Law Class

DANIELLE
HERNANDEZ THE TRIANGLE FIRE
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Table of Contents

i. Introduction... ………………………………………………………………………………2
ii. Background………………………………………………………………………………...2
iii. The Triangle Fire……………………………………………………...………………......4
a. The Trial……………………………………………………………………………….…..6
b. The Result…………….……………………………………………………………….……8
iv. Discussion……….…………………………………………………………………….......9
a. Wal-Mart Lock-ins………………………………………………………………………….10
b. September 11, 2001…………………………………………………………………………11
v. Conclusion…..……………………………………………………………………………...13
vi. Works Consulted……………………………………………………………………………15
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I. INTRODUCTION

1911 working conditions were mirror images of those portrayed in Dickens’ literature.

New York City was being crippled under a powerful political machine that disregarded worker’s

pleas and let regulation go to the wayside. Crowded rooms, poor ventilation, and greedy factory

owners led to countless injuries, deaths, and miseries. None, however, was as catastrophic as the

fire that began at the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire in New York City. Though the fire burned for only

fifteen minutes, 146 lived were taken in that factory- that was out of an estimate of 250 total

workers. The Triangle Fire stood as the worst workplace disaster in New York City history until

September 11, 2001. It took a disaster to finally call politicians’ attention towards the unfairness

of their laws and the dreadful conditions that led to the event. All eventually led to the

establishment of the New York Factory Investigative Commission and the Life Safety Code

which we still use today.

II. BACKGROUND

a. The New York Political Environment

These atrocious workplace conditions were born from a battle between the old and the

new in New York City. Manhattan’s ancient political machine was confronted by progressives

who fought for change in the workplace and challenged the old ways. Likewise, politicians used

to survive off of the support of lower-class immigrants who were exactly the people who were

now outgrowing their protections, learning to stand on their own two feet, and challenging their

authority. This clash was thwarting all efforts of reform because the ones in charge of making

those changes were refusing to listen.

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Politics in New York City were run by Tammany Hall which was a powerful political

machine. It was run by various bosses throughout the city and made use of mobs to, in the case

of Triangle workers, crush strikers and progressives.

Tammany Hall was originally named the Society of St. Tammany when it was founded in

the midst of the American Revolution. It was always existent, but never as prominent as it was

during the turn of the century. The name Tammany came from an Indian chief, Tamamend and

this Indian influence is reflected by the Native American titles seen in the Hall’s hierarchy.

Tammany Hall was representative of the Democratic Party within New York. It was the

organization that catered to immigrants but also staunchly opposed progressivism and populism

(Von Drehle 20-24).

During 1911, the Hall was under the lead of people such as George Washington Plunkitt

in the West Side and Big Tim Sullivan of Downtown Manhattan. These men had eyes and ears

throughout the city and, without a doubt, were quickly informed when Clara Lemlich, a young

Russian immigrant, was leading strikes against her employers, Blanck and Harris. A member of

the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) and of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’

Union (ILGWU), she already had a reputation for stirring the pot. This time around, she was

rallying for safer working conditions in her workplace (Von Drehle 56-62).

It was not long until Plunkitt and Sullivan had sent in Tammany thugs to beat her into

submission (Von Drehle 56-62). Tammany Hall was not a forced to be reckoned with and yet it

ended up thwarting something extremely important. Little did Lemlich know that the public’s

refusal to hear her plea that day would result in the death of 123 young women- one of them

being her own cousin.

b. The Triangle Fire

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In 1911 New York City was, prior to the Triangle Fire, still coming out of the age of

sweatshops filled with lower-class immigrants and child labor. The owners of the Triangle

Factory, Isaac Harris and Max Blanck, had been immigrant workers themselves. After working

in sweatshops, they decided to open up their own factory with the intention of giving workers

more rights than they, themselves, had. (Von Drehle 86-116) It is true that during this time, there

were more limits on child labor (although birth certificates were often forged to slip by these

laws) and work spaces were somewhat larger than before, but there was still a long way to go

when it came to safety codes. There was still little to no ventilation (which caused white lung in

textile factories). There was still a large amount of overcrowding. Unions, picketing, and strikes

were taken out violently by mobs hired by factory owners and Tammany Hall (the political

machine that ran New York City). Most importantly, fire precautions were not mandated by law

and, although it was already illegal to lock all fire escape doors, the lack of money in the city’s

Building Department made inspections for such violations rare (Linder Trial). An exploration of

how the actual fire began and commenced would serve as a prime illustration of how such

conditions can truly take a toll on a workplace.

III. THE TRIANGLE FIRE

To this day, nobody knows how the fire started. It was generally assumed that someone

threw a lit match or a cigarette into a bin containing fabric scraps. The factory girls were always

smoking there and some cigarette cases were found near the area where the fire broke out (See

“1” in diagram 1). Shockingly, the notorious Triangle Fire was not the first fire to be seen at the

Triangle Shirtwaist Factory and especially not the first major fire in a factory owned by Blanck

and Harris. When the fire was first noticed, it wasn’t made a big deal and an employee, William

Bernstein, casually went to put the fire out. A number of

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fires had broken out there over the years, yet none of them ever spread to create such a

catastrophe. (Episode 7: Cities) If looking for catastrophes, some would be found in the factories

previously owned by Harris and Blanck.

The owners, often called the “Shirtwaist Kings,”

were both already notorious for having intentionally

created two at their Diamond Waist Company factory in

1907 and 1910. It was believed that it was all a part of an

insurance scheme, but when the two were tried for

manslaughter in 1914, they were acquitted. They were

charged millions yet spent no time in jail. It is still

supposed that they were involved in yet another insurance

scheme having made anywhere from $8,000 to $10,000

Diagram 1 (Von Drehle 180- per corpse. (Von Drehle 161-162)

No fire, however, went down in history quite like the Triangle Fire at the Asch Building

on Greene Street. Also, there was certainly no other fire that had such an immense aftereffect.

On March 25, 1911, the fire began. According to factory survivor, Pauline Pepe, she and her

girlfriends worked there expecting it to be a good way for them to socialize and make some extra

spending money, as well. (Pepe) For others, it was a daily labor necessary for survival. When the

fire began, one employee calmly made use of one of the fire buckets. Usually that would have

sufficed, but this time the fire was spreading rapidly. Nothing seemed to be going well: the fire

hose was not working, the fire escape collapsed, the ninth floor above was not notified of the

fire, and, worst of all, the workers were trapped. When Samuel Bernstein, the floor manager,

realized that the fire was inextinguishable, he ordered all prior efforts to end and escape became
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their sole priority. There were three escape routes: an Otis elevator, a staircase, and a single fire

escape. Immediately, the fire escape collapsed and there was no other one. The elevator could

carry only a few girls at a time and moved very slowly. The doors to the staircase were made

extremely narrow and only allowed one girl through at a time. This was set up so that each girl

would be able to get searched when they left for the day. Theft would harm the company’s

profits. With hope diminishing, 146 people (123 of them women) began to be eaten by flames or

resigned to leaping from the eighth, ninth, and tenth floors of the Asch Building. Even the tallest

fire ladder in New York City was too short to reach the floors in need. (Episode 7: Cities)

a. The Trial

At first, nobody knew who to blame in the Triangle Factory. Some blamed the New York

City Building Department but still some blamed the company owners. Many of the individuals

who survived the fire as well as the families of those who perished, set out in individual law suits

against Harris and Blanck. On December 4, 1911, there was a grand jury indictment of the

factory owners on charges of six counts of manslaughter and the trial began. The main players in

this trial were Assistant District Attorney, Charles S. Bostwick (prosecution), Judge Thomas

Crain, and renowned cross-examiner, Max D. Steuer (defense). (Linder Trial)

The pivotal element of this trial was the question of the factory door. Article 6, section 80

of New York State Labor Laws requires:

“All doors leading in or to any such factory shall be constructed as

to open outwardly, where practicable, and shall not be locked,
bolted, or fastened during working hours.” (Linder “Building and
Safety Laws”)

Charles Bostwick built the case against the “Shirtwaist Kings” around one woman-

Margaret Schwartz. He intended to prove that a locked door was the direct cause of her death. In
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the factory, there was one unlocked door and a second

door leading to Washington Place that was allegedly

locked. The stairway past the open door was consumed

with flames and Schwartz, along with the others,

supposedly tried to escape through there. According to

witness, Katie Weiner, Schwartz tried pulling and

pushing the door open along with several other but the

door would not budge (See “4” in diagram 2). While she

continued trying to open the door, Weiner saw her

friend’s dress and hair catch fire. Within moments, she Diagram 2 (Von Drehle 180-

was dead. (Linder Trial)

Max Steuer, attorney for the Triangle Waist Company owners, began asking Katie

Weiner to repeat the same story continually. As she repeated her story time and again, Steuer

was able to make the jury believe to think that she had been coached in this response by the

defense. Each retelling contained slightly different wording but certain key phrases came up each

time. Steuer then continued to bring forward his witnesses. First he introduced several

maintenance men and other people who had worked on that floor of the building. They all

claimed that they often used that door and that it was never locked. His other witness ended up

working against him. This witness, May Levantini, stated that there was always a key attached to

that door “on a string or something.” She also said that she successfully opened the door but

recoiled from the sight of all the fire there was in the stairwell beyond. Here, Bostwick accused

Levantini of lying because there was evidence that that staircase was free of flames and was a
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safe escape route for girls coming from other floors (see “6” in diagram 3) who apparently all

made it out to Washington Place unscathed. (Linder Trial)

In the end, Steuer got exactly what he wanted. The

jury could began to believe that the locked door was not

the cause of death of Margaret Schwartz (or at least not

directly). Isaac Harris and Max Blanck were found not

guilty on December 27, 1911. (Linder Trial) Due to their

continued representation from Steuer, the two ended up

having to pay up nothing in various civil law suits from

individuals and companies that were owed money from

the company. Yet although the two may have left the

courthouse that day in a limousine, it was only months Diagram 3 (Von Drehle 180-

before they ended up in impossible debt and lost everything they’d ever had. Suits kept on

coming in, but what many didn’t know was that they wouldn’t have even been able to pay for the

suit of a mere $206 from the Rapid Safety Filter Company. (Von Drehle 258-264)

Although the Shirtwaist Kings met their demise, there would begin a time of great

progression in both the law and society as a whole.

b. The Aftermath of the Fire

Three months after the fire, on June 30, 1911, an Act was passed by the New York State

legislation that created the New York Factory Investigating Commission- a joint legislative

commission. Being a joint legislative commission, it had the power to subpoena witnesses and

documents, elect its own members, employ experts, change its own rules, remake its charter, and

replace its members. The Commission consisted of two senators, four assemblymen, and four
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other civilians (including the founder of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers).

(Wagner)

Major cities such as New York, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Utica, Schenectady, and

Troy all underwent new factory inspections. The two main concerns were of fire safety and

sanitation yet their influence extended far beyond that. The Commission mandated more

staircases to be placed in factories relative to their size. There began the prohibition of smoking

in the workplace since that was the supposed cause of the fire. Buildings now had to have

fireproof construction, automatic sprinkler systems, and fire extinguishers. (Van Drehle 194-218)

Beyond that, it became a necessity to have medical supervision in particularly dangerous

workplaces. Child labor was again reformed by requiring physical examinations of potential

working minors and compulsory education. (History of Investigation Committee) Fire drills are

required both in the factory or workplaces and in school environments. Although a fire drill does

not prevent the fire or spread of the fire, itself, it has been proven by human behavior studies to

prevent panic from arising therefore creating a safer environment. (Colonna) Factories and

other work places must have wired glass windows that are larger than two feet in width and five

feet in length. These windows prevent the glass from shattering inward. (Wagner) One

Triangle employee, Ida Cohen, recalls how she feared that her face would be destroyed by

shattering glass as she was pressed against the glass window in the door by the hysterical mob of

girls pushing their way through the exit. (Von Drehle 123)

As time went on, the Commission continued to create changes regarding maximum hours

in the workweek and fair employee wages. The most important aspect, however, is that they set

up regular inspections of factories whereas the New York City Building Department was failing

to do so beforehand. (Van Drehle 194-218)

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Along with the New York Factory Investigating Commission, came the creation of two

other organizations. The American Society of Safety Engineers and the American Industrial

Hygiene Association that ensured better health and safety measures in the workplace. Both of

these organizations affect the whole country and are still active today. David Michaels recently

paid tribute to the Triangle Fire and its victims in a speech given at a meeting for both the ASSE

and the AIHA in regards to recent accomplishments in areas such as worker’s rights. (Michaels)

“Today, March 25, marks the 99th anniversary of the

Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire. On that day in New York City, one
of the witnesses, watching helplessly in the crowd at the base of
the garment building as women and girls jumped to their death
rather than be burned alive, was Frances Perkins — a young
community activist, FDR's future Secretary of Labor, and the
woman for whom the building in which we are meeting is named.
Six months after 141 women and girls were killed in that
workplace tragedy, the American Society of Safety Engineers was
established.
.....So, on this day, we are reminded that our organizations
are old friends whose bonds have been forged through the
preventable deaths of our fellow citizens and our desire for
workplace reform.” (Michaels)

Reform didn’t stop in the workplace either. Charles Murphy, then at the head of

Tammany Hall, realized that New York was due for an entire liberal movement. It is not

surprising that women finally got the right to vote in the years following the fire. (Van Drehle

194-218)

IV. DISCUSSION

It seems that the Triangle Fire could have been prevented so effortlessly. Precautions

were being taken but in the wrong direction. In example, it had already been agreed upon by

nearly every cities’ Fire Department chiefs that smoking in the work place is an immense hazard

(Wagner). If this was so widely known, why did it occur so often? At the same time, the factory
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placed strict rules in regards to potential theft. Triangle survivor, Pauline Pepe, when interviewed

by two students at Cornell University, firmly felt that the girls she worked with would never steal

anything from the factory. In fact, she makes it clear that it would not even be possible.

"Nobody would take anything! There's one… one or two…

that had their [shirt]waists made. They all do different parts. They
don't sew a whole shirtwaist. Everybody makes sleeves... one
makes that. They don't do the whole blouse or anything. …... What
the hell did they close the door for? What did the think we were
going out with? What are we gonna do, steal a shirtwaist? Who the
heck wanted a shirtwaist?" (Pepe)

In addition to this simple and logical reasoning, records also show that Isaac Harris admitted that

the total value of stolen items over the years that the factory was in business was a mere $25.

Was it truly necessary to make the doors so narrow?

There were a number of laws that the Asch Building barely avoided violating. They

obviously were not charged for having a locked door, they barely had enough stairwells for the

amount of floor space on those floors, and the building was a mere single story short of being

considered a building necessitating non-wood structuring. The fire escape, although inadequate

having collapsed immediately after the fire began, was legal since that was a matter which was

up to the discretion of the owner of the building. (Linden “Building and Safety Laws”)

a. Wal-mart Lock-ins

Wal-Mart often had, and still does, lock-in night-shift workers to prevent theft of goods

and “unnecessary” employee breaks. Reflecting on this, it sounds extremely similar to the

situation in the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory back in 1911. Although there was no catastrophic

Wal-Mart fire that took the lives of 146 people, there have been other crises that come up.
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The first thing to note is that other large retail corporations do not lock-in workers.

Kmart, Sears, Toys ''R'' Us, Home Depot, and Costco have reported that lock-ins do not take

place within their factories or retail stores.

In 2004, a Texas employee, Michael Rodriguez, was working the night-shift at Sam’s

Club (which is a Wal-Mart subsidiary) when his foot was crushed by machinery. The only door

unlocked was a fire door yet employees were consistently threatened that they’d loose their job

for using the fire door in situations where there was no fire. This is very similar to the Triangle

factory where one door was opened and the other was allegedly locked but also off limits.

There was no manager on the floor with a key to unlock the door and it took an hour for

someone to finally come to his aid.

Similarly, in Colorado, a Wal-Mart employee by the name of Roy Ellsworth Jr., suffered

a severe asthma attack after closing time. All workers had been locked in by the store manager

until everything was cleaned and straightened out. No exceptions were made on Mr. Ellsworth’s

behalf.

Yet another incident occurred in Indiana when another employee suffered a heart attack

and was kept locked-in. It was reported that in the 1980’s and 1990’s, even the fire doors were

chained shut which is clearly a legal violation. Even in 1911, the doors were not chained shut so

how does this corporation do so nearly a century later? (Greenhouse)

There is something very similar to this “slipping past the rules” by the Triangle factory

owners found in the Wal-Mart cases. It is clear that in the 1980’s through the 1990’s, Wal-Mart

was breaking the Life Safety Code by locking and chaining the fire doors. Technically, locking

in workers today is legally acceptable as long as a fire door is left open (as it was in the case with

Rodriguez); however, this is something that truly ought to be given more thought. The Life
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Safety Code should be amended to prevent incidents such as the above to occurring. It is about

time that it is understood that fire is not the only thing that can create a workplace disaster. Just

as no one bothered about preventing a fire before the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory had its fire,

there are so many things that are being overlooked today that could be the next big workplace

disaster. Today, there are still businesses and corporations that continue to slip through the

system and manage to circumvent regulations. This could take a toll on not just worker safety but

economics, as well. The range of effects of deregulation can be seen from the S&L crisis to the

recent BP oil spill. (Moss)

b. September 11, 2001

It may seem that the Triangle fire ended with progressive steps for society. Disturbingly,

however, it seems that after all of the torture and toil endured in 1911, there are not many

differences in today's regulatory system and the price to pay for it is only getting worse.

The parallels between the Triangle factory and the terrorist attack at the World Trade

Center on September 11, 2001 seem to be like an episode of the Twilight Zone. Clara Lemlich

was the warning sign which was tossed aside in 1911. In 2001, there were fines surmounting $3

million on behalf of airline security not to mention 823 terrorism scares on airline between 1970

and 2001. These were ignored like the Russian immigrant standing up against Tammany Hall.

Triangle owners Harris and Blanck were tried but never convicted just as modern airlines put

their hands up and claimed no responsibility for the tragedies of 9/11. The New York Factory

Investigating Committee found a number of building regulation and fire safety violations in the

Triangle Factory. Similarly the National Construction Safety Team and the National Institute of

Standards and Technology have noted numerous regulatory infractions at the World Trade

Center, as well. (Sciavo)

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Before 9/11, it would be a lie to say that the attack was totally unforeseen and

unpredictable. The truth is that all at fault had plenty of warnings in the months preceding 9/11.

In January and March of 2001, U.S. airlines received notice of terrorist threats as a result of

Middle East violence. In April, the message was stronger as they were urged to “practice a high

degree of awareness.” Several warnings were given from June to August becoming more and

more specific in regards to possible attack locations, weapons, and individuals involved. If these

blatant messages were not obvious enough, you could look to the federal fines that American

Airlines and United Airlines both racked up. Together, they were charged over $6 million for

security violations. Mary Schiavo, former Inspector General to the U.S. Department of

Transportation, believes that it is not unlikely that terrorists may have targeted these airlines for

just that reason. (Schiavo)

After the attacks on 9/11, when the blame game was starting up, Hillary Clinton stated,

“The point is not to point fingers or place blame but to be sure we have learned to better prepare

ourselves.” (Schiavo) The question arises, though: Isn’t this what they said in response to the

Triangle Fire? And yet 9/11 happened. How do we know what Hillary Clinton said is not going

to be a repetition of what was stated in 1911? Investigations and preparations after disasters,

however, are getting better exponentially as time goes on.

The NIST has studied the collapse of the towers in depth by using computer recreations

of the attacks and modern science. They have been able to reconstruct the framework of the

towers to deduce that the fire was, indeed, the cause of collapse. Apparently, the uneven

distribution of heat due to fire in the floors and the core columns caused buckling and then a

chain reaction of collapsing levels. In fact, their diagrams show a structure that is very unsound

in the first place. The buildings were shaped like irregular trapezoids and the core columns from
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the upper levels did not align with those on the lower levels. It was a disaster waiting to happen

yet no one stopped it. (NIST)

Not only have investigations been more thorough, but airport security measures seem to

have been increased immensely since pre-9/11. Since the attack, the government passed the

Aviation and Transportation Security Act which set up the Transportation Security

Administration. This mandated federal officials to be in charge of airport security screenings.

Just as we now see sprinkler systems as commonplace after the Triangle Fire, we also consider

taking off shoes and having no liquid carry-on products over 3 oz. in airports routine. (Kaplan)

V. CONCLUSION

There have been tragedies connected to issues of deregulation and workplace hazards

from the Robber Barons of America’s Gilded Age to the recent BP oil spill. When, however, will

corporations and the government realize that the biggest concern is not how much will these laws

cost me but how do I protect the people of this country?

It would be ideal to learn from past advancements and foresee what might be our next

biggest disaster. Taking time to consider the future of safety laws, building precautions, and

other workplace codes, should not be put to the wayside. Agreeably, it seems that the public is

doing so more and more as time goes on given the magnitude of investigation and reforms that

takes place after modern-day catastrophes. The United States has moved on from simple

sprinkler systems and inspections to high tech smoke ventilation systems and computerized

security checks.

The Triangle Fire was not the be-all and end-all for workplace disasters and this is

nobody’s fault. There is no way that something such as 9/11 or any other modern-day crises

could be foreseen from 1911. We are, however, advancing quickly today and though this does
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not offer a psychic eye for future misfortunes, it does provide a strong foundation to tackle any

problems that arise more quickly and efficiently than ever before.
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Works Consulted

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Protection Assoc., 2001. Web. 21 Jan 2011.

<http://facilities.uah.edu/erp/documents/EvacuationPlanning.pdf>.

"Episode 7: Cities." America: The Story of Us. History Channel: 16 May 2010. Television.

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<http://www.archives.nysed.gov/a/research/res_topics_bus_guide_history.shtml>

Greenhouse, Steven. "Workers Assail Night Lock-Ins By Wal-Mart." New York Times 18

Jan. 2004: Front Page. Print. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/us/workers-assail-

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Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. UMKC, 2002. Web.

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Michaels, David. American Society of Safety Engineers and American Industrial Hygiene

Association Joint Meeting. United States Department of Labor. Washington, D.C.. 25

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March 2010. Speech.

Moss, David A. "Reversing the Null: Regulation, Deregulation, and the Power of Ideas."

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<http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-080.pdf>.

National Public Radio. Intervew by Deborah George. 1984. Web. 24 Oct 2010.

<http://www.npr.org/templates/dmg/dmg.php?

mediaURL=/wesat/19990313_wesat_triangle&NPRMediaPref=WM>

NIST. Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapses of the World

Trade Center Towers. , 2004. Web. 16 Jan 2011.

<http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/NCSTAR1ExecutiveSummary.pdf>.

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<http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/audio/oralhistories/pauline_pepe.mp3>.

Schiavo, Mary. "Statement of Mary Schiavo to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Upon the United States." Second public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States. 23 May 2003. Address.

Tyler, Gus. Look for the Union Label: A History of the International Ladies Garment

Workers Unions. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995

Von Drehle, David. Triangle: The Fire that Changed America. New York, NY: Atlantic

Monthly Press, 2003. pp 212-215. Print.

Wagner, Robert F., Preliminary Report of the Factory Investigating Commission. Albany,

NY: The Argus Co., 1912

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