‘Space Neg bows Benischeck/Shannon FRONTLINE... NOT INEVITABLE EXT. Commerce and Satellite Destruction Ext. ARMS RACE EXT... SB WEAPS NOT EFFECTIVE. THREAT EXAGGERATED.. SOLVENCY FRNTLINE. SBSF FAILS. BIZCON LIN POLITICS nasa pop. POLITICS nasa unpop. Tirnouttion Fresthine. Mnouilior Extension, Can Space Weapon Ch [SCP Exfersions PEED (mi) zat LS Gime rent) etenreur> ne SCLOOE C) zt st GeSpace Neg DDW 2008 Benischeck Space Weapons Frontline 1, Space Weaponization is not inevitable-vulnerabilities have consistently been overlooked and there are other more probable scenarios Karl P. Mueller RAND Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable? International Studies Association Annual Convention [New Orleans, 27 March 2002 hnp:/www.isanet.org/noarchivefmueller ml ‘The core of this inevitability argument is that even (or especially) if the United States chooses not to build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because ofthe great and sl growing degree to which US. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as “space force enhancement” the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services including communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and missile Jaunch warning, without which American military power would be crippled, This parallels the argument tha the Importance of satellites to the U.S. economy will make them an iresstible target, except that military satellites are far ‘more indispensable, and successful attacks against a relatively small number of them could have a considerable military impact, for example by concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S. operations at a cial juncture. 1(34) Rivals ofthe United States might also find space-o-earth weapons to bea very attractive way to counler U.S, advantages in military power projection ‘These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for US. military capabilities. An enemy that attacked them night be able to impair US. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that concera U.S. suategists. Ittneed not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The US. armed forces possess many important yulnerabil that adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. ‘but one widely-discussed example, during Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did aot atempt to ‘mount special forces atacks against key NATO airbases inlay or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aietaft operating from them during take-off of landing, although such an action could have profoundly disrupted the Aliance's bombing campaign.2135] Moreover, itis quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in ways—such as investing in ground-hased ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilities—that would not involve weaponizing space, and against which ———the logical defensive.countermeasures-would-not invalve placing U,S-sveapons-in-orbiteeithet.-For military as.well-as. commercial satellites, “bodyguard” weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again itis the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 3{36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATTS and satellite launch and control facilities.Space Neg DDW 2008 Benischeck Space Weapons Frontline 2, Space weapons damage the environment and directly impact commerce ‘Michael Krepon is Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center Space Assurance or Space Weapons? 2004, hutp://www 12, georgetown edu/sfs/publications/journal/Issues/sf04/Forum’%20Krepon.pdf ‘The potential debris and disruption caused by space warfare would impair global commerce that depends on space, produce environmental damage, and create hazards to space exploration, ‘Companies that depend on space-aided commerce would be particularly hard-hit by the flight- testing, deployment, ot use of space weapons. Insurance companies that backstop space-related activities would look for less risky investments, or raise their rates appreciably. Continues ‘The weaponization of space is an environmental as well as a national security issue. The environmental degradation of space created by space-faring nations constitutes a danger to space exploration, the space shuttle and other peaceful uses of space. Space litter also poses difficulties for the military uses of space. The weaponization of space, particularly with respect to the flight-testing of ASAT weapons, would greatly compound existing concerns over safe passage. In the event of a resumption of ASAT tests, the Pentagon would attempt to mitigate space debris, as it does with respect to missile defense tests. Other states that test ASATs might not be as conscientious about debris mitigation. The actual use of ASAT would compound these dangers exponentially, Space warfare would therefore not only constitute a threat to targeted satellites, it would also create debris fields that would threaten satellites operating in low earth orbit, the space shuttle, and the International Space Station. Debris fields in the upper reaches of space could be longer lasting than environmental degradation on earth. Traffic management and debris mitigation efforts are essential components of space assurance.Space Neg DDW 2008 Benischeck Space Weapons Frontline 3. There are many barriers to constructing space weapons ‘Theresa Hitchens, C1 Vi bup:/hwww.edi.org/ai ce President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18, 2002 ile-defensespaceweapons.cfi Indeed, the technical barriers to development and deployment of space-based weapons cannot be overestimated, even for the U.S. military. There are serious, fundamental obstacles to the development of both kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against targets in space and terrestrial targets — not to mention the question of the staggering costs associated with launch and maintaining systems on orbit. Problems with lasers include power generation requirements adding to size, the need for large quantities of chemical fuel and refueling requirements, and the physics of propagating and stabilizing beams across long distances or through the atmosphere. Space- based kinetic energy weapons have their own issues, including achieving proper orbital trajectories and velocities, the need to carry massive amounts of propellant, and concern about damage to own-forces from debris resulting from killing an enemy satellite. Space-based weapons also have the problem of vulnerability, for example, predictable orbits and the difficulty of regeneration. A detailed discussion of technology challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but a comprehensive primer on the myriad problems with developing space-based weapons is a September 1999 paper by Maj. William L. Spacy Il, "Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?" written for the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 4, Space-Based Lasers face many Challenges NATO, Parliamentary Assembly, 2003, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=367 Another system intended to support boost phase missile defences is the Space-Based Laser (SBL) ‘This system's maitr element would-be a-satellite-armed-with a hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser capable of destroying missiles during their boost phase. Despite the advantages of operating a laser in the vacuum of space, some of the operational challenges for an SBL are daunting. According to a study by the US National Defense University (NDU), these include lift-to-orbit and space assembly, stable and reliable operation in space, and maintenance and re-supply of fuels. Moreover, an effective system should rely on a constellation of at least 12 satellites, considerably elevating costs. It is pethaps for these reasons that the SBL programme has recently been scaled back. In September 2002, the Pentagon closed the office dedicated to developing the SBL and moved all related research into anew MDA directorate called Laser Technologies. The first test of the programme, scheduled for 2012, and plans to build an SBL test facility have also been cancelled, Despite Congressional cuts to the programme, MDA continues to keep the programme alive, allocating US$5O million for it in 2004.