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Some Ideas on Super Being

Some Ideas on Super Being

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Item from 2004.
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Published by: howard3794 on Oct 04, 2010
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'The first, but enduring impression of Kerala is of multitudes: people
streaming in all directions, filling every street, besieging every shop, forming
instant crowds at the scene of any happening - an elephant bogged down in a
ditch, two auto-rickshaws after collision, a boy on a hobbyhorse beating a
drum. Privacy is unknown, nor does there appear to be any desire for it.
Twenty-nine million Keralans are crammed into a 580-mile-long strip of land
between the high mountains and the sea on the Indian south-west coast. This
state has been described as a continuous village. Its population is packed three
times more densely than the Indian average.
A wonderful combination of geographical and climatic factors has
spared it from the misery so often coexistent with a high level of the human
presence. The soil is superbly fertile, the waters of the Arabian Sea bordering
the state teem with fish, the mountains have kept out all but the most
determined invaders, and two infallible monsoons renew the rivers and water
the crops. Kerala experiences neither famines nor floods, and somehow or
other the multitudes are fed.

Apart from the sheer weight of numbers, the Keralan scene is one of
antlike activity. It is the homeland of cottage industry, with people busying
themselves in public on all sides with an assortment of small-scale enterprises.
To the newcomer an arresting sight is that of the female members of whole
families settled for mile after mile at the side of main roads to break stones:

the seven-year-olds tapping away with their toy hammers, stylish teenagers
wielding four-pounders with accuracy and effect, aged and toothless
grandmothers sorting out the chippings into piles according to size. The
onlooker may object that stone-breaking machines could easily replace this
human labour. To this the reply is, what in that case would all these people do
with their spare time?

(The Happy Ant Heap, Norman Lewis, Jonathan Cape, 1998, page 129-130)

Happy! This is the main thread to pull form this little fluffy ball of literary
ephemera. Think back to the illustration from the work of Fox and Tiger, to their
remark telling us that whatever humans do, as a matter of established behaviour, they
do in response to their evolved nature, even though they then contradicted this by
saying the rise in population was pathological and had induced a predominance of
pathological behaviours in humankind. As we can see from the above, this image of
squalor, is cast as one of happy contentment in squalor. The point being that it is not
population density that amounts to squalor, but the consequent pressure on basic
necessities. Thus, as long as we have food and shelter we are content to form a
biomass as dense as we possibly can. This is the ultimate demonstration of our
human nature, and here we see that it exudes an image of happiness to those who
witness it.

But such happiness is rare, and this is why the author makes a point of noting
it is a product of exceptional circumstances, the population density and consequent
squalor is an endemic feature of human life and much about our existence is in fact
not characterised by happiness, but still we go on.
And we have another fine piece of illustrative writing to insert in this section
to make our point. Selecting and inserting quotes from authors willy-nilly into a work
seems bad form, so lets remind ourselves of the peculiar nature of the effort we are
about in this work. We have noted that an archaeology of the mind, or if you prefer,
an archaeology of knowledge, it is pretty much the same thing, is a legitimate way of
understanding our mode of investigation of human nature. Knowledge is a cultural
deposit like any other cultural deposit in that it can be unearthed and examined,
related to it chronological place in the history of the society of interest, and used to
give a modern interpretation of what human nature is. Thus intellectual mediums are
artifacts, and as such they can be selected and displayed as such. If this work be
considered to be a work of philosophy, which I reluctantly confess it must be, then we
might consider it to be the world's first ever fully illustrated work of philosophy and
in this block just here we have the illustrations, extracts from literary works selected
for their rich use of linguistic imagery, making them perfect for the purpose of
illustration, being light hearted, colourful, thought provoking in a way pertinent to the
subject, as such something to just skim over and delight in, before returning to the
made body of the text which demands fuller attention.


Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must
entirely fail of its aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain
that abounds everywhere in the world, and originates in needs and necessities

inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose at all and the result of mere
chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be
something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule.
I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems
of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in character. Evil is just what is
positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to
defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his position by using a
palpable and paltry sophism.(1) It is the good which is negative; in other
words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some
state of pain brought to an end.
This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not nearly
so pleasant as we expected, and pain very much more painful.
The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or at
any rate, there is an even balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see
shortly whether this statement is true, let him compare the respective feelings
of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other.
The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will be the
thought of other people who are in a still worse plight than yourself; and this is
a form of consolation open to everyone. But what an awful fate this means for
mankind as a whole!

We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of the
butcher, who chooses out first one and then another for his prey. So it is that
in our good days we are all unconscious of the evil Fate may have presently in
store for us sickness, poverty, mutilation, loss of sight or reason.
No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is
continually pressing upon us, never letting us take breath, but always coming
after us like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any moment Time stays his hand,
it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom.
But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst
asunder if the pressure of the atmosphere were removed, so, if the lives of men
were relieved of all need, hardship and adversity; if everything they took in
hand were successful, they would be so swollen with arrogance that, though
they might not burst, they would present the spectacle of unbridled folly nay,
they would go mad. And I may say, further, that a certain amount of care or
pain or trouble is necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast
is unstable and will not go straight.
Certain it is that work, worry, labour and trouble, form the lot of
almost all men their whole life long. But if all wishes were fulfilled as soon as
they arose, how would men occupy their lives? If the world were a paradise of
luxury and ease, a land flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack
obtained his Jill at once and without any difficulty, men would either die of
boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars, massacres, and murders;
so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on itself than it has
now to accept at the hands of Nature.
In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children
in a theatre before the curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly
waiting for the play to begin. It is a blessing that we do not know what is
really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times when children
might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and
as yet all unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless every man

desires to reach old age; in other words, a state of life of which it may be said:
"It is bad to-day, and it will be worse to-morrow; and so on till the worst of

1) Translators Note, cf. Théod: § 153. Leibnitz argued that evil is a negative
quality i.e., the absence of good; and that its active and seemingly positive
character is an incidental and not an essential part of its nature. Cold, he said,
is only the absence of heat, and the active power of expansion in freezing
water is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The fact
is that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an increase of
repulsion amongst its molecules; and Schopenhauer is quite right in calling the
whole argument a sophism.

(Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays, Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by
Thomas Bailey Saunders, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1908. Pages 11 - 13)

Boy, now that is what I call philosophy where's the rope! Imagine being so
inclined as to write like that. It is Marvin the paranoid android from The Hitch Hikers
Guide to the Galaxy
in the flesh. Apparently, if I remember rightly, he was an
aristocrat who lived in a castle, so what the hell he had to be so down-the-gob about I
cannot imagine, he should of been on the Happy ant-hill smashing rocks, as he says, I
suppose, boredom is a nightmare. Actually, although I see this is so for most people, I
would rather be bored to death than worked to death by the enforced boredom of

I hate work unreservedly. Work is not living, work is hell seeping through to
the wrong side of death. Life is not work, life is just living. Such off-the-cuff
remarks are the way I am inclined to rebuff the above notions about life, misery,
work, boredom and such like. He should of gone the pub more often, I would myself,
but there enough days in the week.
But this philosopher gives us another view of the scene painted by the last
artist of human life. This emphasises the point that we do not live the way that we do
because we choose to, however you cut it, we live the way we do because we live the
way we do, and that is that. This week, today is 29/05/04, a prominent item in the
news has been flash floods in the Caribbean neck of the woods. 1500 or so were
drowned. But it turns out that where whole villages were washed away the people
who lived in them were the rock bottom of the social structure, they eked out a living
by cutting down the trees amongst which they lived and making charcoal to sell.
Without the trees the land was turned to mud when the rain came, as I presume it was
bound to do, and they were, in effect, making a living by digging their own watery
graves. This is Schopenhauer's image of life made real, and there is no need for it
since we know better, but we cannot help behaving like this, for complicated reasons
to do with our nature, which imposes the structure upon society that we must work
with, like the innocent children eagerly awaiting their future, completely oblivious of
its meaning.

And finally, since I have one nice and handy, we might select a further piece,
from another author, who notes this oft noted likeness between the human social
scene and that of the busy ant, but this time our object will be to observe how the
scientific establishment regards any such comparison.

On Societies as Organisms

Viewed from a suitable height, the aggregating clusters of medical scientists in
the bright sunlight of the boardwalk at Atlantic City, swarmed there from everywhere
for the annual meetings, have the look of assemblages of social insects. There is the
same vibrating, ionic movement, interrupted by the darting back and forth of jerky
individuals to touch antennae and exchange small bits of information; periodically,
the mass casts out, like a trout-line, a long single file unerringly toward Childs's. If the
boards were not fastened down, it would not be a surprise to see them put together a
nest of sorts.

It is permissible to say this sort of thing about humans. They do resemble, in
their most compulsively social behavior, ants at a distance. It is, however, quite bad
form in biological circles to put it the other way round, to imply that the operation of
insect societies has any relation at all to human affairs. The writers of books on insect
behavior generally take pains, in their prefaces, to caution that insects are like
creatures from another planet, that their behavior is absolutely foreign, totally
unhuman, unearthly, almost unbiological. They are more like perfectly tooled but
crazy little machines, and we violate science when we try to read human meanings in
their arrangements.

It is hard for a bystander not to do so. Ants are so much like human beings as
to be an embarrassment. They farm fungi, raise aphids as livestock, launch armies into
wars, use chemical sprays to alarm and confuse enemies, capture slaves. The families
of weaver ants engage in child labor, holding their larvae like shuttles to spin out the
thread that sews the leaves together for their fungus gardens. They exchange
information ceaselessly. They do everything but watch television.
What makes us most uncomfortable is that they, and the bees and termites and
social wasps, seem to live two kinds of lives: they are individuals, going about the
day's business without much evidence of thought for tomorrow, and they are at the
same time component parts, cellular elements, in the huge, writhing, ruminating
organism of the Hill, the nest, the hive. It is because of this aspect, I think, that we
most wish for them to be something foreign. We do not like the notion that there can
be collective societies with the capacity to behave like organisms. If such things exist,
they can have nothing to do with us.
Still, there it is. A solitary ant, afield, cannot be considered to have much of
anything on his mind; indeed, with only a few neurons strung together by fibers, he
can't be imagined to have a mind at all, much less a thought. He is more like a
ganglion on legs. Four ants together, or ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, begin to
look more like an idea. They fumble and shove, gradually moving the food toward the
Hill, but as though by blind chance. It is only when you watch the dense mass of
thousands of ants, crowded together around the Hill, blackening the ground, that you
begin to see the whole beast, and now you observe it thinking, planning, calculating.
It is an intelligence, a kind of live computer, with crawling bits for its wits.
At a stage in the construction, twigs of a certain size are needed, and all the
members forage obsessively for twigs of just this size. Later, when outer walls are to
be finished, thatched, the size must change, and as though given new orders by
telephone, all the workers shift the search to the new twigs. If you disturb the
arrangement of a part of the Hill, hundreds of ants will set it vibrating, shifting, until it
is put right again. Distant sources of food are somehow sensed, and long lines, like
tentacles, reach out over the ground, up over walls, behind boulders, to fetch it in.

Termites are even more extraordinary in the way they seem to accumulate
intelligence as they gather together. Two or three termites in a chamber will begin to
pick up pellets and move them from place to place, but nothing comes of it; nothing is
built. As more join in, they seem to reach a critical mass, a quorum, and the thinking
begins. They place pellets atop pellets, then throw up columns and beautiful, curving,
symmetrical arches, and the crystalline architecture of vaulted chambers is created. It
is not known how they communicate with each other, how the chains of termites
building one column know when to turn toward the crew on the adjacent column, or
how, when the time comes, they manage the flawless joining of the arches. The
stimuli that set them off at the outset, building collectively instead of shifting things
about, may be pheromones released when they reach committee size. They react as if
alarmed. They become agitated, excited, and then they begin working, like artists.
Bees live lives of organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, all at the same time.
The single bee, out of the hive retrieving sugar (instructed by the dancer: "south-
southeast for seven hundred meters, clover-mind you make corrections for the
sundrift") is still as much a part of the hive as if attached by a filament. Building the
hive, the workers have the look of embryonic cells organizing a developing tissue;
from a distance they are like the viruses inside a cell, running off row after row of
symmetrical polygons as though laying down crystals. When the time for swarming
comes, and the old queen prepares to leave with her part of the population, it is as
though the hive were involved in mitosis. There is an agitated moving of bees back
and forth, like granules in cell sap. They distribute themselves in almost precisely
equal parts, half to the departing queen, half to the new one. Thus, like an egg, the
great, hairy, black and golden creature splits in two, each with an equal share of the
family genome.

The phenomenon of separate animals joining up to form an organism is not
unique in insects. Slime-mold cells do it all the time, of course, in each life cycle. At
first they are single amebocytes swimming around, eating bacteria, aloof from each
other, untouching, voting straight Republican. Then, a bell sounds, and acrasin is
released by special cells toward which the others converge in stellate ranks, touch,
fuse together, and construct the slug, solid as a trout. A splendid stalk is raised, with a
fruiting body on top, and out of this comes the next generation of amebocytes, ready
to swim across the same moist ground, solitary and ambitious.
Herring and other fish in schools are at times so closely integrated, their
actions so coordinated, that they seem to be functionally a great multi-fish organism.
Flocking birds, especially the seabirds nesting on the slopes of offshore islands in
Newfoundland, are similarly attached, connected, synchronized.
Although we are by all odds the most social of all social animals more
interdependent, more attached to each other, more inseparable in our behavior than
bees we do not often feel our conjoined intelligence. Perhaps, however, we are
linked in circuits for the storage, processing, and retrieval of information, since this
appears to be the most basic and universal of all human enterprises. It may be our
biological function to build a certain kind of Hill. We have access to all the
information of the biosphere, arriving as elementary units in the stream of solar
photons. When we have learned how these are rearranged against randomness, to
make, say, springtails, quantum mechanics, and the late quartets, we may have a
clearer notion how to proceed. The circuitry seems to be there, even if the current is
not always on.

The system of communications used in science should provide a neat,
workable model for studying mechanisms of information-building in human society.

Ziman, in a recent Nature essay, points out, "the invention of a mechanism for the
systematic publication of fragments of scientific work may well have been the key
event in the history of modern science.". He continues:

A regular journal carries from one research worker to another the various . . .
observations which are of common interest. . . . A typical scientific paper has never
pretended to be more than another little piece in a larger jigsaw not significant in
itself but as an element in a grander scheme. This technique, of soliciting many
modest contributions to the store of human knowledge, has been the secret of Western
science since the seventeenth century, for it achieves a corporate, collective power
that is far greater than any one individual can exert
[italics mine].

With some alternation of terms, some toning down, the passage could describe

the building of a termite nest.

It is fascinating that the word "explore" does not apply to the searching aspect
of the activity, but has its origins in the sounds we make while engaged in it. We like
to think of exploring in science as a lonely, meditative business, and so it is in the first
stages, but always, sooner or later, before the enterprise reaches completion, as we
explore, we call to each other, communicate, publish, send letters to the editor, present
papers, cry out on finding.
(Page 11 - 15)

(The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher, Lewis Thomas, published by

Allen Lane 1980.)

And so there we have it in a nutshell, but on we go, trying to do something to
allow us to break free from these priestly constraints. We need to coin a new phrase
for the scientific study of corporate behaviour, Hillism.
The result of reasoning, as many have over the centuries, and indeed
millennia, that various social structures mimic specialised body parts is to bring this
whole idea of corporate being occurring at the social level together by recognising
that human society appears in the physical form of an exoskeleton, a highly elaborate
structural exoskeleton within which the living cells exist differentiated functionally
according to their location within the organism's body. Ouspensky fails completely to
even begin to approach this kind of logical culmination to his supposedly organic
reasoning. He offers no formulation of the human superorganism as a living organism
comparative in real terms to a familiar organic structure such as science deals with
ordinarily. Consequently he uses the intuitively realizable implications of the idea to
inspire an elaboration upon the age old mythology of Judaism to which his life is
devoted via the medium of esoteric knowledge. He grasps the implications of certain
collective behaviours, such as war, without having a clue how to account for them.
But as he does this, maddeningly, he raises exactly the issues that attract my attention
and in exactly the right context. War is, in the context of the complex superorganism
the most natural and healthy activity, it is the personification of growth. As long as a
society can find victims to attack by engaging in war it is in good fettle, and this is
why war is the hallmark of Jewish society, by which I means more explicitly the
Christian society whose history I am more familiar with, but of course now the Jews
have their own territory to play with as well as manipulating 'ours' we see the only
occupation that really fills them with joy is the slaughter of defenceless civilians.
And Islam is the same. I do mean to be critical in a political sense, I cannot help it, I

am an individual, but in truth this behaviour is simply the inevitable product of human
Hillistic behaviour, the human organism has to expand its territory, that is what it
does, and there can be only one. And this process of expansion takes exactly the form
that Ouspensky notes, one of an amorphous expansion involving the eradication and
incorporation of organisms by one another according to the outcome of their
meetings. Outcomes that are determined by the physiological structure of the
competing organisms. Physiology which is empowered structurally by dint of the
intensity of information that is at the disposal of the Queen body directing its growth.
Which is just another way of saying that knowledge is power.


The relationship between individual and corporate form. This subject is the
source of so much intellectual gush and argument, Do we need more!! It
cannot be avoided. Ouspensky offers us a rare, if not completely unique, opportunity
to consider the question of individuality within the context of an argument that extols
the reality of Super Being, and so we must note his comments on this subject.
We have already seen that the process of evolving a superorganic being
composed of individually defined organism requires an extension of the process of
increasing structural complexity by means of generating foci of interdependent
differentiation amongst the individual units of which the superorganism is to be
formed. The realisation of this process of interdependent differentiation demands that
the units themselves have a severely limited sense of self. For a sense of self to be
limited it must impose a sense that although an individual cannot see further than the
end of their nose they feel certain that they see everything there is to see. Human
consciousness, as experienced by individuals must be severely limited if a true
superorganic form is to be a real outcome of human nature. Thus the idea of the
individual is the most essential feature of the human superorganism within which
there is no such thing as a human individual. Maddening to think about isn't it.
How is this balance to be struck between a sense of self consciousness that
feels all embracing, and the reality of a consciousness that it virtually nonexistent?
The answer to this question involves the nature of linguistic physiology and the mode
of information it relays, which is so perfectly evolved that a linguistic image replaces
all other images derived from sensory information in the final summation that forms
the conscious sense of self and existence. Language is a looking glass, and it evolved
to be so, precisely in order to deliver this full blown sense of consciousness that is
utterly artificial in its result, making it the exact opposite of self consciousness.
This linguistic hardware is all very well, but the linguistic images themselves
are not self generating, just as legs for locomotion are all very well but journeys do
not just happen because legs exist, the legs have to do the walking that makes the
journeys legs are capable of real. Likewise with mirrors of self deception that
linguistic physiology evolved to make possible, the linguistic images still have to be
fabricated and beamed out into the world where they can function as images of self
awareness by stimulating the sensory organs of information reception, the brains of

It follows in a manner logically consistent with the physiology of a
superorganism that if the evolution of a highly defined organ of authority ensures the
evolution of highly defined individuals then the evolution of a strong sense of self, the
crucial attribute of consciousness that makes a socially functional individual possible,
is likely to be a feature of humans. Making a strong sense of self a feature of an
argument in which the major challenge to conventional wisdom is that there is no

such thing as self seems, at first, to be contradictory, to say the least. This apparent
contradiction has all the appearance of being self serving, fulfilling a desire to have
ones cake and eat it, in exactly the manner of all the usual self serving mythologists
who make a habit of asserting whatever it pleases them to assert by means of an artful
distortion of meaning in their use of familiar words.
But we are talking here of a contradiction born of an attribute of
misconception fabricated by the knowledge perverts who gave us our sacred
knowledge in the first place. The priest produces the image of reality that linguistic
physiology intended should be produced in order that a priesthood could exist.
Therefore the contradiction was created by evolution, and the apparent contradiction
which appears when science notes the real situation is only apparent, and results from
the fact that nature has produced an animal that believes it is self conscious when it is
not because its self consciousness is an illusion. Thus science, as rendered here, is not
saying that there is a superorganism and individuals, it is saying there is a
superorganism composed of units which it unites into itself by means of a corporate
image that each unit experiences, due to their corporate nature in the form of their
linguistic physiology, as a self image.
We are dealing with a contradiction born of a misconception that amounts to a
highly circumscribed sense of awareness that enables an individual to be highly self
conscious, with an intimate and rich sense of self, but otherwise, is completely blind.
And even this self awareness is an illusion. The corporate mind overcomes this
barrier of self centred awareness that focuses the individual upon themselves and their
own interests by acting as the source of the illusion which it radiates in the form of
culture and thus implants into the brain of each individual to which it has access. The
primary medium of corporate self consciousness is religion, superimposed on the
prior main medium of corporate identity which was racial physiology. And obviously
the primary requirement for this facility of linguistic physiology, the production of an
image of self consciousness that is corporate in origin, is the evolution of a core organ
of authority from which the artificial image of identity can be derived.
So linguistic physiology is the hardware of consciousness, as legs are the
hardware of locomotion. Hardware of consciousness produces images, as hardware
of locomotion produces journey which in a sense can be said to map a terrain just as
linguistic images do. But both the products of these physiological attributes have an
extended purpose and overtime they make their mark on the environment so that
journeys result in trails which dictate the route the legs will take, and linguistic
images result in the coalescence of centres of culture where cultural forms are
preserved and which dictate the images that people will experience as their
consciousness of reality. Evolutionary physiology is externalised in this way. And
the evolution of an elite caste organ is the consequence of linguistic physiology just
much as track ways are a result of locomotive physiology. Physiology lays down
structure in the human world in a most elaborate fashion and this is because humans
are a superorganism and their physiology is extended in so elaborate a fashion that it
constitutes exoskeleton and the living units become entirely dependant upon the
extended physiology they, due to their received artificial images of reality, believe
they are responsible for creating!
Ouspensky's interpretation of the three relevant, according to him, Biblical
myths, is delightful, and in terms of the creation of an organ of authority, quite
convincing. His conclusion that the three myths are about human evolution is
important in terms of teasing out the connective threads between his mythological

reasoning and the science he is trying to embrace by extending the esoteric mode of
understanding to cover the new dominant idea of his day, which was evolution.
The reality of mythology's central position in human affairs means that myths
must deliver true power. Consequently, within the dominant cultural heritage of our
time, that of Jewish culture, we should find the functional component of myth that
emulates reality. These functional information components will be encoded in such a
way that they enable the organism whose biomass is imbued with the resulting
artificial image of reality, a linguistic image which constitutes the organism's
corporate identity, an identity that is infused intimately into each individual in the
form of their self consciousness, to comply with the dictates of human nature. And
this conformity between reality and myth is what Ouspensky brings out of the three
Biblical myths for us by way of his matter of fact interpretation of their meaning. He
indicates how these myths each deliver a message to those who know how to interpret
it of a deep understanding of the mechanisms operating in relation to the existence of
the inner circle which is our organ of authority, or super-organ, the brain which
delivers identity, motivation, and direct action to the biomass within which it exists.
These myths instruct the 'chosen', the priests, how to retain their status as the core of
an ascendant superorganic being, and thus to be its identity and the focus of the
purpose that the same identity necessarily imparts to the biomass implanted with it.
The Jews as a cultural body evolved about this priesthood that arose from
within the melting pot of Mesopotamian civilizations, to form a superorganic being
that became so defined as to become a hierarchical structure, and, as a result of the
continuing expansion of the superorganic being that Judaism gave rise to. I see no
other way of understanding the history of Western civilisation than to see the Jews as
being the motive force behind the rise of Greek and Roman culture since this is what
eventually delivered the world to the Christian and Moslem dominion of today.
Precisely how this relationship was borne out is not clear to me since I am not a
scholar of the ancient world but we do have to think of Judaism as some sort of social
being which is special and which supports at its core some kind of priesthood that is
just as operative in the world today as ever it was in Ancient Greece two and a half
thousand years ago. But trying to be precise about this question is very tricky, it is of
never ending interest to me and I could discuss the matter, but it is a detail of the
argument and not central to the idea of Super Being, although in political terms, it is
of the greatest importance for our world today since the ruling force in society still
relies upon the hidden aspect of this knowledge and this is precisely why science has
been so perverted to prevent us from knowing our own true nature as we might if we
were free of theocratic authority.


The self-evolving being. This is perhaps Ouspensky's most marvellous flight
of fancy. Once again, at the heart of this particular expression, we find the
true thread of reasoning that interprets human society in a manner appropriate to the
central idea of human society as a living organism. The unique quality of humans,
what Ouspensky calls the characteristic of being self-evolving, is an attribute of life
forms toward which Nature is driven, no matter what base structure She has to work

The idea that humans are unique, within the context of scientific reasoning, is
so insane as to be downright offensive to any scientist. That said, it is true that all
scientists recognise the absolute uniqueness of human beings. This sounds like a
contradiction, but it is only a linguistic contradiction, the reality is so. The best

analogy I can offer to explain how these contradictory conditions can exist at one and
the same time is to offer you the idea of a corrupt police force. A police officer
prevents crime, therefore it is impossible for a police officer to commit crime. But we
all know all police officers are 'flexible', and some are downright criminal, and some
police forces are rooted in crime. The West's scientific establishment was set up by
the theocracy, and it is of the order of an institution like a police force based on crime,
set up to serve the needs of an autocratic dictator. All scientists are by definition the
absolute enemies of science, where they are required to be, which is in this one crucial
area concerning human nature, and the requirement to guarantee that the duality of
theistic mythology will always dictate the development of science in the field of
human self knowledge.

This is so obvious that the scientist-priests even write books which present
arguments that are folded in upon their own distortions, such as Another Unique
Species: Patterns in Human Evolutionary Ecology
, Robert Foley, first published
1987. This book opens with a chapter entitled The Problem of Human Uniqueness.
We can compare this title, in our imagination, with a religious treatise that a theist
may well see fit to pen entitled The Problem of Christ's Resurrection from Death.
The theist sets up the fiction, absurdity supreme, and then writes books to try and
figure out how these 'self evident facts', that are manifestly stupid, can be accounted
for. It is utter obscenity. But, this is stupidity with a purpose, like the obscenity of
setting up a police force to combat crime which is itself the source of all crime.
Following the terrible Moslem attack on Madrid a couple of months ago, the terrorists
responsible were found to be of Moroccan extraction, at least in part, and this brought
the Moroccan trade in cannabis under scrutiny as a source of revenue funding the
terrorist. Visiting a hill farmer to see how the trade was conducted it turned out that
although it was illegal to grow marijuana, the Chief of Police in the local district sent
his officers round annually to the farms to collect the tithe from the hashish crop.
This is an endemically corrupt police force, it is in effect an institution of state, and it
is a perfectly common model, one found in less sophisticated societies than our own
where wealth is less plentiful than we are use to, and a more traditional hierarchical
authority is the cultural norm.

But in our fabulous society, the ancient mythology reigns supreme in its own
way. Just as, when all is said and done, Ancient Greek society can be seen to of been
an absolute theocracy, despite its great intellectual achievements as a culture, in that
when thinkers challenged the idea that the earth was at the centre of the universe, the
geocentric model, by proposing that the earth travelled about the sun, the heliocentric
model, these intellectuals were threatened with death, ousted from their societies for
the threat the posed to the theocratic edifice of knowledge which was the foundation
of authority, and their works have not come down to us so we do not know how good,
or how bad, their arguments were. Today the system is not so blunt, control is
managed by a swamping effect, and mighty effective it is. But we have, at the core of
the idea of human uniqueness a homocentric world view, upon which theocracy
depends for its authority. The alternative, that I call a biocentric world view, in which
humans are recognised to be a part of nature, and perfectly in accord with that status,
so that no alternative account is required for the location of humanity in the biosphere
of life than that which we would seek to apply to any other organism on earth.
And so, how does Ouspensky deal with this difficulty? Well, the beauty of his
thinking is that he effectively takes his logic to the most superb conclusion, he
recognises, in effect, that humans have a nature in common with other species, such
as the ant. I find this so delightful I cannot help but smile at this. But then, of all

things, how does the man escape from the rigour of his own logic? It beggars belief.
He uses the logic of the mystical ideas he has been developing for us that account for
the evolution of human society by way of wisdom focused in an inner circle which is
sifted into a concentration of wisdom at a focal point by way of a series of inevitable
calamities, a bit like that experienced in the Caribbean this week, as noted above, no
doubt, brought on by the nastiness of the inner circle which allows people to live in
squalor without doing anything about it.
The result is he comes up with the most amazing idea. It seems that any
though is permissible to these damned priests, any though but that which is true. By
saying that ants are, in common with humans, a species that has the attribute of being
'self-evolving', he is saying that human nature and ant nature are the same. Both
humans and ants are superorganic beings with a corporate nature. He very nicely
recognises that this quality must apply to different body plans that are differentiated at
a fundamental level, and this is excellent, it is a most important point to grasp from a
scientific point of view for this is what loads the mammalian physiology with the
potential to unfold into a superorganic form and this therefore establishes the quality
we would call purpose in nature that all theists, and their scientist kind, tell us does
not exist in nature; it is a unique attribute of humans.
Ouspensky however, despite all this wonderful reasoning on the subject in
hand, then comes up with the most extraordinary way of preserving the attribute of
being self-evolving as unique to humans by saying that these species which, by virtue
of their social systems reveal their common nature with humans, must of been earlier
experiments in the same vein as that being conducted upon human kind today, and
therefore logic, esoteric logic that is, tells us they too must of had rounds of calamity
causing a centrifugal effect sifting knowledge into an inner circle of authority but that
in the end they had one fall too far and descended into the living hell of being
absolute automatons that we see ants are today. It is quite remarkable, but I guess in
the broad scheme of the gush these people come out with it is pretty much par for the
course, it is only exceptional because of the subject that is being dealt with on this
occasion. Nice, I love it.

So humans get to remain unique despite their common nature with other
species. The scientists would approve, and with the likes of Foley and Ouspensky on
the team it is little wonder that the obscenity of Judaism has been able to survive for
so long, and continue to be in the ascendant at all times.
Here then, we see Ouspensky and modern science united as one, the esoteric
mythologist and the scientist have one mind. And yet you should of seen how reviled
I was when I encroached upon a BBC maintained website purporting to be for
scientists and offered my superorganic interpretations of questions regarding race and
such like. Nasty, nasty. When I discovered this piece by Ouspensky recently, in a
book I ad bought a few years ago, I felt I knew why the scientists should be so
outraged by someone expressing the idea of human superorganic form, if people like
Ouspensky had given it such a bad name, but upon closer examination we see the
story is far from being so straightforward and it just makes me wonder who the hell
these dammed scientists are, and just what they really know. When you think of the
avowed work of the secret societies such as the Freemasons who have no shame about
combining all ideas in their effort to aid in the theistic control of society it is perfectly
possible that people in these establishments know the truth as I have discovered it,
and are always on guard against it. But that is another story, we can only hope to find
the means to circumvent the control of these knowledge perverts and thus to help
bring them to their end.

Both Ouspensky and the modern scientist agree on the central attribute of
human nature, humans are self-evolving in their eyes. Man makes himself, so the
intellectuals from all walks of life never tire of telling us. The difference between
them is that whereas the scientist displays all the idiocy of the priest in asserting this
attribute to be a unique feature of the human species, at least Ouspensky's logic in this
one respect, as insane as his reasoning is that follows from its application, is far
superior to that of the modern priest of human nature who exists in the guise of the
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, evolutionary scientist and so on. For
Ouspensky sees the existence of a central idea and recognises it must be inclusive of
all life, and as such he is actuated by the logic of the biocentric model of life, rather
than the homocentric model, even though, as we know, he is soon pulled back into the
force field of false, self centred reasoning, that makes the inner circle appear as an
organ within the biomass of society. But while he allows himself to be influenced by
the true scientific logic he allows the idea of inclusivity to flow unimpeded by
arrogant assumptions about what existence is, and what humanity is. The only trouble
is that he then channels the flow of scientific logic in-between the walls of his esoteric
channel and so toward the depths of the lake of stupidity built up behind the damn
built by modern science on the foundations of Darwin's work on evolution which
focused out attention on our form, and which disregarded our nature. Ouspensky did
not simply refuse to address the idea of human organic being, but it is only because he
wanted to impose a mystical interpretation on the dominant idea of evolution that he
let his imagination go in this direction, and of course the scientists are not trying to
assert a mythological idea of existence, they are trying to accommodate one by
allowing science and religion to exist side by side.
It is fascinating to consider how Ouspensky applied himself to this idea of
human society as an organism. The detail I have mentioned that is so well
considered. He recognises that the thrust of any broad sweep of Nature toward the
perfection of a being in the social domain must be constrained by physiological limits.
Consequently he reasons that the path leading to humans is in the guise of mammalian
physiology, and that outside this specific physiological constraint other true paths to
the same end must be considered possible. I think this is a most remarkable
conclusion to draw for a man who is approaching the matter as he is, as a mythologist,
and this is so because he is so right in drawing this conclusion. Why has this simple
idea never occurred to any scientist, of any kind? Plenty of scientist have headed in
this direction, the American anthropologist Leslie A. White, whose last work The
Concept of Cultural Systems: A Key to Understanding Tribes and Nations
, Columbia
University Press, 1975, was published posthumously in the year he died, talked the
talk, but he never even began to walk the walk toward this correct interpretation that
Ouspensky makes here. Ouspensky is the only writer I have ever found that goes the
whole hog and asserts human society is a living being, and Ouspensky is an out and
out nutter that I would not want to be seen dead with. Isn't life strange ........
Although Ouspensky's consideration of this idea is oddly expressed, like the
oddness of the myth of Noah's Ark as a way of accounting for the evolution of
superorganic super-organ of authority, the inner circle, is essentially correct in terms
of illuminating the broad sweep of the process he is considering here. His expression
tallies so well with my purely scientifically inspired interpretation of what we know
about ourselves at the turn of the twenty-first century that we cannot help but be
impressed by Ouspensky's account and the effort he made to create it. I guess that
like the path toward true love, the route toward true knowledge can be a long, and
sometimes, a very winding road.

The potted social history of the corporate insects, the bees and the ants,
provided by Ouspensky is remarkable, what a fella! The part of this social history
delights me most of all where I find my insect counterpart engaged in precisely the
same activity, of raising the alarm, as I am engaged in now. But, likewise, no doubt,
to no avail. I see, occurring all around me, a major transformation of an English
society into the base homogeneity of a global culture, and I weep inside. A small
example can be plucked from this weeks media flow, today is 20-5-04, and a couple
of night ago on the regional news there was a piece about deckchairs in Blackpool. A
local councillor, a women, of course. Women have no sense of quality, their
physiology, it seems to me, causes women to always want renewal. That sounds
sexist, but hell, if I had to have a human grow inside me, and to give birth, I would
want to have some bloody good reason to go through the process of such biological
renewal, and I think the idea of a better future, expressed in material renewal is buried
deep in the female psyche, we see all the time women despising the rich quality of
age, such as we find on an old piece of brass, and preferring the bright shine of a
polished piece of metal that makes all look nice and new. I have a battered old copper
teapot, probably from some Hindu region of the Asian subcontinent, I grasped from a
table where a crowd was fishing for bargains and I paid £5, it has never been cleaned
and it age and genuineness reeks delightfully. One whisk of polish and all that would
be gone, but because it was dirty and looked just like the later twentieth century
imports in style no one had the least interest in it. Their is no depth to the
appreciation of old things, no sense of the culture that such things contain within then
by means of their preservation of style. This is typical of the female psyche and
because we live in a world where men must please women in order to get the only
thing that matters to them in life, the love of a women, then powerful men make the
eradication of culture and its replacement with polish the be all and all of their art.
All of which, conforms perfectly to the requirement of the ever growing
superorganism which wants old to be decayed and replaced by new, like a jungle
recycling itself.

But the deckchairs, I suppose I had better tell you about the deckchairs, I just
know you're dying to know about them. This lady councillor was calling for the
deckchairs to be removed from the sea front. She wanted a continental format to be
adopted. "What is wrong with the continental style, they have it everywhere in the
world, why should we not have it in Blackpool?" she said. Quite, I rest my case, she
answers her own question even as she asks it.
Yesterday, today is, now, 01/06/04, the government announced a programme
of measures to deal with the possible threat from Nile disease. In America last year
some two hundred and eighty people were killed by this, hitherto, African disease.
More people, travelling more quickly, about the globe meant these viruses could make
the leap into as yet uncharted territories. This is the global superorganism for real.
But this homogenisation that we try to stop is no different in kind than the
homogenisation that we try to encourage, in terms of homogenising culture. There is
nothing we can do to stop genetic viruses from existing and there is nothing we can do
to stop linguistic-genes existing, such as the linguistic gene called 'continental style'.
It would be nice to be able to stop all these diseases from invading out world, but we
cannot, we have to accept that the priests, the councillors, have a biological role to
play in the organism and what they do always meets with approval. She is right that
the young have no sentimentality about crappy old furniture, they do have a craving to
have whatever anyone else has that is new. All of this is part of the process of organic

growth, growth involves decay, recycling. If human society is an organism, and it is,
then we should be able to follow the patterns of material recycling and growth in the
record of social transformation, what we call, that is what the priests call, history.
Society operates systematically, that is to say according to systems which
generate their own dominance by virtue of a number of naturally occurring dynamics,
such as we see in the case of the continental style called for by this councillor who
recognises such moves are the way the money is going. Money is the blood in the
system, it carries the energy toward the formation of structure. The continental style
is a way of doing, things, of manufacturing in modern materials, and of presenting
social structure in modern styles. Once a system is moving it will tend to drain the
blood from remnants of old structure, such as deckchairs, toward the new glass and
plastic of modern industrial design.
The consequence is that to stand up as an advocate of the past in any
determined manner is to much like the stand of Cnut, or seating of Cnut, before the
incoming tide. In effect taking this kind of stance in the face of material culture is
futile, all that is likely to happen is that, in time, the parts you wish to preserve will
decay. The reason is that as trends develop they attract all sorts of social
transformations to be drawn toward their general direction so that laws are altered to
accommodate changes and eventually the whole fabric of the exoskeleton is shifted
into a new phase of material expression. Today they announced that the second
country in Europe, Norway, following Ireland's example, had imposed a nationwide
ban on smoking in bars and restaurants. They think this will now ricochet round all
Europe, as an unstoppable virus transforming the social structure overnight. These
are purely organic phenomenon, no different to the spread of Nile virus, we can
challenge these things, but we cannot stop them. We might protest that the
comparison is ludicrous because there are people fighting to stop smoking, this has
not just come about because of some mechanistic relationship between the human
physiology and some alternative parasitic species. But the point is that human society
is an organism and everything that occurs is society is organic in nature and as such
mechanistic. Why should it be possible for a tiny elite to ban a massive minority from
doing what they want to do? How come the only smokers one ever sees in the media
are all for the ban on smoking in public, it is as if burglars, if ever they were
interviewed were all to say that though the idea of more prisons to keep them off the
streets were a brilliant idea! If all these smokers want to stop smoking why don't they
damn well stop? As I say, society works systematically and these trends has a
dynamic to them that is certainly well beyond the control of any individual or
collection of individuals.

Ouspensky's remarks on the on the fall of social insects into a state of uniform
automaton suggests there may be a mechanism for delivering the evolutionary process
toward this mechanistic climax that may one day turn humans into the monstrous
Borg of the Stark Trek stories fame. But to someone like me we seem to be already
there. Religion, and religious belief, is the personification of an intellect reduced to
the status of an automaton's brain. Religion even has the principle of mindless
obedience to its dictates as the supreme expression of the individuals intellect, that is
the principle of unquestioning belief in religious authority which is at the core of all
religions. And when stressful times are upon us, in the most oppressive religions of
this automaton kind, such as the Jewish slave identity we call Islam, we find then the
most perfect expression of this automata of the ant-hill, the suicide bomber.

As a general point on this strange piece of work by a mythologist, we might
just pause to wonder why he should of been inspired to engage so thoroughly in a
consideration of this subject of superorganic being. It delights me to of found such an
account, an account I found quite by accident in a volume already on my bookshelf,
when prompted to look at after seeing Ouspensky mentioned in an encyclopaedia of
secret knowledge I had just bought along with a pile of other books at sale in my local
library. The New Model of the Universe I has acquired several years ago as a
curiosity, but from where I just do not know, quite possibly my local Oxfam charity

But why did Ouspensky write this, when, however you cut it, what he ends up
by concluding is stark raving mad? I am only driven to ask this question because I
already have an answer in mind. As we have seen he manages to tease out a lot of
ideas which I have also found to be valid by following a strictly logical line of
reasoning where my only guide has been that of scientific understanding. So he has
been extending the reach of secret knowledge, making science accord with the
message about the inner circle. And in our own time, with the rise of the Biblical
account of evolution called Creationism which makes the science of evolution accord
with the Bible we see that this practice is not so much surprising, as an inevitable
outcome of the advance of knowledge of reality which overlaps with the foundations
of social knowledge that creates power by dispersing an identity upon which the
power of an inner circle relies, as is the case with the Biblical knowledge which
enslaves the Christians to the Jews.
As a student of esoteric arts Ouspensky will of been familiar with the central
place occupied by social insects in the thoughts of esoteric thinkers down the ages.
The view Ouspensky gives us here of the social milieu of the ant and the bee is only a
version of an age old conception of these nonhuman communities as counterparts of
human society, updated for the requirements of the Darwinian age. From the point of
view of the scientist exposed to such transfigurations of their hard won ideas, the
product is grotesque, and it seems worthless. But there are two points to bear in mind
here. First, the work of the scientist is itself a grotesque piece of theistic propaganda,
all more vile I would suggest for the fact that it is expunged of all appearance of
theistic reasoning while nonetheless being nothing but theistic reasoning. Thus at
least esoteric knowledge might be exactly what it claims to be, an account of
existence which offers insight to the willing pupil, whereas science is a total lie,
follow it with sincerity in your heart and all you will find is emptiness. But, secondly,
and this is what is so amazing, the result in both cases, in that of the Darwinist and the
Creationist, is to provide a perverted conception of reality which totally satisfies those
who come the respective portals of wisdom in search of understanding. And this is
exactly what these knowledge forms are meant to do, except in the case of the
mythologist the objective of their efforts are circumscribed in one direction, toward
social power, and in the case of the scientist their efforts are directed toward social
power too, but, as we have just noted, by an excruciating clever deception. It is only
by working out for yourself the real outcome of scientific endeavour in this
department that you can look upon the work of Ouspensky and understand it, and
indeed see how very clever it was. He must of made a considerable effort to think
about this subject and he was no doubt guided in his reasoning by his already
developed understanding of the way in which a superorganic human society must
function because of his knowledge of secret lore on this subject. But what scientist
would think to look at such a piece as I have quoted here in order to help them learn
what science should really be saying on this subject? None, because in accordance

with the dictates of the theocracy that founded the remit of the scientific establishment
each element of the intellectual arts must be kept separate and the scientist must only
work with the material world which necessarily forces them only to consider the
genetic foundation of biological evolution and precludes the possibility of language
acting as an extension of the genetic information package into the social world in a
strictly deterministic fashion. But this determinism is what is revealed by the obtuse
manner in which Ouspensky gets to the right place by an utterly wrong method.
The professors of esoteric knowledge were always driven to find hidden
messages, hieroglyphs, as Ouspensky says, encoding the rules of social power in the
world about them. These hieroglyphs only need to serve as vehicles for their secret
knowledge. And they were better suited to this purpose than the priest could possibly
know because, as science can now reveal, all these social agglomerations, including
bacteria and marine molluscs, and others no doubt, do share a common nature with

White ants, I should make plain, are termites, not ants at all. The fact is that as
evocative of human society as Maeterlinck's description of life in a termitary is, he is
being unremittingly anthropomorphic. This is not the best way to present a scientific
parallel for human society and termite society, it has a similar result to that
Ouspensky's ideas have, that of bringing the truth into disrepute by contaminating it
with precisely those elements of unrefined human reasoning that science exists to
expunge from its own attempts to comprehend reality.
As far as I am concerned humans, for the most part, do live out their lives
exactly as Maeterlinck says termites do, where the misery and sacrifice of the many is
the overall picture, it being for the sake of, in the case of the termites Maeterlinck says
none, but in the case of humans we can say, to go with Spencer, misery and sacrifice
is for the sake of the few. But the people I know who lead such appalling lives full of
misery and sacrifice, getting pleasure out of such drivel as TV soaps and mass
spectacle games like football, where they take part by being anonymous spectators,
are utterly oblivious to the meaninglessness of their activities. And when I confront
those of them who are intelligent and educated with this analysis of their lives they
simply fail to see the point, and they say that they themselves enjoy their occupations.
Quite! Of course you do! But why? Why do you enjoy such mindless participation
in life, by way of total inactivity on your own part, and, more to the point, why do so
many find fulfilment this collective mindlessness, which, furthermore, tends
invariably to take place about an activity which is itself a total fabrication? By total
fabrication I mean we might see the sense in a community being enthralled and
involved in the young men bringing home the heads of the local tribe, that is pretty
real. But football, which is noted to be a tribal activity in its nature, is a parody, at
best of this kind of activity, so that the real force of internecine conflict over territory
is extracted and used to give expression to people whose lives could not be more
removed from any necessity to be occupied with such affairs. And so, why is this so?
Why should the impulse to be tribal in our behaviour linger after all necessity for this
behaviour has long since vanished? Do we go around breaking up rocks just for the
hell of it even though we no longer farm the land? No, we do go to the gym to work
out because our physique benefits from physical exertion, and this is a clue to the
reason why we engage in tribal activities, because our psyche, like our physique,
evolved to perform certain tasks and this has left it mark on us, when we engage in
mindless social activates that have their sole strength in being mass communal
activities we are exercising out corporate instinct which is the expression and
fulfilment of our corporate nature.

And the point is then that of course we enjoy mindless, meaningless activity
just so long as it is communal, because being communal is its meaning. And so, if we
extract the ludicrous, judgmental observations of Maeterlinck from the evaluation of
termite lives we may say that in so far are we may equate our inherent pleasure in
communal tasks we engage in, so we may say the termite is fulfilled by its obedience
to the demands of its communal programme, and of course when the queen is killed,
as Maeterlinck describes in his book, the termitary dies, it no longer has any will to
live. And in human communities exterminated by slaves programmed by Judaic
identity implants we know that with the loss of their cultural identity many of them
lost the will to live. Only when a society is already delineated into a complex
structure so that there is an elite and an attached biomass is it possible simply to
exterminate the priesthood and supplant the identity of the priests, as the Spanish Jews
did in South America, with a new slave implant thus allowing the indigenous
population to survive in a new guise, under a new master.
We recently passed the centennial date for the showing of the first motion
pictures, I think that was the occasion, and a television commentator noted that when
movies first appeared a French critic noted the lack of involvement on the part of the
audience, effectively saying that the coming of the movies represented the coming of
the Zombie. But not, this commentator went on, we live in a world where all we do is
live via a 'screen' of one sort or another, proving how wrong this early critic was, as
no one today would even think to make the same observation. Well, I often make the
observation that television is the Zombification of the person, and this example of
social change in the wake of technological development, that is evolution in the form
of the exoskeleton, nicely illustrates how we sink imperceptibly ever more into
uniformity, conformity, and orientation toward one centralised source of information
while still preserving our own sense of self intact, the illusion of self, I should say.
The whole social system - think deck chairs - has evolved to see that this happens, and
our individual psychology evolved to be receptive to this process so that we are only
happy to the extent to which we are free to conform. We already are those white ants,
we just do not know it yet, anymore than the termites do.


It must be conceded that, as discussed in point ? , earlier, there does actually
have to be a point toward which evolution is headed for the concept of
progress to be real, and simply an effect of partiality. Ouspensky has already there is
latent potential, only he has no idea what this potential is in scientific terms. But we
know it is the attainment of 'self-evolving' status, as Ouspensky would have it, the
attainment of superorganic being, as I would have it. The reason this is so is perfectly
straightforward, a new body plan comes into being on the planet in response to the
broadest possible environmental conditions, such as the attainment of a mammalian
form characterised by warm blooded physiology. This contrasts sharply with the cold
blooded form that has hitherto been the dominant, and as such as expanded into all
niches of the earth. To the new body plan the ecosystems of the earth appear vacant,
and it proceeds to elaborate its expression to fill this void. As a consequence the air
receives its mammalian form, the sea its own kind, and in the social domain which
comes into being by virtue of the physiology's own existence, a form of itself evolves
to give full expression of its own physiological potential. This folding in upon the
self of a physiological form leads to the evolution of Super Beings.
With the evolution of the Jewish identity and its associated culture, we have
the continuation of the evolutionary unfolding, and we see the same realisation of the

perfect corporate social form in the insects that we have been discussing, only, as
noted, more perfect, because more, apparently, automated. Ouspensky does not so
much see beyond facts, as right through them, truth is certainly no obstacle to the
understanding and exposition of the priest.

And we may note, although again I have broached this topic, when Ouspensky
says the mind is an instrument through which reality is perceived, this naturally raises
the question of what the mind is. The mind in this sense is literally language. The
mind is not a substantial entity, material in form, it is an informational entity,
energetic in form. Forms which are energetic have the capacity to invoke response,
this is the nature of information, action is a form of response as implied in one of
Newton's laws of motion which make it plain that to any action there is always an
opposite and equal reaction. But living forms constitute complex information
handling systems and in humans linguistic physiology is such a system and the mind
is its product so that linguistic information acts as the medium of motivation in this
physiological system where it exists to invoke, or to mediate, action. Information, in
this case in the form of language, is therefore energy, or the manifestation of energy.
But, obviously, this capacity for expressing energy is only operative when the
appropriate physical systems are engaged. In the same way a cars fuel tank may be
full but unless the ignition has been engaged and all things are in order the fuel will
not deliver motive power to the system and cause a reaction. Thus I may of written
the greatest work the world has ever known, but until the world has read it, it does not
know that it has been written. Damn!
As so much of our consciousness is made possible via the medium of
language, so this medium can act as a blind, or distortion. The implication is that we
need to keep in our consciousness the presence of the medium of language through
which we are enabled to see so much. We need to be aware of the actual language we
use to communicate, and this is extremely hard to accomplish for we tend to think that
words mean what they mean, and if they do not then what use are they. But
languages are complex and they are created via general perspectives that act as
interpreters of reality, and this is exactly what we have been seeing as we have seen
that there is not such thing as an individual, there are single persons, with their own
unique identities, but while the word 'individual' purports to say this and nothing
more, it says much more, it says that this individuality is not just something, but
everything. And thus it is this point of view which acts as an interpreter of reality and
thus imparts meaning to the words we take for granted and are obliged to use in our
acts of communication and in our internal thought processes about matters of social
significance about which we want to think.
Ouspensky then, is not trying to be true to reality, he is trying to impart a
shade that is to his liking, to colour meaning according to the filter that is implanted
into his brain. This he does not, presumably see, for if he did he would either give us
a better picture of reality, or, as I would have it, he would of recognised the true
picture that science offers us and he would of seen what I see.


The demise of the wise, those who see where the wind is blowing, toward the
eradication of freewill, self-consciousness and the power to act purposefully which is
supposed to rely upon this qualities of individual personality is the main moral threat

to come from Ouspensky's account which implicitly, if not overtly, sets out to justify
the existence of an elite, and secret, priesthood. This mode of expression is a typical
piece of mythologizing, but it could be said that such a concern is the mainspring of
all my motive energy throughout my life, and this concern for individual freedom is a
recurrent theme throughout many centuries leading up to recent times. The flaw in
this mythological expression, as ever with religious ideology, is its extreme
expression, so extreme, in this case, as to be farcical.
It appears to me that the arrival of the civilised mode of corporate existence
indicates the transformation of the human species that occurred with the unleashing of
the genetically evolved potential that speech has to form a corporate organism. The
freedom of that all individuals experienced in the pre-civilised being was lost as the
process of specialised differentiation evolved, as intimated by Spencer.
As Spencer said, the rigour of the ant-hill was visited upon humanity, but with
one obvious proviso, at least the slavery of most freed the few who were masters.
Taking this descriptive model of hierarchical structure as the starting point, I suggest
that as the sheer mass of the organism increases the access to the privileged
expression of freewill is expanded accordingly. We do not have to degenerate into
the sentimentality of the priest in order to appreciate this fact by supposing this is the
progress of the human ideal. All we need acknowledge is that there is in this process
a relationship between the increasing mass of the core body seeking to expand the
total mass upon which a core depends in order to increase it own inner power. Hence
a core philosophy evolves that eulogises the creation of one world under one authority
and benefits due to all by the realisation of this process. So we find we have a
philosophy that just happens to be in accord with the requirements of Darwinian
evolution, the total eradication of all identities bar one, Judaism, as it turns out. In the
process a liberal and humanitarian ideology makes sense within the ever expanding
central domain where there is a maximum degree of wealth and hence power to act in
a manner that appears to vindicate the sense and the idea of freewill. Liberal ideas,
such as those of Rousseau, perhaps, help to bring about the expansion of the organism
as much as authoritarian ideas such as those of Hitler do. Each plays its part at the
right time and in the right place and all moves along smoothly exactly as it should by
way of finely tuned guillotine blades and humanitarian philosophies and nuclear
bombs and international codes of human rights. Its wonderful.
And so we come to the period of the global superorganism, where wars are carried on
all around the world in the name of Zionism, otherwise called freedom. As president
Bush currently likes to tell us America does not wage war in order to bring the gift of
American freedom to the world, it is God's gift of freedom he gives to us lucky
people. Today the whole of first world is free, riding on the slavery of the third
world. Hence, we, as a society, make freedom the foundation of our cultural ethics,
and we say how we just want to deliver freedom to all the world, but of course this is
biologically impossible, and therefore as such it is just our way of making our use of
these powerless territories of the world sound inclusive. But, not to be cynical about
it, it is because we find, courtesy of evolutionary dynamics, that this ideology of
inclusiveness is the most constructive to follow once the job of extermination of none
Jewish identities has been achieved, that civilisation does progress, as we call it.
It becomes easy to anticipate Natures outcome regarding our species as we
follow the inevitable course of this process of physical expansion, identity
extermination, unification and diversification. We see there is still someway to go
before the whole world is united under a global authority based in Jerusalem, where
all lands answer to one law just as all states in America answer to one law. We can

see the broad outlines of the model, and with wars like the one we are fighting in Iraq
now, and many many more still to be fought, we can see how things will pan out. But
even if this process takes another five centuries, and it may another ten, in the end it
will mean one global civilization under Judaism, there is no other possible outcome as
long as out kind exist, the Jewish culture is way to ascendant ever to be outpaced.
The only hope of a more human identity emerging is to be found in ideas such as
mine, only knowledge can destroy knowledge and offer a replacement, but that is
another story. In the end there must come a time when the world's population of
outsiders is used up, there are, tragically, no more aliens for the Jews to exterminate,
no more ways to progress by means of war. What mode of development is there left?
It is at this point that we get to the good bit, the bit we have all been waiting
for, Utopia! The way forward is already in sight, but the destination toward which it
leads is still over the horizon, and may never be realised, I am not sure. The answer I
am heading toward is that in the end if there is to be a human species in which there is
no slavery, real or virtual, then we have to reach the point where all the world is a
priesthood, where all are equal, where there is no secret knowledge, where there is no
privilege. This can only come about if technology advances so far that the third order
consists entirely of machines, and this can only come about if the environment is
turned entirely into an artificial environment, such as a space ship. Of course since all
such artificial forms are really living forms composed of exoskeleton within which is
housed the living organic fabric in effect if we created craft like those starships we see
on Star Trek we would of transformed ourselves into living creatures whose natural
environment was the vacuum of space. In this circumstance it is possible to conceive
of all people onboard such a craft being of uniform intelligence, appearance and
education, one homogenised elite, created by means of bioengineering and living
within a tailor made suit of exoskeleton. It does not sound very human but that is
where the notion of human nature as corporate nature leads us.
Returning to Ouspensky we have the vision of humanity being reduced to
automatons of an insect kind, and it seems likely if we take up my idea that we are a
superorganic species. But as you can see from what I have just said this insect model
is not correct at all, it completely misjudges the situation because of course it never
sets out to judge the situation correctly according to real knowledge about anything.
And in so far as we continue to live on this planet in a familiar manner the process of
homogenisation is happening around us all the time, we have seen cycles of it many
times over and it is not only produced by great powers such as that of Europe
invading lesser enclaves of humanity such as that of Africa or Australia some two
centuries ago. The same process continues to impinge upon the first order because
society is a living organism. The process evoked in Ouspensky's 'death of the wise' is
not centred on one boundary of supreme wisdom that is lost, resulting in a 'fall' of the
society concerned, from which it must recover by means of the fortuitous survival of a
remnant of the wise, a theme of lost cultural heritage, if we wish to leave Jewish myth
aside for a moment, that it seems to me we can find in the ancient myth of Atlantis,
told by a Greek, but reputedly recovered from the priestly knowledge of the Ancient
Egyptians. The process which invokes the idea of cultural loss and rebirth is about
the gradual attrition of one culture by another, a resident population overwhelmed by
an invading population carrying with it another culture. The essence of the process is
a cultural change and it is irrelevant how this occurs, by war, by immigration, or a
combination of both. We in Europe, a first world power we may be, but we are being
exterminated by the influx of Islam into out world now and we are powerless to do
anything about because the people who run our society are doing everything in their

power to ensure European culture is exterminated, it means nothing to them, they are
not European, they are Jewish, they may call themselves Christian, or Jewish, but in
real terms there is no difference between them.
Only the mast identity remains unchanged because it has not territorial
attachment, you can plant Judaism anywhere, it will always be Judaism, that is the
whole point of Judaism, that is what makes it a super-identity, the identity of the
global superorganism. And before the Jews it is evident from the evidence of
European culture left to us in the likes of such monuments as Stonehenge that a
continental wide culture has laid the foundations of the superorganism that was to be
taken over by Judaism, the Druids had obviously swept across the continent bringing
with them the tools of a civilised lifestyle supporting an elaborate priesthood and
based upon farming, they must exterminated the resident populations of hunter
gathers, wild humans superorganism who had yet to reach that critical stage in their
evolutionary potential where their linguistic physiology ignited and burst into the
symbiotic mode of superorganic growth.
The inner circle at the centre of Ouspensky's account, and it is at the centre of
my scientifically inspired account too.

Idea Three

Gierke on Natural Law and the Organic Nature of Society

"I was never made by that fool of a workman, I who divide time, who mark so
exactly the course of the sun, who repeat aloud the hours which I mark! No!
that is impossible."

Man a Machine, Julien Offray de la Mettrie. Page 145. Unfortunately, being
an American printing, I cannot date this copy, it is dated 1912, but looks like a 70s or
80s paperback. First pub. 1748.

The two previous authors that have provided the kernel for our thinking about
the reality of Super Being as a real solution to the mystery of our existence as animals
on this planet, represent the thoughts of two thinkers working in the immediate, and
post-immediate, aftermath of the presentations of Darwin on the subject of biological
evolution, which included humans in its remit. As such these two pieces have been
explorative for us, they have presented overt statements of the idea that we seek to
profess ourselves, they therefore lend support to our efforts, these works show that
we are not alone in appealing to this idea, and in finding this idea appealing to
ourselves. And the fact is that humanity has not moved on one jot since the days of
Darwin, nor one jot since the coming of the scientific age some five centuries ago, in
terms of solving the mystery of human nature. A year or so ago I saw a book on
evolution in a charity shop, which unfortunately I considered too costly just for the
few lines that fascinated me in the closing pages, but this book, an Oxford University
publication, stated quite matter-of-factly that we may not be one jot closer to
understanding human nature by the end of the next century, that is the one we are now
in. No doubt there were some reasons given, but as we are endeavouring to discover
here, the problem is not breaking the code of nature, but bursting the constraints on
knowledge imposed by the priests who manage knowledge in such places as Oxford.
What wonders just what these mythologists say to one another behind closed doors.
In themselves then, these two preceding authors do not give us any substance,
now we need something more if we are to advance our idea into the more substantial
terrain of the scientist. How do you prove that human beings are a superorganic
species with a nature common to, and specific to, other superorganic forms, over and
above providing a lengthy argument concerning conceptual similarities based on
behavioural observations that anyone can make? Darwin performed the same
operation of convincing by argument for the most part, but he backed up his argument
by many detailed examples of inherited characteristics that he related to the
environment which became a vital part of his explanation for organic evolution.
Darwin's famous account of the Galapagos Island finches is the best example of this
search for hard facts to back up a general thesis.

What might we do that equates to the presentation of evidence of a like kind as
that provided by these finches? Well I am not quite sure, it seems to me that proving
that people have language, showing that people live in cities, that there are naturally
occurring sterile members of the community, as in those who remain celibate or who
settle into same sex partnerships, each of these things proves conclusively, on their
own, that humans have to be a superorganic species, for there is no other scientific
way to account for these organically evolved attributes.
But everyone knows all about these attributes, and the whole point of a
mythology is to ensure that these things are accounted for in a none real manner. So,
providing physical evidence of our superorganic status is not the issue, it is all around
us. Our task is more akin to the story of the Emperor's New Clothes, where the effort
on our part has to be to snap everyone out of their fixation on a finely woven fabric of
linguistic illusion by forcing them to see past the mental image created by the
priestcraft of articulate artists of knowledge formation.
But this will not quite answer our need either, for how do you force people to
give up being idiots when they are devoted to being idiots, they like being idiots, and
everything they value derives from their idiocy? And what is more, like the
spectators viewing the naked king's fine suit of new clothes, they know that in truth,
all that they believe is utter rubbish, but they also know that believing what they
believe, works for them. In other words, idiocy is the highest expression of
intelligence; exactly as you might logically reason it would be in a superorganic form
such as ourselves where the brain evolved to link individuals together to form one
corporate mind.

You cannot tackle this issue head on, the answer is not to try. Our interest is
simply our interest. We shall merely trace the relevant subject matter for our own
fascination, as the antiquarians of old engaged in their pursuits for the mere
gratification of the pursuit of knowledge, in the days before such activity developed
an official status and became a professional study, an established part of the
exoskeleton's institutional structure dedicated to the preservation of the theocracy;
before antiquarians became archaeologists.
We have already likened our mode of enquiry to the work of archaeologists
because of the way we delve into the intellectual deposits of our past. There is much
to be said for this conception of our activity, and in this chapter we are going to turn
to some very different archaeological material derived from the mental deposition of
past times, than that which we have perused so far in the two preceding authors.
The post-modernist French philosopher Michel Foucault had a delightful way
of thinking about our intellectual cultural heritage as an accumulated material, the
investigation of whose past equated to the investigation of material debris left behind
by past peoples. This is indicated by the titles of some of his works, such as The
Archaeology of Knowledge
. This mode of description is delightful to me because it is
the sort of idea that emerges from my ruminations on human nature from time to time,
and I do not recall seeing this thought put into writing anywhere else. However, if
there is any deeper similitude between the train of the thoughts expressed here and
those of Foucault, then I hope that at least I come across as more down to earth and
accessible than my first ocular lick of Foucault's intellectual corpse indicated his
deposit was to me.

Intellectual deposits are real entities, knowledge is a real entity. Knowledge
exists. Everything that exists by way of human existence, although we segregate
these products of our own being from the rest of nature by calling things natural as
opposed to artificial, or man-made, exist in reality, just as much as any so-called

natural product of the universe exists in reality. This artifice of language, regarding
the idea of the artificial, is one of the primary ways in which we are programmed to
perceive the world according to an image created by priestcraft. Knowledge is a
linguistic product, much of knowledge, as we take it for granted, is the product of this
artifice. And as a linguistic product knowledge has a nature that is distinct from other
artificial products of human activity. But once we accept that knowledge exists as a
linguistic product we thereafter can apply the same common standards of
investigation to its form as we do to any other material entity. That is to say, the
deposition of linguistic material leading to the formation of a body of knowledge, will
follow the same principles as the deposition of any other uniform product of a
consistent process. This conception of knowledge as a natural product, subject to the
natural laws of physics, and biology, is at the heart of Foucault's thinking; whether he
considered this point of not.

Language is not used arbitrarily, it has a very definite function, and the
accumulation of linguistic knowledge likewise must be directed by functional
determinants. In a large deposit therefore, we should be able to trace the process of
creativity from the origin of random speculation to the crystallisation of even
conformity. And in the process of investigating our knowledge deposits we should
also be able to relate the different attributes of creative flourish, or creative stability,
with the social conditions that relate to the knowledge band, or subject area, that we
are investigating at any given time. Knowledge, in short, is functional, and it exists in
an environment, a social environment which is the product of an organic being, and
the state of the social environment will be reflected in the mode of information
deposited in the intellectual record of any given society, be it Sumerian, Chinese,
Greek, Minoan, Inca, or whatever. Unfortunately intellectual deposits are a highly
specialised product of nature and not always to be found even in sophisticated
societies. The Druids apparently made a point of not developing a literature in order
to protect the secret law of their priesthood. But they of course were exterminated by
the supreme inheritors of a literate culture, the Jews. It just does not pay to bury your
head in the sand as the likes of the fascist tries to do when the Jewish priesthood of
lawmakers start on the ethnic cleansing by stealth warpath. But, in any case, we are,
happily, in a position to acts as archaeologists of the intellect, for we live in an age
rich in information, where books abound from all times and all periods, and this is the
most glorious thing about our world today. Yes there are great piles of sludge
covering everything in a seemingly interminable blanket of opaqueness, but, as we
can see from our examination of Ouspensky's bizarre work, even the most bleakly
opaque sludge can reveal gems of wisdom when properly investigated according to a
strictly scientific mode of understanding.

From this abstract discussion of the nature of knowledge we can return to the
previous statement regarding a shift from the speculative flourish of our two prior
authors, to the much thicker deposits that are the subject matter of our next author.
Our third person is of a completely different kind to Spencer and Ouspensky, in terms
of the nature of the deposit he left us to examine, for he was himself not an original
depositor, he was, like us, an investigator, an antiquarian of the past intellectual seams
of wisdom. He was in fact an applicator of knowledge, or he sort to be so, rather than
a creator of new ideas. And this distinction is most important, it is one that our
discussion of knowledge, above, makes an implicit feature of behaviour relevant to
the process of knowledge, and, social evolution. There must be a period of

information creation, followed by an ensuing period of material creativity, arising
directly from this creative process, if knowledge is a functional entity, which it is.
Thus, from our primary premise, that language is the fluid-genetic medium of
the superorganic form, we must expect to be able to discover a material deposit of
knowledge in the records of our social evolution which can be shown to be directly
responsible for the evolution of the social structure that we live with today, and
directly responsible for the history that is recorded in our history books. This logical
proposition follows from our early realisation of how the superorganic human form
must evolve, via the medium of language. All forms in the universe are the product of
energetic processes, and in life forms the energetic pathways in which they are
involved are tapped into by sensory acuities that experience these energy pathways as
information. We have already seen how this creates religion when we noted that
religion was the identity component infused into the physiological aspect of the
exoskeleton of the organism as it evolved. Or, if we confine this thought to the
physical being of an individual the same thing applies, as the organism evolves its
outer form takes on attributes of a non-physical functional kind, of an informational
kind, of identity, attributes of communication, attributes which are both positive and
negative, in relation to their own nature, for sometimes they are intended to reveal,
and at others times to disguise the form underneath, the informational appearance.
What we really need to do, is to find the remains of the linguistic genome that
created our social being. Logic tells us, without difficulty, that the place to look, the
band in the broad deposit of knowledge, is in that band which we call law.
And so we come to Otto Gierke, a most remarkable man, and the most
precious author we could ever hope to meet with. As native English speakers we do
not have free access to the works of this, primarily nineteenth century, German
professor of law, we are indebted to two English professors of law working some
decades apart, in the first half of the twentieth century. And we can see straightaway
that as we shift from the realms of direct access to a thinker's work, to an area where a
full comprehension of knowledge is sort, deposits of an institutional character emerge
naturally out of our efforts because of the sheer volume of material that needs to be
encompassed, and the period of investigation that is embraced, covering many human
lifetimes, and the combination of life-efforts that is thereby required. Institutions
grow spontaneously out of the fabrication of knowledge, they create themselves; a
university is an organic entity, a part of an exoskeleton of a living animal, no wonder
libraries were the targets of past warriors, tragically, and they no doubt will be again.
Our selected author however, although not quite, himself, an exponent of the
idea that human society was literally an organism, as far as I can tell, remains a
central figure in the argument that human society is an organic being in its own right.
This is because it is the centrality of this idea in the investigations of past ideas, that
interested him, and he very nearly seems to think, in real terms, of human society as a
living being, but I am not satisfied that he says society is a living creature in a manner
that meets my truly detached scientific requirements. He does not say as much
directly, in either of the two English translations of his work that are available, but the
lengthy introductions to his works provided by his translators do say this of him, that
he thought of society as being living and having the attributes of something more than
just a temporary collection of co-operating individuals. His subject matter is wholly
concerned with the nature of society in terms of its organic form, only his subject is
law. In other words, Gierke investigated the evolution of modern law based on the
centuries of creative intellectual effort that sort to understand society as a living
organism, as a person, which eventually led to the form of the modern state, and a

new World order. This is quite simply a gift from the annals of our intellectual past, it
is precisely what we need to prosecute our claim that human nature is indeed
corporate, and that human society is an organic phenomenon that can be accounted for
in strictly organic terms. This is our evidence, Gierke's work is the anthropologist's
Grail or Galapagos, my Galapagos.

As there are no pieces of work written by Gierke himself comparative to the
two sections I have taken from Spencer and Ouspensky, the problem is what segments
of his work to look at, to suit our purpose of levering open the door to reality, which
will aid our effort to force people to take notice, and relinquish their fixation on the
myth of divinity that preserves their Jewish identity programme, and prevents us from
obtaining the intellectual freedom we are capable of possessing today?
Let us begin by considering the works with which we are concerned. Gierke
wrote a work about the idea of German fellowship, 'The German Law of Associations'
(Das deutsche Genossensckaftsrecht), published in 1881, which is essentially about the
intimate social unity that is indicative of a human superorganism. This work was
extensive and appeared in a number of volumes, in 1900 Frederic Maitland published
a translation of a section from volume three of this work which he says, in his
introduction, amounted to only one twentieth part of the whole. Maitland called his
translation Political Theories of the Middle Age.
I discovered Gierke via another author, Ernest Barker. As with A New Model
of the Universe
by Ouspensky, Barker's book, Principles of Social and Political
, first published by Clarendon Press in 1951, had been silent upon my shelves
for some years, waiting to be discovered. The discovery came one restless evening
this last winter when I thought about trying to dump some books and began by
looking at the top shelf of the small bookcase in my living room. I glanced through a
dozen books before I found myself amazed to be confronted by a passage in a sixties
paperback published by Oxford University Press, dealing with society as an organism!
This led me to Maitland, and to another book by Barker, called Natural Law and the
Theory of Society
. The latter book, being a continuation of Maitland's effort to reveal
Gierke's work to the English speaking world, offered a translation of a subsequent
section of the work Maitland had selected a section from for his translation. Barker's
book, he tells us, concerns the political theories of the modern age, from 1500 to 1800,
and is a translation of five subsections in Gierke's fourth volume, which was first
published in 1913.

Here then we have an extensive body of material that has required a
considerable effort to produce, an effort involving the dedication of a number of
intelligent men, over a fair span of time. This is an impressive, and I must say, as
such, a most delightful piece of work to study. Since it deals directly with my subject
I simply cannot quite believe it exists, or that, given its existence, I have had the good
fortune to find my way to it. Books, books, books. All you can do is keep poking
your nose into to them, and hope, that each time you do, you'll find something nice
and sticky on the end of it. But you cannot just peer in, you have to buy them, chuck
'em in a corner, and leave for your receptacle of information to mature enough to be
able to know the aroma of right wisdom when it wafts from the page; it is not as if I
had not looked at Barker or Ouspensky before. With knowledge, it seems to me, it is
easy to look, but not to see.

So these are our two seams of knowledge, into which we want to sink a pit or
two. As it happens I read Maitland a month ago before beginning this book, before
finding Ouspensky, which made me realise had the foundation for this approach to

this subject. So while I made notes I did not select illustrative passages for
consideration as I have done with Spencer and Ouspensky. I did do this with Barker's
translation and it has to be said that the real recommendation has to be to read the
whole volume! But we do not need to do that, we only need select appropriate
passages. I will begin then by seeing what there is in Maitland's translation, as it
comes first, that might serve to kick us off on this exploration of the real substance of
the superorganic genome that created our modern exoskeleton, and then we can take
some fine artifacts directly from Barker's introduction and Gierke's volume four.



HAD what is here translated, namely, a brief account of the political theories of the
Middle Ages, appeared as a whole book, it would hardly have stood in need of that
distorting medium, an English translation. Englishmen who were approaching the
study of medieval politics, either from the practical or from the theoretical side, would
have known that there was a book which they would do well to master, and many who
were not professed students or whose interests lay altogether in modern times would
have heard of it and have found it profitable. The elaborate notes would have shewn
that its writer had read widely and deeply; they would also have guided explorers into
a region where sign-posts are too few. As to the text, the last charge which could be
made against it would be that of insufficient courage in generalization, unless indeed
it were that of aimless medievalism. The outlines are large, the strokes are firm, and
medieval appears as an introduction to modern thought. The ideas that are to possess
and divide mankind from the sixteenth until the nineteenth century Sovereignty, the
Sovereign Ruler, the Sovereign People, the Representation of the People, the Social
Contract, the Natural Rights of Man, the Divine Rights of Kings, the Positive Law
that stands below the State, the Natural Law that stands above the State these are the
ideas whose early history is to be detected, and they are set before us as thoughts
which, under the influence of Classical Antiquity, necessarily shaped themselves in
the course of medieval debate. And if the thoughts are interesting, so too are the
thinkers. In Dr Gierke's list of medieval publicists, beside the divines and schoolmen,
stand great popes, great lawyers, great reformers, men who were clothing concrete
projects in abstract vesture, men who fashioned the facts as well as the theories of
their time.

Moreover, Englishmen should be especially grateful to a guide who is perhaps
at his strongest just where they must needs be weak: that is, among the books of the
legists and canonists. An educated Englishman may read and enjoy what Dante or
Marsiglio has written. An English scholar may face Aquinas or Ockham or even the
repellent Wyclif. But Baldus and Bartolus, Innocentius and Johannes Andreae, them
he has never been taught to tackle, and they are not to be tackled by the untaught.
And yet they are important people, for political philosophy in its youth is apt to look
like a sublimated jurisprudence, and, even when it has grown in vigour and stature, is
often compelled or content to work with tools a social contract for example which
have been sharpened, if not forged, in the legal smithy. In that smithy Dr Gierke is at
home. With perfect modesty he could say to a learned German public 'It is not

probable that for some time to come anyone will tread exactly the same road that I
have trodden in long years of fatiguing toil.'
But then what is here translated is only a small, a twentieth, part of a large and
as yet unfinished book bearing a title which can hardly attract many readers in this
country and for which an English equivalent cannot easily be found, namely Das
deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht
. Of that work the third volume contains a section
entitled Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters, and that is the section which is
here done into English. Now though this section can be detached and still bear a high
value, and though the author's permission for its detachment has been graciously
given, still it would be untrue to say that this amputating process does no harm. The
organism which is a whole with a life of its own, but is also a member of a larger and
higher organism whose life it shares, this, so Dr Gierke will teach us, is an idea which
we must keep before our minds when we are studying the political thought of the
Middle Ages, and it is an idea which we may apply to his and to every good book.
The section has a life of its own, but it also shares the life of the whole treatise. Nor
only so; it is membrum de membro. It is a section in a chapter entitled 'The Medieval
Doctrine of State and Corporation,' which stands in a volume entitled 'The Antique
and Medieval Doctrine of State and Corporation and its Reception in Germany'; and
this again is part of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Indeed our section is a
member of a highly organized system, and in that section are sentences and
paragraphs which will not yield their full meaning except to those who know
something of the residue of the book and something also of the controversial
atmosphere in which a certain Genossenschaftstheorie has been unfolding itself. This
being so, the intervention of a translator who has read the whole book, who has read
many parts of it many times, who deeply admires it, may be of service. In a short
introduction, even if his own steps are none too sure, he may be able to conduct some
of his fellow-countrymen towards a point of view which commands a wide prospect
of history and human affairs.

Staats- und Korporationslehre the Doctrine of State and Corporation. Such a
title may be to some a stumbling-block set before the threshold. A theory of the State,
so it might be said, may be very interesting to the philosophic few and fairly
interesting to the intelligent many, but a doctrine of Corporations, which probably
speaks of fictitious personality and similar artifices, can only concern some juristic
speculators, of whom there are none or next to none in this country. On second
thoughts, however, we may be persuaded to see here no rock of offence but rather a
stepping-stone which our thoughts should sometimes traverse. For, when all is said,
there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are species. They seem to
be permanently organized groups of men ; they seem to be group-units ; we seem to
attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units. Let it be
allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we
ourselves are not the slaves of a jurist's theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if
between the State and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask ourselves
no questions about the origin of species. Certain it is that our medieval history will go
astray, our history of Italy and Germany will go far astray, unless we can suffer
communities to acquire and lose the character of States somewhat easily, somewhat
insensibly, or rather unless we both know and feel that we must not thrust our modern
'State-concept,' as a German would call it, upon the reluctant material.
Englishmen in particular should sometimes give themselves this warning,
and not only for the sake of the Middle Ages. Fortunate in littleness and insularity,
England could soon exhibit as a difference in kind what elsewhere was a difference in

degree, namely, to use medieval terms, the difference between a community or
corporation (universitas) which does and one which does not 'recognize a superior.'
There was no likelihood that the England which the Norman duke had subdued and
surveyed would be either Staatenbund or Bundesstaat, and the aspiration of
Londoners to have 'no king but the mayor' was fleeting. This, if it diminished our
expenditure of blood and treasure an expenditure that impoverishes diminished also
our expenditure of thought an expenditure that enriches and facilitated (might this
not be said ?) a certain thoughtlessness or poverty of ideas. The State that
Englishmen knew was a singularly unicellular State, and at a critical time they were
not too well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the case
of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, corporations in America which
seemed to have wills and hardly fictitious wills of their own, and which became
States and United States¹. The medieval Empire laboured under the weight of an
incongruously simple theory so soon as lawyers were teaching that the Kaiser was the
Princeps of Justinian's law-books. The modern and multicellular British State often
and perhaps harmlessly called an Empire may prosper without a theory, but does not
suggest and, were we serious in our talk of sovereignty, would hardly tolerate, a
theory that is simple enough and insular enough, and yet withal imperially Roman
enough, to deny an essentially state-like character to those 'self-governing colonies,'
communities, commonwealths, which are knit and welded into a larger sovereign
whole. The adventures of an English joint-stock company which happed into a
rulership of the Indies, the adventures of another English company which while its
charter was still very new had become the puritan commonwealth of Massachusett's
Bay should be enough to shew that our popular English Staatslehre if, instead of
analyzing the contents of a speculative jurist's mind, it seriously grasped the facts of
English history, would shew some inclination to become a Korporationslehre also.
Even as it is, such a tendency is plainly to be seen in many zones. Standing on
the solid ground of positive law and legal orthodoxy we confess the king of this
country to be a 'corporation sole,' and, if we have any curiosity, ought to wonder why
in the sixteenth century the old idea that the king is the head of a 'corporation
aggregate of many²' gave way before a thought which classed him along with the
parish parson of decadent ecclesiastical law under one uncomfortable rubric. Deeply
convinced though our lawyers may be that individual men are the only 'real' and '
natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which places State and Man
upon one level. 'The greatest of artificial persons, politically speaking, is the State': so
we may read in an excellent First Book of Jurisprudence³. Ascending from the legal
plain, we are in a middle region where a sociology emulous of the physical sciences
discourses of organs and organisms and social tissue, and cannot sever by sharp lines
the natural history of the state-group from the natural history of other groups. Finally,
we are among the summits of philosophy and observe how a doctrine, which makes
some way in England, ascribes to the State, or, more vaguely, the Community, not
only a real will, but even 'the' real will, and it must occur to us to ask whether what is
thus affirmed in the case of the State can be denied in the case of other organized
groups: for example, that considerable group the Roman Catholic Church. It seems
possible to one who can only guess, that even now-a-days a Jesuit may think that the
will of the Company to which he belongs is no less real than the will of any State,
and, if the reality of this will be granted by the philosopher, can he pause until even
the so-called one-man-company has a real will really distinct from the several wills of
the one man and his six humble associates? If we pursue that thought, not only will
our philosophic Staatslehre be merging itself in a wider doctrine, but we shall already

be deep in the Genossenschaftstheorie. In any case, however, the law's old habit of
co-ordinating men and 'bodies politic' as two kinds of Persons seems to deserve the
close attention of the modern philosopher, for, though it be an old habit, it has become
vastly more important in these last years than it ever was before. In the second half of
the nineteenth century corporate groups of the most various sorts have been
multiplying all the world over at a rate that far outstrips the increase of 'natural
persons,' and a large share of all our newest law is law concerning corporations°.
Something not unworthy of philosophic discussion would seem to lie in this quarter:
either some deep-set truth which is always bearing fresh fruit, or else a surprisingly
stable product of mankind's propensity to feign. Howbeit, this rare atmosphere we
do not easily breathe and therefore will for a while follow a lower road.

¹ See the remarks of Sir C. Ilbert, The Government of India, p. 55: 'Both the theory
and the experience were lacking which are requisite for adapting English institutions
to new and foreign circumstances. For want of such experience England was destined
to lose her colonies in the Western hemisphere. For want of it mistakes were
committed which imperilled the empire she was building up in the East.' The want of
a theory about Ireland which would have mediated between absolute dependence and
absolute independence was the origin of many evils.

² A late instance of this old concept occurs in Plowden's Commentaries, 234.

³ Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence, 113.

° In 1857 an American judge went the length of saying 'It is probably true that more
corporations were created by the legislature of Illinois at its last session than existed
in the whole civilized world at the commencement of the present century.' Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, § 37 a.

(Political Theories of the Middle Age, Otto Gierke, translated by
F. W. Maitland. Cambridge, 1927. Pages vii - xii)

Reproduced here in full is the opening section to the introduction Maitland
wrote for his translation of Gierke's work. It must be clear to all that we are still
dealing with the very same subject as that which we set out to consider when we took
a fragment of Spencer's work and a piece of Ouspensky's art; namely, the corporate
being of human society. That said, it is equally obvious that we have shifted into a
radically different sphere of intellectual endeavour. Maitland's style is somewhat
archaic, but rich and pleasing, worth a little effort to understand, and this even as he
offers to be the mediator of another author whom we could not hope to understand
without the translator's guidance, even after translation he means.

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