_ TO 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 TECHNICAL MANUAL ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION HAZARDS 25 MAY 1989 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT - Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only for administrative or ."~ ‘operational use, 19 January 1989. Other requests for this document shall be referred to Sacramento ALCMMEDTD, McClellan AFB, CA 956525609. HANDLING AND DESTRUCTION NOTICE - Handle in compliance with distribution statement and destroy by any ‘method that will provent disclosure of the contents or reconstruction of the document. PUBLISHED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 15 OCTOBER 1981 CHANGE 5 - 19 JANUARY 1989 Pea > .ZO 312-10-4 [NBER LATEST CHUNGED PAGES. DESTROY SUPERSEDED PAGES, LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES OTE: enim tanec ne arm avr ne ete a aeinsemms byron gharch [Dates of issue tor original and changed pages af riginal. ..0. . . .1S October 1981 Change. . . . 4. . .11 December 1987 ange. |. . 1... .. 1 March 1983 Change. . . . 5. . . 19 January 1989 hange. +2... . .15 March 1985 ange... . 3... - 27 August 1985 [Total number of pages in this manual is162 consisting of the following: Page Change Page Change Page ‘Change No. “No NO No No “No Mele... 2. 5 SSD. ° AL. Ll lll. 3 54 Blank © ° ee: ses see ° ie 0 57-58. . a aii | ee og str ° av. 0 5-12 Blank. - ° v to rn) : 0 63K. ee 2 Dilla 63s eal: ° Pil 2 64 2 : 3 643 OMA. ° ce es 2 3 6-46 - 6-47 ° a (e-0a) 5 3 6-49" - 6-62 ° 0 ALAR 4 boon Oa 4 56 3 Ard Blank Added 4 30 Bl. ° 2 Be : 2 O85 rs en 3 2 Ga ° 2 Gs. 3 5 0 C-6 Blank 3 : 3 DL - 0-34. ° ° ° ° ° ° A Change 5 USAF(AE) TO 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) PM 11-490-30 TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph wi oo d6oo0uGCodG0dsuuGDd0uG500 ix CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1-1 Radiation Hazards . . ee 14 1-2 Hazards Control Responsibilities ©... se ee ee eee 14 CHAPTER 2 EMRH CONTROL 1 General we ee 2 Local EMRH Control Program... 3 Program Implementation. . 2... 4 Support Activities and Responsi Operating Instruction(Ol). 2... ee -6 Required Attachment to the Operating Instruction. 1 CEFR Documentation of Radiation Hazards... CHAPTER 3 RF HAZARDS SECTION I - PERSONNEL HAZARDS 3-1 Genesee ee ee 3-2 Absorption of Radio Frequency Radiation 3-3 Biological Effects... . 2... +. 3-4 Opthalmological Considerations. . . 3-5 : 3-6 Indirect Biological Effects... Electromagnetic Pulse... . . SECTION Il - FUEL HAZARDS General se ee ee ee tee eee Factors Necessary for Combustion»... 2. tee Ignition of Fuel by Radiated RF Energy... 2... ee ee Change 4 i(AF)T O 312Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-90-30 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) ~ Paragraph Page SECTION Il - FUEL HAZARDS (Continued) 3-10 Fuel Hazard Criterion. 2. eee ee ee 3-5, 3-11 Fuel Hazard Prevention... ee ee et eee es 3-6 3-12 Safety Measures ©. 1 ee ee ee ee 3-6 SECTION III - ELECTROEXPLOSIVE DEVICE (EED) HAZARDS 3-13 General. oe ee et ee te ee eee ee 3-9 3-14 Typical Electric Squib. 6... ee ee ee eee 39 3-15 Piring Current... ee ee ee ee ees 3-9 . 3-16 Crue cenuugauddddddesoogaggad —t) 3-17 RF Ignition of Squibs . . 5 : Be eee ees 3211 3-18 EED Hazard Criterion and Safety Precautions...) 1... + 342 CHAPTER 4 X-RAY HAZARDS : 41 A 441 4-2 Electromagnetic Spectrum. ee ee 41 4-3 Properties of X-Rays see ee 4-1 4-4 High-Voltage Electron Tubes as a Source of X-Radiation. » 1... 4-2 Klystron. se ee ee tee ee ee 4-2 Thyratrons . Gocso0aq6 Boe 44 Magnetrons, Traveling-Wave Tubes and Other. |) 11... 44 45 Detection of X-Radiation ..... ee... eee 4-4 4-6 Units of Measurement. ©. 4-5 41 Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation . . ee eee 46 Generals se ee ee ee ee Oe es 46 Symptoms of Overexposure... See 4-6 4-8 Maximum Permissible Dose... ee ee 4-1 4-9 X-Ray Protection. ©... ee 4-8Paragraph 5-8 5-9 (AF) TO 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) CHAPTER 5 ASSOCIATED HAZARDS SECTION I - INFRARED HAZARDS Infrared Spectrum. © ee ee Passive and Active Infrared Systems... ee ee ee Radiation Hazards to Personnel... 0. 0s ee ee eee SECTION Il - LASER HAZARDS. General... ee wee 5 Safety Precautions © 2... ee ee 5+ SECTION Ill - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HAZARDS General. see ee ee ‘Types of Ionizing Radiation. . . Alpha Rays... 2... Beta Rays... ..... Gamma Rays... 1... Internal Exposure Hazard»... : Generale mcr cis ee = Intake of Radioactive Material»... . 5. Inhalation... . 2. es Bg cero 5 hreithoogbdGq5000dp5005000 Absorption. eee i Internal Emitters. se ee ee Radioactive Electron Tubes and Spark Gaps Materials Used in Tubes»... . Radioactive Tube Identification... . Handling and Disposition... 6... Lhdbdodbduabadad SECTION IV - TOXICITY HAZARDS General... see ee ee Use of Gaseous Dielectric for Waveguides ©... 58 Recommended Safety Precautions... 2... s eee ee ees Sel0 Change 1 iii(AF) T.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Paragraph CHAPTER 6 RF POWER DENSITY/HAZARD DISTANCE SECTION I - RF PROPAGATION 6-1 General ss. vce eee es 6-2 Propagation of Electromagnetic Energy Wave Theory. ss ee ee ee ee Induction and Radiation Fields . . . Electric and Magnetic Fields Polarization... .. + Field Intensity... Transmission in Free Space . 6-3 ‘Transmission of RF Energy. . General... ee Ground-Wave Propagation . . Direct-Wave Component. . . Ground-Reflected Component Surface-Wave Component . . ‘Troposopherie-Wave Component The lonosphere.. - 1. es Sky-Wave Propagation... 2. . Directed Radiation... . . Power Densities in a Typical Radar System The Fresnel Region, or Near Field. . . The Fraunhofer Zone, or Far Fiek Power Level on the Main Beam Axi Power Level off the Main Beam Axis Reflection, Refraction and Scattering Absorption of RF Energy... . . Wood Frame Building... . . Cinder-Block Wall. sw. ss Microwave Absorbent Material Copper Wire Screen... . ‘Transmission Through Waveguides . . Standing Waves... ee ee ee Directional Antennas... . 2... Two-Element Arrays... ees Broadside Array ss... we ‘Transmission from Microwave Antenné Waveguide Antennas... . . . « Electromagnetic Horns... . Lenses, oe vee ee ee ene Pencil-Beam Antennas... . Fanned-Beam Antennas... . . iv E PESSPPPSPAOAEHPSSAMPDDSAADEDODOADParagraph TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) SECTION I - RF PROPAGATION (Continued) Shaped-Beam Antennas . . . Cylindrical Reflector Antennas Spherical Reflector Antennas. Phased Array Antennas . . . (AF) T.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 2 2 2 -3 SECTION Il - CALCULATING POWER DENSITY AND HAZARD DISTANCE General. 20. ee ee Pulse System Characteristics. . Far-Field Equation... .. Example of Far-Field Caleulations Near-Field Gain Reduction. . . Near-Field Gain Reduction for Elliptical or” Rectangular Aperture Antennas... . . . « Sample Calculations of Illumination Taper, On-Axis Power Density and Off-Axis Power Density. . . « Mlumination Taper se ee ee On-Axis Power Density 2. eee ee Off-Axis Power Density... ee ee Near-Field Gain Reduction for Circular Aperture Ante Sample Calculations of Illumination Taper, On-Axis Power Density and Off-Axis Power Density. . . Mlumination Taper... ee ee ee On-Axis Power Density 2... ee eee Off-Axis Power Density... ee ee APPENDIX A OPERATING INSTRUCTION, RADIATION HAZARD CONTROL (EXAMPLE). APPENDIX B AFCC RF RADIATION HAZARD STUDY GUIDE APPENDIX C APPENDIX D TABLES, GRAPHS, AND NOMOGRAMS . . . . ent AFCC RF RADIATION HAZARD SURVEY GUIDE. 6-31 6-31 6-32 6-34 6-35 we 685 5-3" 4 se 643 + 6-43 6-46 Ad Bl ca Dt Change 3 v(AF) 7.0. 312Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS X-Radiation to Other Electromagnetic Radiations. . . 4-2 4-3 X-Radiation Distribution for Typical Hydrogen Thyratron. . 5-1 Portion of Electromagnetic Spectrum, Showing Relationship X-Radiation Distribution for Typical High-Power Klystron . . 1 Typical Electric Squib. 0. ee ee ee 1 Portion of Electromagnetic Spectrum, Showing Relationship of of Infrared Radiation to Other Electromagnetic Radiations . . 6-1 Portion of Electromagnetic Spectrum, Showing Relationship of Microwave Radiations to Other Electromagnetic Radiations 6-2 Creation of Electric and Magnetic Fields About a Conductor Carrying an Electric Current... +... 20 eee 6-3 Change in Intensity of Radiated Energy with Distance in Free Space Over a Given Area. 2. - eee eee 6-4 Power Densities in a Typical Radar System. . 6-5 Field Intensity Distribution Across an Antenna 8-6 Distribution of Energy in Transmitted Beam . 6-7 6-8 Pulse Power Versus Time, Characteristics . . . Reetangular or Elliptical Antenna Axes and Radiated Beamwidths ... 2. eee ee ee eee 6-9 Typical Antenna Vertical Radiation Pattern for Radar Sets AN/FPS-8 and AN/MPS-11. 2 6 es ee ee ee ee ee 6-10 _Near-Field Gain Reduction of Reetangular Aperture with Separable Illumination. . . . . Se ee ee ee 6-11 Illustration of Suggested Radiation Hazard Calculation Table . 6-12 Fresnel Region Patterns for Rectangular Aperture with Uniform Mlumination . 6. ee ee ee ee ee ee 6-13 _ Fresnel Region Patterns for Rectangular Aperture with Cosine Dlumination . 1 6 6 ee ee ee ee 6-14 Fresnel Region Patterns for Rectangular Aperture with Cosine-Squared Hlumination . .... eee ee ee ee 6-15 Fresnel Region Patterns for Rectangular Aperture with Cosine-Cubed Illumination... - + ee ee ee ee ee 6-16 Fresnel Region Patterns for Rectangular Aperture with Cosine-Fourth Mlumination. . 22... ee ee ee eee 6-17 Power Density Dispersion from @ Cireular Aperture Antenna with Uniform Mlumination (k=0to1) .. 2... eee eee 6-18 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with Uniform Mumination (K=1to2) .-. 2 ee ee ee eee 6-19 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-r?) Mumination = 0t01) 2. ee ee 6-20 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-19) Mlumination ®@=1t02) oe ee ee 6-21 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-r)tumination (@=0toD 6. ee ee eee vi 3-10 6-14 6-16 6-17 6-33 6-36 6-39 6-40 6-49 6-50 6-51 6-52 6-53 6-54 6-55 6-56 6-57 6-58 6-59ure 6-22 6-23 6-24 (AF) T.O. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-r)? tumination = 110.2) ee eee eee ee ee ee 660 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-2)? tilumination 2010 eee eee ee ee eee 66 Power Density Dispersion from a Circular Aperture Antenna with (1-r?)? tMlumination = 1t0 2). eee ee ee ee 662 LIST OF TABLES Page Hazards Support Activities. 6 se ee eee ee 25 Maximum Permissible Exposure Levels (PELs) for Human Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation (Averaged over any Six-Minute Period). 00s ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 88 ‘Symptoms and Effects Resulting from Acute Whole-Body Exposure to Radiation. 6. ve eee ee te ee eee 47 Beamwidths, Gain Factors and Side lobes of Rectangular and Elliptical Antennas with Various Illuminations... 2 6... 66+) 6-19 Beamwidths, Gain Factors and Side lobes of Circular Antennas with Various Iuminations . see eee ee ee ee ee 6D Gain Factors and Axial Illuminations for Magnitudes of @L/A ..-... 6-36 Gain Factors and Circular Aperture Illuminations for Magnitudes of O EMP medical surveillance program has not demonstrated that human exposure to EMP results in any adverse effects. All available data indicates that no acute or chronic biological effects can be assigned to EMP exposure. Tentative limits are established in AFOSH Standard 161-9 as a precautionary measure. —_ Table 3-1. Maximum Permissible Exposure Levels (PELs) for Human Exposure ‘to Radio Frequency Radiation (Averaged over any Six-Minute Period) Frequency PEL for Average PEL for Small From To Size Adult Size Human (MHz) (MHz) (mW/cm2) (mW/cm2) 01 3 100 100 3 30 900/42 900/22 30 100 1 1 100 300 4/100 1 300 1000 4/100 1/300 1000 1500 10 £/300 ~~ 1500 300000 10 5 son pS 1. All exposures must be limited to a maximum (peak) electric field intensity of 100 kilovolts per meter (kV/m). 2. In the equations for PELs, "" is the operating frequency of the emitter in megahertz. 3, Use the PELs under the heading ‘Average Size Adult’ for Air Force workers and workplaces. Use the more restrictive PELs under the heading ‘Small Size Human’ when assessing potential hazards in areas where the public has unrestricted access. 4, Asmall size human is an individual less than 55 inches tall. 5. When exposure is to multiple-frequency radiation, the sum of the fractions of the a PELs at the separate frequencies must not exceed unity. 6. When an rf emitter operates over a band of frequencies in which the PEL varies such as between 3 and 30 MHz, the lowest PEL shall apply. Change 2, 3-3/(3-4 Blank)o™ (AF) T.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 SECTION Il - FUEL HAZARDS 3-7. GENERAL. Fuel vapors ean be ignited by an arc induced by a strong rf field: therefore, the potential hazard of any fuel handling operation near an rf source must be addressed. The existance and extent of a fuel hazard is determined by comparing the actual rf energy level to the safety criteria. Precautionary measures must be taken to preclude any fuel handling within the area that has been determined hazardous. 3-8. FACTORS NECESSARY FOR COMBUSTION. In order for fuel vapor to be ignited by a spark, the following conditions are necessary: a, The presence of a fuel vapor-air mixture which is between the upper and lower limits of flammability. b. A spark of sufficient energy across a gap having a certain minimum spacing called the “minimum quenching distance." 3-9, IGNITION OF FUEL BY RADIATED RF ENERGY. a. Rf energy can induce currents into any metal object. The amount of current and thus the strength of a spark across a gap between two conductors depends on both the field intensity of the rf energy and how well the conductors act as a “receiving antenna." Many parts of an aireraft, refueling vehicle and/or the static grounding conductors can act as receiving antennas. ‘The induced current depends mainly on the conductor length, in relation to the wavelength of the rf energy and the orientation in the radiated field. It is not feasible to predict nor control these factors. The hazard criteria must then be based on the assumption that an ideal receiving antenna could be inadvertently created with the required spark gap. b. Personnel should be constantly alert to the fact that electronic transmitting equipment ean cause hazardous voltages to be induced in various fuel-handling equipments, metal structures, and aireraft which are in the same plane as the radiating source. For maximum safety, the recommended safe minimum separation distances for fuel handling operations, as obtained from published data should be observed at ail times. WARNING T.0, 00-25-172 provides safety guidance to control other hazards encountered in operating a transmitter near fuel. 3-10. FUEL HAZARD CRITERION, a. Areas in which the peak power density exceeds 5 watts/em™ (Refer to AFOSH Standard 127-38 for current criteria) shall be considered hazardous areas for refueling operations regardless of the souree of rf energy. Hazards could result from the installation of higher-powered equipment at operational facilities that were previously considered safe. They could also arise when a mobile version of a radar set is sited near refueling facilities, or when airborne radar equipment is energized during ground checks in proximity to refueling operations. Moreover, the use of radar sets equipped with antennas to provide lower beam angles for approach and guidance control will also present problems not normally encountered with tower-mounted ground radar systems.(AF) T.0, 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 NOTE For a given transmitter the fuel hazard eriteron can be expressed in terms of average power. See paragraph 6-5. b. The use of theoretical calculations together with a consideration of antenna radiation patterns may be sufficient to determine fuel hazard areas. However, the final decision should be based on actual field measurements which take into consideration the possible existence of reflections. If measured data is not available, then theoretical "far field" calculations corrected for "near field" effect (as outlined in Chapter 6) should be used as an interim measure to determine hazardous areas in which a peak power density of 5 watts/em? can occur. 3-11, FUEL HAZARD PREVENTION. a, The location of facilities for personnel housing, fuel storage and handling, ordnance storage and handling (including missiles) with respect to nearby communications-electronic equipment and the associated rf propagation should be given extensive study during the site planning phase. Planned utilization of shielding offered by natural terrain features often eliminates the need for large tracts of expensive real estate which would otherwise be required in order to obtain satisfactory separation of facilities. The minimum separation distances can be less when the terrain features "shade" the facilities from direct illumination by the radar beam or when the facilities lie below the beam. b. Siting criteria for various types of communications-electronic facilities may be found by reference to Air Force T.0.'s 31-1-16 and 31R-10-3. 3-12, SAFETY MEASURES. Strict safety control measures must be observed when operating a radar capable of producing a fuel hazard to an adjacent or nearby fuel handling area. Each operational facility will require individual study to determine the operational procedures that should be used and the safety devices that should be installed to permit fuel handling in complete safety. Some typical situations and precautions ar a, Where sufficient seperation allows normal operation of the transmitter, some preeau- tions are still required, (1) Transmitter power shall not be increased above normal without considering the increased hazard distance. (2) The transmitter shall not be operated when the antenna is below normal tilt without considering the change in hazard area. (3) No refueling of lawn mowers, vehicles, ete, shall be permitted within the hazard area. b. Where restrictions on the transmitter operation (seetor blanking or limiting, antenna elevation limiting, reduced power, ete) are required this information must be in an Ol and all concerned shall be made aware of it. c. Where the transmitter is not allowed to operate during fuel handling and vice versa there must be a checklist type procedure and close coordination. 3-6 Change 3(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 4. Flight line operations require strict control to ensure that all fuel handling operations are completely safe. Both fuel handlers and transmitter operators must be aware of the restrictions. Co WARNING ‘There is @ special case where a fuel or weapon rf hazard can exist even though the rf levels are within the safe limits specified. This special case is for both the hand-held (1-5 watts) and mobile 5-50 watts) transceivers. The antennas on these equipments can generate hazardous situations when they are allowed to accidentally touch the aireraft, weapon, or support equipment. To avoid this hazard, transceivers should not be operated any closer than 10 feet from weapons, fuel vents, ete. Local procedures should be estab- lished to control the operation of transceivers in hazardous areas (Refer to T.0, 00-25-172 for information on approved explosion proof transceivers for use in refueling operations), and to provide guidance to personnel. The 10-foot distance is based on an average 6-foot individual with a walkie-talkie in his hand who might accidentally stumble. The recommended 10-foot separation distance could be tailored to fit local situations. 3-7/(3-8 Blank)(AF) 7.0, 312.-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 SECTION Ill - ELECTROEXPLOSIVE DEVICE (EED) HAZARDS 3-13. GENERAL. EEDs are small-size pyrotechnic or explosive devices designed to function by the passage of an electrie current through them which detonates an explosive change. Explosives derive their usefulness from the fact that they liberate chemical energy in the form of heat which raises the gaseous produets of decomposition to high pressure and temperature. ‘This provides systems which are capable of doing considerable quantities of work by expansion. Among such devices are: primers, detonators, squibs, blasting caps, igniters, initiators, dimple motors, ete. At present, and in the envisaged future, four types of EEDs are employed: Bridgewire (BW), Conducting Composition (CC), Exploding Bridgewire (EBW), and Carbon Bridge (CB). The basic EED is the squib, and this is the term which will be used throughout this section as a general term to include all types of EEDs, without regard to its technical application to ordnance items. 3-14, TYPICAL ELECTRIC SQUIB. The squib is the medium by which an electrical signal causes a flammable material to ignite. A typical electric squib is illustrated in figure 3-1. It is a simple device consisting of the flammable material in contact with an electrical tranducer. It comes in numerous shapes and sizes, but all consist of four main components: the electrical leads, a filament or bridge across the leads, the explosive material, and, the cylinder of metal in which these are enclosed. Generally, a heat-sensitive initiating bead located on the filament or between the ends of the two leadwires constitutes the bridge. The heat-sensitive bead is generally a matchhead composition of potassium chlorate, antimony sulfide, and dextrin. The designer of a system using such devices is bound by certain limitations. He must provide that the squib will not be activated prematurely or uninten- tionally, especially by stray or spurious currents. On the other hand, the system cannot be so stable that it will make intentional activation difficult, impossible, or lengthy. A recent tendeney has been to minimize the use of the term "squib" and to use "primer" instead, for the basie electroexplosive activating device. ‘The reason for this is that almost all EEDs contain some primer or booster charge. 3-15. FIRING CURRENT. a, The current sensitivity of the squib is related to the resistance (per unit length and cross-section) of the bridgewire, the voltage and the ignition temperature of the matchhead ‘composition ignition bead. These variables will differ even when squibs are of the same design and composition. The bridgewire is usually an alloy of two or more metals combined to produce the desired resistance and thermal characteristics. Metals commonly used for this purpose are nickel, chromium, iron, platinum, iridium, and copper. The resistance of a typical bridgewire designed for ordnance application may be only @ fraction of an ohm to several ohms. The resistance of the filament or bridge changes the electrical energy to heat, causing the heat-sensitive bead to ignite. The whole process takes milliseconds to complete. b. Another consideration is the characteristics of the ingredients chosen to form the ignition bead relative to the temperature at which ignition of the powder grains will occur. The thermal action of the resistance wire forming the bridgewire introduces @ time delay in the ignition process. In general, the time delay decreases as the firing current is increased above the minimum firing value. For example, if a firing current of 0.5 ampere is applied to a certain type of squib at an ambient temperature of 70°F, the time delay before an explosion occurs is approximately 27 microseconds, whereas the same squib at a firing current of 1.0 amperes has a time delay of only 9 microseconds. 3-9(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 Leo wines ISULATING nie case (_—— *sfeee vetion ' ‘eno eine _— scoster Said ite Figure 3-1. Typical Electric Squib. ¢. Values of minimum firing current may vary as much as +10 percent for a given type of squib. Also, a current which is below the minimum firing value may be passed through the bridgewire for several minutes before sufficient heat is developed to fire the ignition bead, if it fires at all. The highest amperage at which none of the squibs is activated is called the "no-fire" current; the lowest amperage which will energize all the squibs is the "all-fire” current. In practice, the current sensitivity of a squib is decreased by placing a "shunt" in parallel with the bridgewire between the external leg wire of the squib. ‘The shunt may merely consist of a piece of metal foil wrapped around bared sections of the leg wires. The addition of the shunt makes it necessary to use a higher firing current to detonate the squib. Also, since the shunt is in parallel with the bridgewire, the effects of static electricity are almost completely offset because static discharge currents are shunted around the bridgewire. However, the placement of the shunt in the leg wires of the firing cireuit may be critical with respect to the higher radio frequencies, therefore, the use of a shunt does not rule out the possibility that rf energy may fire the squib. 3-16. BASIC FIRING CIRCUIT. The basic firing circuit for a squib consists of.a firing switch in series with the voltage source used to supply the necessary current to the bridgewire. The firing cireuit ineludes all electrical circuits and components between the trigger circuit initiation power source and the electroexplosive element of the squib. It is the wiring of the external firing cireuit that presents the greatest problem with regard to a possible rf radiation hazard. To deny access of stray energy to squibs, and for a sound electroexplosive subsystem, the following is necessary: 3-10 —~ ~~(AF) 7.0. 312,-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 a. Firing cireuits should be isolated from other circuits and from each other, by means of individual shields. Individually shielded firing circuits may be routed together in a common secondary shield. b. Trigger-cireuit-firing shields should be grounded to the vehicle only at the initiator casing. The shield should have no discontinuities or gaps, and good electrical contact of the initiator case with the vehicle into which it is assembled should be insured. ©. Static discharge resistors may be connected in parallel across the firing circuit as close to the bridgewire as possible. Such a resistor provides a path of high resistance to firing-currents, through which any accumulation of stati charges can be dissipated. 4. Firing-cireuit wiring should be kept to a minimum. €. All conductors that connect the firing cireuit with other weapon components, should be shielded. f. Carefully designed and tested rf attenuating filter elements should be used to protect against nearby sources of rf energy, such as airborne radar beacons, telemetry transmitters, very high power ground radars, ete. Temperature rise of the filter due to dissipation of rf energy should be isolated from the squib. g. The firing-cireuit wiring should be twisted in order to maintain electrical balance and reduce induetion. h. The trigger circuit should be in a completely shielded case and located as close to the initiator as possible. i. The trigger-cireuit interface should be designed to preclude actuation by a false signal from internal or external stray electrical energy. Extreme care must be exercised on any electroexplosive subsystem that does not meet the criteria listed above. 3-17. RF IGNITION OF QU! a, Military and commercial electric squibs are susceptible to detonation by rf currents. The accidental firing of electroexplosive devices by rf energy is not a new problem. Commercial manufacturers of blasting caps have warned their customers for many years about the potential hazard involved in using electrically fired blasting caps in the vicinity of radio transmitters. b. The response of a squib to an rf energy field and the possibility of detonation depend on many factors, such as the average power output and frequency of radiation from communica- tions-electronie equipment in the vicinity, the polarization of the rf energy field with respect to the plane of the firing circuit leads, antenna propagation characteristics, physical separation distance between antenna and firing circuit lead wires, type and configuration of firing circuits (as they may affect resonance and govern induced currents), shielding of the squib, and the thermal time-constant of the bridgewire. ‘The typical squib tends to become less sensitive to rf energy as the frequency increases. ©. Sufficient rf energy can be induced to raise the temperature of the explosive in contact with the wire to a point where its physical conditions are modified. It is also possible to burn out the bridgewire with power insufficient to initiate the device. This phenomenon, known as "dudding” is generally restricted to the exploding bridgewire type device and is undesirable from a reliability standpoint. 3-11(AE) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 d. Because of the tactical uses and nature of ordnance items in which the squib is a necessary part, an accidental firing due to rf ignition could have serious consequences. Therefore, until such time as thorough investigation of the problem reveals otherwise, it must be assumed that a hazardous condition exists whenever a squib device is exposed to a high- intensity rf field. To insure against inadvertent activation, stray current checks must be made of circuits into which EDs are to be inserted, immediately before such installation. 3-18. EED HAZARD CRITERION AND SAFETY PRECAUTIONS. a, The safe power density for EEDs is dependent upon the exposure, frequency, and maximum no-fire sensitivity of the squib involved. Refer to AFR 127-100, Explosives Safety Standards, Chapter 6, for current criteria information. b, The following safety rules shall be followed when working with squibs: (1) Only qualified and authorized personnel shall handle, install, remove, or dispose of squibs. (2) Squibs shall not be stored, handled, or installed without proper electromagnetic shielding. Squibs shall be left in their containers until ready for installation. The criteria given in Chapter 6 of AFR 127-100 shall be used as a guide in maintaining safe distance between the squib and a transmitting antenna, (3) Squib leads shall be twisted, shielded wire, with the shield grounded. Leads shall not, be untwisted into a loop, resonant dipole, or other effective type of antenna configuration. (4) Firing leads shall be routed separately and isolated from electric power cables and rf transmission lines. During storage and handling, lead wires shall be shorted together. (5) Filament shunts, clips, or other short-circuiting devices in use, shall not be removed except for continuity testing or when the squib is ready for immediate installation. (6) Squibs shall be left in their containers until immediately before they are to be installed. They shall be stored in accordance with AFR 127-100. Only approved containers shall be used for transporting, storing, and testing these devices. (7)_ Immediately before installation, a stray current check shall be made of the circuit into which the squib is to be inserted. (8) Squib parts shall not be rubbed or polished. Lightning protection devices and grounding equipment should be used to eliminate static electricity. Outdoor activities shall be curtailed uring an electrical storm or when one is eminent. (9) Only preseribed testing devices and procedures shall be used on squibs or circuits in which they are installed. They should be tested only in designated areas by trained, authorized personnel using prescribed equipment. (10) Electrical connections shall not be made to a squib in a system using an indicator- type safe and arm unless the indicator shows the device is in the safe position. (11) Squibs should not be dropped, thrown about, or handled in any manner that will damage them or cause their accidental activation. They shall not be carried in pockets, tool boxes, or similar unprotected places. 3-12 ()(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 (12) Squibs shall be kept away from open flame, prolonged direct sunlight, and heating and electrical equipment. (13) Nonessential personnel shall not be permitted in areas where a squib is being installed. (14) Deteriorated or expended squids shall be disposed of as prescribed in applicable regulations and directives. There is a special case where a fuel or weapon rf hazard can exist even though the rf levels are within the safe limits specified. This special case is for both the hand-held (1-5 watts) and mobile (5-50 watts) transceivers. The antennas on these equipments can generate hazardous situations when they are allowed to accidentally touch the aircraft, weapon, or support equipment. To avoid this hazard, transceivers should not be operated any closer than 10 feet from weapons, fuel vents, ete. Local procedures should be estab- lished to control the operation of transceivers in hazerdous areas (Refer to T.0. 00-25-172 for information on approved explosion proof transceivers for use in refueling operations), and to provide guidance to personnel. The 10-foot distance is based on an average 6-foot individual with a walkie-talkie in his hand who might accidentally \ as stumble. The recommended 10-foot separation distance could be tailored to fit local situations. 3-13/(3-14 Blank)(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 CHAPTER 4 X-RAY HAZARDS, 4-1. GENERAL. Some C-E equipment does produce X-rays and this potential hazard must be controlled. When invisible X-radiation penetrates the body, it gives no sensation to warn of its presence or to indicate the biological damage which is occurring. Therefore, it is important for the individual to understand how X-rays are generated, to know something about their behavior, to be familiar with the X-ray shielding problem, and to know the dangers of overexposure. Armed with this knowledge, the individual can avoid unsafe situations. 4-2, ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM. Electromagnetic waves include Hertzian waves (long waves to microwaves) in the low-frequeney (long-wavelength) portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and X-rays and gamma rays in the extremely high-frequency (short-wavelength) portion of the spectrum. ‘These electromagnetic radiations are all basically the same in that they travel at the same speed as light. b. Figure 4-1 illustrates a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to establish the spectral relationship of X-radiations to other electromagnetic radiations. As the illustration suggests, the frequency and wavelength regions occupied by the various kinds of electro magnetic radiation are not clearly defined, but rather overlap one another to provide a gradual transition from waves of one type to those of another. Thus, the X-ray higher frequencies (shorter wavelengths) overlap and are not easily distinguished from the gamma-ray lower frequencies (longer wavelengths). The electromagnetic spectrum includes a great number of frequencies, or wavelengths. ‘Therefore, it is natural that several convenient units are used to measure wavelength. Wavelength in the radio-frequency spectrum is measured in meters, centimeters, or milli- meters; wavelength in the regions near visible light is measured in microns (1 micron equals 107 centimeter) or angstroms. The angstrom unit (A) is used almost exclusively to express. wavelength in the X-ray and gamma-ray regions; 1 angstrom unit is equal to 108 centimeter. 4-3. PROPERTIES OF X-RAYS. a, X-tays are electromagnetic waves which are produced in a vacuum tube when high-velocity electrons strike @ metal target. The slowing-down process of the electrons is ‘accompanied by a loss of’energy, which is given up in the form of heat and a relatively wide band of electromagnetic radiations. These radiations or waves travel at the speed of light, are unaffected by electric or magnetic fields, ean be reflected, refracted, and polarized, and can produce fluorescence and phosphorescence. b. X-rays have an extremely short wavelength, as indicated by the portion of the electromagnetic spectrum illustrated in figure 4-1. The terms "soft" and "hard" are used to designate the penetrating power of an X-ray beam. ‘The harder the radiation (shorter wavelength), the greater its penetrating power. Since electromagnetic waves are classified according to their souree or to the method of producing them, the wavelengths of X-rays overlap those of other rays such as gamma radiation. (X-rays are produced by bombarding a metallic target with high-velocity electrons; gamma rays are radiations which originate in the nuclei of atoms.) However, an X-ray and a gamma ray of the same wavelength have identical properties. 4-1(AF) 7.0. 312,-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 PHOTON ENERGY ( ev) tone 1 1 10! 10? 108 104 108 oe 107 ‘EE weraneo RAYS E cAwwa Rays Oe VISIBLE LIGHT-efZA sort RAYS ar =m 1 2 IN ANGSTROM UNITS (1 ANGSTROM UNIT=10°CM) Bxio® axI07 3NOF —3x10% 3x10! 3xI0" x10! 3x10! sxiol* 3xi0!9 FREQUENCY (MHz) Figure 4~ . Portion of Electromagnetic Spectrum, Showing Relationship of X-Radiation to Other Electromagnetic Radiations ¢. Like all electromagnetic radiations, X-rays obey the inverse square law; that is, their intensity decreases as the square of the distance from a point source. One of their most unusual properties is the ability to penetrate solid matter, and this property is commonly used in radiography to reveal the internal structure of normally opaque objects. Another important property of X-rays is their ability to modify, damage, and destroy living tissue; this property makes X-rays useful for medical treatments, but also makes them a hazard when not controlled. 4-4, HIGH-VOLTAGE ELECTRON TUBES AS A SOURCE OF X-RADIATION. X-ray tubes are built for the specific purpose of generating X-rays; however, other types of electron tubes operating under similar conditions ean also produce these radiations. Some of these types of tubes, under normal and/or abnormal operating conditions, can and do generate a dangerous amount of X-radiation. WARNING In practice, the shielding is designed to attenuate the X-radiation to a level which is well within the permissible levels established by AFR 161-8. Without the radiation shields in place, the intensity of the radiation emitted is extremely dangerous to personnel. a. Klystron. (1) A typical high-power klystron is illustrated in figure 4-2. This type of klystron power amplifier operates with anode potentials up to 250 kV and higher. X-radiation occurs with greatest intensity in the region of the collector assembly. The shaded areas shown in figure 4-2 illustrate the general distribution of X-radiation around a typical high-power Klystron when it is in operation, Note that the greatest intensity is near the collector assembly, the output cavity, and the elbow bend of the output waveguide. Radiation of lesser intensity occurs along the body of the tube approaching the output cavity and also from the electron gun itself. 4-2(AF) T.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 (2). X-radiation from the klystron occurs under two conditions: when the tube is in operation and delivering rf power to the load, and when high voltage is present but rf drive is not applied. In the latter condition, the electron beam travels through the tube to the collector, and X-radiation is produced predominantly in the collector region. However, when rf drive is applied to the tube and velocity modulation of the electron beam takes place, some dispersion of the electron beam causes emission from the body cavities of the tube. The inereased acceleration of electrons neat the output cavity region, caused by the higher- effective voltage developed as a result of the applied de potential and rf fields, gives rise to the generation of X-radiation of even greater intensity and penetrating power. Under normal operating conditions, the X-radiation measured in the immediate vicinity of the collector assembly may average 800 milliroentgens per hour for a typical klystron. ‘Thus, as can be seen from the illustration in figure 4-2, the klystron must be equipped with radiation shielding made of lead or other suitable material(s) installed over the collector, output eavity and main rf body, and electron gun assembly. connector Regeuele ov oureur wAVERUbe COLLECTOR £ cot oureur yo, eau >> FELD cavity oe > wt BieL9 eos oy = roguswe__— SS fi S$ ELECTRON et asset Figure 4-2. X-Radiation Distribution for Typical High-Power Klystron(AF) 7.0, 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 b. Thyratrons. (1) Hydrogen thyratrons operating with high anode potentials may also emit X-rays. When thyratrons are used for high-voltage switching applications, as in radar pulse-modulator cireuits, they may produce a considerable amount of X-radiation at the beginning of a pulse before the anode voltage drops, and a smaller amount of radiation between pulses. Radiation between pulses is caused, not by cathode electron emission, but by grid emission. The anode is surrounded by the grid structure in a thyratron tube, so that most of the radiation completely surrounds the tube in the form of a very narrow beam, extending outward from the grid-anode region as shown in figure 4-3. It is important to note that with such a narrow radiation beam, as illustrated in figure 4-3, irradiation of personnel could occur at head level and not be detected by a film badge or dosimeter worn at chest level, depending upon the equipment configuration. The intensity of the X-radiation is closely related to the amount of grid emission; therefore, a tube with excessive grid emission may generate X-rays of a much higher intensity than those of a normal tube with little or no grid emission. (2) A series of investigations has been made concerning the production of ionizing radiation from a number of thyratron tube types. X-radiation from one type hydrogen thyratron, operated with a plate voltage of 30 kV and at a prf of 100 pps, has been measured to. be approximately 20 milliroentgens per hour. For the same set of operating conditions, when the prf was increased to 250 pps, the radiation level increased to 360 milliroentgens per hour. Increasing the prf to a still higher rate of 500 pps caused a sharp increase in the measured radiation level to approximately 1200 milliroentgens per hour and, in some cases, to as high as 4800 milliroentgens per hour. Thus, it is seen that for a given set of operating conditions, an increase in prf increases the amount of X-radiation generated by the tube. (3) Thyratrons ean be shielded to prevent radiation from reaching dangerous levels. Equipment cabinets designed with solid steel panels at least 1/16 inch thick, or similar panels with inspection windows of 1/4 inch leaded glass, will attenuate radiation from the typical hydrogen thyratron to an acceptable level as defined by AFR 161-8. ¢. Magnetrons, Traveling-Wave Tubes and Other. Magnetrons and traveling-wave tubes operating with high eleetron-accelorating potentials will also emit X-rays, Tie intemal rf voltage, as well as the de potential, affects the velocities of the electrons. Like the klystron, most of the radiation occurs near the output of the tube and its associated waveguide. Again, as for klystrons, there is an almost linear relationship between the value of the applied high-voltage potential and the production of X-radiation. Other types of tubes operating above approximately 15 kV, such as high-voltage rectifiers (diode) and eathode-ray tubes, may also emit X-radiation, 4-5. DETECTION OF X-RADIATION. a, Various devices are used to ascertain the presence of the different types of radiation to which personnel may be exposed and to measure the intensity over a given period of time. However, to date there is no single device which is capable of measuring all types of radiation; as a result, many kinds of devices using several different methods of detection, identification, and measurement have been developed, b. Almost all radiation detectors are based on one of three basic principles; the exposure of undeveloped photographic film, the ionization of gas within an enclosed chamber, or the liberation of light by certain crystals when excited by radiation. Radiation detectors form an integral part of all radiation monitoring systems devised for either personnel or area monitoring. Several types of portable equipment are available for area monitoring or for 4-4(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 testing for the presence of radiation generated by communications-electronic equipment; these include ionization chambers, proportional counters, Geiger-Mueller counters, scintilla~ tion detectors, large photographie films, and electroseopes. The Bioenvironmental Engineer (BEE) has the equipment and responsibility for X-ray monitoring. ANODE X=RADIATION ‘eeaW ito const oR ‘CATHODE BAFFLES CATHODE SHIELO CATHODE Figure 4-3. X-Radiation Distribution for Typical Hydrogen Thyratron ¢. Radiation detectors used for personnel monitoring fall into two general classifications: those which require additional processing to determine the level of exposure and those which are direct reading. The film badge is an example of a detector which requires further processing; the pocket dosimeter (electroscope) is read directly. Neither of these devices are Tecommended for C-E personnel. 4-6, UNITS OF MEASUREMENT. The roentgen is the basic unit commonly used to indicate a measured quantity of X-rays and gamma rays. Milliroentgen (mR), which is one-thousandth of the basie unit, is frequently used for convenience in expressing small values of ionizing radiation. 4-8(AF) 7.0, 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 4-7, BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, a. General. (1) All X-rays except those of very low photon energy will penetrate human tissue and form positive and negative ions. Depending upon the dosage, these ions may cause tissue damage of either a temporary or permanent nature. The absorption of X-rays gives up energy to matter by the process of ionization. Unless the dosage is extremely high, there will be no noticeable effects for days or weeks or, in some cases, years after the exposure. This delay in the effect is no doubt the most important reason for cases of overdoses of X-rays, since the damage has been done long before the symptoms begin. (2) Bach cell of the body comprising the various tissues and organs is a very small living structural and functional unit, which has a definite life span. The parent cell must grow and divide, producing "daughter" cells, which in turn grow end divide. Radiation produces structural and funetional changes in the cells and tissues, depending upon the amount of ionization which has taken place. After exposure of a cell to ionizing radiation, the cell funetions may eventually return to normal, just as a normal recovery is made from disease or infection, in which case the biological effects of radiation are said to be "reversible." When the damage results in permanent injury to the cell, the effects are said to be “irreversible.” (3) The effects of ionizing radiation upon the cells may be either direct or indirect, and may be immediate or delayed. Because of the nature of the cell structure of the body, the biological effects may be limited to those cells that receive radiation directly, or because of normal body processes, the effects may be transmitted to other locations within the body. For this reason, elapsed time is a factor and accounts for the fact that biological effects are not immediately apparent. b. Symptoms of Overexposure. (1) Ionizing radiation produces biological effects by damaging the cell structure. Many illnesses cause similar cell damage and the body reacts the same regardless of the cause. AS indicated in table 4~1 the symptoms vary with the extent of exposure. (2) Radiation exposure can be described in terms of the part of the body exposed, the total dose received, the dose rate, and the time duration of the exposure. A single exposure to radiation or a series of exposures in a short period of time is considered to be an “acute” exposure, whereas minute continuous exposure over a long period of time is considered to be a "ehronie” exposure. (3) Acute exposure to radiation can cause immediate and delayed biological effects. Chronie exposure usually produces only delayed effects. Delayed effects from radiation exposure are considered to be either "genetic" effects or "somatic" effects. Genetic effects are those effects that control the inherited characteristics of succeeding generations; somatic effects are those effects that pertain to the individual human body, its tissues, organs, and Parts, and for the most part are similar to pathological conditions sueh as leukemia, skin changes, cataracts, sterility, and changes in life span, which ean result from other causes. The delayed effects produced by either acute or chronic exposure are similar, but the ability of the human body to repair the damage is usually greater for chronie exposure than for acute exposure. A controlled exposure of 1000 roentgens may be safely applied to a small part of the body for radiation therapy purposes, but 450 roentgens applied to the whole body would most likely produce the symptoms noted in table 4-1, and the individual could have a 50-80 chance of survival. Therefore, the term "radiation dose must be qualified to indicate whether the whole body or only part of the body was exposed. 4-6(AF) 7.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 ‘Table 4-1. Symptoms and Effects Resulting from Acute Whole-Body Exposure to Radiation (OENTEEN) 0-25 25-100 100-200 200-300, 300-600 600 and over SYMPTOMS AND EFFECTS [No observable reactions. Delayed effects may occur. ‘Changes in blood detectable by clinical tests. Disabling sickness not common; individual should be able to continue usual duties. Delayed effects possible, but serious effects on average indi vidual unlikely. Produces nausea and fatigue, with possible vomiting above 125 roencgens. Changes in blood detectable by clinical tests. Delayed effects may shorten life expectancy of exposed individual ‘on the order of one percent. Produces nausea and vomiting on frst day following exposure. Latent period up to 2 weeks or longer, then other symptoms appear, but are not severe, Symptoms are loss of appetite, gen eral illness or discomfort, sore throat, pallor, petechiae (crimson spots in skin or mucous mem: brane), diarrhea, and moderate em: ‘Recovery is expected in about 3 months unless com- plicated by poor previous health, additional injuries or infections. Produces nausea, vomiting, and diarthea in first few hours following exposure. Latent period, ppechaps as long a 7 days, with no definite symptoms. Symptoms are epilation (loss of hair), loss of appetite, general illness or discomfort, and fever during second week, followed by hem: corshage, petechiae, inflammation of mouth and theoat, diarrhea, and emaciation in the third week. Some deaths in 2 to 6 weeks. Possible eventual death of up to 50 percent of the exposed individuals for exposures of 450 roentgens. Produces nausea, vomiting, and diarthea in fist few hours following exposure. Short latent period with no definite symptoms in some cases during first week. Diazthea, hemorrhage, in- flammation of mouth and throat, and fever toward end of first week, Rapid emaciation and death as early asthe second week with possible eventual death of up to 100 percent of the ex- posed individuals. 4-8, MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOSE. The National Committee on Radiation Protection has developed a set of protection rules which define maximum permissible levels of radiation exposure. The term "permissible dose" is generally defined as the dose of ionizing radiation whieh, in the light of present knowledge, is not expected to cause appreciable injury to an average individual at any time during his normal life span. AFR 161-8 provides information regarding occupational exposure to ionizing radiation. Consult the local BEE for specific guidance. 4-7(AF) 7.0, 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 4-9, X-RAY PROTECTION. a, X-ray survey data is supplied with all new equipment capable of X-ray production. X-ray measurements are made on the equipment to determine the amount of radiation produced and to verify the adequacy of shielding provided. The latter measurements are repeated periodically in the field by base Bioenvironmental Engineers and should also be conducted anytime a change or modification occurs which could increase or introduce a hazard. WARNING In the event that any component used to safeguard personnel from X-radiation (leaded glass inspection windows, shielding, interlocks, ete) is damaged or becomes defective during the installation or operation phase, it shall be replaced with an exact replacement. Following replacement, X-radiation measurements shall be made by qualified personnel, to make certain that the radiation level does not exceed an acceptable level as defined in AFR 161-8. Disregard of this warning may result in a serious accident. b. Personnel working with high-voltage electron tubes capable of generating X-rays should make certain that the radiation has been checked by qualified medical personnel. Under normal operating conditions, there will very likely be proper shielding for these tubes, but the technician should be aware of the fact that radiation intensity may increase under unusual operating conditions. Personnel should not be permitted to operate any electronic deviee or tube employing a peak plate voltage of 15 kV or higher with any of the shielding removed from the equipment, except where such operation is conducted following approved health procedures specifically required by a technical manual or following procedures approved by the local BEE. 4-8(AF) 7.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 CHAPTER 5 ASSOCIATED HAZARDS SECTION I - INFRARED HAZARDS * 5-1. INFRARED SPECTRUM. a, Infrared radiation is a form of electromagnetic radiation. Its spectrum lies between the microwave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and visible light. The infrared spectrum is frequently divided into three arbitrary bands: near infrared (near visible light), middle infrared, and far infrared. b, Wavelength in the radio-frequency spectrum is measured in meters, centimeters, or millimeters; and in the regions near visible light,-as microns (1 micron equals 104 centimeter) or angstroms. It is generally found more convenient to express wavelength in the infrared region in terms of the micron. The near infrared band wavelengths are 0.75 to 3 microns, the middle infrared band wavelengths are from 30 to approximately 1000 microns. ¢. Figure 5-1 illustrates a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to establish the spectral relationship of infrared radiation to other electromagnetic radiations. As the illustration suggests, the fer infrared region is not clearly defined, but in recent years the development of improved infrared detectors has enabled measurements to be extended into the longer wavelength far infrared region of 900 to 1100 microns. 4. A characteristic of the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum permits the wes to be readily absorbed and the energy converted into heat. It behaves as do radio or light waves and is transmitted in the same manner through air or vacuum. Infrared radiation can be refracted and reflected according to the laws of optics, since infrared and visible light are of the same nature. The fact that infrared radiation is readily converted into thermal energy when it strikes an object distinguishes it from other types of electromagnetic radiation. 5-2, PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INFRARED SYSTEMS. a, Passive infrared systems are systems that function to detect infrared radiation emitted by objects (targets). Active infrared systems function in a manner similar to radar, in that an infrared source generates and radiates energy which is reflected from objects and is then detected. The active infrared system represents the greatest hazard to personnel, sine the infrared source generally produces a searchlight type of bearn, which is filtered to remove any radiation in the form of visible light. b. Passive and active infrared systems are employed for tactical communications, beacons, reconnaissance, surveillance, recognition, navigation, airborne proximity warning, direction finding, tracking, homing, fire control, bombing, and missile guidance, to name a few of the military applications. Infrared is also used in the fields of photography, chemistry, astronomy, criminology, physiotherapy, and has many industrial applications. 5-3. RADIATION HAZARDS TO PERSONNEL. The human eye is susceptible to damage by infrared energy, since the energy may cause the development of cataracts or opacities. Infrared is invisible and it is therefore possible that personnel may interrupt an infrared beam (from an active system) without being aware of the fact. This danger does not exist where 5-1(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 only passive systems are in operation. Usually, the danger is not too great because personnel will sense the heating effects of infrared and thus be alerted before damage occurs, assuming they have knowledge of the presence of a nearby active infrared system. However, it is - possible for the eyes to be damaged before the heating effects provide sufficient warning. It - is not advisable to stare into a source of intense infrared radiation, even though the source is equipped with a filter and all visible light is removed. Special problems related to personnel exposure should be referred to the support medical facility (Bioenvironmental Engineer/ Environmental Health). PHOTON ENERGY (ev) 1? on \ © fa rar INFRARED RAYS NEAR “tient =f emia waves | es oF 108 108 v0 10> v2 A IN ANGSTROM UNITS (1 ANGSTROM UNIT =10-8CM) 1 ee ® H or oF XIN MICRONS ( |.) —™ on we o> woe we 08 " WAVELENGTH (CM) 3x108 3xi08 3x10? axiot 3x0? 3x08 FREQUENCY (MHz) Figure 5-1. Portion of Electromagnetic Spectrum, Showing Relationship of Infrared Radiation to Other Electromagnetic Radiations = 5-2(AF) T.O. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 SECTION Il - LASER HAZARDS 8-4. GENERAL. In this section the reader is acquainted with the hazards of laser devices. Comprehensive discussions of these hazards are contained in AFOSH Standard 161-10. Lasers generate or amplify electromagnetic energy. Electromagnetic energy, as discussed earlier, can be harmful to the human organism. In this respect, lasers are identical to conventional rf generators. There are, however, at least two important differences: First, there is the matter of power level. Such devices can generate peak power levels far exceeding those ever before generated. Secondly, the laser operates in the visible or near-visible region of the electromagnetic spectrum. (Many lasers operate at infrared wavelengths.) This, then, constitutes @ special hazard to the human eye. Consider that the eye functions at light frequencies. It collects and focuses such energy. Consequently, it can further concentrate sub-hazard levels of power to levels hazardous to the internal structure of the eye. 5-5. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS. The following safety precautions must be observed with laser devices: a, Prior to placing a laser device in operation become familiar with, and adhere to, the safety guidance provided in AFOSH Standard 161-10. Maintain a close liaison with the base medical services (Bioenvironmental Engineer/Environmental Health). b. Never knowingly look into the beams of such devices, regardless of their power level or how distant they may be. Consult the Bicenvironmental Engineer for safe skin and eye distances. ¢. Keep reflective surfaces out of laser beams. 4. Keep covers and shields in place when working on such devices. e, Be aware of the dangers of electrical shock due to the use of high voltage. f. The most important precaution of all is tc seek the guidance of the base Bioenviron- mental Engineer. He is kept up-to-date on the hazards involved, For additional assistance, contact the USAF Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory at Brooks AFB, Texas (See table 2-1 for office symbol and telephone number). 5-3/(5-4 Blank)(AF) 7.0. 31Z-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 SECTION Ill - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HAZARDS 5-6. GENERAL. The purpose of the information contained in this section is to provide the reader with a knowledge of the potential hazard which exists in the form of radioactive materials used in components of electronic equipments. One primary source of potentially harmful ionizing radiation is the radioactive electron tubes which are commonly employed in modern microwave and radar equipments. It is, therefore, important for personnel working with such equipments to be aware of the possible dangers associated with radioactive electron tubes and to exercise caution when handling such tubes. 5-1. TYPES OF IONIZING RADIATION. Ionizing radiation exists in two forms: electro- magnetic radiation (consisting of photons) or particulate radiation (sometimes call corpuscular radiation) consisting of electrons, positrons, neutrons, ete. Radioactive substances are sources of ionizing radiation. These substances undergo a disintegration process which is accompanied by the emission of radiation. Most naturally occurring radioactive elements radiate either alpha or beta particles. In some cases, gamma rays accompany the alpha or beta particles. The specifie properties of the radiations, such as the velocities of the alpha or beta particles, their penetrability and power of ionization, and the wavelengths of the gamma rays, depend on the particular radioactive element from which they originate. a, Alpha Rays. Alpha rays (or particles) are particulate ionizing radiation consisting of helium Tuclei carrying a positive charge traveling at moderately high speeds (approximately T percent of the speed of light). Alpha particles have a short range, dissipate their energy quickly, and have a very strong ionizing power. However, these particles have weak penetrating power and are easily stopped by a thin sheet of paper, such as this printed page. b. Beta Rays. Beta rays (or particles) are particulate ionizing radiation consisting of electrons of positrons traveling at extremely high speeds (up to 95 percent of the speed of light). Beta particles have strong ionizing power and moderate penetrating power. Beta particles do not ionize gases as readily as alpha particles, but beta particles can penetrate shields 100 times as thick as that required to stop alpha particles. Metallic shields are very effective against beta particles; a sheet of aluminum 0.04 ineh thick will stop a beta particle. c. Gamma Rays. Gamma rays are electromagnetic radiations which originate in the nuclei of atoms--Camma rays are similar to X-rays, but extend into the shorter-wavelength region of the electromagnetic spectrum. However, X-rays and gamma rays of the same wavelength have identical properties. Gamma rays are more penetrating than either alpha or beta particles and can be detected after passing through as much as 12 inches of steel. 5-8, INTERNAL EXPOSURE HAZARD. a, General. Exposure of the human body to ionizing radiation can be either external or internal. External exposure, originating from sources of ionizing radiation outside the body, can be dealt with by providing proper shielding, by increasing the distance from the source, or by decreasing the exposure time, However, internal exposure results from radioactive Substances within the body; therefore, the problem of internal exposure resolves itself into preventing the entry of radioactive material into the body. If significant radioactive material is taken into the body, the effects can be quite serious and equally as dangerous as the external exposure effects described in the previous section in connection with X-radiation. When a radioactive substance is taken into the body, it may tend to concentrate in certain parts of the body, or it may disperse itself throughout the body. Wherever it is located, the substance irradiates nearby cells and tissues; this irradiation process continues until the 5-5(AF) 7.0. 312-10-4 (ARMY) FM 11-490-30 substance is excreted through normal body processes or until it decreases in radioactivity to a level which ceases to be biologically significant. The biological damage caused by such internal emitters depends upon many factors, such as the concentration and distribution of material within the body, the sensitivity of tissues and organs, the route of material entry, the material solubility, and the route and rate of elimination from the body. The effect of ionizing radiation upon body cells and tissues is the same regardless of whether the radiation exposure is internal or external. b. Intake of Radioactive Material. Biological effects in man occurring as a result of the intake of radioactive material are not as common as those occurring as a result of external exposures; nevertheless, internal exposure to radiation can be quite dangerous and precau- tionary measures must be taken by those who may be occupationally exposed to potential sources of internal radiation to avoid the intake of radioactive materials. The processes by which radioactive material can be taken into the body in the order of likelihood are: inhalation, ingestion, or absorption. (1) Inhalation. Airborne particles of radioactive material gain access to the body through the process of inhalation, or breathing. As air containing radioactive dust or vapor is drawn into the lungs and exhaled, some filtering takes place and the larger radioactive particles are removed from the air and deposited in the nose. Other particles may come in contact with, and be deposited in, the mucous coating of tissues lining the nasal and upper lung respiratory passages. Particles which are trapped in the upper respiratory passages may eventually be swallowed and enter the digestive system. Only a small amount of the radioactive material inhaled will reach the small air sacs of the lungs. Any of this material that is soluble will pass throught the air sac membranes and enter the blood stream to cause damage elsewhere in the body. Insoluble materials will remain in the air sacs to cause continuous damage to the surrounding tissues and will likely result in the formation of tumors. (2) Ingestion. Particles of radioactive material can enter the body through the process of ingestion, wherein contaminated food or drink is taken into the stomach for digestion. If the radioactive materials are capable of being dissolved in the digestive system, they will be absorbed in the same manner as food and carried to various parts of the body. These soluble materials may eventually be eliminated from the body by means of urine and excrement. Materials which do not dissolve will pass through the digestive system and will be ejected with the body excrement. (3) Absorption. Particles of radioactive material can enter the body through the process of absorption. Access to the body interior is mostly through open sores, skin Punetures, cuts, scratches, or other surface wounds which lay open to the entry of small particles. The absorption process depends upon the dissolving of the material in body fluids and entrance via these fluids into the blood stream, to be distributed throughout the body. Insoluble material entering surface wounds may remain beneath the skin tissues to cause damage. ¢. Internal Emitters. (1) The hazards associated with internal emitters arise primarily from alpha and beta particles, sinee these are completely absorbed in the body, while only a fraetion of the gamma-ray energy given off by an internal emitter is absorbed by body tissues before the gamma rays leave the body. (2) The alpha particle does not represent a danger to the body from an external source because of its weak penetrating power, but if inside the body it becomes extremely injurious. 5-6