership on the part of the ard, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action. . . . . . . . . .R;9S . . . the 2urisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embe55led, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ard for the purpose of obtaining information hich may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ard1 and that only in e.treme cases, here property clearly belongs to the ard or here his title thereto has already been 2udicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.R;>S ,n the other hand, the respondent 2udge 2ustified the disputed rit of preliminary in2unction he issued in this ise+ The legal guardian filed a verified Fotion To #ite Spouses %eonardo and Teresa $aracan To 'ppear For :.amination and Fanifestation &ith Supplemental Fotion praying that upon filing of these pleadings a rit of preliminary attachment be issued. (t appears from the verified motion that the spouses %eonardo and Faria Teresa $aracan is ( sic) indebted to the (PB,@@@,@@@.@@). ards amounting to Five Fillion Pesos
That hen the said spouses as ( sic) as (sic! charged by the ardRsS through the legal guardian of 8iolation of ?.P. ;;, said spouses started concealing and ta/ing a ay all the assets real and personal in order to pre2udice the ards and considering that the obligation or indebtedness as incurred through fraud, they have been concealing and disposing the property in order to avoid and frustrate the intention of the ardRsS to attach preliminarily their petition. (t as also alleged that Spouses $aracan are leasing a place located at the Franda Fall ?uilding o ned by the Franda #orporation of hich the ards are the ma2ority stoc/holders. )o ever, they have been deliberately and by stealth removing all the ares and goods in the said Samut Sari $epartment Store in order to pre2udice the said ards, their creditors. &):R:F,R:, a rit of preliminary attachment is hereby issued in this case in order to stop the further concealment or disposal of the assets of RtheS Spouses $aracan in order to pre2udice the ards herein as their creditors upon RtheS filing of a bond in the amount of three hundred thousand pesos (P=@@,@@@.@@), let a rit of preliminary attachment be issued in this case directing and ordering the $eputy Sheriff of this #ourt to sei5e all the personal properties of the Spouses $aracan andGor real estate ithin the Province of Pampanga, for safe/eeping not to e.ceed F(8: F(%%(," P:S,S (PB,@@@,@@@.@@) until further orders from this #ourt. S, ,R$:R:$.R;7S (t is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the #ourt of 'ppeals, the respondent 2udge 3clearly e.ceeded RhisS 2urisdiction4 in issuing the rit. (narguably, a guardianship court e.ercises but a limited 2urisdiction that cannot e.tend to the determination of 0uestions of o nership. 'part from that, the ?.P. ?lg. ;; cases filed by the ards against the herein complainants can not be utili5ed by the respondent 2udge as basis for the issuance of the rit simply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over hich he as then presiding. Similarly, the fact that herein complainants ere deliberately and by stealth removing all their ares and goods from their store to the pre2udice of the ards to hom they (complainants) ere
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indebted to the tune of PB million is entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings1 and the guardian-s remedy the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a rit of attachment. ?e that as it may, the mind feels ill at ease to conclude that respondent 2udge is guilty of gross ignorance of the la order. For it has been held that+
as to institute a collection suit against
or of /no ingly rendering an un2ust
. . . if every error of the 2udge should be punished, then perhaps no 2udge, ho ever good, competent, honest and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary ithout a blemished record and a tarnished image.R;CS (n Dela #ru2 v. #oncepcion&F43I later reiterated in -ingarts v. ,udge $ervillano 5. 5ejia&R=6S this #ourt had the occasion to e.pound on the nature and the isdom behind the t in charges of gross ignorance of the la andGor /no ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment. There e declared thus+ To constitute gross ignorance of the la , the sub2ect decision, order or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to e.isting la and 2urisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. (n the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent as thus motivated. Mno ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. 's a crime, it is punished under 'rt. ;@< of the Revised Penal #ode the elements of hich are+ (a) the offender is a 2udge1 (b) he renders a 2udgment in a case submitted to him for decision1 (c) the 2udgment is un2ust1 and (d) the 2udge /no s that his 2udgment is un2ust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an un2ust 2udgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, /no ing it to be un2ust. 'n un2ust 2udgment is one hich is contrary to la or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an un2ust 2udgment may be error or ill* ill. There is no liability at all for a mere error. (t is ell*settled that a 2udicial officer, hen re0uired to e.ercise his 2udgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error hich he commits, provided he acts in good faith. ?ad faith is therefore the ground of liability. (f in rendering 2udgment the 2udge fully /ne that the same as un2ust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. 's interpreted by Spanish courts, the term 3/no ingly4 means sure /no ledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an in2ustice. Fere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the la does not constitute the crime. The nature of the administrative charge of /no ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this particular administrative charge, it must be established that respondent Dudge rendered a 2udgment or decision not supported by la andGor evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive.R=;S True it is that subse0uently, the far stricter norm of allo ing only permissible margins of error has been adopted, thus+ &e need not belabor 2urisprudence to accommodate respondent-s argument hich in effect posits that not every 2udicial error bespea/s ignorance of the la and that, if committed in good faith, does not arrant administrative sanction. So e have ruled and so e have acted, but only in cases ithin the parameters of tolerable 2udgment. &here, ho ever, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the la hich, hopefully, as not merely feigned to subserve an un orthy purpose. R==S ,nly recently, ho ever, the doctrine of bad faith as the ground for accountability has again come to fore. Fr. Dustice %eonardo '. Nuisumbing rote+ . . . To establish her guilt, it is indispensable that the chec/s she issued for hich she as subse0uently charged, be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of /no ingly issuing a chec/ ith insufficient funds. #learly, it as error to convict the complainant on the basis of her letter alone. "evertheless, despite this incorrect interpretation of a rule of evidence, e do not find the same as sufficiently constitutive of the charges of gross ignorance of the la and of /no ingly rendering an un2ust decision. Rather, it is at most an error in 2udgment, for hich, as a general rule, he cannot be held administratively liable. (n this regard, e reiterate the prevailing rule in our 2urisdiction as established by current 2urisprudence+ &e have heretofore ruled that a 2udge may be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To un2ustifiably hold other ise, assuming that he has erred, ould be nothing short of harassment and ould ma/e his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the la in the process of administering 2ustice can be infallible in 2udgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. (t is only in this latter instance, hen the 2udge acts fraudulently or ith gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this #ourt. 's a matter of public policy then, the acts of a 2udge in his official capacity are not sub2ect to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Eood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in hich a 2udge charged ith ignorance of the la can find refuge. 'nd in a later case, Fr. Dustice Nuisumbing as even more trenchant hen he said+ The other charges, namely ignorance of the la and issuing an un2ust 2udgment, deserve consideration since the direct contempt order of respondent 2udge, under the attending circumstances it as issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading as not submitted to respondent but filed in another court presided by another 2udge stationed in #ebu literally miles a ay from here respondent holds court in %eyte. 's this #ourt ruled in Ang vs. #astro@ !se of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular 2udge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or 2udge as to interrupt the administration of 2ustice.
<<
)o ever, administrative liability for ignorance of the la andGor /no ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a 2udge issuing a decisionGresolutionGorder later ad2udged to be erroneous. ,ther ise, perhaps no 2udge, ho ever competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the 2udiciary ith an unblemished record. For liability to attach for ignorance of the la , the assailed order, decision or actuation of the 2udge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he as moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other li/e motive. Similarly, a 2udge ill be held administratively liable for rendering an un2ust 2udgment * one hich is contrary to la or 2urisprudence or is not supported by evidence * hen he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. #n fine$ bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. Conversely$ a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an un"ust "udgment will not prosper against a "udge acting in good faith. %bsent the element of bad faith$ an erroneous "udgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses$ mere error of "udgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.C34D (n the case on hand, there is not a scintilla of evidence, not even any remote indication, that the respondent 2udge, in issuing his erroneous rit of preliminary attachment, as impelled by ill* ill, malice, revenge, personal animosity, impulse to do an in2ustice, greed, corrupt consideration or any other similar motive. ,n the contrary, the testimony of the respondent stands out unrebutted because of the failure of the complainants to appear despite due notice. )e declared that he does not /no and had never seen the complainants before. R=BS )e as prompted to issue the assailed rit of attachment only * ?ecause these spouses $aracan ere renting a big store in the Franda Fall o ned and operated by the ardRsS ho are no senile. That is the reason hy ( granted the petition for 2udicial guardianship. 'nd hen they learned that the ards ho are the spouses are no longer handling the business in the mall, and there-s already a legal guardian, they too/ a ay the most valuable items of their big store dealing in dry goods and the store as then $amuJt $ari and they left ithout paying any rentals, ithout paying their obligation amounting to several millions of pesos padloc/ed the store and they only left old stoc/s hich are almost valueless and, in fact, the items sei5ed by the sheriff is ( sic) intact in the office of the sheriff and despite the notice issued by the sheriff for them to retrieve the same in vie of the fact that the preliminary rit of attachment as dissolved, they failed to do so. R=9S and that * . . . ( have been very careful in dealing ith this matter as ( as on the verge of retiring at that time. (n fact, my last or/ing day fell on "ovember ;9, 6CCC. 'nd on that very day hen ( attended the last day of my public service, that as the time that ( suffered the heart attac/ and ( as hospitali5ed at the )eart #enter for t o months and until no , ( am still under observation and medication and convalescing from my complicated disease, because my disease ere pulmonary disease (sic). ( suffer pleurisy of the lungs. )o ever, my /idney again functioned so the dialysis stopped and the only disease no that ( am suffering is the lung disease and the pulmonary disease. That is all, Aour )onor.R=>S The respondent 2udge furthermore e.plained that he as of the impression that the portion of Section 9, Rule C9 of the Revised Rules of #ourt reading 3ma/e such orders as ill secure the estate against such embe55lement, concealment or conveyance4 authori5ed him to issue the rit of attachment to preserve the status 8uo and the real rights of the ards.R=7S !nder the obtaining circumstances, it is apropos to 0uote Dustice Nuisumbing once more+ 3(t ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he ho alleges the same has the onus of proving it. (n this regard, the complainants have not discharged that burden of proof . . ..4R=CS Re+ The charges of oppression and gross partiality. Similarly, there is no factual support to the charges of oppression and partiality. 'nd again, this is for the reason that the complainants, instead of presenting evidence, had played truant from the investigation. The #ourt finds the recommendation of Dustice 8alde5 ell*ta/en. 'nent the charges of gross ignorance of the la and /no ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order, the #ourt in #anson v. /architorenaR<@S restated the oft*0uoted dictum that+ 3R'Ss a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a 2udge in his 2udicial capacity are generally not sub2ect to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.4 R<6S (n the recent case of $antos v. ,udge Orlino&R<;S e held+ The fundamental propositions governing responsibility for 2udicial error ere more recently summari5ed in An Re@ ,oa8uin T. %orromeo.R<=S There the #ourt stressed, inter alia& that given the nature of 2udicial function and the po er vested in the Supreme #ourt and the lo er courts established by la , administrative or criminal complaints are neither alternative nor cumulative to 2udicial remedies here such are available, and must ait on the result thereof. :.isting doctrine is that 2udges are not liable for hat they do in the e.ercise of their 2udicial functions hen acting ithin their legal po ers and 2urisdiction.R<<S #ertain it is that a 2udge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. R<BS To hold other ise ould render 2udicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the fact or interpret the la in the process of administering 2ustice can be infallible in his 2udgment.R<9S The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred ith evident bad faith.R<>S Stated succinctly, for administrative liability to attach it must be established that respondent other motiveR<7S and as defined * as moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
?ad faith does not simply connote bad 2udgment or negligence1 it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obli0uity and conscious doing of a rong1 a breach of a s orn duty through some motive or intent or ill* ill1 it parta/es of the nature of fraud. R<CS (t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating ith furtive design or some motive of self*interest or ill* ill for ulterior purposes. RB@S :vident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do rong or cause damage.RB6S
<B
The record is devoid of any sho ing that respondent 2udge as moved by ill* ill or bad faith in issuing the rit of preliminary attachment. #omplainants have not, in fact, adduced any proof to sho that bad faith attended the issuance of the assailed order. To reiterate, bad faith is not presumed and he ho alleges the same has the onus of proving it. RB;S 8ie ed vis7K7vis the fact that complainants 3played truant to the investigation4 instead of presenting evidence to substantiate their charges, the complaint becomes reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. #oncededly, administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence. (t needs be pointed out, ho ever, that the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still sub2ect to limitations imposed by the fundamental re0uirement of due process. (ndeed, 3RTShe Rules even in an administrative case, demand that, if the respondent 2udge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct /no ledge.RB=S The 2udiciary to hich the respondent belongs demands no less. ?efore any of its members could be faulted, it should only be after the presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.4 RB<S To hold a 2udge liable for /no ingly rendering an un2ust 2udgment or order, it must be sho n beyond reasonable doubt that the 2udgment or order is un2ust and that it as made ith a conscious and deliberate intent to do an in2ustice. RBBS (n this regard, it is useful to reiterate the ruling in Ra8ui2a v. #astaneda& ,r.RB9S hich stressed that * The ground for the removal of a 2udicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule here the charges on hich the removal is sought is misconduct in office, illful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. the general rule in regard to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply. (n short, this #ourt can not give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. RB>S For the foregoing considerations, the allegations of oppression and gross partiality must li/e ise fall in the absence of factual support to substantiate the charges. @:EREFORE, based on the foregoing, the complaint filed by the Spouses %eonardo $aracan and Fa. Teresa $aracan against Dudge :li E.#. "atividad, Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch <7, San Fernando, Pampanga, is $(SF(SS:$ for lac/ of merit. SO ORDERED.
$avide, Dr., #.D., (#hairman), Puno, Mapunan, and Pardo, DD., concur.
Special Proceedings Finals E.R. "o. 69;B>6 Dune 6B, ;@@B
<9
'R":% %. 'E!ST(", petitioner , vs. ),". #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S '"$ F(",R F'RT(" D,S: PR,%%'F'"T:, R:PR:S:"T:$ ?A )(S F,T):RGE!'R$('" F: '"E:%' PR,%%'F'"T:, respondents.
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't issue in this petition for certiorari 6 is hether or not the #ourt of 'ppeals (#') gravely erred in e.ercising its discretion, amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, in issuing a decision ; and resolution= upholding the resolution and order of the trial court, < hich denied petitioner-s motion to dismiss private respondents- complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deo.yribonucleic acid ($"') paternity testing. Respondents Fe 'ngela and her son Fartin Prollamante sued Fartin-s alleged biological father, petitioner 'rnel %. 'gustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of Nue5on #ity, ?ranch 6@9.B (n their complaint, respondents alleged that 'rnel courted Fe in 6CC;, after hich they entered into an intimate relationship. 'rnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her =<th birthday on "ovember 6@, 6CCC. $espite 'rnel-s insistence on abortion, Fe decided other ise and gave birth to their child out of edloc/, Fartin, on 'ugust 66, ;@@@ at the #apitol Fedical )ospital in Nue5on #ity. The baby-s birth certificate as purportedly signed by 'rnel as the father. 'rnel shouldered the pre*natal and hospital e.penses but later refused Fe-s repeated re0uests for Fartin-s support despite his ade0uate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. 'rnel also denied having fathered the child. ,n Danuary 6C, ;@@6, hile Fe as carrying five*month old Fartin at the #apitol )ills Eolf and #ountry #lub par/ing lot, 'rnel sped off in his van, ith the open car door hitting Fe-s leg. This incident as reported to the police. (n Duly ;@@6, Fe as diagnosed ith leu/emia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. ,n Farch B, ;@@;, Fe and Fartin sued 'rnel for support.9 (n his amended ans er, 'rnel denied having sired Fartin because his affair and intimacy ith Fe had allegedly ended in 6CC7, long before Fartin-s conception. )e claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. 'rnel admitted that their relationship started in 6CC= but Ihe never really fell in love ith (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Dun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. 's a result, theirs as a stormy on*and*off affair. &hat started as a romantic liaison bet een t o consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction here (Fe) became so obsessed ith ('rnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ays and means to alienate (him) from his ife and familyU. !nable to bear the prospect of losing his ife and children, 'rnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shopI > here she or/ed. %ater on, 'rnel found out that Fe had another erst hile secret lover. (n Fay ;@@@, 'rnel and his entire family ent to the !nited States for a vacation. !pon their return in Dune ;@@@, 'rnel learned that Fe as telling people that he had impregnated her. 'rnel refused to ac/no ledge the child as his because their Ilast intimacy as sometime in 6CC7.I 7 :.asperated, Fe started calling 'rnel-s ife and family. ,n Danuary 6C, ;@@6, Fe follo ed 'rnel to the #apitol )ills Eolf and #ountry #lub par/ing lot to demand that he ac/no ledge Fartin as his child. 'ccording to 'rnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no Ialternative but to move on but ithout bumping or hitting any part of her body.I C Finally, 'rnel claimed that the signature and the community ta. certificate (#T#) attributed to him in the ac/no ledgment of Fartin-s birth certificate ere falsified. The #T# erroneously reflected his marital status as single hen he as actually married and that his birth year as 6C9B hen it should have been 6C9<. 6@ (n his pre*trial brief filed on Fay 6>, ;@@;, 'rnel vehemently denied having sired Fartin but e.pressed case.66 illingness to consider any proposal to settle the
,n Duly ;=, ;@@;, Fe and Fartin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to $"' paternity testing pursuant to Rule ;7 of the Rules of #ourt.6; 'rnel opposed said motion by invo/ing his constitutional right against self*incrimination. 6= )e also moved to dismiss the complaint for lac/ of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate as a forgery and that, under the la , an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recogni5ed by the putative father.6< (n his motion, 'rnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe ((.S. "os. @;*B>;= and @;*>6C;) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Fartin-s birth certificate (doc/eted as #ivil #ase "o. N*@;*<999C). )e attached the certification of the Philippine "ational Police #rime %aboratory that his signature in the birth certificate as forged. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to $"' paternity testing at the e.pense of the applicants. The #ourt of 'ppeals affirmed the trial court. Thus, this petition. (n a nutshell, petitioner raises t o issues+ (6) hether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (;) hether $"' paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support ithout violating petitioner-s constitutional right to privacy and right against self* incrimination.6B The petition is ithout merit. First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner-s motion to dismiss because the private respondents- complaint on its face sho ed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are+ (6) the plaintiff-s primary right and the defendant-s corresponding primary duty, and (;) the delict or rongful act or omission of the defendant, by hich the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.69
<>
(n the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations ith the petitioner, as a result of hich she gave birth to Fartin out of edloc/. (n his ans er, petitioner admitted that he had se.ual relations ith Fe but denied that he fathered Fartin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child-s conception and birth. (t is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there e.isted a se.ual relationship bet een 'rnel and Fe. The only remaining 0uestion is hether such se.ual relationship produced the child, Fartin. (f it did, as respondents have alleged, then Fartin should be supported by his father 'rnel. (f not, petitioner and Fartin are strangers to each other and Fartin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. Preliminaries aside, e no tac/le the main issues. Petitioner refuses to recogni5e Fartin as his o n child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the child-s birth certificate hich he purportedly signed as the father. )e also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the #ourt of 'ppeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, hich is supposedly proscribed by la . 'ccording to petitioner, Fartin, as an unrecogni5ed child, has no right to as/ for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under 'rticle ;7= 6> in relation to 'rticle ;9B 67 of the #ivil #ode and Section 6, Rule 6@B6C of the Rules of #ourt. The petitioner-s contentions are ithout merit. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allo ed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner ho had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of ac/no ledgement. ?ut even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition ith an action for support, such as valid and in accordance ith 2urisprudence. (n Tayag v. #ourt of Appeals&;@ e allo ed the integration of an action to compel recognition ith an action to claim one-s inheritance+ U(n 'aulino, e held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. &e also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had ac/no ledged and recogni5ed the illegitimate child because such ac/no ledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such ac/no ledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition hich cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in 'aulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of ac/no ledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. 'pplying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor #had #uyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, t&#t t&e t/o c#)$e$ o* #ction2 one to co'!e -eco%nition #n. t&e ot&e- to c #i' in&e-it#nce2 '#y +e Boine. in one co'! #int i$ not ne/ in o)- B)-i$!-).ence. 's early as R6C;;S e had occasion to rule thereon in %ri2 vs. %ri2& et al. (<= Phil. >9= R6C;;S) herein e said+
The 0uestion hether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a comple. action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one hich in the opinion of this court must be ans ered in the affirmative, provided al ays that the conditions 2ustifying the 2oinder of the t o distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In ot&e- /o-.$2 t&e-e i$ no #+$o )te nece$$ity -e()i-in% t&#t t&e #ction to co'!e #cEno/ e.%'ent $&o) . &#,e +een in$tit)te. #n. !-o$ec)te. to # $)cce$$*) conc )$ion !-io- to t&e #ction in /&ic& t&#t $#'e ! #inti** $eeE$ #..ition# -e ie* in t&e c&#-#cte- o* &ei- . #ertainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel ac/no ledgment as to re0uire that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . . . The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore e.plicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some e.tent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, /e &#,e &e . in n)'e-o)$ c#$e$2 #n. t&e .oct-ine ')$t +e con$i.e-e. /e $ett e.2 t&#t # n#t)-# c&i . &#,in% # -i%&t to co'!e #cEno/ e.%'ent2 +)t /&o &#$ not +een in *#ct e%# y #cEno/ e.%e.2 '#y '#int#in !#-tition !-ocee.in%$ *o- t&e .i,i$ion o* t&e in&e-it#nce #%#in$t &i$ co&ei-$ F F F1 and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . .. (n neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to sho a prior decree compelling ac/no ledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons ho might ta/e by inheritance are before the court1 and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (!nderscoring supplied) 'lthough the instant case deals ith support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. &hether or not respondent Fartin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. ' separate action ill only result in a multiplicity of suits, given ho intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag& the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. ,n the second issue, petitioner posits that $"' is not recogni5ed by this #ourt as a conclusive means of proving paternity. )e also contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against self*incrimination as guaranteed under the 6C7> #onstitution. These contentions have no merit. Eiven that this is the very first time that the admissibility of $"' testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical s/etch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning $"' testing is called for. (n the 6CCB case of 'eople v. Teehan)ee;6 here the appellant as convicted of murder on the testimony of three eye itnesses, e stated as an obiter dictum that I hile eye itness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the D*A test result(emphasis supplied).I ,ur faith in $"' testing, ho ever, as not 0uite so steadfast in the previous decade. (n 'e 9im v. #ourt of Appeals,;; promulgated in 6CC>, e cautioned against the use of $"' because I$"', being a relatively ne science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity ( ould) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and ritten, by the putative father.I
<7
;=
(n ;@@6, ho ever, e opened the possibility of admitting $"' as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. #ourt of Appeals+
' final note. Parentage ill still be resolved using conventional methods unless e adopt the modern and scientific ays available. Fortunately, e have no the facility and e.pertise in using $"' test for identification and parentage testing. The !niversity of the Philippines "atural Science Research (nstitute (!P*"SR() $"' 'nalysis %aboratory has no the capability to conduct $"' typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the $"' of a childGperson has t o (;) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The $"' from the mother, the alleged father and child are analy5ed to establish parentage. ,f course, being a novel scientific techni0ue, the use of $"' test as evidence is still open to challenge. :ventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of $"' evidence. For it as said, that courts should apply the results of science hen competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to re2ect said result is to deny progress. The first real brea/through of $"' as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine 2urisprudence came in ;@@; ith our en banc decision in 'eople v. +allejo;< here the rape and murder victim-s $"' samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused ere admitted in evidence. &e reasoned that Ithe purpose of $"' testing ( as) to ascertain hether an association e.ist(ed) bet een the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected ( ere) sub2ected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.I ' year later, in 'eople v. ,anson&;B e ac0uitted the accused charged ith rape for lac/ of evidence because Idoubts persist(ed) in our mind as to ho ( ere) the real malefactors. Aes, a comple. offense (had) been perpetrated but ho ( ere) the perpetratorsK )o e ish e had $"' or other scientific evidence to still our doubtsVI (n ;@@<, in Tecson& et al. v. #O5.9.#;9 here the #ourt en banc e stated+ as faced ith the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Dr.,
(n case proof of filiation or paternity ould be unli/ely to satisfactorily establish or ould be difficult to obtain, $"' testing, hich e.amines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. ' positive match ould clear up filiation or paternity. (n Ti2ing vs. #ourt of 'ppeals, this #ourt has ac/no ledged the strong eight of $"' testingU Foreover, in our en banc decision in 'eople v. 6atar&;> e affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape ith homicide, the principal evidence for hich included $"' test results. &e did a lengthy discussion of $"', the process of $"' testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the conte.t of our o n Rules of :vidence+ $eo.yribonucleic 'cid, or $"', is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. ' person-s $"' is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person-s lifetime1 the $"' in a person-s blood is the same as the $"' found in his saliva, s eat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, ear a., mucus, urine, s/in tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Fost importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no t o individuals have the same $"', ith the notable e.ception of identical t ins. ... ... ... (n assessing the probative value of $"' evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the follo ing factors+ ho the samples ere collected, ho they ere handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure follo ed in analy5ing the samples, hether proper standards and procedures ere follo ed in conducting the tests, and the 0ualification of the analyst ho conducted the tests. (n the case at bar, $r. Faria #ora5on 'bogado de !ngria as duly 0ualified by the prosecution as an e.pert itness on $"' print or identification techni0ues. ?ased on $r. de !ngria-s testimony, it as determined that the gene type and $"' profile of appellant are identical to that of the e.tracts sub2ect of e.amination. The blood sample ta/en from the appellant sho ed that he as of the follo ing gene types+ v&' 6BG6C, T)@6 >G7, $)FRP;CG6@ and #SF6P, 6@G66, hich are identical ith semen ta/en from the victim-s vaginal canal. 8erily, a $"' match e.ists bet een the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial. 'dmittedly, e are 2ust beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal 2ustice system, so e must be cautious as e traverse these relatively uncharted aters. Fortunately, e can benefit from the ealth of persuasive 2urisprudence that has developed in other 2urisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the !.S. has proven instructive. (n Daubert v. 5errell Dow (B@C !.S. B>C (6CC=)1 6;B %. :d. ;d <9C) it as ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it as relevant and reliable. Dudges, under Daubert, ere allo ed greater discretion over hich testimony they ould allo at trial, including the introduction of ne /inds of scientific techni0ues. $"' typing is one such novel procedure. !nder Philippine la , evidence is relevant hen it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its e.istence or non*e.istence. 'pplying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the $"' evidence obtained through P#R testing and utili5ing STR analysis, and hich as appreciated by the court a 8uo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology. Significantly, e upheld the constitutionality of compulsory $"' testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. (n that case, $"' samples from semen recovered from a rape victim-s vagina ere used to positively identify the accused Doel IMa itI Aatar as the rapist. Aatar claimed that the compulsory e.traction of his blood sample for $"' testing, as ell as the testing itself, violated his right against self*incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 6; and 6> of 'rticle ((( of the #onstitution. &e addressed this as follo s+ The contention is untenable. The /ernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self*incrimination is simply against the legal process of e.tracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. (t does not apply here the evidence sought to be e.cluded is not an incrimination but as part of ob2ect evidence.
<C
,ver the years, e have e.pressly e.cluded several /inds of ob2ect evidence ta/en from the person of the accused from the realm of self*incrimination. These include photographs,;7 hair,;C and other bodily substances.=@&e have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for omen accused of adultery, =6 e.pulsion of morphine from one-s mouth =; and the tracing of one-s foot to determine its identity ith bloody footprints.== (n ,imene2 v. #aLi2ares,=< e even authori5ed the e.amination of a oman-s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she as impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures ere, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them ere constitutionally sound. $"' testing and its results, per our ruling in 6atar,=B are no similarly acceptable. "or does petitioner-s invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. (n Ople v. Torres,=9 here identification system embodied in 'dministrative ,rder "o. =@7, e said+ e struc/ do n the proposed national computeri5ed
An no uncertain terms& we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good.. . (ntrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. )istorically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and sei5ures, => and the infringement of privacy of communication =7 here the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner-s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self*incrimination is in 2eopardy holds no ater. )is hollo invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any ay being violated. (f, in a criminal case, an accused hose very life is at sta/e can be compelled to submit to $"' testing, e see no reason hy, in this civil case, petitioner herein ho does not face such dire conse0uences cannot be ordered to do the same. $"' paternity testing first came to prominence in the !nited States, here it yielded its first official results sometime in 6C7B. (n the decade that follo ed, $"' rapidly found idespread general acceptance.=C Several cases decided by various State Supreme #ourts reflect the total assimilation of $"' testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. The case of -ilson v. 9umb<@ sho s that $"' testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme #ourt of St. %a rence #ounty, "e Aor/ allo ed a party ho had already ac/no ledged paternity to subse0uently challenge his prior ac/no ledgment. The #ourt pointed out that, under the la , specifically Section B69 of the "e Aor/ Family #ourt 'ct, the Family #ourt e.aminer had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order $"' tests+<6 W B69*a. 'c/no ledgment of paternity. (a) 'n ac/no ledgment of paternity e.ecuted pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services la or section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health la shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such ac/no ledgment must be reduced to riting and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health la ith the registrar of the district in hich the birth occurred and in hich the birth certificate has been filed. "o further 2udicial or administrative proceedings are re0uired to ratify an unchallenged ac/no ledgment of paternity. (b) 'n ac/no ledgment of paternity e.ecuted pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services la or section four thousand one hundred thirty*five*b of the public health la may be rescinded by either signator-s filing of a petition ith the court to vacate the ac/no ledgment ithin the earlier of si.ty days of the date of signing the ac/no ledgment or the date of an administrative or a 2udicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in hich either signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the Idate of an administrative or a 2udicial proceedingI shall be the date by hich the respondent is re0uired to ans er the petition. 'fter the e.piration of si.ty days of the e.ecution of the ac/no ledgment, either signator may challenge the ac/no ledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mista/e of fact, ith the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary ac/no ledgment. U!on -ecei,in% # !#-tyG$ c&# en%e to #n #cEno/ e.%'ent2 t&e co)-t $&# o-.e- %enetic '#-Ee- te$t$ o- DNA te$t$ *o- t&e .ete-'in#tion o* t&e c&i .G$ !#te-nity #n. $&# '#Ee # *in.in% o* !#te-nity2 i* #!!-o!-i#te2 in #cco-.#nce /it& t&i$ #-tic e . "either signator-s legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the ac/no ledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the ac/no ledgment e.cept for good cause as the court may find. (f a party petitions to rescind an ac/no ledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an ac/no ledgment is invalid because it as e.ecuted on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mista/e of fact, the court shall vacate the ac/no ledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in hich the child-s birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy*t o*c of the social services la . (n addition, if the mother of the child ho is the sub2ect of the ac/no ledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title si.*' of article three of the social services la , the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the mother ith such services. (c) ' determination of paternity made by any other state, hether established through the parents- ac/no ledgment of paternity or through an administrative or 2udicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such ac/no ledgment meets the re0uirements set forth in section <B;(a)(>) of the social security act. (emphasis supplied) $"' testing also appears else here in the "e Aor/ Family #ourt 'ct+<;
WB=;. Eenetic mar/er and $"' tests1 admissibility of records or reports of test results1 costs of tests. a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic mar/er tests or $"' tests and, on the court-s o n motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic mar/er or $"' tests of a type generally ac/no ledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly 0ualified physician to aid in the determination of hether the alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No $)c& te$t $&# +e o-.e-e.2 &o/e,e-2 )!on # /-itten *in.in% +y t&e co)-t t&#t it i$ not in t&e +e$t inte-e$t$ o* t&e c&i . on t&e +#$i$ o* -e$ B).ic#t#2 e()it#+ e e$to!!e 2 o-
B@
t&e !-e$)'!tion o* e%iti'#cy o* # c&i . +o-n to # '#--ie. /o'#n . The record or report of the results of any such genetic mar/er or $"' test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven*/ of the social services la shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty*five hundred eighteen of the civil practice la and rules here no timely ob2ection in riting has been made thereto and that if such timely ob2ections are not made, they shall be deemed aived and shall not be heard by the court. I* t&e -eco-. o- -e!o-t o* t&e -e$) t$ o* #ny $)c& %enetic '#-Ee- o- DNA te$t o- te$t$ in.ic#te #t e#$t # ninety-*i,e !e-cent !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity2 t&e #.'i$$ion o* $)c& -eco-. o- -e!o-t $&# c-e#te # -e+)tt#+ e !-e$)'!tion o* !#te-nity2 #n. $&# e$t#+ i$&2 i* )n-e+)tte.2 t&e !#te-nity o* #n. i#+i ity *o- t&e $)!!o-t o* # c&i . !)-$)#nt to t&i$ #-tic e #n. #-tic e *o)- o* t&i$ #ct. (b) &henever the court directs a genetic mar/er or $"' test pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty*five hundred eighteen of the civil practice la and rules if offered by any party. (c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. (f the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any 0ualified public health officer to conduct such test, if practicable1 other ise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district. (n its order of disposition, ho ever, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be apportioned bet een the parties according to their respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party ho does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied) (n R... v. #...-.&<= a decision of the Fississippi Supreme #ourt, $"' tests ere used to prove that ).&., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage bet een '.#.&. and #.:.&., as actually the child of R.:. ith hom #.:.&. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship. (n .rie #ounty Department of $ocial $ervices on behalf of Tiffany 5.(. v. /reg /. ,<< the <th $epartment of the "e Aor/ Supreme #ourt-s 'ppellate $ivision allo ed E.E., ho had been ad2udicated as T.F.).-s father by default, to have the said 2udgment vacated, even after si. years, once he had sho n through a genetic mar/er test that he as not the child-s father. (n this case, E.E. only re0uested the tests after the $epartment of Social Services, si. years after E.E. had been ad2udicated as T.F.).-s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her. (n /reco v. #oleman,<B the Fichigan Supreme #ourt hile ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of la allo ing non*modifiable support agreements pointed out that it as because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of $"' testing that such support agreements ere necessary+ 's a result of DNA testing, the accuracy ith hich paternity can be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this la suit entered into their support agreementU(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to CC.CCCCCCQ accuracy). )o ever, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity as a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate childHs access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 6C7B. (I(n fact, since its first reported results in 6C7B, DNA matching has progressed to Hgeneral acceptance in less than a decadeHI). ,f course, hile prior blood*testing methods could e.clude some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, hen the settlement agreement bet een the present parties as entered in 6C7@, establishing paternity as a far more difficult ordeal than at present. #ontested paternity actions at that time ere often no more than credibility contests. #onse0uently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on hether the putative father as, in fact, the childHs biological father, but rather on hether the mother could prove to a court of la that she as only se.ually involved ith one man**the putative father. 'llo ing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the ris/ that the mother ould be unable meet her burden of proof. (t is orth noting that amendments to Fichigan-s Paternity la have included the use of $"' testing+ <9 W>;;.>69 Pretrial proceedings1 blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father1 court order1 refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling1 0ualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling1 compensation of e.pert1 result of typing or identification profiling1 filing summary report1 ob2ection1 admissibility1 presumption1 burden of proof1 summary disposition. Sec. 9. (6) In # !-ocee.in% )n.e- t&i$ #ct +e*o-e t-i# 2 t&e co)-t2 )!on #!! ic#tion '#.e +y o- on +e&# * o* eit&e- !#-ty2 o- on it$ o/n 'otion2 $&# o-.e- t&#t t&e 'ot&e-2 c&i .2 #n. # e%e. *#t&e- $)+'it to + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% .ete-'in#tion$2 /&ic& '#y inc ).e2 +)t #-e not i'ite. to2 .ete-'in#tion$ o* -e. ce #nti%en$2 -e. ce i$oen"y'e$2 &)'#n e)Eocyte #nti%en$2 $e-)' !-otein$2 o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in%2 to .ete-'ine /&et&e- t&e # e%e. *#t&e- i$ iEe y to +e2 o- i$ not2 t&e *#t&e- o* t&e c&i .. I* t&e co)-t o-.e-$ # + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in% to +e con.)cte. #n. # !#-ty -e*)$e$ to $)+'it to t&e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in%2 in #..ition to #ny ot&e- -e'e.ie$ #,#i #+ e2 t&e co)-t '#y .o eit&e- o* t&e *o o/in%+ <#> Ente- # .e*#) t B).%'ent #t t&e -e()e$t o* t&e #!!-o!-i#te !#-ty. <+> I* # t-i# i$ &e .2 # o/ t&e .i$c o$)-e o* t&e *#ct o* t&e -e*)$# )n e$$ %oo. c#)$e i$ $&o/n *o- not .i$c o$in% t&e *#ct o* -e*)$# . (;) ' blood or tissue typing or $"' identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recogni5ed scientific organi5ation, including, but not limited to, the 'merican association of blood ban/s. ... ... ... (B) I* t&e !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity .ete-'ine. +y t&e ()# i*ie. !e-$on .e$c-i+e. in $)+$ection <2> con.)ctin% t&e + oo. o- ti$$)e ty!in% o- DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i in% i$ 55H o- &i%&e-2 #n. t&e DNA i.enti*ic#tion !-o*i e #n. $)''#-y -e!o-t #-e #.'i$$i+ e #$ !-o,i.e. in $)+$ection <4>2 !#te-nity i$ !-e$)'e.. I* t&e -e$) t$ o* t&e #n# y$i$ o* %enetic te$tin% '#te-i# *-o' 2 o- 'o-e !e-$on$
B6
in.ic#te # !-o+#+i ity o* !#te-nity %-e#te- t&#n 55H2 t&e cont-#ctin% #+o-#to-y $&# con.)ct #..ition# %enetic !#te-nity te$tin% )nti # +)t 1 o* t&e !)t#ti,e *#t&e-$ i$ e i'in#te.2 )n e$$ t&e .i$!)te in,o ,e$ 2 o- 'o-e !)t#ti,e *#t&e-$ /&o &#,e i.entic# DNA. (9) !pon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (B), either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section >. (emphasis supplied) (n Rafferty v. 'er)ins,<> the Supreme #ourt of Fississippi ruled that $"' test results sho ing paternity legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage+ ere sufficient to overthro the presumption of
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating Per/ins as DustinHs father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Per/ins, e find that no reasonable 2ury could find that :aster is not DustinHs father based upon the CC.C<Q probability of paternity concluded by the $"' testing. (n $.,.". and ,.#.". v. R.#.-.,<7 the "orth $a/ota Supreme #ourt upheld an order for genetic testing given by the #ourt of 'ppeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded ithout such order being given. Significantly, hen D.#.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and support ith the $istrict #ourt, neither party re0uested genetic testing. (t as only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, hich the "orth $a/ota Supreme #ourt upheld. The case of Cohl v. Amundson&<C decided by the Supreme #ourt of South $a/ota, demonstrated that even default 2udgments of paternity could be vacated after the ad2udicated father had, through $"' testing, established non*paternity. (n this case, Mohl, having e.cluded himself as the father of 'mundson-s child through $"' testing, as able to have the default 2udgment against him vacated. )e then obtained a ruling ordering 'mundson to reimburse him for the amounts ithheld from his ages for child support. The #ourt said I( )hile 'mundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that re0uire(d) Mohl to support her child. #ontrary to 'mundsonHs position, the fact that a default 2udgment as entered, but subse0uently vacated, (did) not foreclose Mohl from obtaining a money 2udgment for the amount ithheld from his ages.I (n 5.A.$. v. 5ississippi Dept. of (uman $ervices ,B@ another case decided by the Supreme #ourt of Fississippi, it as held that even if paternity as established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once $"' testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Fississippi )igh #ourt reiterated this doctrine in -illiams v. -illiams.B6 The foregoing considered, e find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court hich both denied the petitioner-s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for $"' testing. !nder Rule 9B of the 6CC> Rules of #ivil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available I hen any tribunal, board or officer has acted ithout or in e.cess of its or his 2urisdiction, or ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and ade0uate remedy in the ordinary course of la .IB; (n 9and %an) of the 'hilippines v. the #ourt of AppealsB= here e dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 9B, e discussed at length the nature of such a petition and 2ust hat as meant by Igrave abuse of discretionI+ Erave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and himsical e.ercise of 2udgment as is e0uivalent to lac/ of 2urisdiction or, in other ords, /&e-e t&e !o/e- i$ eFe-ci$e. in #n #-+it-#-y '#nne- +y -e#$on o* !#$$ion2 !-eB).ice2 o- !e-$on# &o$ti ity2 #n. it ')$t +e $o !#tent o- %-o$$ #$ to #'o)nt to #n e,#$ion o* # !o$iti,e .)ty o- to # ,i-t)# -e*)$# to !e-*o-' t&e .)ty enBoine. o- to #ct #t # in conte'! #tion o* #/ . The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of 2urisdiction and not errors of 2udgment. The raison dJetre for the rule is hen a court e.ercises its 2urisdiction, an error committed hile so engaged does not deprive it of the 2urisdiction being e.ercised hen the error is committed. (f it did, every error committed by a court ould deprive it of its 2urisdiction and every erroneous 2udgment ould be a void 2udgment. (n such a scenario, the administration of 2ustice ould not survive. )ence, here the issue or 0uestion involved affects the isdom or legal soundness of the decisionJnot the 2urisdiction of the court to render said decisionJthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the #' is a petition for revie on certiorari under Rule <B of the Revised Rules of #ourt. ,n the other hand, if the error sub2ect of the recourse is one of 2urisdiction, or the act complained of as perpetrated by a 0uasi*2udicial officer or agency ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 9B of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied) (n the instant case, the petitioner has in no ay sho n any arbitrariness, passion, pre2udice or personal hostility that ould amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the #ourt of 'ppeals. The respondent court acted entirely ithin its 2urisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made ould have only been an error in 2udgment. 's e have discussed, ho ever, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in la and 2urisprudence, as correct. :pilogue For too long, illegitimate children have been marginali5ed by fathers ho choose to deny their e.istence. The gro ing sophistication of $"' testing technology finally provides a much needed e0uali5er for such ostraci5ed and abandoned progeny. &e have long believed in the merits of $"' testing and have repeatedly e.pressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time hen $"' testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. &e therefore ta/e this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that $"' testing is a valid means of determining paternity. @:EREFORE, in vie of the foregoing, the petition is hereby $:"(:$. The #ourt of 'ppeals- decision dated Danuary ;7, ;@@< in #'*E.R. SP "o. 7@C96 is hereby 'FF(RF:$ in toto. #osts against petitioner.
B;
S, ,R$:R:$.
Panganiban, (#hairman), Sandoval*Eutierre5, #arpio*Forales, and Earcia, DD., concur.
B=
E.R. "o. 69=9@<
Fay 9, ;@@B
R:P!?%(# ,F T): P)(%(PP(":S, petitioner, vs. T): ),". #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S (T entieth $ivision), ),". PR:S($("E D!$E: F,RT!"(T, %. F'$R,"', RT#*?R. =B and 'P,%("'R(' F'%("', D,F,#, respondents.
$:#(S(,"
#'RP(,*F,R'%:S, ,.+
(n I(n the Fatter of $eclaration of Presumptive $eath of 'bsentee Spouse #lemente P. Domoc, 'polinaria Falinao Domoc, petitioner,I the ,rmoc #ity, Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch =B, by ,rder of September ;C, 6CCC,6 granted the petition on the basis of the #ommissioner-s Report ; and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, ho had left his petitioner* ife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. (n granting the petition, the trial 2udge, Dudge Fortunito %. Fadrona, cited 'rticle <6, par. ; of the Family #ode. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subse0uent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage here the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute $)''#-y !-ocee.in%$ for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse , ithout pre2udice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. The Republic, through the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral, sought to appeal the trial court-s order by filing a "otice of 'ppeal. = ?y ,rder of "ovember ;;, 6CCCs,< the trial court, noting that no record of appeal as filed and served Ias re0uired by and pursuant to Sec. ;(a), Rule <6 of the 6CC> Rules of #ivil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding,I disapproved the "otice of 'ppeal. The Republic-s Fotion for Reconsideration of the trial court-s order of disapproval having been denied by ,rder of Danuary 6=, ;@@@,B it filed a Petition for #ertiorari9 before the #ourt of 'ppeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals re0uiring a record on appeal. ?y $ecision of Fay B, ;@@<,> the #ourt of 'ppeals denied the Republic-s petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this ise+ 't the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. (t failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed ,rder dated Danuary 6=, ;@@@ Rdenying its Fotion for Reconsideration of the "ovember ;;, 6CCC ,rder disapproving its "otice of 'ppealS. Foreover, the petition 0uestioned the Rtrial court-sS ,rder dated 'ugust 6B, 6CCC, hich declared #lemente Domoc presumptively dead, li/e ise for having been issued ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ of 2urisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. ,n this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance ith Sec. =, Rule <9 of the Rules of #ourt. )o ever, despite the procedural lapses, the #ourt resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validityGnullity of the assailed order. T&e !-inci!# i$$)e in t&i$ c#$e i$ /&et&e- # !etition *o- .ec #-#tion o* t&e !-e$)'!ti,e .e#t& o* # !e-$on i$ in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in%. (f it is, the period to appeal is =@ days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file ith the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. ,ther ise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 6B days from notice or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section =, Rule <6, Rules of #ourt). 's defined in Section =(a), Rule 6 of the Rules of #ourt, Ia civil action is one by hich a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a rongI hile a special proceeding under Section =(c) of the same rule is defined as Ia remedy by hich a party see/s to establish a status, a right or a particular fact ()eirs of Aaptinchay, et al. v. $el Rosario, et al., E.R. "o. 6;<=;@, Farch ;, 6CCC). #onsidering the aforementioned distinction, this #ourt finds that t&e in$t#nt !etition i$ in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in% #n. not #n o-.in#-y #ction. The petition merely see/s for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse #lemente Domoc. (t does not see/ the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a rong. "either does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. ,n the basis of the foregoing discussion, the sub2ect ,rder dated Danuary 6=, ;@@@ denying ,SE-s Fotion for Reconsideration of the ,rder dated "ovember ;;, 6CCC disapproving its "otice of 'ppeal as correctly issued. T&e in$t#nt !etition2 +ein% in t&e n#t)-e o* # $!eci# !-ocee.in%2 OS8 $&o) . &#,e *i e.2 in #..ition to it$ Notice o* A!!e# 2 # -eco-. on #!!e# in accordance ith Section 6C of the (nterim Rules and Euidelines to (mplement ?P ?lg. 6;C and Section ;(a), Rule <6 of the Rules of #ourt . . . (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals here a record on appeal shall be filed and served in li/e manner. Petitioner cites Rule 6@C of the Revised Rules of #ourt hich enumerates the cases herein multiple appeals are allo ed and a record on appeal is re0uired for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices. ?y Resolution of $ecember 6B, ;@@<,7 this #ourt, noting that copy of the September ;>, ;@@< Resolution Cre0uiring respondent to file her comment on the petition as returned unserved ith postmaster-s notation IParty refused,I Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.
B<
The pertinent provisions on the 8ene-# P-o,i$ion$ on S!eci# P-ocee.in%$ , Part (( of the Revised Rules of #ourt entitled SP:#('% PR,#::$("ES, read+ RULE 12 SU69ECT MATTER AND APPLICA6ILIT7 OF 8ENERAL RULES Section 6. $ubject matter of special proceedings. = Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the follo ing+ (a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons1 (b) :scheat1 (c) Euardianship and custody of children1 (d) Trustees1 (e) 'doption1 (f) Rescission and revocation of adoption1 (g) )ospitali5ation of insane persons1 (h) )abeas corpus1 (i) #hange of name1 (2) 8oluntary dissolution of corporations1 (/) Dudicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children1 (l) #onstitution of family home1 (m) $eclaration of absence and death1 (n) #ancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. Sec. ;. Applicability of rules of civil actions. = (n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (!nderscoring supplied) The pertinent provision of the #ivil #ode on presumption of death provides+ 'rt. =C@. 'fter an absence of seven years, it being un/no n !)-!o$e$2 e.cept for those of succession. . . . (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) !pon the other hand, 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode, upon of the absent spouse, provides+ hich the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death hether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead *o- #
'rt. <6. ' marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subse0uent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a ell* founded belief that the absent spouses as already dead. (n case of disappearance here there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of 'rticle =C6 of the #ivil #ode, an absence of only t o years shall be sufficient. For the purpose pf contracting the subse0uent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a $)''#-y !-ocee.in% #$ !-o,i.e. in t&i$ Co.e for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, ithout pre2udice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) Rule <6, Section ; of the Revised Rules of #ourt, on Fodes of 'ppeal, invo/ed by the trial court in disapproving petitioner-s "otice of 'ppeal, provides+ Sec. ;. 5odes of appeal. *
BB
(a) Ordinary appeal. 7 The appeal to the #ourt of 'ppeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial #ourt in the e.ercise of its original 2urisdiction shall be ta/en by filing a notice of appeal ith the court hich rendered the 2udgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. "o record on appeal shall be re0uired e.cept in $!eci# !-ocee.in%$ and other c#$e$ o* ') ti! e o- $e!#-#te #!!e# $ /&e-e t&e #/ o- t&e$e R) e$ $o -e()i-e. (n such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in li/e manner. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) ... ?y the trial court-s citation of 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode, it is gathered that the petition of 'polinaria Domoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subse0uent marriage. .rgo, the petition for that purpose is a I$)''#-y !-ocee.in%,I follo ing above*0uoted 'rt. <6, paragraph ; of the Family #ode. Since Title T( of the Family #ode, entitled S!FF'RA D!$(#('% PR,#::$("E (" T): F'F(%A %'&, contains the follo ing provision, inter alia+ ... 'rt. ;=7. !nless modified by the Supreme #ourt, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in # c#$e$ provided for in this #odes re0uiring $)''#-y co)-t !-ocee.in%$. S)c& c#$e$ $&# +e .eci.e. in #n eF!e.itio)$ '#nne- /it&o)t -e%#-. to tec&nic# -) e$. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) . . ., there is no doubt that the petition of 'polinaria Domoc re0uired, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family #ode, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of #ourt appeal for hich calls for the filing of a Record on 'ppeal. (t being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a "otice of 'ppeal from the trial court-s order sufficed. That the Family #ode provision on repeal, 'rt. ;B<, provides as follo s+ 'rt. ;B<. Titles (((, (8, 8, 8(, 8((, 8(((, (T, T( and T8 of ?oo/ ( of Republic 'ct "o. =79, other ise /no n as the #ivil #ode of the Philippines, as amended, and 'rticles 6>, 67, 6C, ;>, ;7, ;C, =@, =6, =C, <@, <6 and <; of Presidential $ecree "o. 9@=, other ise /no n as the #hild and Aouth &elfare #ode, as amended, and all #/$, decrees, e.ecutive orders, proclamations -) e$ and regulations, or parts thereof, incon$i$tent t&e-e/it& are hereby -e!e# e., (:mphasis and underscoring supplied), seals the case in petitioner-s favor. Finally, on the alleged procedural fla in petitioner-s petition before the appellate court. Petitioner-s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court-s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its "otice of 'ppeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Eiven the issue raised before it by petitioner, hat the appellate court should have done as to direct petitioner to comply ith the rule. 's for petitioner-s failure to submit copy of the trial court-s order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court-s observation that petitioner as also assailing it, petitioner-s 7*page petition 6@ filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the "otice of 'ppeal. @:EREFORE, the assailed Fay B, ;@@< $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals is hereby R:8:RS:$ and S:T 'S($:. %et the case be R:F'"$:$ to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion. SO ORDERED.
'anganiban& (#hairman!& $andoval7/utierre2& #orona& and /arcia& ,,.& concur.
Special Proceedings Finals E.R. "o. %*<=9; 'ugust =6, 6CB6
B9
F'T(F(", '. E'R#(', petitioner*appellant, vs. P'TR,#("(, P,"E'", respondent*appellee.
Ramon Duterte& #ecillo /illamac& Antolin Rubillos and /audencio 5ontecillo for appellant. .leuterio R. Ramo for appellee.
F:R(', ,.+
' petition for habeas corpus as originally filed in the #ourt of First (nstance of #ebu by the petitioner the respondent Patrocinio Pongan, to recover the custody of Teonila Earcia born on "ovember 67, 6C=7, ho is a natural child of both the petitioner and respondent because they ere free to marry at the time of the conception of said child. 'fter the hearing, the lo er court rendered 2udgment denying the appellantHs petition, and a arding to the respondent the rightful custody of said Teonila Earcia1 and the petitioner appealed from said 2udgment. Section =66 of the ne #ivil #ode provides that IThe father and mother 2ointly e.ercise parental authority over their legitimate children ho are not emancipated,I and that Ithe recogni5ed natural and adopted children ho are under age are under the parental authority of the father or mother recogni5ing or adopting them.I !nder article =69 of the same code the effects of parental authority of the legitimate father and mother upon their unemancipated legitimate children, and of the father or mother over their minor recogni5ed natural children are, among others, the duty to support them and /eep them in their company. The parentsH duty of /eeping their legitimate and recogni5ed minor children in their company or giving them a place herein to live, is a part of the due to them1 but this duty is at the same time a right hich is incumbent upon them to facilitate compliance ith their duties imposed upon the parents by said article =69. (f only one of the parents, for instance the father, has recogni5ed a natural child, there ould be no 0uestion or doubt that in the e.ercise of his parental authority, he has the right to /eep the recogni5ed child in his company or to have it under his custody, and he can not be deprive of such right and may not even renounce or transfer it Ie.cept in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the court, or emancipation by concession,I according to article =6= of the same #ode. ?ut in the present case, not only the appellant father, but also the respondent mother have recogni5ed the minor child Teonila Earcia, the former by 2udgment of the court, and the latter voluntarily testifying or stating under oath before the #ourt of First (nstance in this case, that said Teonila is her natural child, hich is a ne means of voluntary recognition of a natural child by his father or mother under article ;>7 of the ne #ivil #ode, hich says that IRecognition shall be made in the record of birth, a ill, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic riting.I Such voluntary recognition does not re0uire 2udicial approval according to article ;76 of the same #ode, hich provides that only I hen the recognition of a minor does not ta/e place in a record of birth or in a ill 2udicial approval shall be necessary.I 'nd as the minor Teonila Earcia is over ten years and prefers to live ith her mother, the court did not err in a arding to the appellee the care, custody, and control of said minor, there being no sho ing that she is unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity or poverty, in accordance ith the provision of section 9, Rule 6@@ of the Rules of #ourt, hich reads as follo s+ S:#. 9. 'roceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. J &hen husband and ife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the 0uestion as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a #ourt of First (nstance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony of either or both parents, and such other testimony as may be pertinent, shall a ard the care, custody, and control of each such child as ill be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose hich parent it prefers to live ith if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to ta/e charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drun/enness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . (t is true that the above*0uoted provisions refer to legitimate minor children hose parents are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, but it is not less true that they are also applicable to the present case by analogy. The la confers upon the courts the po er to a ard the care, custody and control of the minor child to either of the parents hom the child prefers to live ith if it is over ten years unless the parent so chosen be unfit, because either the father or the mother has a preferred right to such care, custody and control in the e.ercise of parental authority they have over the person of their unemancipated legitimate children. (n the present case, the minor Teonila Earcia having been legally recogni5ed by both the appellant and appellee as their natural child, either one of them has the right to have the care, control and custody of said minor by virtue of their parental authority over her. &herefore the order appealed from is affirmed ith costs against the appellant. So ordered.
'aras& #.,.& 'ablo& %eng2on& 'adilla& Tuason& Reyes& ,ugo and %autista Angelo& ,,.& concur.
B>
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
A!-i 222 2003 RE3 PROPOSED RULE ON CUSTOD7 OF MINORS AND @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO CUSTOD7 OF MINORS RESOLUTION
'cting on the letter of the #hairman of the #ommittee on Revision of the Rules of #ourt submitting for this #ourt-s consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on custody of Finors and &rit of )abeas #orpus in Relation to #ustody of Finors, the #ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. The Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6B, ;@@= follo ing its publication in a ne spaper of general circulation not later than 'pril =@, ;@@=. 'pril ;;, ;@@= Davide& ,r.& #.,.& %ellosillo& 'uno& +itug& 'anganiban& 6nares7$antiago& $andoval7/utierre2& #arpio& Austria75artine2& #orona& #arpio75orales& #allejo& $r.& and A2cuna& ,,., concur. <uisumbing& ,., on official leave.
RULE ON CUSTOD7 OF MINORS AND @RIT OF :A6EAS CORPUS IN RELATION TO CUSTOD7 OF MINORS SECTION 1. %pplicability. * This rule shall apply to petitions for custody of minors and rits of habeas corpus in relation thereto. The Rules of #ourt shall apply suppletorily. Section 2. Petition for custody of minors& who may file.* ' verified petition for the rightful custody of a minor may be filed by any person claiming such right. The party against hom it may be filed shall be designated as the respondent. Section 3. Where to file petition. * The petition for custody of minors shall be filed resides or here the minor may be found. Section 4. Contents of petition. * The verified petition shall allege the follo ing+ (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and of the respondent1 (b) The name, age and present hereabouts of the minor and his or her relationship to the petitioner and the respondent1 (c) The material operative facts constituting deprivation of custody1 and (d) Such other matters hich are relevant to the custody of the minor. The verified petition shall be accompanied by a certificate against forum shopping, hich the petitioner must sign personally. Section 0. S)''on$I !e-$on# $e-,ice on -e$!on.ent. * (f the court is satisfied that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, it shall direct the cler/ of court to issue summons, hich shall be served together ith a copy of the petition personally on the respondent. Section 6. 'otion to (ismiss. * ' motion to dismiss the petition is not allo ed e.cept on the ground of lac/ of 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter or over the parties. 'ny other ground that might arrant the dismissal of the petition may be raised as an affirmative defense in the ans er. Section 1. Verified %nswer. * The respondent shall file an ans er to the petition, personally verified by him, and a copy of the petition. ithin five days after service of summons ith the Family #ourt of the province or city here the petitioner
Section 4. Case study& duty of social wor!er. * !pon the filing of the verified ans er or the e.piration of the period to file it, the court may order a social or/er to ma/e a case study of the minor and the parties and to submit a report and recommendation to the court at least three days before the scheduled pre*trial. Section 5. Notice of mandatory pre)trial. * &ithin fifteen days after the filing of the ans er or the e.piration of the period to file ans er, the court shall issue an order+ (6) fi.ing a date for the pre*trial conference1 (;) directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre*trial briefs in such manner as shall ensure receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre*trial1 and (=) re0uiring the respondent to present the minor before the court.
B7
The notice of its order shall be served separately on both the parties and their respective counsels. The pre*trial is mandatory. Section 10. Contents of pre)trial brief. * The pre*trial brief shall contain the follo ing+ (a) ' statement of the illingness of the parties to enter into agreements that may be allo ed by la , indicating its terms1 (b) ' concise statement of their respective claims together ith the applicable la s and authorities1 (c) 'dmitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts1 (d) The disputed factual and legal issues1 (e) 'll the evidence to be presented, briefly stating or describing its nature and purpose1 (f) The number and names of the and itnesses and their respective affidavits hich shall serve as the affiantHs testimony on direct e.amination1
(g) Such other matters as the court may re0uire to be included in the pre*trial brief. Failure to file the pre*trial brief or to comply ith its re0uired contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre*trial. Section 11. *ffect of failure to appear at the pre)trial .*(a) (f the petitioner fails to appear personally at the pre*trial, the case shall be dismissed, unless his counsel or a duly authori5ed representative appears in court and proves a valid e.cuse for the non*appearance of the petitioner. (b) (f the respondent has filed his ans er but fails to appear at the pre*trial, the petitioner shall be allo ed to present his evidence e. parte. The court shall then render 2udgment on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence thus presented. Section 12. What may be done at pre)trial. * 't the pre*trial, the parties may agree on the custody of the minor. (f the parties fail to agree, the court may refer the matter to a mediator ho shall have five days to effect an agreement bet een the parties. (f the issue is not settled through mediation, the court shall proceed ith the pre*trial conference, on hich occasion it shall consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody . * 'fter an ans er has been filed or after e.piration of the period to file it, the court may issue a provisional order a arding custody of the minor. 's far as practicable, the follo ing order of preference shall be observed in the a ard of custody+ (a) ?oth parents 2ointly1 (b) :ither parent, ta/ing into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit1 (c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or dis0ualified1 (d) The eldest brother or sister over t enty*one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or dis0ualified1 (e) The actual custodian of the minor over t enty*one years of age, unless the former is unfit or dis0ualified1 or (f) 'ny other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor. Section 14. +actors to consider in determining custody . * (n a arding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to his material and moral elfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor encouraging to his physical, psychological and emotional development. (t also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the gro th and development of the minor. The court shall also consider the follo ing+ (a) 'ny e.tra2udicial agreement hich the parties may have bound themselves to comply ith respecting the rights of the minor to maintain direct contact ith the non custodial parent on a regular basis, e.cept hen there is an e.isting threat or danger of physical, mental, se.ual or emotional violence hich endangers the safety and best interests of the minor1 (b) The desire and ability of one parent to foster an open and loving relationship bet een the minor and the other parent1 (c) The health, safety and elfare of the minor1
BC
(d) 'ny history of child or spousal abuse by the person see/ing custody or courting the parent1 (e) The nature and fre0uency of contact ith both parents1 (f) )abitual use of alcohol, dangerous drugs or regulated substances1 (g) Farital misconduct1
ho has had any filial relationship
ith the minor, including anyone
(h) The most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment for the holistic development and gro th of the minor1 and (i) The preference of the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Section 10. Temporary visitation rights. * The court shall provide in its order a arding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the non* custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or dis0ualified. The temporary custodian shall give the court and non custodial parent or parents at least five daysH notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or ta/e him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not pre2udice the visitation rights of the non*custodial parent or parents. Section 16. ,old (eparture -rder. * The minor child sub2ect of the petition shall not be brought out of the country hile the petition is pending. ithout prior order from the court
The court, motu proprio or upon application under oath, may issue e. parte a hold departure order, addressed to the ?ureau of (mmigration and $eportation, directing it not to allo the departure of the minor from the Philippines ithout the permission of the court. The Family #ourt issuing the hold departure order shall furnish the $epartment of Foreign 'ffairs and the ?ureau of (mmigration and $eportation of the $epartment of Dustice a copy of the hold departure order ithin t enty*four hours from its issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal. The hold departure order shall contain the follo ing information+ (a) The complete name (including the middle name), the date and place of birth, the nationality and the place of last residence of the person against hom a hold departure order has been issued or hose departure from the country has been en2oined1 (b) The complete title and doc/et number of the case in hich the hold departure order as issued1 (c) The specific nature of the case1 (d) The date of the hold departure order1 and (e) ' recent photograph, if available, of the party against has been en2oined. hom a hold departure order has been issued or hose departure from the country
The court may recall the hold departure order motu proprio, or upon verified motion of any of the parties after summary hearing, sub2ect to such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the best interests of the minor. Section 11. Protection -rder. * The court may issue a Protection ,rder re0uiring any person+ (a) To stay a ay from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the minor, other parent or any other party, or from any other specific place designated by the court1 (b) To cease and desist from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such minor or the other parent or any person to minor is a arded1 hom custody of the
(c) To refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable ris/ to the health, safety, or elfare of the minor1 (d) To permit a parent, or a party entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation agreement, to visit the minor at stated periods1 (e) To permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in order to ta/e personal belongings not contested in a proceeding pending ith the Family #ourt1 and (f) To comply ith such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the minor.
9@
Section 14. Judgment. * 'fter trial, the court shall render 2udgment a arding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor. (f it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to ta/e charge of such minor, or commit him to any suitable home for children. (n its 2udgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective of ho may be its custodian. (n determining the amount of support, the court may consider the follo ing factors+ (6) the financial resources of the custodial and non*custodial parent and those of the minor1 (;) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor1 (=) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to1 and (<) the non*monetary contributions that the parents ould ma/e to ard the care and ell* being of the minor. The court may also issue any order that is 2ust and reasonable permitting the parent ho is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody. Section 15. %ppeal. * "o appeal from the decision shall be allo ed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or ne days from notice of 2udgment. 'n aggrieved party may appeal from the decision by filing a "otice of 'ppeal reconsideration or ne trial and serving a copy thereof on the adverse parties. trial ithin fifteen
ithin fifteen days from notice of the denial of the motion for
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. * ' verified petition for a rit of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed ith the Family #ourt. The rit shall be enforceable ithin its 2udicial region to hich the Family #ourt belongs. )o ever, the petition may be filed ith the regular court in the absence of the presiding 2udge of the Family #ourt, provided, ho ever, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family #ourt as soon as its presiding 2udge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed ith the appropriate regular courts in places here there are no Family #ourts. The rit issued by the Family #ourt or the regular court shall be enforceable in the 2udicial region here they belong. The petition may li/e ise be filed ith the Supreme #ourt, #ourt of 'ppeals, or ith any of its members and, if so granted, the rit shall be enforceable any here in the Philippines. The rit may be made returnable to a Family #ourt or to any regular court ithin the region here the petitioner resides or here the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. !pon return of the rit, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the furnished a copy of the decision. rit shall be
Section 21. Confidentiality of proceedings . * The hearings on custody of minors may, at the discretion of the court, be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be released to non*parties ithout its approval. Section 22. *ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on Fay 6B, ;@@= follo ing its publication in a ne spaper of general circulation not later than 'pril =@, ;@@=.
96
8.R. No. 105314
9) y 122 2001
FELIPE N. MADRIJAN2 Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCA R. MADRIJAN2 Respondent.
$:#(S(,"
CORONA2 J.3
&hen a family brea/s up, the children are al ays the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart*rending affair. Such is the case here. :ven the usually technical sub2ect of 2urisdiction became emotionally charged. Petitioner Felipe ". FadriOan and respondent Francisca R. FadriOan 8illage, ?rgy. Foon al/, ParaOa0ue #ity. ere married on Duly >, 6CC= in ParaOa0ue #ity. They resided in San 'gustin
Their union as blessed ith three sons and a daughter+ Ronnic/, born on Danuary =@, 6CC<1 Phillip, born on "ovember 6C, 6CC91 Francis 'ngelo, born on Fay 6;, 6CC7 and Mri5ia 'nn, born on $ecember 6;, ;@@@. 'fter a bitter 0uarrel on Fay 67, ;@@;, petitioner allegedly left their con2ugal abode and too/ their three sons ith him to %igao #ity, 'lbay and subse0uently to Sta. Rosa, %aguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents*in*la to patch things up bet een her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the9upong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnic/, Phillip and Francis 'ngelo in the #ourt of 'ppeals, alleging that petitioner-s act of leaving the con2ugal d elling and going to 'lbay and then to %aguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother-s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to e.plain hy they should not be returned to her custody. Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 6>, ;@@;. They initially agreed that petitioner sons to respondent. Petitioner, ho ever, had a change of heart6 and decided to file a memorandum. ould return the custody of their three
,n September =, ;@@;, petitioner filed his memorandum ; alleging that respondent as unfit to ta/e custody of their three sons because she as habitually drun/, fre0uently ent home late at night or in the ee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. )e claimed that, after their s0uabble on Fay 67, ;@@;, it as respondent ho left, ta/ing their daughter ith her. (t as only then that he ent to Sta. Rosa, %aguna here he or/ed as a tricycle driver. )e submitted a certification from the principal of the $ila :lementary School in Sta. Rosa, %aguna that Ronnic/ and Phillip ere enrolled there. )e also 0uestioned the 2urisdiction of the #ourt of 'ppeals claiming that under Section B(b) of R' 7=9C (other ise /no n as the IFamily #ourts 'ct of 6CC>I) family courts have e.clusive original 2urisdiction to hear and decide the petition forhabeas corpus filed by respondent.= For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on Fay 67, ;@@; but as driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it as petitioner ho as an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner-s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation as aggravated by the fact that their home as ad2acent to that of her in*la s ho fre0uently meddled in their personal problems.< ,n ,ctober ;6, ;@@;, the #ourt of 'ppeals B rendered a decision9 asserting its authority to ta/e cogni5ance of the petition and ruling that, under 'rticle ;6= of the Family #ode, respondent as entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis 'ngelo ho ere at that time aged si. and four, respectively, sub2ect to the visitation rights of petitioner. &ith respect to Ronnic/ ho as then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule CC of the Rules of #ourt. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the #ourt of 'ppeals decision but it as denied. )ence, this recourse. Petitioner challenges the 2urisdiction of the #ourt of 'ppeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that 2urisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under R' 7=9C. )e invo/es Section B(b) of R' 7=9C+ Section B. ,urisdiction of "amily #ourts. The Family #ourts shall have e.clusive original 2urisdiction to hear and decide the follo ing cases+ ... ... ...
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter1 ... Petitioner is rong. (n Thornton v. Thornton,> this #ourt resolved the issue of the #ourt of 'ppeals- 2urisdiction to issue rits of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in R' 7=9C giving family courts e.clusive original 2urisdiction over such petitions+ T&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ $&o) . t#Ee co%ni"#nce o* t&e c#$e $ince t&e-e i$ not&in% in RA 4365 t&#t -e,oEe. it$ B)-i$.iction to i$$)e /-it$ o* habeas corpus in,o ,in% t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$. ... ...
9;
...
...
...
&e rule therefore that RA 4365 .i. not .i,e$t t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. t&e S)!-e'e Co)-t o* t&ei- B)-i$.iction o,e- habeas corpus c#$e$ in,o ,in% t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$. ... ... ...
The provisions of R' 7=9C reveal no manifest intent to revo/e the 2urisdiction of the #ourt of 'ppeals and Supreme #ourt to issue rits of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of R' 7=9C, R' >@C; R'n 'ct :.panding the Durisdiction of the #ourt of 'ppealsS and ?P 6;C RThe Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct of 6C7@S are absolutely incompatible since R' 7=9C does not prohibit the #ourt of 'ppeals and the Supreme #ourt from issuing rits of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of R' 7=9C must be read in harmony ith R' >@;C and ?P 6;C that *#'i y co)-t$ &#,e conc)--ent B)-i$.iction /it& t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. t&e S)!-e'e Co)-t in !etition$ *o- habeas corpus/&e-e t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$ i$ #t i$$)e.7 (emphases supplied) The 2urisdiction of the #ourt of 'ppeals over petitions for habeas corpus as further affirmed by '.F. "o. @=*@=*@<*S# ('pril ;;, ;@@<) in Re+ Rule on #ustody of Finors and &rit of (abeas #orpus in Relation to #ustody of Finors+ (n any case, /&#te,e- )nce-t#inty t&e-e /#$ &#$ +een $ett e. /it& t&e #.o!tion o* A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re3 R) e on C)$to.y o* Mino-$ #n. @-it o* :#+e#$ Co-!)$ in Re #tion to C)$to.y o* Mino-$. Section ;@ of the rule provides that+ Section ;@. 'etition for writ of habeas corpus . ' verified petition for a rit of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed #ourt. The rit shall be enforceable ithin its 2udicial region to hich the Family #ourt belongs. ... ... ... ith the Family
T&e !etition '#y iEe/i$e +e *i e. /it& t&e Supreme #ourt, Co)-t o* A!!e# $, or ith any of its members #n.2 i* $o %-#nte.2 t&e /-it $&# +e en*o-ce#+ e #ny/&e-e in t&e P&i i!!ine$. The rit may be made returnable to a Family #ourt or to any regular court ithin the region here the petitioner resides or here the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that t&e Co)-t o* A!!e# $ #n. S)!-e'e Co)-t &#,e conc)--ent B)-i$.iction /it& *#'i y co)-t$ in habeas corpus c#$e$ /&e-e t&e c)$to.y o* 'ino-$ i$ in,o ,e. .C(emphases supplied)
1avvphi1
&e note that after petitioner moved out of their ParaOa0ue residence on Fay 67, ;@@;, he t ice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different 2udicial regions. This situation is hat the Thornton interpretation of R' 7=9C-s provision on 2urisdiction precisely addressed+ RThe reasoning that by giving family courts e.clusive 2urisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the la ma/ers intended them to be the sole courts hich can issue rits of habeas corpusS ill result in an ini0uitous situation, leaving individuals li/e RrespondentS ithout legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. (ndividuals ho do not /no the hereabouts of minors they are loo/ing for ould be helpless since they cannot see/ redress from family courts hose rits are enforceable only in their respective territorial 2urisdictions. T&)$2 i* # 'ino- i$ +ein% t-#n$*e--e. *-o' one ! #ce to #not&e-2 /&ic& $ee'$ to +e t&e c#$e &e-e2 t&e !etitione- in # habeas corpus c#$e /i +e e*t /it&o)t e%# -e'e.y. T&i$ #cE o* -eco)-$e co) . not &#,e +een t&e intention o* t&e #/'#Ee-$ /&en t&ey !#$$e. CRA 4365D.6@ Foreover, a careful reading of Section B(b) of R' 7=9C reveals that family courts are vested ith original e.clusive 2urisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. &rits of habeas corpus hich may be issued e.clusively by family courts under Section B(b) of R' 7=9C pertain to the #nci #-y -e'e.y that may be availed of in con2unction ith a petition for custody of minors under Rule CC of the Rules of #ourt. (n other ords, the issuance of the rit is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The rit must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of 2urisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co*e0ual court and 2udicial instability. The rule therefore is+ hen by la 2urisdiction is conferred on a court or 2udicial officer, all au.iliary rits, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. 66 ,nce a court ac0uires 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of a case, it does so to the e.clusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters. 'ccordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. #osts against petitioner. S, ,R$:R:$.
RENATO C. CORONA 'ssociate Dustice
9=
8.R. No. 111140 No,e'+e- 162 1550
DAISIE T. DA;ID2 petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS2 RAMON R. ;ILLAR2 respondents.
MENDO?A2
J.:
Petitioner $aisie T. $avid or/ed as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. 8illar, a businessman in 'ngeles #ity. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all gro n*up. 'fter a hile, the relationship bet een petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of hich a son, #hristopher D., as born on Farch C, 6C7B to them. #hristopher D. as follo ed by t o more children, both girls, namely #hristine, born on Dune C, 6C79, and #athy Fae on 'pril ;<, 6C77. The relationship became /no n to private respondentHs in 6C79 and introduced him to 8illarHs legal ife. ife hen $aisie too/ #hristopher D, to 8illarHs house at 8illa Teresa in 'ngeles #ity sometime
'fter this, the children of $aisie ere freely brought by 8illar to his house as they ere eventually accepted by his legal family. (n the summer of 6CC6, 8illar as/ed $aisie to allo #hristopher D., then si. years of age, to go ith his family to ?oracay. $aisie agreed, but after the trip, 8illar refused to give bac/ the child. 8illar said he had enrolled #hristopher D. at the )oly Family 'cademy for the ne.t school year. ,n Duly =@, 6CC6, $aisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of #hristopher D. 'fter hearing, the Regional Trial #ourt, ?ranch B7 at 'ngeles #ity, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of hich reads+ &):R:F,R:, premises considered, 2udgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent+ 6. the rightful custody of the minor #hristopher D. T. $avid is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner $aisie T. $avid1 ;. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P=,@@@.@@ a month to the sub2ect minor #hristopher D. T. $avid, #hristine $avid and #athy Fae $avid to ta/e effect upon the finality of this decision1 and =. to pay the costs of this suit. S, ,R$:R:$. ,n appeal, the #ourt of 'ppeals reversed, holding+ &e agree ith the respondent*appellantHs vie that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case. %a and 2urisprudence herein the 0uestion of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation here the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family #ode, the father and mother have 2oint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by e.press provision of the la . )ence, the 0uestion of custody and support should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. (n point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not ac0uire 2urisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner*appellee and respondent*appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support. 'dmittedly, respondent*appellant is financially ell*off, he being a very rich businessman1 hereas, petitioner*appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. (n fact, he financially supported petitioner*appellee and her three minor children. (t is, therefore, for the best interest of #hristopher D that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent*appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case. &):R:F,R:, the decision appealed from is hereby S:T 'S($:, and a ":& ,": :"T:R:$ dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding "o. <<7C. $aisie in turn filed this petition for revie of the appellate courtHs decision. Rule 6@;, W6 of the Rules of #ourt provides that Ithe rit of habeas corpus shall e.tend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by person is deprived of his liberty, or by hich the rightful custody of any person is ithheld from the person entitled thereto.I hich any
(t is indeed true, as the #ourt of 'ppeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases here the parents, ho are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. (t does not follo , ho ever, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For e.ample, in the case of $alvaLa v. /aela, 1 it as held that the rit of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the
9<
custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free a man against her ill.
ill because the parents
ere compelling her to marry
(n the case at bar, #hristopher D. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. 8illar, as married to another oman other than the childHs mother. 's such, pursuant to 'rt. 6>9 of the Family #ode, #hristopher D. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, ho, as a conse0uence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the rit of habeas corpus. (ndeed, Rule 6@;6 W6 ma/es no distinction bet een the case of a mother ho is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child ho, by la , is vested ith sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recogni5ed the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. !nder 'rt. ;6= of the Family #ode, Ino child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order other ise.I 3 "or is the fact that private respondent is ell*off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her o n since they ere born. Petitioner is a mar/et vendor earning from P;,@@@ to P=,@@@ per month in 6CC= hen the RT# decision as rendered. She augments her income by or/ing as secretary at the #omputer System Specialist, (nc. earning a monthly income of P<,B@@.@@. She has an arrangement ith her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She or/s up to 7+@@ oHcloc/ in the evening to ma/e up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. #ooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it hat it is. $aisie and her children may not be en2oying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. ith him. (t is enough, ho ever, that
The Regional Trial #ourt ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P=,@@@.@@ a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by $aisie, e.cept the meager amount of PB@@.@@ a ee/ hich he stopped giving them on Dune ;=, 6CC;. )e is a rich man ho professes love for his children. (n fact he filed a motion for the e.ecution of the decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals, alleging that he had observed his son Ito be physically ea/ and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the lu.ury and amenities he as accustomed to hen in the former custody of the respondent.I )e prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him ith the Iproper care and education.I 'lthough the 0uestion of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is 2ustified by the fact that private respondent has e.pressed illingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allo ance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. !nder 'rt. ;@< of the Family #ode, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allo ance fi.ed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family d elling the person ho is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is Ia moral or legal obstacle thereto.I (n the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, #hristopher D., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case as decided by the RT#, cannot be ta/en from the motherHs custody. :ven no that the child is over seven years of age, the motherHs custody over him ill have to be upheld because the child categorically e.pressed preference to live ith his mother. !nder 'rt. ;6= of the Family #ode, courts must respect the Ichoice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfitI and here it has not been sho n that the mother is in any ay unfit to have custody of her child. (ndeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the a ard of his custody to him (private respondent). &):R:F,R:, the decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals is R:8:RS:$ and private respondent is ,R$:R:$ to deliver the minor #hristopher D. T. $avid to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P=,@@@.@@, pending the fi.ing of the amount of support in an appropriate action. S, ,R$:R:$.
*arvasa& #.,.& Regalado and 'uno& ,,.& concur.
"rancisco& ,.& is on leave.
9B
8.R. No. L-16115
M#-c& 302 1521
LEE 7ICA :ON2 petitioner*appellee, vs. T:E INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS2 defendant*appellant.
Attorney7/eneral "eria for appellant. *o appearance for appellee.
STREET2 J.:
This is an appeal by the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms from the action of the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila in imposing upon him a fine of PB@ for an alleged contempt of court. The circumstances connected ith the incident hich gave rise to the proceeding are these+ (t appears that on Duly ;=, 6C;@, a petition for the rit of habeas corpus as filed in the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila by one %ee Aic/ )on, alleging he had lately arrived from #hina at the port of Fanila ith a vie to entering the Philippine (slands, but as presented from so doing by the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms, ho as detaining him for deportation. !pon the presiding in Sala (8 of said court, cited the collector to appear and sho cause in riting hy the rit of habeas corpus should not be issued as prayed. This citation as served at about 66 a.m., at hich house arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on on a boat scheduled to leave Fanila for )ong/ong at noon on the same day1 and either by oversight or design the (nsular #ollector failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result as that %ee Aic/ )on as deported ithin t o or three hours after the (nsular #ollector had been served ith the citation to sho cause in the habeas corpusproceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings ere instituted against the (nsular #ollector, ith the result already stated. &e are of the opinion that the action of the lo er court in imposing fine on the appellant cannot be sustained1 and the 2udgment must accordingly be reserved. The conditions under hich a person can be punished for contempt are precisely defined in sections ;=6 and ;=; of the #ode of #ivil Procedure1 and unless the reprobated conduct legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be punished as for contempt. The first of these sections contemplates misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near the court of 2udge as to obstruct the administration of 2ustice. &ith this situation e are not here concerned, as the act hich constitutes the alleged contempt as committed a ay from the presence of the court and if punishable at all, it falls under subsection (6) of section ;=;, herein it is declared that nay person may be punished as for contempt ho is guilty of Idisobedience of or resistance to a la ful rit, process, order, 2udgment, or command of the court or in2unction granted by a court or 2udge.I (n this case before us, if it be as/ed hat la ful rit, process, order, 2udgment or command of the court or 2udge belo as disobeyed or resisted by the appellant, the ans er must be+ "one hatever. The citation that as served upon the appellant re0uired him to appear at a stated time in the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila and sho cause if any there might be, hy the rit prayed for should not issue. That citation as literally complied ith hen, on Duly =@, 6C;@, the 'ttorney*Eeneral, on behalf of the (nsular #ollector, filed his ans er, herein it as in effect stated that the case of %ee Aic/ )on had been regularly passed upon by the special ?oard of (n0uiry, and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine (slands in contravention of the (mmigration and :.clusion 'cts, herefore the (nsular #ollector had ordered his deportation. That ans er, so far as appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient1 and the sole ground relied upon to sustain the 2udgment finding the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allo ing %ee Aic/ )on to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the possible issuance of the rit of habeas corpus for hich application had been made. 't this point attention should be directed to the fact that the order to sho cause, a copy of hich as served on the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms on Duly ;=, 6C;@, is not the peremptory rit of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The re0uisites of the peremptory rit of habeas corpus are stated in section B== of the #ode of #ivil Procedure1 and appropriate forms are supplied in section B=< of said #ode and in section 7; of Eeneral ,rders, "o. B7. The order served in the case before us as merely a preliminary citation re0uiring the respondent to appear and sho cause hy the peremptory rit should not be granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the rit of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are a are, become common in our courts1 and upon considerations of practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases here the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory rit is not manifest. "evertheless in a case li/e that no before us, it is necessary to ta/e account of the difference bet een the preliminary citation and the real rit of habeas corpus1 and hen advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allo ing %ee Aic/ )on to be deported. ,f course if the 2udge issuing the citation had his attention directed to the fact that the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on as imminent, and there had been any reason to fear that the #ollector of #ustoms might proceed ith his deportation not ithstanding the service of the bare citation, his )onor could have penned a fe additional ords, adding to the citation an admonition to the effect that the petitioner should not be deported until his application for the rit of habeas corpus should be heard. (f a temporary restraining order of that /ind had been issued, it ould no doubt have been respected. (n proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court, it is not to be forgotten that such proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in their nature even hen the acts complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this reason the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. (9 R. #. %., p. B=@.) Foreover, it is ell settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the violation of an in2unction or in fact of any 2udicial order unless the act hich is forbidden or re0uired to be done is clearly and e.actly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to hat specific act or thing is forbidden or re0uired. (!.S. vs. 'tchison, etc., R. #o., 6<9 Fed., 6>9, 67=.) ' party cannot be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the order. (6= #. D., 6B.) (n the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner as not forbidden by any order of the court, and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court. !pon principle the point is clear1 and although no case e.actly identical ith the present one has been called to our attention from the decisions of 'merican courts, something very similar is found in .x parte %a/e (=> Te.. #rim. Rep. 9B91 99 'm. St. Rep. 7<7). The facts involved in that case ere these+ ,ne :d ards had been charged ith the commission of a criminal offense in ,/lahoma, but he fled to the State of Te.as1 and upon re0uisition from the Eovernor of ,/lahoma, a arrant as issued by the Eovernor of Te.as for his arrest in that State. !pon his being arrested, application as made in his behalf before on of the Te.as courts for the rit of habeas corpus to secure his release. $uring the period hen the propriety of granting the
99
rit as under consideration in said court, one %a/e, the legally appointed e.tradition agent, acting under the authority of a proper arrant issued by the Eovernor of Te.as, obtained the custody of :d ards from the sheriff ho had him in charge and hurriedly departed ith the prisoner for ,/lahoma. The result as that the proceedings upon the application for the rit habeas corpus ere frustrated and the rit as in fact never issued J as occurred in the case no before us. The 2udge before hom the application for the rit of habeas corpus as pending thereupon caused %a/e to be arrested and fined him B@ dollars for the supposed contempt. (t as held by the Te.as #ourt of #riminal 'ppeals that his action could not be sustained and the 2udgment as reversed. 'mong the reasons stated for this decision as the fact that the alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the 2udge, for there as none of any character made in the case, Iand there as no order, decree, rit, or any other process in e.istence, forbidding him form doing 2ust hat he didI. Spea/ing further of this aspect of the case, the court said+ I&e have found no case authori5ing punishment by contempt for such conduct as is attributed to %a/e, and e believe none can be found. The authorities have been closely and e.haustively e.amined, and the rule deducible therefrom, is that unless the court has 2urisdiction of the supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process has been resisted or disobeyed, the court has no 2urisdiction to punish for contempt. Durisdiction over the party ill not confer po er to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the reasonable rules of the courtI. ( .x parte %a/e, supra.) The considerations found in that decision are applicable to the case no before us and corroborate the conclusion to be inevitably dra n form our o n provisions relative to contempt, namely, that the deportation of %ee Aic/ )on by the (nsular #ollector under the circumstances stated as not a contempt of court. Dudgment is reversed and the defendant absolved, ith costs de oficio. So ordered.
5apa& #.,. and +illamor& ,.& concur.
Se!#-#te O!inion$
MALCOLM2 J.$ dissenting+
( am in complete accord ith the decision of Dudge of First (nstance #oncepcion finding 8icente 'ldanese, (nsular #ollector for #ustoms, guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a nominal fine of PB@. This action of the trial court as 2ustified, considering that the #ollector of #ustoms deported a #hinese alien claiming to be a member to the household of the #onsul*Eeneral for #hina, during the pendency of the habeas corpusproceedings, in disregard of a 2udicial order, and to the great pre2udice of the rights of the alien. ' brief narration of the facts of record ill serve to demonstrate the correctness of the foregoing statements. The #hinaman %ee Aic/ )on arrived at the port of Fanila and as/ed for admission into the Philippine (slands on the ground that he as the coo/ of the #hinese #onsul*Eeneral. )e as refused admission by a ?oard of Special (n0uiry. The (nsular #ollector of #ustoms, in a decision filed on Duly ;;, 6C;@, affirmed the findings of the ?oard of Special (n0uiry and ordered that the alien be deported from the Philippine (slands to #hina. (mmediately on receipt of this order, counsel for the alien filed in the #ourt of First (nstance of Fanila a petition for a rit of habeas corpusin hich, among other things, it as alleged that the respondent #ollector of #ustoms held the petitioner for the purpose of deportation. :arly on the morning of Duly ;=, 6C;@, the )onorable Pedro #oncepcion, Dudge of Fist (nstance, (ssued an order directed to the #ollector of #ustoms re0uiring his appearance before the Dudge of First (nstance one ee/ later to sho cause hy the rit of habeas corpus prayed for should not issue. This order of the court as served on the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms by 'ntonio de la #ru5, deputy sheriff of the city of Fanila, in company ith a representative of the counsel for the petitioner, at appro.imately 6@.=@ on the morning of Duly ;=. Fr. 'ldanese as told INue ese chino se va a deportar y por eso la orden es esta.I (That that #hinaman ill be deported and therefore this is the order.) "evertheless, on the same afternoon at about < oHcloc/, the #hinese petitioner as placed on a boat and deported to )ong/ong. (t appears that hen the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms received the order of Dudge #oncepcion, he merely passed it on to Fr. ,bieta of the same office, ith this notation+ IFor ard these paper ith the case to the 'ttorney*Eeneral. J 8. '.I Fr. ,bieta found the papers on his des/ at about = oHcloc/ in the afternoon, and for arded them to Fr. Sotelo, the chief of the immigration division. Fr. Sotelo received the order on the follo ing morning, that is, subse0uent to the deportation of the alien. 'pparently, the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms had no e.act /no ledge of hat had actually occured, for on Duly ;<, he signed a letter re0uesting the 'ttorney*Eeneral to represent the interests of the Eovernment in the case. This the 'ttorney*Eeneral did by filing an ans er on Duly =@, 6C;@, or e.actly one ee/ after the #hinaman had been sent out of the country. These facts constitute, in my opinion, constructive con*tempt. Paraphrasing the definitions of contempt, there has been a disregard of, or disobedience to, the orders of a 2udicial body. 'n act has been done not in the presence of the court but at a distance, hich tends to belittle, to obstruct, to interrupt, and to embarrass the administration of 2ustice. (t matters not that Fr. 'ldanese had no malicious intention of refusing obedience to an order of the court, for it is the action done hich determined hether a contempt has been committed. (n the ords of #hief Dustice Taney, I's regards the 0uestion hether a contempt has or has not been committed, it does not depend on the intention of the party, but upon the act he has done. (t is a conclusion of la from the act1 disobedience to the legitimate authority of the court is, by la , a contempt, unless the party can sho sufficient causes to e.cuse it.I (&artman vs. &artman R67B=S, ;C Fed. #as. "o. 6>;6@.) &hether intentionally or unintentionally, hether maliciously or negligently, the result is as disastrous to the rights of the person ho might possibly have been granted admission to the Philippine (slands. Fines for contempt of court at least have the merit of ma/ing customs officials more careful in the performance of their duties. Faulty Eovernmental routine should not be permitted to defeat a rit as fundamental in nature as is habeas corpus. (t is said, ho ever, by the ma2ority, that for there to have been a contempt of court, the order issued by the 2udge should not only have been one re0uiring attendance to sho cause hy the rit should not issue, but should further have contained a clause in the nature of a preliminary in2unction. There is no gainsaying that a negative al ays ma/es an affirmative stronger. 't the same time it is not usually considered necessary for courts to e.plain their meaning by restating it in an opposite manner. The order issued by Dudge #oncepcion as a 2udicial one, a replica of hundreds of other, hich should have been respected by the respondent. (nstead, the action of the respondent made compliance impossible and served to defeat the
9>
petition for habeas corpus. From the moment the order as received by the respondent, the person of the petitioner la , and hen the respondent interfered ith such custody a contempt of court as committed.
as technically in the custody of the
(t is not desired by this opinion to critici5e unduly the conduct of the (nsular #ollector of #ustoms. (t is only desired to uphold the hands of the lo er court in the legitimate performance of its functions, and to ma/e /no n that such orders must be respected.
Araullo& ,.& concurs.
97
&R(T ,F 'FP'R, T): R!%: ," T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, Section 6. Petition. * The petition for a rit of amparo is a remedy available to any person hose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened ith violation by an unla ful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The rit shall cover e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Sec. ;. &ho Fay File. * The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any 0ualified person or entity in the follo ing order+ 6. 'ny member of the immediate family, namely+ the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party1 ;. 'ny ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party mentioned in the preceding paragraph1 or ithin the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
=. 'ny concerned citi5en, organi5ation, association or institution, if there is no /no n member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authori5ed parties to file similar petitions. %i/e ise, the filing of the petition by an authori5ed party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein. Sec. =. &here to File. * The petition may be filed on any day and at any time ith the Regional Trial #ourt of the place here the threat, act or omission as committed or any of its elements occurred, or ith the Sandiganbayan, the #ourt of 'ppeals, the Supreme #ourt, or any 2ustice of such courts. The rit shall be enforceable any here in the Philippines. &hen issued by a Regional Trial #ourt or any 2udge thereof, the rit shall be returnable before such court or 2udge. &hen issued by the Sandiganbayan or the #ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, it may be returnable before such court or any 2ustice thereof, or to any Regional Trial #ourt of the place here the threat, act or omission as committed or any of its elements occurred. &hen issued by the Supreme #ourt or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such #ourt or any 2ustice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the #ourt of 'ppeals or any of their 2ustices, or to any Regional Trial #ourt of the place here the threat, act or omission as committed or any of its elements occurred. Sec. <. "o $oc/et Fees. * The petitioner shall be e.empted from the payment of the doc/et and other la ful fees 2ustice or 2udge shall doc/et the petition and act upon it immediately. Sec. B. #ontents of Petition. * The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the follo ing+ 6. The personal circumstances of the petitioner1 hen filing the petition. The court,
;. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is un/no n or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation1 =. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened ith violation by an unla ful act or omission of the respondent, and ho such threat or violation is committed ith the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits1 <. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together ith any report1 B. The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to determine the fate or responsible for the threat, act or omission1 and 9. The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs. Sec. 9. (ssuance of the &rit. * !pon the filing of the petition, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall immediately order the issuance of the rit if on its face it ought to issue. The cler/ of court shall issue the rit under the seal of the court1 or in case of urgent necessity, the 2ustice or the 2udge may issue the rit under his or her o n hand, and may deputi5e any officer or person to serve it. The rit shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition hich shall not be later than seven (>) days from the date of its issuance. ho ell
hereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
Sec. >. Penalty for Refusing to (ssue or Serve the &rit. * ' cler/ of court ho refuses to issue the rit after its allo ance, or a deputi5ed person refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, 2ustice or 2udge for contempt ithout pre2udice to other disciplinary actions.
Sec. 7. )o the &rit is Served. * The rit shall be served upon the respondent by a 2udicial officer or by a person deputi5ed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge ho shall retain a copy on hich to ma/e a return of service. (n case the rit cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. Sec. C. Return1 #ontents. * &ithin seventy*t o (>;) hours after service of the supporting affidavits hich shall, among other things, contain the follo ing+ rit, the respondent shall file a verified ritten return together ith
6. The la ful defenses to sho through any act or omission1
that the respondent did not violate or threaten
ith violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party,
9C
;. The steps or actions ta/en by the respondent to determine the fate or the threat, act or omission1
hereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for
=. 'll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party1 and
<. (f the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or ill still be ta/en+
6. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party1 ;. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition prosecution of the person or persons responsible1 =. to identify itnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance1 <. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as about the death or disappearance1 ell as any pattern or practice that may have brought hich may aid in the
B. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and 9. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. ' general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allo ed. Republic of the 'hilippines $M'R.5. #OMRT 5anila .* %A*# A.5. *o. 3>7071G7$# October 1 & G33> . T(. RM9. O* T(. -RAT O" A5'ARO. (Amended $ection 0 D 11! R.$O9MTAO* 'ursuant to the action of the #ourt en banc in its session held on October 1 & G33>& .ections / and 00 of the Rule on the -rit of Amparo are hereby A5.*D.D to read as follows@ .ec. /. 1eturn& Contents. ) Within +#V* 234 W-15#N6 (%7. after service of the writ$ the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall$ among other things$ contain the following: 2a4 The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life$ liberty and security of the aggrieved party$ through any act or omission& 2b4 The steps or actions ta!en by the possession to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat$ act or omission& 2c4 %ll relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat$ act or omission against the aggrieved party& and 2d4 #f the respondent is a public official or employee$ the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be ta!en: 2i4 to verify the identity of the aggrieved party& 2ii4 to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible& 2iii4 to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance& 2iv4 to determine the cause$ manner$ location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance& 2v4 to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance& and 2vi4 to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
>@
Sec. 6@. $efenses not Pleaded $eemed &aived. * 'll defenses shall be raised in the return, other ise, they shall be deemed aived. Sec. 66. Prohibited Pleadings and Fotions. * The follo ing pleadings and motions are prohibited+ 6. Fotion to dismiss1 ;. Fotion for e.tension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings1 =. $ilatory motion for postponement1 <. Fotion for a bill of particulars1 B. #ounterclaim or cross*claim1 9. Third*party complaint1 >. Reply1 7. Fotion to declare respondent in default1 C. (ntervention1 6@. Femorandum1 66. Fotion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders1 and 6;. Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. T(. '.RAOD TO "A9. A R.TMR* #A**OT %. .BT.*D.D .B#.'T O* (A/(96 5.RATORAOM$ /ROM*D. The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation& its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed@ .ec. 00. Prohibited Pleadings and 'otions.) The following pleadings and motion are prohibited: 2a4 'otion to dismiss& 2b4 'otion for e8tension of time to file opposition$ affidavit$ position paper and other pleadings& 2c4 (ilatory motion for postponement& 2d4 'otion for a bill of particulars& 2e4 Counterclaim or cross)claim& 2f4 Third)party complaint& 2g4 1eply& 2h4 'otion to declare respondent in default& 2i4 #ntervention& 2"4 'emorandum& 2!4 'otion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders& and 2l4 Petition for certiorari$ mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. The amendments to the 1ule shall ta!e effect on -ctober 9:$ 9;;< following its publication in three 2=4 newspapers of general circulation. -ctober 0>$ 9;;< Sec. 6;. :ffect of Failure to File Return. * (n case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall proceed to hear the petition e. parte. Sec. 6=. Summary )earing. * The hearing on the petition shall be summary. )o ever, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus. Sec. 6<. (nterim Reliefs. * !pon filing of the petition or at anytime before final 2udgment, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may grant any of the follo ing reliefs+ (a) Temporary Protection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of /eeping and securing their safety. (f the petitioner is an organi5ation, association or institution referred to in Section =(c) of this Rule, the protection may be e.tended to the officers involved.
>6
The Supreme #ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall e.tend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance ith guidelines hich it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply ith the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge. (b) (nspection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant ob2ect or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. (t shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of /no ledge of the enforced disappearance or hereabouts of the aggrieved party. itnesses having personal
(f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must sho that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori5ed to ma/e the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of ma/ing the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall e.pire five (B) days after the date of its issuance, unless e.tended for 2ustifiable reasons. (c) Production ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, boo/s, accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, or ob2ects in digiti5ed or electronic form, hich constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, 2ustice or 2udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (d) &itness Protection ,rder. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the itnesses to the $epartment of Dustice for admission to the &itness Protection, Security and ?enefit Program, pursuant to Republic 'ct "o. 9C76. The court, 2ustice or 2udge may also refer the itnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of /eeping and securing their safety. Sec. 6B. 'vailability of (nterim Reliefs to Respondent. * !pon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section. ' motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of of the respondent. itnesses having personal /no ledge of the defenses hich case the court, 2ustice or 2udge
Sec. 69. #ontempt. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge may order the respondent ho refuses to ma/e a return, or ho ma/es a false return, or any person ho other ise disobeys or resists a la ful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. Sec. 6>. ?urden of Proof and Standard of $iligence Re0uired. * The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent ho is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable la s, rules and regulations as observed in the performance of duty. The respondent ho is a public official or employee must prove that e.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable la s, rules and regulations as observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invo/e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. Sec. 67. Dudgment. * The court shall render 2udgment ithin ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the rit and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 other ise, the privilege shall be denied. Sec. 6C. 'ppeal. * 'ny party may appeal from the final 2udgment or order to the Supreme #ourt under Rule <B. The appeal may raise 0uestions of fact or la or both. The period of appeal shall be five (B) or/ing days from the date of notice of the adverse 2udgment. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. Sec. ;@. 'rchiving and Revival of #ases. * The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or itnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. ' periodic revie of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival hen ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed ith pre2udice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of t o (;) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The cler/s of court shall submit to the ,ffice of the #ourt 'dministrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first of Danuary of every year. ee/
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Sec. ;6. (nstitution of Separate 'ctions. * This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. Sec. ;;. :ffect of Filing of a #riminal 'ction. * &hen a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the rit shall be filed. The reliefs under the rit shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the rit of amparo. Sec. ;=. #onsolidation. * &hen a criminal action is filed subse0uent to the filing of a petition for the rit, the latter shall be consolidated ith the criminal action. &hen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse0uent to a petition for a rit of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated ith the criminal action. 'fter consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. Sec. ;<. Substantive Rights. * This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recogni5ed and protected by the #onstitution. Sec. ;B. Suppletory 'pplication of the Rules of #ourt. * The Rules of #ourt shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent ith this Rule. Sec. ;9. 'pplicability to Pending #ases. * This Rule shall govern cases involving e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. Sec. ;>. :ffectivity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, follo ing its publication in three (=) ne spapers of general circulation.
Republic of the Philippines S!PR:F: #,!RT Fanila :" ?'"# '.F. "o. @>*C*6;*S# $eptember GH& G33>
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'cting on the recommendation of the #hairperson of the #ommittee on Revision of the Rules of #ourt submitting for this #ourt-s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the &rit of 'mparo, the #ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. This Rule shall ta/e effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, follo ing its publication in three (=) ne spapers of general circulation. Septermber ;B, ;@@>.
(Sgd.) R:"'T, S. P!", #hief ,ustice
Special Proceedings Finals 8.R. No. 146640 Fe+-)#-y 112 2010
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8EN. ALEKANDER 6. 7ANO2 C&ie* o* St#**2 A-'e. Fo-ce$ o* t&e P&i i!!ine$2 LT. 8EN. ;ICTOR S. I6RADO2 Co''#n.in% 8ene-# 2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 #n. MA9. 8EN. RALP: A. ;ILLANUE;A2 Co''#n.e-2 1t& In*#nt-y Di,i$ion2 P&i i!!ine A-'y2 Petitioners, vs. CLEOFAS SANC:E? #n. MARCIANA MEDINA2 Respondents.
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CARPIO MORALES2 J.:
,n $ecember ;7, ;@@>, respondent #leofas Sanche5 (#leofas) filed before this #ourt a petition doc/eted as E.R. "o. 67@7=C for issuance of a &rit of 'mparo ith Fotion for Production and (nspection directed against Een. )ermogenes :speron (Een. :speron), the then #hief of Staff of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP). ,n Danuary ;, ;@@7, the #ourt6 resolved to issue a &rit of 'mparo and ordered Een. :speron to ma/e a verified return of the rit before #ourt of 'ppeals Dustice :dgardo Sundiam, ho as ordered to hear and decide the case hich as eventually redoc/eted as #'*E.R. SP "o. @@@6@ &RG'. #leofas amended her petition; on Danuary 6<, ;@@7 to include herein co*respondent Farciana Fedina (Farciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to implead other military officers= including %t. 'li Sumangil (%t. Sumangil) and Sgt. Eil 8illalobos< (Sgt. 8illalobos) as therein additional respondents. (n the 'mended Petition, #leofas and Farciana (respondents) alleged that on September 6>, ;@@9 at around 7+@@ p.m., their respective sons "icolas Sanche5 and )eherson Fedina ere catching frogs outside their home in Sitio $alin, ?arangay ?ueno, #apas, Tarlac1 that at around 6+@@ a.m. of the ne.t day, September 67, ;@@9, "icolas- I ivesI %ourde5 and Rosalie Sanche5, ho ere then at home, heard gunshots and sa armed men in soldiersuniforms passing by1 that at around <+@@ a.m. of the same day, %ourde5 and Rosalie ent out to chec/ on "icolas and )eherson but only sa their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as ell as bloodstains1 and that they immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials. Respondents narrated that they, together ith other family members, proceeded on September 6C, ;@@9 to the #apas Station of the Philippine "ational Police (P"P). 'ccompanied by officials of the "ational #ommission on (ndigenous Peoples ("#(P), B they also tried to search for "icolas and )eherson at the #amp $etachment of the >6st (nfantry ?atallion of the Philippine 'rmy ('rmy) in ?arangay ?urgos, San Dose, Tarlac, and at the #amp of the ?ravo #ompany of the 'rmy-s >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita, Tarlac #ity, but to no avail. Furthermore, respondents alleged that Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria, also /no n as 'ntonina Ealang (Dosephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that she had seen t o men inside #amp Servillano '0uino of the "orthern %u5on #ommand ("olcom) in San Figuel, Tarlac #ity on September ;6, ;@@9, hom Dosephine later identified as "icolas and )eherson (the victims) after respondents had sho n her their photographs1 and that Dosephine informed them that she sa the victims again on September ;<, ;@@9 and "ovember 6, ;@@9, 9 this time at the #amp of the ?ravo #ompany of the 'rmy-s >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita, here she had occasion to tal/ to %t. Sumangil and Sgt. 8illalobos. Respondents filed a case on $ecember ;6, ;@@9 before the #ommission on )uman Rights (#)R), hich endorsed > the same to the ,mbudsman for appropriate action. #ontending that the victims- life, liberty and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for the issuance of a rit of 'mparo, the production of the victims- bodies during the hearing on the &rit, the inspection of certain military camps,7 the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of 2udgment under Section 67 of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo. C Fean hile, a consolidated Return of the &rit, 6@ verified by Een. :speron, %t. Sumangil, Sgt. 8illalobos, Fa2. Een. Duanito Eome5 (Fa2. Een. Eome5) as #ommander of the 'rmy-s >th (nfantry $ivision, and %t. #ol. 8ictor ?ayani (%t. #ol. ?ayani) as #amp #ommander of #amp Servillano '0uino of the "olcom in Tarlac #ity, as filed ith the appellate court on Danuary ;<, ;@@7. %t. Een. 'le.ander Aano (%t. Een. Aano), #ommanding Eeneral of the 'rmy, filed a Return of the &rit upon his return from an official trip abroad. (n their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited that the proper remedy of respondents as to file a petition for the issuance of a &rit of )abeas #orpus, since the petition-s ultimate ob2ective as the production of the bodies of the victims, as they ere allegedly abducted and illegally detained by military personnel1 66 that the petition failed to indicate the matters re0uired by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section B of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo, such that the allegations ere incomplete to constitute a cause of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best, speculative1 that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other competent persons hich ould clearly validate their claim that the military violated the victims- right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining them1 and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction attributable to the military officers ith respect to their duties1 or allege that respondents too/ any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military camps adverted to in order to verify Dosephine-s claim that she sa the victims on t o different occasions inside the camps, or that they too/ efforts to follo up on the P"P #apas Station-s further action on their complaint. 6; $enying he violated the victims- right to life, liberty and security, Een. :speron specifically asserted that, in compliance ith the $efense Secretary-s directive in relation to cases of &rit of 'mparo against the 'FP, he issued directives to the "olcom #ommander and the 'rmy-s #ommanding Eeneral to investigate and establish the circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units as concerned1 and undertoo/ to bring any military personnel involved, hen arranted by the evidence, to the bar of 2ustice. 6= Fa2. Een. Eome5 li/e ise denied having custody or /no ledge of the hereabouts of the victims, stating that it as not army policy to abduct civilians in his area of responsibility, 6< and that he as a ay on official business at the time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.6B %t. #ol. ?ayani attested that he as designated #amp #ommander only on September 6, ;@@> and thus had no personal /no ledge about the victimsalleged disappearance or abduction on September 67, ;@@91 that he as informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals ere detained in the camp as it did not even have detention facilities1 and that in compliance ith Een. :speron-s directive, their command as conducting further investigation to verify the allegations in the petition.69
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%t. Sumangil denied having spo/en to Dosephine inside the camp on September ;<, ;@@9, on hich date civilians ere not allo ed to enter e.cept on official missions or hen duly authori5ed to conduct transactions inside the camp. )e thus concluded that Dosephine lied in claiming to have seen the t o victims inside the #amp of the ?ravo #ompany of the >6st (nfantry ?atallion inside )acienda %uisita on September ;<, ;@@9 or at any time thereafter. )e instead recounted that on September ;<, ;@@9, he spo/e for the first and only time, but only at the gate of the camp, ith a person ho identified herself as I'ntonina Ealang,I ho informed him about the disappearance of the victims since September 67, ;@@9. &arning him that these men ere members of the "e People-s 'rmy ("P'), she advised him not to entertain any 0ueries or complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.6> Sgt. 8illalobos echoed Sumangil-s disclaimer about having any of the victims in his custody or meeting anyone named Dosephine 8ictoria, or about the latter having entered the camp-s /itchen to drin/ ater. %t. Een. Aano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he immediately in0uired on the actions ta/en on the case. )e averred that he had never participated directly or indirectly1 or consented, permitted or sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations. )e declared that it had al ays been his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of la , and to bring those ho violated the la before the court of 2ustice. (n opposing the re0uest for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart from compromising national security should entry into these military campsGbases be allo ed, these orders partoo/ of the nature of a search arrant, such that the re0uisites for the issuance thereof must be complied ith prior to their issuance. They ent on to argue that such re0uest relied solely on bare, self*serving and vague allegations contained in Dosephine-s affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she sa "icolas and )eherson on board an army truc/ near the "olcom gate and, days later, inside the /itchen of the >6st (nfantry ?attalion #amp inside )acienda %uisita and hile logging outside said camp, Dosephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the veracity of the places here she allegedly sa "icolas and )eherson. 67 ,n hether the impleaded military officers ere either directly or indirectly connected ith the disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after hearing, absolved, by the assailed $ecision of September 6>, ;@@7,6C Een. :speron, %t. Een. Aano, Fa2. Een. Eome5, and %t. #ol. ?ayani for lac/ of evidence lin/ing them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follo s+ 'll said, this #ourt is convinced that petitioners have not ade0uately and convincingly established any direct or indirect lin/ bet een respondents individual military officers and the disappearances of "icolas and )eherson."either did the concerned Philippine 'rmy !nits have e.erted fully their efforts to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of 2ustice. The concerned Philippine 'rmy units (such as the "orthern #ommand and the >th (nfantry $ivision, hich had 2urisdiction over the place of disappearance of "icolas and )eherson, should e.ert e.traordinary diligence to follo all possible leads to solve the disappearances of "icolas and )eherson. The Philippine 'rmy should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the people and the State. R:%(:FS &hile as &e stated hereinbefore that &e could not find any lin/ bet een respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of "icolas and )eherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the t o men are still missing. )ence, &e find it e0uitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of human rights and 2ustice as follo s+ 6. (nspections of the follo ing camps+ #amp Servillano '0uino, San Figuel, Tarlac #ity, any military camp of the >th (nfantry $ivision located in '0ua Farm, )acienda %uisita, Tarlac #ity, ithin reasonable or/ing hours of any day e.cept hen the military camp is on red alert status. ;. Thorough and (mpartial (nvestigation for the appropriate (nvestigating !nit of the Philippine 'rmy at #amp Servillano '0uino and the Philippine 'rmy, >th (nfantry $ivision in Fort Fagsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of "icolas and )eherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their ritten report to this #ourt ithin three (=) months from notice. S, ,R$:R:$.;@ (underscoring supplied) The military officers filed a Fotion for Partial Reconsideration (Fotion), arguing in the main that since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs.;6 The appellate court denied the Fotion by the assailed Resolution of Farch =, ;@@C.;; Ta/ing up the cudgels for the military, Een. 'le.ander Aano,;= %t. Een. 8ictor (brado,;< and Fa2. Een. Ralph 8illanueva;B (petitioners) filed the present petition for revie of the appellate court-s assailed issuances, faulting it for . . . ",T #'T:E,R(#'%%A $:"A("E T): PR(8(%:E: ,F T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, P!RS!'"T T, S:#T(," 67 ,F T): R!%: ," T): &R(T ,F 'FP'R, $:SP(T: (TS F("$("E T)'T R:SP,"$:"TS F'(%:$ T, PR,8: T):(R '%%:E'T(,"S (" T):(R P:T(T(," F,R 'FP'R, ?A S!?ST'"T('% :8($:"#:. . . . R'"$S . . . $(R:#T("E P:T(T(,":RS T,+ (') '%%,& R:SP,"$:"TS T, ("SP:#T #'FP S:R8(%%'", 'N!(",, ",RT) %!L," #,FF'"$, P)(%(PP(": 'RFA, S'" F(E!:%, T'R%'# #(TA '"$ '"A F(%(T'RA #'FP ,F T): >th ("F'"TRA $(8(S(," %,#'T:$ (" 'N!' F'RF, )'#(:"$' %!(S(T', T'R%'# #(TA1 '"$. (?) #,"$!#T T),R,!E) '"$ (FP'RT('% ("8:ST(E'T(," ,F T): $(S'PP:'R'"#: ,F T): 'EER(:8:$ P'RT(:S, F(%: #)'RE:S 'E'("ST T),S: F,!"$ E!(%TA '"$ S!?F(T &R(TT:" R:P,RT &(T)(" T)R:: F,"T)S FR,F ",T(#:. ;9 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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The #ourt finds merit in the petition. (n ruling in favor of %t. Sumangil and Sgt. 8illalobos, the appellate court resolved the case on the basis of the credibility of Dosephine as a arrived at the follo ing findings+ itness. (t
To prove that these t o military officers too/ or have custody of "icolas and )eherson, petitioners presented Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria, also /no n as 'ntonina Ealang, a niece of petitioner #leofas Sanche5- neighbor, ho allegedly sa "icolas and )eherson inside #amp Servillano '0uino on September ;6, ;@@9 hen she visited her uncle, a certain Fa2or )enry Ealang, ho is allegedly living inside the camp1 that a fe days later, she again sa "icolas and )eherson at '0ua Farm at )acienda %uisita, here the camp of ?ravo #ompany of the >6st (nfantry ?attalion is located and here )eherson as seen s eeping the floor and "icolas as seen coo/ing, having ounds in their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot ound1 that on "ovember 6, ;@@9, she ent bac/ upon advice of %t. Sumangil to give her a cellfone hich Tech. Sgt. 8illalobos handed to her for her to /no here "icolas and )eherson ill be brought1 that they RsicS sa the t o outside getting some oods under the atchful eye of a soldier hen Sumangil /ic/ed "icolas for being slo and thereafter, she did not see the t o anymore. &hile Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s story of ho she sa the sub2ect t o missing persons ("icolas and )eherson) appeared initially as plausible, ho ever, her credibility as a itness had been successfully destroyed by the follo ing itnesses presented by the respondents. 6) ?arangay #aptain Rodolfo P. Supan of #ut*#ut ((, Tarlac #ity, attested that she /no s a certain oman named Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria ho introduces herself as 'ntonina Ealang, niece through the cousin of his ife and a long*time resident of #ut*#ut (( since birth until she lived ith her partner Philip 8ictoria and they still visit and goes to her auntie or sibling-s house1 that he /no s the reputation of Dosephine 8ictoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her truthfulness and integrity, /no n to fool others and invents stories for money reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before Eod and the State. ;) 's if that is not yet enough, Eloria Ealang Fansalay testified that she is a resident of #ut*#ut (( since birth in 6C9< and she /no s Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother1 that she even too/ care of 'ntonina as a child but her general reputation in telling the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, /no n to fool others, a liar and invent RsicS stories for reason of money. =) #larita Ealang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of #ut*cut (( and 'ntonina Ealang is a niece and attested the same negative reputations against 'ntonina. (t appears that said negative testimonies of Dosephine Ealang 8ictoria-s relatives ere never successfully rebutted by her and the #ourt gives credence to them. "o ill motive RsicS ere established against the said itnesses to testify against 'ntonina Ealang. Furthermore, 'ntonina Ealang stated that she as in #amp Servillano '0uino hen she first sa "icolas and )eherson riding in an army truc/ because she as visiting her uncle, Fa2or )enry Ealang, allegedly living in the camp. Parenthetically, this story of 'ntonina Ealang as put to doubt. TSE :dgard Reyes ho attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Fa2or Ealang as no longer residing there in September ;@@9. This testimony and revelation of TSE Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other itnesses on 'ntonina Ealang-s penchant to invent stories or tell a lie. (n sum, &e are not inclined to give credence to the claims of 'ntonina Ealang that the t o missing person RsicS she sa first in #amp Servillano '0uino and later, in '0ua Farm, ere "icolas and )eherson. "otably, 'ntonina Ealang never did see the faces of the t o but ere /no n to her through photographs. #ertainly, there may be a difference bet een photographs and the faces in person. To be noted also is that even the t o ives of "icolas did not ma/e an e.press attestation that they sa "icolas and )eherson in the company of those armed men ho passed their place in the early morning of September 67, ;@@9.;> (underscoring supplied) ",T'?%A, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate court-s September 6>, ;@@7 $ecision. The entrenched procedural rule in this 2urisdiction is that a party ho did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the 2udgment modified. 'll that said appellee can do is to ma/e a counter*assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the 2udgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a 8uo or raised in the appellant-s assignment of errors or arguments.;7 This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in ma/ing its determinations. ' party ho fails to ac0uire complete relief from a decision of the court has various remedies to correct an omission by the court. )e may move for a correction or clarification of 2udgment, or even see/ its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the #ourt to s/ip the rule and e.cuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties- contentions that have remained disputed.;C &hat is thus left for the #ourt to resolve is the issue of evidence are valid and proper. hether the grant of the R:%(:FS =@ by the appellate court after finding ant of substantial
Sections 6> and 67 of the 'mparo Rule lay do n the re0uisite standard of proof necessary to prove either party-s claim, vi5+ S:#. 6>. ?urden of Proof and Standard of $iligence Re0uired. * The parties shall establish their claim by substantial evidence. The respondent ho is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable la s, rules and regulations observed in the performance of duty. as
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The respondent ho is a public official or employee must prove that e.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable la s, rules and regulations observed in the performance of duty.
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The respondent public official or employee cannot invo/e the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. S:#. 67. Dudgment. * The #ourt shall render 2udgment ithin ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the rit and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 other ise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The re0uisite standard of proof substantial evidence * spea/s of the clear intent of the Rule to have the e0uivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit 2udicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that standard substantial evidence hich a reasonable mind might accept as ade0uate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse 2udgment, the appellate court-s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, no beyond the ambit of revie . Fean hile, the re0uirement for a government official or employee to observe e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the e.traordinary measures e.pected to be ta/en in safeguarding every citi5en-s constitutional rights as ell as in the investigation of cases of e.tra*2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances.=6 The failure to establish that the public official observed e.traordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo rit. (t does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides, ho ever, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. (n line ith this, Section 6< of the 'mparo Rule provides for inte-i' o- !-o,i$ion# -e ie*$ that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the itnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, vi5+ S:#. 6<. Anterim Reliefs. J !pon filing of the petition o- #t #nyti'e +e*o-e *in# B).%'ent , the court, 2ustice or 2udge may grant any of the follo ing reliefs+ (a) Temporary 'rotection Order. J The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of /eeping and securing their safety. (f the petitioner is an organi5ation, association or institution referred to in Section = (c) of this Rule, the protection may be e.tended to the officers involved. The Supreme #ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall e.tend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance ith guidelines hich it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply ith the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge. (b) Anspection Order. J The court, 2ustice or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant ob2ect or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. (t shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of /no ledge of the enforced disappearance or hereabouts of the aggrieved party. itnesses having personal
(f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must sho that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori5ed to ma/e the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of ma/ing the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall e.pire five (B) days after the date of its issuance, unless e.tended for 2ustifiable reasons. (c) 'roduction Order. J The court, 2ustice, or 2udge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, boo/s, accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, or ob2ects in digiti5ed or electronic form, hich constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. hich case the court, 2ustice or 2udge
The court, 2ustice or 2udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a 2udicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of "icolas and )eherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync ith a finding that petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to hether the reliefs granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this #ourt to modify the appellate court-s 2udgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the production of logboo/s and reports.=; 't this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in their #omment. "o modification of 2udgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.== (f respondents believed that the September 6>, ;@@7 $ecision of the appellate court as merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to 0uestion the conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners- motion for reconsideration filed ith the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading=< under the 'mparo Rule, but they did not. &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'"T:$. The assailed September 6>, ;@@7 $ecision and Farch =, ;@@C Resolution of the #ourt of 'ppeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier*0uoted reliefs are SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice
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8.R. No. 140506
Octo+e- 12 2004
T:E SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE2 T:E C:IEF OF STAFF2 ARMED FORCES OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 petitioners, vs. RA7MOND MANALO #n. RE7NALDO MANALO2 respondents.
$:#(S(,"
PUNO2 C.J.3
&hile victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the orld behind secret alls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching s/y that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a rit of Amparo filed before this #ourt. This is an appeal via Petition for Revie under Rule <B of the Rules of #ourt in relation to Section 6C 6 of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo, see/ing to reverse and set aside on both 0uestions of fact and la , the $ecision promulgated by the #ourt of 'ppeals in #.'. E.R. A5'ARO "o. @@@@6, entitled IRaymond Fanalo and Reynaldo Fanalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of "ational $efense, the #hief of Staff, 'rmed Forces of the Philippines, respondents.I This case as originally a Petition for Prohibition, (n2unction, and Temporary Restraining ,rder (TR,) ; filed before this #ourt by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on 'ugust ;=, ;@@> to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) andGor their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective #ustody ,rders, 'ppointment of #ommissioner, (nspection and 'ccess ,rders, and all other legal and e0uitable reliefs under 'rticle 8(((, Section B(B) = of the 6C7> #onstitution and Rule 6=B, Section 9 of the Rules of #ourt. (n our Resolution dated 'ugust ;<, ;@@>, e (6) ordered the Secretary of the $epartment of "ational $efense and the #hief of Staff of the 'FP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the #iti5ens 'rmed Forces Eeographical !nit (#'FE!) to submit their #omment1 and (;) en2oined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or other ise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under 'rticle (((, Section 6< of the 6C7> #onstitution.B &hile the 'ugust ;=, ;@@> Petition as pending, the Rule on the &rit of Amparo too/ effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>. Forth ith, therein petitioners filed a Fanifestation and ,mnibus Fotion to Treat :.isting Petition as AmparoPetition, to 'dmit Supporting 'ffidavits, and to Erant (nterim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that+ (6) the petition be considered a Petition for the &rit of Amparo under Sec. ;99 of the Amparo Rule1 (;) the #ourt issue the rit commanding therein respondents to ma/e a verified return ithin the period provided by la and containing the specific matter re0uired by la 1 (=) they be granted the interim reliefs allo ed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule1 (<) the #ourt, after hearing, render 2udgment as re0uired in Sec. 67> of the Amparo Rule1 and (B) all other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs.7 ,n ,ctober ;B, ;@@>, the #ourt resolved to treat the 'ugust ;=, ;@@> Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, vi2+ &):R:F,R:, let a &R(T ,F 'FP'R, be issued to respondents re0uiring them to file ith the #' (#ourt of 'ppeals) a verified ritten return ithin five (B) or/ing days from service of the rit. &e R:F'"$ the petition to the #' and designate the $ivision of 'ssociate Dustice %ucas P. ?ersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on "ovember 7, ;@@> at ;+@@ p.m. and decide the petition in accordance ith the Rule on the &rit of Amparo.C ,n $ecember ;9, ;@@>, the #ourt of 'ppeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of reads, vi2+ ACCORDIN8L7, the PRI;ILE8E OF T:E @RIT OF AMPARO is 8RANTED. The respondents SECRETAR7 OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP C:IEF OF STAFF are hereby R:N!(R:$+ 6. To furnish to the petitioners and to this #ourt ithin five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation underta/en in connection ith their case, e.cept those already on file herein1 ;. To confirm in riting the present places of official assignment of FGSgt )ilario a/a Rollie #astillo and $onald #aigas days from notice of this decision. ithin five hich
=. To cause to be produced to this #ourt all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) ho attended to them from February 6<, ;@@9 until 'ugust 6;, ;@@> ithin five days from notice of this decision. The compliance ith this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent 'FP #hief of Staff or his duly authori5ed deputy, the latterHs authority to be e.press and made apparent on the face of the s orn compliance ith this directive. S, ,R$:R:$.6@ )ence, this appeal. (n resolving this appeal, e first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents+ Respondent Raymond Fanalo recounted that about one or t o ee/s before February 6<, ;@@9, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the #'FE! summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San (delfonso, ?ulacan. Respondents ere not able to attend as they ere not informed of the gathering, but Raymond sa some of the soldiers hen he passed by the barangay hall.66
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,n February 6<, ;@@9, Raymond as sleeping in their house in ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan. 't past noon, several armed soldiers earing hite shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They as/ed him if he as ?estre, but his mother, :ster Fanalo, replied that he as Raymond, not ?estre. The armed soldier slapped him on both chee/s and nudged him in the stomach. )e as then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face do n. )e as /ic/ed on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. )e told his mother to follo him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. 6; 'mong the men ho came to ta/e him, Raymond recogni5ed brothers Fichael de la #ru5, Fadning de la #ru5, IPutiI de la #ru5, and IPulaI de la #ru5, ho all acted as loo/out. They ere all members of the #'FE! and residing in Fanu5on, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan. )e also recogni5ed brothers Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a, also members of the #'FE!. &hile he as being forcibly ta/en, he also sa outside of his house t o barangaycouncilors, Pablo #unanan and ?ernardo %ingasa, ith some soldiers and armed men.6= The men forced Raymond into a hite %=@@ van. ,nce inside, he as blindfolded. ?efore being blindfolded, he sa the faces of the soldiers ho too/ him. %ater, in his 67 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one ho drove the van as Ri5al )ilario alias Rollie #astillo, hom he estimated as about <@ years of age or older. The leader of the team ho entered his house and abducted him as IEanata.I )e as tall, thin, curly*haired and a bit old. 'nother one of his abductors as IEeorgeI ho as tall, thin, hite*s/inned and about =@ years old. 6< The van drove off, then came to a stop. ' person as brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. ?oth of them ere beaten up. ,n the road, he recogni5ed the voice of the person beside him as his brother ReynaldoHs. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo ere each brought to a different room. &ith the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond sa several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body ith the butt of their guns for about 6B minutes. 'fter hich, Reynaldo as brought to his (RaymondHs) room and it as his (RaymondHs) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers as/ed him if he as a member of the "e PeopleHs 'rmy. :ach time he said he as not, he as hit ith the butt of their guns. )e as 0uestioned here his comrades ere, ho many soldiers he had /illed, and ho many "P' members he had helped. :ach time he ans ered none, they hit him. 6B (n the ne.t days, RaymondHs interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers ho beat him up ould salute them, call them Isir,I and treat them ith respect. )e as in blindfolds hen interrogated by the high officials, but he sa their faces hen they arrived and before the blindfold as put on. )e noticed that the uniform of the high officials as different from those of the other soldiers. ,ne of those officials as tall and thin, ore hite pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. )e spo/e in Tagalog and /ne much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection ith the respondentsH abduction. 69 &hile these officials interrogated him, Raymond as not manhandled. ?ut once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. &hen the guards got drun/, they also manhandled respondents. $uring this time, Raymond as fed only at night, usually ith left*over and rotten food.6> ,n the third ee/ of respondentsH detention, t o men arrived hile Raymond as sleeping and beat him up. They doused him ith urine and hot ater, hit his stomach ith a piece of ood, slapped his forehead t ice ith a .<B pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body ith a burning ood. &hen he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then sub2ected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. ?efore their torturers left, they arned Raymond that they ould come bac/ the ne.t day and /ill him. 67 The follo ing night, Raymond attempted to escape. )e aited for the guards to get drun/, then made noise ith the chains put on him to see if they ere still a a/e. &hen none of them came to chec/ on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and 2umped through the indo . )e passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond here he used stones to brea/ his chains. 'fter al/ing through a forested area, he came near a river and an (glesia ni Mristo church. )e tal/ed to some omen ho ere doing the laundry, as/ed here he as and the road to Eapan. )e as told that he as in Fort Fagsaysay. 6C )e reached the high ay, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run a ay. The soldiers chased him and caught up ith him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of hat he sa as Fort Fagsaysay. )e as bo.ed repeatedly, /ic/ed, and hit ith chains until his bac/ bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so*called IFamI or IFadamI suddenly called, saying that she anted to see Raymond before he as /illed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he as returned inside Fort Fagsaysay here Reynaldo as detained. ;@ For some ee/s, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their resumed, particularly hen respondentsH guards got drun/.;6 ounds ere treated. &hen the ounds ere almost healed, the torture
Raymond recalled that sometime in 'pril until Fay ;@@9, he as detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. )e stayed all the time in that small room measuring 6 . ; meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bo els, bathing, eating and sleeping. )e counted that eighteen people;; had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.;= For about three and a half months, the respondents ere detained in Fort Fagsaysay. They ere /ept in a small house ith t o rooms and a /itchen. ,ne room as made into the bartolina. The house as near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. 't da n, soldiers marched by their house. They ere also sometimes detained in hat he only /ne as the I$T!.I;< 't the $T!, a male doctor came to e.amine respondents. )e chec/ed their body and eyes, too/ their urine samples and mar/ed them. &hen as/ed ho they ere feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs ere aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The ne.t day, t o ladies in hite arrived. They also e.amined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amo.icillin and mefenamic acid. They brought ith them the results of respondentsH urine test and advised them to drin/ plenty of ater and ta/e their medicine. The t o ladies returned a fe more times. Thereafter, medicines ere sent through the ImasterI of the $T!, IFasterI $el Rosario alias #arinyoso at Puti. Respondents ere /ept in the $T! for about t o ee/s. &hile there, he met a soldier named :fren ho said that Een. Palparan ordered him to monitor and ta/e care of them. ;B ,ne day, Ri5al )ilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along ith :fren and several other armed men earing fatigue suits, ent to a detachment in Pinaud, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan. Respondents ere detained for one or t o ee/s in a big t o*storey house. )ilario and :fren stayed ith them. &hile there, Raymond as beaten up by )ilarioHs men.;9 From Pinaud, )ilario and :fren brought respondents to Sapang, San Figuel, ?ulacan on board the Revo. They ere detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of IMapitanI for about three months. &hen they arrived in Sapang, Een. Palparan tal/ed to them. They ere brought out of the house to a bas/etball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Een. Palparan as already aiting, seated. )e as about t o armsH length
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a ay from respondents. )e began by as/ing if respondents felt ell already, to hich Raymond replied in the affirmative. )e as/ed Raymond if he /ne him. Raymond lied that he did not. )e then as/ed Raymond if he ould be scared if he ere made to face Een. Palparan. Raymond responded that he ould not be because he did not believe that Een. Palparan as an evil man.;> Raymond narrated his conversation ith Een. Palparan in his affidavit, vi2+
Tinanong a/o ni Een. Palparan, I"gayon na /aharap mo na a/o, di /a ba natata/ot sa a/inKI Sumagot a/ong, ISiyempre po, natata/ot din...I Sabi ni Een. Palparan+ ISige, bibigyan /o /ayo ng isang pag/a/ataon na mabuhay, bastaHt sundin nHyo ang lahat ng sasabihin /o... sabihin mo sa magulang mo * hu ag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Marapatan at sa )uman Right dahil nilolo/o lang /ayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na hu ag palo/o doon. Tulungan /ami na /ausapin si ?estre na sumu/o na sa gobyerno.I;7 Respondents agreed to do as Een. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do other ise. 't about =+@@ in the morning, )ilario, :fren and the formerHs men * the same group that abducted them * brought them to their parentsH house. Raymond as sho n to his parents hile Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not al/. (n the presence of )ilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents hat Een. Palparan told him. 's they ere afraid, RaymondHs parents acceded. )ilario threatened RaymondHs parents that if they continued to 2oin human rights rallies, they ould never see their children again. The respondents ere then brought bac/ to Sapang. ;C &hen respondents arrived bac/ in Sapang, Een. Palparan as about to leave. )e as tal/ing ith the four ImastersI ho ere there+ 'rman, Eanata, )ilario and #abalse.=@ &hen Een. Palparan sa Raymond, he called for him. )e as in a big hite vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Een. Palparan told him to gain bac/ his strength and be healthy and to ta/e the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. )e said the medicine as e.pensive at Php=B.@@ each, and ould ma/e them strong. )e also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and arned that they ould not be given another chance.=6 $uring his testimony, Raymond identified Een. Palparan by his picture.=; ,ne of the soldiers named 'rman made Raymond ta/e the medicine left by Een. Palparan. The medicine, named I'live,I as green and yello . Raymond and Reynaldo ere each given a bo. of this medicine and instructed to ta/e one capsule a day. 'rman chec/ed if they ere getting their dose of the medicine. The I'liveI made them sleep each time they too/ it, and they felt heavy upon a/ing up.== 'fter a fe days, )ilario arrived again. )e too/ Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. 'rman instructed Raymond that hile in Sapang, he should introduce himself as I,scar,I a military trainee from Sariaya, Nue5on, assigned in ?ulacan. &hile there, he sa again Eanata, one of the men ho abducted him from his house, and got ac0uainted ith other military men and civilians.=< 'fter about three months in Sapang, Raymond as brought to #amp Tecson under the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion. )e as fetched by three unidentified men in a big hite vehicle. :fren ent ith them. Raymond as then blindfolded. 'fter a =@*minute ride, his blindfold as removed. #hains ere put on him and he as /ept in the barrac/s.=B The ne.t day, RaymondHs chains ere removed and he as ordered to clean outside the barrac/s. (t as then he learned that he as in a detachment of the Rangers. There ere many soldiers, hundreds of them ere training. )e as also ordered to clean inside the barrac/s. (n one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn #adapan from %aguna. She told him that she as a student of the !niversity of the Philippines and as abducted in )agonoy, ?ulacan. She confided that she had been sub2ected to severe torture and raped. She as crying and longing to go home and be ith her parents. $uring the day, her chains ere removed and she as made to do the laundry. =9 'fter a ee/, Reynaldo as also brought to #amp Tecson. T o days from his arrival, t o other captives, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino, arrived. Maren and Fanuel ere put in the room ith I'llanI hose name they later came to /no as $onald #aigas, called ImasterI or IcommanderI by his men in the ;<th (nfantry ?attalion. Raymond and Reynaldo ere put in the ad2oining room. 't times, Raymond and Reynaldo ere threatened, and Reynaldo as beaten up. (n the daytime, their chains ere removed, but ere put bac/ on at night. They ere threatened that if they escaped, their families ould all be /illed.=> ,n or about ,ctober 9, ;@@9, )ilario arrived in #amp Tecson. )e told the detainees that they should be than/ful they ere still alive and should continue along their Irene ed life.I ?efore the hearing of "ovember 9 or 7, ;@@9, respondents ere brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. )o ever, their parents had already left for Fanila. Respondents ere brought bac/ to #amp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September ;@@9 to "ovember ;@@9, and Raymond as instructed to continue using the name I,scarI and holding himself out as a military trainee. )e got ac0uainted ith soldiers of the ;<th (nfantry ?attalion hose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.=7 ,n "ovember ;;, ;@@9, respondents, along ith Sherlyn, Maren, and Fanuel, ere transferred to a camp of the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion in %imay, ?ataan. There ere many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until Fay 7, ;@@>. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed ith them. &hile there, battalion soldiers hom Raymond /ne as IFarI and I?illyI beat him up and hit him in the stomach ith their guns. Sherlyn and Maren also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They ere all made to clean, coo/, and help in raising livestoc/. =C Raymond recalled that hen I,peration %ubogI as launched, #aigas and some other soldiers brought him and Fanuel ith them to ta/e and /ill all sympathi5ers of the "P'. They ere brought to ?arangay ?ayan*bayanan, ?ataan here he itnessed the /illing of an old man doing )aingin. The soldiers said he as /illed because he had a son ho as a member of the "P' and he coddled "P' members in his house. <@ 'nother time, in another I,peration %ubog,I Raymond as brought to ?arangay ,rion in a house here "P' men stayed. &hen they arrived, only the old man of the house ho as sic/ as there. They spared him and /illed only his son right before RaymondHs eyes.<6 From %imay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Maren, and Fanuel ere transferred to Lambales, in a safehouse near the sea. #aigas and some of his men stayed ith them. ' retired army soldier as in charge of the house. %i/e in %imay, the five detainees ere made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Lambales from Fay 7 or C, ;@@> until Dune ;@@>.<;
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(n Dune ;@@>, #aigas brought the five bac/ to the camp in %imay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Fanuel the camp. Raymond narrated hat he itnessed and e.perienced in the camp,vi2+
ere tas/ed to bring food to detainees brought to
(sang gabi, sinabihan /ami ni $onald (#aigas) na matulog na /ami. "a/ita /o si $onald na inaayos ang /anyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni $onald na /ung mayroon man /aming ma/ita o marinig, alang nangyari. Minaumagahan, na/ita naming ang bang/ay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa /ampo. Fayroong binuhos sa /anyang /ata an at itoHy sinunog. Fasansang ang amoy. Fa/araan ang isang lingo, dala ang bang/ay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 9 . 9 na tra/ at dinala sa loob ng /ampo. Fay nai ang mga ba/as ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bang/ay. "aamoy /o iyon nang nililinis ang ba/as. Fa/alipas ang isa o dala ang lingo, may dinu/ot sila na dala ang (ta. (tinali sila sa labas ng /ubo, piniringan, i/inadena at labis na binugbog. "a/ita /ong na/ata/as ang isa sa /anila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. (yong gabi na/ita /ong pinatay nila iyong isang (ta malapit sa Post =1 sinilaban ang bang/ay at ibinaon ito. Pag/alipas ng halos 6 bu an, ; pang bang/ay ang dinala sa /ampo. (binaba ang mga bang/ay mula sa pic/ up tra/, dinala ang mga bang/ay sa labas ng ba/od. Minaumagahan na/ita /ong mayroong sinilaban, at napa/amasangsang ang amoy. Fay na/ilala rin a/ong 6 retiradong /oronel at 6 /asama niya. Pina/ain /o sila. Sabi nila sa a/in na dinu/ot sila sa ?ataan. (yong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi /o na sila na/ita. ... ... ... (/inadena /ami ng = ara . Sa i/atlong ara , nilabas ni %at si Fanuel dahil /a/ausapin da siya ni Een. Palparan. "a/apiring si Fanuel, ala siyang suot pang*itaas, pinosasan. "ila/asan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasa/yan. $i nagtagal, narinig /o ang hiya o ungol ni Fanuel. Sumilip a/o sa isang haligi ng /amalig at na/ita /ong sinisilaban si Fanuel. Minaumagahan, na/a*/adena pa /ami. Tinanggal ang mga /adena mga = o < na ara ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo /ung papatayin /ami o hindi. pag/alipas. Sinabi sa amin na /aya /ami na/a/adena
Tinanggal ang aming /adena. Minausap /ami ni $onald. Tinanong /ami /ung ano ang sabi ni Fanuel sa amin. Sabi ni $onald hu ag na ra naming hanapin ang dala ang babae at si Fanuel, dahil mag/a/asama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni $onald na /ami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na /ami /ina/adena.<= ,n or about Dune 6=, ;@@>, Raymond and Reynaldo ere brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for $onald (#aigas). #aigas told respondents to also farm his land, in e.change for hich, he ould ta/e care of the food of their family. They ere also told that they could farm a small plot ad2oining his land and sell their produce. They ere no longer put in chains and ere instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Ri5al, %aguna. << Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the high ay from here they stayed. They helped farm ad2oining lands for hich they ere paid Php;@@.@@ or Php<@@.@@ and they saved their earnings. &hen they had saved Php6,@@@.@@ each, Raymond as/ed a neighbor ho he could get a cellular phone as he anted to e.change te.t messages ith a girl ho lived nearby. ' phone as pa ned to him, but he /ept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php6,<@@.@@ bet een them. There ere four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo ere housed in one of them hile their guards lived in the other three. #aigas entrusted respondents to "onong, the head of the guards. RespondentsH house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There as no television, but they had a radio. (n the evening of 'ugust 6=, ;@@>, "onong and his cohorts had a drin/ing session. 't about 6+@@ a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. &hen none of the guards a o/e and too/ notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded to ards the high ay, leaving behind their sleeping guards and bar/ing dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Fanila and ere thus freed from captivity. <B Reynaldo also e.ecuted an affidavit affirming the contents of RaymondHs affidavit insofar as they related to matters they itnessed together. Reynaldo added that hen they ere ta/en from their house on February 6<, ;@@9, he sa the faces of his abductors before he as blindfolded ith his shirt. )e also named the soldiers he got ac0uainted ith in the 67 months he as detained. &hen Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Fagsaysay, Reynaldo as severely beaten up and told that they ere indeed members of the "P' because Raymond escaped. &ith a .<B caliber pistol, Reynaldo as hit on the bac/ and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. 't one point during their detention, hen Raymond and Reynaldo ere in Sapang, Reynaldo as separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Ri5al )ilario. )e as /ept in the house of Mapitan, a friend of )ilario, in a mountainous area. )e as instructed to use the name IRodelI and to represent himself as a military trainee from Feycauayan, ?ulacan. Sometimes, )ilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. ,ne time, he as brought to a mar/et in San Dose, del Fonte, ?ulacan and made to ait in the vehicle hile )ilario as buying. )e as also brought to Tondo, Fanila here )ilario delivered bo.es of I'liveI in different houses. (n these trips, )ilario drove a blac/ and red vehicle. Reynaldo as blindfolded hile still in ?ulacan, but allo ed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. (n one of their trips, they passed by Fort Fagsaysay and #amp Tecson here Reynaldo sa the sign board, I&elcome to #amp Tecson.I<9 $r. ?enito Folino, F.$., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo. $r. Folino speciali5ed in forensic medicine and as connected ith the Fedical 'ction Eroup, an organi5ation handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases here torture as involved. )e as re0uested by an "E, to conduct medical e.aminations on the respondents after their escape. )e first as/ed them about their ordeal, then proceeded ith the physical e.amination. )is findings sho ed that the scars borne by respondents ere consistent ith their account of physical in2uries inflicted upon them. The e.amination as conducted on 'ugust 6B, ;@@>, t o days after respondentsH escape, and the results thereof ere reduced into riting. $r. Folino too/ photographs of the scars. )e testified that he follo ed the (stanbul Protocol in conducting the e.amination. <>
7;
Petitioners dispute respondentsH account of their alleged abduction and torture. (n compliance ith the ,ctober ;B, ;@@> Resolution of the #ourt, they filed a Return of the &rit of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, vi2+ 6=. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo ere not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitionersH parents before the #ourt of 'ppeals in #.'.*E.R. SP "o. C<<=6 against FGSgt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie #astillo, as head of the ;< th (nfantry ?attalion1 Fa2. Een. Dovito Palparan, as #ommander of the > th (nfantry $ivision in %u5on1 %t. Een. )ermogenes :speron, in his capacity as the #ommanding Eeneral of the Philippine 'rmy, and members of the #iti5ens 'rmed Forces Eeographical !nit (#'FE!), namely+ Fichael dela #ru5, Puti dela #ru5, Fadning dela #ru5, Pula dela #ru5, Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a. The respondents therein submitted a return of the rit... ,n Duly <, ;@@9, the #ourt of 'ppeals dropped as party respondents %t. Een. )ermogenes #. :speron, Dr., then #ommanding Eeneral of the Philippine 'rmy, and on September 6C, ;@@9, Fa2. (sic) Dovito S. Palparan, then #ommanding Eeneral, > th (nfantry $ivision, Philippine 'rmy, stationed at Fort Fagsaysay, Palayan #ity, "ueva :ci2a, upon a finding that no evidence as introduced to establish their personal involvement in the ta/ing of the Fanalo brothers. (n a $ecision dated Dune ;>, ;@@>..., it e.onerated FGSgt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie #astillo for lac/ of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Fanalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents ere illegally detaining the Fanalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. <7 'ttached to the Return of the &rit as the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of "ational $efense, assumed office only on 'ugust 7, ;@@> and as thus una are of the Fanalo brothersH alleged abduction. )e also claimed that+ hich attested that he
>. The Secretary of "ational $efense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he underta/e command directions of the 'FP units in the field, nor in any ay micromanage the 'FP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of "ational $efense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the $epartment (bureaus and agencies) including the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines1 7. (n connection ith the &rit of Amparo issued by the )onorable Supreme #ourt in this case, ( have directed the #hief of Staff, 'FP to institute immediate action in compliance ith Section C(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... %i/e ise, in a Femorandum $irective also dated ,ctober =6, ;@@>, ( have issued a policy directive addressed to the #hief of Staff, 'FP that the 'FP should adopt the follo ing rules of action in the event the &rit of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the 'FP+ (6) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party1 (;) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition the prosecution of the person or persons responsible1 (=) to identify itnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance1 (<) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as brought about the death or disappearance1 ell as any pattern or practice that may have hich may aid in
(B) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and (9) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.<C Therein respondent 'FP #hief of Staff also submitted his o n affidavit, attached to the Return of the &rit, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of "ational $efense and that acting on this directive, he did the follo ing+ =.6. 's currently designated #hief of Staff, 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP), ( have caused to be issued directive to the units of the 'FP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. =.;. ( have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to )igher head0uarters andGor direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unitGs, dispatching Radio Fessage on "ovember @B, ;@@>, addressed to the #ommanding Eeneral, Philippine 'rmy ((nfo+ #,F",%#,F, #E, >6$ P' and #, ;< (? P'). ' #opy of the Radio Fessage is attached as '"":T I=I of this 'ffidavit. =.=. &e underta/e to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in hose favor the &rit of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished )igher head0uarters. =.<. ' parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the &rit of Amparo (E.R. "o. 6>CCC<) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain #adapan and :mpeOo pending before the Supreme #ourt. =.B. ,n the part of the 'rmed Forces, this respondent ill e.ert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if sho n to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of 2ustice, hen arranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.B@ 'lso attached to the Return of the &rit as the affidavit of %t. #ol. Felipe 'nontado, ("F (ES#) P', earlier filed in E.R. "o. 6>CCC<, another Amparo case in this #ourt, involving #adapan, :mpeOo and Ferino, hich averred among others, vi2+

th
7=
6@) !pon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the ;< (nfantry ?atallion detachment as detention area, ( immediately ent to the ;<th (? detachment in %imay, ?ataan and found no unto ard incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn #adapan, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino being held captive1 66) There as neither any reports of any death of Fanuel Ferino in the ;<th (? in %imay, ?ataan1 6;) 'fter going to the ;<th (? in %imay, ?ataan, e made further in0uiries ith the Philippine "ational Police, %imay, ?ataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and ere informed that none as reported to their good office1 6=) ( also directed #ompany #ommander 6st %t. Romeo Publico to in0uire into the alleged beachhouse in (ba, Lambales also alleged to be a detention place here Sherlyn #adapan, Maren :mpeOo and Fanuel Ferino ere detained. 's per the in0uiry, ho ever, no such beachhouse as used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain #adapan, :mpeOo and Ferino. B6 (t as e.plained in the Return of the &rit that for lac/ of sufficient time, the affidavits of Fa2. Een Dovito S. Palparan (Ret.), FGSgt. Ri5al )ilario a/a Rollie #astillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and ould be subse0uently submitted.B; )erein petitioners presented a lone itness in the summary hearings, %t. #ol. Ruben !. Dimene5, Provost Farshall, > th (nfantry $ivision, Philippine 'rmy, based in Fort Fagsaysay, Palayan #ity, "ueva :ci2a. The territorial 2urisdiction of this $ivision covers "ueva :ci2a, 'urora, ?ataan, ?ulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.B= The ;<th (nfantry ?attalion is part of the >th (nfantry $ivision.B< ,n Fay ;9, ;@@9, %t. #ol. Dimene5 as directed by the #ommanding Eeneral of the > th (nfantry $ivision, Fa2. Een. Dovito Palaran, BB through his 'ssistant #hief of Staff,B9 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by #'FE! au.iliaries under his unit, namely+ #'' Fichael de la #ru51 #'' Roman de la #ru5, a/a Puti1 #'' Fa.imo de la #ru5, a/a Pula1 #'' Randy Fendo5a1 e.*#'' Farcelo de la #ru5 a/a Fadning1 and a civilian named Rudy Fendo5a. )e as directed to determine+ (6) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo by the alleged elements of the #'FE! au.iliaries1 and (;) the administrative liability of said au.iliaries, if any. B>Dimene5 testified that this particular investigation as initiated not by a complaint as as the usual procedure, but because the #ommanding Eeneral sa ne s about the abduction of the Fanalo brothers on the television, and he as concerned about hat as happening ithin his territorial 2urisdiction.B7 Dimene5 summoned all si. implicated persons for the purpose of having them e.ecute s orn statements and conducting an investigation on Fay ;C, ;@@9.BC The investigation started at 7+@@ in the morning and finished at 6@+@@ in the evening. 9@ The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. :duardo %ingad, too/ the individual s orn statements of all si. persons on that day. There ere no other s orn statements ta/en, not even of the Fanalo family, nor ere there other itnesses summoned and investigated96 as according to Dimene5, the directive to him as only to investigate the si. persons.9; Dimene5 as beside %ingad hen the latter too/ the statements. 9= The si. persons ere not /no n to Dimene5 as it as in fact his first time to meet them.9< $uring the entire time that he as beside %ingad, a subordinate of his in the ,ffice of the Provost Farshall, Dimene5 did not propound a single 0uestion to the si. persons.9B Dimene5 testified that all si. statements ere ta/en on Fay ;C, ;@@9, but Farcelo Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a had to come bac/ the ne.t day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements as interrupted by a po er failure. Dimene5 testified that the t o signed on Fay =@, ;@@9, but the 2urats of their statements indicated that they ere signed on Fay ;C, ;@@9. 99 &hen the S orn Statements ere turned over to Dimene5, he personally rote his investigation report. )e began riting it in the afternoon of Fay =@, ;@@9 and finished it on Dune 6, ;@@9. 9> )e then gave his report to the ,ffice of the #hief of Personnel.97 's petitioners largely rely on Dimene5Hs (nvestigation Report dated Dune 6, ;@@9 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially 0uoted+ (((. ?'#MER,!"$ ,F T): #'S: <. This pertains to the abduction of R'AF,"$ F'"'%, and R:A"'%$, F'"'%, ho ere forcibly ta/en from their respective homes in ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan on 6< February ;@@9 by unidentified armed men and thereafter ere forcibly disappeared. 'fter the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for 'bduction in the civil court against the herein suspects+ Fichael dela #ru5, Fadning dela #ru5, Puti $ela #ru5, Pula $ela #ru5, Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a as alleged members of the #iti5en 'rmed Forces Eeographical !nit (#'FE!). a) S orn statement of #'' Fa.imo F. dela #ru5, a/a Pula dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I?I) states that he as at Sitio Fo5on, ?rgy. ?ohol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together ith some neighbor thereat. )e claims that on 6B February ;@@9, he as being informed by ?rgy. Maga ad Pablo !mayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo. 's to the allegation that he as one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he as a #'FE! and that they claimed that those ho abducted the Fanalo brothers are members of the Filitary and #'FE!. Sub2ect vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims. b) S orn statement of #'' Roman dela #ru5 y Faustino '/a Puti dtd ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I#I) states that he is a resident of Sitio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan and a #'' member based at ?ia/ na ?ato $etachment, San Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo being his neighbors are active membersGsympathi5ers of the #PPG"P' and he also /no s their elder Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:STR: of being an "P' %eader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the t o (;) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 6<, ;@@9, he as one of those or/ing at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. )e claims further that he 2ust came only to /no about the incident on other day (6B Feb @9) hen he as being informed by Maga ad Pablo Munanan. That sub2ect #'' vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the #'FE!.
7<
c) S orn Statement of #'' Randy Fendo5a y %ingas dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit I,I) states that he is a resident of ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan and a member of #'FE! based at ?ia/ na ?ato $etachment. That being a neighbor, he as very much a are about the bac/ground of the t o (;) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the #PP "P' in their ?rgy. and he also /ne their elder brother IM!F'"$:R ?:STR:I T"+ Rolando Fanalo. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he as at ?rgy. Fagmarate, San Figuel, ?ulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident hen he arrived home in their place. )e claims further that the only reason hy they implicated him as due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:STR: ho is an "P' #ommander ho /illed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Sub2ect #'' vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Fanalo brothers. d) S orn Statement of Rudy Fendo5a y %ingasa dated Fay ;C, ;@@9 in (:.hibit I:I) states that he is a resident of ?rgy. Farung/o, 'ngat, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo are familiar to him being his barriomate hen he as still unmarried and he /ne them since childhood. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he as at his residence in ?rgy. Farung/o, 'ngat, ?ulacan. )e claims that he as being informed only about the incident lately and he as not a are of any reason hy the t o (;) brothers ere being abducted by alleged members of the military and #'FE!. The only reason he /no s hy they implicated him as because there are those people ho are angry ith their family particularly victims of summary e.ecution (/illing) done by their brother X M' ?estre Rolando Fanalo ho is an "P' leader. )e claims further that it as their brother X M' ?:STR: ho /illed his father and he as living itness to that incident. Sub2ect civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Fanalo brothers. e) S orn statement of :.*#'' Farcelo dala #ru5 dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit IFI) states that he is a resident of Sitio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan, a farmer and a former #'' based at ?ia/ na ?ato, San Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. )e claims further that they are active supporters of #PPG"P' and that their brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:STR: is an "P' leader. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< February ;@@9, he as in his residence at Sitio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the t o (;) brothers and learned only about the incident hen rumors reached him by his barrio mates. )e claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Fa.imo ho are his brothers. f) S orn statement of Fichael dela #ru5 y Faustino dated ;C Fay ;@@9 in (:.hibit IEI) states that he is a resident of Sitio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan, the #hief of ?rgy. Tanod and a #'FE! member based at ?ia/ na ?ato $etachment, San Figuel, ?ulacan. )e claims that he /ne very ell the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod #hief for t enty (;@) years. )e alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathi5ers of the #PPG"P' and hose elder brother Rolando Fanalo X M' ?:STR: is an "P' leader operating ithin the area. ?eing one of the accused, he claims that on 6< Feb ;@@9 he as helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident hich is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo hen one of the ?rgy. Maga ad in the person of Pablo #unanan informed him about the matter. )e claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a #'' member. (8. $(S#!SS(," B. ?ased on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of lin/ing them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo that transpired on 6< February ;@@9 at Sitio Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges bet een each families (sic) in the past to 0uote+ the /illing of the father of Randy and Rudy Fendo5a by X M' ?:STR: T"+ Rolando Fanalo, this ill not suffice to establish a fact that they ere the ones ho did the abduction as a form of revenge. 's it as also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Fanalos are active sympathi5ersGsupporters of the #PPG"P', this ould not also mean, ho ever, that in the first place, they ere in connivance ith the abductors. ?eing their neighbors and as members of #'FE!Hs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they ere fully a are of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo in so far as their connection ith the #PPG"P' is concerned. 8. #,"#%!S(," 9. Premises considered surrounding this case sho s that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. )ence, it lac/s merit to indict them for any administrative punishment andGor criminal liability. (t is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. 8(. R:#,FF:"$'T(,"S >. That #''s Fichael F. dela #ru5, Fa.imo F. $ela #ru5, Roman dela #ru5, Randy Fendo5a, and t o (;) civilians Fa.imo F. $ela #ru5 and Rudy %. Fendo5a be e.onerated from the case. 7. !pon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.9C (n this appeal under Rule <B, petitioners 0uestion the appellate courtHs assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the $ecember ;9, ;@@> $ecision on the follo ing grounds, vi2+ (.
7B
T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S S:R(,!S%A '"$ ER(:8,!S%A :RR:$ (" ?:%(:8("E '"$ E(8("E F!%% F'(T) '"$ #R:$(T T, T): ("#R:$(?%:, !"#,RR,?,R'T:$, #,"TR'$(#T:$, '"$ ,?8(,!S%A S#R(PT:$, R:):'RS:$ '"$ S:%F*S:R8("E 'FF($'8(TGT:ST(F,"A ,F ):R:(" R:SP,"$:"T R'AF,"$ F'"'%,. ((. T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S S:R(,!S%A '"$ ER(:8,!S%A :RR:$ (" R:N!(R("E R:SP,"$:"TS ():R:(" P:T(T(,":RS) T,+ (') F!R"(S) T, T): F'"'%, ?R,T):R(S) '"$ T, T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S '%% ,FF(#('% '"$ !",FF(#('% R:P,RTS ,F T): ("8:ST(E'T(," !"$:RT'M:" (" #,"":#T(," &(T) T):(R #'S:, :T#:PT T),S: '%R:'$A (" F(%: &(T) T): #,!RT1 (?) #,"F(RF (" &R(T("E T): PR:S:"T P%'#:S ,F ,FF(#('% 'SS(E"F:"T ,F FGSET. )(%'R(, a/a R,%%(: #'ST(%%, '"$ $,"'%$ #'(E'S1 '"$ (#) #'!S: T, ?: PR,$!#:$ T, T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S '%% F:$(#'% R:P,RTS, R:#,R$S '"$ #)'RTS, '"$ R:P,RTS ,F '"A TR:'TF:"T E(8:" ,R R:#,FF:"$:$ '"$ F:$(#(":S PR:S#R(?:$, (F '"A, T, T): F'"'%, ?R,T):RS, T, ("#%!$: ' %(ST ,F F:$(#'% P:RS,"":% (F(%(T'RA '"$ #(8(%('") &), 'TT:"$:$ T, T):F FR,F F:?R!'RA 6<, ;@@9 !"T(% '!E!ST 6;, ;@@>.>@ The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo (Amparo Rule). %et us hear/en to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a t o*day "ational #onsultative Summit on :.tra2udicial Millings and :nforced $isappearances sponsored by the #ourt on Duly 69*6>, ;@@>. The Summit as Ienvisioned to provide a broad and fact*based perspective on the issue of e.tra2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances,I >6 hence Irepresentatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as ell as all the sta/eholders in the 2ustice systemI>; participated in mapping out ays to resolve the crisis. ,n ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, the #ourt promulgated the Amparo Rule Iin light of the prevalence of e.tralegal /illing and enforced disappearances.I >= (t as an e.ercise for the first time of the #ourtHs e.panded po er to promulgate rules to protect our peopleHs constitutional rights, hich made its maiden appearance in the 6C7> #onstitution in response to the Filipino e.perience of the martial la regime. >< 's the Amparo Rule as intended to address the intractable problem of Ie.tralegal /illingsI and Ienforced disappearances,I its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these t o instances or to threats thereof. I:.tralegal /illingsI are I/illings committed ithout due process of la , i.e., ithout legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.I >B ,n the other hand, Ienforced disappearancesI are Iattended by the follo ing characteristics+ an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organi5ed groups or private individuals acting ith the direct or indirect ac0uiescence of the government1 the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or hereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac/no ledge the deprivation of liberty hich places such persons outside the protection of la .I>9 The rit of Amparo originated in Fe.ico. IAmparoI literally means IprotectionI in Spanish.>> (n 67=>, de Toc0uevilleHs Democracy in America became available in Fe.ico and stirred great interest. (ts description of the practice of 2udicial revie in the !.S. appealed to many Fe.ican 2urists. >7 ,ne of them, Fanuel #rescencio Re2Yn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Aucatan, >C hich granted 2udges the po er to protect all persons in the en2oyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea as incorporated into the national constitution in 67<>, vi2+ The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the e.ercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this #onstitution and by la s enacted pursuant hereto, against attac/s by the %egislative and :.ecutive po ers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, ma/ing no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.7@ Since then, the protection has been an important part of Fe.ican constitutionalism. 76 (f, after hearing, the 2udge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officialHs superiors, to cease the violation and to ta/e the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full en2oyment of the right in 0uestion. Amparo thus combines the principles of 2udicial revie derived from the !.S. ith the limitations on 2udicial po er characteristic of the civil la tradition hich prevails in Fe.ico. (t enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this po er to ma/e la for the entire nation.7; The rit of Amparo then spread throughout the &estern )emisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.7= (t became, in the ords of a 2ustice of the Fe.ican Federal Supreme #ourt, one piece of Fe.icoHs self*attributed Itas/ of conveying to the orldHs legal heritage that institution hich, as a shield of human dignity, her o n painful history conceived.I 7< &hat began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes+ (6) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, e0uivalent to the habeas corpus rit1 (;) Amparo contra leyes for the 2udicial revie of the constitutionality of statutes1 (=) Amparo casacion for the 2udicial revie of the constitutionality and legality of a 2udicial decision1 (<) Amparo administrativo for the 2udicial revie of administrative actions1 and (B) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasantsH rights derived from the agrarian reform process.7B (n %atin 'merican countries, e.cept #uba, the rit of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military 2untas. (n general, these countries adopted an all*encompassing rit to protect the hole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio*economic rights.79,ther countries li/e #olombia, #hile, Eermany and Spain, ho ever, have chosen to limit the protection of the rit of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.7> (n the Philippines, hile the 6C7> #onstitution does not e.plicitly provide for the rit of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of 'rticle 8(((, Section 6 of the 6C7> #onstitution, the Erave 'buse #lause, provides for the 2udicial po er Ito determine hether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e.cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Eovernment.I The #lause accords a similar general protection to human rights e.tended by the 'mparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 6C7> #onstitution.77 The #lause is an offspring of the !.S. common la tradition of 2udicial revie , hich finds its roots in the 67@= case of M#-+)-y ,. M#.i$on.7C &hile constitutional rights can be protected under the Erave 'buse #lause through remedies of in2unction or prohibition under Rule 9B of the Rules of #ourt and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 6@;,C@ these remedies may not be ade0uate to address the pestering problem of e.tralegal /illings
79
and enforced disappearances. )o ever, ith the s iftness re0uired to resolve a petition for a rit of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid rit of the common la and civil la traditions * borne out of the %atin 'merican and Philippine e.perience of human rights abuses * offers a better remedy to e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as it parta/es of a summary proceeding that re0uires only substantial evidence to ma/e the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner1 it is not an action to determine criminal guilt re0uiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages re0uiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility re0uiring substantial evidence that ill re0uire full and e.haustive proceedings.C6 The rit of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (t is preventive in that it brea/s the e.pectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses1 it is curative in that it facilitates the subse0uent punishment of perpetrators as it ill inevitably yield leads to subse0uent investigation and action. (n the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. (n the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for IProhibition, (n2unction, and Temporary Restraining ,rderI C; to stop petitioners andGor their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on 'ugust ;=, ;@@>, C= prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective #ustody ,rders, 'ppointment of #ommissioner, (nspection and 'ccess ,rders and other legal and e0uitable remedies under 'rticle 8(((, Section B(B) of the 6C7> #onstitution and Rule 6=B, Section 9 of the Rules of #ourt. &hen the Amparo Rule came into effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@>, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it ould be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Fanalo brothersH enforced disappearance. The #ourt granted their motion. &ith this bac/drop, states, vi2+ e no come to the arguments of the petitioner. PetitionersH first argument in disputing the $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals
The #ourt of 'ppeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self*serving affidavitGtestimony of herein respondent Raymond Fanalo. C< (n delving into the veracity of the evidence, e need to mine and refine the ore of petitionersH cause of action, to determine presented is metal*strong to satisfy the degree of proof re0uired. Section 6 of the Rule on the &rit of Amparo provides for the follo ing causes of action, vi2+ Section 6. 'etition. * The petition for a rit of Amparo is a remedy available to any person hose -i%&t to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. o- t&-e#tene. /it& ,io #tion by an unla ful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The rit shall cover e.tralegal /illings and en*o-ce. .i$#!!e#-#nce$ o- t&-e#t$ t&e-eo*. (emphasis supplied) Sections 6> and 67, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof re0uired, vi2+ Sec. 6>. %urden of 'roof and $tandard of Diligence Re8uired. * The parties shall establish their claims by$)+$t#nti# e,i.ence. ... ... ... Sec. 67. ,udgment. * ... (f the # e%#tion$ in t&e !etition #-e !-o,en +y $)+$t#nti# e,i.ence , the court shall %-#nt the privilege of the and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate1 ot&e-/i$e, the privilege shall be .enie.. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade0uate to support a conclusion. CB 'fter careful perusal of the evidence presented, e affirm the findings of the #ourt of 'ppeals that respondents ere abducted from their houses in Sito Fu5on, ?rgy. ?uhol na Fangga, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan on February 6<, ;@@9 and ere continuously detained until they escaped on 'ugust 6=, ;@@>. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents ere narrated by respondent Raymond Fanalo in a clear and convincing manner. )is account is dotted ith countless candid details of respondentsH harro ing e.perience and tenacious ill to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. ' fe e.amples are the follo ing+ ISumilip a/o sa isang haligi ng /amalig at na/ita /ong sinisilaban si Fanuel.I C9 I(")ila/asan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasa/yan. $i nagtagal, narinig /o ang hiya o ungol ni Fanuel.I C> IFay nai ang mga ba/as ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bang/ay. "aamoy /o iyon nang nililinis ang ba/as.I C7 ITumigil a/o sa may palaisdaan /ung saan ginamit /o ang bato para tanggalin ang mga /adena.ICC ITinanong /o sa isang /apit*bahay /ung paano a/o ma/a/a/uha ng cell phone1 sabi /o gusto /ong i*te.t ang isang babae na na/atira sa malapit na lugar.I6@@ &e affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond FanaloHs affidavit and testimony, vi2+ ...the abduction as perpetrated by armed men ho ere sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and #'FE! au.iliaries. Raymond recalled that the si. armed men ho barged into his house through the rear door ere military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the #'FE! au.iliaries, namely+ Fichael de la #ru5, Fadning de la #ru5, Puti de la #ru5 and Pula de la #ru5, all members of the #'FE! and residents of Fu5on, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan, and the brothers Randy Fendo5a and Rudy Fendo5a, also #'FE! members, served as loo/outs during the abduction. Raymond as sure that three of the si. military men ere Eanata, ho headed the abducting team, )ilario, ho drove the van, and Eeorge. Subse0uent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the > th (nfantry $ivision, Philippine 'rmy, and their #'FE! au.iliaries. rit hether the evidence
7>
&e are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction as the suspicion that the petitioners ere either members or sympathi5ers of the "P', considering that the abductors ere loo/ing for Ma ?estre, ho turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. The efforts e.erted by the Filitary #ommand to loo/ into the abduction ere, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Farshall of the >th (nfantry $ivision focused on the one*sided version of the #'FE! au.iliaries involved. This one*sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Farshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Farshall should have refrained from outrightly e.culpating the #'FE! au.iliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Een. PalparanHs participation in the abduction as also established. 't the very least, he as a are of the petitionersH captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. (n fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Een. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in ?ulacan and told them hat he anted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Een. PalparanHs direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been sho n but his /no ledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespo/e of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians ithout due process of la and ithout probable cause. (n the habeas proceedings, the #ourt, through the Former Special Si.th $ivision (Dustices ?u5on, chairman1 Santiago*%agman, Sr., member1 and Romilla*%onto/, Dr., memberGponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that FGSgt. Ri5al )ilario had anything to do ith the abduction or the detention. )ilarioHs involvement could not, indeed, be then established after :vangeline Francisco, ho allegedly sa )ilario drive the van in hich the petitioners ere boarded and ferried follo ing the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. B;) )o ever, in this case, Raymond attested that )ilario drove the hite %*=@@ van in hich the petitioners ere brought a ay from their houses on February 6<, ;@@9. Raymond also attested that )ilario participated in subse0uent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of hich as hen )ilario fetched them from Fort Fagsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San (ldefonso, ?ulacan here they ere detained for at least a ee/ in a house of strong materials (:.hibit $, rollo, p. ;@B) and then )ilario (along ith :fren) brought them to Sapang, San Figuel, ?ulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Mapitan here they ere /ept for more or less three months. (:.hibit $, rollo, p. ;@B) (t as there here the petitioners came face to face ith Een. Palparan. )ilario and :fren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitionersH parents, here only Raymond as presented to the parents to relay the message from Een. Palparan not to 2oin anymore rallies. ,n that occasion, )ilario arned the parents that they ould not again see their sons should they 2oin any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (:.hibit $, rollo, pp. ;@B*;@9) )ilario as also among four Faster Sergeants (the others being 'rman, Eanata and #abalse) ith hom Een. Palparan conversed on the occasion hen Een. Palparan re0uired Raymond to ta/e the medicines for his health. (:.hibit $, rollo, p. ;@9) There ere other occasions hen the petitioners sa that )ilario had a direct hand in their torture. (t is clear, therefore, that the participation of )ilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners as established. The participation of other military personnel li/e 'rman, Eanata, #abalse and #aigas, among others, as similarly established. ... ... ... 's to the #'FE! au.iliaries, the habeas #ourt found them personally involved in the abduction. &e also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is over helming.6@6 &e re2ect the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond FanaloHs statements ere not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.6@; RaymondHs affidavit and testimony ere corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Fanalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist $r. Folino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical in2uries inflicted on respondents, 6@= also corroborate respondentsH accounts of the torture they endured hile in detention. Respondent Raymond FanaloHs familiarity ith the facilities in Fort Fagsaysay such as the I$T!,I as sho n in his testimony and confirmed by %t. #ol. Dimene5 to be the I$ivision Training !nit,I 6@< firms up respondentsH story that they ere detained for some time in said military facility. (n O-ti" ,. 8)#te'# #,6@B a case decided by the (nter*'merican #ommission on )uman Rights, the #ommission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister $iana ,rti5 as abducted and tortured by agents of the Euatemalan government. (n this case, Sister ,rti5 as /idnapped and tortured in early "ovember 6C7C. The #ommissionHs findings of fact ere mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, ritten and oral, made by Sister ,rti5 regarding her ordeal. 6@9 These statements ere supported by her recognition of portions of the route they too/ hen she as being driven out of the military installation here she as detained. 6@> She as also e.amined by a medical doctor hose findings sho ed that the 666 circular second degree burns on her bac/ and abrasions on her chee/ coincided ith her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered hile in detention.6@7 &ith the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal ill come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account ill depend on their credibility and candidness in their ritten andGor oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmar/s they can identify in the places here they ere detained. &here po erful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of itnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. &e no come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the rit of Amparo. There is no 0uarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Fanalo has no passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. ?ut hile respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not Ifree in every sense of the ordI 6@C as their Imovements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Dudicial 'ffidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any ay. These people are directly connected to the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to t&-e#ten -e$!on.ent$L -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity.I66@ (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under t&-e#t o* +ein% once #%#in #+.)cte.2 Ee!t c#!ti,e o- e,en Ei e., hich constitute a direct violation of their -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.666
77
:laborating on the I-i%&t to $ec)-ity2 in %ene-# ,I respondents point out that this right is Ioften associated ith liberty1I it is also seen as an Ie.pansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment.I #onceding that there is no right to security e.pressly mentioned in 'rticle ((( of the 6C7> #onstitution, they submit that their rights Ito be /ept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places66; fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the rit of Amparo.I They submit that the #ourt ought to give an e.pansive recognition of the right to security of person in vie of the State Policy under 'rticle (( of the 6C7> #onstitution hich enunciates that, IThe State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.I Finally, to 2ustify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Monc)!# ,. En-i e66= that Ithe right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the e.ercise of that libertyI 66< such as a re0uirement to Ireport under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of libertyI66B or being put under Imonitoring and surveillance.I669 (n sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the t&-e#t to t&ei- -i%&t to i*e #n. i+e-ty, and a ,io #tion o* t&ei- -i%&t to $ec)-ity. Let )$ !)t t&i$ -i%&t to $ec)-ity )n.e- t&e en$ to .ete-'ine i* it &#$ in.ee. +een ,io #te. #$ -e$!on.ent$ #$$e-t. The -i%&t to $ec)-ity or the -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on finds a te.tual hoo/ in 'rticle (((, Section ; of the 6C7> #onstitution hich provides, vi2+ Sec. ;. The -i%&t o* t&e !eo! e to +e $ec)-e in t&ei- !e-$on$ , houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei5ures of hatever nature and for any purpose shall be in,io #+ e, and no search arrant or arrant of arrest shall issue e.cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udge... 't the core of this guarantee is the immunity of oneHs person, including the e.tensions of hisGher person * houses, papers, and effects * against government intrusion. Section ; not only limits the stateHs po er over a personHs home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.66> The purpose of this provision as enunciated by the #ourt in Peo! e ,. CFI o* Ri"# 2 6-#nc& IK2 M)e"on City, vi2+667 The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei5ures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unla ful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the la acting under legislative or 2udicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation hen attempted. ('dams v. "e Aor/, 6C; !.S. 7B71 'lvero v. $i5on, >9 Phil. 9=> R6C<9S). The right to privacy is an e$$enti# con.ition to t&e .i%nity #n. &#!!ine$$ #n. to t&e !e#ce #n. $ec)-ity o* e,e-y in.i,i.)# 2 /&et&e- it +e o* &o'e o- o* !e-$on$ #n. co--e$!on.ence. (TaOada and #arreon, Political %a of the Philippines, 8ol. ;, 6=C R6C9;S). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and sei5ures must be deemed absolute as not&in% i$ c o$e- to # '#nL$ $o) t&#n t&e $e-enity o* &i$ !-i,#cy #n. t&e #$$)-#nce o* &i$ !e-$on# $ec)-ity . 'ny interference allo able can only be for the best causes and reasons.66C (emphases supplied) &hile the right to life under 'rticle (((, Section 66;@ guarantees essentially the right to be alive6;6 * upon hich the en2oyment of all other rights is preconditioned * the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure 0uality of this life, vi2+ IThe life to hich each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a po erful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived ith the assurance that the government he established and consented to, ill protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the hole history of man. (t touches every aspect of manHs e.istence.I 6;; (n a broad sense, the right to security of person Iemanates in a personHs legal and uninterrupted en2oyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. (t includes the right to e.ist, and the right to en2oyment of life hile e.isting, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things hich are necessary to the en2oyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and la ful desires of the individual.I6;= ' closer loo/ at the right to security of person ould yield various permutations of the e.ercise of this right. Fi-$t2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ =*-ee.o' *-o' *e#-.= (n its I hereasI clauses, the Uni,e-$# Dec #-#tion o* :)'#n Ri%&t$ (!$)R) enunciates that Ia orld in hich human beings shall en2oy freedom of speech and belief and *-ee.o' *-o' *e#- and ant has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.I (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that Ifreedom from fearI is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 6;< (t is the Iright to security of personI as the ord IsecurityI itself means Ifreedom from fear.I6;B 'rticle = of the !$)R provides, vi2+ :veryone has the right to life, liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.6;9 (emphasis supplied) (n furtherance of this right declared in the !$)R, 'rticle C(6) of the Inte-n#tion# Co,en#nt on Ci,i #n. Po itic# Ri%&t$ ((##PR) also provides for the right to security of person, vi2+ 6. :veryone has the right to liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on. "o one shall be sub2ected to arbitrary arrest or detention. "o one shall be deprived of his liberty e.cept on such grounds and in accordance ith such procedure as are established by la . (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the !$)R and the (##PR. (n the conte.t of Section 6 of the Amparo Rule, Ifreedom from fearI is the right and #ny t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty o- $ec)-ity is the #ction#+ e /-on%. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction1 t&-e#t is a stimulus, ac#)$e o* #ction. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to ell*founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another ith the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past e.perience ith the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo conte.t, it is more correct to say that the Iright to securityI is actually the =*-ee.o' *-o' t&-e#t.= 8ie ed in this light, the Ithreatened ith violationI #lause in the latter part of Section 6 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.6;> Secon.2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ # %)#-#ntee o* +o.i y #n. !$yc&o o%ic# inte%-ity o- $ec)-ity . 'rticle (((, Section (( of the 6C7> #onstitution guarantees that, as a general rule, oneHs body cannot be searched or invaded ithout a search arrant. 6;7 Physical in2uries inflicted in the conte.t of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. (t may constitute dismemberment,
7C
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. 's the degree of physical in2ury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. "otably, in criminal la , physical in2uries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. 6;C Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. &hen employed to vitiate the free ill such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the e.ercise of free ill. 'rticle (((, Section 6; of the 6C7> #onstitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, vi2+ (;) "o torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means hich vitiate the free ill shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free ill * although not involving invasion of bodily integrity * nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of Ifreedom from threatI as afore*discussed. 'rticle (((, Section 6; guarantees freedom from dehumani5ing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. 8ictims of enforced disappearances ho are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. 'n overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture as made by the :uropean #ourt of )uman Rights (:#)R) in the recent case of Po!o, ,. R)$$i#.6=@ (n this case, the claimant, ho as la fully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. 'rticle B(6) of the :uropean #onvention on )uman Rights provides, vi2+ I:veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. "o one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the follo ing cases and in accordance ith a procedure prescribed by la ...I (emphases supplied) 'rticle =, on the other hand, provides that I(n)o one shall be sub2ected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.I 'lthough the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill*treatment as found baseless, the :#)R relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, vi2+ ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time hen they could reasonably have been e.pected to ta/e measures in order to ensure his $ec)-ity and to investigate the circumstances in 0uestion. ... ... ... ... the authorities failed to ensure his $ec)-ity in custody or to comply investigation into his allegations.6=6 (emphasis supplied) ith the procedural obligation under 'rt.= to conduct an effective
The !.". #ommittee on the :limination of $iscrimination against &omen has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of may also be related to the right to security and liberty, vi2+
omen
...gender*based violence hich impairs or nullifies the en2oyment by omen of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international la or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination ithin the meaning of article 6 of the #onvention (on the :limination of 'll Forms of $iscrimination 'gainst &omen). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and $ec)-ity o* !e-$on.6=; T&i-.2 t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ # %)#-#ntee o* !-otection o* oneL$ -i%&t$ +y t&e %o,e-n'ent . (n the conte.t of the rit of Amparo, this right is +)i t into t&e %)#-#ntee$ o* t&e -i%&t to i*e #n. i+e-ty under 'rticle (((, Section 6 of the 6C7> #onstitution #n. t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under 'rticle (((, Section ;. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State Iguarantees full respect for human rightsI under 'rticle ((, Section 66 of the 6C7> #onstitution. 6== 's the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the #onstitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially hen they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organi5ation of the government apparatus to e.tend protection to victims of e.tralegal /illings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) andGor their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of 2ustice. The (nter*'merican #ourt of )uman Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the ;e #$()e" Ro.-i%)e" C#$e,6=< vi2+ (The duty to investigate) ')$t +e )n.e-t#Een in # $e-io)$ '#nne- #n. not #$ # 'e-e *o-'# ity !-eo-.#ine. to +e ine**ecti,e . 'n investigation must have an ob2ective and be #$$)'e. +y t&e St#te #$ it$ o/n e%# .)ty2 not #$ # $te! t#Een +y !-i,#te inte-e$t$ t&#t .e!en.$ )!on t&e initi#ti,e o* t&e ,icti' o- &i$ *#'i y or upon their offer of proof, ithout an effective search for the truth by the government.6=B This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the !nited "ationsH )uman Rights #ommittee6=9 in not a fe cases involving 'rticle C 6=> of the (##PR. &hile the right to security of person appears in con2unction ith the right to liberty under 'rticle C, the #ommittee has ruled that the -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* !e-$on c#n eFi$t in.e!en.ent y o* t&e -i%&t to i+e-ty . (n other ords, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invo/ed. (n De %#.o P#e" ,. Co o'+i# ,6=7 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in %eticia, #olombia, hose social vie s differed from those of the 'postolic Prefect of %eticia, the #ommittee held, vi2+ The first sentence of article C does not stand as a separate paragraph. (ts location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the vie that the right to security arises only in the conte.t of arrest and detention. The travau. prZparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt ith in the other provisions of article C. T&e Uni,e-$# Dec #-#tion o* :)'#n Ri%&t$2 in #-tic e 32 -e*e-$ to t&e -i%&t to i*e2 t&e -i%&t to i+e-ty #n. t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity o* t&e !e-$on. T&e$e e e'ent$ &#,e +een .e# t /it& in $e!#-#te c #)$e$ in t&e Co,en#nt. A t&o)%& in t&e Co,en#nt t&e on y -e*e-ence to t&e -i%&t o* $ec)-ity o* !e-$on i$ to +e *o)n. in #-tic e 52 t&e-e i$ no e,i.ence t&#t it /#$ inten.e. to n#--o/ t&e conce!t o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity on y to $it)#tion$ o* *o-'# .e!-i,#tion o* i+e-ty. At t&e $#'e ti'e2 St#te$ !#-tie$ &#,e )n.e-t#Een to %)#-#ntee t&e -i%&t$ en$&-ine. in t&e Co,en#nt. It c#nnot +e t&e c#$e t&#t2 #$ # '#tte-
C@
o* #/2 St#te$ c#n i%no-e Eno/n t&-e#t$ to t&e i*e o* !e-$on$ )n.e- t&ei- B)-i$.iction2 B)$t +ec#)$e t&#t &e o- $&e i$ not #--e$te. oot&e-/i$e .et#ine.. St#te$ !#-tie$ #-e )n.e- #n o+ i%#tion to t#Ee -e#$on#+ e #n. #!!-o!-i#te 'e#$)-e$ to !-otect t&e'. An inte-!-et#tion o* #-tic e 5 /&ic& /o) . # o/ # St#te !#-ty to i%no-e t&-e#t$ to t&e !e-$on# $ec)-ity o* non-.et#ine. !e-$on$ /it&in it$ B)-i$.iction /o) . -en.e- tot# y ine**ecti,e t&e %)#-#ntee$ o* t&e Co,en#nt .6=C (emphasis supplied) The P#e" ruling as reiterated in 6/# y# ,. ?#'+i#26<@ hich involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience ho continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements follo ing his release from detention. (n a catena of cases, the ruling of the #ommittee as of a similar import+ 6#&#'on.e ,. E()#to-i# 8)ine#,6<6 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state1T$&i$&i'+i ,. ?#i-e,6<; involving the abduction of the complainantHs husband ho as a supporter of democratic reform in Laire1 Di#$ ,. An%o #26<= in,o ,in% t&e ')-.e- o* t&e co'! #in#ntL$ !#-tne- #n. t&e &#-#$$'ent &e <co'! #in#nt> $)**e-e. +ec#)$e o* &i$ in,e$ti%#tion o* t&e ')-.e-I #n. C&on%/e ,. ?#'+i#26<<involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance. Similarly, the :uropean #ourt of )uman Rights (:#)R) has interpreted the Iright to securityI not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. 6<B The :#)R interpreted the Iright to security of personI under 'rticle B(6) of the :uropean #onvention of )uman Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, A)-t ,. T)-Eey.6<9 (n this case, the claimantHs son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The familyHs re0uests for information and investigation regarding his hereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this as a violation of her sonHs right to security of person. The :#)R ruled, vi2+ ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity ith the substantive and procedural rules of national la but must e0ually be in /eeping ith the very purpose of 'rticle B, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... )aving assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her hereabouts. For this reason, A-tic e 0 ')$t +e $een #$ -e()i-in% t&e #)t&o-itie$ to t#Ee e**ecti,e 'e#$)-e$ to $#*e%)#-. #%#in$t t&e -i$E o* .i$#!!e#-#nce #n. to con.)ct # !-o'!t e**ecti,e in,e$ti%#tion into #n #-%)#+ e c #i' t&#t # !e-$on &#$ +een t#Een into c)$to.y #n. &#$ not +een $een $ince .6<> (emphasis supplied) 'pplying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, respondentsH right to security. e no determine hether there is a continuing violation of
Fi-$t2 t&e ,io #tion o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity #$ *-ee.o' *-o' t&-e#t to -e$!on.ent$L i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity. &hile respondents ere detained, they ere threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, ould be /illed. (n RaymondHs narration, he as tortured and poured ith gasoline after he as caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Fagsaysay. ' call from a certain IFam,I ho anted to see him before he as /illed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be /illed has come to pass. (t should be stressed that they are no free from captivity not because they ere released by virtue of a la ful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. (t ought to be recalled that to ards the end of their ordeal, sometime in Dune ;@@> hen respondents ere detained in a camp in %imay, ?ataan, respondentsH captors even told them that they ere still deciding hether they should be e.ecuted. Respondent Raymond Fanalo attested in his affidavit, vi2+ Minaumagahan, na/a*/adena pa /ami. Tinanggal ang mga /adena mga = o < na ara ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo /ung papatayin /ami o hindi.6<7 pag/alipas. Sinabi sa amin na /aya /ami na/a/adena
The possibility of respondents being e.ecuted stared them in the eye hile they ere in detention. &ith their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso no that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their o n abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons /no n to have disappeared such as Sherlyn #adapan, Maren :mpeOo, and Fanuel Ferino, among others. !nderstandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citi5ens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free ill as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. 6<C Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be e.pected to sho evidence of overt acts of threat such as face*to*face intimidation or ritten threats to their life, liberty and security. "onetheless, the circumstances of respondentsH abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they ill again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even e.ecuted. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a rit of Amparo. NeFt2 t&e ,io #tion o* t&e -i%&t to $ec)-ity #$ !-otection +y t&e %o,e-n'ent . 'part from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondentsH abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitionersH o n itness, %t. #ol. Ruben Dimene5, Provost Farshall of the >th (nfantry $ivision. The one*day investigation conducted by Dimene5 as very limited, superficial, and one*sided. )e merely relied on the S orn Statements of the si. implicated members of the #'FE! and civilians hom he met in the investigation for the first time. )e as present at the investigation hen his subordinate %ingad as ta/ing the s orn statements, but he did not propound a single 0uestion to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. )e did not call for other itnesses to test the alibis given by the si. implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. (n his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of "ational $efense attested that in a Femorandum $irective dated ,ctober =6, ;@@>, he issued a policy directive addressed to the 'FP #hief of Staff, that the 'FP should adopt rules of action in the event the rit of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the 'FP, hich should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party1 recovery and preservation of relevant evidence1 identification of itnesses and securing statements from them1 determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance1 identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance1 and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.6B@ Petitioner 'FP #hief of Staff also submitted his o n affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of "ational $efense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the 'FP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertoo/ to provide results of the investigations

6B6
C6
to respondents. To this day, ho ever, almost a year after the policy directive as issued by petitioner Secretary of "ational $efense on ,ctober =6, ;@@>, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation hich they no see/ through the instant petition for a rit of Amparo. !nder these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to guarantee of protection by the government. arrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondentsH right to security as a
(n sum, e conclude that respondentsH right to security as Ifreedom from threatI is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is li/e ise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, e come to the -e ie*$ granted by the #ourt of 'ppeals, hich petitioners 0uestion. ith their case, e.cept
Fi-$t, that petitioners furnish respondents # o**ici# #n. )no**ici# -e!o-t$ o* t&e in,e$ti%#tion underta/en in connection those already in file ith the court.
Secon., that petitioners con*i-' in /-itin% t&e !-e$ent ! #ce$ o* o**ici# #$$i%n'ent o* MNS%t. :i #-io #E# Ro ie C#$ti o #n. Don# . C#i%#$ . T&i-., that petitioners cause to be produced to the #ourt of 'ppeals all 'e.ic# -e!o-t$2 -eco-.$ #n. c&#-t$2 #n. -e!o-t$ o* #ny t-e#t'ent %i,en o-eco''en.e. #n. 'e.icine$ !-e$c-i+e.2 i* #ny2 to t&e M#n# o +-ot&e-$ , to include a i$t o* 'e.ic# !e-$onne <'i it#-y #n. ci,i i#n> /&o #tten.e. to t&e' from February 6<, ;@@9 until 'ugust 6;, ;@@>. &ith respect to the *i-$t #n. $econ. -e ie*$, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents parta/es of the characteristics of a search arrant. Thus, they claim that the re0uisites for the issuance of a search arrant must be complied ith prior to the grant of the production order, namely+ (6) the application must be under oath or affirmation1 (;) the search arrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be sei5ed1 (=) there e.ists probable cause ith one specific offense1 and (<) the probable cause must be personally determined by the 2udge after e.amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the itnesses he may produce. 6B; (n the case at bar, ho ever, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self*serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Fanalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents see/ to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, ith no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been sho n. PetitionersH arguments do not hold ater. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused ith a search arrant for la enforcement under 'rticle (((, Section ; of the 6C7> #onstitution. This #onstitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. (nstead, the Amparo production order may be li/ened to the production of documents or things under Section 6, Rule ;> of the Rules of #ivil Procedure hich provides in relevant part, vi2+ Section 6. Fotion for production or inspection order. !pon motion of any party sho ing good cause therefor, the court in hich an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, boo/s of accounts, letters, photographs, ob2ects or tangible things, not privileged, hich constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and hich are in his possession, custody or control... (n M#te-i# Di$t-i+)to-$ <P&i .> Inc. ,. 9).%e N#ti,i.#. ,6B= the respondent 2udge, under authority of Rule ;>, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the boo/s and papers of Faterial $istributors (Phil.) (nc. The company 0uestioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and sei5ure clause. The #ourt struc/ do n the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that Icannot be identified or confused ith unreasonable searches prohibited by the #onstitution...I Foreover, in his affidavit, petitioner 'FP #hief of Staff himself undertoo/ Ito provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in hose favor the &rit of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished )igher head0uarters.I @it& -e$!ect to t&e $econ. #n. t&i-. -e ie*$ , petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of FGSgt. )ilario a/a Rollie #astillo and $onald #aigas, as ell as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a rit of Amparo. They add that it ill unnecessarily compromise and 2eopardi5e the e.ercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even un ittingly and unnecessarily e.pose them to threat of personal in2ury or even death. ,n the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of FGSgt. )ilario a)a Rollie #astillo and $onald #aigas, hom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial 2urisdiction. Such disclosure ould also help ensure that these military officers can be served ith notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondentsH rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and ma/e appropriate medical interventions, hen applicable and necessary. (n blatant violation of our hard* on guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances. The rit of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret alls. @:EREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals dated $ecember ;9, ;@@> is affirmed.
C;
SO ORDERED.
RE7NATO S. PUNO #hief Dustice
C=
8.R. No. 142444
9)ne 112 2004
DANIEL MASAN8AA7 TAPU?2 AURORA TAPU?-MADRIA8A2 LI6ERT7 M. ASUNCION2 LAD7L7N 6AMOS MADRIA8A2 E;ERL7 TAPU? MADRIA8A2 EKCEL TAPU?2 I;AN TAPU? AND MARIAN TIM6AS2 petitioners, vs. :ONORA6LE 9UD8E ELMO DEL ROSARIO2 in &i$ c#!#city #$ P-e$i.in% 9).%e o* RTC 6-. 0 A# i+o2 S:ERIFF NELSON DELA CRU?2 in &i$ c#!#city #$ S&e-i** o* t&e RTC2 T:E P:ILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE $t#tione. in 6o-#c#y I$ #n.2 -e!-e$ente. +y t&e PNP STATION COMMANDER2 T:E :ONORA6LE COURT OF APPEALS IN CE6U 14 DI;ISION2 SPOUSES 8RE8ORIO SANSON O MA. LOURDES T. SANSON2 respondents.
t&
RESOLUTION
6RION2 J.3
?efore us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to $ections 1 and N of Rule H of the Revised Rules of #ourt? $ections 1 and H of the Rule on the -rit of Amparo 16 and $ections 1 and of theRule on the -rit of (abeas Data ;) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the rits of amparo and habeas data filed by the above*named petitioners against the )onorable Dudge :lmo del Rosario Rin his capacity as presiding 2udge of RT# ?r. B, MaliboS, Sheriff "elson de la #ru5 Rin his capacity as Sheriff of the RT#S, the Philippine "ational Police stationed in ?oracay (sland, represented by the P"P Station #ommander, the )onorable #ourt of 'ppeals in #ebu, 67 th $ivision, and the spouses Eregorio Sanson and Fa. %ourdes T. Sanson, respondents. The petition and its anne.es disclose the follo ing material antecedents+ The private respondents spouses Eregorio Sanson and Fa. %ourdes T. Sanson (the I private respondentsI), filed ith the Fifth Funicipal #ircuit Trial #ourt of ?uruanga*Falay, '/lan (the I 5#T#I) a complaint= dated ;< 'pril ;@@9 for *o-ci+ e ent-y and damages ith a prayer for the issuance of a rit of preliminary mandatory in2unction against the petitioners $aniel Fasang/ay Tapu5, 'urora Tapu5*Fadriaga, %iberty F. 'suncion, %adylyn ?amos Fadriaga, :verly Tapu5 Fadriaga, :.cel Tapu5, (van Tapu5 and Farian Timbas (the I petitionersI) and other Dohn $oes numbering about 6;@. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that+ (6) they are the registered o ners under T#T "o. =B76= of a 6.@@C=*hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, ?alabag, ?oracay, Falay, '/lan (the I disputed landI)1 (;) they ere the disputed landHs prior possessors hen the petitioners * armed ith bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together ith unidentified persons numbering 6;@ * entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, ithout the private respondentsH permission and against the ob2ections of the private respondentsH security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. (n their 'ns er< dated 6< Fay ;@@9, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that+ (6) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land1 (;) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders1 and (=) the private respondentsH certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They as/ed for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. The F#T#, after due proceedings, rendered on ; Danuary ;@@> a decision B in the private respondentsH favor. (t found prior possession * the /ey issue in forcible entry cases * in the private respondentsH favor, thus+ IThe /ey that could unravel the ans er to this 0uestion lies in the 'mended #ommissionerHs Report and S/etch found on pages ;<B to ;<7 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. (t is sho n in the 'mended #ommissionerHs Report and S/etch that the land in 0uestion is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone ire perimeter fence in pin/ and green highlighter as sho n in the S/etch Plan (p. ;<7). Said perimeter fence as constructed by the plaintiffs 6< years ago. The foregoing findings of the #ommissioner in his report and s/etch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they ac0uired the land in 0uestion on Fay ;>, 6CC= through a $eed of Sale ('nne. H'H, 'ffidavit of Eregorio Sanson, p. ;>9, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 6CC= ('ffidavit of Eregorio Sanson, pp. ;>6*;>B, rec.). From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs ere in actual physical possession of the hole lot in 0uestion since 6CC= hen it as interrupted by the defendants (sic) hen on Danuary <, ;@@B claiming to (sic) the )eirs of 'ntonio Tapu5 entered a portion of the land in 0uestion ith vie of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Eregorio Sanson to confront them before ?SP!, Police #hief (nspector Dac/ %. &an/y and ?arangay #aptain Elenn SacapaOo. 's a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an 'greement ('nne. H$H, #omplaint p. ;@) herein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in 0uestion and agreed not to build any structures thereon. The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of Danuary <, ;@@B hen the plaintiff posted security guards, ho ever, sometime on or about 9+=@ '.F. of 'pril 6C, ;@@9, the defendants some ith bolos and one carrying a sac/ suspected to contain firearms ith other Dohn $oes numbering about 6;@ persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure ('nne. H:H, #omplaint, p. 66) inside the lot in 0uestion hich incident as promptly reported to the proper authorities as sho n by plaintiffsH #ertification ('nne. HFH, #omplaint, p. 6;) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date 'pril 6C, ;@@9, the plaintiffs filed a complaint ith the ,ffice of the %upong Tagapamayapa of ?arangay ?alabag, ?oracay (sland, Falay, '/lan but no settlement as reached as sho n in their #ertificate to File 'ction ('nne. HEH, #omplaint, p. 6=)1 hence the present action. $efendantsH (sic) contend in their ans er that Hprior to Danuary <, ;@@B, they ere already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of o nership by open continuous, adverse possession to the e.clusion of other (sic)H. (Paragraph <, 'ns er, p. ;B). The contention is untenable. 's adverted earlier, the land in 0uestion is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 6CC= as noted by the #ommissioner in his Report and reflected in his S/etch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs here (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in 0uestion from 6CC= up to 'pril 6C, ;@@9 hen they ere ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. 'pplying by analogy the ruling of the )onorable Supreme #ourt in the case of Folina, et al. vs. $e ?acud, 6C S#R' CB9, if the land ere in the possession of plaintiffs from 6CC= to 'pril 6C, ;@@9, defendantsH claims to an older possession must be re2ected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recogni5ed at the same time in t o different personalities. $efendants li/e ise contend that it as the plaintiffs ho forcibly entered the land in 0uestion on 'pril 67, ;@@9 at about =+@@ oHcloc/ in the afternoon as sho n in their #ertification ('nne. H$H, $efendantsH Position Paper, p. 6=B, rec.).
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The contention is untenable for being inconsistent ith their allegations made to the commissioner ho constituted (sic) the land in 0uestion that they built structures on the land in 0uestion only on 'pril 6C, ;@@9 (Par. $.<, #ommissionerHs 'mended Report, pp. ;<9 to ;<>), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date. %i/e ise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendantsH itnesses, Ro ena ,nag, 'polsida !mambong, 'riel Eac, $ar in 'lvare5 and :dgardo Pinaranda, in their Doint 'ffidavit (pp. 6<=* H6<<, rec.) RsicS categorically stated Hthat on or about 'pril 6C, ;@@9, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors a ay from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed menH. From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on 'pril 67, ;@@9 but it as only on 'pril 6C, ;@@9 hen the defendants overpo ered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy. %i/e ise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as anne.es to their position paper ere not noted and reflected in the amended report and s/etch submitted by the #ommissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in 0uestion, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in 0uestion prior to 'pril 6C, ;@@9 9.I The petitioners appealed the F#T# decision to the Regional Trial #ourt (I RT#,I ?ranch 9 of Malibo, '/lan) then presided over by Dudge "iovady F. Farin (I,udge 5arinI). ,n appeal, Dudge Farin granted the private respondentsH motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an ,rder dated ;9 February ;@@>, ith the issuance conditioned on the private respondentsH posting of a bond. The rit > * authori5ing the immediate implementation of the F#T# decision * as actually issued by respondent Dudge :lmo F. del Rosario (the I respondent ,udgeI) on 6; Farch ;@@> after the private respondents had complied ith the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the rit1 the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. The respondent Dudge subse0uently denied the petitionersH Fotion for Reconsideration and to $efer :nforcement of Preliminary Fandatory (n2unction in an ,rder dated 6> Fay ;@@>7. Fean hile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. C The respondent Dudge nevertheless issued via a Special ,rder 6@ a rit of demolition to be implemented fifteen (6B) days after the SheriffHs ritten notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houseGs to allo the private respondents to effectively ta/e actual possession of the land. The petitioners thereafter filed on ; 'ugust ;@@> ith the #ourt of 'ppeals, #ebu #ity, a Petition for Revie 66(under Rule <; of the 6CC> Rules of #ivil Procedure) of the Permanent 'andatory #n"unction and -rder of (emolition of the 1TC of 5alibo$ ?r. > in Civil Case No. <//; . Fean hile, respondent Sheriff "elson R. dela #ru5 issued the "otice to 8acate and for $emolition on 6C Farch ;@@7. 6; (t as against this factual bac/drop that the petitioners filed the present petition last ;C 'pril ;@@7. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely+ a petition for certiorari under Rule 9B of the Revised Rules of #ourt1 the issuance of a rit of habeas data under the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata1 and finally, the issuance of the rit of amparo under the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo. To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the F#T#Hs findings and legal reasons. Fost importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition * bases as ell of the petition for the issuance of the rit of amparo * read+ I;C. ,n 'pril ;C, ;@@9 at about C+;@ a.m. armed men $!o-tin% 12 %#)%e $&ot %)n$ int-).e. into t&e !-o!e-ty o* t&e .e*en.#nt$ Rthe land in disputeS. They ere not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. %ater the follo ing day at ;+@@ a.m. t o houses of the defendants ere burned to ashes. =@. These armed men R ithout uniformsS removed the barbed ire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. T o of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants ho resisted their intrusion. ,ne of them ho as identified as S'F!:% %,"E", y E:E'"S,, 6C years old, single, and a resident of ?inun*an, ?atad, (loilo, fired t ice. =6. T&e #-'e. 'en to-c&e. t/o &o)$e$ o* t&e .e*en.#nt$ -e.)cin% t&e' to #$&e$. C...D 32. T&e$e #ct$ o* TERRORISM #n. <&eino)$ c-i'e> o* ARSON /e-e -e!o-te. +y one o* t&e :EIRS OF ANTONIO TAPU? C...D. T&e te--o-i$t$ t-#ine. t&ei- $&ot%)n$ #n. *i-e. #t 'ino-$ n#'e y I;AN 8A9ISAN #n. MIC:AEL MA86ANUA2 /&o -e$i$te. t&ei- int-)$ion. T&ei- #ct i$ # + #t#nt ,io #tion o* t&e #/ !en# i"in% Act$ o* ;io ence #%#in$t /o'en #n. c&i .-en2 /&ic& i$ #%%-#,#te. +y t&e )$e o* &i%&-!o/e-e. /e#!on$. CPD =<. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential ith the police authorities o ing to their financial and political clout. =B. The actual prior occupancy, as ell as the o nership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists Rintroduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffsS are attested by itnesses ho are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested
CB
itnesses in the case namely+ Ro ena ,nag, 'polsida !mambong, 'riel Eac, $ar in 'lvare5 and :dgardo Penarada. %i/e ise, the affidavit of "emia T. #armen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to un2ustly evict the defendants.6=I The petitioners posit as ell that the F#T# has no 2urisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed belo . #iting Section == of The ,udiciary Reorgani2ation Act of 10O3& as amended by Republic Act *o. > 01 ,6< they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, ith the assessed value of the property involved e.ceeding P;@,@@@.@@1 thus, the case should be originally cogni5able by the RT#. 'ccordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RT# * to here the F#T# decision as appealed * e0ually has no 2urisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders. OUR RULIN8 @e *in. t&e !etition$ *o- ce-tio-#-i #n. i$$)#nce o* # /-it o* &#+e#$ .#t# *#t# y .e*ecti,e2 +ot& in $)+$t#nce #n. in *o-'. T&e !etition *o- t&e i$$)#nce o* t&e /-it o* #'!#-o2 on t&e ot&e- &#n.2 i$ *#t# y .e*ecti,e /it& -e$!ect to content #n. $)+$t#nce. T&e Petition *o- Ce-tio-#-i &e conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RT# orders has been *i e. o)t o* ti'e. (t is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition ith the #ourt of 'ppeals (the I #A petitionI) for the revie of the same RT# orders no assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the e.act status of their pending #' petition. The #' petition, ho ever, as filed ith the #ourt of 'ppeals on ; 'ugust ;@@>, hich indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) ere received on 0 %ugust 9;;< at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, as filed on 'pril ;C, ;@@7 or more than eight months from the time the #' petition as filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RT# orders by at least eight (7) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of si.ty (9@) days 6B from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration. &e note in this regard that the petitionersH counsel stated in his attached I#ertificate of #ompliance ith #ircular [6*77 of the Supreme #ourtI69 (I#ertificate of #omplianceI) that Iin the meantime the RT# and the $heriff issued a *OTA#. TO +A#AT. A*D "OR D.5O9ATAO* not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same *OTA#. to their counsel on April 1O& G33O by 9%# .I To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this "otice to 8acate, e feel it best to declare no that the counting of the 9@*day reglementary period under Rule 9B cannot start from the 'pril 67, ;@@7 date cited by the petitionersH counsel. The "otice to 8acate and for $emolition is not an order that e.ists independently from the RT# orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed #' petition. (t is merely a notice, made in compliance ith one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its o n separately from the assailed order on hich it is based. (t cannot therefore be the appropriate sub2ect of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 9B in the conte.t of this case. The 'pril 67, ;@@7 date cannot li/e ise be the material date for Rule 9B purposes as the above*mentioned "otice to 8acate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petitionHs Prayer patently sho s. 6> ?ased on the same material antecedents, and, at the very least, of forum shopping. e find too that the petitioners have been guilty of illful and deliberate misrepresentation before this #ourt
?y the petitionersH o n admissions, they filed a petition ith the #ourt of 'ppeals (doc/eted as #' * E.R. SP "o. @;7BC) for the revie of the orders no also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because I the #A did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic! to see) relief in the #A would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the #A refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the $heriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of 9A#C O" ,MRA$DA#TAO* .I67 (nterestingly, the petitionersH counsel * #ompliance6C that+ I. . . (e) the petitioners (sic)1 ent up to the #ourt of 'ppeals to 0uestion the &R(T ,F PR:%(F("'RA ("D!"#T(," copy of the petition is attached hile ma/ing this claim in the body of the petition * at the same time represented in his #ertificate of
(f) t&e CA initi# y i$$)e. # -e$o )tion .enyin% t&e PETITION +ec#)$e it &e . t&#t t&e ORDER TO ;ACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF T:E :OMES OF PETITIONERS i$ not c#!#+ e o* +ein% t&e $)+Bect o* # PETITION FOR RELIEF , copy of the resolution of the #' is attached hereto1 (underscoring supplied) (g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on 'ugust >, ;@@> but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the FR is attached (sic). . . .I The difference bet een the above representations on hat transpired at the appellate court level is replete ith significance regarding the petitionersH intentions. &e discern ** from the petitionersH act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that I the #A did not act on the petition up to this date I hile stating the real #ourt of 'ppeals action in the #ertification of #ompliance ** the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought belo in order to mislead us into action on the RT# orders ithout frontally considering the action that the #ourt of 'ppeals had already underta/en. 't the very least, the petitioners are obviously see/ing to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not ait for from the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. SP "o. @;7BC. The petitionersH act of see/ing against the same parties the nullification of the same RT# orders before the
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appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes illful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section =, Rule <91 Section B, Rule >1 Section 6, Rule 9B1 and Rule B9, all of the Revised Rules of #ourt. That a rong remedy may have been used ith the #ourt of 'ppeals and possibly ith us ill not save the petitioner from a forum*shopping violation here there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, ith the recourses e.isting side by side at the same time. To restate the prevailing rules, Iforum shopping is the institution of t o or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court ould ma/e a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against hom an adverse 2udgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to see/ a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles ith the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of 2ustice and congest court doc/ets. &illful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case1 it may also constitute direct contempt.I;@ 'dditionally, the re0uired verification and certification of non*forum shopping is defective as one (6) of the seven (>) petitioners * (van Tapu5 * did not sign, in violation of Sections < and B of Rule >1 Section =, Rule <91 Section 6, Rule 9B1 all in relation ith Rule B9 of the Revised Rules of #ourt. ,f those ho signed, only five (B) e.hibited their postal identification cards ith the "otary Public. (n any event, e find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The F#T# correctly assumed 2urisdiction over the private respondentsH complaint, hich specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not * as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated * a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. !nder Section ==, par. ; of The Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.! *o. > 01 , e.clusive 2urisdiction over forcible entry and unla ful detainer cases lies ith the Fetropolitan Trial #ourts, Funicipal Trial #ourts and Funicipal #ircuit Trial #ourts. These first*level courts have had 2urisdiction over these cases * called accion interdictal * even before the R.'. >9C6 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This 2urisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved1 the la established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unla fully detained. Separately from accion interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of o nership.;6 'pparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to hen they cite Section ==, par. =, in relation ith Section 6C, par. ; of The Dudiciary Reorgani5ation 'ct of 6C7@, as amended by Republic 'ct "o. >9C6, in hich 2urisdiction may either be ith the first*level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty sub2ect of the litigation. 's the complaint at the F#T# as patently for forcible entry, that court committed no 2urisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition. In $)'2 t&e !etition *o- ce-tio-#-i $&o) . +e .i$'i$$e. *o- t&e cite. *o-'# .e*iciencie$2 *o- ,io #tion o* t&e non-*o-)' $&o!!in% -) e2 *o&#,in% +een *i e. o)t o* ti'e2 #n. *o- $)+$t#nti,e .e*iciencie$. T&e @-it o* A'!#-o To start off ith the basics, the rit of amparo as originally conceived as a response to the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lac/ of available and effective remedies to address these e.traordinary concerns. (t is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an e.traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. @&#t it i$ not2 i$ # /-it to !-otect conce-n$ t&#t #-e !)-e y !-o!e-ty o- co''e-ci# . Neit&e- i$ it # /-it t&#t /e $&# i$$)e on #'o-!&o)$ #n. )nce-t#in %-o)n.$ . #onse0uently, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo * in line ith the e.traordinary character of the rit and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands * re0uires that every petition for the issuance of the P rit must be supported by 2ustifying allegations of fact, to it+ I(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner1 (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is un/no n or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation1 2c4 The right to life$ liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent$ and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits 1 2d4 The investigation conducted$ if any$ specifying the names$ personal circumstances$ and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals$ as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation$ together with any report 1 (e) The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to determine the fate or person responsible for the threat, act or omission1 and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other 2ust and e0uitable reliefs.I ;; The rit shall issue if the #ourt is preliminarily satisfied ith the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of ho and to hat e.tent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party as or is being committed. The issuance of the rit of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore 0uoted, ;=that are essentially repeated in paragraph B< of the petition. These allegations are supported by the follo ing documents+ hereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
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I(a) Doint 'ffidavit dated ;= Fay ;@@9 of Ro ena ?. ,nag, 'polsida !mambong, 'riel Eac, $ar in 'lvare5 and :dgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitionersH prior possession, private respondentsH intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 6C 'pril ;@@91 (b) !nsubscribed 'ffidavit of "emia #armen y Tapu5, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors * descendants of 'ntonio Tapu51 (c) !nsubscribed 'ffidavit of Felanie Tapu5 y Samindao, essentially corroborating "emiaHs affidavit1 (d) #ertification dated ;= 'pril ;@@9 issued by Police ,fficer Dac/son Dauod regarding the incident of petitionersH intrusion into the disputed land1 (e) #ertification dated ;> 'pril ;@@9 issued by Police ,fficer 'llan R. ,tis, narrating the altercation bet een the Tapu5 family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun*po/ing and shooting incident involving one of the security guards1 (f) #ertification issued by Police ,fficer #hristopher R. Fendo5a, narrating that a house o ned by Dosiel Tapu5, Dr., rented by a certain Dorge ?uenavente, as accidentally burned by a fire.I ,n the hole, hat is clear from these statements * both s orn and uns orn * is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to 0uestions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. (f at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned e.cept to the e.tent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the e.tent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of Iarmed men bare to the aistI and the alleged pointing and firing of eapons. Not#+ y2 none o* t&e $)!!o-tin% #**i.#,it$ co'!e in% y $&o/ t&#t t&e t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity o* t&e !etitione-$ i$ i''inent o- i$ contin)in%. ' closer loo/ at the statements sho s that at least t o of them * the statements of "emia #arreon y Tapu5 and Felanie Tapu5 are practically identical and unsworn. The #ertification by Police ,fficer Dac/son Dauod, on the other hand, simply narrates hat had been reported by one $anny Tapu5 y Fasang/ay, and even mentions that the burning of t o residential houses as Iaccidental.I 's against these allegations are the cited F#T# factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case hich re2ected all the petitionersH factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they ere made under a full*blo n 2udicial process, i.e., after e.amination and evaluation of the contending partiesH positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court*appointed commissioner. &e preliminarily e.amine these conflicting factual positions under the bac/drop of a dispute ( ith incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that as brought to and ruled upon by the 'CTC1 subse0uently brought to the 1TC on an appeal that is still pending1 still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results1 and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RT# appeal moot. !nder these legal and factual situations, e are far from satisfied ith the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts that ould 2ustify the issuance of a rit of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property7related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners ish to see/ redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the e.traordinary remedy of the rit of amparo. "or do e believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the F#T# findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the F#T# ruling independently of the appeal to the RT# that is no in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, ill obviously rea/ havoc on the orderly administration of 2ustice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo does not intend to ea/en or negate. Separately from these considerations, e cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitionersH present recourse via the remedy of the rit of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. &e discern this from the petitionersH misrepresentations pointed out above1 from their obvious act of forum shopping1 and from the recourse itself to the e.traordinary remedies of the rits of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, hen recourses in the ordinary course of la fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the rit of certiorari nor that of amparo * e.traordinary though they may be * ill suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The rit of amparo, particularly, should not issue hen applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or hen it ill inordinately interfere ith these processes * the situation obtaining in the present case. &hile e say all these, e note too that the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, ;< for the effect of earlier* filed criminal actions,;B and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a rit of amparo ith a subse0uently filed criminal and civil action.;9 These rules ere adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing ith petitions for the issuance of the rit of amparo hen the parties resort to other parallel recourses. &here, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly ith the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, e see no point in separately and directly intervening through a rit of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie sho ing that the right to life, liberty or security * the personalconcern that the rit is intended to protect * is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. &e see no legal bar, ho ever, to an application for the issuance of the rit, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co*e.istence of the rit ith a separately filed criminal case. T&e @-it o* :#+e#$ D#t#
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Section 9 of the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata re0uires the follo ing material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a habeas data+ I(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent1
rit of
(b! The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life$ liberty or security of the aggrieved partyI (c! The actions and recourses ta!en by the petitioner to secure the data or informationI (d! The location of the files$ registers or databases$ the government office$ and the person in charge$ in possession or in control of the data or information$ if !nownI (e! The reliefs prayed for& which may include the updating& rectification& suppression or destruction of the database or information or files )ept by the respondent. (n case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order en2oining the act complained of1 and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are 2ust and e0uitable.I Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that+ I6. R U S Similarly, a petition for a &R(T ,F )'?:'S $'T' is prayed for so that the P"P may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the #ourt and the petitioners ith copy of the same1 RUS 99. Petitioners apply for a &R(T ,F )'?:'S $'T' commanding the Philippine "ational Police RP"PS to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and li/e ise the investigation report if an investigation as conducted by the P"P.I These allegations obviously lac/ hat the Rule on &rit of )abeas $ata re0uires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, e see no concrete allegations of un2ustified or unla ful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition li/e ise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral anne.es. The necessity or 2ustification for the issuance of the rit, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been sho n. (n sum, the prayer for the issuance of a rit of habeas data is nothing more than the I fishing expeditionI that this #ourt * in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data * had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. (n these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the rit of habeas data is fully in order. @:EREFORE, premises considered, and attachments. SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. 6RION 'ssociate Dustice
e hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRI8:T for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body
CC
A. M. No. 04-1-16-SC
9#n)#-y 222 2004 T:E RULE ON T:E @RIT OF :A6EAS DATA RESOLUTION
'cting on the recommendation of the #hairperson of the #ommittee on Revision of the Rules of #ourt submitting for this #ourt-s consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata, the #ourt Resolved to 'PPR,8: the same. This Resolution shall ta/e effect on February ;, ;@@7, follo ing its publication in three (=) ne spapers of general circulation. Danuary ;;, ;@@7. ***************************************************************************** T:E RULE ON T:E @RIT OF ,%?*%. (%T% SECTION 1. ,abeas (ata. * The rit of habeas data is a remedy available to any person hose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unla ful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. @&o M#y Fi e. * 'ny aggrieved party may file a petition for the disappearances, the petition may be filed by+ rit of habeas data. )o ever, in cases of e.tralegal /illings and enforced
(a) 'ny member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely+ the spouse, children and parents1 or (b) 'ny ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party ithin the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph1 or SEC. 3. @&e-e to Fi e. * The petition may be filed ith the Regional Trial #ourt here the petitioner or respondent resides, or that over the place here the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed government offices. ith the Supreme #ourt or the #ourt of 'ppeals or the Sandiganbayan hich has 2urisdiction
hen the action concerns public data files of
SEC. 4. @&e-e Ret)-n#+ eI En*o-ce#+ e. * &hen the court or 2udge.
rit is issued by a Regional Trial #ourt or any 2udge thereof, it shall be returnable before such
&hen issued by the #ourt of 'ppeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such court or any 2ustice thereof, or to any Regional Trial #ourt of the place here the petitioner or respondent resides, or that hich has 2urisdiction over the place here the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. &hen issued by the Supreme #ourt or any of its 2ustices, it may be returnable before such #ourt or any 2ustice thereof, or before the #ourt of 'ppeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its 2ustices, or to any Regional Trial #ourt of the place here the petitioner or respondent resides, or that hich has 2urisdiction over the place here the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The rit of habeas data shall be enforceable any here in the Philippines. Sec. 0. DocEet Fee$. * "o doc/et and other la ful fees shall be re0uired from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be doc/ed and acted upon immediately, ithout pre2udice to subse0uent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (6B) days from the filing of the petition. SEC. 6. Petition. * ' verified ritten petition for a rit of habeas data should contain+ (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent1 (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and ho it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party1 (c) The actions and recourses ta/en by the petitioner to secure the data or information1 (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if /no n1 (e) The reliefs prayed for, by the respondent. hich may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files /ept
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(n case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order en2oining the act complained of1 and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are 2ust and e0uitable. SEC. 1. I$$)#nce o* t&e @-it. * !pon the filing of the petition, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall immediately order the issuance of the rit if on its face it ought to issue. The cler/ of court shall issue the rit under the seal of the court and cause it to be served ithin three (=) days from the issuance1 or, in case of urgent necessity, the 2ustice or 2udge may issue the rit under his or her o n hand, and may deputi5e any officer or person serve it. The rit shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition issuance. hich shall not be later than ten (6@) or/ days from the date of its
SEC. 4. Pen# ty *o- Re*)$in% to I$$)e o- Se-,e t&e @-it. * ' cler/ of court ho refuses to issue the rit after its allo ance, or a deputi5ed person refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, 2ustice or 2udge for contempt ithout pre2udice to other disciplinary actions.
ho
SEC. 5. :o/ t&e @-it i$ Se-,e.. * The rit shall be served upon the respondent by a 2udicial officer or by a person deputi5ed by the court, 2ustice or 2udge ho shall retain a copy on hich to ma/e a return of service. (n case the rit cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Ret)-nI Content$. * The respondent shall file a verified ritten return together ith supporting affidavits ithin five (B) or/ing days from service of the rit, hich period may be reasonably e.tended by the #ourt for 2ustifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the follo ing+ (a) The la ful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others1 (b) (n case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information sub2ect of the petition1 (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection1 (ii) the steps or actions ta/en by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information1 and, (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held1 and, (c) ,ther allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. ' general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allo ed. SEC. 11. Conte'!t. * The court, 2ustice or 2udge may punish ith imprisonment or fine a respondent ho commits contempt by ma/ing a false return, or refusing to ma/e a return1 or any person ho other ise disobeys or resist a la ful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. @&en De*en$e$ M#y +e :e#-. in C&#'+e-$. * ' hearing in chambers may be conducted here the respondent invo/es the defense that the release of the data or information in 0uestion shall compromise national security or state secrets, or hen the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. Sec. 6=. Prohibited Pleadings and Fotions. * The follo ing pleadings and motions are prohibited+ (a) Fotion to dismiss1 (b) Fotion for e.tension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings1 (c) $ilatory motion for postponement1 (d) Fotion for a bill of particulars1 (e) #ounterclaim or cross*claim1 (f) Third*party complaint1 (g) Reply1 (h) Fotion to declare respondent in default1 (i) (ntervention1
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(2) Femorandum1 (/) Fotion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders1 and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Ret)-nI Fi in%. * (n case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, 2ustice or 2udge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may arrant unless the court in its discretion re0uires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 10. S)''#-y :e#-in%. * The hearing on the petition shall be summary. )o ever, the court, 2ustice or 2udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. SEC. 16. 9).%'ent. * The court shall render 2udgment ithin ten (6@) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. (f the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall en2oin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be 2ust and e0uitable1 other ise, the privilege of the rit shall be denied. !pon its finality, the 2udgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any la ful officers as may be designated by the court, 2ustice or 2udge or/ing days. ithin five (B)
SEC. 11. Ret)-n o* Se-,ice. * The officer ho e.ecuted the final 2udgment shall, ithin three (=) days from its enforcement, ma/e a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the rit and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, ith copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return ho the 2udgment as enforced and complied regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the rit. ith by the respondent, as ell as all ob2ections of the parties
SEC. 14. :e#-in% on O**ice-G$ Ret)-n. * The court shall set the return for hearing ith due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 15. A!!e# . * 'ny party may appeal from the final 2udgment or order to the Supreme #ourt under Rule <B. The appeal may raise 0uestions of fact or la or both. The period of appeal shall be five (B) or/ing days from the date of notice of the 2udgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases. SEC. 20. In$tit)tion o* Se!#-#te Action$. * The filing of a petition for the administrative actions. rit of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or
SEC. 21. Con$o i.#tion. * &hen a criminal action is filed subse0uent to the filing of a petition for the criminal action. &hen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse0uent to a petition for a criminal action.
rit, the latter shall be consolidated
ith the
rit of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated
ith the
'fter consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. E**ect o* Fi in% o* # C-i'in# Action. * &hen a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the under the rit shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the rit of habeas data. SEC. 23. S)+$t#nti,e Ri%&t$. * This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. S)!! eto-y A!! ic#tion o* t&e R) e$ o* Co)-t. * The Rules of #ourt shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent ith this Rule. SEC. 20. E**ecti,ity. * This Rule shall ta/e effect on February ;, ;@@7, follo ing its publication in three (=) ne spapers of general circulation. CPU6LIS:ED IN T:E MANILA 6ULLETIN2 T:E P:ILIPPINE STAR AND T:E P:ILIPPINE DAIL7 INMUIRER ON 20 9ANUAR7 2004D rit shall be filed. The relief
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8.R. No. 144165
Octo+e- 02 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPAN72 ALEKANDER S. DE7TO and RU6EN A. SAPITULA2 Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO 8OPE? LIM2 Respondent.
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CARPIO MORALES2 J.:
The #ourt is once again confronted ith an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the rit of habeas data. Fay an employee invo/e the remedies available under such rit here an employer decides to transfer her or/place on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein \ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, hich imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereofK Rosario E. %im (respondent), also /no n as #herry %im, is an administrative cler/ at the Fanila :lectric #ompany (F:R'%#,). ,n Dune <, ;@@7, an anonymous letter as posted at the door of the Fetering ,ffice of the 'dministration building of F:R'%#, Plaridel, ?ulacan Sector, at hich respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads+ #herry %im+ F'T'P,S F,"E %'F!"(" %')'T "E ?(A'A' "E F:R'%#,, "E'A," "'F'" 'A E!ST, F,"E P'%'F," '"E ?!,"E M!FP'"A' S' FE' ?!&'A' "E E,?A:R",. M'P'% "E F!M)' F,, %!F'A'S M' R(T,, &'%'"E !T'"E "' %,,?U. 6 #opies of the letter ere also inserted in the loc/ers of F:R'%#, linesmen. (nformed about it, respondent reported the matter on Dune B, ;@@7 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine "ational Police.; ?y Femorandum= dated Duly <, ;@@7, petitioner 'le.ander $eyto, )ead of F:R'%#,-s )uman Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to F:R'%#,-s 'labang Sector in Funtinlupa as I'GF ,TFS #ler/,I effective Duly 67, ;@@7 in light of the receipt of IU reports that there ere accusations and threats directed against RherS from un/no n individuals and hich could possibly compromise RherS safety and security.I Respondent, by letter of Duly 6@, ;@@7 addressed to petitioner Ruben '. Sapitula, 8ice*President and )ead of F:R'%#,-s )uman Resource 'dministration, appealed her transfer and re0uested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the IpunitiveI nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. #iting the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to 'labang and bac/ entails, and violation of the provisions on 2ob security of their #ollective ?argaining 'greement (#?'), respondent e.pressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this ise+ .... ( feel that it ould have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least ( could have found out if these are credible or even serious. ?ut as you stated, these came from un/no n individuals and the ay they ere handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be RsicS highly suspicious, doubtful or are 2ust mere 2o/es if they e.isted at all. 'ssuming for the sa/e of argument only, that the alleged threats e.ist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment hich ill ma/e me a Isitting duc/I so to spea/, seems to betray the real intent of management hich is contrary to its e.pressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me thin/ t ice on the rationale for management-s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly e.tending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action ould be a punitive one.< (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent thus re0uested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. "o response to her re0uest having been received, respondent filed a petition B for the issuance of a Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of ?ulacan, doc/eted as SP. Proc. "o. ;6=*F*;@@7. rit of habeas data against petitioners before the
?y respondent-s allegation, petitioners- unla ful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her ith details or information about the alleged report hich F:R'%#, purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a rit commanding petitioners to file a ritten return containing the follo ing+ a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security1 the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection1 b) the measures ta/en by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information1 and c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained. 'dditionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining ,rder (TR,) en2oining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the F:R'%#, 'labang Sector.
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?y ,rder of 'ugust ;C, ;@@7, ?ranch > of the ?ulacan RT# directed petitioners to file their verified the trial court granted respondent-s application for a TR,.
9
ritten return. 'nd by ,rder of September B, ;@@7,
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TR, on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for rit of habeas data in order1 and the RT# lac/ed 2urisdiction over the case hich properly belongs to the "ational %abor Relations #ommission ("%R#). >
as not
?y $ecision7 of September ;;, ;@@7, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a rit of preliminary in2unction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent-s transfer until such time that petitioners comply ith the disclosures re0uired. The trial court 2ustified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a rit of habeas data should e.tend not only to victims of e.tra*legal /illings and political activists but also to ordinary citi5ens, li/e respondent hose rights to life and security are 2eopardi5ed by petitioners- refusal to provide her ith information or data on the reported threats to her person. )ence, the present petition for revie under Rule <B of 6CC> Rules of #ivil Procedure and the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata C contending that 6) the RT# lac/ed 2urisdiction over the case and cannot restrain F:R'%#,-s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of or/ of its employees, and ;) the issuance of the rit is outside the parameters e.pressly set forth in the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata. 6@
1avvphi1
Faintaining that the RT# has no 2urisdiction over hat they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that Ialthough ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially 0uestioning the transfer of her place of or/ by her employerI66 and the terms and conditions of her employment hich arise from an employer*employee relationship over hich the "%R# and the %abor 'rbiters under 'rticle ;6> of the %abor #ode have 2urisdiction. Petitioners thus maintain that the RT# had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Femorandum transferring respondent-s place of or/ hich is purely a management prerogative, and that ,#'*#ircular "o. >C*;@@= 6; e.pressly prohibits the issuance of TR,s or in2unctive rits in labor*related cases. Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata directs the issuance of the rit only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party-s person, family or home1 and that F:R'%#, (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities. The petition is impressed ith merit. Respondent-s plea that she be spared from complying ith F:R'%#,-s Femorandum directing her reassignment to the 'labang Sector, under the guise of a 0uest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall ithin the province of a rit of habeas data. Section 6 of the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata provides+ Section 6. )abeas $ata. The rit of habeas data is a remedy available to any person hose -i%&t to !-i,#cy in i*e2 i+e-ty o- $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. ot&-e#tene. +y #n )n #/*) #ct o- o'i$$ion of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity en%#%e. in t&e %#t&e-in%2 co ectin% o$to-in% o* .#t# o- in*o-'#tion regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of 2udicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. (t is meant to provide a forum to enforce one-s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person-s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. (t bears reiteration that li/e the rit of amparo, habeas data as conceived as a response, given the lac/ of effective and available remedies, to address the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances. (ts intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.6= #astillo v. #ru56< underscores the emphasis laid do n in Tapu5 v. del Rosario 6B that the rits of amparo and habeas data ill ",T issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor hen the grounds invo/ed in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. 69 :mployment constitutes a property right under the conte.t of the due process clause of the #onstitution. 6> (t is evident that respondent-s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer * a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one-s employment * are hat prompted her to adopt the e.traordinary remedy of habeas data. Durisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by la ith the "%R# and the %abor 'rbiters. (n another vein, there is no sho ing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any un2ustifiable or unla ful violation of respondent-s right to privacy vis*a*vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners- refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent-s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact triviali5es these threats and accusations from un/no n individuals in her earlier*0uoted portion of her Duly 6@, ;@@7 letter as Ihighly suspicious, doubtful or are 2ust mere 2o/es if they e.isted at all.I67 'nd she even suspects that her transfer to another place of or/ IbetrayRsS the real intent of managementSI and could be a Ipunitive move.I )er posture un ittingly concedes that the issue is labor*related. &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'"T:$. The assailed September ;;, ;@@7 $ecision of the ?ulacan RT#, ?ranch > in SP. Proc. "o. ;6=*F*;@@7 is hereby R:8:RS:$ and S:T 'S($:. SP. Proc. "o. ;6=*F*;@@7 is, accordingly, $(SF(SS:$. "o costs. S, ,R$:R:$.
Special Proceedings Finals CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice
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8.R. No. 142160
No,e'+e- 202 2005
PNSUPT. FELIK6ERTO CASTILLO2 POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO 6A8TAS2 RUPERTO 6ORLON8AN2 EDMUNDO DIONISIO2 RONNIE MORALES2 ARNOLD TRIA2 #n. 8IL6ERTO PUN?ALAN2 EN8R. RICASOL P. MILLAN2 EN8R. REDENTOR S. DELA CRU?2 MR. ANASTACIO L. 6ORLON8AN2 MR. ARTEMIO ES8UERRA2 =TISO72= #n. 9O:N DOES2 Petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRU?2 NIKON T. CRU?2 #n. FERDINAND T. CRU?2 Respondents.
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CARPIO MORALES2 J.:
Petitioners6 , employees and members of the local police force of the #ity Eovernment of Falolos, challenge the Farch ;7, ;@@7 $ecision of the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of Falolos, ?ranch 6@ in a petition for issuance of rits of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents. The factual antecedents. Respondent 'manda #ru5 ('manda) ho, along ith her husband Francisco E. #ru5 (Spouses #ru5), leased a parcel of land situated at ?arrio Euinha a, Falolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Eovernment of ?ulacan (the Province) hich intended to utili5e it for local pro2ects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unla ful detainer against the Spouses #ru5 before the then Funicipal Trial #ourt (FT#) of ?ulacan, ?ulacan. ?y $ecision of September B, 6CC>, the FT# rendered 2udgment against the Spouses #ru5, the RT#, became final and e.ecutory. hich 2udgment, follo ing its affirmance by
The finality of the decision in the e2ectment case not ithstanding, the spouses #ru5 refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province; and the 2udges ho presided over the case. = Those cases ere dismissed e.cept their petition for annulment of 2udgment lodged before ?ranch 67 of the RT# of Falolos, and a civil case for inB)nction 7==*F*;@@< lodged before ?ranch 6@ of the same RT# Falolos. The Spouses #ru5 sought in the case for in2unction the issuance of a permanent and e.ecutory 2udgment against them. rit of in2unction to prevent the e.ecution of the final
?y ,rder of Duly 6C, ;@@B, the RT#, finding merit in the Spouses #ru5es- allegation that subse0uent events changed the situation of the parties to 2ustify a suspension of the e.ecution of the final and e.ecutory 2udgment, issued a permanent rit of in2unction, the dispositive portion of hich reads+ @:EREFORE, the foregoing petitioners- Fotion for Reconsideration of the ,rder dated 'ugust 6@, ;@@< is hereby 8RANTED. ,rder dated 'ugust 6@, ;@@< is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated "ovember @B, ;@@; are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the FT#*?ulacan, ?ulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners ith the same determines the metes and bounds of <@@ s0. meters leased premises sub2ect matter of this case ith immediate dispatch. 'ccordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued rit of demolition to the FT# of ?ulacan, ?ulacan. S, ,R$:R:$.< (:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) Finding that the fallo of the RT# Duly 6C, ;@@B ,rder treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent in2unction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the FT#. (n a Eeodetic :ngineer-s Report submitted to the FT# on 'ugust =6, ;@@>, the metes and bounds of the property ere indicated. The FT#, by ,rder of Danuary ;, ;@@7, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent in2unction hich the RT# issued is ineffective. ,n motion of the Province, the FT#, by ,rder of Danuary ;6, ;@@7, thus issued a Second 'lias &rit of $emolition. ,n receiving notice of the Danuary ;, ;@@7 FT# ,rder, the Spouses #ru5 filed a motion before ?ranch 6@ of the RT# for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TR,) hich it set for hearing on Danuary ;B, ;@@7 on hich date, ho ever, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such not ithstanding, the RT# issued a TR,.B The Spouses #ru5, along ith their sons*respondents "i.on and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as o ners of the property hich as for lease. ,n February ;6, ;@@7, petitioners Police Superintendent Feli.berto #astillo et al., ho ere deployed by the #ity Fayor in compliance ith a memorandum issued by Eovernor Doselito R. Fendo5a instructing him to Iprotect, secure and maintain the !o$$e$$ion o* t&e !-o!e-ty,I entered the property.
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'manda and her co*respondents refused to turn over the property, ho ever. (nsisting that the RT# Duly 6C, ;@@B ,rder of Permanent (n2unction en2oined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed on Farch =, ;@@7 a IRespectful Fotion*Petition for &rit of 'mparo and )abeas $ata,I doc/eted as S!eci# Ci,i Action No. 03-M-2004, hich as coincidentally raffled to ?ranch 6@ of the RT# Falolos. Respondents averred that despite the Permanent (n2unction, petitioners unla fully entered the property ith the use of heavy e0uipment, tore do n the barbed ire fences and tents, 9 and arrested them hen they resisted petitioners- entry1 and that as early as in the evening of February ;@, ;@@7, members of the Philippine "ational Police had already camped in front of the property. ,n the basis of respondents- allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RT#, by ,rder of Farch <, ;@@7, issued rits of amparo and habeas data.> The RT#, crediting respondents- version in this ise+ Petitioners have sho n by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses e.amined into on &rits of 'mparo and )abeas $ata that there have been an on*going hearings on the verified Petition for #ontempt, doc/eted as Special Proceedings "o. =@9*F*;@@9, before this #ourt for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary (n2unction ,rder dated Duly 69, ;@@B RsicS in Sp. #ivil 'ction "o. 7==*F*;@@;, hearings ere held on Danuary ;B, ;@@7, February 6; and 6C, ;@@7, here the respondents prayed for an 'pril ;;, ;@@7 continuance, ho ever, in the pitch dar/ness of February ;@, ;@@7, police officers, some personnel from the :ngineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy #ompound, converged therein and ith continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone*thro ing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a prete.t of an ordinary police operation hen entervie ed RsicS by the media then present, but at 7+@@ a.m. to late in the afternoon of February ;6, ;@@7, 5oomed in on the petitioners, sub2ecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial la police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citi5en,7 rendered 2udgment, by $ecision of Farch ;7, ;@@7, in favor of respondents, disposing as follo s+ I@:EREFORE, premises considered, the #ommitment ,rders and aivers in #rim. #ases "os. @7*>> for $irect assault1 #rim. #ase "o. @7*>> for ,ther Forms of Trespass1 and #rim. #ase "o. @7*>7 for %ight Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners ere deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a ell*founded fear of personal violence. 'ccordingly, the commitment orders and aivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared A6SOLUTE. &ithout any pronouncement as to costs. S, ,R$:R:$.IC (:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) )ence, the present petition for revie on certiorari, pursuant to Section 6C 6@ of The Rule on the &rit of 'mparo ('.F. "o. @>*C*6;* S#),66 hich is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the &rit of )abeas $ata ('.F. "o. @7*6*69*S#).6; (n the main, petitioners fault the RT# for U giving due course and issuing rits of amparo and habeas data hen from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (6) the petition in RsicS insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights1 and (;) criminal cases had already been filed and pending ith the Funicipal Trial #ourt in #ities, ?ranch 6, #ity of Falolos. (!nderscoring supplied) The petition is impressed ith merit. The #ourt is, under the #onstitution, empo ered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. 6= (n vie of the heightening prevalence of e.tra2udicial /illings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo as issued and too/ effect on ,ctober ;<, ;@@> hich coincided ith the celebration of !nited "ations $ay and affirmed the #ourt-s commitment to ards internationali5ation of human rights. Fore than three months later or on February ;, ;@@7, the Rule on the &rit of (abeas Data as promulgated. Section 6 of the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo provides+ Section 6. 'etition. The petition for a rit of amparo is a remedy available to #ny !e-$on /&o$e -i%&t to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity i$ ,io #te. o- t&-e#tene. /it& ,io #tion +y #n )n #/*) #ct o- o'i$$ion of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The rit shall cover e.tralegal /illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 6 of the Rule on the &rit of (abeas Data provides+
6@>
Section 6. (abeas Data. The rit of habeas data is a remedy available to any person hose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unla ful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (:mphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above*0uoted provisions, the coverage of the rits is limited to the protection of rights to i*e2 i+e-tyand $ec)-ity. 'nd the rits cover not only actual but also threats of unla ful acts or omissions. $ecretary of *ational Defense v. 5analo6< teaches+ 's the 'mparo Rule as intended to address the intractable problem of Ie.tralegal /illingsI and Ienforced disappearances,I its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these t o instances or to threats thereof.I:.tralegal /illingsI are I/illings committed ithout due process of la , i.e., ithout legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.I ,n the other hand, Ienforced disappearancesI are Iattended by the follo ing characteristics+ an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organi5ed groups or private individuals acting ith the direct or indirect ac0uiescence of the government1 the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or hereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac/no ledge the deprivation of liberty hich places such persons outside the protection of la .6B (!nderscoring supplied, citations omitted) To thus be covered by the privilege of the rits, respondents must meet the threshold re0uirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened ith an unla ful act or omission. :vidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute bet een the Provincial Eovernment and respondents. 'bsent any considerable ne.us bet een the acts complained of and its effect on respondents- right to life, liberty and security, the #ourt ill not delve on the propriety of petitioners- entry into the property. Apropos is the #ourt-s ruling in Tapu2 v. Del Rosario@69 To start off ith the basics, the rit of amparo as originally conceived as a response to the e.traordinary rise in the number of /illings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lac/ of available and effective remedies to address these e.traordinary concerns. (t is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an e.traordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. @&#t it i$ not2 i$ # /-it to !-otect conce-n$ t&#t #-e !)-e y !-o!e-ty o- co''e-ci# . Neit&e- i$ it # /-it t&#t /e $&# i$$)e on #'o-!&o)$ #n. )nce-t#in %-o)n.$. #onse0uently, the Rule on the &rit of 'mparo in line ith the e.traordinary character of the rit and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands re0uires that every petition for the issuance of the rit must be supported by 2ustifying allegations of fact, to it+ .... The rit shall issue if the #ourt is preliminarily satisfied ith the prima facie e.istence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of ho and to hat e.tent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party as or is being committed.6> (:mphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted) Tapu2 also arose out of a property dispute, albeit bet een private individuals, ith the petitioners therein branding as Iacts of terrorismI the therein respondents- alleged entry into the disputed land ith armed men in to . The #ourt therein held+ ,n the hole, hat is clear from these statements both s orn and uns orn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to 0uestions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. (f at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned e.cept to the e.tent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the e.tent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of Iarmed men bare to the aistI and the alleged pointing and firing of eapons. Not#+ y2 none o* t&e $)!!o-tin% #**i.#,it$ co'!e in% y $&o/ t&#t t&e t&-e#t to t&e -i%&t$ to i*e2 i+e-ty #n. $ec)-ity o* t&e !etitione-$ i$ i''inent o- contin)in%. 67(:mphasis in the original1 underscoring supplied) (t bears emphasis that respondents- petition did not sho any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. ?are allegations that petitioners Iin unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then illfully, forcibly and feloniously ith the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)I6C ill not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the rit of amparo. "o undue confinement or detention as present. (n fact, respondents ere even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.;@ 'lthough respondents- release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the rit of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, andGor that there e.ists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the rit cannot be 2ustified. That respondents are merely see/ing the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Doint 'ffidavit, vi5+
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.... 66. Mami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy e0uipment na ha a/ ha a/ ang nasabing /autusan ng RT# ?ranch 6@ (P:RF'":"T ("D!"#T(," at RT# ,R$:RS $'T:$ February 6;, 6> at 6C ;@@7) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng /autusan ng /orte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng IS:%F*):%PI at batas u/ol sa IPR,P:RTA R(E)TSI, &ala /aming naga a ipagtanggol ang aming /arapatan sa lupa na <B years naming I(" P,SS:SS(,".I (!nderscoring supplied) ,ddly, respondents also see/ the issuance of a rit of habeas data hen it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. 's for respondents- assertion of past incidents;6 herein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent (n2unction order, these incidents ere already raised in the in2unction proceedings on account of hich respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.;; ?efore the filing of the petition for rits of amparo and habeas data, or on February ;;, ;@@7, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus hich as considered moot and academic by ?ranch 6< of the Falolos RT# and as accordingly denied by ,rder of 'pril 7, ;@@7. Fore. Respondent 'manda and one of her sons, Francisco Dr., li/e ise filed a petition for rits of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the rits by the RT#, hich petition as .i$'i$$e. for insufficiency and forum shopping. (t thus appears that respondents are not ithout recourse and have in fact ta/en full advantage of the legal system ith the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.;=
1avvphi1
(t need not be underlined that respondents- petitions for rits of amparo and habeas data are e.traordinary remedies used as tools to stall the e.ecution of a final and e.ecutory decision in a property dispute.
hich cannot be
't all events, respondents- filing of the petitions for rits of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they ere arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance ith Section 9, Rule 66;;< of the Rules of #ourt. 8alidity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for rits of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the rits may, ho ever, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.;B @:EREFORE, the petition is ER'"T:$. The challenged Farch <, ;@@7 ,rder of ?ranch 6@ of the Regional Trial #ourt of Falolos is $:#%'R:$ "!%% '"$ 8,($, and its Farch ;7, ;@@7 $ecision is RE;ERSED and SET ASIDE.Special #ivil 'ction "o. B=*F*;@@7 is $(SF(SS:$. SO ORDERED.
6@C
8.R. No. 145100
Se!te'+e- 12 2010
IN T:E MATTER OF T:E PETITION FOR T:E @RIT OF %'P%1- AND T:E @RIT OF ,%?*%. (%T% IN FA;OR OF MELISSA C. ROKAS2 MELISSA C. ROKAS2 Petitioner, vs. 8LORIA MACAPA8AL-ARRO7O2 8IL6ERT TEODORO2 8EN. ;ICTOR S. I6RADO2 PNDIR. 8EN. 9ESUS AME ;ER?OSA2 LT. 8EN. DELFIN N. 6AN8IT2 PCNSUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRU?2 MA9. 8EN. RALP: ;ILLANUE;A2 PSNSUPT. RUD7 8AMIDO LACADIN2 AND CERTAIN PERSONS @:O 8O 67 T:E NAMECSD DEK2 RC AND ROSE2 Respondents.
$:#(S(,"
PERE?2 J.:
't bench is a Petition For Revie on #ertiorari 6 assailing the $ecision; dated ;9 'ugust ;@@C of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. SP "o. @@@=9*&R' J a petition that as commenced 2ointly under the Rules on the &rit of 'mparo ('mparo Rule) and )abeas $ata ()abeas $ata Rule). (n its decision, the #ourt of 'ppeals e.tended to the petitioner, Felissa #. Ro.as, the privilege of the rits of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter-s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads+ &):R:F,R:, the Petition is P'RT('%%A F:R(T,R(,!S. This #ourt hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the &rit of 'mparo and )abeas $ata. 'ccordingly, Respondents are en2oined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in hatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner-s Felissa #. Ro.as, andGor Felissa Ro.as1 alleged ties to the #PP*"P' or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner-s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lac/ of merit. 'lthough there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continueGcomplete the investigation of this incident ith the end in vie of prosecuting those ho are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family hile in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. = &e begin ith the petitioner-s allegations. Petitioner is an 'merican citi5en of Filipino descent. < &hile in the !nited States, petitioner enrolled in an e.posure program to the Philippines ith the group ?agong 'lyansang Fa/abayan*!nited States of 'merica ( %A6A**!S') of hich she is a member. B $uring the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and to ns of #entral %u5on and, in 'pril of ;@@C, she volunteered to 2oin members of %A6A**Tarlac9 in conducting an initial health survey in %a Pa5, Tarlac for a future medical mission. > (n pursuit of her volunteer or/, petitioner brought her passport, allet ith Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P6B,@@@.@@) in cash, 2ournal, digital camera memory card, laptop computer, e.ternal hard dis/, A'OD,7 rist atch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.C ith
'fter doing survey or/ on 6C Fay ;@@C, petitioner and her companions, Duanito #arabeo (#arabeo) and Dohn :d ard Dandoc (Dandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Fr. Desus Paolo (Fr. Paolo) in $itio ?agong Si/at,%arangay Mapani/ian, %a Pa5, Tarlac.6@ 't around 6+=@ in the afternoon, ho ever, petitioner, her companions and Fr. Paolo ere startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.66 Suddenly, fifteen (6B) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face do n.6; The armed men ere all in civilian clothes and, ith the e.ception of their leader, ere also earing bonnets to conceal their faces. 6= Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (B) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 6< 't this 2uncture, petitioner sa the other armed men herding #arabeo and Dandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.6B 'gainst her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner to ards the vanJbruising her arms, legs and /nees. 69 ,nce inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner as able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 6>The van then sped a ay. 'fter about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 67 Petitioner, #arabeo and Dandoc ere ordered to alight. 6C'fter she as informed that she is being detained for being a member of the #ommunist Party of the Philippines*"e People-s 'rmy (#PP*"P'), petitioner as separated from her companions and as escorted to a room that she believed as a 2ail cell from the sound of its metal doors. ;@ From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes ta/ing off and landing and some construction bustle. ;6 She inferred that she as ta/en to the military camp of Fort Fagsaysay in %aur, "ueva :ci2a.;; &hat follo ed as five (B) straight days of interrogation coupled ith torture. ;= The thrust of the interrogations as to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to Ithe fold.I ;< The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, cho/ing, bo.ing and suffocating the petitioner.;B Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner as made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. ;9 Petitioner as only relieved of her blindfolds hen she as allo ed to ta/e a bath, during hich she became ac0uainted ith a oman named IRoseI ho bathed her. ;> There ere also a fe times hen she cheated her blindfold and as able to pee/ at her surroundings.;7 $espite being deprived of sight, ho ever, petitioner as still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators ho introduced themselves to her as I$e.,I IDamesI and IR#.I;C IR#I even told petitioner that those ho tortured her came from the ISpecial ,perations Eroup,I and that she as abducted because her name is included in the I,rder of ?attle.I=@ ,n ;B Fay ;@@C, petitioner as finally released and returned to her uncle-s house in Nue5on #ity. =6 ?efore being released, ho ever, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone ith a S(F =; card, a slip of paper containing an e*mail address ith pass ord, == a plastic bag containing biscuits and

=< =B
66@
boo/s, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner as also sternly arned not to report the incident to the group Marapatan or something unto ard ill happen to her and her family. =9 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from R# via the cellular phone given to her. =>,ut of apprehension that she monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner thre a ay the cellular phone ith a S(F card. as being
See/ing sanctuary against the threat of future harm as ell as the suppression of any e.isting government files or records lin/ing her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the &rits of 'mparo and )abeas $ata before this #ourt on 6 Dune ;@@C. =7 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it as government agents ho ere behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner li/e ise included in her suit IRose,I I$e.I and IR#.I =C The 'mparo and )abeas $ata petition prays that+ (6) respondents be en2oined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family1 (;) an order be issued allo ing the inspection of detention areas in the >th (nfantry $ivision, Fort Fagsaysay, %aur, "ueva :ci2a1 (=) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the >th (nfantry $ivision, the Special ,perations Eroup of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines ('FP) and its subsidiaries or branchGes prior to, during and subse0uent to 6C Fay ;@@C1 (<) respondents be ordered to e.punge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Felissa #. Ro.as, Felissa Ro.as or any name hich sounds the same1 and (B) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her 2ournal, digital camera ith memory card, laptop computer, e.ternal hard dis/, (P,$, rist atch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P6B,@@@.@@ cash.<@ (n a Resolution dated C Dune ;@@C, this #ourt issued the desired rits and referred the case to the #ourt of 'ppeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.<6 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified ritten return.<; ,n 67 Dune ;@@C, the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (,SE), filed a Return of the &rits<= on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. &e no turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. The public respondents label petitioner-s alleged abduction and torture as Istage managed.I << (n support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Fr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report <B of the %a Pa5 Police Station. (n the Special Report, Fr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his t o sons to avoid leaving the house. <9 From this statement, the public respondents dre the distinct possibility that, e.cept for those already inside Fr. Paolo-s house, nobody else has any ay of /no ing here petitioner and her companions ere at the time they ere supposedly abducted. <> This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there as any IabductionI it must necessarily have been planned by, or done ith the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.<7 Public respondents also cited the Fedical #ertificate<C of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she as sub2ected to serious torture for five (B) days. The public respondents noted that hile the petitioner alleges that she as cho/ed and bo.ed by her abductorsJinflictions that could have easily produced remar/able bruisesJher Fedical #ertificate only sho s abrasions in her rists and /nee caps. B@ For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in 0uestion the very authenticity of petitioner-s alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. )ence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture as no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. B6 "evertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the 'mparo and )abeas $ata petition based on the follo ing grounds+ (a) as against respondent President Eloria Facapagal*'rroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,B; and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in vie of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authori5ed, the commission of such atrocities. B= Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. B< (n both the police and military arms of the government machinery, in0uiries ere set*up in the follo ing manner+ Police 'ction Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around <+=@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon of 6C Fay ;@@C, hen %arangay #aptain Fichael F. Fanuel came to the %a Pa5 Funicipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men some here in %arangay Mapani/ian.BB 'cting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.B9 The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Fr. Paolo, ho informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (=) persons Jlater identified as petitioner Felissa Ro.as, Duanito #arabeo and Dohn :d ard DandocJ ho ere all staying in his house. B> Fr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 6+=@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon, and as perpetrated by about eight (7) heavily armed men ho forced their ay inside his house.B7 ,ther itnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dar/ blue van ith an un/no n plate number and t o (;) )onda TRF motorcycles ith no plate numbers.BC 't B+@@ o-cloc/ in the afternoon of 6C Fay ;@@C, the investigators sent a Flash Fessage to the different police stations surrounding %a Pa5, Tarlac, in an effort to trac/ and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. !nfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 9@ ,n ;@ Fay ;@@C, the results of the initial investigation ere included in a Special Report 96 that as transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial ,ffice, headed by public respondent PGS Supt. Rudy %acadin (Supt. %acadin). Public respondent Supt. %acadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police ,ffice of Region = about the abduction.9; Follo *up investigations ere, at the same time, pursued.9=
666
,n ;9 Fay ;@@C, public respondent P#GSupt. %eon "ilo $ela #ru5, as $irector of the Regional Police ,ffice for Region =, caused the creation of Special (nvestigation Tas/ EroupJ#'R,D'" (Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'") to conduct an in*depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, #arabeo and Dandoc.9< Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" started its in0uiry by ma/ing a series of bac/ground e.aminations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 9B Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" also maintained liaisons ith Marapatan and the 'lliance for 'dvancement of People-s RightsJorgani5ations trusted by petitionerJin the hopes of obtaining the latter-s participation in the ongoing investigations.99 !nfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators re0uesting for the availability of the petitioner for in0uiries ere left unheeded. 9> The progress of the investigations conducted by Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" had been detailed in the reports 97 that it submitted to public respondent Eeneral Desus 'me 8er5osa, the #hief of the Philippine "ational Police. )o ever, as of their latest report dated ;C Dune ;@@C, Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" is still unable to ma/e a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsJa fact that tas/ group #'R,D'" attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fello victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.9C Filitary 'ction Public respondent Eilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of "ational $efense, first came to /no about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this #ourt directing him and the other respondents to file their return. >@ (mmediately thereafter, he issued a Femorandum $irective>6 addressed to the #hief of Staff of the 'FP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an in0uiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.>; 'cting pursuant to the Femorandum $irective, public respondent Eeneral 8ictor S. (brado, the 'FP #hief of Staff, sent an 'FP Radio Fessage>= addressed to public respondent %ieutenant Eeneral $elfin ". ?angit (%t. Een. ?angit), the #ommanding Eeneral of the 'rmy, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.>< For his part, and ta/ing cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent %t. Een. ?angit instructed public respondent Fa2or Eeneral Ralph '. 8illanueva (Fa2. Een. 8illanueva), the #ommander of the >th (nfantry $ivision of the 'rmy based in Fort Fagsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. >B (n turn, public respondent Fa2. Een. 8illanueva tapped the ,ffice of the Provost Farshal (,P8) of the >th (nfantry $ivision, to conduct the investigation. >9 ,n ;= Dune ;@@C, the ,P8 of the >th (nfantry $ivision released an (nvestigation Report >> detailing the results of its in0uiry. (n substance, the report described petitioner-s allegations as IopinionatedI and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. >7 The $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals (n its $ecision,>C the #ourt of 'ppeals gave due eight and consideration to the petitioner-s version that she as indeed abducted and then sub2ected to torture for five (B) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by hich the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and as thereby convinced that the latter as telling the truth. 7@ ,n the other hand, the #ourt of 'ppeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner as Istage managed,I as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions /ne here they ere staying at the time they ere forcibly ta/en.76 The #ourt of 'ppeals further stressed that the Fedical #ertificate of the petitioner can only affirm the e.istence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very in2uries the latter claims to have sustained during her harro ing ordeal, particularly hen she as handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.7; The #ourt of 'ppeals also recogni5ed the e.istence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of IR#I to contact and monitor her, even after she as released. 7= This threat, according to the #ourt of 'ppeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators ho are still at large. 7< Thus, the appellate court e.tended to the petitioner the privilege of the rit of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as ell as continuing, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, their e.isting investigations involving the abduction.7B The #ourt of 'ppeals li/e ise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the e.istence of Irecords of investigationsI that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the #PP*"P'. 79 The appellate court derived the e.istence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party*list representatives Dovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor 'lcover ('lcover), hich allegedly sho the petitioner participating in rebel e.ercises. Representative 'lcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female #PP*"P' member ho anted out of the organi5ation. 'ccording to the #ourt of 'ppeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as ell as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the #PP*"P' does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 7> To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the rit of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in hatever form, relative to petitioner-s alleged ties ith the #PP*"P' or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.77 The foregoing not ithstanding, ho ever, the #ourt of 'ppeals as not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the ac0uiescence of the government, ere responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 7C The appellate court stressed that, 2udging by her o n statements, the petitioner merely IbelievedI that the military as behind her abduction. C@ Thus, the #ourt of 'ppeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner. C6 The petition as li/e ise dismissed as against public respondent President Eloria Facapagal*'rroyo, in vie of her immunity from suit.C; 'ccordingly, the petitioner-s prayers for the return of her personal belongings order also met the same fate.C< ere denied. C= Petitioner-s prayers for an inspection order and production
66;
)ence, this appeal by the petitioner. 'FP'R, '. Petitioner first contends that the #ourt of 'ppeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.CB #orollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of #ourt of 'ppeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. C9 Petitioner insists that the manner by hich her abduction and torture as carried out, as ell as the sounds of construction, gun*fire and airplanes that she heard hile in detention, as these ere detailed in her t o affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.C> Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invo/es the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high*ran/ing civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. C7 Thus, petitioner see/s from this #ourt a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as ell as liable for the return of her belongings. CC #ommand Responsibility in 'mparo Proceedings (t must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the 2ustification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive la that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party*respondent in an amparo petition. 6@@ The case of Rubrico v. 'rroyo,6@6 hich as the first to e.amine command responsibility in the conte.t of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that+ 6@; The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its conte.t in the development of la s of ar and armed combats. 'ccording to Fr. ?ernas, Icommand responsibility,I in its simplest terms, means the Iresponsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons sub2ect to their control in international ars or domestic conflict.I 6@= (n this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The )ague #onventions of 6C@> adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, 6@<foreshado ing the present*day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. 's then formulated, command responsibility is I#n o'i$$ion 'o.e o* in.i,i.)# c-i'in# i#+i it y,I hereby the superior is made responsible for c-i'e$ co''itte. by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators6@B (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (:mphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied) Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invo/ed in a full*blo n criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the rit itself+ The rit of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing 2udicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 6@9 &hile the principal ob2ective of its proceedings is the initial determination of hether an enforced disappearance, e.tralegal /illing or threats thereof had transpiredJthe rit does not, by so doing, fi. liability for such disappearance, /illing or threats, hether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive la .6@> The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo rit has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmar/ case of The Secretary of "ational $efense v. Fanalo+6@7 . . . The remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as it parta/es of a summary proceeding that re0uires only substantial evidence to ma/e the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner1 it is not an action to determine criminal guilt re0uiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages re0uiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility re0uiring substantial evidence that ill re0uire full and e.haustive proceedings. 6@C(:mphasis supplied) (t must be clarified, ho ever, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition ere committed ith their direct or indirect ac0uiescence. (n hich case, commanders may be impleadedJnot actually on the basis of command responsibilityJbut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. (n Ra5on v. Tagitis,66@ the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability ere given special and uni0ue significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to it+ . . . Re$!on$i+i ity refers to the e.tent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in hatever ay, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this #ourt shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Acco)nt#+i ity, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those ho e.hibited involvement in the enforced disappearance ithout bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above1 or ho are imputed ith /no ledge relating to the enforced disappearance and ho carry the burden of disclosure1 or those ho carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of e.traordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents 't any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one ay or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 666 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to sho that it as government agents ho ere behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and tortureJi.e., the forcible ta/ing in broad daylight1 use of vehicles ith no license plates1
66=
utili5ation of blindfolds1 conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations1 and the infliction of physical abuseJ hich, according to her, is consistent ith the ay enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.66; Foreover, petitioner also claims that she as held inside the military camp Fort FagsaysayJa conclusion that she as able to infer from the travel time re0uired to reach the place here she as actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun*fire and airplanes she heard hile thereat. 66= &e are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors ere military or police personnel and that she as detained at Fort Fagsaysay. First. The similarity bet een the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction ith those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient eight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. &e opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. (n amparo proceedings, the eight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non*availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. $irect evidence of identity, hen obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. 'n amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and ha5y inference hat it could other ise clearly and directly ascertain. (n the case at bench, petitioner as, in fact, able to include in her ,ffer of :.hibits, 66< the cartographic s/etches66B of several of her abductors hose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this #ourt, these cartographic s/etches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner-s abductors. !nfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been reali5ed in vie of the fact that the faces described in such s/etches remain unidentified, much less have been sho n to be that of any military or police personnel. ?luntly stated, the abductors ere not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she as ta/en to Fort Fagsaysay as not ade0uately established by her mere estimate of the time it too/ to reach the place here she as detained and by the sounds that she heard hile thereat. %i/e the #ourt of 'ppeals, &e are not inclined to ta/e the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its faceJnot only because they ere made mostly hile she as in blindfolds, but also in vie of the fact that she as a mere so2ourner in the Philippines, hose familiarity ith Fort Fagsaysay and the travel time re0uired to reach it is in itself doubtful.669 &ith nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner-s claim that she as ta/en to Fort Fagsaysay remains a mere speculation. (n sum, the petitioner as not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors ere actually affiliated, hether formally or informally, ith the military or the police organi5ations. "either does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner as indeed ta/en to the military camp Fort Fagsaysay to the e.clusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, ma/e it virtually impossible to determine hether the abduction and torture of the petitioner as in fact committed ith the ac0uiescence of the public respondents. ,n account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Prayer for the Return of Personal ?elongings This brings !s to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings. (n its decision, the #ourt of 'ppeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents ere involved in her abduction and torture. 66> &e agree ith the conclusion of the #ourt of 'ppeals, but not entirely ith the reason used to support it. To the mind of this #ourt, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of hether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. (n the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already e0uivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fi.ed in a full and e.haustive proceeding. 's already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 667 ?ut perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies ith the fact that a person-s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightsJ hich are no longer protected by the rit of amparo. 66C Section 6 of the 'mparo Rule,6;@ hich defines the scope and e.tent of the rit, clearly e.cludes the protection of property rights. ?. The ne.t error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the #ourt of 'ppeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Fagsaysay. 6;6 #onsidering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner-s ordeal, this #ourt finds no error on the part of the #ourt of 'ppeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Fagsaysay. &e agree ith the appellate court that a contrary stance ould be e0uivalent to sanctioning a Ifishing e.pedition,I hich as never intended by the 'mparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.6;; #ontrary to the e.plicit position6;= espoused by the petitioner, the 'mparo Rule does not allo a Ifishing e.peditionI for evidence. 'n inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before ma/ing a decision.6;< ' basic re0uirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party see/ing the order. &hile the 'mparo Rule does not re0uire that the place to be inspected be identified ith clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to ma/e a prima facie case. This, as as sho n above, petitioner failed to do.
66<
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to ma/e out a prima facie case that she as detained in Fort Fagsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. 'n inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. )'?:'S $'T' 's earlier intimated, the #ourt of 'ppeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the rit of habeas data, by en2oining the public respondents from Idistributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in hatever form, reports, documents or similar papersI relative to the petitioner-s Ialleged ties ith the #PP*"P' or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.I Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this #ourt is constrained to pass upon and revie this particular ruling of the #ourt of 'ppeals in order to rectify, hat appears to !s, an error infecting the grant. For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the #ourt of 'ppeals in granting the privilege of the relevant portion6;B of its decision+ rit of habeas data, &e 0uote hereunder the
!nder these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Felissa #. Ro.as or Felissa Ro.as be produced and eventually e.punged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Eovernment-s ,rder of ?attle under ,plan ?antay %aya hich listed political opponents against hom false criminal charges ere filed based on made up and per2ured information. Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before !s, :.*army general Dovito Palaparan, ?antay party*list, and Pastor 'lcover of the 'lliance for "ationalism and $emocracy party*list held a press conference here they revealed that they received an information from a female "P' rebel ho anted out of the organi5ation, that Petitioner as a communist rebel. 'lcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter ith photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an "P' training camp and a video #$ of the training e.ercises. #learly, and not ithstanding Petitioner-s denial that she as the person in said video, there ere records of other investigations on Felissa #. Ro.as or Felissa Ro.as hich violate her right to privacy. &ithout a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one ay or another, to petitioner-s abduction here she claimed she had been sub2ected to cruelties and dehumani5ing acts hich nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the #PP*"P'. 'nd if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioner-s security and privacy ill certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons ho have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video #$ or reports of Petitioner-s alleged ties ith the #PP*"P' indiscriminately made available for public consumption ithout evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner-s right to privacy hich must be protected by this #ourt. &e, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the &rit of )abeas $ata. (:mphasis supplied). The rit of habeas data as conceptuali5ed as a 2udicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.6;9 The rit operates to protect a person-s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances here such information is being collected through unla ful means in order to achieve unla ful ends. "eedless to state, an indispensable re0uirement before the privilege of the rit may be e.tended is the sho ing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.6;> This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the #ourt of 'ppeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that sho s that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the #ourt of 'ppeals to the public respondents that ould have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e.& /eeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner-s ties ith the #PP*"P', as not ade0uately provenJconsidering that the origin of such records ere virtually une.plained and its e.istence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and 'lcover in their press conference. "o evidence on record even sho s that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. (n vie of the above considerations, the directive by the #ourt of 'ppeals en2oining the public respondents from Idistributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in hatever form, reports, documents or similar papersI relative to the petitioner-s Ialleged ties ith the #PP*"P',I appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it as not proven to have. 8erily, until such time that any of the public respondents ere found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the e.istence of reports being /ept in violation of the petitioner-s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this #ourt must, at least in the meantime, stri/e do n the grant of the privilege of the rit of habeas data. $(SP,S(T(," ,F T): #'S: ,ur revie of the evidence of the petitioner, hile telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed t o important things that can guide !s to a proper disposition of this case. ,ne, that further investigation ith the use of e.traordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner1 and t o, that the #ommission on )uman Rights (#)R), pursuant to its #onstitutional mandate to Iinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,I 6;7must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Further (nvestigation Fust ?e !nderta/en (ronic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason hy the petitioner as not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one*sided investigations conducted by the government
66B
itself. This Ia / ardI situation, herein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or e.tralegal /illing are, at the same time, the very ones tas/ed by la to investigate the matter, is a uni0ue characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the Ievidentiary difficultiesI faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.6;C #ogni5ant of this situation, ho ever, the 'mparo Rule placed a potent safeguardJre0uiring the Irespondent ho is a public official or employeeI to prove that no less than Ie.traordinary diligence as re0uired by applicable la s, rules and regulations as observed in the performance of duty.I 6=@ Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to sho to the satisfaction of the amparo court that e.traordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. &ith this in mind, &e note that e.traordinary diligence, as re0uired by the 'mparo Rule, investigations in the case at bar. as not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military
' perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" sho s modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete ith bac/ground chec/s on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been ta/ing to ascertain the authors of the crime. 'lthough conducting a bac/ground investigation on the victims is a logical first step in e.posing the motive behind the abductionJits necessity is clearly out eighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, ho as no longer in captivity, already came up ith allegations about the motive of her captors. (nstead, Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non*cooperation of the petitionerJ ho, they claim, as less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 6=6 &hile it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner ould have facilitated the progress of Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'"-s investigation, this #ourt believes that the former-s reticence to cooperate is hardly an e.cuse for Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" not to e.plore other means or avenues from hich they could obtain relevant leads. 6=; (ndeed, hile the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as ade0uate evidence before a court of la Jthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply ith the high standard of diligence re0uired by the 'mparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. 'ssuming the non*cooperation of the petitioner, Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'"-s reports still failed to e.plain hy it never considered see/ing the assistance of Fr. Desus PaoloJ ho, along ith the victims, is a central itness to the abduction. The reports of Tas/ Eroup #'R,D'" is silent in any attempt to obtain from Fr. Paolo, a cartographic s/etch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one ho, by petitioner-s account, as not earing any mas/.
1avvphi1
The recollection of Fr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the s/etches included in petitioner-s offer of e.hibits that, it may be pointed out, ere prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the #)R pursuant to the latter-s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.6== ?ut as mentioned earlier, the #)R s/etches remain to be unidentified as of this date. (n light of these considerations, &e agree ith the #ourt of 'ppeals that further investigation under the norm of e.traordinary diligence should be underta/en. This #ourt simply cannot rite finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. (n a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in 2eopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of 2ustice. To add teeth to the appellate court-s directive, ho ever, &e find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary tas/ of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the #)R. 6=< &e note that the #)R, unli/e the police or the military, seems to en2oy the trust and confidence of the petitionerJas evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 6=B #ertainly, it ould be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the #)R have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, &e also deem it 2ust and appropriate to relegate the tas/ of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the #)R. )ence, &e modify the directive of the #ourt of the 'ppeals for further investigation, as follo sJ 6.) 'ppointing the #)R as the lead agency tas/ed ith conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 'ccordingly, the #)R shall, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, ta/e or continue to ta/e the necessary steps+ (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic s/etches submitted by the petitioner, as ell as their hereabouts1 and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner-s abduction and torture. ;.) $irecting the incumbent #hief of the Philippine "ational Police (P"P), or his successor, and the incumbent #hief of Staff of the 'FP, or his successor, to e.tend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the #)R, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner-s abduction and torture, sub2ect to reasonable regulations consistent ith the #onstitution and e.isting la s. =.) Further directing the incumbent #hief of the P"P, or his successor, to furnish to this #ourt, the #ourt of 'ppeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, ithin ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision. <.) Further directing the #)R to (a) furnish to the #ourt of 'ppeals ithin ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations1 and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this #ourt. 'ccordingly, this case must be referred bac/ to the #ourt of 'ppeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance ith the above directives and determining hether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there ould already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
669
responsible or, at least, accountable. 'fter ma/ing such determination, the #ourt of 'ppeals shall submit its o n report ith recommendation to this #ourt for final action. The #ourt of 'ppeals ill continue to have 2urisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tas/s under this decision. @:EREFORE2 the instant petition is PARTIALL7 MERITORIOUS. &e hereby render a decision+ 6.) 'FF(RF("E the denial of the petitioner-s prayer for the return of her personal belongings1 ;.) 'FF(RF("E the denial of the petitioner-s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Fagsaysay. =.) R:8:RS("E the grant of the privilege of habeas data, ithout pre2udice, ho ever, to any modification that this #ourt may ma/e on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision. <.) F,$(FA("E the directive that further investigation must be underta/en, as follo sJ a. 'PP,("T("E the #ommission on )uman Rights as the lead agency tas/ed ith conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 'ccordingly, the #ommission on )uman Rights shall, under the norm of e.traordinary diligence, ta/e or continue to ta/e the necessary steps+ (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic s/etches submitted by the petitioner, as ell as their hereabouts1 and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner-s abduction and torture. b. $(R:#T("E the incumbent #hief of the Philippine "ational Police, or his successor, and the incumbent #hief of Staff of the 'rmed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to e.tend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the #ommission on )uman Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner-s abduction and torture, sub2ect to reasonable regulations consistent ith the #onstitution and e.isting la s. c. Further $(R:#T("E the incumbent #hief of the Philippine "ational Police, or his successor, to furnish to this #ourt, the #ourt of 'ppeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, ithin ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision. d. Further $(R:#T("E the #ommission on )uman Rights (a) to furnish to the #ourt of 'ppeals ithin ninety (C@) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations1 and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this #ourt. B.) R:F:RR("E ?'#M the instant case to the #ourt of 'ppeals for the follo ing purposes+ a. To F,"(T,R the investigations and actions ta/en by the P"P, 'FP, and the #)R1 b. To $:T:RF(": hether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the #)R, the abduction and torture of the petitioner committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents1 and on the basis of this determinationJ as
c. To S!?F(T to this #ourt ithin ten (6@) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the #ommission on )uman Rights Jits o n report, hich shall include a recommendation either for the $(SF(SS'% of the petition as against the public respondents ho ere found not responsible andGor accountable, or for the 'PPR,PR('T: R:F:$('% F:'S!R:S, 'S F'A ?: '%%,&:$ ?A T): 'FP'R, '"$ )'?:'S $'T' R!%:S, T, ?: !"$:RT'M:" as against those found responsible andGor accountable. 'ccordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to ans er for any responsibilities andGor accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. ,ther findings of the #ourt of 'ppeals in its $ecision dated ;9 'ugust ;@@C in #'*E.R. SP "o. @@@=9*&R' that are not contrary to this decision are 'FF(RF:$. S, ,R$:R:$.
9OSE PORTU8AL PERE? 'ssociate Dustice
66>
8.R. No. 112263
9) y 52 2004
SPOUSES AUT:ER 8. AELLE72 9R. #n. DORIS A. AELLE72 #omplainants, vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS2 INC. #n. 9OR8E A. RA8UTANA2 6 Respondents.
R:S,%!T(,"
CORONA2 J.:
Petitioner 'uther E. Melley, Dr. ('uther) ac0uired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, (nc. (PP() in 6C7C. $ue to 'uther-s failure to pay despite demand, PP( filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial #ourt of Fa/ati #ity, ?ranch B> (RT# Fa/ati #ity). This as doc/eted as #ivil #ase "o. C6*C@<. 'fter trial on the merits, the RT# Fa/ati #ity decided in favor of PP( and issued a rit of e.ecution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Dorge '. Ragutana sold on e.ecution real property covered by T#T "o. 6B@>C located in "aga #ity. ' certificate of sale as issued in favor of PP( as the highest bidder. 'fter being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners 'uther and his ife $oris '. Melley ($oris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RT# Fa/ati #ity on the ground that the sub2ect property as their family home hich as e.empt from e.ecution. Petitioners- motion as denied for failure to comply ith the three*day notice re0uirement. Subse0uently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home ith damages against Ragutana and PP( in the Regional Trial #ourt of "aga #ity, ?ranch 6C (RT# "aga #ity). This as doc/eted as #ivil #ase "o. ;@@@* @677. The case as, ho ever, dismissed for lac/ of 2urisdiction and lac/ of cause of action. The dismissal as upheld by the #'. Petitioners no come to us in this petition for revie on certiorari contending that the #' erred in upholding the dismissal of #ivil #ase "o. ;@@@*@677 by the RT# "aga #ity. They claim that $oris as a stranger ; to #ivil #ase "o. C6*C@< (in the RT# Fa/ati #ity) ho could not be forced to litigate therein. Petitioners anchor their action in #ivil #ase "o. ;@@@*@677 on their contention that T#T "o. 6B@>C is the Melley family home. "o doubt, a family home is generally e.empt from e.ecution = provided it as duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home as constituted 2ointly by the husband and ife or by an unmarried head of a family. < (t must be the house here they and their family actually reside and the lot on hich it is situated.B The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the con2ugal partnership, or of the e.clusive properties of either spouse ith the latter-s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. 9 The actual value of the family home shall not e.ceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P=@@,@@@ in urban areas and P;@@,@@@ in rural areas.> !nder the Family #ode, there is no need to constitute the family home 2udicially or e.tra2udicially. 'll family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family #ode ('ugust =, 6C77) are constituted as such by operation of la . 'll e.isting family residences as of 'ugust =, 6C77 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family #ode.7 The e.emption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.C Foreover, the debts for hich the family home is made ans erable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77. ,ther ise (that is, if it as incurred prior to 'ugust =, 6C77), the alleged family home must be sho n to have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially pursuant to the #ivil #ode. The rule, ho ever, is not absolute. The Family #ode, in fact, e.pressly provides for the follo ing e.ceptions+ 'rticle 6BB. The family home shall be e.empt from e.ecution, forced sale or attachment e.cept+ (6) For non*payment of ta.es1 (;) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home1 (=) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution1 and (<) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others ho have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
... ... ...
'rticle 69@. &hen a creditor hose claim is not among those mentioned in 'rticle 6BB obtains a 2udgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually orth more than the ma.imum amount fi.ed in 'rticle 6B>, he may apply to the court hich rendered the
667
2udgment for an order directing the sale of the property under e.ecution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home e.ceeds the ma.imum amount allo ed by la as of the time of its constitution. (f the increased actual value e.ceeds the ma.imum amount allo ed by la in 'rticle 6B> and results from subse0uent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the o ner or o ners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. ... ... ...
&e grant the petition only to the e.tent of allo ing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that T#T "o. 6B@>C is in fact their family home as constituted in accordance ith the re0uirements of la . This is in consonance ith our ruling in /ome2 v. $ta. Anes6@ here e held+ RThe husband and childrenS ere not parties to the Pasig RT# case and are third*party claimants ho became such only after trial in the previous case had been terminated and the 2udgment therein had become final and e.ecutory. "either ere they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RT# case, and they could not therefore intervene in said case. 's strangers to the original case, respondents cannot be compelled to present their claim ith the Pasig RT# hich issued the rit of e.ecution.... (n said case, the alleged family home as sold on e.ecution by the sheriff of the Pasig RT#. The husband and children of the 2udgment debtor filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property in ?ayombong, "ueva 8i5caya here the alleged family home as situated. 's they ere considered strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RT#, e ruled that the "ueva 8i5caya RT# had 2urisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their alleged claim to the levied property there.66
1avvphi1
@:EREFORE, #ivil #ase "o. ;@@@*@677 captioned $pouses Auther /. Celley& ,r. and Doris A. Celley v. 'lanters 'roducts& Anc. and ,orge A. Ragutana is hereby REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial #ourt of "aga #ity, ?ranch 6C for determination hether or not the property covered by T#T "o. 6B@>C is a duly constituted family home and therefore e.empt from e.ecution. SO ORDERED.
66C
8.R. No. 140520
9) y 202 2010
9UANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS2 ALMA RAMOS @ORAA2 MANUEL T. RAMOS2 9OSEFINA R. ROT:MAN2 SONIA R. POST2 EL;IRA P. MUNAR2 #n. OFELIA R. LIM2 Petitioners, vs. DANILO PAN8ILINAN2 RODOLFO SUMAN82 LUCRECIO 6AUTISTA #n. ROLANDO ANTENOR2 Respondents.
$:#(S(,"
CARPIO MORALES2 J.:
Respondents filed in ;@@= a complaint 6 for illegal dismissal against :.F. Ramos :lectric, (nc., a company o ned by :rnesto F. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. ?y $ecision; of 'pril 6B, ;@@B, the %abor 'rbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount ofP6,996,<C@.=@ representing their bac/ ages, separation pay, 6=th month pay P service incentive leave pay. The $ecision having become final and e.ecutory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the %abor 'rbiter issued on September 7, ;@@B a rit of e.ecution = hich the $eputy Sheriff of the "ational %abor Relations #ommission ("%R#) implemented by levying a property in Ramos- name covered by T#T "o. =7C>7, situated in Pandacan, Fanila (Pandacan property). 'lleging that the Pandacan property as the family home, hence, e.empt from e.ecution to satisfy the 2udgment a ard, Ramos and the company moved to 0uash the rit of e.ecution. < Respondents, ho ever, averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in 'ntipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the company-s business address as borne by the company-s letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property as indeed the family home, only the value e0uivalent to P=@@,@@@ as e.empt from e.ecution. ?y ,rderB of 'ugust ;, ;@@9, the %abor 'rbiter denied the motion to 0uash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the "%R# hich affirmed the %abor 'rbiter-s ,rder. Ramos and the company appealed to the #ourt of 'ppeals during the pendency of hich Ramos died and as substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the "%R#, as third*party claimants, a Fanifestation 0uestioning the "otice to 8acate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled t o (;) lots, including the lot covered by T#T "o. =7C>7, hence, they cannot be as/ed to vacate the house. The %abor 'rbiter as later to deny, by $ecision of Fay >, ;@@C, the third*party claim, holding that Ramos- death and petitioners- substitution as his compulsory heirs ould not nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan property. 'nd the "%R#9 ould later affirm the %abor 'rbiter-s ruling, noting that petitioners failed to e.ercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property ithin the one 6 year period or until Danuary 69, ;@@C. The "%R# brushed aside petitioners- contention that they should have been given a fresh period of 6 year from the time of Ramos- death on Duly ;C, ;@@7 or until Duly =@, ;@@C to redeem the property, holding that to do so ould give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos-. 's to petitioners- claim that the property as covered by the regime of con2ugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos- share can be levied upon, the "%R# ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the T#T indicating the registered o ner as I:rnesto Ramos, married to Duanita Trinidad, Filipinos,I did not mean that both o ned the property, the phrase having merely described Ramos- civil status. ?efore the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the "%R# erred in ruling that the mar/et value of the property as P;,6>>,@@@ as assessed by the #ity 'ssessor of Fanila and appearing in the documents submitted before the %abor 'rbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property as constituted as the family home in 6C<<, its value as ay belo P=@@,@@@1 and that 'rt. 6B= of the Family #ode as applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to 2udicial or e.tra2udicial constitution. (n the assailed $ecision> of September ;<, ;@@7, the appellate court, in denying petitioners- appeal, held that the Pandacan property as not e.empted from e.ecution, for hile I'rticle 6B= 7 of the Family #ode provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, RitS did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all e.isting family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family #ode.I The appellate court ent on to hold that hat as applicable la ere 'rticles ;;< to ;B6 of the #ivil #ode, hence, there as still a need to either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners- family home before it can be e.empted1 and as petitioners failed to comply there ith, there as no error in denying the motion to 0uash the rit of e.ecution. The only 0uestion raised in the present petition for revie levy upon the Pandacan property as valid. The petition is devoid of merit. on certiorari is the propriety of the #ourt of 'ppeals $ecision holding that the
6;@
(ndeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right hich is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the d elling place and the land on hich it is situated, hich confers upon a particular family the right to en2oy such properties, hich must remain ith the person constituting it and his heirs. (t cannot be sei5ed by creditors e.cept in certain special cases.C Melley, Dr. v. Planters Products, (nc.6@ lays do n the rules relative to the levy on e.ecution over the family home, vi5+ "o doubt, a family home is generally e.empt from e.ecution provided it as duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home as constituted 2ointly by the husband and ife or by an unmarried head of a family. (t must be the house here they and their family actually reside and the lot on hich it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the con2ugal partnership, or of the e.clusive properties of either spouse ith the latter-s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not e.ceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P=@@,@@@ in urban areas and P;@@,@@@ in rural areas. !nder the Family #ode, there is no need to constitute the family home 2udicially or e.tra2udicially. 'll family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family #ode ('ugust =, 6C77) are constituted as such by operation of la . 'll e.isting family residences as of 'ugust =, 6C77 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family #ode. The e.emption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Foreover, the debts for hich the family home is made ans erable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77. ,ther ise (that is, if it as incurred prior to 'ugust =, 6C77), the alleged family home must be sho n to have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra2udicially pursuant to the #ivil #ode. (emphasis supplied) For the family home to be e.empt from e.ecution, distinction must be made as to hat la applies based on hen it as constituted and hat re0uirements must be complied ith by the 2udgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. )ence, t o sets of rules are applicable. (f the family home as constructed before the effectivity of the Family #ode or before 'ugust =, 6C77, then it must have been constituted either 2udicially or e.tra*2udicially as provided under 'rticles ;;B, ;;C*;=6 and ;== of the #ivil #ode. 66 Dudicial constitution of the family home re0uires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court-s order ith the Registry of $eeds of the area here the property is located. Fean hile, e.tra2udicial constitution is governed by 'rticles ;<@ to ;<; 6; of the #ivil #ode and involves the e.ecution of a public instrument hich must also be registered ith the Registry of Property. Failure to comply ith either one of these t o modes of constitution ill bar a 2udgment debtor from availing of the privilege. ,n the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family #ode on 'ugust =, 6C77, there is no need to constitute e.tra2udicially or 2udicially, and the e.emption is effective from the time it as constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under 'rt. 6B<6= actually resides therein. Foreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or con2ugal partnership, or if e.clusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been ith consent of the other, and its value must not e.ceed certain amounts depending upon the area here it is located. Further, the debts incurred for hich the e.emption does not apply as provided under 'rt. 6BB 6< for made ans erable must have been incurred after 'ugust =, 6C77.
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hich the family home is
'nd in both cases, hether under the #ivil #ode or the Family #ode, it is not sufficient that the person claiming e.emption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for e.emption must be set up and proved.6B (n the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home as constituted prior to 'ugust =, 6C77, or as early as 6C<<, they must comply ith the procedure mandated by the #ivil #ode. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property as 2udicially or e.tra2udicially constituted as the Ramos- family home, the la -s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records sho that the sheriff e.hausted all means to e.ecute the 2udgment but failed because Ramos- ban/ accounts69 ere already closed hile other properties in his or the company-s name had already been transferred,6> and the only property left as the Pandacan property. @:EREFORE, the petition is DENIED. S, ,R$:R:$.
CONC:ITA CARPIO MORALES 'ssociate Dustice #hairperson
6;6
8.R. No. L-15021
Octo+e- 302 1564
T:E PEOPLE OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 plaintiff*appellee, vs. ESTE6AN R. C:A;ES2 defendant*appellant.
Office of the $olicitor /eneral for plaintiff7appellee. 5aximo P. 'acudan for defendant7appellant.
RE7ES2 9.6.L.2 J.:
'ppeal from an order of the #ourt of First (nstance of ,riental Fisamis, dated $ecember 6, 6C96, issued in #riminal #ase "o. 69@6, declaring a family home e.tra2udicially constituted not e.empt from the e.ecution levy issued at the instance of the offended party. The accused, :steban #haves, has been found by the #ourt of First (nstance (#rim. #ase "o. 69@6) and by the #ourt of 'ppeals (#'*E.R. "o. @@@B=* R) guilty of a violation, of Republic 'ct "o. 6<B, in that he had collected, in Danuary, 6C<7, a claim of Farcela Rambuyon for death benefits in the sum of ]<,;B;.;@ due her for the demise of her son, !S'FF: veteran Santos :chaure1 the corresponding chec/ as cashed by #haves, ho later delivered only P=,;@;.;@ to the claimant, and retained PB,=9;.;@ for himself. #haves as sentenced to undergo one year imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of PB,=9;.;@ and to pay the costs. The conviction and sentence became final on 'pril 69, 6C96. The indemnity not having been paid, the offended party obtained a rit of e.ecution in Fay, 6C96, and the Sheriff accordingly levied on a residential lot and building of the accused, but desisted from proceeding further hen the accused e.hibit proof that the property had been e.tra2udicially constituted and recorded as a family home, in accordance ith the provisions of the #ivil #ode. on $ecember B, 6CB=, after the filing of the information but before conviction. !pon petition by the complainant, the #ourt issued the contested order declaring that the family home as not e.empt from the levy made by the Sheriff because the accusedHs obligation to pay the amount rongfully retained by him as anterior to the constitution of the family home. The motion of accused #haves for reconsideration of the order having been denied, he resorted to this #ourt on appeal. The issue is hether the family home e.tra2udicially constituted is entitled to e.emption, considering that 'rticle ;<= of the #ivil #ode of the Philippines is to the follo ing effect+ 'RT. ;<=. The family home e.tra2udicially formed shall be e.empt from e.ecution, forced sale or attachment, e.cept+ (6) For nonpayment of debts, (;) For debts incurred before the declaration as recorded in the Registry of Property1 (=) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such re*cord of the declaration1 (<) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material*men and others the construction of the building. 'ppellant ta/es the position that the indemnity due to the complainant became a IdebtI 2udgment ordering indemnification, years after family home in 0uestion as established. ho have rendered Service or furnished material for
ithin the purvie
of this 'rticle only from the date of the
&e see no merit in the appeal. The ord IdebtI, as used in subdivision (;) of 'rticle ;<=, Iis not 0ualified and must, therefore, be ta/en in its generic senseI (Fontoya vs. (gnacio, B< ,ff. Ea5. C>7*C>C), i.e., of IobligationsI in general. The duty of #haves to reimburse the amount of the veteranHs benefits improperly retained by him certainly arose and came into e.istence from the date of his misappropriation (Danuary, 6C<7), and the 2udgment of 6C96 merely established the fact of the misappropriation beyond controversy and reasonable doubt. The 2udgment sentencing #haves to indemnify complainant as not the source of his duty to return, any more than a 2udgment on a promissory note ould be the origin of the promissorHs duty to pay. That a 2udgment is not necessary to clothe a pree.isting debt ith the privileged character of being enforceable against the family home e.tra2udicially established at a later date is apparent by comparison ith 'rticle ;<> of the #ivil #ode. 'RT. ;<>. &hen a creditor hose claim is not mentioned in article ;<= obtains a 2udgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home of the 2udgment debtor is orth more than the amount mentioned in 'rticle ;=6, he may apply to the #ourt of First (nstance for an order directing the sale of the property under e.ecution. "ote that under this article it is only claims not mentioned in Article GN4 that must be reduced to 2udgment before being enforced against the family home. #ertainly, the Ihumane considerations,I for hich the la surrounded the home ith immunities from levy, did not include the intent to enable a debtor to th art the 2ust claims of his creditors. (f in the case of a 2udicially established family home the la re0uires that the petitioning debtor should first give sufficient security for his unsecured debts before the family home is authori5ed ('rt. ;=6), there is no reason hy in the case of the e.tra2udicial constitution, that creditors have no opportunity to oppose or protest, the constituting debtor should be enabled to escape payment of his 2ust debts, and leave the creditors holding an empty bag. The order appealed from is affirmed. #osts against appellant.
%eng2on& #.,.& %autista Angelo& #oncepcion& %arrera& 'aredes& Di2on& 5a)alintal& %eng2on& ,.'.& and Paldivar& ,.,.& concur. Regala& ,.& too/ no part.
6;;
8.R. No. 146021
Dece'+e- 42 2010
REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 Petitioner, vs. MERL7N MERCADERA t&-o)%& &e- Atto-ney-in-F#ct2 E;EL7N M. O8A2 Respondent.
$:#(S(,"
MENDO?A2 J.:
This petition for revie on certiorari assails the $ecember C, ;@@7 $ecision 6 of the #ourt of 'ppeals (#A!& in #' E.R. #8 "o. @@B97*F(", hich affirmed the September ;7, ;@@B ,rder of the Regional Trial #ourt of $ipolog #ity, ?ranch 7 (RT#!& in a petition for correction of entries, doc/eted as Special Proceedings "o. R*=<;> (SP "o. R*=<;>), filed by respondent Ferlyn Fercadera (5ercadera! under Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt. T&e F#ct)# #n. P-oce.)-# Antece.ent$ ,n Dune 9, ;@@B, Ferlyn Fercadera (5ercadera!& represented by her sister and duly constituted 'ttorney*in*Fact, :velyn F. ,ga (Oga!, sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her #ertificate of %ive ?irth * from 5arilyn 9. 5ercadera to 5erlyn 9. 5ercadera before the ,ffice of the %ocal #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity pursuant to Republic 'ct "o. C@<7 (R.A. *o. 03NO!.; !nder R.'. "o. C@<7, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is no authori5ed to effect the change of first name or nic/name and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. I!nder said la , 2urisdiction over applications for change of first name is no primarily lodged ith administrative officers. The la no e.cludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 6@= until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subse0uently deniedI = and removes Icorrection or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 6@7.I )ence, hat is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.< The ,ffice of the %ocal #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity, ho ever, refused to effect the correction unless a court order as obtained Ibecause the #ivil Registrar therein is not yet e0uipped ith a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic 'ct C@<7.IB Fercadera as then constrained to file a 'etition "or #orrection of $ome .ntries as Appearing in the #ertificate of 9ive %irth under Rule 6@7 before the Regional Trial #ourt of $ipolog #ity (RT#!. The petition as doc/eted as Special Proceedings "o. R*=<;> ($' *o. R74NG>!. Section ; of Rule 6@7 reads+ SEC. 2. *ntries sub"ect to cancellation or correction. Q !pon good and valid grounds, the follo ing entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected+ (a) births1 (b) marriages1 (c) deaths1 (d) legal separations1 (e) 2udgments of annulments of marriage1 (f) 2udgments declaring marriages void from the beginning1 (g) legitimations1 (h) adoptions1 (i) ac/no ledgments of natural children1 (2) naturali5ation1 (/) election, loss or recovery of citi5enship1 (l) civil interdiction1 (m) 2udicial determination of filiation1 (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor1 and <o>c&#n%e$ o* n#'e. R!nderscoring suppliedS !pon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RT# issued an order, dated Dune 6@, ;@@B, hich reads+ Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on D!%A ;9, ;@@B at 7+=@ o-cloc/ in the morning, at the Session )all of ?ranch 7, this #ourt, ?ul agan ng Matarungan, $ipolog #ity, on hich date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in riting his grounds thereRforS, serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and li/e ise file copies ith this #ourt on or before the said date of hearing. %et this order be published at the e.pense of petitioner once a ee/ for three (=) consecutive ee/s in a ne spaper edited and published in $ipolog #ity and of general circulation therein, the #ity of $apitan and the province of Lamboanga del "orte, and copies hereof be furnished to the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral of (sic) 6=< 'morsolo St., %egaspi 8illage, Fa/ati, Fetro Fanila, the #ity #ivil Registrar of $ipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the #ity )all of $ipolog, the Provincial #apitol ?uilding, and of this #ourt. (T (S S, ,R$:R:$. The ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (O$/! entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputi5ed the ,ffice of the #ity Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September B, ;@@B. ,n said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Fercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. &ithout any ob2ection from the #ity Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch cler/ of court to receive evidence for Fercadera. ,n September 6B, ;@@B, the testimony of ,ga and several photocopies of documents ere formally offered and mar/ed as evidence to prove that Fercadera never used the name IFarilynI in any of her public or private transactions. ,n September ;9, ;@@B, the RT# issued an order 9 admitting :.hibits I'I to I(I> and their submar/ings, as relevant to the resolution of the case. The follo ing facts ere gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of ,ga, as reported by the lo er court+ Petitioner Ferlyn F. Fercadera as born on 'ugust 6C, 6C>@ at $ipolog #ity. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso !. Fercadera and "orma #. %ac0uiao. The fact of her birth as reported to the ,ffice of the #ity #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity on September 7, 6C>@. (t as recorded on page 97,
6;=
boo/ no. C, in the Registry of ?irths of said civil registry. (n the certification of birth dated Fay C, ;@@B issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Farilyn and not Ferlyn (:.hibit I#I). ,n September ;C, 6C>C, petitioner as bapti5ed according to the rites and ceremonies of the !nited #hurch of #hrist in the Philippines. 's reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she as bapti5ed by the name Ferlyn %. Fercadera (:.hibit I$I). (n her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng :sta/a, $ipolog #ity1 her high school diploma issued by the Lamboanga del "orte School of 'rts and Trades, $ipolog #ity1 and college diploma issued by the Silliman !niversity, $umaguete #ity, here she earned the degree of ?achelor of Secondary :ducation, uniformly sho her name as Ferlyn %. Fercadera (:.hibits I:I, IFI, and IEI). Presently, she is or/ing in !.P. Findanao, ?uhangin, $avao #ity. )er certificate of membership issued by the Eovernment Service (nsurance System also bears his RsicS complete name as Ferlyn %ac0uiao Fercadera (:.hibit I)I). &hen she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the "ational Statistics ,ffice, she discovered that her given name as registered is Farilyn and not Ferlyn1 hence, this petition. (n its September ;7, ;@@B $ecision,7 the RT# granted Fercadera-s petition and directed the ,ffice of the #ity #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Farilyn %ac0uiao Fercadera, to F:R%A" %ac0uiao Fercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RT# $ecision reads+ &):R:F,R:, the petition is ER'"T:$. 'ccordingly, the ,ffice of the #ity #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Farilyn %ac0uiao Fercadera to F:R%A" %ac0uiao Fercadera. (n a four*page decision, the RT# ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Fercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. #onsidering that she had used IFerlynI as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her #ertificate of %ive ?irth, the RT# as convinced that the correction as 2ustified. The ,SE timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RT# decision. (t mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Fercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 6@7. (n its ?rief C filed ith the #', the ,SE argued that the lo er court erred (6) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for correction of entries1 and (;) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of ,ga. For the ,SE, the correction in the spelling of Fercadera-s given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but Iit is in truth a material correction as it ould modify or increase substantive rights.I 6@ &hat the lo er court actually allo ed as a change of Fercadera-s given name, hich ould have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 6@= and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lo er court, Imay not substitute one for the other for purposes of e.pediency.I66 Further, because Fercadera failed to invo/e a specific ground recogni5ed by the Rules, the lo er court-s order in effect allo ed the change of one-s name in the civil registry ithout basis. The #' as not persuaded. (n its $ecember C, ;@@7 $ecision, The #' assessed the controversy in this ise+
6;
the appellate court affirmed the 0uestioned RT# ,rder in #'*E.R. #8 "o. @@B97*F(".
'ppellant-s insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 6@= and not Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt is off the mar/. This #ourt does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court as one for the correction on an entry in petitioner-s #ertificate of %ive ?irth and not one in hich she sought to change her name. (n #o v. #ivil Register of Fanila, E.R. "o. 6=7<C9, February ;=, ;@@<, the )igh #ourt reiterated the distinction bet een the phrases Ito correctI and Ito change.I Said the )igh #ourt+ To correct simply means Ito ma/e or set aright1 to remove the faults or error from.I To change means Ito replace something ith something else of the same /ind or ith something that serves as a substitute. 'rticle <6; of the "e #ivil #ode does not 0ualify as to the /ind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. 'fter all, the role of the #ourt under Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the #ourt from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs > and 7 thereofJ .... 'nent the RT#-s error in admitting the photocopies of Fercadera-s documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to ,ga-s testimony, the #' cited the ell*established rule that Ievidence not ob2ected to may be admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its 2udgment.I 6= ,n Farch 9, ;@@C, the ,SE filed the present petition. ,n behalf of Fercadera, the Public 'ttorney-s ,ffice (P',) filed its #omment 6< on Duly =, ;@@C. The ,SE declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an e.haustive discussion on the follo ing assigned errors+ 6B ( T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S :RR:$ ," ' N!:ST(," ,F %'& (" ER'"T("E T): #)'"E: (" R:SP,"$:"T-S "'F: !"$:R R!%: 6@=. ((
6;<
T): #,!RT ,F 'PP:'%S :RR:$ ," ' N!:ST(," ,F %'& (" #,"S($:R("E S:#,"$'RA :8($:"#:. Rule 6@= procedurally governs 2udicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to 'rticle =>9 of the #ivil #ode. 69 This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations ith others, that is, his legal position in, or ith regard to, the rest of the community. 6> (n petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the Idesignation by hich he is /no n and called in the community in hich he lives and is best /no n.I 67 &hen granted, a person-s identity and interactions are affected as he bears a ne Ilabel or appellation for the convenience of the orld at large in addressing him, or in spea/ing of, or dealing ith him.I 6C Dudicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 6@= is also an action in rem hich re0uires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. &hen complied ith, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the hole orld. 's notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all ho might ma/e an ob2ection. I(t is the publication of such notice that brings in the hole orld as a party in the case and vests the court ith 2urisdiction to hear and decide it.I;@ :ssentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one-s e.isting family relations or in the rights and duties flo ing therefrom. (t does not alter one-s legal capacity or civil status. ;6 )o ever, Ithere could be instances here the change applied for may be open to ob2ection by parties ho already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he ould thereby ac0uire certain family ties ith them but because the e.istence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind.I ;; )ence, in re0uests for a change of name, I hat is involved is not a mere matter of allo ance or disallo ance of the re0uest, but a 2udicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the 2ustifications advanced . . . mindful of the conse0uent results in the event of its grant . . ..I;= Rule 6@7, on the other hand, implements 2udicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode.;< :ntries in the civil register refer to Iacts, events and 2udicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,I ;B also as enumerated in 'rticle <@7 of the same la .;9?efore, only mista/es or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 6@7 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citi5enship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. (n the abandoned case of #hua -ee v. Republic,;> this #ourt declared that, . . . if Rule 6@7 ere to be e.tended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors hich are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citi5enship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 6@7 ould thereby become unconstitutional for it ould be increasing or modifying substantive rights, hich changes are not authori5ed under 'rticle <6; of the ne #ivil #ode.I (n the latter case of -ong v. Republic&;7 ho ever, Dustice 8icente 'bad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that 'rticle <6;, hich Rule 6@7 implements, contemplates all /inds of issues and all types of procedures because Ithe provision does not say that it applies only to non*controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature.I (n Republic v. Dudge $e la #ru5, ;C the dissenting opinion penned by Dustice Pacifico $e #astro echoed the same vie + (t is not accurate to say that Rule 6@7 ould be rendered unconstitutional if it ould allo the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it ould thereby increase or modify substantive rights hich the #onstitution e.pressly forbids because 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode, the substantive la sought to be implemented by Rule 6@7, allo s only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. 's as stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid &ong #ase, 'rticle <6; does not limit in its e.press terms nor by mere implication, the correction authori5ed by it to that of mere clerical errors. . . . it ould be reasonable and 2ustified to rule that 'rticle <6; contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of hatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as as the manifest purpose of Rule 6@7. . . . proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing oneHs status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, . . . the boo/s ma/ing up the civil register and all documents relating thereto . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. )ence, the status as corrected ould not have a superior 0uality for evidentiary purpose. Foreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to ma/e the matter corrected spea/ for the truth. . . . Finally in Republic v. 8alencia,=@ the above stated vie s ere adopted by this #ourt insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. I(f the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors hich are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mista/e. )o ever, as repeatedly construed, changes hich may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as ell as se., are substantial and controversial alterations hich can only be allo ed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. #hanges hich affect the civil status or citi5enship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and herein all the parties ho may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted . . ..I =6 I&here such a change is ordered, the #ourt ill not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authori5ed by la . (n short, Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive la embodied in 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode and so does not violate the #onstitution.I=; (n the case at bench, the ,SE posits that the conversion from IF'R(%A"I to IF:R%A"I is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name hich entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the ,SE, this is a substantial error that re0uires compliance ith the procedure under Rule 6@=, and not Rule 6@7. (t appears from these arguments that there is, to some e.tent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 6@= and Rule 6@7. &here a Ichange of nameI ill necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. &hile there is no clear*cut rule to categori5e petitions under either rule, this #ourt is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions bet een the t o rules ith respect to alterations in a person-s registered name can effectively clear the seeming perple.ity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself ill serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.
6;B
The Ichange of nameI contemplated under 'rticle =>9 and Rule 6@= must not be confused ith 'rticle <6; and Rule 6@7. ' change of one-s name under Rule 6@= can be granted, only on grounds provided by la . (n order to 2ustify a re0uest for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person re0uesting ill be pre2udiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invo/ed therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.== (n petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. #onsidering that the enumeration in Section ;, Rule 6@7 =< also includes Ichanges of name,I the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 6@7. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allo ed in one-s name are confined under Rule 6@=. #orrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 6@7. This rule in Inames,I ho ever, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 6@7 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by ay of a summary proceeding. 's e.plained above, Republic v. 8alencia is the authority for allo ing substantial errors in other entries li/e citi5enship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 6@7 provided there is an adversary proceeding. I'fter all, the role of the #ourt under Rule 6@7 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.I=B ' serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lac/ of support to the ,SE-s assumption that Fercadera intended to change her name under Rule 6@=. 'll that the petition propounded are s ift arguments on the alleged procedural fla s of Fercadera-s petition before the RT#. (n the same vein, no concrete contention as brought up to convince this #ourt that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 6@= are attendant in this case. (nstead, the RT# found the documents presented by Fercadera to have satisfactorily sho n that she had been /no n as F:R%A" ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance ith the publication re0uirement. Thus, the petition filed by Fercadera before the RT# correctly falls under Rule 6@7 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means Ito ma/e or set aright1 to remove the faults or error from.I To change means Ito replace something ith something else of the same /ind or ith something that serves as a substitute.I =9 From the allegations in her petition, Fercadera clearly prayed for the lo er court Ito remove the faults or errorI from her registered given name IF'R(%A",I and Ito ma/e or set arightI the same to conform to the one she gre up to, IF:R%A".I (t does not ta/e a comple. assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Fercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allo ed by R.'. "o. C@<7 but she unfortunately failed to en2oy the e.pediency hich the la provides and as constrained to ta/e court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition as clear in stating+ >. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her #ertificate of %ive ?irth from F'R(%A" to F:R%A" to conform to her true and correct given name that she had been using and had been /no n ithin the community . . .. 7. That herein petitioner ent to the ,ffice of the %ocal #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity and re0uested them to effect such correction in her #ertificate of %ive ?irth, ho ever, the %ocal #ivil Registrar of $ipolog #ity ill not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this )onorable #ourt because the %ocal #ivil Registrar therein is not yet e0uipped ith permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic 'ct C@<7, hence the filing of this petition. R:mphases suppliedS (ndeed, there are decided cases involving mista/es similar to Fercadera-s case hich recogni5e the same a harmless error. (n 6u v. Republic=> it as held that Ito change ^Sincio- to ^Sencio- hich merely involves the substitution of the first vo el ^i- in the first name into the vo el ^e- amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.I (n 9abayo7Rowe v. Republic&=7 it as held that the change of petitioner-s name from I?eatri5 %abayoG?eatri5 %abayuI to I:mperatri5 %abayoI as a mere innocuous alteration herein a summary proceeding as appropriate. (n Republic v. #ourt of 'ppeals, Daime ?. #aranto and Lenaida P. #aranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters IchI for the letter Id,I so that hat appears as IFidaelI as given name ould read IFichael.I (n the latter case, this #ourt, ith the agreement of the Solicitor Eeneral, ruled that the error as plainly clerical, such that, Ichanging the name of the child from ^Fidael #. Fa5on- to ^Fichael #. Fa5on- cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced ith the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).I =C (n this case, the use of the letter IaI for the letter Ie,I and the deletion of the letter Ii,I so that hat appears as IFarilynI ould read as IFerlynI is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity bet een IFarilynI and IFerlynI may ell be the ob2ect of a mi.* up that blemished Fercadera-s #ertificate of %ive ?irth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same. The #' did not allo Fercadera the change of her name. &hat it did allo ever since she could remember. as the correction of her misspelled given name hich she had been using
(t is orthy to note that the ,SE-s reliance on Republic vs. )ernande5 <@ is fla ed. (n that case, this #ourt said that Ia change in a given name is a substantial matterI and that it Icannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that ould in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding.I &hile this #ourt stands true to the ruling in )ernande5, the said pronouncement therein as stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. )ernande5 as decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There as a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding change in the adoptee-s given name because Iit ould be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at la .I (n the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 6@= or Rule 6@7 and the relief sought by Fercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This #ourt finds no attempt on the part of Fercadera to render the re0uirements under Rule 6@= illusory as in )ernande5. ?esides, granting that Rule 6@= applies to this case and that compliance ith the procedural re0uirements under Rule 6@7 falls short of hat is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Fercadera complied ith the re0uirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lo er court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a ne spaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the ,SE and the %ocal #ivil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the ,SE, did not deprive the court of its 2urisdiction to hear the same and did not ma/e the proceeding less adversarial in nature. #onsidering that the ,SE did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte hen it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot no complain that the proceedings in the lo er court ere procedurally defective. (ndeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons hy the #' correctly affirmed the findings of the lo er court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Fercadera.
6;9
&):R:F,R:, the $ecember C, ;@@7 $ecision of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. #8 "o. @@B97*F(" is 'FF(RF:$. S, ,R$:R:$.
9OSE CATRAL MENDO?A 'ssociate Dustice
6;>
8.R. No. 114645
Octo+e- 222 2001
ROMMEL 9ACINTO DANTES SIL;ERIO2 petitioner, vs. REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 respondent.
DECISION
CORONA2 J.3
-hen /od created man& (e made him in the li)eness of /od? (e created them male and female. (/enesis H@17G! Amihan ga2ed upon the bamboo reed planted by %athala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. QOh *orth -indR *orth -indR 'lease let us outR&Q the voices said. $he pec)ed the reed once& then twice. All of a sudden& the bamboo crac)ed and slit open. Out came two human beings? one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man Q5ala)asQ ($trong! and the woman Q5agandaQ (%eautiful!. (The 9egend of 5ala)as and 5aganda! &hen is a man a man and hen is a oman a omanK (n particular, does the la recogni5e the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling ith regard to a person-s se.K Fay a person successfully petition for a change of name and se. appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a se. reassignment surgeryK ,n "ovember ;9, ;@@;, petitioner Rommel Dacinto $antes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and se. in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial #ourt of Fanila, ?ranch 7. The petition, doc/eted as SP #ase "o. @;*6@B;@>, impleaded the civil registrar of Fanila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he as born in the #ity of Fanila to the spouses Felecio Petines Silverio and 'nita '0uino $antes on 'pril <, 6C9;. )is name as registered as IRommel Dacinto $antes SilverioI in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). )is se. as registered as Imale.I )e further alleged that he is a male transse.ual, that is, Ianatomically male but feels, thin/s and acts as a femaleI and that he had al ays identified himself ith girls since childhood.6 Feeling trapped in a man-s body, he consulted several doctors in the !nited States. )e under ent psychological e.amination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. )is attempts to transform himself to a I omanI culminated on Danuary ;>, ;@@6 hen he under ent se. reassignment surgery; in ?ang/o/, Thailand. )e as thereafter e.amined by $r. Farcelino Reysio*#ru5, Dr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, ho issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and as in fact engaged to be married. )e then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from IRommel DacintoI to IFely,I and his se. from ImaleI to Ifemale.I 'n order setting the case for initial hearing as published in the People-s Dournal Tonight, a ne spaper of general circulation in Fetro Fanila, for three consecutive ee/s.= #opies of the order ere sent to the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (,SE) and the civil registrar of Fanila. ,n the scheduled initial hearing, 2urisdictional re0uirements ere established. "o opposition to the petition as made.
$uring trial, petitioner testified for himself. )e also presented $r. Reysio*#ru5, Dr. and his 'merican fiancZ, Richard P. :del, as itnesses. ,n Dune <, ;@@=, the trial court rendered a decision< in favor of petitioner. (ts relevant portions read+ Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any la or 2udgment or any infraction thereof or for any unla ful motive but solely for the purpose of ma/ing his birth records compatible ith his present se.. The sole issue here is hether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief as/ed for. The RcSourt rules in the affirmative. Firstly, the RcSourt is of the opinion that granting the petition ould be more in consonance ith the principles of 2ustice and e0uity. &ith his se.ual Rre*assignmentS, petitioner, ho has al ays felt, thought and acted li/e a oman, no possesses the physi0ue of a female. Petitioner-s misfortune to be trapped in a man-s body is not his o n doing and should not be in any ay ta/en against him. %i/e ise, the RcSourt believes that no harm, in2ury RorS pre2udice ill be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. ,n the contrary, granting the petition ould bring the much*a aited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her RfiancZS and the reali5ation of their dreams. Finally, no evidence as presented to sho any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. :ven the State, through the R,SES has not seen fit to interpose any RoSpposition. &):R:F,R:, 2udgment is hereby rendered ER'"T("E the petition and ordering the #ivil Registrar of Fanila to change the entries appearing in the #ertificate of ?irth of RpSetitioner, specifically for petitioner-s first name from IRommel DacintoI to '*@7 and petitioner-s gender from IFaleI to +*'%@*. B

9
6;7
,n 'ugust 67, ;@@=, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the ,SE, filed a petition for certiorari in the #ourt of 'ppeals. (t alleged that there is no la allo ing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of se. alteration. ,n February ;=, ;@@9, the #ourt of 'ppeals> rendered a decision7 in favor of the Republic. (t ruled that the trial court-s decision lac/ed legal basis. There is no la allo ing the change of either name or se. in the certificate of birth on the ground of se. reassignment through surgery. Thus, the #ourt of 'ppeals granted the Republic-s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP #ase "o. @;*6@B;@>. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it as denied.C )ence, this petition. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and se. in his birth certificate is allo ed under 'rticles <@> to <6= of the #ivil #ode, Rules 6@= and 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt and R' C@<7.6@ The petition lac/s merit. A Pe-$onG$ Fi-$t N#'e C#nnot 6e C&#n%e. On t&e 8-o)n. o* SeF Re#$$i%n'ent Petitioner invo/ed his se. reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and se.. 's found by the trial court+ Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any la or 2udgment or any infraction thereof or for any unla ful motive but $o e y *o- t&e !)-!o$e o* '#Ein% &i$ +i-t& -eco-.$ co'!#ti+ e /it& &i$ !-e$ent $eF. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner believes that after having ac0uired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. &e disagree. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 66 ' change of name is a privilege, not a right.6; Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.6= (n this connection, 'rticle =>9 of the #ivil #ode provides+ 'RT. =>9. "o person can change his name or surname ithout 2udicial authority. This #ivil #ode provision as amended by R' C@<7 (#lerical :rror %a ). (n particular, Section 6 of R' C@<7 provides+
S:#T(," 6. Authority to #orrect #lerical or Typographical .rror and #hange of "irst *ame or *ic)name. "o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected ithout a 2udicial order, e.cept for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nic/name hich can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance ith the provisions of this 'ct and its implementing rules and regulations. R' C@<7 no governs the change of first name. 6< (t vests the po er and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. !nder the la , therefore, 2urisdiction over applications for change of first name is no primarily lodged ith the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the la is to e.clude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 6@= (#hange of "ame) and 6@7 (#ancellation or #orrection of :ntries in the #ivil Registry) of the Rules of #ourt, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subse0uently denied. 6B (t li/e ise lays do n the corresponding venue, 69 form6> and procedure. (n sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not 2udicial. R' C@<7 li/e ise provides the grounds for hich change of first name may be allo ed+ S:#T(," <. /rounds for #hange of "irst *ame or *ic)name. The petition for change of first name or nic/name may be allo ed in any of the follo ing cases+ (6) The petitioner finds the first name or nic/name to be ridiculous, tainted ith dishonor or e.tremely difficult to rite or pronounce1
(;) The ne first name or nic/name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly /no n by that first name or nic/name in the community1 or (=) The change ill avoid confusion. Petitioner-s basis in praying for the change of his first name as his se. reassignment. )e intended to ma/e his first name compatible ith the se. he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. )o ever, a change of name does not alter one-s legal capacity or civil status. 67 R' C@<7 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of se. reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner-s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. ?efore a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason 2ustifying such change. 6C (n addition, he must sho that he ill be pre2udiced by the use of his true and official name. ;@ (n this case, he failed to sho , or even allege, any pre2udice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. (n sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner-s first name as not ithin that court-s primary 2urisdiction as the petition should have been filed ith the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. (t as an improper remedy because the proper remedy as administrative, that is, that provided under R' C@<7. (t as also filed in the rong venue as the proper venue as in the ,ffice of the #ivil Registrar of Fanila here his birth certificate is /ept. Fore importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not pre2udice him at all. For all these reasons, the #ourt of 'ppeals correctly dismissed petitioner-s petition in so far as the change of his first name as concerned.
6;C
No L#/ A o/$ T&e C&#n%e o* Ent-y In T&e 6i-t& Ce-ti*ic#te A$ To SeF On t&e 8-o)n. o* SeF Re#$$i%n'ent The determination of a person-s se. appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must loo/ to the statutes. ;6 (n this connection, 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode provides+ 'RT. <6;. "o entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected ithout a 2udicial order. Together ith 'rticle =>9 of the #ivil #ode, this provision as amended by R' C@<7 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can no be made through administrative proceedings and ithout the need for a 2udicial order. (n effect, R' C@<7 removed from the ambit of Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt the correction of such errors. ;; Rule 6@7 no applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.;= Section ;(c) of R' C@<7 defines hat a Iclerical or typographical errorI is+ S:#T(," ;. Definition of Terms. 's used in this 'ct, the follo ing terms shall mean+ ... ... ...
(=) I#lerical or typographical errorI refers to a mista/e committed in the performance of clerical or/ in riting, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the li/e, hich is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other e.isting record or records+ 'rovided& however& That no co--ection ')$t in,o ,e t&e c&#n%e o* nationality, age, status or $eF of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) !nder R' C@<7, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of se. is not a mere clerical or typographical error. (t is a substantial change for hich the applicable procedure is Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt. The entries envisaged in 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode and correctable under Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt are those provided in 'rticles <@> and <@7 of the #ivil #ode+;< 'RT. <@>. 'cts, events and 2udicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. 'RT. <@7. The follo ing shall be entered in the civil register+ (6) ?irths1 (;) marriages1 (=) deaths1 (<) legal separations1 (B) annulments of marriage1 (9) 2udgments declaring marriages void from the beginning1 (>) legitimations1 (7) adoptions1 (C) ac/no ledgments of natural children1 (6@) naturali5ation1 (66) loss, or (6;) recovery of citi5enship1 (6=) civil interdiction1 (6<) 2udicial determination of filiation1 (6B) voluntary emancipation of a minor1 and (69) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under 'rticle <@> of the #ivil #ode include even those that occur after birth. ;B )o ever, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can 2ustify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of se. reassignment. To correct simply means Ito ma/e or set aright1 to remove the faults or error fromI hile to change means Ito replace something ith something else of the same /ind or ith something that serves as a substitute.I ;9 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. 'll entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and se., ere all correct. "o correction is necessary. 'rticle <@> of the #ivil #ode authori5es the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, ac/no ledgments of illegitimate children and naturali5ation), events (such as births, marriages, naturali5ation and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturali5ation, loss or recovery of citi5enship, civil interdiction, 2udicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and 2udicial decrees produce legal conse0uences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are e.pressly sanctioned by the la s. (n contrast, se. reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in 'rticle <@>. "either is it recogni5ed nor even mentioned by any la , e.pressly or impliedly. IStatusI refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in vie nationality and his family membership.;> of his age,
The status of a person in la includes all his personal 0ualities and relations, 'o-e o- e$$ !e-'#nent in n#t)-e2 not o-.in#-i y te-'in#+ e #t &i$ o/n /i , such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term statusU include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.;7 (emphasis supplied) ' person-s se. is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. (t is a part of a person-s legal capacity and civil status. (n this connection, 'rticle <6= of the #ivil #ode provides+ 'RT. <6=. 'll other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special la s. ?ut there is no such special la in the Philippines governing se. reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner-s cause.
6=@
Foreover, Section B of 'ct =>B= (the #ivil Register %a ) provides+ S:#. B. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or mid ife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the ne born child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be e.empt from documentary stamp ta. and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or mid ife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the ne born child. (n such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the follo ing facts+ (a) date and hour of birth1 (b) $eF and nationality o* in*#nt1 (c) names, citi5enship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not /no n, of the mother alone1 (d) civil status of parents1 (e) place here the infant as born1 and (f) such other data as may be re0uired in the regulations to be issued. ... ... ... (emphasis supplied)
!nder the #ivil Register %a , a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they e.isted at the time of birth. ;C Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth& visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or mid ife) by e.amining the genitals of the infant. #onsidering that there is no la legally recogni5ing se. reassignment, the determination of a person-s se. made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, =@ is immutable.=6 &hen ords are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The ords Ise.,I ImaleI and IfemaleI as used in the #ivil Register %a and la s concerning the civil registry (and even all other la s) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. (n this connection, se. is defined as Ithe sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a femaleI =; or Ithe distinction bet een male and female.I == Female is Ithe se. that produces ova or bears youngI=< and male is Ithe se. that has organs to produce spermato5oa for fertili5ing ova.I =B Thus, the ords ImaleI and IfemaleI in everyday understanding do not include persons ho have undergone se. reassignment. Furthermore, I ords that are employed in a statute hich had at the time a ell*/no n meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the conte.t compels to the contrary.I =9 Since the statutory language of the #ivil Register %a as enacted in the early 6C@@s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term Ise.I as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allo s a post*operative male*to*female transse.ual to be included in the category Ifemale.I For these reasons, hile petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no la authori5es the change of entry as to se. in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neit&e- M#y Ent-ie$ in t&e 6i-t& Ce-ti*ic#te A$ to Fi-$t N#'e o- SeF 6e C&#n%e. on t&e 8-o)n. o* E()ity The trial court opined that its grant of the petition as in consonance cause no harm, in2ury or pre2udice to anyone. This is rong. ith the principles of 2ustice and e0uity. (t believed that allo ing the petition ould
The changes sought by petitioner ill have serious and ide*ranging legal and public policy conse0uences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition as but petitioner-s first step to ards his eventual marriage to his male fiancZ. )o ever, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman .=> ,ne of its essential re0uisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.=7 To grant the changes sought by petitioner ill substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the la s on marriage and family relations. (t ill allo the union of a man ith another man ho has undergone se. reassignment (a male*to*female post*operative transse.ual). Second, there are various la s hich apply particularly to omen such as the provisions of the %abor #ode on employment of omen, =C certain felonies under the Revised Penal #ode<@ and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 6=6 of the Rules of #ourt, <6 among others. These la s underscore the public policy in relation to omen hich could be substantially affected if petitioner-s petition ere to be granted. (t is true that 'rticle C of the #ivil #ode mandates that IRnSo 2udge or court shall decline to render 2udgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the la .I )o ever, it is not a license for courts to engage in 2udicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the la , not to ma/e or amend it. (n our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine hat guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of se. reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case here the claims asserted are statute*based. To reiterate, the statutes define ho may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, here they may be filed, hat grounds may be invo/ed, hat proof must be presented and hat procedures shall be observed. (f the legislature intends to confer on a person ho has undergone se. reassignment the privilege to change his name and se. to conform ith his reassigned se., it has to enact legislation laying do n the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. (t might be theoretically possible for this #ourt to rite a protocol on hen a person may be recogni5ed as having successfully changed his se.. )o ever, this #ourt has no authority to fashion a la on that matter, or on anything else. The #ourt cannot enact a la here no la e.ists. (t can only apply or interpret the ritten ord of its co*e0ual branch of government, #ongress. Petitioner pleads that IRtShe unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and RtheS reali5ation of their dreams.I "o argument about that. The #ourt recogni5es that there are people hose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recogni5ed parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. )o ever, the remedies petitioner see/s involve 0uestions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. @:EREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
6=6
#osts against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

'uno& #.,.& #hairperson& $andoval7/utierre2& A2cuna& /arcia& ,,.& concur.
6=;
8.R. No. 145416
Fe+-)#-y 22 2011
REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 Petitioner, vs. 9ULIAN ED@ARD EMERSON COSETEN8-MA8PA7O <A.A.A. 9ULIAN ED@ARD EMERSON MARMUE?-LIM COSETEN8>2 Respondent.
$:#(S(,"
CARPIO MORALES2 J.:
?orn in Fa/ati on September C, 6C>;, Dulian :d ard :merson #oseteng Fagpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio F. Fagpayo Dr. and 'nna $omini0ue Far0ue5*%im #oseteng ho, as respondent-s certificate of live birth 6sho s, contracted marriage on Farch ;9, 6C>;. #laiming, ho ever, that his parents ere never legally married, respondent filed on Duly ;;, ;@@7 at the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of Nue5on #ity a Petition to c&#n%e &i$ n#'e to Dulian :d ard :merson Far0ue5 %im #oseteng. The petition, doc/eted as SPP "o. N*@79=@B7, as entitled I(" R: P:T(T(," F,R #)'"E: ,F "'F:,F D!%('" :$&'R$ :F:RS," #,S:T:"E F'EP'A, T, D!%('" :$&'R$ :F:RS," F'RN!:L*%(F #,S:T:"E.I (n support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the "ational Statistics ,ffice stating that his mother 'nna $omini0ue Idoes not appear in RitsS "ational (ndices of Farriage.I ; Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college = sho ing that he carried the surname I#oseteng,I and the birth certificate of his child here I#osetengI appears as his surname. < (n the 6CC7, ;@@6 and ;@@< :lections, respondent ran and as elected as #ouncilor of Nue5on #ity-s =rd $istrict using the name ID!%('" F.%. #,S:T:"E.I B ,n order of ?ranch >> of the Nue5on #ity RT#, 9 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance under Section ;, Rule 6@=S of the Rules of #ourt.> ith the =*year residency re0uirement
The notice setting the petition for hearing on "ovember ;@, ;@@7 as published in the ne spaper ?roadside in its issues of ,ctober =6*"ovember 9, ;@@7, "ovember >*6=, ;@@7, and "ovember 6<*;@, ;@@7.7 'nd a copy of the notice as furnished the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (,SE). "o opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default evidence e. parte.C as entered by the trial court hich then allo ed respondent to present
?y $ecision of Danuary 7, ;@@C,6@ the trial court granted respondent-s petition and directed the #ivil Registrar ofFa/ati #ity to+ 6. $elete the entry IFarch ;9, 6C>;I in (tem ;< for I$'T: '"$ P%'#: ,F F'RR('E: ,F P'RT(:SI Rin herein respondent-s #ertificate of live ?irthS1 ;. #orrect the entry IF'EP'A,I in the space for the %ast "ame of the RrespondentS to I#,S:T:"EI1 =. $elete the entry I#,S:T:"EI in the space for Fiddle "ame of the RrespondentS1 and <. $elete the entry IFulvio Firanda Fagpayo, Dr.I in the space for F'T):R of the Rrespondent SU (emphasis and underscoring supplied1 capitali5ation in the original) The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it as denied by the trial court by ,rder of Duly ;, ;@@C, 66 hence, it, thru the ,SE, lodged the present petition for revie to the #ourt on pure 0uestion of la . The Republic assails the decision in this ise+ (. . . . T): P:T(T(," F,R #)'"E: ,F "'F:U("8,%8:S T): #)'"E: ,F RR:SP,"$:"T-SS #(8(% ST'T!S FR,F %:E(T(F'T: T, (%%:E(T(F'T: '"$, T):R:F,R:, S),!%$ ?: F'$: T)R,!E) 'PPR,PR('T: '$8:RS'R('% PR,#::$("ESU ((. T): TR('% #,!RT :T#::$:$ (TS D!R(S$(#T(," &):" (T $(R:#T:$ T): $:%:T(," ,F T): "'F: ,F R:SP,"$:"T-S F'T):R FR,F )(S ?(RT) #:RT(F(#'T:.6; (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent-s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.6= The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent-s parents- date of marriage and the name of respondent-s father from the entries in respondent-s birth certificate,6< the trial court e.ceeded its 2urisdiction, such order not being in accord ith respondent-s prayer reading+ &):R:F,R:, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the )onorable #ourt issue an orderallo ing the change of name of petitioner from D!%('" :$&'R$ :F:RS," #,S:T:"E F'EP'A, to D!%('" :$&'R$ :F:RS," F'RN!:L*%(F #,S:T:"E, and that the )onorable #ourt order the %ocal #ivil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records. Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.6B (underscoring supplied)
6==
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court as adversarial in nature. )e cites the serving of copies of the petition and its anne.es upon the #ivil Registrar of Fa/ati, the #ivil Registrar Eeneral, and the ,SE1 the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing1 the delegation to the ,SE by the #ity Prosecutor of Nue5on #ity to appear on behalf of the Republic1 the publication of the notice of hearing in a ne spaper of general circulation for three consecutive ee/s1 and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.69 The petition is impressed ith merit. ' person can effect a change of name under Rule 6@= (#)'"E: ,F "'F:) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) hen the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or e.tremely difficult to rite or pronounce1 (b) hen the change results as a legal conse0uence such as legitimation1 (c) hen the change ill avoid confusion1 (d) hen one has continuously used and been /no n since childhood by a Filipino name, and as una are of alien parentage1 (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and ithout pre2udicing anybody1 and (f) hen the surname causes embarrassment and there is no sho ing that the desired change of name as for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name ould pre2udice public interest.6> Respondent-s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recogni5ed grounds, ho ever. The present petition must be differentiated from 'lfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 67 (n 'lfon, the #ourt allo ed the therein petitioner, :strella 'lfon, to use the name that she had been /no n since childhood in order to avoid confusion. 'lfon did not deny her legitimacy, ho ever. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother hich she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the #ourt held that she as la fully entitled to use her mother-s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion as 2ustification enough to allo her to do so. (n the present case, ho ever, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent-s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. (t see/s to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 6@= then ould not suffice to grant respondent-s supplication. %abayo*Ro e v. Republic6C categorically holds that Ichanges hich may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations hich can only be allo ed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .I Since respondent-s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 6@7 applies. (t reads+ S:#T(," 6. &ho may file petition.J'ny person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons hich has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, ith the RRT#S of the province here the corresponding civil registry is located. .... S:#. =. Parties.J&hen cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar andall persons interest hich ould be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. ho have or claim any
S:#. <. "otice and publication. !pon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fi. the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a ee/ for three (=) consecutive ee/s in a ne spaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Rule 6@7 clearly directs that a petition hich concerns one-s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in hich the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Fa/ati in the present case, and Iall persons ho have or claim any interest hich ould be affected therebyI should be made parties to the proceeding. 's earlier stated, ho ever, the petition of respondent as filed not in Fa/ati here his birth certificate as registered but in Nue5on #ity. 'nd as the above*mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RT# sho s, neither the civil registrar of Fa/ati nor his father and mother ere made parties thereto. Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. #apote ;@ in support of his claim that his change of name proceeding. Republic v. ?elmonte,;6 illuminates, ho ever+ The procedure recited in Rule 6@=S regarding change of name and in Rule 6@7 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of e.pediency. To hold other ise ould render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of #ourt allo ing the change of one-s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitali5ation and underscoring supplied) :ven assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these t o statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied ith Rule 6@7. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Fa/ati and all affected parties as respondents in the case. Republic v. %abrador;; mandates that Ia petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as ell as all other persons ho have or claim to have any interest that ould be affected thereby.I (t cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry. as effected through an appropriate adversary

;=
6=<
%abayo*Ro e highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition hich involves substantial and controversial alterations. (n that case, the therein petitioner :mperatri5 %abayo*Ro e (:mperatri5) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, 8icente Ficlat, Dr. and 8ictoria Ficlat, in the #ivil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. :mperatri5 alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is ?eatri5, hich is her nic/name, but her full name is :mperatri51 and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter 8ictoria as ImarriedI on I6CB= ?ulanI are erroneous because she as not married to 8icente Ficlat ho as the one ho furnished the data in said birth certificate. The trial court found merit in :mperatri5-s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children-s birth certificates from ?eatri5 to :mperatri51 and to correct her civil status in 8ictoria-s birth certificate from ImarriedI to IsingleI and the date and place of marriage to Ino marriage.I ,n petition before this #ourt after the #ourt of 'ppeals found that the order of the trial court involved a 0uestion of la , the #ourt nullified the trial court-s order directing the change of :mperatri5- civil status and the filiation of her child 8ictoria in light of the follo ing observations+ . . . . 'side from the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral, all other indispensable parties should have been maderespondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as ell, together ith the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights ould be adversely affected thereby. 'll other persons ho may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of 2ustice. The right of the child 8ictoria to inherit from her parents ould be substantially impaired if her status ould be changed from IlegitimateI to Iillegitimate.I Foreover, she ould be e.posed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she ill bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition as published in a ne spaper of general circulation and notice thereof as served upon the State ill not change the nature of the proceedings ta/en. Rule 6@7, li/e all the other provisions of the Rules of #ourt, as promulgated by the Supreme #ourt pursuant to its rule*ma/ing authority under Section 6=, 'rticle 8((( of the 6C>= #onstitution, hich directs that such rules Ishall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.I (f Rule 6@7 ere to be e.tended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors hich are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citi5enship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, ithout observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule ould thereby become an unconstitutional e.ercise hich ould tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode. ;< (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) 's for the re0uirement of notice and publication, Rule 6@7 provides+ S:#. <. "otice and publication.J!pon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fi. the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition . The court shall also cause the order to be published once a ee/ for three (=) consecutive ee/s in a ne spaper of general circulation in the province. S:#. B. ,pposition.JThe civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry hose cancellation or correction is sought may, ithin fifteen (6B) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) ' reading of these related provisions readily sho s that Rule 6@7 clearly mandates t o sets of notices to different Ipotential oppositors.I The first notice is that given to the Ipersons named in the petitionI and the second ( hich is through publication) is that given to other persons ho are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That t o sets of notices are mandated under the above* 0uoted Section < is validated by the subse0uent Section B, also above*0uoted, hich provides for t o periods (for the t o types of Ipotential oppositorsI) ithin hich to file an opposition (6B days from notice or from the last date of publication). This is the overriding principle laid do n in ?arco v. #ourt of 'ppeals. ;B (n that case, "adina Faravilla ("adina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter Dune from Dune Salvacion Faravilla to Dune Salvacion IEustilo,I 'rmando Eustilo being, according to "adina, her daughter-s real father. Eustilo in fact filed before the trial court a I#,"ST'"#('I herein he ac/no ledged Dune as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition. 'fter Eustilo died, his son Dose 8icente Eustilo filed of Dune-s family name to Eustilo. ith the #ourt of 'ppeals a petition for annulment of the ,rder of the trial court granting the change
Filagros ?arco (?arco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Fary Doy 'nn Eustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Fary Doy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court-s ,rder as Fary Doy as, by ?arco-s claim, also fathered by Eustilo. The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint*in*intervention. ,n appeal by ?arco, this #ourt ruled that she should have been impleaded in "adina-s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Fary Doy. ?ut since a petitioner, li/e "adina, is not e.pected to e.haustively identify all the affected parties, the subse0uent publication of the notice cured the omission of ?arco as a party to the case. Thus the #ourt e.plained+ !ndoubtedly, ?arco is among the parties referred to in Section = of Rule 6@7. )er interest as affected by the petition for correction, as any 2udicial determination that Dune as the daughter of 'rmando ould affect her ard-s share in the estate of her father. (t cannot be established hether "adina /ne of Fary Doy-s e.istence at the time she filed the petition for correction. (ndeed, doubt may al ays be cast as to hether a petitioner under Rule 6@7 ould /no of all the parties hose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For e.ample, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be a are of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of hisGher spouse or paramour. . . . ..
1awphi1
....
6=B
The purpose precisely of Section <, Rule 6@7 is to bind the hole orld to the subse0uent 2udgment on the petition. The s eep of the decision ould cover even parties ho should have been impleaded under Section =, Rule 6@7 but ere inadvertently left out. . . . ..;9 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Fean hile, in Republic v. Mho, ;> #arlito Mho (#arlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of ?utuan #ity, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of #arlito-s minor children. #arlito and his siblings re0uested the correction in their birth certificates of the citi5enship of their mother :pifania to IFilipino,I instead of I#hinese,I and the deletion of the ord ImarriedI opposite the phrase I$ate of marriage of parentsI because their parents \ Duan and :pifania \ ere not married. 'nd #arlito re0uested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his ife-s date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. (n the course of the hearing of the petition, #arlito also sought the correction of the name of his ife from Faribel to IFarivel.I The Mhos- mother :pifania too/ the The trial court granted the petition. ,n the issue of hether the failure to implead Farivel and the Mhos- parents rendered the trial of the petition short of the re0uired adversary proceedings and the trial court-s 2udgment void, this #ourt held that hen all the procedural re0uirements under Rule 6@7 are follo ed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. (n so ruling, the #ourt noted that the affected parties ere already notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner*siblings Mhos ere the ones ho initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citi5enship, and #arlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his ife1 and, ith respect to the Mhos- petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother :pifania herself too/ the itness stand declaring that she as not married to their father. &hat is clear then in ?arco and Mho is the mandatory directive under Section = of Rule 6@7 to implead the civil registrar and the parties ho ould naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. "on*impleading, ho ever, as party*respondent of one ho is inadvertently left out or is not established to be /no n by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication. (" F(":, hen a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citi5enship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance ith the re0uirements of Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt is mandated. &):R:F,R:, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, ER'"T:$. The Danuary 7, ;@@C $ecision of ?ranch >> of the Regional Trial #ourt of Nue5on #ity in SP Proc. "o. N*@79=@B7 is "!%%(F(:$. S, ,R$:R:$.
itness stand
here she declared that she as not married to Duan ho died before the filing of the Mhos- petition.
6=9
8.R. No. 101043
Fe+-)#-y 22 2001
REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 Petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE2 Respondent.
$:#(S(,"
CORONA2 J.3
This petition for revie on certiorari6 see/s to set aside the #ourt of 'ppeals (#') decision ; dated Danuary 6=, ;@@= in #'*E.R. #8 "o. 996;7, hich affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#), ?ranch ;= of San Duan, Southern %eyte dated September 6<, 6CCC granting a petition for change of name. Respondent Trinidad R. '. #apote filed a petition for change of name of her ard from /iovanni *. /allamaso to/iovanni *adores on September C, 6CC7. (n Special Proceeding "o. R*<76,= #apote as Eiovanni-s guardian ad litem averred+ ... ... ... 6. RRespondentS is a Filipino citi5en, of legal age, married, hile minor E(,8'""( ". E'%%'F'S,, is also a Filipino citi5en, si.teen (69) years old and both are residents of San Duan, Southern %eyte here they can be served ith summons and other court processes1 ;. RRespondentS as appointed guardian Rad litemS of minor Eiovanni ". Eallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special RProc.S "o. R*<BC, dated R'ugust 67, 6CC7S ... ... authori5ing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance ith the desire of his mother R ho is residing and or/ing abroadS1 =. ?oth RrespondentS and minor have permanently resided in San Duan, Southern %eyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (6B) years prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 6C>@ hile the latter since his birth Rin 6C7;S1 <. The minor as left under the care of RrespondentS since he as yet nine (C) years old up to the present1 B. Finor E(,8'""( ". E'%%'F'S, is the illegitimate natural child of #ora5on P. "adores and $iosdado Eallamaso. R)eS as born on Duly C, 6C7; R,S prior to the effectivity of the "e Family #ode and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage bet een them1 and REiovanniS has been /no n by that name since birth Ras per his birth certificate registered at the %ocal #ivil Register of San Duan, Southern %eyteS1 9. The father, $iosdado Eallamaso, from the time REiovanniS as born and up to the present, failed to ta/e up his responsibilities Rto himS on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. REiovanni-s pleasS for attention along that line RfellS on deaf ears ... ... ...1 >. REiovanniS is no fully a are of ho he stands ith his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother-s surname1
7. REiovanni-sS mother might eventually petition RhimS to 2oin her in the !nited States and RhisS continued use of the surname Eallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate RhisS status as natural child1 and C. The change of name RfromS E(,8'""( ". E'%%'F'S, to E(,8'""( "'$,R:S ill be for the benefit of the minor. ... ... ...< Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on Eiovanni-s birth certificate. )aving found respondent-s petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.B Publication of the petition in a ne spaper of general circulation in the province of Southern %eyte once a ee/ for three consecutive ee/s as li/e ise ordered. 9 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (,SE) be sent a copy of the petition and order.> Since there as no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court*appointed commissioner. The ,SE, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not ob2ect1 hence, the lo er court granted the motion. 'fter the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Eiovanni ". Eallamaso to Eiovanni "adores. 7 From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the ,SE, filed an appeal granting the petition in a summary proceeding. ith a lone assignment of error+ the court a 8uo erred in
Ruling that the proceedings ere sufficiently adversarial in nature as re0uired, the #' affirmed the RT# decision ordering the change of name. C (n this petition, the Republic contends that the #' erred in affirming the trial court-s decision hich granted the petition for change of name despite the non*2oinder of indispensable parties.6@ Petitioner cites Republic of the 'hilippines v. 9abrador66 and claims that the purported parents and all other persons ho may be adversely affected by the child-s change of name should have been made respondents to ma/e the proceeding adversarial. 6;
6=>
&e deny the petition. IThe sub2ect of rights must have a fi.ed symbol for individuali5ation hich serves to distinguish him from all others1 this symbol is his name.I6= !nderstandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname ithout 2udicial authority. 6< This is a reasonable re0uirement for those see/ing such change because a person-s name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citi5ens. The Rules of #ourt provides the re0uirements and procedure for change of name. )ere, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 6@=, 6B a separate and distinct proceeding from Rule 6@7 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only ith innocuous or clerical errors thereon).69 The issue of non*2oinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a 8uo is intert ined point is hether the proceedings ere sufficiently adversarial. ith the nature of the proceedings there. The
Summary proceedings do not e.tensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their conduct is e.pediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal ith substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as ell as successional rights.6> Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings herein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. 67 &hen Eiovanni as born in 6C7; (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family #ode of the Philippines), 6Cthe pertinent provision of the #ivil #ode then as regards his use of a surname, read+ 'rt. =99. ' natural child ac/no ledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. (f recogni5ed by only one of the parents, # n#t)-# c&i . $&# e'! oy t&e $)-n#'e o* t&e -eco%ni"in% !#-ent. (emphasis ours) ?ased on this provision, Eiovanni should have carried his mother-s surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Eiovanni-s putative father to actually recogni5e him. Fean hile, according to the Family #ode hich repealed, among others, 'rticle =99 of the #ivil #ode+ 'rt. 6>9. I e%iti'#te c&i .-en $&# )$e t&e $)-n#'e and shall be under the parental authority o* t&ei- 'ot&e-, and shall be entitled to support in conformity ith this #ode. ... ... ... (emphasis ours) ,ur ruling in the recent case of An Re@ 'etition for #hange of *ame andSor #orrectionS#ancellation of .ntry in #ivil Registry of ,ulian 9in #arulasan -ang;@ is enlightening+ ,ur la s on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family #ode gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, hile illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recogni5es their filiation, in hich case they may bear the father-s surname. 'pplying these la s, #n i e%iti'#te c&i . /&o$e *i i#tion i$ not -eco%ni"e. +y t&e *#t&e- +e#-$ on y # %i,en n#'e #n. &i$ 'ot&e-G $)-n#'e2 #n. .oe$ not &#,e # 'i.. e n#'e . T&e n#'e o* t&e )n-eco%ni"e. i e%iti'#te c&i . t&e-e*o-e i.enti*ie$ &i' #$ $)c&. (t is only hen the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subse0uent marriage of his parents or ac/no ledged by the father in a public document or private hand ritten instrument that he bears both his mother-s surname as his middle name and his father-s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an ac/no ledged child. ;6
1awphi1.net
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person-s name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be ta/en lightly as to deprive those ho may, in any ay, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change. The la and facts obtaining here favor Eiovanni-s petition. Eiovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 6@= of the Rules of #ourt, and complied ith all the procedural re0uirements. 'fter hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Eiovanni-s petition sufficiently established that, under 'rt. 6>9 of the #ivil #ode, Eiovanni is entitled to change his name as he as never recogni5ed by his father hile his mother has al ays recogni5ed him as her child. ' change of name ill erase the impression that he as ever recogni5ed by his father. (t is also to his best interest as it ill facilitate his mother-s intended petition to have him 2oin her in the !nited States. This #ourt ill not stand in the ay of the reunification of mother and son. Foreover, it is note orthy that the cases cited by petitioner ;; in support of its position deal ith cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal ith the application and interpretation of Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt hile this case as correctly filed under Rule 6@=. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondent-s case. &hile the ,SE is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the ,SE cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its o n failure to participate therein. 's the #' correctly ruled+ The ,SE is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. !nli/e petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt, a petition for change of name under Rule 6@= cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 6@7 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also re0uired to reflect the change in name. In t&i$ -e%#-.2 C#!!e eeD C#!ote co'! ie. /it& t&e -e()i-e'ent *o- #n #.,e-$#-i# !-ocee.in% +y !o$tin% in # ne/$!#!e- o* %ene-# ci-c) #tion notice o* t&e *i in% o* t&e !etition. T&e o/e- co)-t # $o *)-ni$&e. t&e OS8 # co!y t&e-eo*. De$!ite t&e notice2 no one c#'e *o-/#-. to o!!o$e t&e !etition inc ).in% t&e OS8. T&e *#ct t&#t no one o!!o$e. t&e !etition .i. not .e!-i,e t&e co)-t o* it$ B)-i$.iction to &e#- t&e $#'e no- .oe$ it '#Ee t&e !-ocee.in% e$$ #.,e-$#-i# in n#t)-e. The lo er court is still e.pected to e.ercise its 2udgment to determine hether the petition is meritorious or not
6=7
and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. #onsidering that the ,SE neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte hen it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot no complain that the proceedings in the lo er court ere not adversarial enough.;= (emphasis supplied) ' proceeding is adversarial here the party see/ing relief has given legal arning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.;< Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as re0uired by the rules. ;B &ith this, all interested parties ere deemed notified and the hole orld considered bound by the 2udgment therein. (n addition, the trial court gave due notice to the ,SE by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the re0uirements to ma/e a proceeding adversarial ere satisfied hen all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the ,SE, ere afforded the opportunity to contest the petition. @:EREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the Danuary 6=, ;@@= decision of the #ourt of 'ppeals in #'*E.R. #8 "o. 996;7 AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
6=C
8.R. No. L-40030 Dece'+e- 102 1542
REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES #n. 9OSE ?OLETA in &i$ c#!#city #$ Actin% Loc# Ci,i Re%i$t-#- o* L)cen# City2 petitioners, vs. T:E :ONORA6LE DELIA P. MEDINA2 in &e- c#!#city #$ P-e$i.in% 9).%e o* t&e Co)-t o* Fi-$t In$t#nce o* M)e"on2 6-#nc& II2 #n. 9UANITO A. U72 respondents.
The $olicitor /eneral for petitioners.
.dmundo T. Pepeda for respondents.
MAAASIAR2 J.:
,n 'pril 69, 6C>B, private respondent Duanito M. !y filed a verified complaint ith the #ourt of First (nstance of Nue5on, ?ranch ((, presided by respondent Dudge $elia P. Fedina, praying Ithat the %ocal #ivil Registrar andGor the 'cting %ocal #ivil Registrar of %ucena #ity be ordered to change the entry appearing under item "o. 7 of 'nne. H'H hereofI (birth certificate of his daughter), from I#hineseI to IFilipinoI as his true, actual and present legal citi5enship. Private respondent alleged in his verified complaint that he has been a Filipino by naturali5ation since February ;6, 6C961 that his ife, :leanor !mali, also a Filipino, gave birth to their daughter Doyal !mali !y on Duly 6B, 6C>6 in the #alayan &omenHs )ospital (no Fedical #enter*%ucena) in %ucena #ity, o ned and operated by $r. :meterio #alayan, Dr., the Fedical $irector, and said delivery as assisted by $ra. Dosefina 8. #alayan1 that in the preparation of Doyal !mali !yHs birth certificate, ithout the /no ledge and consent of private respondent, a mista/e as committed ith respect to the latterHs nationality as the father of Doyal !mali !y1 and that petitioner Loleta, in his capacity as 'cting %ocal #ivil Registrar of %ucena, registered the said birth certificate despite the aforementioned error in the said entry. ,n ,ctober 6>, 6C>B, petitioner, through the Solicitor Eeneral, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent court had no 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of the case, arguing that Isubstantial alteraction, such as those affecting the status and citi5enship of a person in the #ivil Registry Records,I can only be established in Ian appropriate adversary proceeding as a remedy for the ad2udication of real and 2usticiable controversies involving actual conflict of rights, the final determination of hich depends upon the resolution of the issues of nationality, paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for hich e.isting substantive and procedural la s as ell as other rules of court amply provide.I Subse0uently, more specifically, on $ecember 6;, 6C>B, private respondent filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss alleging that I hat is prohibited under the la and 2urisprudence on the sub2ect matter is the correction of the record in the #ivil Registry by a summary proceeding. (n the absence of a sho ing that pre2udice ould be caused to any party interested, a correction or amendment on a birth certificate under peculiar circumstances may be made. The plaintiff therefore should be given a chance to have his day in court, considering that the suit is not summary in nature.I ,n Farch ;, 6C>9, respondent court issued t o orders*deferring resolution on petitionerHs motion to dismiss and re0uiring the private respondent to ma/e the proper publication of the complaint for three (=) consecutive ee/s in a ne spaper of general circulation in Nue5on province. 'fter private respondent had adduced his evidence, respondent court on 'ugust <, 6C>9, rendered the disputed decision, the dispositive portion of hich follo s+ &herefore, finding the action filed by the plaintiff to be ell*ta/en, the #ourt hereby denies the Fotion to $ismiss dated ,ctober 6>, 6C>B filed by the Solicitor Eeneral and orders the %ocal #ivil Registrar of %ucena #ity to correct the entry or the birth certificate of Doyal !mali !y, pertaining to the nationality of the plaintiff Duanito M. !y, from I#hineseI to IFilipinoI. )ence, this petition. Petition is ell*ta/en and the challenged decision should be reversed. Respondent court has no 2urisdiction over the sub2ect matter of the case considering that the entry sought to be corrected is substantial and controversial affecting as it does the citi5enship of private respondent and his daughter. Too ell*settled to re0uire citation of authorities is the doctrine that correction of entries in the #ivil Registry records cannot be had in proceedings held under 'rticle <6; of the "e #ivil #ode. 's early as 6CB<, in the case of Ty Mong Tin vs. Republic (<< Phil. =;6), the )onorable Supreme #ourt has consistently declared that 'rticle <6; of the ne #ivil #ode contemplates Imere corrections of mista/es that are clerical in nature and not those hich may affect the civil status or the nationality or citi5enship of the persons involved. (f the purpose of the petition is merely to correct a clerical error, then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mista/e may be corrected. (f it refers to a substantial change, hich affects the status or citi5enship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. ... This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in 'rticle <6; is summary in nature hich cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.I The raison d:etre for the rule cannot be overemphasi5ed. (n the said case of Ty Mong Tin this #ourt stated thus+ IThe boo/s ma/ing up the civil registrar and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained, and if the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through a mere summary proceeding and not through an appropriate action herein all the parties ho may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, e ould set ide open the door to fraud or other mischief, the conse0uence of hich might be detrimental and far*reaching.I (n a subse0uent ruling, i.e.& $y ,liva vs. Republic (;@ S#R' 6@>@), herein the facts bear stri/ing similarity ith those of the instant case, this #ourt, spea/ing through the then 'cting #hief Dustice D.?.%. Reyes, reiterated hat had been stated in the case of 'nsaldo vs. Republic (6@; Phil. 6@<9)+ ... the clerical errors hich might be corrected through 2udicial sanction under 'rticle <6; of the "e #ivil #ode, ould be those harmless and innocuous changes, such as, correction of a name that is clearly misspelled,
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occupation of the parents, etc.1 but for changes involving the civil status of the parents their nationality or citi2enship& those are grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citi2enship and nationality not only of said parents but of the offsprings , and to see/ said changes, it is necessary to file a proper suit herein not only the state, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made ith due process of la and on the basis of facts proven. Then and only then may the change or changes be made in the entry in a civil register that ich affect or even determine conclusively the citi5enship or nationality of a person therein involved. (:mphasis supplied.) &ith the data presently appearing in the civil registry, hich, according to the certificate of live birth of the child, ere furnished by 8icente S. ,liva (:.h. (*'), ,scar Sia ,liva, as the son of $omingo $y ,liva, a #hinese national and of 8icente Au Sia, another #hinese national is a #hinese citi5en. To alter the entries by changing the nationality of said parents, from I#hineseI to IFilipino,I ould be to ma/e it appear in that public record that the same ,scar Sia ,liva is the son of Filipino citi5ens and, therefore, is a citi5en of the Philippines. (t is not difficult to see that the changes as/ed for are neither harmless nor innocuous, as petitioner* appellees pretend them to be. "either is the case e.empted from the operation of the rule simply because the petitioning parents ere able to present evidence tending to establish their (the parentsH) Philippine citi5enship. That fact ould not be material in a summary proceeding for 2udicial correction of the civil registry, citi5enship not being a proper sub2ect or in0uiry therein. The case of Francisco Euevarra %im vs. Republic (%*7C=;, Fay =6, 6CB>) cannot be controlling in the instant case considering that the correction of entry pertaining to the nationality of petitioner therein as a fact already established by the $eportation ?oard, hence, incontrovertible, unli/e in the case at bar herein the error sought to be corrected ould have re0uired the respondent court to decide a controversial issue. (n denying the Solicitor EeneralHs motion to dismiss and directing the %ocal #ivil Registrar of %ucena #ity to correct the entry on the birth certificate of private respondentHs daughter, Doyal !mali !y, pertaining to plaintiffHs nationality, from I#hineseI to IFilipino,I respondent #ourt herein elucidated as follo s+ ... hat the la forbids in cases of this nature is only a summary proceeding ('rticle <6;, "e #ivil #ode). ?ut after the publication re0uired under Rule 6@7, Sec. < of the "e Rules of #ourt and after the defendant, the Solicitor Eeneral and all persons ho might have been affected by this action ere given a chance to oppose plaintiffHs cause, the proceeding underta/en in this case can barely be considered as summary in nature. Respondent Dudge should have loo/ed closely into the case of #hua &ee, et al. vs. Republic, (%*;>>=6, 'pril ;6, 6C>6, =7 S#R' <@C), herein a comprehensive construction of 'rticle <6; of the ne #ivil #ode in relation to Rule 6@7 of the Revised Rules of #ourt as made in the follo ing manner+ From the time the "e #ivil #ode too/ effect on 'ugust =@, 6CB@ until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of #ourt on Danuary 6, 6C9<, there as no la nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure 2udicial authori5ation to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to 'rticle <6; of the "e #ivil #ode. Rule 6@7 of the Revised Rules of #ourt no provides for such a procedure hich should be limited solely to the implementation of 'rticle <6;, the substantive la on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 6@7, li/e all the other provisions of the Rules of #ourt, as promulgated by the Supreme #ourt pursuant to its rule*ma/ing authority under Sec. 6= of 'rt. 8((( of the #onstitution, hich directs that such rules of court Ishall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.I (f Rule 6@7 ere to be e.tended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors hich are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citi5enship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 6@7 ould thereby become unconstitutional for it ould be increasing or modifying substantive rights, hich changes are not authori5ed under 'rticle <6; of the "e #ivil #ode. ... ... ... 'gain, in 9ee vs. 9ee (ian Tiu and the 9ocal #ivil Registrar (%*;<B<@, 'pril ;B, 6C97, ;= S#R' ;6;), a petition similar to the instant case as filed on February 67, 6C9< and, pursuant to the order of the trial court, as published once a ee/ for three consecutive ee/s in a ne spaper of general circulation. The order li/e ise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the entries hose corrections ere sought to file their opposition to the said petition. Fr. Dustice :nri0ue F. Fernando, spea/ing for the Supreme #ourt, held+ (t ould be to overturn a long list of cases, impressive for their number and their unanimity, upholding the ty Mong Tin, decision, for this petition to prosper. To abondon such a doctrine hich has in its favor adherence to a sound policy is unthin/able. "ecessarily then, reliance on petitions of this character for the far from commendable purpose of changing oneHs nationality should continue to be fro ned upon and discouraged. &hat as set forth in #hug Siu v. #ivil Registrar of Fanila bears reiteration. Thus+ I,ne of the most emphatic affirmations against the utili5ation of this mode of procedure to obtain a 2udicial declaration of citi5enship comes from the pen of former #hief Dustice ?eng5on in the above cited 6C9< decision ofReyes v. Republic. Thus, HThe case before us is not of first impression. &e have repeatedly declared that in this 2urisdiction, the remedy sought in the instant petition cannot be granted in the manner desired, &hile ostensibly, the action see/s a mere correction of an entry in the #ivil Registry, in effect, it re0uests the 2udicial declaration of Philippine citi5enship. Fany such rases this #ourt has dismiss &e have clearly stated time and again, declaratory relief is not available for the purpose of obtaining a 2udicial declaration of citi5enship (%ee vs. )ian Tiu et al., supra& p. ;6=).
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The ruling in the aforecited cases as reiterated in Republic vs. (on. Rafael dela #ru2& etc.& et al. (E.R. "o. %*=<@>C, "ov. ;, 6C7;)1 5ariano -ong& et al. vs. Republic (E.R. "o. %*;C=>9, Duly =@,6C7;)1 Republic vs. #aparosso (6@> S#R' 9>, >6)1 and Republic vs. #F( of $avao (C; S#R' 9=;). Follo ing the long established doctrine on the matter, it is crystal clear that respondent should not have assumed 2urisdiction of the case as the sub2ect matter thereof is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citi5enship, hich is undisputably substantial as ell as controverted, and as such, can only be established in an appropriate adversary proceeding. '##,R$("E%A, T): N!:ST(,":$ $:#(S(," ,F T): R:SP,"$:"T #,!RT F!ST ?: 'S (T (S ):R:?A, R:8:RS:$. ", #,STS. S, ,R$:R:$.
A8uino& #oncepcion& /uerrero and .scolin& ,,.& concur.
Se!#-#te O!inion$
A6AD SANTOS2 J.$ dissenting+
( dissent for the reasons given by Dudge Fedina hich are 0uoted on page 9 of the decision. ( ant to point out that until no this #ourt has not indicated the procedure for ma/ing substantial changes or corrections in the #ivil Registry. (t /eeps on saying that 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode and Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt allo only innocuous corrections. &ell then, hat is the procedure for non*innocuous correctionsK The public is entitled to /no .
DE CASTRO2 J.$ dissenting+
( regret to have to dissent, ith respect to the nature of the proceedings under Rule 6@7 of the Revised Rules of #ourt. implementing 'rticle <6; of the #ivil #ode. (n my humble opinion, it is that Iproper suitI or Iappropriate actionI as mentioned in e.isting 2urisprudence, starting ith Ty Mong Tin a 6CB< case. Thus, in a decision ( penned in the #ourt of 'ppeals, #'*E.R. "o. 9@BC;, Danuary C, 6C>C, 1 made the follo ing observation+ 'll the foregoing not ithstanding, &e are of the opinion that the proceedings that have already ta/en place can very ell be regarded as that Iproper suitI or Iappropriate actionI as mentioned in e.isting 2urisprudence, starting ith Ty Cong Tim vs. Republic (6CB<) << Phil. =;6, reiterated up to %aybayan vs. Republic (6C99) supra, for as provided in Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt, a ne provision on the proceedings intended to implement 'rt. <6; of the #ivil #ode, promulgated obviously in the light of the then prevailing doctrine that proceedings under 'rt. <6; are summary in nature, can hardly be considered as merely summary. The ne Rule 6@7 re0uires publication of the petition three times, once a ee/ for three consecutive ee/s (Sec. <). The Rule also re0uires inclusion as parties of all persons or claim any interest hich ould be affected by the cancellation or correctionI (Sec. =). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also re0uired to file their opposition, if any, ithin fifteen (6B) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice. &ith all these procedural re0uirements, an action under 'rt. <6; of the #ivil #ode, in effect, has become a proceeding in rem, * an action against the hole orld*one hich certainly cannot be described as IsummaryI. &e venture to say that the promulgation of this ne provision of Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt as intended precisely to outline the procedure of that Iappropriate actionI repeatedly held to be necessary for the correction of more than mere clerical errors, but even substantial ones, as could easily be gleaned from hat may be 2udicially ordered cancelled or corrected after the proceedings. Thus * S:#. ;. :ntries sub2ect to cancellation or correction. * !pon good and valid ground, the follo ing entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected+ (a) births1 (b) marriages1 (c) deaths1 (d) legal separations1 (e) 2udgments of annulment of marriage1 (f) 2udgment declaring marriages void from the beginning, (g) legitimations (h) adoptions1 (i) ac/no ledgments of natural children1 2) naturali5ation (/) election, loss or recovery of citi5enship1 (6) civil interdiction1 (m) 2udicial determination of filiation1 (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor1 and (o) changes of name. The case cited by the Eovernment in its opposition to the instant petition, +iray vs. Republic, =B S#R' 6=< (6C>@), affords no une0uivocal and direct ruling that not ithstanding the promulgation of Rule 6@7 to implement 'rt. <6; of the "e #ivil #ode the proceedings contemplated thereunder remain summary in nature. Significantly, Rule 6@7 of the Rules of #ourt as not even mentioned e.plicitly in the case abovecited, for the petition in said case, as filed on ,ctober 6;, 6C9B, hen Rule 6@7 has been effective only as of Danuary 6, 6C9<, and the Supreme #ourt held the case is merely a change of name under Rule 6@=. &e refuse to believe that despite the 2udicial proceedings as prescribed by Rule 6@7, all that the court is authori5ed to do is to order the correction of mere clerical errors hich are Iharmless or innocuous.I The %ocal #ivil Registrar, upon proper petition, may easily be authori5ed to correct mere clerical errors ithout any ris/ that needs to be safeguarded by 2udicial overseeing. &ith the more or less elaborate proceedings outlined by Rule 6@7, the #ourt should no have the authority to correct more than mere clerical errors, as those mentioned in Sec. ; thereof. ($ecision, pp. 7*6@) The foregoing reflects my vie to hich, ith due respect to my brethren, ( ould li/e to be permitted to adhere.
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8.R. No. L-32600 Fe+-)#-y 262 1544
REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 petitioner, vs. :ON. FELICIANO 6ELMONTE2 9).%e o* t&e Co)-t o* Fi-$t In$t#nce o* 6#%)io #n. 6en%)et #n. ANITA PO # i#$ ;ERONICA PAO2 #$$i$te. +y &e- 'ot&e- :ELEN POA2 respondents.
8ANCA7CO2 J.:
#an a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be 2oined in the same proceedingK This is the issue posed in this petition for revie of a decision of the #ourt of First (nstance of ?aguio and ?enguet. 1 The record of the case discloses that on 'ugust ;7, 6C97, the herein private respondent 'nita Po alias 8eronica Pao, a resident of ?aguio #ity, filed ith the then #ourt of First (nstance of ?aguio and ?enguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita 'o to +eronica 'ao. 2 For this purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her fatherHs name appearing as P, A! be corrected to P', A! and her motherHs name recorded as P'M('T #)'" be changed to ):%:" #)'". 't the time the litigation as commenced, the petitioner as a 69*year old minor. Thus, she as assisted in the case by her mother. The suit as doc/eted as Special Proceeding #ase "o. 9<;. The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is )elen #han and that the given name 'a)iat ritten on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Au and not Po Au as erroneously ritten in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of #hinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been bapti5ed by a #atholic priest and that she as christened as 8eronica Pao, the first being her #hristian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname1 that since her childhood up to the present, she had al ays been /no n and referred to as +eronica 'ao and not Anita 'o. ,n the basis of these allegations, the petitioner as/ed the trial court to allo her change of name and to order the correction of her records in the %ocal #ivil RegistrarHs ,ffice at %a Trinidad, ?enguet to conform to the name +eronica 'ao. She also as/ed the trial court to order the correction of her fatherHs name recorded in her birth certificate from 'o 6u to 'ao 6u, as ell as her motherHs name appearing as 'a)iat #han changed to (elen #han. 't the hearing scheduled by the trial court on Farch <,6C9C, the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral presented its ,pposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the said ,pposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allo ed by the mere submission of the said Petition. The pertinent portions of the ritten arguments in the ,pposition are as follo s J ... ' petition for change of name is filed under Rule 6@= of the Rules of #ourt ... and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the #ivil Register is filed under Rule 6@7 of the same Rules... . Rule 6@= and Rule 6@7 are distinct and separate from each other and each provides for different re0uirements that must be satisfied in order that a person may avail of any one of them. The present petition apparently satisfies the re0uirements of Rule 6@= on change of name but fails insofar as the re0uest for correction of certain entries is concerned because the civil registrar concerned and the other parties affected by the corrections sought to be made have not been included in the petition as re0uired by section = of Rule 6@7. 'nd from the nature of the change sought to be made by the herein petitioner in her surname, it seems that orderly and proper procedure re0uires that a correction be first made of the alleged errors in the names of the petitionerHs parents to 2ustify her petition for change of name. Thus, petitioner alleges that her fatherHs name is correctly Pao Au but the same is recorded in her birth certificate as 'o 6u )o ever, in the said birth certificate, petitionerHs name appears as 'nita Po follo ing the name of her father as registered in the same birth certificate, hich is 'o 6u. (t therefore appears that until the name of the father is sho n to have been registered erroneously, there is no 2ustification for allo ing the petitioner to use the surname Poa The importance and necessity of first determining the propriety of the corrections sought to be made by the herein petitioner before allo ing her to change her name is magnified hen it is noted that the corrections sought involve the very identity of the parents of the herein petitioner, ithout a clear*cut clarification of hich, the court may un ittingly allo itself to become an instrument in the substitution in a public record of the (dentities of certain persons. (n vie of these circumstances, it appears that considered as a petition for change of name, the present petition does not state a cause of action considering that on the basis of the data appearing in the birth certificate, petitionerHs father is Po Au and not Pao Au 'nd the present petition can not be considered (sufficient) in form and substance as a petition for correction because it does not satisfy the re0uirements set forth by section = (Rule 6@7) of the Rules of #ourt and there is no allegation of ho the alleged error as committed.
... ... ... 3

(n a $ecision dated Duly ;<,6C9C, the trial court, ith respondent Dudge Feliciano ?elmonte presiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. 4 The petitioner as allo ed to change her name from Anita 'o to +eronica 'ao. The court also allo ed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the Petition in the registry of birth. The %ocal #ivil Registrar of %a Trinidad ?enguet as ordered to implement the corresponding corrections. ,n behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral elevated the case to this #ourt by Solicitor Eeneral raises the follo ing issues J ay of the instant Petition.
0
The
(6) &hether or not the private respondent 'nita Po alias 8eronica Pao has presented a proper and reasonable cause for the change of her name1 and (;) &hether or not the names Po Au and Pa/iat #han appearing in the birth certificate of 'nita Po can be changed in the same proceeding for the change of name of 'nita Po. The parties having submitted their respective briefs, the case is no submitted for decision.
6<=
&e have gone through the entire record of the case and &e find merit in the instant Petition. The allegations of the private respondent are not disputed by the petitioner. The respondent Dudge rendered 2udgment in accordance ith these undisputed facts. ' conclusion of a court dra n from undisputed facts raises a 0uestion of la . 6 The issues raised in the instant Petition are directed against the conclusions arrived at by the respondent Dudge and dra n from undisputed facts. Ta/ing into account these observations and considering that the resolution of the issues raised herein ould not re0uire this #ourt to re*e.amine the evidence presented before the trial court, &e hold that the t o issues raised in this Petition are 0uestions of la . (nasmuch as the t o issues are related to each other, they ill be resolved together. (n fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is +eronica 'ao inasmuch as +eronica is her #hristian name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, ho ever, deny that the name of her father appearing in her birth certificate is 'o 6u and not 'ao 6u. She assigns the discrepancy to mere clerical error. 'n e.amination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name of +eronica 'ao is predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is 'ao 6u and not 'o 6u as recited in her o n birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father in her birth certificate as entered erroneously. 's correctly observed by the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral, until the name of her father is sho n to have been registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no 2ustification for allo ing the petitioner to use the surname 'ao. The corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very (dentity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner ith the trial court. 'side from the change of her name, the petitioner see/s a correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 6@7 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. 1 ' clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. 4 The petitioner see/s more than 2ust the correction of a clerical error. Foreover, under Section = of Rule 6@7, hen cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons ho have or claim any interest hich ould be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. 'n inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner ith the trial court sho s that the local civil registrar concerned as never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made. 5 The procedure recited in Rule 6@= regarding change of name and in Rule 6@7 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of e.pediency To hold other ise ould render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of #ourt allo ing the change of oneHs name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. (f both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the re0uirements of Rules 6@= and 6@7 must be complied ith. 'ccordingly, &e hold that the Petition filed for lac/ of merit. ith the trial court is not sufficient in form and substance and should have been dismissed by the trial court
&):R:F,R:, in vie of the foregoing, the $ecision of the #ourt of First (nstance of ?aguio and ?enguet in Special Proceeding #ase "o. 9<; dated Duly ;<,6C9C is hereby S:T 'S($: and declared to be ithout force or effect. The entries in the local civil registry of %a Trinidad, ?enguet pertaining to the petitioner 'nita Po and her parents Po Au and Pa/iat #han stand as they ere before such $ecision. %et a copy of this $ecision be furnished the %ocal #ivil Registrar of %a Trinidad, ?enguet for his information and implementation. &e ma/e no pronouncement as to costs. S, ,R$:R:$.
*arvasa& #ru2 and /riLo7A8uino& ,,.& concur.
Teehan)ee& #.,.& concur in the result.
6<<
8.R. No. 140463
Se!te'+e- 42 2005
AN8ELITA ;ALDE?2 Petitioner, vs. REPU6LIC OF T:E P:ILIPPINES2 Respondent.
$:#(S(,"
NAC:URA2 J.:
?efore this #ourt is a Petition for Revie on #ertiorari under Rule <B of the Rules of #ourt assailing the $ecision of the Regional Trial #ourt (RT#) of #amiling, Tarlac dated "ovember 6;, ;@@> dismissing petitioner 'ngelita 8alde5-s petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio). The facts of the case are as follo s+ Petitioner married Sofio on Danuary 66, 6C>6 in Pateros, Ri5al. ,n $ecember 6=, 6C>6, petitioner gave birth to the spouses- only child, "ancy. 'ccording to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter as unemployed and did not bring home any money. (n Farch 6C>;, Sofio left their con2ugal d elling. Petitioner and their child aited for him to return but, finally, in Fay 6C>;, petitioner decided to go bac/ to her parents- home in ?ancay 6st, #amiling, Tarlac. Three years passed ithout any ord from Sofio. (n ,ctober 6C>B, Sofio sho ed up at ?ancay 6st. )e and petitioner tal/ed for several hours and they agreed to separate. They e.ecuted a document to that effect. 6 That as the last time petitioner sa him. 'fter that, petitioner didn-t hear any ne s of Sofio, his hereabouts or even if he as alive or not.; ?elieving that Sofio as already dead, petitioner married 8irgilio Reyes on Dune ;@, 6C7B. = Subse0uently, ho ever, 8irgilio-s application for naturali5ation filed ith the !nited States $epartment of )omeland Security as denied because petitioner-s marriage to Sofio as subsisting. < )ence, on Farch ;C, ;@@>, petitioner filed a Petition before the RT# of #amiling, Tarlac see/ing the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. The RT# rendered its $ecisionB on "ovember 6;, ;@@>, dismissing the Petition for lac/ of merit. The RT# held that 'ngelita I as not able to prove the ell*grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa as already dead.I (t said that under 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has a ell*founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subse0uent marriage. This belief, the RT# said, must be the result of proper and honest*to*goodness in0uiries and efforts to ascertain the hereabouts of the absent spouse. The RT# found that, by petitioner-s o n admission, she did not try to find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. %i/e ise, petitioner-s daughter testified that her mother prevented her from loo/ing for her father. The RT# also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he ould have been only 96 years old by then, and people ho have reached their 9@s have not become increasingly lo in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioner-s testimony that Sofio as a chain smo/er and a drun/ard, there is no evidence that he continues to drin/ and smo/e until no . Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 She argued that it is the #ivil #ode that applies in this case and not the Family #ode since petitioner-s marriage to Sofio as celebrated on Danuary 66, 6C>6, long before the Family #ode too/ effect. Petitioner further argued that she had ac0uired a vested right under the provisions of the #ivil #ode and the stricter provisions of the Family #ode should not be applied against her because Title T(8 of the #ivil #ode, here 'rticles =7< and =C@ on declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, as not e.pressly repealed by the Family #ode. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family #ode ill impair the rights petitioner had ac0uired under the #ivil #ode. The RT# denied the Fotion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated $ecember 6@, ;@@>.> Petitioner no comes before this #ourt see/ing the reversal of the RT# $ecision and Fotion for Reconsideration.
(n its Fanifestation and Fotion,7 the ,ffice of the Solicitor Eeneral (,SE) recommended that the #ourt set aside the assailed RT# $ecision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The ,SE argues that the re0uirement of I ell*founded beliefI under 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode is not applicable to the instant case. (t said that petitioner could not be e.pected to comply ith this re0uirement because it as not yet in e.istence during her marriage to 8irgilio Reyes in 6C7B. The ,SE further argues that before the effectivity of the Family #ode, petitioner already ac0uired a vested right as to the validity of her marriage to 8irgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the #ivil #ode. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio-s death, the ,SE posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family #ode.C "e.t, the ,SE contends that 'rticle =C@ of the #ivil #ode as not repealed by 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode. 6@Title T(8 of the #ivil #ode, the ,SE said, as not one of those e.pressly repealed by the Family #ode. Foreover, 'rticle ;B9 of the Family #ode provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they ill pre2udice or impair vested or ac0uired rights. 66 The RT# $ecision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. )o ever, those cited in the RT# $ecision. e must state that e are denying the Petition on grounds different from
(nitially, e discuss a procedural issue. !nder the Rules of #ourt, a party may directly appeal to this #ourt from a decision of the trial court only on pure 0uestions of la . ' 0uestion of la lies, on one hand, hen the doubt or difference arises as to hat the la is on a certain set of facts1 on the other hand, a 0uestion of fact e.ists hen the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. )ere, the facts are not disputed1 the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the la or 2urisprudence to the undisputed facts.6; The RT# erred in applying the provisions of the Family #ode and holding that petitioner needed to prove a I ell*founded beliefI that Sofio dead. The RT# applied 'rticle <6 of the Family #ode, to it+ as already
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'rt. <6. ' marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subse0uent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a ell*founded belief that the absent spouse as already dead. (n case of disappearance here there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of 'rticle =C6 of the #ivil #ode, an absence of only t o years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting a subse0uent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this #ode for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, ithout pre2udice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (t is readily apparent, ho ever, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and 8irgilio on Danuary 66, 6C>6 and Dune ;@, 6C7B, respectively, celebrated under the auspices of the #ivil #ode. The pertinent provision of the #ivil #ode is 'rticle 7=+ 'rt. 7=. 'ny marriage subse0uently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless+ (6) The first marriage as annulled or dissolved1 or (;) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage ithout the spouse present having ne s of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subse0uent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to 'rticles =C@ and =C6. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. 'rticle =C@ of the #ivil #ode states+ 'rt. =C@. 'fter an absence of seven years, it being un/no n for those of succession. hether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, e.cept ith any person other than such first ere both
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. (f he disappeared after the age of seventy*five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The #ourt, on several occasions, had interpreted the above*0uoted provision in this ise+ For the purposes of the civil marriage la , it is not necessary to have the former spouse 2udicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance ith the provisions of the #ivil #ode has for its sole purpose to enable the ta/ing of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, ho ever, the la only re0uires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not /no his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 6= Further, the #ourt e.plained that presumption of death cannot be the sub2ect of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee-s estate. (n re S5atra 6< is instructive. (n that case, petitioner contracted marriage ith a Polish national in 6C=>. They lived together as husband and ife for three years. Sometime in 6C<@, the husband, on the prete.t of visiting some friends, left the con2ugal abode ith their child and never returned. 'fter in0uiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband ent to Shanghai, #hina. )o ever, friends ho came from Shanghai told her that the husband as not seen there. (n 6C<7, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven years and she had not heard any ne s from him and about her child, she believes that he is dead. (n deciding the case, the #ourt said+ The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of "icolai S5atra , because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had ac0uired no property during his married life ith the petitioner. The rule invo/ed by the latter is merely one of evidence hich permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invo/ed and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, hich is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. (ndependently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invo/ed, nor can it be made the sub2ect of an action or special proceeding. (n this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. "either is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact ()agans v. &isli5enus, <; Phil. 77@), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitionerHs husband is dead, but merely as/s for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. (f there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitionerHs husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthori5ed. The petition is for a declaration that the petitionerHs husband is presumptively dead. ?ut this declaration, even if 2udicially made, ould not improve the petitionerHs situation, because such a presumption is already established by la . ' 2udicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and e.ecutory, ould still be a prima facie presumption only. (t is still disputable. (t is for that reason that it cannot be the sub2ect of a 2udicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only 0uestion or matter involved in a case, or upon hich a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy bet een the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of hich certain rights and obligations arise or may arise1 and once such controversy is decided by a final 2udgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the 2udgment on the sub2ect of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the e.istence of a particular fact, becomes res 2udicata, sub2ect to no collateral attac/, e.cept in a fe rare instances especially provided by la . (t is, therefore, clear that a 2udicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption 2uris tantum only, sub2ect to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, ould have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. (f a 2udicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years,
1avvphi1
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cannot become final and e.ecutory even after the lapse of the reglementary period ithin hich an appeal may be ta/en, for such presumption is still disputable and remains sub2ect to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.6B (n %u/ban v. Republic,69 petitioner %ourdes E. %u/ban contracted marriage ith Francisco #huidian on $ecember 6@, 6C==. ' fe days later, on $ecember ;>, Francisco left %ourdes after a violent 0uarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. )er diligent search, in0uiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last /no n address, proved futile. ?elieving her husband as already dead since he had been absent for more than t enty years, petitioner filed a petition in 6CB9 for a declaration that she is a ido of her husband ho is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subse0uent marriage. ,n the other hand, the antecedents in Eue v. Republic 6> are similar to S5atra . ,n Danuary B, 6C<9, 'ngelina Eue-s husband left Fanila here they ere residing and ent to Shanghai, #hina. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not ritten to her, nor in any ay communicated ith her as to his hereabouts. $espite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. 'fter 66 years, she as/ed the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of &illian Eue, pursuant to the provisions of 'rticle =C@ of the #ivil #ode of the Philippines. (n both cases, the #ourt reiterated its ruling in S5atra . (t held that a petition for 2udicial declaration that petitionerHs husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authori5ed by la .67 From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the #ivil #ode, the presumption of death is established by la 6Cand no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have ta/en place by the seventh year of absence, ;@ Sofio is to be presumed dead starting ,ctober 6C7;. #onse0uently, at the time of petitioner-s marriage to 8irgilio, there e.isted no impediment to petitioner-s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph ; of 'rticle 7= of the #ivil #ode. Further, considering that it is the #ivil #ode that applies, proof of I ell*founded beliefI is not re0uired. Petitioner could not have been e.pected to comply ith this re0uirement since the Family #ode as not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to 8irgilio. The enactment of the Family #ode in 6C77 does not change this conclusion. The Family #ode itself states+ 'rt. ;B9. This #ode shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not pre2udice or impair vested or ac0uired rights in accordance other la s. ith the #ivil #ode or
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family #ode re0uiring petitioner to e.hibit I ell*founded beliefI ill, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, hich as valid at the time it as celebrated. Such a situation ould be untenable and ould go against the ob2ectives that the Family #ode ishes to achieve. (n sum, e hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio-s death can be granted under the #ivil #ode, the same presumption having arisen by operation of la . )o ever, e declare that petitioner as capacitated to marry 8irgilio at the time their marriage as celebrated in 6C7B and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid. &):R:F,R:, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is $:"(:$. S, ,R$:R:$.
ANTONIO EDUARDO 6. NAC:URA 'ssociate Dustice
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8.R. No. 40026 9) y 142 1544
9. 8ON?ALES-ORENSE2 petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS #n. PRIMA M. CA8UIAT-AL6A2 respondents.
Ambrosio 'adilla& 5empin D Reyes 9aw Offices for private respondent.
CRU?2 J.:
The novel 0uestion presented in this case is hether or not, hen an a ard of attorneyHs fees by the probate court is elevated to the #ourt of 'ppeals, a record on appeal is necessary. The issue arose hen, having been retained by the private respondent on Duly 6, 6C7;, to represent her in the probate of her husbandHs ill, the petitioner as subse0uently dismissed on Farch B, 6C7<. )e claimed the stipulated attorneyHs fees e0uivalent to 6@Q of the estate but the probate court, 1 in its order dated $ecember 7,6C79, allo ed him only P;@,@@@.@@ on the basis of 8uantum meruit. ,n $ecember 6C, 6C79, he filed a notice of appeal from this order, and the probate court then transmitted the records of the case to the #ourt of 'ppeals, hich notified the petitioner accordingly. ,n Duly ;@, 6C7>, he submitted the brief for the appellant. The private respondent traversed ith her brief for the appellee on September 7, 6C7>. ,n September ;;, 6C7>, ho ever, the #ourt of 'ppeals 2 declared the petitionerHs appeal abandoned and dismissed for his failure to submit his record on appeal as re0uired under ?P 6;C and the (nterim Rules and Euidelines. The petitioner then came on appeal by certiorari to this #ourt to as/ that the said resolution be set aside as null and void. The pertinent provision of ?P 6;C reads as follo s+ Sec. =C. Appeals. J The period for appeal from final orders, resolution, a ards, 2udgment or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (6B) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution a ard, 2udgment or decision appealed from. Provided, ho ever, that in habeas corpuscases the period for appeal shall be forty*eight (<7) hours from the notice of the 2udgment appealed from. "o record on appeal shall be re0uired to ta/e an appeal. (n lieu thereof, the entire original record shall be transmitted pages prominently numbered consecutively together ith an inde. of the contents thereof. This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases applicable provisions of the Rules of #ourt. The (nterim Rules and Euidelines provide thus+ Sec. 67. .limination of record on appeal and appeal bond . J The filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed cases referred to in sub*paragraph (b) of paragraph 6C hereof. "o appeal bond shall be re0uired for an appeal. Sec. 6C. 'eriod of Appeal J (a) 'll appeals e.cept in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be ta/en ithin fifteen (6B) days from notice of the 2udgment, order, resolution or a ard appealed from1 (b) (n appeals in special proceedings in accordance ith Rule 6@C of the Rules of #ourt and other cases herein multiple appeals are allo ed, the period of appeal shall be =@ days, a record on appeal being re0uired. The petitioner contends that under the above rules it as not necessary for him to file a record on appeal because his appeal involves an ordinary claim for payment of attorneyHs fees hich may be asserted against the private respondent either in the probate case or in a separate civil action. The appeal should therefore be covered by the general rule rather than by the e.ception. The probate court apparently believed as much because it immediately directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the respondent court in lieu of the record on appeal, and so too did the appellee for she filed her brief in due time instead of moving to dismiss because of the non*filing of the record on appeal. )e adds that he could not be regarded as having abandoned his appeal as in fact he had filed a motion for e.ecution pending appeal on 'ugust 66, 6C7>, ithout pre2udice to the final outcome of his appeal. The private respondent, for her part, supports the respondent court and argues that the above*cited provisions specifically e.clude from the general rule special proceedings and other cases here multiple appeals are allo ed. The period for appeal in these cases is retained at thirty days and the record on appeal is still necessary. "on*compliance ill result in dismissal of the appeal as the re0uirements are mandatory, and more so in this case since the petitioner as re0uired to file the record on appeal and did not choose to comply ith the order of the respondent court. (t is stressed that the petitionerHs appeal as in Sp. Proc. "o. =B=C7 in the Regional Trial #ourt of Nue5on #ity and not in any ordinary or separate civil action. (n the vie of the #ourt, the decisive provision is Rule 6@C, Section 6, of the Rules of #ourt, hich reads in full as follo s+ Section 6. ,rders or 2udgments from hich appeals may be ta/en. 'n interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or 2udgment rendered by a #ourt of First (nstance or a Duvenile and $omestic Relations #ourt, here such order or 2udgment+ (a) 'llo s or disallo s a ill1 (b) $etermines ho are the la ful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to hich such person is entitled1 ith e.cept in the ith all the
herein multiple appeals are allo ed under
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(c) 'llo s or disallo s, in hole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it1 (d) Settles the account of an e.ecutor, administrator, trustee or guardian1 (e) #onstitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lo er court of the rights of the party appealing, e.cept that no appeal shall be allo ed from the appointment of a special administrator1 and (f) (s the final order or 2udgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a ne trial or for reconsideration. (t is settled that the fees of the la yer representing the e.ecutor or administrator are directly chargeable against the client for hom the services have been rendered and not against the estate of the decedent. 3 )o ever, the e.ecutor or administrator may claim reimbursement of such fees from the estate if it can be sho n that the services of the la yer redounded to its benefit. 4 's the petitionerHs claim for attorneyHs fees is not a claim against the estate of the private respondentHs husband, he could have filed it in an ordinary civil action, in hich event an appeal therefrom ill not be regarded as involved in a special proceeding re0uiring the submission of a record on appeal. (t appears, ho ever, that it as not filed in such separate civil action but in the probate case itself, hich is a special proceeding and so should be deemed governed by Rule 6@C on appeals from such proceedings. The appeal ould come under Subsection (e) thereof as the order of the probate court granting the challenged attorneyHs fees Iconstitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lo er court of the rights of the party appealing.I The conse0uence is that the e.ception rather than the rule in ?P 6;C and the (mplementing Rules and Euidelines should be follo ed and, therefore, the record on appeal should be re0uired. Rule B@, Section 6, of the Rules of #ourt provides in part as follo s+ /rounds for dismissal of appeal. J 'n appeal may be dismissed by the #ourt of 'ppeals, on its o n motion or on that of the appellee, on the follo ing grounds+ ... ... ... (b) "ailure to file, ithin the period prescribed by these rules, the notice of appeal, appeal bond orrecord on appeal. ,n the basis of the above rule, the challenged resolution of the respondent court dismissing the petitionerHs appeal cannot be faulted. (t is noted, ho ever, that the 0uestion presented in this case is one of first impression1 that the petitioner acted in honest if mista/en, interpretation of the applicable la 1 that the probate court itself believed that the record on appeal as unnecessary1 and that the private respondent herself apparently thought so, too, for she did not move to dismiss the appeal and instead impliedly recogni5ed its validity by filing the appelleeHs brief. (n vie of these circumstances, and in the interest of 2ustice, the #ourt feels that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to comply ith the above* discussed rules by submitting the re0uired record on appeal as a condition for the revival of the appeal. The issue raised in his appeal may then be fully discussed and, in the light of the briefs already filed by the parties, resolved on the merits by the respondent court. '##,R$("E%A, the respondent court is directed to R:("ST'T: the petitionerHs appeal upon his submission, the re0uired record on appeal as duly approved by the probate court. "o costs.
*arvasa& /ancayco& /riLo7A8uino and 5edialdea& ,,.& concur.
ithin thirty days from notice hereof, of

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