The Residence of Evil

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World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Elmira Cheremisova
Residence of Evil or Can the Afghan War Ever End? By Elmira Cheremisova Introduction The politically unstable situation in Afghanistan has been a cornerstone for the foreign policy of many countries in the world, as well as for international security in general. During the previous three decades Afghanistan has experienced several military interventions, including the Soviet occupation (1979-1989), Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, and the ongoing UN-NATO operation. The current United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan is aimed at conflict resolution, and it seems to have got into a stalemate. The insurgency is flourishing in the country, making it a driving force for endless civil war. This study seeks to find out the possible obstacles in the way of the UN-NATO operations attempts to stop the war in Afghanistan. Filling the gap in previous studies, the process of conducting military operations is analyzed from a primarily technical viewpoint, looking at coordination between civil and military components of the operation. Even though within the mission several separate operations can be held (for instance, civil and military) the mission cannot possibly succeed without well-balanced coordination between its elements. This fact has little been highlighted by scholars who focus mainly on suggesting possible cures for resolving the conflict and conditions for peace on Afghan land. For example, Jonathan Goodhand states that for long-lasting
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peace it is necessary to create a strong legal state possessing a monopoly on force.1 Astri Suhrke argues that the creation of such a centralized and sovereign state is complicated particularly by disagreements between factions within Afghanistan2 and the coalition participants.3 Necessity of coordination between the missions participants is underlined by J. Alexander Their, who states that the UN forces have been overshadowed by NATO.4 He argues that the mandate of NATO has been more complicated than the mandate of the UN. In spite of being authorized to employ all necessary means by the UN Security Council, NATO has achieved little success. According to Thier, NATOs strategy of increasing the numbers in the Afghan National Army is necessitated by this failure. Nevertheless an increase in quantity hardly means creation of a qualified efficient National Army that is essential for maintaining security within the state. The strategy for The Afghan Army should be focused on increasing its military capabilities, that is to say, an ability to conduct military actions independently. Military capabilities of The National Afghan Army during the last year will be analyzed as NATOs key task according to its mandate.5 At the same time, stabilization of the internal situation in
Goodhand, Jonathan. 2002. Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly (October): 854. For example, such factors as: Afghan-Pakistan cross-border drug-trafficking, regional powers and fragile democratic regime. Suhrke, Astri. 2007 .Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly, p. 1307. Thier, J. Alexander. 2006. Afghanistan. In Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William J. Durch. Washington, DC: United states Institute for Peace. NATOs role in Afghanistan, NATO official web-site: Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 2
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Afghanistan will be analyzed as the primary goal of the UN.6 Results of achieving their own goals will be shown to reflect shortcomings of coordination between military and non-military actors of the operation. Theoretical concept: Role of Civil-Military Dialogue in the Operation Process If the military operation is multidimensional and includes both military and non-military components, civil-military dialogue is a crucial condition for its success.7 According to the Civil-Military Coordination Officer Handbook, civil-military dialogue presupposes two main aspects: labor division and coordination between military and non-military (civil) components of the operation.8 Labor division Operational tasks include three categories: political, civic and military. Civic and political tasks are often combined together making task classification based on military or non-military nature. Non-military tasks are aimed at analyzing the dynamics of conflict, control of the conflict itself, and designing strategies of conflict resolution by peaceful means.9 These tasks include but are not limited to collecting data about warring parties, contacting competitors at all the stages of the conflict, diplomatic efforts,

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UN official web-page. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. Civil-Military Coordination Officer Handbook. Version E 1.0 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007-2008), p.12. Available at: <http:ochaonline.un.org/Ocha> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. Civil-Military Coordination Officer Handbook. Version E 1.0 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007-2008), p.12. Available at: <http:ochaonline.un.org/Ocha> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, (UN DPKO, December 2003), pp.23. Available at:http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/library/Handbook%20on%20UN%20P KOs.pdf [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 3
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demobilization efforts, disarmament, and reintegration, and providing for negotiations and the peace-building process.10 What is more, these actions presuppose assistance by local populations in the reconstruction of social, legal and political institutions as well as in support of democratic order and economic development.11 Military tasks, according to the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, include a wide variety of activities ranging from preventive deployment, restoration and maintenance, law and order, ending by enforcement of sanctions, security sector reform and training.12 It should be remembered that military actions, though playing a significant role during the operation, become effective only if they are integrated into the single operational strategy.13 Civil-military coordination Coordination between civil and military components has two levels: coordination between civil and military actors (or leading organizations) and internal coordination within each individual actor. Coordination between leading organizations can be either weak or strong. Successful coordination can be realized by the creation of special divisions within the operation hierarchy. One such body, the Joint Planning Cell, had a significant role in Kosovo, coordinating actions of The Mission of Transitional Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and International Peacekeeping Force (KFOR). It

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Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, 2003, op.cit. P. 23. Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, 2003, op.cit. P.35. Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, 2003, op.cit. P. 63.
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Deployment of the Army, (December 2006), par. 2-1. Cited at: Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, And Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report, June 8, 2010), p. 6. Available at the web-site of federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. 4
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contributed to well-balanced decision-making by all participating elements of the mission. Coordination within the civil and military components, on the one hand, presupposes partnership with special funds, agencies and donors. On the other hand it includes cooperation of interdivisional mechanisms on the battlefield. The latter is mainly achieved by the actions of General Secretary Special Representatives in the field.14 Analysis: UN-NATO Civil-Military Dialogue Coordination within and between UN and NATO ISAF15official representatives note that leadership, control and coordination within the NATO military forces are not very efficient.16 One of the key problems is coordination between the ISAF leadership and Regional Commands. Particularly for the South Regional Command, the largest part of the military contingent is represented by Great Britain, Canada and the Netherlands. Each of these states is fond of interaction with Kabul ministries in terms of providing assistance to the province where its troops are

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Civil-Military Coordination Officer Handbook, op.cit. P. 12. See also: Dr. Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications and Responses, Center on International Cooperation, NYU. Available at: <http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UNDocuments/evolvingmodels.pdf >[Accessed: March 12, 2011]. ISAF International Security Assistance Force, NATO-led international military contingent. Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2010), pp. 18-19. Available at the web-site of federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. 5
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deployed. Consequently South Regional Command has no single strategy, and is conducting four different programs aimed at each province separately.17 Another problem of coordination within NATO is information exchange between NATO members and allies. According to the NATO leaders located in Kabul Headquarters, the general situation in the country is clearer in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, rather than in the north or west.18 Information exchange problems can occur for several reasons. For instance, contributing states are not eager to share information which can seem especially or uniquely important for them. Another reason can be a language barrier or the use of different communication channels (NATO and national ones). The consequence of information exchange shortcomings is a more challenging collection of data about activities of all the twenty-six Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Afghanistan. This creates significant challenges for strategically effective resource distribution by NATO and Afghan Government.19 With regards to coordination within the UN, various agencies are engaged in Afghanistan. Starting from January 2009, activity of the UN Office for the Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs has been renewed in Afghanistan.20 Its actions are aimed at coordination, promotion and support of humanitarian assistance. What is more, the UN

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Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2010), pp. 18-19. Available at the web-site of federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2010), pp. 18-19. Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2010), pp. 18-19. Afghanistan Civil Coordination- Pilot Session- 03 United Nations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan/CivilMilitaryCoordination/tabid/5356/language/enUS/Default.aspx> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. 6
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mission is partnering a wide variety of different programs and agencies including The World Health Organization, The World Food Program, The World Bank, UN Children Fund and many others.21 In December 2010, due to representatives of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the first border check-point was created on the Afghan-Pakistan border in the framework of a struggle with transnational organized crime and crossborder trafficking. It brought about a 50% reduction in the amount of opium and heroin exported (from 2.9 billion dollars to 1.4 billion).22 The UN Reconstruction Program in Afghanistan has thirty-two directions. These include but are not limited to healthcare, education, and food service. In order to stimulate well-balanced coordination between all the UN agencies engaged in the operation the UN Command Fund was established for mobilization of all the resources available and for more effective assistance distribution.23 The significance of UN-NATO cooperation is emphasized by the position of both UN and NATO.24 Their partnership is fixed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1402 (2002) which was the one to authorize UNAMA. UN actions are aimed at support and implementation of Governmental decisions and assistance in joint decision-making by

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UN Security Council Secretary-Generals Report S/2011/120, (The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security), March 9, 2011. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.tabid=1746 > [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. UN Security Council Secretary-Generals Report S/2011/120, (The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security), March 9, 2011.Op.cit UN Development Assistance Framework, 2010-2013, P.11. NATOs role in Afghanistan, NATO official web-site: Available at:<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 7
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Government and ISAF forces.25 NATOs principle idea is the unity of the reconstruction process and security providing.26 This reflects the intention of NATO to go hand-inhand with the UNs mission. Their joint efforts are focused and successfully applied to two purposes: providing security of local populations and demining activities.27 Communication between UN and NATO forces occurs through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. This body was established for common decision-making and planning processes in order to assist in the implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.28 UN and NATO representatives have on average about 10 meetings in a week.29 Joint efforts aimed at development of Afghanistan are the result of the three-sided partnership of UN, NATO and the Afghan Government.30

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UN Security Council Secretary-Generals Report S/2011/120, (The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security), March 9, 2011. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1746> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. ISAF`s Strategic Vision (Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan), 03.04.2008. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010, p.22. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/humanrights/MarchAnnualReport0Final.pdf> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. For detailed information see also: Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010, P.22. Todays Afghan Headlines, UNAMA news. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. Matthew D. Brady, The 766th Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell Leads the Way Into Afghanistan, Engineer, (January-April 2009), p.43. Available at: <http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/PDFsforJan-Apr2009/Brady.pdf > [Accessed: April 09, 2011].
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Joint coordination and monitoring board (JCMB), Terms of Reference, Available at: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/JCMB_TOR_-_English.pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. Tackling Security Challenges - An overview of ISAFs Mission, Afghanistan Reconstruction Summit Briefing, Istanbul, Turkey, January 20-21, 2010. P.104. Available at: 8
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Given that the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan is integrated, it should have a single chain of command coordinating the actions of the UN and its allies.31 In practice the missions leadership has separate command. ISAF is managed by the NATO North Atlantic Council and the United States Armed Forces while the UN mission is under the authority of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.32 In spite of this absence of a single chain of command, the partnership of the UN and NATO still has positive results. As was said their joint activity was effectively conducted in two key directions equally important for military actions and the peace process - securing of local population and demining activities. In addition to that, since both are members of the Joint Coordination Board, representatives of both the UN and NATO participate in the decision-making process regarding the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Labor division between UN and NATO UN activity in Afghanistan is mainly concentrated on social activities such as supporting the current democratic government and implementing social programs covering such areas as education, healthcare, reconstruction and development. The UN
<http://www.investmentsummits.com/summit/ars/pdfs/day_1/Panel_2_ISAF.pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011].

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NATOs role in Afghanistan, NATO official web-site: Available at: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]; See also: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan. Available at: <http://www.aco.nato.int/page20844847.aspx> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. Dr. Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications and Responses (External Study of Feryal Cherif Center on International Cooperation, NYU). p.16. UN official web-page. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748 > [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 9
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is focusing on support of humanitarian aid delivery, coordination of activities aimed at human rights protection and governance of law and order throughout the country. Key tasks of the UN mandate are: conflict resolution and prevention, support of national reconciliation, political consulting, control and investigation of human rights abuses, communication with Afghan Government, fair and representative political parties, initiative groups, representatives of central, regional and local authorities and conducting the Good Offices Mission to support and strengthen the peace process in Afghanistan.33 NATO was initially supposed to provide security around Kabul and to improve the National Security Forces of Afghanistan.34 Later, under authorization of the UN Security Council, NATOs mandate was expanded and included UN functions, such as support of local government and reconstruction and development. The total list of NATO tasks in Afghanistan includes providing security throughout the country, reconstruction and development, humanitarian aid delivery, support of government and strengthening of local political institutions for maintaining law and order within the country. Tasks that overlap between UN and NATO seem to make labor division between them very vague and creates great challenges for the achievement of their own tasks in Afghanistan. Goals achieved?
33 UN official web-site. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/> [Accessed: March 12, 2011].

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ISAF official web-site; UN official web-page. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 10
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The UNs key aim is stabilization and reconstruction within Afghanistan. Looking at the political, social and economic situation during the last decade, hardly any progress has been achieved. The current democratic government in the country is not able to control territory beyond the capital. Even though the presidential elections of 2009 were proclaimed by the UN as free and fair35, it is hard to pretend that Khamid Kharzai is a popular or effective figure. The socio-economic situation, although full of positive tendencies in the cases examined, is not much more promising altogether.36 The table below reflects these indications:
1 Table1: Indicators of socio-economic growth in Afghanistan, 2010-2011. Indicators Annual GDP growth, (%) Numbers Tendency Increase
3.4 (2008); 22.5 (2009); 8.9 (2010); 6.8 (2011**) [Global Finance, 2011] 3.4 (2008); 22.5 (2009); 8.9 (2010); [CIA, 2011] 15.1 (2004); 8.8 (2005); 16. (2006); 8.2 (2007); 12.1 (2008); 3.4 (2009*); 9.0 (2010*) [Brookings Institute, September, 2010]; 14.5 (2005); 11.2 (2006); -0.2 (2007); 2.3 (2008); 40.8 (2009) [World Bank, March 2011]

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UN Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009). Available at: <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/277/12/PDF/N0927712.pdf> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. Pickering, Jeffrey and Kisangani, Emizet F. 2006.Political, Economic and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention. Political Research Quarterly (September): 367. 11
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Literacy level of population,(%)
28.1 (2011) [CIA, 2011] 28 (2010) [Brookings Institute, September, 2010];
Practically no change
Infant mortality rate (number of
149.2 (2011) [CIA, 2011] 208 (2005); 206 (2006); 204(2007);
Decrease
deaths/ 1000 201(2008);199(2009) [World Bank, 2011] fertilities) Average life expectancy, (years) 43(2005); 43(2006); 44(2007); 44(2008); [World Bank, 2011] Slight increase
45.02 (2011) [CIA, 2011]
Source: Brookings Institute Report. September 20, 2010; Global Finance, April 2011; Index Mundi Country Profile, March 2011; Afghanistan Country Profile, The World Fact book, CIA, March 2011; The World Bank's Open Data Catalog, April 2011.37

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Livingston I. S., Messera H. L., O'Hanlon M. Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post- 9/11 Afghanistan (Brookings Institute Report, September 20, 2010). Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20100920.p df> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. Afghanistan Country Report, Global Finance, Vol.25, No.4 (April 2011).Available at: <http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/334-afghanistan-gdp-countryreport.html#axzz1J6rvkEoO> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. Afghanistan Literacy, Index Mundi Country Profile, March 2011. Available at: <http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/literacy.html> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. Afghanistan Country Profile, The World Fact book, CIA, March 2011. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. The World Bank's Open Data Catalog, April 2011.Different indexes available at: Mortality rate:< http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>; Life expectancy:<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>; GDP growth 12
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As can be seen from the table, the economic situation is hardly going better in Afghanistan. What is more, such problems as corruption and drug-trafficking are extremely urgent in the country. According to Transparency International, Afghanistan is the third most corrupted country in the world.38 Moreover, reports of the Congressional Research Service emphasize corruption on all the levels of the government.39 In addition to this, according to the Brookings Institute, Afghanistan is the worlds second weakest country.40 The ongoing war in Afghanistan does not give any possibility to make the stable ground necessary for the peace process or fair conditions for socio-economic growth. Socioeconomic growth is not possible in the situation of ongoing conflict in the country. To support the UN in its goals, NATOs mission in Afghanistan is trying to strengthen the National Afghan Forces which is the key mechanism for government to maintain security situation in the country. The table below reflects dynamics of Afghan Army military capabilities:
annual:<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>. [Accessed: April 10, 2011].

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Corruption Index 2010 from Transparency International, Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/oct/26/corruption-index-2010-transparencyinternational>[Accessed: April 4, 2011]. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, (Congressional Research Service Report, January 21, 2011), p.2. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155581.pdf> [Accessed: April 4, 2011] Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post- 9/11 Afghanistan, (Brookings Institute Report, 2009). Op. Cit. 13
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2 Table 2: Afghan Army military capabilities, 2009-2011.
Number of battalions, able to conduct military actions independently with support of ISAF under ISAF leadership Total number of battalions Number of troops
December June 2010 2009 28 30 30 88 97,000 21 48 42 101 119,388
January Tendency 2011 2 52 80 178 152,000 Decrease Increase Increase Increase Increase
Source: NATO Factsheets, Facts and Figures: Afghan National Army, Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium. January 2011, June 2010, December 2009. NATO Factsheets, Facts and Figures: Afghan National Army, Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium. January 2011, June 2010, December 2009.41
According to the numbers in the table, the total number of troops has increased significantly during the last year, whereas the number of troops able to function independently decreased dramatically. For more precise conclusions, following calculations are below:

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Factsheet for January 2011 available at: <http://www.aco.nato.int/page265721841.aspx> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. Factsheet for June 2010 available at: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheetsjune/June202010-Fact20Sheet20ANA.pdf> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. Factsheet for December 2009 cited at: Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report, June 8, 2010), p.38. Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114344> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. 14
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Percent of the Afghan Army able to conduct military actions independently can be calculated as the following: December 2009: 28x100/88 = 31.8% January 2011: 2x100/178 = 1.1% This means that during the year 2010 the independent military capabilities of the Afghan Army decreased by 30%. In that same time the real number of troops increased by 63.8%. The most significant conclusion of these calculations is that in spite of dramatic increase in quantity (63.8%), quality, that is to say, military capabilities of the Afghan Army, decreased sharply (31.8%). Currently the National Afghan Army is practically unable to conduct military actions independently (except 1.1% of troops). These results contradict the core aspiration of NATO to improve the quality of the National Afghan Army: Quantity is important, but quality is imperative.42 Nevertheless, according to the UNs Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army is too weak to provide security in the country.43 Yet NATO still claims the Afghan Army to be the most-improved body of the Afghan National Security Forces.44 Conclusion

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Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Available at: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/0423-11_ANSF_LR_en(1).pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. Today s Afghan Headlines, Featured News. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1783&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=1308 1> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report, June 8, 2010), p.38. 15
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As the analysis has shown, both the UN and NATO fail to achieve their key goals to improve the internal situation in Afghanistan and strengthen the National Afghan Army. There cannot be ground for socio-economic development without providing security in the country. Moreover, the government cannot maintain control, law and order throughout the country without reliable security forces. Despite this inability to achieve its core goal, NATO claims to overlap the UNs mandate and substitute it in other fields. Conceptually, civil-military dialogue is the crucial technical condition for the effectiveness of a military operation. Coordination between the UN and NATO is being put into practice successfully in some important by limited ways, but as to labor division, because of NATO-UN tasks overlapping none of them are able to reach success in their activity: the socio-economic climate is very weak, the political situation is fragile, and the National Army cannot be relied on. However, the problem is that until the National Afghan Army is able to function independent from the ISAF, the necessity of international presence in Afghanistan remains urgent. What is more important, it is hard to judge when the operation can finally be stopped. Works cited Literature:
1) Afghanistan Civil Coordination- Pilot Session- 03 United Nations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Available at:<http://ochaonline.un.org/afghanistan/CivilMilitaryCoordination/tabid/5356/language /en-US/Default.aspx> [Accessed: March 19, 2011].
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2) Civil-Military Coordination Officer Handbook. Version E 1.0 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007-2008), p.12. Available at:<http:ochaonline.un.org/Ocha> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 3) Dr. Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications and Responses, Center on International Cooperation, NYU. Available at:<http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/UNDocuments/evolvingmodels. pdf >[Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 4) Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Deployment of the Army, (December 2006), par. 2-1. Cited at: Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, And Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report, June 8, 2010), p. 6. Available at the web-site of federation of American Scientists: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> [Accessed:
March 19, 2011]. 5) Goodhand, Jonathan. 2002. Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly (October): 854. 6) Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, (UN DPKO, December 2003), pp.23. Available
at:<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/library/Handbook%20on%20 UN%20PKOs.pdf > [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 7) Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, (Congressional Research Service Report, January 21, 2011), p.2. Available at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155581.pdf> [Accessed: April 4, 2011]. 8) Matthew D. Brady. 2009. The 766th Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell Leads the Way Into Afghanistan. Engineer (January-April): p.43. Available
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at:<http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/PDFsforJan-Apr2009/Brady.pdf > [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. 9) Pickering, Jeffrey and Kisangani, Emizet F. 2006.Political, Economic and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention. Political Research Quarterly (September): 367. 10) Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2010), pp. 18-19. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> [Accessed: March 19, 2011]. 11) Suhrke, Astri. 2007.Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly, p. 1307. 12) Thier, J. Alexander. 2006. Afghanistan. In Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William J. Durch. Washington, DC: United states Institute for Peace. Documents and reports: 13) Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Available at: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/042311_ANSF_LR_en(1).pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. 14) Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010, p.22. Available at:<http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/humanrights/MarchAnnualReport0Fina l.pdf> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. For detailed information see also: 15) Afghanistan Country Profile, The World Fact book, CIA, March 2011. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. 18
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16) Afghanistan Country Report. 2011. Global Finance, (April). Available at: <http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/334-afghanistan-gdp-countryreport.html#axzz1J6rvkEoO> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. 17) Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post- 9/11 Afghanistan, (Brookings Institute Report, 2009). Op. Cit. 18) Afghanistan Literacy, Index Mundi Country Profile, March 2011. Available at: <http://www.indexmundi.com/afghanistan/literacy.html> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. 19) Corruption Index 2010 from Transparency International, Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/oct/26/corruption-index-2010transparency-international>[Accessed: April 4, 2011]. 20) Factsheet for December 2009 cited at: Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service Report, June 8, 2010), p.38. Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9cbe1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114344> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. 21) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan. Available at:<http://www.aco.nato.int/page20844847.aspx> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. 22) ISAF official web-site; UN official web-page. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 23) ISAF`s Strategic Vision (Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan), 03.04.2008. Available at:<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011].
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24) Joint coordination and monitoring board (JCMB), Terms of Reference, Available at:<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/JCMB_TOR_-_English.pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. 25) Livingston I. S., Messera H. L., O'Hanlon M. Afghanistan Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post- 9/11 Afghanistan (Brookings Institute Report, September 20, 2010). Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20100 920.pdf> [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. 26) NATOs role in Afghanistan, NATO official web-site: Available at:<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 27) NATOs role in Afghanistan, NATO official web-site: Available at:<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 28) Tackling Security Challenges - An overview of ISAFs Mission, Afghanistan Reconstruction Summit Briefing, Istanbul, Turkey, January 20-21, 2010. P.104. Available at:<http://www.investmentsummits.com/summit/ars/pdfs/day_1/Panel_2_ISAF.pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011]. 29) The World Bank's Open Data Catalog, April 2011.Different indexes available at:<http://data.worldbank.org/>. [Accessed: April 10, 2011]. 30) Today s Afghan Headlines, Featured News. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1783&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID =13081> [Accessed: April 09, 2011]. 31) UN Development Assistance Framework, 2010-2013. 32) UN official web-page. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748 > [Accessed: March 12, 2011].
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33) UN Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009). Available at: <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/277/12/PDF/N0927712.pdf> [Accessed: March 12, 2011]. 34) UN Security Council Secretary-Generals Report S/2011/120, (The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security), March 9, 2011. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.tabid=1746 > [Accessed: March 19, 2011].
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1

<http://www.investmentsummits.com/summit/ars/pdfs/day_1/Panel_2_ISAF.pdf> [Accessed: May 15, 2011].

33 UN official web-site. Available at: <http://unama.unmissions.org/default.aspx?/> [Accessed: March 12, 2011].

Literacy level of population,(%)

28.1 (2011) [CIA, 2011] 28 (2010) [Brookings Institute, September, 2010];

Infant mortality rate (number of

149.2 (2011) [CIA, 2011] 208 (2005); 206 (2006); 204(2007);

45.02 (2011) [CIA, 2011]

annual:<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>. [Accessed: April 10, 2011].

2 Table 2: Afghan Army military capabilities, 2009-2011.

December June 2010 2009 28 30 30 88 97,000 21 48 42 101 119,388

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