CASES OF LEGAL ETHICS PART 1 IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.

: Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows: 1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. 2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). 3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case.

4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget. 5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3 At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's coaccused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4 Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) RESOLUTION CASTRO, C.J.: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the

common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502). When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,

It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective. the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. counseling clients in legal matters. the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. rel. 129 Ohio St. body. However. including the Chairman. committee. and the giving of all legal advice to clients. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. 102 S. and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . as here. Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. referee. CHRISTIAN MONSOD. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. one who. all advice to clients. firms. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. practice . or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. petitioner. 262. commissioner. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading.. v.. respondents. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects... It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. Jr. 263). WHEREFORE. a majority thereof. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. particularly where.. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. conveying. JOVITO R. there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. is engaged in the practice of law. 340 Mo. at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. (State ex. in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management. board.S.E. Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. at the time of their appointment. indeed necessary.. in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. premises considered. and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.Agrava.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. In general. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. 2d 895. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. J. It embraces conveyancing. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. conveyancing. the facts are disputed. (5 Am.:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. 23. 3rd ed. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. and HON. 173. (105 Phil. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. vs. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. including the Chairman. to the proper administration of justice . 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . however. and in addition. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. SALONGA. HON. it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1). where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate.. Sec. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l).. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. Dudley and Co. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. before any court..sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky.W.176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. a majority thereof..C. . shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RENATO CAYETANO. Otherwise stated. so far as . in a representative capacity. PARAS. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. the foreclosure of a mortgage. (Black's Law Dictionary. p. holders of a college degree.. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT. No valid distinction. and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. a wide experience with men and affairs. and conducting proceedings in attachment. at the time of their appointment. and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. However. GUILLERMO CARAGUE. 193 N. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. It is a grave responsibility. Mckittrick v. negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation.. It is not limited to appearing in court. but embraces the preparation of pleadings. at least thirty-five years of age. (Article X. using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney. Dworken.

citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass. that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice. Automobile Service Assoc. FOZ. 128 Conn. there are still uninformed . MR." MR. in effect. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.). cit. The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. 222. Mr. MR. we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA. Presiding Officer. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill.. (Ibid. p. a corporate lawyer." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law. Before we suspend the session. it will involve legal work. Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Today. And. commonly understood to be the practice of law. The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous. the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". quoted in Rhode Is.). Mr. although it is auditing.). OPLE.] . FOZ. In either case. provides. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. of the Commission on Audit. 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm.144). to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service. Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm..). 139. or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. therefore. in or out of court. will necessarily involve legal work. op.E. FOZ. 1986].. MR. Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip. 626 [1941])." (Ibid.. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. although many lawyers do not engage in private practice. therefore. saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. The term. which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co. knowledge. 593). Yes.]. v. v. In most firms. Presiding Officer. and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. Among others. Generally. p. 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services. [R. And.: Minnesota. the answer is yes. The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy. Is he. 3 [1953 ed. among others. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. . legal procedure. (Ibid. then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners. FOZ.2d 863.I. the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history. Yes. (Barr v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. Nonetheless. MR. 15). it might be helpful to define private practice. MR. Yes. OPLE. We must consider the fact that the work of COA. it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. 140 A. ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1).). MR. even chairman. Thank you. counselling and public service. FOZ. Vol. p. training and experience. [1986]. (Moran. Wolfram. not reality. p. once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today. of sound moral character. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.2d 623. (Gary Munneke. OPLE. 593). So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession. The Commissioner will please proceed. 665-666. In this regard thus. Bar Assoc. MR. 145 Conn.(Wolfram." Groups of lawyers are called "firms. Cardell. 22 A. At this point. 194 N. (Ibid. as commonly understood. 313.concerns the question set forth in the order. and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. Payne. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. . (State Bar Ass'n v. there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates. may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. . lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession." (Ibid. OPLE. such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. which requires the application of law. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms. Jamir). 325.] 179 A. Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois]. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer. (Charles W. in or out of court. To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit. Comments on the Rules of Court. the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.

These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. operational analysis. 687). tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers.1990. a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. as in medicine. many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. legal institutions. legal skills." Jan. know that in most developed societies today. 1989. the appraisal of major trends. A corporate lawyer. inter alia: corporate legal research. p. the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. . of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. advice-giving. an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice. a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). (Ibid. In most cases. At any rate. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. the most prominent is that of prosecutor. supra. For one. Moreover. wherein a "model". clients. In our litigation-prone country. p. 11. for example. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Instead. or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. 4). Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers. p. 11. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen. (Business Star. the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. i. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law.) In a big company." Jan. and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." Jan. the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed. p. 4). Of these special roles. 4). To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. After all. unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. "Corporate Finance Law. a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." (Business Star. is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. 11. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks. 1989. at least theoretically. international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. the diagnostician and the trial lawyer. to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems. functioning at the legal policy level of decisionmaking now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. "Corporate Finance Law. Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. tax laws research. Nonetheless.). a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. and electronic computing equipment." He is the "big-time" lawyer. 1989. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. for all intents and purposes. Understandably. surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective.). however. ( Emphasis supplied. a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties. 4). Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management. and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory. "Corporate Finance Law. the surgeon. a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. each involving different legal doctrines. so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. a business daily. automatic data processing. the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action. the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors. herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice. particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning. Truth to tell. and other interested parties. and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law." (Business Star. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law. the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Wolfram. In short.laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts." has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling. Lawyers. Certainly. This brings us to the inevitable. one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action.e.. document drafting." May 25. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous. "Corporate Law Practice. and negotiation. p. appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission). (Ibid. acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings). The business lawyer has been described as the planner. In several issues of the Business Star. legal processes. Lawyers and other professional groups. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation. (Business Star. many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. By no means will most of this work involve litigation.

[Be this as it may." so to speak. managing expanded liability exposure. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?. "The Corporate Counsel. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. thus: Preventive Lawyering. Also. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work." Jan. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. In the context of a law department. or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star. and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. 1991. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders. p. p. enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical. also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does . 4). These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. and psychological. the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made." it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global. including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. creating new and varied interactions with public decisionmakers. it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation. An understanding of the role of feedback loops. and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. social. aid in negotiation settlement. Managerial Jurisprudence. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. In Europe. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels." April 10. the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. 1991. he must. "Corporate Finance law. and the need to think about a corporation's. including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning. They differ from those of remedial law. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. economic. concern three pointed areas of consideration. 4). at the very least. promoting team achievements within the organization. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees. and rates of flow. three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. In a crisis situation. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. In general. For that matter. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities. with a shared area linking them.Today. managerial. "Business Star". Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process. including structuring its global operations. the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older. the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. interdependent environment.] the organization and management of the legal function. Esprit. 11. strategy at multiple levels. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues. 1989. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. inventory levels. Yet. more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities.

"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Soliven. served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate.S. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned. he took his oath of office. 15. (Ibid. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987). entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations. then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U. Romulo.) and having hurdled the bar. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970. 1991." Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal. and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. and since 1986.not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Manila. In a loan agreement. An appointment is essentially within the . such as the farmer and urban poor groups. Graduate School of Law. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties. (4) covenants." (See Ricardo J. having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. p. in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development. particularly the modern concept of law practice. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970). Michael Hager. 3 and 4. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms. Necessarily. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". Civil Service Commission. filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void." submitted by L. 265). It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. Vol. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel). a lawyer-manager. U. Third and Fourth Quarters. a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Nos. p. 13). 1982. regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development. Monsod. and project work of the Bank. a quast judicial body. Atty. the finance manager. but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation.S. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. 124. 1991. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.T. p. the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist.P. On June 18. On the same day. demand expertise in the law of contracts. 1973). 2. (Guillermo V. In the field of advocacy. Monsod used to be a member. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. has worked with the under privileged sectors. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts. a negotiating panel acts as a team." Staff Paper No. he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination. ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. 321). petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer. and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified. 1987. 143 SCRA 327. Atty. an unpublished dissertation. p. (p. once said: "They carry no banners. Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U. he worked with the Meralco Group. If he does. Jr. which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. in initiating. perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies. the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. for which he was cited by the President of the Commission. a lawyer-negotiator of contracts. and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Central Bank of the Philippines. Atty. 1977. has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. Civil Service Commission. "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments. Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry. lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. (pp. ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises. and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution. (3) conditions of closing. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising. the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission. as in this case.. but where they are. during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast. 11). Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. On June 5. men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery. they beat no drums. for instance. (Condensed from the work paper. (2) borrower's representation. Thus. and all the other legal requirements are satisfied. and (5) events of default. they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. economic. (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion. In the same vein.

may the Court reject the nominee. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion. et al.: On September 4. Senate. posting of bond. VIII." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines. are actually practicing law. . law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice. Laguna. (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. 1 Constitution). this petition is hereby DISMISSED. L-1532. and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. I greatly doubt. he would be considered on official leave of absence. SO ORDERED. charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C.S. Clearly. since no abuse. This is different from the acts of persons practising law. the Chief of Police of Alaminos. without first becoming lawyers. Romero. perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say. Once. consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination. In the instant case. is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved. oath-taking. most individuals. Thus. not the spirit of the agreement. I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified. Upon the other hand. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused. Additionally. . The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter. subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. by operation of law. that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed. he ceased to engage in private law practice. which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. and (4) acceptance e. 1949. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA. but by the spirit that giveth life. et al. (2) In the same vein. PAREDES.discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. in making use of the law. Sec. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar. Of those first appointed. . for has been clearly shown. without reappointment. . the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter. and that he would not receive any payment for his services. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U. vs. No. Nov. No blood shall flow from his veins. . much less a grave abuse of discretion. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City. and fuming with righteous fury. upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation. 1947. how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation. 1959. October 14. For one thing. Gonzales. The condition of his appearance as such. In view of the foregoing. but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power.. a member of the Philippine Bar. the President issues the permanent appointment. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance . Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines. vs. Delilah agreed on condition that — No blade shall touch his skin. who has been practising law for over ten years. it would be incredible that the U. as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee. p. or in advising others on what the law means. Plaintiff-Appellee. In that sense.. L-3081. two Members for five years. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. three Members shall hold office for seven years. perhaps. whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case. the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion. Supreme Court would still reverse the U. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Monsod is a lawyer. Finally. Blanco. say. this is far from the constitutional intent. implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President. invoking the case of Aquino. the answer is in the negative. only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. having entered his appearance as private prosecutor. etc. accused the procurator of reneging on his word. Moreover. (Art. J. and the last Members for three years. how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified. 28. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured. Law on Public Officers.g. This blinded the man.S. the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth. Delilah was beside herself with anger. (Lacson v. DefendantAppellant. Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice.S.

allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. the Secretary of Justice. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. for it consists in frequent or customary actions. because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. Rule 138. and which we consider plausible. the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General. as it is hereby affirmed. Sec. presided by the Hon. a succession of acts of the same kind. in all respects. Jarencio. 864. 1. Revised Rules). for patently being without merits. Bryan. On the other hand. counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case. with costs against appellant. now Sec. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. 98 N. On December 17. Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person. law library WHEREFORE." He claims that City Attorney Fule. Revised Rules of Court. Laguna. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. Under date of January 4. The appeal should be dismissed. the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. Cotner. M. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING. to represent the complainant in the case at bar. the decision appealed from should be. 644. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. law library In view of the foregoing. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. Laguna. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed. 1961. 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. Practice is more than an isolated appearance. In other words. heretofore reproduced. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos. 647). therefore. Hilarion U. Rule 27. 768). in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. 31. 87 Kan. Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge. 127. or with the aid of an attorney. 1961. it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior. 42 LRA. this Court holds that Asst.. the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation. Rule 138.of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. as already pointed out. with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose.E. 4 S. the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. 35. 35. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. without costs. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially. which bars certain attorneys from practicing." this time invoking Section 32. For one thing. the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. 522.S. which rendered judgment on December 20. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna. as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.C. The offended party had. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. p. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public. who is a relative.

the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. Within two years from the approval of this Act. Act 6397. On August 16. in general. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires. Thereafter. pleading. and publish information relating thereto. the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession. 3. professional competence. 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. learning. therefore. law reform. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. at the outset. pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession. opinions. such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity. giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. jurisprudence." The petition in Adm. for this purpose. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar. make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law. convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration. are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice. the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. It will suffice. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. integration fosters cohesion among lawyers. out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated. 526 2 of the Court. as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. SEC. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. . and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public. 4 Since then. (7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law. comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration. 2. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On December 1. public service and conduct. 1972. practice and procedure. The purposes of an integrated Bar. Written oppositions were admitted. 1972. with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. (3) Discharge. sentiments. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated. fully and properly. after due hearing. (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood. 1962. thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. and ensures. Case No. as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report. (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers. improve the administration of justice. (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members. through their own organized action and participation." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. In September. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views. and make reports and recommendations thereon. arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. to carry out the purposes of this Act. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. 1971. and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. In 1970. its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30. 1973 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar. and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Congress passed House Bill No.PART II January 9. Bar integration. Marcos on September 17. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. SEC. Integration of the Bar will. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. (6) Encourage and foster legal education. (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law. among other things. and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants.

as an officer of the court. (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. The issue therefore. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. moreover.(4) Shield the judiciary. (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. and to the nation. the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power. . not involuntary membership in any other aspect. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. it follows that as an incident to regulation. and the admission to the practice of law. (8) Provide placement services. (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it. and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service. (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards. given existing Bar conditions. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation. a privilege. practice. therefore. (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces. the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. will "raise the standards of the legal profession. Freedom of Association. — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege. The Supreme Court. Regulatory Fee. Sec. impartiality and independence. while the purpose of a tax is revenue. and procedure in all courts. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. Otherwise stated. the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. 1. such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. Anent the first issue. 13 of the Constitution. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar. on the importance of preventive legal advice. more specifically. and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. to the courts. (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations. in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services. is a question of compelled financial support of group activities. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people." Indeed. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue. because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client. Moreover. it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. and assist it to maintain its integrity. the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. and promulgate minimum fees schedules. it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. but there can be no collective action without an organized body. (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers. under Article VIII. — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action. — Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest." Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. the administration of justice. and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State. it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body. and (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation." Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer. no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses. 2. which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum. improve the administration of justice. but also to his brethren in the profession. but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or. may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar. "to promulgate rules concerning pleading. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: — Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. and. (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law. clothed with public interest.

while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto.06 per cent) are non-committal. none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen.090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses. 4. (5) elimination of unauthorized practice. would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. on the other hand. Upon the other hand. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation. hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE. of the 13. Canada and the United States. has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession. to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes. at the time Bar integration takes effect. It is noteworthy. ACCORDINGLY. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration. and 285 (or 2. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar. In many other jurisdictions. Freedom of Speech. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar. that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England. A lawyer is free. 1973. because it will apply equally to all lawyers. The conscientious objector. In addition. to the courts. as he has always been. it has been variously argued that in the event of integration. of a total of 15. however. Canada and the United States." within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines.802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission. if his liberties were to be thus extended. while only 378 (or 2. they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed. and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits. 662 (or 4.04 per cent) are noncommital.555 (or 96. 3. improve the administration of justice. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar. Case No. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court. Even the income tax would be suspect. and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members. might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. it is not unfair. that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable. effective on January 16. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. (4) greater Bar facilities and services. by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution. it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.80 per cent) vote against it. Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. 12. and 157 (or 1. cliquism will be the inevitable result. it is not unequal. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. and politics will intrude into its affairs. The Court is fully convinced. 14.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof. it has restored public confidence in the Bar. a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration. Finally. and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. enlarged professional consciousness. effective lobbying will not be possible. Government authority will dominate the Bar. (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar. Fair to All Lawyers. by proper work.51 per cent) voted against it. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. young and old. and vastly improved the administration of justice. even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.855 (or 93. it is not retroactive. it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which. local Bar associations will be weakened. (8) more cohesive profession. notably in England. the Court. energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public. . the Bar will become an impersonal Bar. (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns. (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar. and to the public.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration.

the proper forum.00. issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5. ATTY. and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B. respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. 3 (Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar. Blg. she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court. but also an injury to the public. a member of the Philippine Bar.A. instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions. can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce. 27. in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989. The Court of Appeals. 85-38361.00. Martinez.000. 85-38360.400. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. in Criminal Case No. In due time. PHILIPPINES. 05093. and to pay a fine of P16.P.00.000.00. Marquez. CR No. the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa. the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but.00. respondent. On 17 December 1983. for sale on a commission basis. she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. docketed as Criminal Case No.00 in Criminal Case No. the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance. to pay a fine of P 6. 8538359. with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Tuanda. 85-38360 and 8538361. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5. . On appeal. and (b) three (3) for violation of B.00. 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B. multiplied a thousandfold. docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. respondent. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5. complainant in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.400. . The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation. respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee. the practice is prescribed by the law.PART III CANON 1 PEOPLE OF THE vs. respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. in addition. Sometime in February 1984. 22 in all three (3) cases.400. for insufficiency of funds.P. four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa. FE T. respondent received from one Herminia A.-G. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest. Marquez several pieces of jewelry. In Lozano v. and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder. respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. 85-38358.00. Blg. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. Blg. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.400. the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit. Blg. in Criminal Case No.R.000.P." On 1 February 1989. 1 On 16 December 1988. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989. .P.P. the Court of Appeals in C. CR No. 22.000. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B. after trial.R. .250.A. noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court. Consequently. (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5. 85-38359. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Traders Royal Bank. and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15. with a total stated value of P36. TUANDA. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. 22 in the following terms: The gravamen of the offense punished by B. PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Marquez. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. SO ORDERED. In that Resolution. and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15.00.00. all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.-G.450. asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.450. respondent Fe T. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. Blg.00.

In his opinion. She went back to Ivisan. constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAGDALENA T. . Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. 1971. he did not mind because he loved her very much. 865). Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. 1975. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. MANIWANG respondent. 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case. however. Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. 28. K to Z). Davao del Sur. AQUINO. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. 1973 that she was pregnant. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar. 1973 of their child. grossly immoral conduct. Fearing that there was something amiss. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. vs. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife.P. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada. Blg. violation of B. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4. have been filed or are pending in any court. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. J. she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. They renewed their relationship. Ivisan. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past.Magdalena remained in Cebu.: Magdalena T. involving moral turpitude. she and Segundino went to her hometown. 1975. 1970 at Cebu City. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him. In Melendrez v. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". 1973 for the baptism of his child. I and J). its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Segundino stopped visiting her. He went to Cebu in December. or other gross misconduct in such office. 5 ACCORDINGLY. Thereafter. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Bukidnon. Arciga in her complaint of February 24. they had sexual congress. Oblena. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. When Magdalena discovered in January. The results were released on April 25. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section. In December. Michael Dino Maniwang. or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. He continued his law studies in Davao City. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. Erlinda Ang. Magdalena went to Davao in July. Segundino passed the bar examinations. Several days after his oath-taking. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January.malpractice. ARCIGA complainant. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. (Italics supplied) Sec. SEGUNDINO D. to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. they had repeated acts of cohabitation. which Magdalena also attended. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case. respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. . After they had dinner one night in March. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation. Capiz. 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. 1975 to contact her lover. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. 117 Phil. and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25. 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October. Decena.

Administrative Case No. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. 27 SCRA 169. Jr. Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. 768. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual. who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno. where lawyer Eugenio V. observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man. which he refused to fulfill. 101 Phil. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony. when old-fashioned morality still prevailed. Agustin. 106 Phil. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct. and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C. two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. 1967 and 1968. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant. disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. . February 28. that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her. See Sarmiento vs. (5) Where Flora Quingwa. February 28. Abaigar vs. falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. De la Cruz. Ruado. 1975. 450). and. seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. however. (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. a married woman separated from her husband. 117 Phil. (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities.J. she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. J. marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies. 100 Phil. after such fake marriage. for better or for worse. Lopez. because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent. 507. 1206. Toledo. 62 SCRA 382. Simbol. Puno refused to marry her. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt. 1102). 100 Phil.It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. 313). Administrative Case No. middle and the last in my life. 1975. or shameless. 1967. 48 Phil." (People vs. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. Almirez. anyway. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. (See Montana vs.: In a complaint made way back in 1971. According to the complainant. Administrative Case No. In 1955. (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras. who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles. 959).S. Before be could take his oath. SIMEON BARRANCO. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila. vs. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that. Reyes vs. was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because. Villanueva. Administrative Case No." "Through thick and thin. 586). complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. (Almirez vs. see Villasanta vs. February 24. a public school teacher. JR. 256). It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. honor and morality is not well cultivated. 1979. they were going to get married. There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. 63 SCRA 667. 322. 865)." (Mortel vs.93 SCRA 91). Aspiras. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage. succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. 533. 1969. 19 SCRA 439). the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Paz. Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents. Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. 535). An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general. while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage. 2nd 896). (Quingwa vs.. Josefina Mortel. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. under promise of marriage. She used to give Puno money upon his request. (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. flagrant. Wong. Administrative Case No. be denied admission to the legal profession. 123 Phil. respondent. Puno. (Royong vs. September 10. RESOLUTION ROMERO. my Josephine you will always be the first. 389. after unsuccessful attempts in 1966. and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage. Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children. Viojan vs. SO ORDERED. 997. 114 Phil. Oblena. Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco. a married man. in life or in death. Peralta. they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs." will depend on the surrounding circumstances. 481. whose sense of dignity. he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy. 547. (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena. January 29. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PATRICIA FIGUEROA. 116 Phil. complainant. she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. 117 Phil. Duran. Cui.

45 Sisa Street. 1964. p. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE TOLOSA. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit. 1988 when the Court.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays." 6 It is a willful. the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco. The IBP's report dated May 17. complainant alleged. Their intimacy yielded a son. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned. respondent. Barrio Tenejeros. 1974. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. both of whom possess no impediment to marry. in response to complainant's opposition. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Unfortunately. or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. complainant.: On 7 April 1982. vs. his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Iloilo from 1980-1986. Malabon. On June 1. born on December 11. credible. this petition. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. they were steadies. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman. the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. On June 18. respondent repeated his request. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Upon complainant's motion. 1993. ALFREDO CARGO. resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. 5 Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17. We agree. 1 It was after the child was born. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams. the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Iloilo. Since 1953. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15. the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17. when they were both in their teens. respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart. voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems. who is now sixty-two years of age. the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. 3 In 1988. 1980. Rafael Barranco. 1979. even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Jr. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971. To recapitulate." (Rollo. . Sevilla in June and July 1971. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. but grossly immoral. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral. who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. 1988. sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. 10 Respondent. J. is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. bitter and unforgiving to the end. 9 Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. when she learned that respondent married another woman. respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman.Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. He gave only P10. to take the lawyer's oath. Jr. 1974. Hence. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble. WHEREFORE. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. flagrant. perpetually. 1982. SO ORDERED. report and recommendation. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. not for any other reason. should thus be allowed. 7 We find the ruling in Arciga v. for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love. 8). 4 On September 29. citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay. Respondent Simeon Barranco. Complying with an order of this Court. Patricia Figueroa. On February 18. albeit belatedly.The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay. On October 2. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.

Sept. Barrio Tenejeros. Tenejeros. 1983. 1 Lopez Jaena St. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. Malabon. (Rollo. That Priscilla. May 12. Malabon. Quezon City. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. 10.10. June 15. Domingo. 4. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. In fact. Malabon. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. 1982. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. pp. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. 'B-l' and 'K'). Metro Manila.. as assistance in her medical expenses. 'B'.. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). pp. 1983). N' and 'Q'). (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. Metro Manila from her earnings. Malabon. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. 1983.. Galas. July 29. 7. 33-35). his wife left their conjugal house at No. because of her differences with complainant. Edgardo Miclat.. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. 1984). Barrio Tenejeros. 1982. 45 Sisa St. 1985.Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'.. June 21. 45 Sisa St. 10-11. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. pp. 45 Sisa Street. pp. . That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. Quezon City. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. 4. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. 3. denying the further allegations of complainant. Domingo Church in 1980. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. Sept.. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. 9. and visited her at the hospital everyday. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. (Rollo. pp. Galas. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. Galas. Malabon. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. 45 Sisa Street. 8. 6. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. 5-8. Priscilla (tsn. 6. That sometime in June. Metro Manila (tsn. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. in fact. Quezon City. Quezon City. That while Priscilla was staying there. Barrio Tenejeros. That again in Quezon City. Exh.. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. 1983). 3. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. pp. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. 18-20. 16.17. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. 37-39). Metro Manila. 1983). 2. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. Malabon. 5. Tenejeros. Exh.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. 20. pp. Malabon. their residences being one house away from each other. 9). left their conjugal house and lived at No. and complainant. p. to live with respondent at No. 5. 1 Galas St. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. pp. pp. 7. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. at the FEU Hospital. May 12. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. May 12. c) That respondent only gave P35. That respondent had been courting his wife. 8. 'M'. 8. 35-37). 1982. nor lived with her at No. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. 2. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. (Rollo. Metro Manila (tsn. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. report and recommendation. Tenejeros. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. 13-15.1 Lopez Jaena St. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). Quezon City (tsn.

'B'. 1978 against respondent (Exh. (Rollo. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear. complainant. In view of these. 1978. 39-40). "B") for the amount of P5. The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7 February 1990 in the following manner: On August 7.00 was signed by respondent on August 7. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. Atty.In effect.000. At the same time. in spite of his differences with complainant." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. 4. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. 1978. p. the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. The Court referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution dated 15 July 1981. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife." (Rollo. She tried to seek respondent's signature on the receipt but it was only on August 7. For this very reason. 2. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to appear. complainant sought the help of the U. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. At the same time. ACCORDINGLY.000. 1978 when she was able to see respondent and gave to him the P5. 3. . Atty. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. Afraid that her investment will not be returned. SERGIO AMANTE. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27. Sergio Amante to be invested in business with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting Aug. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5. 7. A written receipt (Exh. "A") payable to the latter and which. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. As officers of the court. Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. For the many weeks that followed. Complainant was further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily. from disbursing monies that may be due to respondent on account of his retirement from the University's service. Received by: S. 1978 and which states: Mrs. was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the casino. On 18 June 1981. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. but failed to complete his presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. Three days after August 7. per agreement between the two of them.000. Atty. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent failed to come. 40). The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified on her own behalf and submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. Sergio G.00 to Atty.000. testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. Respondent also presented documentary evidence on his behalf. "C"). Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct.00 check for which respondent signed the receipt/promissory note. By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980. respondent RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p On 27 March 1979. 'G'. Thus. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. pp. report and recommendation. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. complainant even begged respondent to return her money if he could not give the interests but respondent merely made promises. respondent Amante failed to offer formally his documentary evidence. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from leaving the country and an order restraining respondent's employer. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. More specifically.00 (Exh. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by complainant. 1978 in the amount of P5. The LIZASO. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence.M Amante(signed) The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4. complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the interest on her investment but respondent failed to give her any. ATTY. 1978. Court required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the complaint. 1978. Moreover. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SHIRLEY CUYUGAN vs. capital to be returned after two months. complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. the University of the East.E Legal Department Head. in spite again of his differences with complainant. 655615 dated August 4. and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. however. The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of the check. B-1'. 'F'.

Amante admitted he encashed the check. Antonio Ravelo. "1" would affix his signature so far away below from the handwritten words. It totally negates respondent's claim that the check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to complainant. at all.000. To provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent. 655615C (P5. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check confirms it.000. are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause of action against respondent. was of the opinion that this was a personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle.00 to complainant. prior to finally securing legal assistance from a private lawyer.00 to respondent Amante for investment purposes and that respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof. Fourth.00 capital investment which respondent failed to do. 2 Upon the other hand. 1978. but' argued that he did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior obligation to him.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B" of the Complaint.000. 655615 as payment of my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley C. complainant sought the help of the University President.00 allegedly given in payment of complainant's loan from respondent. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being incredible if not manufactured for the following reasons: Furthermore. complainant sought the help of Mr. in separate written complaints.00. Thus. respondent affixed his signature. which loan fell due a month later. complainant allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20. Lizaso.000. to substantiate his own version of the evidence. "H") authorizing complainant to collect in his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr.E Head of Legal Department. by her letter of December 11. "1". Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of respondent.E Faculty President.000. Lizaso Check No. despite repeated demands therefor. 1987. "B" embodying the agreement that the P5. Complainant was allegedly very slow in repaying the loan. the stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the investigation of this disbarment case.000. but the latter was not able to help her because respondent denied that he ever owed complainant anything.000.E Faculty President and the University President himself. and purportedly signed by complainant.00 investment. the exhibits submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. Noriega who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with payment of respondent's fee. the latter dangled the possibility of a second loan for P20. upon complainant's repayment of her first loan. addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No. the agreement between him and complainant was to invest the amount in respondent's business venture.000. correspond to the . 1978 addressed to a certain Mr.E. The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5. Again. however. dated August 7. "D"). "1" is fully handwritten.000. 2. Furthermore. he claimed that complainant inserted the words in Exh. Moreover. "B" do not. According to respondent. subsequently marked as Exh. Amante(signed) Exh. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check. Moreover. already contained the words "capital investment" at the back thereof. and that the capital of P5. Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5. Legal Department Head or the U. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a second loan to complainant. This amply and clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent and presented by him to the bank. 1978 (Exh. we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has discharged the burden of showing. 1978 embodying the following words: Received from Shirley C. such as the U. the U. Mr. the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible. At the same time.00 needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house. complainant tendered to respondent Amante the P5. Third.00 shall be returned to complainant after two months from date thereof.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7. "1" that what remained is the receipt promissory note or Exh.000. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or reimburse complainant's money. it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh.000.E Faculty President. the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the investigations/confrontations set by the U. 1 Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts. the latter wrote a note dated November 7. the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a note of receipt when. at the time of encashment by respondent. Instead. "1" which consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of the top of Exh.00) in payment of her loan. U. Mr. Exh. all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement of her P5. To all these terms. by clear and convincing evidence. Annex "2". is the alleged receipt dated August 4. and that complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings of Exh. on 7 August 1978. "1" and Exh. Noriega then returned the note to her with the advice that she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected by complainant. "B" with the last handwritten line in Exh. d) Finally. that said amount has a guarantee of 10% profit per day starting August 7. "B") dated August 7. [Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature below] Sergio G. respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a receipt for P5. in the ordinary course of things as in the case at bar. it should be the respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of P5. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent Amante by harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5. The receipt/promissory note (Exh.00 to complainant. if indeed complainant paid her loan to respondent. leaving a big void or vacant space in between which any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage and manipulated to the prejudice of the signatory.000. Second. Noriega. even more so that respondent is a lawyer. Annex "1" — photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by three inches.00 was entrusted to respondent to be invested by him in his business venture. After careful examination of the records of this case. he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only to dismiss the complaint outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was spreading within the university.000. Complainant presented this note to Mr. "B" are one and the same and that in view of the long and big vacant space between the handwritten words and his signature. which was substantially as follows. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by respondent.00 check referred to in the complaint. Resty Noriega (Exh.000. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from various school officials. 1978 clearly expresses the terms of their oral agreement that the amount of P5. Conrado Aquino. Aquino. The analysis of respondent's evidence by the Solicitor General follows: 1.Because of this. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow: First. "B" of the complainant and the same signature of respondent. that she had delivered P5. 1978 and the same to be returned two months thereafter. a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. Sometime in June 1978.

the courts retain the power to discipline him. the last line of respondent's Exh.00. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character. respondent tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be falsified and which try to make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys. was appointed guardian of a minor child. just like Annex "1" (stub receipt). 5. non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. by promising to give her P20. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the P5. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. would be doubly expected to protect his loan by a similar receipt. borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank and to guarantee that personal loan. "1". Unfortunately.000. It is true. In disciplining the respondent. it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan of P5. justifies suspension or disbarment. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice. Justice Malcolm went on to say: The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. It also appears that when finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the disbarment proceedings. as well as between court and attorney. In the case at bar. therefore. a member of the Bar.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June. as the respondent is. Any person. as there was actually none to secure. which does not contain any tail loops at all. was expressed by Mr. As such guardian. who knows that she will be given a P20. constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. In other words. Pelaez.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5.000. whether relating to professional or non-professional matters." as used in this rule. Exh. just as well.00 loan. 1978. is the conclusion that Exh. she could have very well secured the same from the bank and not from the respondent. 8 (Emphasis supplied) The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr.000. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. including some shares of stock in certain corporations. when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. had never been presented by respondent in any of the confrontations set by the university officials between complainant and respondent. indicative of moral unfitness. in common with other courts.00 she gave him. "B" is a physical continuation of Exh.000. We are compelled to conclude that respondent attorney converted . get the same loan from the bank as she was able to. In other words. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. and the court requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. So it is that we. Justice Malcolm said: .000.000. hold. "1" and "B" are not the same and are far different from each other. is quite hollow and very unlikely.000.00 loan. respondent. 3. he came into possession of certain property. immoral or deceitful conduct. respondent was not able to. is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago. 1978 in order to invest it on respondent's business venture. indicative of moral unfitness for the profession. that misconduct. the complainant no less. in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness. it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. . But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity.00 loan to respondent who promised to give her. Abordo 9 in the following terms: that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. Lastly.000. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck. 7 with eloquence and restraint: As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted to him. . who is not a lawyer.last line of Exh. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. And yet. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others.000.00. Moreover." Mr. If complainant really needed the balance of P15. that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. "1". justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good moral character. a P20. To follow respondent's twisted reasoning. "B". it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. however. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings.000.000. it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for such return and accounting.000. without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court. but was only presented during the investigation at bar.00 loan he earlier gave to her. which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him. it evokes wonder why complainant would secure a P5. 10 Finally. if it were true that the paper showing Exh. whether it be professional or non-professional. 6 (Emphasis supplied) The rationale of the rule that misconduct. who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez 4 the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. In that case. As early as 1923. For a lawyer. Mr. there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a subsequent loan from respondent because she could. while still guardian of the minor. Immediately clear.00 on August 4. with all his legal expertise. it appears strange that he has not required complainant to sign any receipt for the P5. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not have any tail loops that would correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh. 5 The nature of the office. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person..00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence." If complainant.00 but would merely partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15.00 if she pays the P5.000.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. of course. pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor. anyway. we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest. was able to make him sign a receipt for P5. [A]s a general rule." We emphasize here that "conduct. Pelaez.000. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. 3 Thus.000.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from the latter. the respondent Vicente Pelaez.

respondent Atty. not to mention his seeming indifference to the complaint brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the Solicitor General. . to the courts.00 loan extended to him and at the same time demanding payment thereof. was able to obtain a loan in the amount of P1. purportedly for an urgent personal need. In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May. Luis. After the investigation conducted by said Solicitor. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Despite complainant's repeated demands however. (Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation. Saludares with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis Constantino. Jr. respondent borrowed money in the amount of P1. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.00 loan despite repeated demands by complainant who was duly authorized to collect the same. p. It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence. There is no doubt that respondent. he could have done so in several instances repayment was demanded of him. Jr. Jr. 1990. As a matter of fact. Copies shall also be finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney. and is therefore a proper subject for disciplinary action. complainant and his wife took turns in trying to recover the debt from respondent. vs. Bersamira. it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. (Rollo. Saludares be charged with violation of Section 27.00 which he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands. at the appointed place of payment. CONSTANTINO. J. p. Sergio G. the case was deemed submitted for report and recommendation. 1978. categorically admits having borrowed money from complainant's son. Jr. the Solicitor General rendered its report. PRUDENCIO G. respondent persistently refused to pay back the said amount. 1978 reminding the latter of the P1. respondent does not deny the fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the P1. This act. to say the least. The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt. complainant Luis G. 1978. respondent. p. By his failure to present convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt. he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs.'s absence from the country to justify such act of non-payment. authorizing the latter to collect the sum of money owed by respondent. The Solicitor General further add that respondent's refusal to pay the debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer's oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. by abusing the trust and confidence of complainant's son. 19 SCRA 439 [1967] ). to his clients. prompting the former to seek assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavit-complaint. Jr.000. 214 SCRA 1 [1992] ). SALUDARES. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. Subsequent demands for payment were then made by Luis. challenged the veracity of respondent's contentions and reiterated his previous allegation of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtness despite repeated demands. On October 15.000. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation promising to pay it back promptly the following day. 19) This however. was appointed to the Bench and no report nor recommendation was made by him. Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis. Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension. 25. In the interim. A lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. was left unheeded. respondent failed to demonstrate that he still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. He however. the respondent admits said indebtness but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt.000. Jr. Javier. The Civil Relations Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24. complainant alleges. On March 12.000. Prudencio S.000. Puno. report and recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and complainant. Respondent failed to comply with his promise. ATTY. It is clear from the records that after Luis. As far as the records of this case show. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUIS G. respondent filed his comment on the affidavit-complaint alleging among other things that the complaint was without basis and malicious in nature. the case was duly referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. 1984 the case was re-assigned to another Solicitor. to write respondent a letter dated February 3. Jr. He reasons out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis. Solicitor Bersamira. in his reply. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. left the country and afterwards wrote his father.00 from complainant's son Luis.complainant's monies to his personal uses. RESOLUTION BIDIN. Jr. wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice. respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies. It appears that sometime in August 1977. Respondent further cites the fact of Luis Jr. Prudencio S. This prompted Luis.: In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21. 4). was assigned to the Office of Solicitor Jesus G. 1979. (Rollo. We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law. Constantino charges respondent Atty. left the country. failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment. He must perform his duties to the Bar. Complainant. The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer. however. WHEREFORE. Had respondent intended to settle his indebtness. but to no avail. promising to pay it back the following day. 1979. 3) The Solicitor General found that respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his debt was apparent from the averments in the affidavit-complaint and this fact was sufficiently established during the proceedings before the investigating Solicitor. Luis. Jr.00 from Luis Constantino. Jr. like the other demands. is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. Such a conduct. On November 8. borrowed P1. constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office.

After his proposals to settle the present case for P5. 1973. 2d 729 as cited in Tan vs. (Fellner vs. is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. 2 It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution. the Court directed the examination of Mrs. thereby degrading not only his person but his profession as well. selling all his business. 1970).000. 1974. the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important that truthfulness and candor. Hall [LQ App] 90 so2d 519. The lower court dismissed the complaint. 1973. Saludares from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice. It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. 1973.. were successively rejected by complainant's counsel. now deceased. honesty and integrity of the profession (Lyons vs. The lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. but must also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. and the foundry shop where Mrs. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. 5 That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals. Valenzuela. No. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration. who was especially deputized to serve the writ. on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. Ong Ting. Sabandal. Amante. with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts. improvements. and for P40. materials. petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Bulacan. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ). so long set at naught and disregarded. in its Order of March 19. including equipment. It was docketed as G. 1973. it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession. one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court. as shown in its order dated March 23. Certiorari and prohibition lie.: The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. vs. all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect and confidence of the public. SO ORDERED. Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan. machineries. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June 27. 131 A.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. to the bar. 3 This Court. 1973 denied his motions." 7 chanrobles virtual law library Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records. In the case at bar. a point stressed in another motion dated February 2. Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. dated March 12. which certainly deserve no encouragement. Clemencio. WHEREFORE. A member of the Bar must act with integrity. petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint.00 on December 22. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961. J. denied the petition for certiorari of private respondent. Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila. Extensive hearings were conducted. competence and fairness (Roque vs. 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts show that on January 16. Respondents. immoral or deceitful conduct. to the courts and to his clients.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful. To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity. did so on January 17 and 18. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. 212 SCRA 618 [1992] ). for P25. supra). 1970. 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). FERNANDO. with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. 1 Thereafter. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy. Petitioners. asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. "allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop . the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. L-36636. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. The original writ of execution had been returned wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their names.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. Valenzuela. It is about time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union. to his compadre Lo . 1973. 1968. by the employment of techniques. Javier. 1970 6 for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. 4 In the meanwhile.000. much less approval.00 in September 1968. 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17. in the New Century Foundry Shop. and the private respondent Lo Bu. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. His conduct should be characterized by candor. He is required not only in fact to be possessed of good moral character. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action. soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31. supplies and rights. Consequently. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari.000.The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath. in its resolution dated July 17. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS. 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in Marcelo vs. honesty and professional decorum. Both his professional and personal conduct must be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. 1970. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. 1968. There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal. Bar Association of Baltimore City. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road. showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs. Bulacan. Rule 1. reinstating it in its resolution of December 19. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23. This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. after hinting of taking measures to avoid liability. there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties.00 in October 1968. he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22.. and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed. ALVAREZ.R. dated March 11.

There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of being the alleged vendee. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice.B. the then Justice. pursuant to the provision of Section 17. was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3. from which he realized P20. the bad faith being evident. That is the ordinary course of judicial procedure. he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner labor union. assailed in the certiorari proceeding. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. 1973 and February 2. Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. herein above reproduced in its entirety. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft. there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been . "Ong Ting lost everything. On February 10. he gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. he did specifically maintain: "On January 26. when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name. dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. decreed. . 17 Counsel Yolando F. for on the facts as found. by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop. private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance.. " Then. .. such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood. this Court. denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in accordance with law. the CIR issued an order on January 30. his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court." . may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final . Mrs. It is clearly fictitious... In the latter motion. had the temerity to deny such allegations. If petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No.. the ostensible vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. promulgated in 1969. ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale. 1973. we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing . herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2. " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. 1973. De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v.. there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith. .. 1970. 1973. . 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. Under the circumstances. On February 3. as a forced intervenor. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. for P20. It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop.. Busmente in his Answer to this petition.. Acting Director of Prisons. which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its resolution of July 17. followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J. Rules of Court).Bu. he was still residing in the premises of the shop . Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses.' . Valenzuela.. in order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties. 1959. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that particular case. herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself. Rule 135.. Moreover.. also prolix.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. It is not so however in this case... There is this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v.00 . in his special and affirmative defenses.' So it has been from 1919. praying for the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond. As a general rule. 1969. " This allegation was made despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu. He could. when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v.. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts. "even if erroneous.. 1969..'" 13 3. 6. now Chief Justice. As emphasized by the ponente. that is merely. 1973. 1973. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.000. where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. in 1967. In Cruz v. 1973. in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded. Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the Supreme Court.000. filed on February 20. At the time Ong Ting died.000. which he denied.' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. In fact he did file two motions for that purpose. Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25. which he acknowledged so fully paid . . . . What is worse. So it must be here.00.. as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before this Court.. 1969. petitioner in L-36636. to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR. Court of Industrial Relations. this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory. both of which were denied." 9 chanrobles virtual law library That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. He failed. as in this case.00. Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu. For even if such be the case. as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. He . 1975. the Court may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. Lo Bu. . one day before the schedule sale. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. On February 27. 1973. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order. His daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier..." What is more. the alleged manager in absentia. for the purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22. all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23. One last point. to accord deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the case. and it is not enough. As noted. Lo Bu. A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified. by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. 1973. That is the most that can be said of his performance. alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. without the latter being made a party to the case. Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice proceeding. 3021-ULP. an alias writ of execution was issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road. there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v. On January 7. herein petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR. and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12... 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. 1973. His family continued to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. a 1962 decision. with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar... The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. Private respondent. and ii was not surprising. being the court of last resort. and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31. 1973. be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition. dated February 25. in Sanchez v. categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work. of course. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu. Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5. As much. To all intents and purposes then." 8 The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu. as stated earlier. in an expeditious or less expensive manner. was. it was alleged that as a result of the fire. that is the law of the case. indeed. Ong Ting. through Justice Street. 1973. Having acquired jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. there was a fictitious sale resorted to. The alleged sale was no doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents.L.

including vote-buying. the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other. in addition. 1989)." In his second column. Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs.L. PER CURIAM: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3. the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind. in an article. Attorneys Nereo Paculdo. Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart.000. and the editorial.e. upon invitation of the Court." Mr. and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband. July 8. Drilon is employed. based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth. on the day of the election. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand. However. 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC). appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court. appreciated to P50. and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend. June 20. directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors. Reyes. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations. 1989. Drilon. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. the alleged use of government planes.was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal. mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i. the ballots. Drilon's) candidacy. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x. Emil Jurado. I.000 to P20. at 2:00 o'clock p. entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE. delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve. Sunday. respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal. before the Supreme Court en banc. heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence.000. Triple costs. as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara. there is a widespread belief. Thereafter. and Teodoro Locsin Jr. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with. and.1989. was an informal one." headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals. the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited . no less than the dignity of the profession. Drilon.1989). but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. notably Chinese Filipinos. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3. and Violeta C. Cruz. and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates. June 17. in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya. the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard. Luis Mauricio. exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar. or regional. or chapter. resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officerselect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. soul. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.P. In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Violeta C. Jose B. giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. II. Ramon Nisce. Responding to the critical reports. and marking of. for the consideration of the Court. Mr. June 20.disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates. 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. and of the IBP officers.m. the Court. all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The fundamental assumption was that officers. 1989). namely. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U. to give counsel and advice. the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4. some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial." the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously. 1989). led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association. direct or indirect. 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya. requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client. and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting. was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board." Mr. 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec. womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5. Mr. ready and eager to do his every bidding. attended the dialogue. entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and. 1989. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity). Concepcion. national. except that of dismissing it. The Supreme Court en banc. is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. June 10. in its en banc resolution dated June 15." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates.. especially conciliators and employers.

or to vote for or against a candidate. A Delegate. Governor. or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections. drink. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. IBP By-Laws). — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political. (6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. 14. IBP By-Laws). Atty. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution. the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. a businessman. and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision. Narvasa. (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. and Carolina C. I. in any form or manner. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. Art. (d) Formation of tickets. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. the Hyatt. refused to identify. 14[e]. directly or indirectly. food. Their stories were based. whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member. or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[a]. (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts. and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon. The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. Luis Mauricio. (5) Giving free hotel accommodations. Daniel Martinez. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. on letters. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza. IBP BY-Laws). (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member. or any similar consideration to any person. and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Messrs. The Clerk of Court. quasi-judicial.acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate. on election day. has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. as members. 14[c]. executive vicepresident. or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. thus: "SEC. Atty. Gancayco. (b) Distribution. drinks. "' Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC. (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. (10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. 14[b]. as Chairman. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. Padilla. but whom they. Article I. of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper. Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. after deliberating thereon. quasi-judicial." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected. without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. IBP BY-Laws). Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31. Griño-Aquino. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited. 1989. transportation or any article of value. (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. Emilio A. they said. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. to conduct the inquiry. III. the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president. while holding an elective. or combinations of candidates. invoking the Press Freedom Law. No lawyer holding an elective. IBP ByLaws). 4. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective. judicial. acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. single slates. Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Abraham F. offered or promised to any person. Henry Dy. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. 14[e]. and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Drilon. officer or employee of the Integrated Bar. Non-political Bar. SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED . quasi-judicial. or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. agency or instrumentality thereof. as well as the advertisement thereof. judicial. Sarmiento. and the Court. The newspaper columnists. or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial. entertainment. judicial. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee. entertainment to delegates. except on election day. (2) giving of food. of election campaign material.

BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers. He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: (b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-atArms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.' 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region. 10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph: No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.". The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said petitioners, of Manila,

court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,

one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's

L-19718. which. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Bolinao. After hearing. On May 3. the enforcement of the writ. Bolinao. and on April 17. Ago appealed. The respondents then filed on August 2. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. the Quezon City court countermanded. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done. 1962. and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. Upon their petition. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). However. the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. affirmed the judgment. upon his own admission. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied. except Lourdes Yu Ago. it rendered decision. and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. 37830-R). and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. in Ago vs. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored.propensity to litigate. 1965. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.R. 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. 1967. The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. Bolinas. and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9. in part. In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. 1966. Our decision of May 22. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. 1966. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. Atty. 1967 the court finally. Castañeda. now joined by his wife. in Ago vs. A." or about August 3. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners. vs. Failing to obtain reconsideration. Jr. antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. its primacy is indisputable.N. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon.R. 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G. On January 31. 1963 when he filed. the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. After remand. the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3. CASTRO. from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G. however.. docketed as L-26116. Perez. as his co-plaintiff.87. Jr. No pronouncement as to costs. and for the third time. 1966. and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25. LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS. AGO. the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City. which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26. ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. On November 1.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8.N. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15." his motions were denied. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot. 1963 to the highest bidders. so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407. PASTOR D. 39407. ACCORDINGLY. the trial court issued on August 25. respondents. 1961. affirmed the dismissal. was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. J. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court. "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. Ago moved to stop the auction sale.923. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October. . petitioners. Atty. Crispin D. from registering the latter's final deed of sale. reconsideration was denied on July 18.1äwphï1. Civil Case No. 1963. 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Ago failed to redeem. 1961 this Court.1966 this Court.: The parties in this case. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction. 1964 Pastor Ago. the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. with Atty. et al. 39438-R). praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila. 1. L-14066. lifted the restraining order. which issued the writ of possession. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3. Court of Appeals. on May 2. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Lourdes Yu Ago. after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON. that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor. curiously enough. 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation. Baizas and A. failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. and on June 30. 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession.

In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses. a mere expectancy. (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961. as in the case at bar. The assumption is of course obviously wrong. a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. (3) she lives in the very properties in question. the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint. here. 67 Phil. We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2. Invoking Comilang vs. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago. we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). must now enjoy them. (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint. 6. Relying upon Omnas vs. 7 7. This half-share is not in esse. then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit. which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court. (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963. et al. (Expediente. but is merely an inchoate interest. 2 5. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case. 419. the respondents Agos. abetted by their lawyer Jose M. grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. for. for. have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture. by exercising due diligence. (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale. in a general sense. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986).2. the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined. and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union. the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client. what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession. The respondents. Luison. and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit. p. 4. and (9) it was only on May 2. in the present case. Rivera. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. constituting neither legal nor equitable estate.. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity. 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem. rather than traverse the incontrovertible. Laches. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end. have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. the decision would actually separate husband and wife. is failure or neglect. the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. elementary justice demands that the petitioners. the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined. 1974. which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion). she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed. considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities. Atty. besides living with her husband Pastor. or even the impossibility. Now. for. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. and temper his clients propensity to litigate. to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. could or should have been done earlier. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not. 815) . We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who. and even up to the present. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house. Buendia. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless. the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice. (b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim. to do that which. 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld. laches now effectively bars them from raising it. of its enforcement. (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17. far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice. 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started. a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. its primacy is indisputable. with the assistance of counsel. and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance. 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. 3. there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued. (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint. on the merit or lack of merit of his case. but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended. (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. dated April 20. ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. Even then. (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution. prevent them from living together.

We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. which resulted in the replevin suit. which. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos. supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable. the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess. to cause more damage. 1964. the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. Atty. in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith. & Mrs. it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular. but. for the reasons hereunder stated.000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. seized and took possession of certain machineries. The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action. then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos. the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. pursuant to an alias writ of seizure. Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale. still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs. and the business venture that he entered into. 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff.877. moreover. which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable. and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. Discussion on The Causes of Action of The Supplemental Complaint And The Amended Supplemental Complaint Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint. 1964. are baseless. while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. 23. is the same issue that we have already resolved. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7. that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99. The issue here. the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question.08 in damages. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action.37 in civil case 27251. Rule 39. to their damage in the sum of P256. actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. ACCORDINGLY. in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction. depriving the Agos of the use thereof. caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago. and no third-party claim has been filed. For the same reason. Upon the second cause of action." (Sec. This third cause of action. Juan Quijano. that.750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75. the Agos suffered P174. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . 1966. the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor. illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141. the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint. Atty. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.877. that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith.923. the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value. the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. the Agos allege that on January 5. Luison.000 up to May 5. as shown. the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. and because of said acts.750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99. The Complaint Upon the first cause of action. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint. we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches. the inclusion of a paragraph averring that. the sheriff sold the properties for P141. and that the bank also acted in bad faith. the defendants. and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings. in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon. he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment.877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31. which is. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed. Jose M. Anent this third cause of action. which shall be paid by their lawyer. without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas.500. for. taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction.08 out of the judgment value of P172. therefore. as barred by laches. they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation. VI. (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement. for infectious hepatitis from December. a deep sinuous ulcer. and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. And secondly. and JON DE YSASI. In his manifestation dated September 14. 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes. telephone. 0452-84. As farm administrator. he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil. herein private respondent. erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d). said decision was affirmed in toto. vs. 10 I. were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. thirteenth month pay for 1983. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC. however. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary. respondents. he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August. et al. fertilizing. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil. power. 1982.). 0452-84. J. if any of the complaints pertain to their work. The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father. Inc. 1983 to January. the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent. as well as attorney's fees. Apolonio Sumbingco. petitioner. 3 His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit. 8 Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues. Bacolod City. moral and exemplary damages. 1984. thirteenth month pay and other benefits. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof. this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. During his recuperation which lasted over four months.: The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case. in refutation. on October 17.). private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. he was under the care of Dr. the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. were not acted upon. that is. Following his marriage on June 6.JON DE YSASI III. he lived on the farm. Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC. Prior thereto. the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. . in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition. thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. For this case is an action filed by an only son. said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC. Albeit with distaste. planting. against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages. consequential. or the surgical removal of the fistula. whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions. avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. without due notice. 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. 1984. In November.000. but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5. On July 31. Patricio Tan. 6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. 1991. 1982. . they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. Cebu City. gasoline. Both demands. dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent. docketed therein as RAB Case No. Furthermore. as well as for the remittance of his salary. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION). 1992. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. medical and dental expenses. the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it. In June. weeding. and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. However. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16. the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting: This case is truly unique. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. payment of back wages. private respondent's auditor and legal adviser. thereafter. two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. the Solicitor General remarked: . REGALADO. for brevity). 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12. CEBU CITY. with other allowances covering housing.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. Private respondent. For this purpose. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved. National Labor Relations Commission. Inc. notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. food. petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. 1982. he underwent fistulectomy. such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator. 9 Additionally. . most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other. 1984. 1983. Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d]. Negros Occidental sometime in April. occupying the upper floor of the house there. 1980. After an exhaustive reading of the records. in April. harvesting. light. his father's namesake. as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. 1992. First. Regional Arbitration Branch No.

NLRC (191 SCRA 328). 1987 at 49-50). it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.Rule 46 and Section 1[g]. As a manager. NLRC (184 SCRA 25). In any event. III. p. in fact or in law. 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his coemployee's health. . without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process. The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions. 1989 edition. to wit: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. who eventually decided the case. Vol. February 19. in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative. who conducted the hearings therein from December 5. Vol. in several cases. and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara. but not the least. 19 The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance: It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982. and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. such as herein public respondent NLRC. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center. such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process. III. petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. or a labor arbiter for that matter. The fact . Inc. It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge. he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation. Tan. with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. Last. 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. Dr. we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. For want of substantial bases. is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. Third. Dr. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. ever mindful of the longstanding legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure. First. After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human experience. (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Similarly. that there is no abandonment. once able to work. justice. we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment. Octavio. petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. During the period of his illness and recovery. This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn. In Dagupan Bus Company v. 133). illustrates what constitute abandonment. January 22. and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of. This Honorable Court. 12 Thus. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence. 1984 to July 11. 1985. cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. 20 The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Uy. petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao. 17 After a careful review of the records of this case.. petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. redundancy. Inc. and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 16 On the other hand. there must be a deliberate. we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency. Rule 50) of the Rules of Court. Mere absence is not sufficient. other than the one who conducted the hearing. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. . Tan. v. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Prefatorily. The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. 1986 at 20-44). petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking. For this reason. 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. There are significant indications in this case. it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. not defeat. is justified by his illness and strained family relations. there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. presents no procedural infirmity. Bacolod City (Tsn. the Court rules that for abandonment to arise. unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.

INC. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work. it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION. as private respondent contends. It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 1982. petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April. reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes. Machineries. for this reason. According to private respondent. when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks: It is also significant that the special power of attorney by private respondent on June 26. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor. specifications and other details relative thereto. Manucao. 1983. 31 It will be observed that all of these chores. private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. of legal age. 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner. as this is undeniably among his basic rights. specifically stating — 32 executed That I. 30 and remitting to private respondent through Atty. in fact. I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member. hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL. whether as salary. or even out of place. JON de YSASI. he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984. relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. and who is familiar with the terms. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent. . petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. however. prolonged though it may have been. petitioner argues. such as an employee. it would be awkward. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G. am a sugarcane planter. pension or allowance. in his pleadings. Private respondent. as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It was only in April. 26 With these. considering the nature of these transactions. If. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and. none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. We repeat. and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him. the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician. whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until April. It was only in January. 25 As earlier mentioned. there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. 27 To stress what was earlier mentioned. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives. and not salaries as. the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. 22 With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao.A. deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and. petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm. with or without deductions. Moreover. and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December. with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. it is clear." 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. and a resident of Hda. True. petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated. married. is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983. hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. Inc. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case. in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements. this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal. Inc. While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator. there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son. BISCOM Mill District. which petitioner took care of.. 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities. as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations. as well as the property values and monetary sums involved. while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee.. In the present case. in this regard he proved to be quite successful. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times. was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.. he kept petitioner on the payroll. viz. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982. 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders. Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him.remains that on account of said illnesses. nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. That as such planter-member of BIPA. 1984. 1980 in favor of petitioner. 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. 1984. asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital. The assertion regarding abandonment of work. private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January. no longer listed him as an employee. or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. Filipino. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go.

We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. the monthly sums received by petitioner. by way of substantial compliance. it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5. 35 and. Sec. 41 Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission. were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. Sec. said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name. notice shall be served at the worker's last known address. 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings. specifically. 33 the issuance of withholding tax reports. 6. much less a chance to be heard. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case. Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor. Rule XIV. PROVIDED. APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JON de YSASI III whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed. TO GET FOR ME and in my name. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee. petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. Besides. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise: Sec. 7. as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address. Notice of Dismissal. and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel. ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures. 42 On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case. Sec. specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers. there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work. the Solicitor General rejoins as follows: The Labor Arbiter held thus: . In cases of abandonment of work. as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. argues that Section 2. if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative. place and stead. 40 The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV. 39 Private respondent. place and stead. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor. that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks. 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. Answer and hearing. 5. my check/checks aforementioned. Decision to dismiss. Ovejera of said office. the dates of commencement and termination of employment. VI of the NLRC. especially when there is just cause therefor. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month. both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and crossexamine a witness. but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition. Right to contest dismissal. whether denominated as salary. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. regardless of designation. Sec. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code. HOWEVER. in opposition. of my On procedural considerations. but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. allowance or ex gratia handout. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel. petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits. We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez. the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. which involves the taking of testimony. the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.That I have named. as witness for private respondent. appointed and constituted as by these presents I HEREBY NAME. the reasons for their dismissal. if he so desires. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case. Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. Report of dismissal. That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK". As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. thereby foreclosing his opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. Furthermore. 2. pension. 11. he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner.

it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded. and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee. 48 We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination. we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General: The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 188 SCRA 295). the facts of the case justify their allowance. in addition to moral. therefore. are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with. is guilty of illegal dismissal. the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. NLRC. 51 We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. not only was petitioner dismissed without due process. In Wenphil. to wit: As a general rule. instead. arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud. the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial: Art. instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. or was contrary to morals. Similarly. however. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. However. 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned. 188 SCRA 295). 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. . inclusive of allowances. payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence. 49 III. the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. 170 SCRA 69. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the present case. records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code. This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. They are not recoverable as a matter of right. however. 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton. In the present case. Rule XIV of the implementing rules. the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause. (Wenphil Corp. temperate. Moral damages. vs. would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if. provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. Private respondent. as required under Section 5 (now. NLRC. No. a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales. vs. On this score. for his part. 279. (Morales vs. (Decision Labor Arbiter. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided. NLRC. therefore. seemingly. 47 Thus. the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. wounded feelings. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. G. vs. petitioner insists on an award of moral damages. Annex "C" Petition). Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and. and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement. Security of Tenure. 0452-84 should be modified.R. under Article 2229. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. Inc. 173 SCRA 192. Section 11). 50 Exemplary damages. differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. besmirched reputation. but his dismissal is without just cause. 43 II. Private respondent. But in Pacific Cement Company. where reinstatement is no longer possible. — In cases of regular employment. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. v. Clearly. a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan. good customs or public policy. The public policy behind this is that. he must not be rewarded re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. And for this failure. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. at 11-12. And in lieu of reinstatement. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. 53 We do not feel. Jr. and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.000. For this reason. This however. and social humiliation. liquidated or compensatory damages. we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement. Finally. an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. In the present case. affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5. may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish.While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment. petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service. we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office. . . He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers. 80587). . however. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. NLRC. NLRC. or constituted oppression. it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. oppressive or malevolent manner. good customs or public policy. 45 The Court.

a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality. respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Accordingly. sans sentimentality. who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983." On this point." 57 If he ever did so. the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years. a member of the Philippine Bar. the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind. taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice. The complainant spouses alleged. the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Once again. Decena. for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979. Complainants' Complaint. and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking. records). complainants signed the same. the Solicitor General presented the following: FINDINGS Complainants allege that on August 5. preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. of familial bonds. to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest.000.000. Almonte. a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted. October and November. end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D. with malpractice and breach of trust. he gave the document to respondent. that respondent. 183 SCRA 651). Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982. . the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. respondent. authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30. respondent exacted from complainants P500. as revealed by the records. p. however. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice. report and recommendation. 16.00. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants. REYNERIO I. In his answer dated 18 March 1980.000. complainants. DECENA. vs. ATTY. Jamero.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid. we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence. neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. instead of the strengthening. On 10 September 1982. Despite the assurance. had compromised that case without their authority. 54 The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5. In the same manner. On 19 July 1988. 56 Rule 1. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary. despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. that respondent had. we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute. One final word. the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. 58 and. 1976. therefore. and upon such assurance. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C. In as Report. after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case. By resolution dated 14 April 1980. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision.NLRC. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. SO ORDERED. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. But all claims for damages should be dismissed. a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Confronted by this discrepancy. WHEREFORE. replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September. rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. if not more importantly. it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5. in lieu of reinstatement. without qualification or deduction. among others. succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City. separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service. to conduct the necessary investigation.000. It is just as much their responsibility. Jorge T. Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987.00 loan. with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make.00. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN. when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case. records) over the same lot 3125-C. for both parties are equally at fault. In this new Real Estate Mortgage. In fine. the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document. 1975. 1975. who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda. the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur. or at least entertained the thought. by means of fraud and deceit. Pedro S. It is the Court's earnest hope. we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.00.lâwphî1. but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10. we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. 18. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. 1975. p. they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4. After the same was notarized. respondent prepared a new document on May 7. Complaint. 1976.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent. finally.00 on August 5. applies in this case.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10. and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter.00 to complainants and not P4. which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20. he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants. 1975 up to May 31. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent. which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection. computed as follows: the first loan of P5. the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Respondent's Position Paper). 1975.000. (b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. 2 of case).000. as between the parties and their successors in interest. it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth.000.000.00. 1979 to pay their obligation.000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5. 6.000. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5. although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage. This respondent failed to do. 14. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract.00. the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions.00 on May 7. Respondent did not accept the proffered P10. since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5. that they obtained a loan of P5. Thus.. returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30. For their failure to pay the obligation.000.00.000.000. 1975 and November 30. applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16. p. One of the exceptions. When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres.000. 7. it is to be considered as complaining all such terms. per advice of respondent himself. he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it. beginning December 31. All the requirements of Act No. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4. is allegedly the truth. With respect to the second loan. 1976. 1975. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. 1976). it may be stated that complainants. we find against respondent.00.00. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. Consequently. From the facts obtaining in the case. particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.respondent insisted that complainants sign the same. relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality.00. October 31.000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4. complainants tried to raise the amount of P10.000. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. .300.000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva. they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10.00 was supposedly due on August 31.000. However. Complainants' Position Paper). and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage. being a lawyer. Hence. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. 1976. 1975 and another P10. plus the P2. re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. rec. except in the following cases: (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing.).00.00.1976. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants.00. and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5. as appearing on said document.000. p.000. at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976. Evidence of written agreements. complainants signed the document. respondent.000. 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. which amount plus the P2. 1975.00 equals P 3.00 on September 30. respectively. i.00 was applied to interest. title was transferred to him. The term "agreement" includes wills. or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings. There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5. Adding this amount to the previous P5. Upon learning of the sale in March. thus making a total of P10. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6. considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4.000. that is. that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage.00 from complainants. While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate. but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B. P6. were voluntarily signed by the complainants.000. neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. Section 7. Hence.00. the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5. was clear of any encumbrance. After the document was notarized. or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.00. the respondent on October 12. In this connection. This claim is incorrect. and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. therefore. 1976.500. despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500. and on June 20. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing. Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5.00 obtained from respondent. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. 1979.000.000.00. respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8.000.e. as amended. it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.00 but only P4. hoping that they could redeem their property. Folder No.000. which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00.000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30.000.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5. 3135.400.000. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed.00 and the inflated P10. complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person. no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. Complainants. Six (6) months at P500. as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8. 1979.000.000. respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12. failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. 1979. as aforequoted. there can be. and.

000. who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying. he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount. Court for District of Nebraska C. the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.000. Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500. 7 SCRA 859). and respondent.C. The Investigating Fiscal. complainants alleged that respondent. the fact that respondent received P500. three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31.00. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722). respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years. but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30. they did not bother to have them explained by another . Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them. but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. He accepted the amount of P500.Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0. 00 as payment of the loan. However. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants. Knowing this. socially and intellectually. regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. In addition thereto.S. respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z]. complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel. The doing of the act itself. for estafa. when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and. being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda.000. 1979. Complainants' Position Paper. complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent. the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice. 34. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case.C. the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. 1976. Dist. The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves. To the mind of the undersigned.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement. A parting comment. Indeed.1979.00 that had been given to respondent.ñèt In view of all the foregoing. 734. complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent.' Clearly.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M. had this to say: With respect to the second charge. alleging that if the offer were true. respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2. who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting: In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent. With its lapse of time.00 as advance payment. barely a month after May 30.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. a difference of a few thousand pesos. At any rate. as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C. giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment. perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2. All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.00 to respondent. complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. complainants made the offer.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. At this stage. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M. upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0. Folder No.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him. It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2. there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question' Going now into the second charge. for only P12. more so.00. Besides. fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs.000. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents. in the case at bar. respondent is in a better position financially. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.) showing that the P500. as counsel of the complainants in this case. U. Respondent's denial is spacious. honesty. or good morals for which he may be suspended.000. Admittedly.lâwphî1.000. 1979.00. modesty. record). Again. without however. relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained. against accused Reynaldo Pineda. p. knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. and not its prohibition by statute. In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. However. 2). Id. respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment. Oblena.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same. On June 27.

Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings. In those hearings. that is. Reynerio I.00 to the complainants. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero.00. in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law.000. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2. done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. after their direct testimony. not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the nonsubmission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5.00 instead of P4. being "contrary to justice. (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form). Likewise. Santos. the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. Even so. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. respondent's liability merits mitigation. held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T." The standard required from members of the Bar is not.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement. from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers.000. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest. Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants. respondent's conduct. we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General. constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Hence. 2. (Emphasis supplied) and made the following recommendation: WHEREFORE. Generally. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority. . in fact.000.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. did not turn over the P500. and 6. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar. but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. were crossexamined by the counsel for respondent. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality". We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation. compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession. which puts his moral character in serious doubt.000. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity. out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. had become final and executory. a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses. Jamero. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. for a period of three years. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements.00. 3. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General. complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. but the full amount in cash. the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived.lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. the complainants presented a number of witnesses who. they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer. through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero. The following acts of respondent: 1. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent. 5. having received the amount of P500." he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover. 4. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. honesty. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper. modesty or good morals. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude. of course. the second is that. renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses. Where however.00. the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to. with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987. After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500. their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants.

The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. Court: Arraign the accused.In the instant case. defendant-appellant. in the municipality of Concepcion. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. Two days later. Q. It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention. Under this provision. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. or on May 10.: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above described. vs. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. when a defendant appears without attorney. vs. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum. respondent Reynerio I. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. 1947. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant. 1948. Frisco Holgado. MORAN. Ocampo. The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man. Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. the said accused being a private individual. section 3. the day set for the trial. 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney. the trial court rendered the following judgment: [Criminal Case No. the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. Court: Sentenced reserved. the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned. I plead guilty. with costs. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. V-118] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. This case is called for trial on May 8. and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest. What do you plead? — A. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney. . THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1948. but I was instructed by one Mr. Q. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. it was not prudent. and without justifiable motive. Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question. what is his complete name? — A. and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Q. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years.J. the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Court: — to the accused. The accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment. he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. your honor." On may 8. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. WHEREFORE. considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years.. plaintiff-appellee. 1948. being a private person. with the accessory penalties provided for by law. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. Province of Romblon. C. plaintiff-appellee. Mr. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 2 SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION SENTENCE The accused. Rule 112. the trial court proceeded as follows: Court: Fiscal: Is this the case ready for trial? I am ready. Ocampo. FRISCO HOLGADO. Who is that Mr. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. Contrary to law. Under the circumstances. did then and there wilfully. Numeriano Ocampo. stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the following INFORMATION That on or about December 11. and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney. to say the least. unlawfully and feloniously.

No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET P560. the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. 429 UN Ave. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.. is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. in the instant case. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam. ULEP. The Legal Clinic. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. Call Marivic. State Bar of Arizona.00 Info ANNULMENT. Investment in the Phil. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. UN Ave. Adoption. 1977." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". but. 5222041 CLINIC. Annulment of Marriage. Visa Ext. we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). valid MARRIAGE? marriage. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. INC. vs. LEGAL Ermita. 521-7251. in either case. The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent. petitioner. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI). VISA. (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP). and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. R E SO L U T I O N REGALADO. INC. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE.. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services.Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. Declaration of Absence.. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. So ordered. he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. . the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. In its answer to the petition.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. ABSENCE. Ocampo. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted. (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA). the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. 522-2041. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. Inc. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. J. particularly in the rules of procedure. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. their memoranda. for on a DIVORCE. It must be added. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance. Manila nr. Immigration Problems. and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and. & Special Retiree's Visa. as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and. Quota/Non-quota Res. 521-0767 1 Tel. and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment. (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA). INC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAURICIO C. But above all. demeaning of the law profession. that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr.. Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Mla. It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. without counsel. and. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. 521-7232. thereafter. Guam divorce. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.P. unethical. Victoria Bldg. respondent. as a member of the legal profession. US Embassy CLINIC. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. (4) U. THE LEGAL CLINIC.. what is worse. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney.

marriage." makes light of the "special contract of permanent union. to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic. that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services). arguendo. good customs and the public good. public order and public policy. as the respondent claims. (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood. or serves to induce. and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered. apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Inc. Thus. Furthermore. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. Rule 1. by simply going to Guam for a divorce. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic. as earlier discussed. the only logical consequence is that. i. this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy. It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services. At the very least. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. passports. members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law. Said advertisements. This is not only misleading.." which is how the Family Code describes marriage. that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: Article 1. 4 A. It must not be forgotten. emphasize to Guam divorce. The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. evidence gathering. in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader. or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. but encourages. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so. thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar. which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage. It may be conceded that. it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems. property. and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code. "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services". the respondent's name. Inc.e. this is outright malpractice. The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. or any other advertisements similar thereto.02." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services. violation of Philippine law. too. 1. B. and that is: Article 26. For who could deny that document search. It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it. which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. as published in the advertisements subject of the present case. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public. the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms. . In addition. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed. The Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. first of all. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services. . this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice. we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter. it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. local or foreign visas. In addition. whether true or not. By simply reading the questioned advertisements." as the respondent would have it. It is also submitted that . however." if not suggesting a "secret marriage. morals.Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case. just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. as earlier mentioned. or business registration. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law. the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam. appears with (the) scale(s) of justice. Worse. If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed. . the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law. there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized. obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. At worst. The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications." the inviolable social institution. constitutes practice of law? The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. consequences. Even if it be assumed. to wit. the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition. where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. morals." Such a name. assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth. obtaining documents like clearance. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers. More importantly. as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Immigration Laws. that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law. from offering such services to the public in general. Such practice is unauthorized. the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved. that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar. a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter. it must be required to include. but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields. but before allowance of such practice may be considered. for the protection of the public. respondent "The Legal Clinic. Although respondent uses its business name. 2 and 3. and 4. Precisely. when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law. but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice. 39)." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law. Philippine Bar Association: Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen. particularly regarding foreign divorces. that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion. particularly on visa related problems. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical. It must be emphasized. Legal and Judicial Ethics. Rule 138. especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. but also misleading and patently immoral. even if both are (equal) in skill. and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law. not legal services. electronic data gathering. the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. immigration problems. however. not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also. Alternatively. Inc. Obviously. the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. Admittedly. such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. secret marriages. Philippine Lawyers' Association: The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position. Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law. This is absurd." and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. If respondent is allowed to advertise. as enumerated above. But its advertised services. and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical. the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws. Inc. litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. 5 2. who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. the legal principles and procedures related thereto. in answer to the issues stated herein. respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic. Comment). 1. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. Jur. Both the Bench and the Bar. rendering opinions. 3. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic. From all indications. at the very least. without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation. in the information given. but includes drawing of deeds. This. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. As advertised. or. Unquestionably. There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services. through experienced paralegals. and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin. However. however." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception. knowledge and experience. . however. it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law. misleading and immoral advertising. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. 6 3. investigators for gathering of evidence. 2. standardized legal forms. 1984 ed. a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law.. incorporation. 270). Respondent would then be offering technical assistance. law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession. absence and adoption. Also. Indeed.. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. such as computer experts. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). p. and more importantly. are wit: 1.respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers. with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training. Inc. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating. Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit. annulment of marriages. should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form. that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright. storage and retrieval. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. albeit outside of court. The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored.

no one . paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law. . the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements. becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Bankers. when it cannot nor should ever be attempted. immigration. or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law. A good example is the architect. who must be familiar with zoning. factory and tenement house statutes. a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. is a lawyer qualified to practice law.P. (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country. which are in essence. except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. however. . divorce. We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee. and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend. the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law. and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law. . seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages. — does not help matters. 10 6. is unprofessional. Or the industrial relations expert cites. Inc. then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. where in this country there is none. this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so. the fact remains that at present. but when we are serving others. Atty. when in fact it is not so. for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. It seems . as claimed. . will be given to them if they avail of its services. but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic. Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases. Inc. . the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. building and fire prevention codes. are highly reprehensible. and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers. . courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. Assuming that Respondent is. measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. do not constitute the practice of law . It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here. If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like. there are in those jurisdictions. and seek advice on divorce. Of necessity. . . provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. . they are not. Only then. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic. annulment of marriage. Nogales. liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. At present. when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic." 7 4. .. declaration of absence. 8 A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising. 37. Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition. Likewise. it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals. such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies. Inc. but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. In the case (of) In re Taguda. who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article. visa extensions. . The most . these do not exist in the Philippines. as provided for under the above cited law. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. . replies that it is required by the statute. however. But this is not the case. Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves. It is not only presumed that all men know the law. staffed purely by paralegals. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards. perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. . This is not practicing law. the issues before this Honorable Court. Are they practicing law? In my opinion. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. asked by his client to omit a fire tower. In the meantime. 53 Phil. as there are doctors in any medical clinic. legal matters ." Clearly. it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic. whether run by lawyers or not. . Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines: Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which. could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. in support of some measure that he recommends. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable. the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law. But suppose the architect. In the same manner. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: 1. Inc. Women Lawyers' Circle: In resolving. . In the same vein." 9 5.Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case. adoption and foreign investment. While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice.. No amount of reasoning that in the USA. . Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder. U.

such as the Legal Clinic.9. 1946.. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts.11. or by counsel. just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan.8 From the foregoing. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give. Among the larger corporate employers. Here. . Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract. . Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. In the present case. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits. annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce. (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar. and give legal advice. defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows. cited in Statsky. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. constitutes the unlawful practice of law. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer. 53 A. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. (Auerbacher v. or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take. In determining whether a man is practicing law. Rules and Regulations. Services on routine. that is. there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce. if as part of a welfare program. But such is not the fact in the case before me. even as a minor feature of his work. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person. It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. S. and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. However. he drew employees' wills.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here. More recently. absence. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. to guide his client's obligations to his employees. Let me add that if.important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. separation. however.10. straightforward marriages. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). . This is not per se the practice of law.). however. and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread. It is not entirely improbable. then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. does not transform his activities into the practice of law. . even arguing questions purely legal. This. the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit. All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. . 2d 800. with or without a mediator. if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case. may not constitute practice of law. well-established method of conducting business is unlawful. 1. Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining. to guide his client along the path charted by law. with advice as to how the forms should be filled out. at pp. it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.31. he would be practicing law. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney. the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct: Rule 15. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law. (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. 154-156. the text and the forms. we should consider his work for any particular client or customer. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. . that aside from purely giving information. as a whole. The law only provides the frame within which he must work. Wood. The record does fully support. it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that: (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. September 11th. An agency of the federal government. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion. the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal . or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so. like securing a marriage license. . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit. Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two. the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client. however. may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. If a non-lawyer. For instance. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees. would be the practice of the law. especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. . Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government. such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . since the situation is not presented by the proofs. annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 1. Introduction to Paralegalism [1974]. In this phase of his work. of course. consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff. it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter. he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar. 1. 203. 1. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems. and making arrangements with a priest or a judge. or of a statute. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion. and ther representative' one not a lawyer. or by other representative.

Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. therefore. rel. states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. no Philippine marriage can be secret. 139. 173. 13 In the practice of his profession. 194 N. v. in or out of court. (State v. in a representative capacity. On this score. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term. 18 In the recent case of Cayetano vs. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law. 852). legal procedures. and receives pay for it. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute. a wide experience with men and affairs. and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. board. No valid distinction. citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass].stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. one who. . to that extent.]. and not legal services. conveyancing. C. 102 S. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. 2. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings.). pending or prospective. 313. training and experience. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. knowledge. all advice to clients." . Mckittrick v. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. referee. performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. 144). 14 When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer. are available.2). formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2. Vol. Family Code). Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. The practice of law. committee. 101. particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce. 263)." 11 A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. et seq.. Practice of law means any activity. firms. 340 Mo. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar. we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. par. he is in the practice of law. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings. of course. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. 650). p. It is not limited to appearing in court. 12 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. pp. the foreclosure of a mortgage. Agrava (105 Phil." thus: Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent." such would constitute practice of law (Comment. It includes legal advice and counsel. 15 One who confers with clients. 6. E. 23. and the giving of all legal advice to clients. but embraces the preparation of pleadings. (5 Am. and property according to law. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court. some of which we now take into account. supra at p. however. Generally. Respondent. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman. Comments on the Rules o Court. 2d 895. which requires the application of law. is also practicing law. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. and in addition. It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case. Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. [R. (Moran. body. 1.] 197 A. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. Automobile Service Assoc. constitute "practice of law. Jr. 665-666. v. before any court. non-advisory. In general. 129 Ohio St. With all the solemnities. Monsod. Winder. Bar Assoc. It embraces conveyancing. 348. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. liberty. Dworken . associations or corporations as to their right under the law. and conducting proceedings in attachment. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there.11. 193N. 3 [1973 ed. 262. "It is not controverted. W.10. (State ex. although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. in such representative capacity. to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. . that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. as advertised. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases. separation. in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. so far as concerns the question set forth in the order.I. conveying. of sound moral character. advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court. and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life. is engaged in the practice of law.. we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent. covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. commissioner. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. 2.remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law. quoted in Rhode Is. Dudley and Co. is. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services". practicing law. . E. cited in Statsky. Otherwise stated. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law.S. NYS 2D 270 [1973]. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured. 176-177).12. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. This Court. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. There are cases which do not. and gather evidence to support the case. has specialists in taxation and criminal law. fact finding investigations. contract drafting and so forth. and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. 23 Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes." explains Atty. or liabilities of their clients. then it's referred to one of our specialists. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or. marriage. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. No matter what the client's problem.P. local or foreign visas. kung baga sa hospital. we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. counsellors and attorneys. or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. and family law. Again. And once the problem has been categorized. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you. too. . divorce and adoption. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. litigation. property. Inc. evidence gathering. medico-legal problems. non-advisory. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals. obtaining documentation like clearances. marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country. With its attorneys and so called paralegals. as the weight of authority holds. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found. processing. with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U." where an insight into the structure. they observe you for the symptoms and so on. in medical terms. passports. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for. 24 The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. which are strictly non-diagnostic. 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star. like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. or software for the efficient management of law offices. educational or employment records or certifications. courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order. locating parties or witnesses to a case. Nogales: This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic. and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property. about foreign laws on marriage. and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. That's how we operate. Avenue in Manila. N. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. we start by analyzing the problem. who. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law. corporate legal departments. storage. transmission and reproduction of information and communication. or defend the rights claims. "when they come. such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices. and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court. but rather. hindi kailangang ma-confine. it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law. and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation. for example. interpretation. encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers. and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies. main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor. as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U. designing and installing computer systems. giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization. not in the protection of While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow. is entitled to practice law. through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering. counsel with. 22 It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. That's what doctors do also. is not limited merely giving legal advice. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals. the bar. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who. or the computerization of research aids and materials. operation and effect of law. with respect to the construction. require surgery or follow-up treatment." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice. Nogales. and who is in good and regular standing. it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms. like birth. like foreign divorce. document search. to wit: Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers. out-patient. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13. entitled "Rx for Legal Problems. WILOCI. are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study. protect. 20 The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. or business registrations. Nogales and his staff of lawyers. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property." Atty. furnish a copy thereof to the client. Atty. labor. In providing information. who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court. if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will. 21 That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. Atty. Rogelio P. have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise. The purpose is to protect the public. the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. The Legal Clinic. such as computerized legal research. then you would need a litigator. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. Further. programs. it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. and have been admitted to. said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. the court. they take your temperature. Now.

fair. being for the convenience of the profession. or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct. vs. Bayot 38 an advertisement. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct. 29 In the Philippines. and the American Paralegal Association. 36 The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. either personally or thru paid agents or brokers. We repeat. Inc. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of. dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. Estanislao R. schools attended with dates of graduation. namely. in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. Code of Ethics. but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. Law is a profession and not a trade.the bar from competition. with their written consent. and all other like self-laudation. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. constitutes malpractice. in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons. such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments. but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law. such as the National Association of Legal Assistants. the fact of listings in other reputable law lists. or in return for. deceptive. As pointed out by FIDA. . membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility. which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. the names of clients regularly represented. respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. public or quasi-public offices. 30 Accordingly. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership. we have adopted the American judicial policy that. date and place of birth and admission to the bar. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. The exceptions are of two broad categories. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. cable addresses. misleading. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. rules or regulations granting permission therefor. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). fraudulent. Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Thus. 44 Verily. address. self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. . not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. the names and addresses of references. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false. which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent . a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper. some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services. ." 42 The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose. telephone number and special branch of law practiced. undignified. taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task. . 40 Of course." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. As admitted by respondent. legal teaching positions. management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. 32 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements. Whatever may be its merits. addresses. legal authorships. posts of honor. honest. it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper. Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics. in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority. For that reason. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible.). firm name or office address. trade journal or society program. The card may contain only a statement of his name. while there are none in the Philippines. the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true. magazine. magazine. and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 43 The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. 41 The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists. similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding. the name of the law firm which he is connected with. A lawyer cannot. without violating the ethics of his profession. is not objectionable. As a member of the bar. in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities. we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service." (Canon 27. telephone numbers. the magnitude of the interest involved. trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates. branches of law practiced. a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States. 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation. the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. even for a young lawyer. the importance of the lawyer's position. degrees and other educational distinction. and. publicity to attract legal business. associates. of brief biographical and informative data. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. 27 We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.

45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent. to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. and from conducting. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances. a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela. to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. September 18. he can help you collect your loans although long overdue. I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. was created should be passed upon and determined. he is hereby reprimanded. as well as any complaint for or against you. Echague. albeit in a different proceeding and forum. it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems. 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter. In sum. The Legal Clinic. MALCOLM. to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In re LUIS B. it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative. he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office. is a member of the Philippine Bar. vs. and is willing to help and serve the poor. cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services. subject to disciplinary action. While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic. operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. et al. but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. under the present state of our law and jurisprudence. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely. ISABELA. we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is. State Bar of Arizona. Nogales. can renew lost documents of your animals. can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. FOR THIRD TAGORDA Public MEMBER Secondly. At this point in time. I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. who is the prime incorporator. ACCORDINGLY. Isabela. just like the rule against unethical advertising. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board. Inc. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague. major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic. of course. and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession. and can execute any kind of affidavit. can make your application and final requisites for your homestead. even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan. a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule. Otherwise. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. No such exception is provided for.corporation for services rendered. in translation. to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. which. the prohibition stands. directly or indirectly. criticisms at times. Luis B. in translation. — As notary public. is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition. it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer. since. expressly or impliedly. The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer. The ruling in the case of Bates. as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers. any activity. Besides. in (NOTE. imperative that this matter be promptly determined. which letter. the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith. we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. such as that being invoked by herein respondent. admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular.: The respondent. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. Tagorda. Come or write to him in his town. as in the case at bar. even if unfair. Inc. As a lawyer. whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials. Rogelio P. He offers free consultation. reads as follows: LUIS Attorney Notary CANDIDATE Province of Isabela B. . it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: Trustworthy from Professional from Honest from Dignified from 45% to 14% 71% 71% 65% to to to 14% 14% 14% light of the putative misuse thereof. TAGORDA. that is on the 16th of next month. This interdiction. 49 Considering that Atty. J. reads as follows: ECHAGUE.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano.. 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates. Inc.

A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. People vs. court or prison officials. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. or to remunerate policemen. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. even for a young lawyer. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. said codal section was amended by Act No. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should. (State vs. or to employ agents or runners for like purposes. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Cas. Rossman [1909]. to seek his professional services. and. is not per se improper. ADVERTISING. with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case. whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct. physicians. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office. the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. third. except in rare cases where ties of blood. the importance of the lawyer's position. in influencing the criminal. Accordingly. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts. the sick and the injured.. It lowers the standards of that profession. his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. and sometimes of convenience. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. L. The provincial fiscal of Isabela. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1. and especially with his brother lawyers. 53 Wash. 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. The law is a profession and not a business. it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. 625. constitutes malpractice. In view of all the circumstances of this case. circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are. either personally or through paid agents or brokers.. 1097. the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. 17 Ann. or to pay or reward directly or indirectly. I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association. This cannot be forced. and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind. not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. C. and are intolerable. DIRECT OR INDIRECT. 19 L. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. therefore. (Sgd.I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. the ignorant or others. second. A. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself. but it is indictable at common law. or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations. hospital attaches or others who may succeed. or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. 2 R. Yours respectfully. DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. first. Mac Cabe [1893]. being a matter of personal taste or local custom. suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. and all other like self-laudation. but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit. the magnitude of the interest involved.. 1. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional. R. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. 231. relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. his youth and inexperience at the bar. is unprofessional. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . and have been upheld as constitutional. The facts being conceded. That should be distinctly understood. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements. defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards. his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice. But as mitigating. the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. 1929.

Natividad. died. issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal: It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5. counsel of BRSEI (B. filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. . Reyes. Inc. the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty.-G. this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Reyes and Renne Marie N. since all that BRSEI is asking for. respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration. thru its counsel. respondent Court. . on 9 September 1974. the auction sale thereof. and Antonio Marinas. The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12 . until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. 14 On 12 January 1976. 2 Petitioner. In its Resolution of 9 October 1974. . 1974. in the interest of justice. Crispin D. Atty. Crispin Baizas. had also left the firm. earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. Reyes. In the Resolution of 13 November 1975.. received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. The material operative facts of this case. 10 On 6 November 1975. dismissing the appeal. unjust and unlawful decision.A.CANON 3 B. praying. 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. . and while Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. EULOGIO B. petitioner. requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17. scheduling for Friday. and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution. and is.: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus. to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.R. Eulogio B. Motion Denied. this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. on 9 July 1974. Salaysay. especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. Inc. 6 On 28 September 1974. Alberto & Associates. senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS. R. Pasay City Branch. 1974. against the Director of Public Works. NICANOR G.). this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes. Eulogio B. on 13 November 1975. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19. 2. . Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition. set aside and reversed. Sebastian Enterprises. 53546-R. therefore. the law firm of Baizas. the latter having established her own law office. the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence. 5 As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution. in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff. Baizas died on January 16. respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties. 1974. thus. 3. that the resolution of September 9. 1 On 7 May 1973. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.. On 19 February 1974. SALAYSAY. No. JR. DAVIDE. and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. on the grounds therein stated. petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals. and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief. Baizas. it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas. furthermore. the plaintiff-appellee therein. Alberto and Associates. Reyes. 1974. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. Sebastian Enterprises. timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. R. That late as it may be. filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal. as Deputy Sheriff. J. stating that: Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant. vs. the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair. B. Donna Marie N. 8 No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review. It had. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Felicisima R. be set aside. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9. and ANTONIO MARINAS. COURT OF APPEALS. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court. which docketed the case as C. No. REYES. INC. petitioner. respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale. HON. thru its then counsel of record. as gathered from the pleadings of the parties. 9 Pursuant thereto. 3 During the pendency of the appeal. 1974. 1974. Eulogio B. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court. petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975. now deceased. 757-R. respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. Rodolfo Espiritu. are not disputed. Hence. Nicanor G. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. . Crispin D. therefore. in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. .A. 1974 and no cause was shown. and the copy of the Resolution of July 9. and containing the following allegations: 1.-G. the same became final and executory. with prayer for preliminary injunction. respondents. he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. . copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17. a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.R. Ruby Alberto.R. Reyes. petitioner. .

As this Court. this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision.. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. Crispin D. respondents' comment thereon. and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. the Answer to the complaint. This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof. Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea. 30 We said: Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal. 16 In compliance therewith. Alquiza. however. But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. 27 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel. If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction. in its Memorandum. Since counsel did none of those things. Ramirez. and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment. To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. 1974. However. the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part. 34 Idaho 623. 6). extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. C. 29 Fla. Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. on 31 May 1976. it appears that Atty. That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief. 84 ALR 595. petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. et al. this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice. 22 SCRA 494. having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. said: We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld." Hence. this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief. 28 Indeed. 276. State. Inc. 384. Court of Appeals. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. engaged the services of Atty. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. Court of Appeals. 1970. petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Court of Appeals. his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe. But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower court. vs. Ganzon. 66 O. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS. Alberto & Associates" was . which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. the petition should be given due course. 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co. 11 So. evince that the law firm "Crispin D. — Considering the allegations. Sebastian Enterprises. which they complied with on 5 April 1976.. 34 SCRA 728). 62 Phil. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Atty. et al. petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas.In the Resolution of 21 January 1976. it cannot and must not be upheld. Inc. 176. 1968. the law firm "Baizas. Reyes with his heirs. On 10 September 1976. in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action. February 10. Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant case.). vs. After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court. Sebastian. Ganzon. Raymundo. State vs. thru its president Bernardo R. Said case. 757-R. it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal. vs. de Ordoveza vs. requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. et al. issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. L-23342. In consequence (sic) of his death.. 20 In the Resolution of 12 May 1976. it. et. prompt and justify its exercise (sic). the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.G. Petitioner. 279). al. nevertheless. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal. 108 Phil." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas. Alberto & Associates. no fraud is involved. 203 Pac. had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. Answer to Cross-Claim. in said case. August 31. Alberto & Associates. through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino. as well as petitioner's reply to said comment. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said case. Baizas & Associates. It says: 31 Petitioner. Vda. Chavez vs. There must be such a showing which would call for.R. L-30543. Cawili. 275. Otherwise. has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. however. Crispin D. this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21 L-41862 (B." On January 16. still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause. As held in Chavez. this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. 26 On 29 November 1976.

Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices. Crispin Baizas. On the other hand. the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause. Atty. In the Negros Stevedoring case. In effect. As revealed by the records. a copy of which the former also received. thus. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. Hence. in such event. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO AND GREGORIO GERONIMO. the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner. whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them. J. Inc. Espiritu.in a terribly confused state of affairs. it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. SP No. Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since. its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. the death of the latter must have been known to the former. 19943 and September 1. son of deceased Crispin D. nor (sic) is it unavoidable.4 respectively. on 28 September 1974. Crispin Baizas. supra. respondents. it appearing that some. later left the office after the death of Atty. . Jose Baizas.R. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court. In Gutierrez & Sons. 33 Moreover. The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. petitioners. 35271 affirming the orders dated May 5.. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner chose not to comply with it. This Court held therein that: The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal. the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. IT SO ORDERED. 1995. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.: This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision1 dated April 28. 1994. Crispin Baizas. As pointed out by respondents. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. hence. which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence. Undoubtedly. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy. 35 Based on the foregoing. Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the associates took over petitioner's case. which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974. We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. an associate who was designated to handle the case. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan. cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. on 6 November 1975. supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. . 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar.. 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS. petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS. With Baizas' death. it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Atty. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.2 July 12. if not many. That Atty. the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office. this Court held: The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable. the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or. vs. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers. Baizas. Branch 22. petitioner's counsel. Costs against petitioner. which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court. WHEREFORE. Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. QUISUMBING. But. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. In the abovementioned Yuseco case. the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm. constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. granting . Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when. the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas. Then. 1994. The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. vs. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court. and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court. is binding upon the latter. reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers. . ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION SAN ANTONIO. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. the responsibility of Atty. said law firm was dissolved. fraud.

That lot situated in Brgy. Blk. 1993. As said earlier. …RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT. A second motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated September 1. reconveyance or redemption of the property covered by TCT No. To secure the loan.00) Philippine Currency in hand received today by the defendants spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio from the plaintiffs. as culled from the records. the Court of Appeals denied the petition on April 28.000. both situated in Barrio Tabe. 1991. after the lapse of six months that private respondents delivered the three titles to petitioners. 9. …RULING THAT THE ORDER DATED MAY 5. RT-6652 (T-296744) including its improvements and thenceforth bind themselves to respect the right of ownership. . petitioners. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due date.7 Hence this petition for review wherein petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: I. the said plaintiffs shall be deemed to have waived and renounced any all rights. claims and demands whatsoever they may have over that property covered by TCT No. c. failed to transfer the ownership and deliver the titles of the three parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the agreement or to pay 2 Million Pesos within the six-month period from August 25. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan together with its improvements.6 In accordance with the stipulations in paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement. That the parties further agree to set aside any claim.000.019. RT-6653 (T-209250) shall it be respect. Bulacan. Consequently. 233-M-92. for the purpose of the cancellation of the annulment of the sale in the title subject to the condition that should plaintiffs fail to deliver the titles to the three lots heretofore mentioned to the defendants San Antonio. SO ORDERED. 1990. docketed as Civil Case No. and is DISMISSED.000. As the delivery was beyond the agreed six-month period. they submitted to the court on September 16. 6. Guiguinto. This compromise agreement shall be in full settlement of the obligations of the plaintiffs with respect to Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated February 14. hence. For a consideration of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2. Subsequently. Within six (6) months from signing of this compromise agreement simultaneous to which delivery of the title to the afore-mentioned properties in the names of the defendants San Antonio. The parties are enjoined to comply faithfully with their obligation under said agreement. II. TCT No. Private respondents. 1994 DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AMEND THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BASED ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. III. The Orders of respondent court dated May 1[5]. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied on July 12.5 Finding the above to be in order. thus making their total obligation in the amount of Two Million Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P2. SO ORDERED. 3 consisting of 135 square meters. the spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio. During the auction sale. a compromise agreement dated August 25. petitioners refused to accept the same or execute an instrument for the resale. 4.00) within the same period. the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. private respondents obtained an additional loan of Nine Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P991. thus: WHEREFORE. RT-6652 (T-296744). 1995. are as follows: Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria Geronimo obtained a loan in the amount of One Million Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P1. Private respondents filed a motion for execution of the September 22. The facts. Municipality of Guiguinto. 4. being the highest bidder bought the two parcels of land.028. 38 consisting of 75 square meters. 1994. 1993 is hereby APPROVED. Another lot situated in Brgy. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals. 1993 in Civil Case No. the defendants San Antonio will execute the corresponding instrument of resale/reconveyance/redemption over that properly together with its improvements covered by TCT No.556 square meters. 1993.000. 6652 (T-296744) and TCT No. Tuctucan. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. Blk. 1993. Municipality of Guiguinto.859) with an interest of 3. the trial court approved the same in its order dated September 22. covered by TCT No. RT-6653 after private respondents paid them Two Million Pesos (P2. 1989 and the Susog ng Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated July 16. T47229 was issued in the names of petitioners. 30079. covered by TCT No. with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Municipality of Guiguinto. Tuctucan. 1993. 1994. Bulcan. private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure with preliminary mandatory injunction. Blk. RT-6653 (T209250) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan including its improvements. the terms and conditions of which are: 1. b. the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed. however. RT-6652. RT-6652 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. or to pay Two Million Pesos (P2. and September 1. July 12. 1993 order with the trial court. 1994. damages and counter-claims they may have against each other. 233-M92. Before the one-year redemption period expired.000). the possession of the plaintiffs of the subject property covering TCT No. morals and public policy. Lot 27 consisting of 78 square meters. private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT No. thus: A careful perusal of the Compromise Agreement dated August 25.859). Bulcan. After the parties presented their respective evidence. Branch 22. a. defendants San Antonio will execute a deed of resale/reconveyance/redemption of that subject property covered by TCT No. petitioners executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale covering TCT No. (SIC) 5. This compromise agreement is immediately executory (underscoring supplied). the terms and conditions of which are quoted as follows: COME NOW parties assisted by their respective counsels and before the Honorable Court most respectfully submit this compromise agreement. This was granted on May 5. Bulcan covered by TCT No. 30078. For the release/resale/reconveyance of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. RT-6652 with an area of 2.390 square meters and TCT No. Tuctucan. 2. Lot No. and possession of the defendants San Antonio over said property. That in the meantime.33% per month. 29832. …RULING THAT THE DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. 1994. That lot including its improvements situated in Brgy. subject matter of the complaint. RT-6653 with an area of 10. ACCORDINGLY. 1994 are AFFIRMED. No.the motion for execution of compromise judgment dated September 22. the compromise agreement dated August 25.000. TCT No. 1993 reveals that the terms and conditions thereof are not contrary to law. and those related there. plaintiffs obligate themselves to transfer the ownership of the following to the defendants San Antonio. payable on or before February 15. It was only on March 4. 3.000) from petitioners.

VI. July 12. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law. As herein petitioners have not yet made demand and as they have not yet performed their part of the agreement. the court which rendered it loses jurisdiction over the case and it can no longer be modified except for clerical errors.16 Compromise agreements are contracts. cannot compel petitioners. as the judge was merely performing a ministerial duty. In their view. Petitioners also contend that private respondents should not blame the Register of Deeds for the delay in the delivery of the three titles since private respondents submitted the registration documents to the Register of Deeds only on March 2. Private respondents additionally point out that in reciprocal obligations. petitioners deny that they are guilty of delay for not executing the deed of resale.IV. morals. If they failed. They assert that they were not seeking rescission of the compromise agreement but its full enforcement regardless of whether the delay is slight or substantial. we find that it should be properly addressed. While it becomes the trial court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution may be refused on equitable grounds. we find that this point serves only to confuse the Court on the real facts of the case. or put an end to one already commenced. In filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court therefore.. i. the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it. RT-6652 even after the lapse of the six-month period. They explain that even on equitable considerations this was not allowed because once a decision becomes final. 1994. petitioners said. 13 Nevertheless. delay sets in only when one part fulfills his obligation and the other is unable to perform his part of the obligation. As to the alleged delay on the part of petitioners in executing the Deed of Resale and Reconveyance. As the facts of this case show. 1995. it will be unjust to petitioners if we compel them to accept the three titles despite the lapse of the agreed period. It has the force and effect of res judicata. 1994 and September 1. …NOT RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 6 THEREOF. private respondents failed to deliver the titles on February 25. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .e.17 WHEREFORE. 1993. whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation. RT-6652. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. reconveyance or redemption despite their receipt of two million pesos. private respondents deny that they delivered the three titles late and if ever the delivery was delayed it was the Register of Deeds who was to blame. is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code15 applicable in this case? According to petitioners. 1994. While indeed private respondents did not meet head on this issue. like the ones in this case.12 Private respondents could have done so earlier. SO ORDERED. … NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY COMPLIED WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. We find petitioners' petition impressed with merit. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a valid contract. RT-6653. ownership of the land covered by TCT No. to accept the three titles beyond the six-month period. once approved by final order of the court.11 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attributed to the Register of Deeds private respondents' delay in the delivery of the three titles. the compromise agreement clearly provided private respondents six months. This only shows that private respondents did not intend to truly comply with their obligations. petitioners raise the following issues for our resolution: 1. Despite the fact that the compromise agreement involved two parcels of land up for redemption. private respondents submitted to the Register of Deeds the pertinent documents for registration of the three titles in petitioners' name only on March 2. it was error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of contract. beyond the six-month period deadline. pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement. Further. But as shown in their decisions. 1993 to February 25. in issuing the writ. 1994. which was the execution of the deed of reconveyance. Likewise. from August 25.R. beyond the six-month period. A compromise agreement. 1994. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. 1994. are hereby declared NULL AND VOID. to deliver the titles to the three parcels of land described in the agreement. 1993. the petition is GRANTED. did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? Petitioners claim that the trial court did. Petitioners contend that judgement based on a compromise is conclusive upon the parties and is immediately executory. The compromise agreement approved by the trial court in its order dated September 22.9 In this case. The decision dated April 28. delay by private respondents has not yet occurred. 1995. was merely performing a ministerial duty. ownership over the land covered by TCT No. Bulacan. this was sufficient compliance of petitioners' duty under the Compromise Agreement. because it is in effect an amendment to the compromise agreement. good customs. but they did not. …APPLYING ARTICLE 1191 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. Hence.10 In this case. Did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? 2. SP No. Branch 22. Also. when they gave the titles to petitioners. 1994. has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. private respondents did not indicate as to which parcel of land petitioners did not execute a deed of resale. a person obligated to deliver something incurs in delay only after demand. 1994. as the judge issued the writ of execution. public order or public policy. Private respondents counter that there has been no modification of the final judgment when the trial judge issued the writ of execution. V. Private respondents are ordered to cease and desist from disturbing the ownership and possession by petitioners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. Thus. Costs against private respondents. Private respondents claim that the trial court. hence it cannot be modified. They said that as early as August 25. Accordingly. they already executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale of the land covered by TCT No. petitioners could rightfully refuse acceptance of the titles.8 In sum. private respondents admitted that petitioners already executed a Certificate of Redemption. petitioners sought the appellate court's declaration that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. the Court of Appeals erred when it found that private respondents' delay did not constitute substantial breach to warrant rescission of the compromise agreement. It was error therefore for the trial court to grant the writ of execution in favor of private respondents because it effectively compelled petitioners to accept delivery of the three titles in exchange for the release of the land covered by TCT No. 35271 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applicable in this case? On the first issue. Lastly. If after the lapse of the said period and no delivery is yet made by private respondents. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. the orders dated May 5. they must be complied with in good faith. 14 For us. via a writ of execution. as it was only on March 4. provided that private respondents had six months within which to deliver the titles. and resolution dated September 11.

a client.ADRIANO E. aside from being members of the Philippine bar. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not. the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20. in his 1980 verified complaint. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare. the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives. to H. (p.) . filed against Attorney Vicente C. Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. Agpalo. KWAN and JOSE A. Dacanay. GUERRERO.: Lawyer Adriano E. 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. There was no action from the respondent. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr. (V & G for short). 3. Torres.) As early as January 15. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2.. JR. 3. NUNAG. complainant vs. it is only during the incumbency of Atty. in his reply dated December 7. On May 19. COLLANTES. which contains the names of the ten lawyers. SALONGA. TORRES. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. he filed the instant complaint. (p. 1987. respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter.. COLLAS JR. Attorney Dacanay. We hold that Baker & McKenzie. house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision. On May 26. 1983 Ed. EVANGELISTA.. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. Rules of Court).. Conduct unbecoming of public official. Rule 138. 2. 5. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. VICENTE C. what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Vicente C. Dishonesty.000) was sent to respondent through his niece. Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.. vs. 6. VICENTE A.. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. Causing undue injury to a party. (See Ruben E.) WHEREFORE. LUCAS M. 1979. Jr.E. Collantes. 1979 respondent Vicente A. respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them. Legal Ethics. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics. AQUINO. Gabriel. p. respondent imposed additional registration requirements. respondents' memo). The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: 1. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum. using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie. NATIVIDAD B.. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 4. PER CURIAM:p This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. SANDEJAS. Renomeron. 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Inc. Inc. V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. a law firm organized in Illinois. Collas. 10. since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2. 1987. Another request was made on February 16. Rollo.00 as pocket money per trip. J." Not having received any reply. 1987. in lieu thereof. or. sought to enjoin Juan G. denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. On May 22. ROMEO L..000.000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. CURAMMENG. JR. Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie. J. RAFAEL E. Renomeron. the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality. respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 6 FERNANDO T. RENOMERON respondent. 1. SO ORDERED. 7. In a letter dated November 16. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification. 15. JOSE R. being an alien law firm. complainant. Extortion. are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. DACANAY. Rollo. admitted to the bar in 1954. asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions. cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. stressing that: . practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres. that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration . ATTY. for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. 115. 1987.. respondents. LUIS MA. which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2. respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. CLARO TESORO. Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial. Respondents.

and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility. and efficient administration of justice. and that. de la Cruz. as a lawyer. (pp. a high sense of honor. and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which. on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece. 7. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion. effective immediately. in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification. and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. Ruben E. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service. respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator. 17-18. 165 dated May 3.790.. As recommended by the Secretary of Justice. and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. 968). the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to . such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. 1988. dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension.. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics.' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him.) Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service. to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). From a lawyer. 1419. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. full candor. subpars. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. The answer is yes. for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.) The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).00 bills but in P50. As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. speedy. 102 Phil. Upon receipt of the charges. pp. recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty. the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Section 17. the President of the Philippines.1987 (Consulta No. he continued with his inaction. its exalted place. to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter. xxx xxx xxx In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement. notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession. not in the original denomination of P100. Attorney Leonardo Da Jose. retrieved from him the amount of P800. subpars. intellectual honesty. extortion. In his answer dated July 9. 64 SCRA 784. Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. De Luna. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138. fair. with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. 66-67). respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment. in this case. . or be heard in a formal investigation. throughout the centuries. 789. We believe that. the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4. absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official. 1987. disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics. may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 1983 Edition. The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds. Bonifacio on February 22. 1579). Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Rollo). evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party. respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings. recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration. Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer. Case No. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing. that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof. Rules of Court. 5. The investigator. 87-15). His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation. In a Resolution dated July 27. After due investigation of the charges. Exasperated by respondent's conduct. (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality.00 bills. 1987. its prestige. 1987. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. 1990. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. People vs. for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. Order No. The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved. Rollo. Agpalo. the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. are expected those qualities of truth-speaking. and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. emphasis supplied. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office. Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him. [a] and [d]). 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. by Adm. that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question. a disbarment complaint against said respondent. The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and. Ms. against respondent Register of Deeds. have been compendiously described as moral character. rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties.On May 27.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare. Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA.

" The power to appoint special fiscals being thus expressly conferred upon judges of Courts of First Instance. or fails or refuses to discharge thus duty by reason of illness or other cause. and a restatement and review of the evidence at this time would serve no useful purpose. we think there can be no doubt of the power of the judges of Courts of First Instance to appoint special fiscals or prosecuting officers. who shall be paid out of the provincial treasury the same compensation per day as that provided by law for the regular provincial fiscal for the days actually employed. immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1. plaintiff-appellee. It is urged that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises because the information charging the commission of the crime was filed. nor shall he."1awphil. that we carefully and exhaustively abstracted and analyzed for ourselves the great mass of evidence brought here on this appeal. in cases wherein it appears that there has been a manifest abuse of judicial discretion in making the appointment. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. final judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused necessarily turns upon the degree of credit which should be accorded the respective witnesses called for the prosecution and the defense. legal appointment. 1912 the provincial fiscal conducted an investigation of the alleged crime at the urgent request of counsel for the private prosecutrix. and the trial conducted by a special fiscal. 244): "If the provincial fiscal fails or refuses to discharge his duty in the prosecution of criminal cases. in the exercise of the sound judicial discretion conferred upon them. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. that the cause was remanded in the early days of July. whether in public or private life. the mere fact that the judge acts unwisely or improvidently or under a misapprehension of facts when he makes an appointment in no wise affects the legality or the validity of the appointment. Low (19 Phil. and affords no ground for appellant's contention as to a lack of jurisdiction in the court below to entertain and decide a criminal action based on an information filed by a special fiscal legally appointed for that purpose. together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. without discovering anything which. Rep. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. There can be no question of abuse of judicial discretion in the appointment of the special fiscal in the case at bar. except. the effect of which need not be and is not now considered.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent. was not disposed to press the case. or fails or refuses to discharge his duty by reason of illness or other cause. the judge of the Court of First Instance for the province is authorized and required to appoint a temporary fiscal. J. 278). in our opinion. WHEREFORE. PEDRO BARREDO. and each of them was sentenced to two years. who saw and heard the witnesses testify and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of the account of the commission of the crime of attempted rape which was given on the witness-stand by the principal witnesses called for the prosecution. PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO. In his opinion the trial judge sets forth at some length the material evidence adduced at the trial. Hermoso. A large number of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense were called at the trial. Section 1 of Act No.. and indeed from the plain and explicit provisions of the statute. with reference to criminal cases.net Construing and applying this statute we said in the case of Nuñez vs. 142 SCRA 632. 1912 the private prosecutrix filed a complaint against the defendants in this action in the court of the justice of the peace of Nagcarlang. and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys SO ORDERED.03. promising. wherein he set forth that on the 12th of June. 1912. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. but later declined to do so. and even if it were admitted that the trial judge acted improvidently or unwisely or erroneously in making the appointment. improvidently appointed by the trial judge without authority of law. perhaps. that the provincial fiscal had not done anything further at the date . that about the 2nd of October. 1912. In its last analysis. four months and one day of prision correccional. to perform their duties. dishonest. Court Administrator vs. then the judge or court must relieve such officer temporarily and appoint a qualified person to take his place. The presiding judge of the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province has the power to cause the prosecution of criminal cases to go forward. as he himself. or his assistant. never-the-less to ask the court to appoint a special fiscal. Code of Professional Responsibility). and the record contains some two hundred and fifty pages of typewritten testimony and documentary evidence. Judge Guevarra. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines.engage in unlawful. CARSON. Hermoso. when. The appointment of the special fiscal was made in response to a petition filed by counsel for the private prosecutrix on November 8. 150 SCRA 269. we do not think that in the case at bar the special fiscal was erroneously or improvidently appointed. that on the 29th of the same month the accused waived a preliminary trial before the justice of the peace and prayed that the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance. would justify us in holding that the trial judge erred in arriving at his conclusions as to their guilt. that thereafter the provincial fiscal promised to file a formal information against the accused. the judge of the Court of First Instance is not only authorized but is required to appoint a temporary fiscal to represent the Government in such cases. If the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province did not have authority to appoint a temporary fiscal when the exigencies of the service demanded it. (Rule 7. 150 SCRA 269). The attorney for the Moro Province and his assistant stand in the same position as a provincial fiscal with reference to this matter. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE UNITED STATES. Sison. The fiscal thus temporarily appointed shall discharge all the duties of the provincial fiscal as provided by law which the regular provincial fiscal fails or is unable to perform. it might occur that the whole court machinery.01. vs. 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. the appointment when made was a valid. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal.: The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of the crime of attempted rape. honorable. they find that "the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. and a careful examination of the record discloses nothing which would justify us in disturbing the findings in this regard of the trial judge. or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103)." From what was said in the case just cited. and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Code of Professional Responsibility. Rodolfo G. 1699 reads in part as follows: "Whenever the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. charging the commission of the crime on the 9th of that month. defendants-appellants. would be impeded on account of the refusal on the part of the attorney. Moreover. He should therefore be disbarred. as a result of the machinations of the personal and political enemies of one or all of the defendants. Suffice it to say that so strongly were we impressed by the forceful oral argument of counsel for the appellants with the possibility of a grave miscarriage of justice in the court below. it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. It remains only to consider the contentions of counsel for the appellants touching the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain and adjudicate this action. and if the officer designated by law to prosecute such criminal cases fails or refuses to perform his duty.

The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in such cases is either to go forward with the prosecution or to move the court to dismiss the complaint. should not institute criminal proceedings against such persons. . But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal. This petition was endorsed over to the provincial fiscal by the presiding judge. and others wherein while the prosecuting officer acts practically on his own responsibility. 139. we need hardly say that we think the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to prosecute the case.. The nolle prosequi was not. that the evidence against them was unsatisfactory and unworthy of credence. 1627. Vol. "amounting nearly to law" requiring the consent of the court in all cases wherein it is exercised. Holding as we do that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a finding as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. (People vs.. 13.) There are States in which a statute. 1389. that the practice whereby the prosecuting officer in some jurisdiction enters upon the records of a criminal case that "He does not desire to prosecute further" — dicit nolle prosequi — is a very ancient one. the General Court consisting of five judges unanimously decided: "That the District Attorney has not in any case the right to enter a nolle prosequi without leave of the court. and it has been by several statutes delegated to district attorneys. therefore. he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the facts. Ordinarily. at least. But even before that Act. and 25 Wendell. and in some it is not plain what the course is. The right of the Attorney.) At common law the attorney general alone possessed this power. Nor is it in our judgment." (Anonymous. and that they were victims of a conspiracy of their personal and political enemies to ruin them by compelling them to stand trial for a heinous offense which they had not committed. 194. and in either event to move with the promptitude necessary to secure the right of the accused to a speedy trial." Upon a motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace. or otherwise. The minutes are the records of the acts of the court and no entry can be made thereon except with his consent. 1 Hill. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge or Court of First Instance" — not that he shall await the action of the provincial fiscal. or in which a custom amounting nearly to law does. sec. and that a special fiscal should be appointed to prosecute the case in view of the manifest indisposition on the part of the provincial fiscal to bring the accused to trial. provided that it should not thereafter be lawful for any district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi upon any indictment. and pending further proceedings. requires the consent of the court. that the case should not be dismissed. . in view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to file an information and bring the accused to trial. 1 Va. 377. he was satisfied that the accused had not committed the crime with which they were charged..) In Virginiaa 1803. a complete act . and to move the court to dismiss the proceedings. or in any other way discontinue or abandon the same without leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense charged. By the act of 1870 it is expressly provided to the contrary. When the justice of the peace remands an accused person for trial in the Court of First Instance. and of the provincial fiscal held that in the interests of justice it would not be proper "to deny the petition of the injured woman" and appointed a special fiscal under the provisions of Act No. discontinue a criminal prosecution in that form at any time before verdict . and Act No. we know of no authority for it: — The State is the party . It is for the justice of the peace to determine whether the accused shall be remanded for trial.of the petition (November 9 [8]. although we are aware it has often been done. to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted. or if it appears to him from the record of the proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace. and section 2 of Act No. secs. But we are of the opinion that in the event that criminal proceedings have been instituted. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts. but only as authorizing him to secure the attendance of witnesses before him in making necessary investigation for the purpose of instituting or carrying on criminal prosecutions. it rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. of course. It must go on the minutes of the court and must transpire. Others have declined to adopt it. 302 for official investigations by provincial fiscals. without the content of court. 1 and 2. 1912). under section precautions as he felt it his duty to adopt. 2nd ed. to aid him in determining the course to be adopted at this stage of the proceedings that provision is made in section 2 of Act No. within the power of the Solicitor General to nolle prosequi an indictment at his option without the approbation of the court. who now represent the attorney general in nearly everything pertaining to indictments and other criminal proceedings local to their respective countries. Act No. in which this official set out at length his reasons for declining to file an information. Under the English rule the uncontrolled right to enter a "nolle prosequi" was the prerogative of the Attorney-General. in part. and the investigations of the provincial fiscal have satisfied him that the accused person is innocent. it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations. directly or by construction. and can only be terminated therein by the court itself.) Nor was the paper handed by the Solicitor-General to the clerk an entry of nolle prosequi.. 2. the case becomes forthwith a criminal action pending in that court. 556. sec. Such a proceeding is to be coram judice. and that the judges should not therefore challenge the formal expression of his will in this regard. We agree with the contentions of counsel that a conscientious prosecuting official. It is true. 483. 1699. and returned with an extended statement. This the Solicitor General did not ask. It probably exists unimpaired in the attorney general to this day. Thereafter the trial judge. and might. that is to say in the presiding judge thereof. The legislature finding the power in so many hands. with the cognizance of the court..General to dismiss without consent of court was there maintained under the theory that that officer was the immediate representative of the King. and fearing its abuse . Cas. and some of the courts which do not consider themselves bound by common law precedents have declared the English practice unsound and have held the better rule to be "to ask leave of the court giving some good reason therefor." The order is usually taken upon motion by the prosecuting officer and with leave of the court. and Practice. In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power. the court claims the right to control him if it chooses.. It is. Enc. Discretion in the matter of subjecting to trial persons remanded for trial in a Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace lies with the judge of the court. 194.. In substance he stated that as a result of his investigations based upon the complaint of the private prosecutrix. expressly provide that in case the justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. or as a result of information furnished by the private prosecutor.itc-a1f The modern tendency would seem to be to modify and control the power of prosecuting officers in this regard either by express legislative enactment or by the judicial recognition of a custom. (10. McLeod.. he may deny the motion. and proceed with the trial. of Plead. as counsel supported by authority contends. Criminal Procedure. leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in the premises. or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to that end. upon full consideration of the statements of counsel for the private prosecutrix. (Bishop. Some American states have followed the English rule. whose investigations have satisfied him as to the innocence of persons charged with the commission of crime. But it is to be observed that it is expressly provided that: "This section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as justice of the peace in any preliminary investigation.

he failed in the discharge of his duty.].. All that is required is that there be a sufficient legal evidence to make it appear that "a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. with or without the consent of the trial judge. we think that he undoubtedly misconceived his duty. in such cases only is it lawful totally to discharge him.'" (loc. and has not been questioned by this court. 14692a. Rep. when desiring to nolle prosequi a case after indictment found. and whether they shall be confined or admitted to bail. In this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge.. 125. 193. . . N. The uniform practice of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has been that the AttorneyGeneral by himself. and upon that question express no opinion. on a trial in chief. acting as committing magistrate. But we think that the evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to justify and require his proceeding promptly with the trial. "If.A. and I should require. 130. Although in making a commitment the magistrate does not decide on the guilt of the prisoner. therefore. He evidently was of opinion that it rested wholly in his discretion whether the case should or should not proceed to trial. amounted to a substantial failure on his part to discharge his duty in the premises. and if the latter. In the case of United States vs. . Without reflecting upon the integrity of the good faith of the provincial fiscal. Wells. asks leave of the court that it may be so entered. and I understand probable cause to be case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it... 11 L. 25 Fed. (Moulton vs. Cas. 1081).S. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison or give bail. in holding a defendant to answer for a crime. Quinn. This probable cause. I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed." says a very learned and accurate commentator. (loc." 135 N. In this connection it is proper to observe that a magistrate. In failing so to do.Y. 41 Ga.. though from the nature of the case it must be Ex parte.Y. App. Chief Justice Marshall. The trial judge was manifestly of opinion that the long delay of the provincial fiscal before taking action in the case at bar. 642) this court said: "After the complaint has been presented and certainly after trial has been commenced the Court and not the fiscal has full control of it." Section 2 of Act No." We conclude that in this jurisdiction. consisting principally of affidavits. 59. precedes the institution of a prosecution. Burr. yet he does decide on the probable cause and a long and painful imprisonment may be the consequence of his decision." The rule in New York is thus stated in People vs..R." Section 62. 347): "In order to hold defendant and put him on his trial.. in holding that evidence presented by the government. and we do not pretend to say that he must have been convinced of the guilt of the accused. State (61 Neb. cit.. In conclusion we here insert a number of citations of authority touching the degree of proof upon which an accused person may properly be required to stand trial for the crime with which he is charged. and partly for the information of committing magistrates and prosecuting officers generally.. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the Court. it was said: "Upon just what ground the trial court condemned the action of the examining magistrate does not clearly appear. or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless. it was said: "We are not called upon on this hearing to pass upon the sufficiency of this evidence to warrant the conviction of the defendant." In re Kelly (28 Nev. But the common law is not in force in this Kingdom . He has not and ought not to have unlimited power of prosecution. . and submitting the evidence to the court for its final determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused..S. 309. Robertson (6 Hawaii. 718) the court said: "The proposition of the counsel for the Attorney-General that at the common law the Attorney-General of England and of States which have adopted this part of the common law has the right upon his sole responsibility to enter a nolle prosequi. giving the court or the presiding justice some satisfactory reason therefor. which. 136 prescribing the duties of the provincial fiscal provides that: "He shall be an officer of the Court and subject to its directions in relation to official matter pending in the Court of First Instance. He manifestly erred in his belief that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix was insufficient to justify him in proceeding with the prosecution. . nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused: but I ought to require. the Chief Justice said: "This being a mere inquiry. 507. is not doubtful. beyond a reasonable doubt. and that this limitation upon their power extends to the dismissal of complaints upon which accused persons have been committed or admitted to bail to await the action of the judge of the Courts of First Instance." (Citing. Men's minds may well differ as to the probative value of evidence submitted in support of an alleged fact. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge of Court of First Instance. and which.. and we think that under all the circumstances the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to conduct the proceedings in his stead. McGinley (153 Wis. Valencia. though in most other respects. 554). (supra). Willet vs. the question to be determined is. in the first volume of our reports. 5). is not required to have submitted evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the person charged beyond a reasonable doubt.S. and as a logical and necessary consequence of the above cited provisions of the statutes in this regard. ed. under the uniform practice since the announcement of the rule in the case of United States vs. Beecher. 1 Abb. in deciding that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima facie case. 194 provides that when a justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. or by his deputy. grievous error was committed. vs.) .Y. Moss.) Again.. 528. in what place they are to be tried. 410. provincial fiscals have not the power to dismiss criminal actions pending in Courts of First Instance without leave of court.) In Rhea vs. As was said in a recent decision (In re Mitchell [Cal.Y.)" In State vs. 491).. 2 L. and great evils may result and have resulted from placing such a power in the hands of one man . . (Statham vs.) it was said: "Evidence that would justify a committing magistrate in finding that probable cause existed for the detention of a defendant need not necessarily be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty when he is placed on trial. without deciding upon guilt. 10 Ann..) In the case of King vs. ought to be proved by testimony in itself legal.. cit. Bungart vs. But there must be proof "that a crime has been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. and that he failed to discharge it when he neglected and declined to proceed with the prosecution. 15.) The District-Attorney acts for the people in criminal cases except he must have the consent of the court to enter a nolle prosequi. and that he had the uncontrolled power to decline to prosecute. Shenk (142 N. 477. 187 N. An examination to see whether an accused person shall be . If.. to be such as a court and jury might hear.. was sufficient to justify the commitments of Aaron Burr. 82 Pac. `upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that no such crime has been committed. in Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch 75. by the Court of Special Session: "A committing magistrate is not required to exact the full measure of proof necessary to secure a conviction. but is obliged to hold one accused of crime for trial if there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty.. Perkins vs. partly in explanation and support of our ruling upon the action of the court below in holding that the provincial fiscal had failed to discharge his duty in the premises. State. Cas. that probable cause be shown. as was the trial judge after hearing the evidence.and the Solicitor General only the agent to carry on the proceeding. of Act No.S. 68 N.. and his attitude when called upon the explain his failure to prosecute at the urgent instance of counsel for the private prosecutrix. prefaced his opinion as follows: "On an application of this kind." (U.S. Valencia (1 Phil. whether the accused shall be discharged or held to trial. the judge viewed such evidence from the standpoint of a trial court. the committing magistrate is not required to find evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction.

From this order. 1936. 1936. without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. The Bar Association of Tayabas. Perfecto R. and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag. according to the information under date of July 8. On June 30. among other things. Fortunato N. Emiliano A. asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution. The justice of the peace of Calauag. 1935. Tayabas. 624). on September 23 1936. in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed. While the said case was pending preliminary investigation. No. Later. 271). Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa. with the costs of this instance against the appellants. On May 11. on May 5. ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. If there is evidence sufficient to give the magistrate any room whatever for the exercise of judgment.R. Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas.S. conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez. the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. vs. was appointed to preside over case No. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course. reinvestigated the case. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. then and there willfully. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20. The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition.placed on trial for an offense charged against him. Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor. with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Que el mencionado Juez Hon. 16835).. Petitioner. SERVILLANO PLATON. Steffens (27 Fed. Palacio. at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. The complaint. denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. 16384). The examining magistrate has very broad latitude in the matter — if the evidence. it was said: "A committing magistrate acts in a two fold capacity.. State (140 Wis. Lumsden (26 Fed. after hearing. alleging. — as a court in deciding questions of law and of evidence. a motion for the dismissal of the case. despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados.y At the instance of the petitioner herein. 1935. in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. Respondents. demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente . without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever. prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition.. 1936. in any reasonable view of it. designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Van de Carr (84 N. he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14. to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. was docketed and given due course. Judge Platon. Lundstrum vs. P. 461). 6426 corresponded. — in other words. 1936. of the Philippine Constabulary. being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal." In United States vs. In re Squires (13 Idaho. and the judgment convicting and sentencing them in the court below should therefore be affirmed. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ: Que el mencionado Juez Hon. justice of the peace of the said municipality. Suarez. Crim. Suarez. It is not required before the magistrate as it is before the jury. in the municipality of Calauag. the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Layman (22 Idaho. LAUREL. in which. Damian Jimenez. VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ. 15641). and within the jurisdiction of this Court. 387). upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal. considered the court's order of August 14. as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May.. So. through its president.. on petition. Hon. the petitioner herein. It appears on May 9. Accordingly. moved for the temporary dismissal of the case.: This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez. unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag. Ex parte Patterson (50 Tex. Palacio to handle the prosecution. that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused.. Cas. We find no error in the proceedings in the case at bar prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants and appellants. declined to proceed. who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance. Ramon Valdez y Nieto. On August 14. and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. Ed. The court. Gala. the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez. But Fiscal Palacio. After such reinvestigation. So ordered. did. 1936. it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the prisoner committed the offense charged. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. then his decision can not be reversed in the matter attempted in this instance. In re Van Campen (28 Fed. and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused. Cas. he filed on April 23. Cas. that all reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt must be removed. and one Tomas Ruedas.. as a jury in finding questions of fact. But the scope of investigation before the magistrate falls far short of a trial of a prisoner before the court and a jury. 1935. Province of Tayabas. Suarez with this court. being one of the accused. we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge. While the case was pending in the latter court.I. upon preliminary examination. the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G. the appeal was dismissed. one of the respondents herein.Y. 1936. where the case was docketed as criminal case No. Fortunato N. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz. the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FORTUNATO N. Lieutenant Orais. Lieutenant Vivencio Orais. any jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact within the broad field of probability. 1935. Judge Serviliano Platon. SUAREZ. that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez. after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case. 6426. the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas. Province of Tayabas. by a closely divided court. of the accused. People vs. moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez. Gutierrez David. and dismissed the case. State vs. denied the motion. J. The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS. 45431." The following cases are also in accord on the point in question: United States vs. satisfies him that a crime within the charge made has been committed and there is reasonable cause to believe the accused is the guilty party he is warranted in holding him to bail. 141). Suarez. charging the petitioner herein. Jacinto Yamson. one of the respondents in this case. and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision. Fortunato N. and the case thus dismissed. is a mere inquest.

because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia. dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos. Santos. Que despues de haberles arrestado.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos. con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna. vs..) Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. 1936. Jimenez. the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case. dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia. y por haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado. relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias del caso. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas. Barredo. uno de los acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion. It appears. Fil. 11 Jur. Se debe tener en cuenta. (Vease pag. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them. a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno. Aunque es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad'. y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in .U. en el juzgado de paz de Calauag. E. no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. 1936.) We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14. sin embargo. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion. los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935. ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli. solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. sin embargo. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A"). que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion.] Que el Hon. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. however. ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa. no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag. 36 Jur. y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello. ni que haya incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales. 202. el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez. teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas. el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado Fortunato N. Anexo O. juez de paz de Calauag. (E. de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia. trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna.el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos. ademas. acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas.fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez. que para que exista este delito. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". vs. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal. por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado. La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. 1. Fil. library Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas. aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores. y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas. aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio.U. y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha persecusion. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes. se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag. 32 Jur. but adds: (a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais. presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion. Rosa. as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case. 1936: En sintesis. that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who. existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal. teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. (E. 462. maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los sakdalistas. 482. creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. Fil. y que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito. en nuestra humilde opinion.U. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas. se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas. por tanto. no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma. 909. moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14. etc. y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria. por el delito de detencion arbitraria. Vallejo y otro.por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno. que dice asi: El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado. especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian.. vs." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April 23. por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag. haanalizado este extremo. denying the motion for dismissal. Suarez. El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado. el que suscribe.. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L.

Criminal Cases Nos. pg. Aklan from Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation. dated October 10. 6858. intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made. 1985. therefore.the prosecution of public offenses. The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4.50 After trial. a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith. incorporator. June. in August. sec. 5 Corpus Juris. except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense. 6857.C. and 6862 were allegedly committed in July. T o t a l . (United States vs. without pronouncement regarding cost. p. The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds." (69 United States Law Review.indeed. and Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864. pp. 341). to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum. In the language of Mr. therefore. 1985. pp. he should do so. in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. 37-40. herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7. 36 Phil. it is unquestionable that they may. convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. But. 853. As such. 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10.. we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon. 6866 and 6867 in October. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices .. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor . non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act. the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12. 1935. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 6859. to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30. to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia. petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia. (Rollo. in the municipality of Numancia. abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify." (pp. 6860. His term was to expire in 1986. of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. while he may strike hard blows. 6856-6867 of said Court. 450.. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. in the interest of justice. Respondent.. he should be exculpated. paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: SEC. contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest. 1983. of which the accused is the president. After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition. Criminal Cases Nos. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. If. 1985. was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. since such a duty is not ministerial. J. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. Aklan. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11. in order to do justice and avoid injustice.. and to pay the cost of the action. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced. Santos. 1980. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are. Philippines. and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1. director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 399. 1980. in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. 20. 855. the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 6856.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws. In this supplemental pleading. which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States. which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. 1980 and some time subsequent thereto. the abovenamed accused. 6861. . ALAMPAY. by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner. 1980. a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. 309. Rollo. are hereunder quoted: xxx xxx xxx The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h).Act. and amounts involved. Otherwise.P7.L. being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia. Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. Upon leave of the Court given. Extraordinary Legal Remedies. did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business. it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not. So ordered. "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. See generally Voorhees on Arrest.) Considering all the circumstances. Aklan. Accordingly. 1985. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all. to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the public office. A supplemental petition. 156. 6856 which is hereunder quoted: That on or about the month of July. 1986. the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6. reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. 1984. 6. vs. the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4. Decision.730. but that justice shall be done. 2 R. in appropriate cases. Upon the other hand. 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GENEROSO TRIESTE. Sr.to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum.. C-865. SR. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass. the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. 416.". This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact. in any way. suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia. (High.. Aklan and as such. 1984.: c The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6... and whose interest. Petitioner. 1984. delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. 173-175). Rollo. No. pp. voucher numbers. 21190-10-174 in the amount of P558. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx .)" The petition is hereby dismissed. Generoso Trieste. 1985. it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais. 322). SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION).

after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar. Corporation Code of the Philippines). Furthermore. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. 1986. 338-339). xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing recital of facts. a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. and. constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Sir. In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former. gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the abovementioned law? 3. Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. page 15) It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense. Rollo. Act No. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. the Court in its resolution of January 16. subsequently delivered by the supplier. 1980. Oct. Yes. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen? A. (pp. upon acknowledging and concluding that: xxx xxx xxx Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3. pp. a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions. Rollo. Aklan. Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. Anyway. 1980. Treasurer Aniceto Vega. Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen. The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo. evidence discloses absence of bidding and award The prosecution's lone witness. 293). showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation. The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner. (Consolidated Comment. b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement. not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141.. contract or transaction. There was no public bidding. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President. contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. 36-37. The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act? 2. Sir. before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship. as the prosecution evidence show. directly or indirectly. Q. Was damage or prejudice. (Rollo. filed on October 7. Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC In any event.(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business. as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel. In other words. the law only requires submission of annual financial reports. Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14. thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor. caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto. (Rollo. in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding? A. Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however. petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort. or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. 340-341) Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General. the following legal questions arise: 1. Yes. was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? 4. pp. Q. 1983) In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen. the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations: library Prosecution failed to prove charges. as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law. how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and . pp. was presented. should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. which is said to have been effected on February 25. 1986. 1986. Tsn. 26. SEC records. Rosene TriesteTuason. 299-300). be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General. raised the following legal questions. The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business.

Vol. to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper. authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293. we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature. . Now.delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself.. they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer. page 603). ESCAREAL: y Q. prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste? A. sir. A. which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Already paid. Exhibits A. F. page 7). Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award. the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen? xxx xxx xxx A. Your Honor. decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2. H. G. They had already been paid for. 94. Q. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence. F. 5. CONSULTA: Q. 301-303) xxx xxx xxx Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla: Q. 306. (Rello. CONSULTA: I am sorry. did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment. The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial. Now. B. Vega. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7). but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer. Respondent Court said: . Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer? A. what exhibits particularly do you know were issued by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste? A. Exhibit I and Exhibit H. Now. (Resolution dated March 11. 1959. The municipal treasurer. Under official receipt issued by Trigen. made to Trigen by the municipality? A. sir Q. (Tsn. I were prepared. Q. do you know why Mr. Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered. D. Q. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. Congressional Record. petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not. You said they had already been paid for. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. Who authorized the payment? A. C. pp. C. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E. In short. . Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste. Q. accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award. Series 1961 and Opinion No. Maravilla. . . No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment Now. Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. (Opinion No. Yes. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials. ATTY. then Mr. what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality? ESCAREAL: Payment made by Trigen? ATTY. 1984. Mar. xxx xxx xxx What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. pp. Mr. 2 and 3 thereof. Under what authority were they paid? A. D. as you said. May 6. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? A. Previously. sir. were the purchases in question already paid? A. B. xxx xxx xxx Q. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them. Yes. G.J. 1949). Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen? A. 1984).. aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared. Q. 11.

receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52. RTC. with her knowledge and consent. therefore. 52. then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51. . guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. 1986. 1983 to May 31. she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked." for attempted murder. Based on the evidence presented by the parties. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. FERNAN. R-705-RTJ. . The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. Puerto Princess City 2 with: 1. Br. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest. Puerto Princess City. . in his capacity as Mayor. encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature. 307-308. R-705RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. power. the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. JUDGE EMMANUEL M. 1980. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same alleged offense. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits. 6856 to 6867. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved. vs. Notwithstanding. 1986. 1984 and from April 23 to 27. accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice. Matter No. No. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting. report and recommendation. RTC. the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. . Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. docketed as Adm. has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3. Sr. 52. ABAYA. 1984. Adm. 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1. 4 We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. WHEREFORE. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. Respondents. which by the way. It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery. ABAYA.M.There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had. vs. Austria in AC-2909. Matter No.. 1984. then Presiding Judge of RTC. the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. Br. C. Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29. A. Branch 52. entitled "People of the Philippines vs. 2. used his influence. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. 1986. ABAYA. R-705-RTJ: a.: In a complaint under oath dated July 21. Branch 51. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. according to complainants. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30.J. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5. Matter No. finding the herein petitioner.The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51. Puerto Princess City. Leonardo Cruz. Abaya. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were. where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge. and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein. Matter No. underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions. 1986. Br. Herrera for investigation. the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents. Branch Clerk of Court. was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period. most reasonable. LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO. Ligaya G. library SO ORDERED. as amended. 4995 of the RTC. 2909 August 23. R-698-P August 23. to get the construction materials from Trigen. the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases. RTC. vs. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. I. 51. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court. Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality. No. of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.M. and advantageous to the municipality. in Criminal Cases Nos. Complainant. filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18. Emphasis supplied). RTC.. 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30. by verifying official hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants. Branch 52. Generoso Trieste. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS. demanding.c By resolution of December 11. 1986. a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste. Respondent. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal. dated November 2.1986 docketed as Adm. Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends: 1. After Atty. On October 28. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. This Court will do no less and. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic). A. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. complainants. Respondent. Case No. thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money. (Rollo. Sr. Complainant. 3. 2. pp. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. Atty. 3. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm.1986 against one of his accusers. Puerto Princess. Branch Clerk of Court. Atty. is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment. the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Thus.

13 July 2. then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. Mrs. he told her that he has a problem. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs. would impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Miclat about the matter. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers.00 given by Mrs. the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). b. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted. he is asking money. Miclat. testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P." (This is terrible. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder. countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31. "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Fuertes' diary. Leonila Fuertes.000 and I brought the money to Judge.Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges. All she presented were so-called practice notes. It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand. Fuertes' son. 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. Leonila Fuertes. 10 Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Mrs. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment.200. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya. she could not produce any single order. 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. He asked me for my case was 50-50. 12 August 15. RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. Fuertes. I went to town to see Baby Francisco. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. Ten Commandments (3 units).) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom. she should. telling him that was all she could afford. complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case. her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said subjects.000. in consideration of the sum of P 2.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15. Under the circumstances.c We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence. Yet she charged him with a serious offense. 8 Be that as it may. He testified that Mrs. 13-A Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units). a school teacher.M. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. library Mrs. who is a good friend of the Judge. We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs.1985 in his chambers. Genilo Jr. showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P. Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya. the latter's arrival on August 13. civil or criminal. He surmised that Mrs. to 8:15 P. Nonetheless. He is talking care Nanette na idinay ko. Fuertes' conversation remarked. but only about P1. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. 9 Roselyn Teologo. 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. now Judge Angel R. thus: August 13. he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case.000. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5. gave P2. "Grabe ito. not because of any outside interference. 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother. but because the evidence of guilt was strong. 5304. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. Fuertes had been there. on August 13. Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness. 1984.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. 11 Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes.00.The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52. but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief. he was informed later on that Mrs. He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52. It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration.M. we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon. 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting. We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without intervention from your respondent. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself. Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked. When Mrs. 5304 entitled "People vs.. Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units). . Baloco. Mrs.M. stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session.200. she delivered the amount of Pl. a school teacher. the officerin-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. Fuertes perjured herself just to . as in fact. Moreover. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Fuertes' testimony: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness. Fuertes. nanghihingi ng pera.

the promulgation was set on April 22. a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch. By these acts. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4. he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. As he had previously resigned. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price. fanned by Atty. and who was appointed stenographer on September 3. 1986. 18 We are in accord with this observation. which carried certain conditions. Lastly. On April 21. . Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. Fuertes.00 from as fringe benefits. for indeed. 1986. Atty. 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide. only for Atty. he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash.. As requested.. the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court. we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. 15 Nilo Jamora. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end . While the investigating officer. No. even if true. declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl. From him. labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion. Edgardo Servando. Austria's proddings. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. 21 Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: . with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court. as then acting City Fiscal. 1986 in Criminal Case No. R-698-P and Adm. That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men. (should be 13) 1985. Teologo. Atty. 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. Upon the other hand. 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22. 16 Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge. 1986. 1986. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. A week later. This is patently illegal. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. However. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected killers of her son. he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it. We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as abovedescribed the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. No. one of the complainants herein.00. 2909 against Atty.000. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. On January 16. he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31. In the meantime.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400. which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya. then Clerk of Court of Branch 52.M. but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya. albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya. as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera. in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl. Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order. she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose.000. set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16. On the latter date. In this regard. He further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money. 14 c. 2909 The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A. we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt. she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. A. who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. This order. 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila.. medical allowance and year-end bonus. which undertaking he complied with.It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment. we find Judge Emmanuel M. . the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. II. RTC Palawan.M. such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs. on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. In summation. hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3.1986. the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. the latter demoted him to process server. shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency. the payment of said benefits having been in checks. Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward. Case No. Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it.00 every payday.her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order. except earned leave credits. April 22. 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria.accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. Case No.to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. the testimony of Mrs. 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. Atty.. Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day. Austria against Judge Abaya. Judge Abaya requested Atty.

Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. trustees. except his earned leave credits. choses in actions. bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces. . and all evidence relating to them.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. Signing orders in the name of. transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar. and municipal districts in the Philippines. the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. administrators. Gaz. inventories. a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. Matter No.. except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya. and appropriating the sum of P2. receive the accounts of executors. 24 We find Atty. PEDRO M. guardians. Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. petitioner. trusteeships. municipalities. 28 June 1956. SR. if any. Abaya. was passed.: This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No." (Annex A. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. and evidence to the judge. and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works. the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 2909. She could have probably released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records. accounts. WHEREFORE. On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). obligations.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. properties. finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court. HON.In the absence of the judge. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter.500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint. the resignation of Atty. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. 127 providing. except her earned leave credits. 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited. she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership. On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. That would not only be contrary to law. and forthwith transmit such reports. R-698-P and Adm. and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees. Abaya. liabilities. together with his findings in relation to the same. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JULIO D. In Adm. On the same date. Atty. P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance. when directed so to do by the judge. 4415-4417).000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them. On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5. or to guardianship. and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. equipment. 1829 approving Resolution No. respondent. 2. 23 However. the Court hereby orders: 1. In Adm. On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. and may also. and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules. should the judgment be appealed. she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if warranted. Annex I). Matter No. among others. or receiverships. and can never be the subject of agency.As a lawyer and branch clerk of court. PADILLA. or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons. (Annex B). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal. that his professional fee shall be P1. On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 542. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel. vs. J. machinery. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). ENRIQUEZ. adopted and passed Resolution No. R-705-RTJ. assets. On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer . representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ. On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F. The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. reports. Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records. supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities. Case No. 1383. Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications. and. jurisdiction. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. and receivers. 22 Generally speaking. appropriations. petitions. but also subversive of public order and public policy. for precisely as a lawyer. and P500 after judgment shall have become final or. cities. if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency. notes. if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES. 5. and by reason of his highest qualification. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged. Batangas. Ligaya GonzalesAustria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31. to the appellate courts.

Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision. as amended by Executive Order No. would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor. series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province.. pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. legatee. Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). 1383 was valid and constitutional. On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court. Under the foregoing provisions of law. who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel.to the complaint (Annex J). Silvosa. The petitioner's contention is untenable. The decision under review is affirmed. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed. . 1683. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law. . without pronouncement as to costs. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice.1 and when in the case involving the municipality. Gaz. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. Control.. 3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment. The Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. 97 Phil. As such he shall. ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. 51 Off. would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. In Mondano vs. who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel. upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. SEC. or child. he. where he swore. Gaz. 2888. . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. . When he is disqualified to represent the municipality. and. 392. 2884. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. among others. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. therefore. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case. SEC. but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. series of 1950. 5917. . is pecuniarily involved as heir. or his wife. except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. 1682. 46 Off. the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. . The fact that the Secretary of Justice had. on several occasions. 5913. . . Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. when so requested. including district health officers. this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows: . 143. based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L). Rule 45.. 542. creditor or otherwise. On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 2241. On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. on the other hand. provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500.4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. a special attorney may be employed by its council. the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. 94. of the Rules of Court Annex N). submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province.

1969 during the transaction on May 22. 1987. and Mrs. Her Report dated 4 August 1998 reads as follows: Victor D. Nunga. he could not annex all the needed documents to support the allegations.00) but his parents Atty. Complainant submitted certification and the respective orders of the Clerk of Court and presiding judges . Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn't capable to buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400.00) loan in . vs. Complainant alleged that in May 1996. in support of his contention. Venancio Viray had been commissioned to act as notary public for the said province on January 2. 1982. and previous certification issued by the Clerk of Court of Pampanga to the effect that Respondent Atty. According to Respondent. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed.. In fact. A few month[] thereafter. The annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. the Undersigned noted that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a].CANON 7 VICTOR NUNGA. respondent. only complainant complied with the order. Viray. . CJ In his complaint. 1996 and had no record of any notarial reports. VENANCIO VIRAY.000. he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father's resignation as its president.000. 1981 to December 31. [i]n 1987 and 1997.nêt The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment. president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in the said transaction. Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M. Lydia A. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. 362813 PR 9907.000. From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters. JR. there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. the same title was . 1983 to December 31. he allegedly discovered that one of the bank's assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. and] he would not [have obtained] a commission without the PTR. January 10. Venancio Viray. respondent herein [sic].] Viray. Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. a minor born February 2. and January 8. Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. 1984. These therefore negate respondent's allegation that he [has been] commissioned as notary public since 1965 to the present. in the alleged documents he had PTR for that purpose [. Navarro. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation.1âwphi1. favor of Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn't commissioned as notary public. The Investigating Commissioner was atty. After going over the records of this case. ATTY. while his father is facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission.00) on July 15. but is facing criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling. . 1995 to December 31. . to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise. complainant. DAVIDE. Venancio M. After issues were joined. 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. . After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M.

to the bar. We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty. Cabanting (supra): A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. routinary act. performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws. Nowhere from the records and evidence[] submitted was there any proof that Respondent was commissioned as notary public in 1987 and 1991. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. and the administrative offices in general. 252-253 [1997]). It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. Cabanting. the Notarial Law. which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 2002. Book I. (Citing Marcelo v. in fact as of those dates 1987 and 1991 he was not commissioned as notary public. too. For one. which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so. Then. 272 SCRA 408. notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Revised Administrative Code). the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code. he is.Complainant likewise submitted a copy of the Resolution which dismissed the cases filed against the Complainant and his father and the xerox copy of the TCT No. (Maligsa v. 282 SCRA 248. the years the Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized by Respondent as appearing to be May 22.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. Llosa. it is respectfully recommended that if Respondent is presently commissioned as notary public. It is invested with substantive public interest. he was unable to . 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). Javier. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar promulgated Resolution No. The respondent's contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public. For this reason." By such misconduct as a notary public. rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question. Title IV. for all legal intents and purposes. the same should be revoked. 1991 [sic]. it is apparent that Respondent violated the provisions of the notarial law by having affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when . 1991. to the courts and to his clients. meaningless. honesty and integrity of the legal profession. indulging in deliberate falsehood. we said in Maligsa v. 362813 PR 9907 where the special power of attorney and the annotations for the cancellation of mortgage showed inscription of the same in the notarial register of Venancio Viray on June 4. and [he should] not be granted any commission as notary public up to December 31. such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. . On 5 November 1998. XIII-98-196 adopting the Report of the Investigating Commissioner and recommending that respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. . more specifically. the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Elaborating on this. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public. Arrieta v. We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. 1987 and the inscription for cancellation of mortgage on the dorsal side of TCT 362813 as June 4. 413 [1997]. Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11. In view of the foregoing. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1. Yet. He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since "1965 to date" he has always been commissioned as a notary public. Inasmuch as Respondent was not able to counteract the averments of Complainant which were duly supported with evidence[]. dishonest. the courts. immoral or deceitful conduct.

Navarro. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment. The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar. Inc. or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons. As such guardian. which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved. who was then only eighteen years old and. therefore. 1918. However. without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.. Even In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code. taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent. WHEREFORE. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law. which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession.: .What aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son. 1921. On April 13. effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution. the shares of stock in question. respondent ATTY. a minor. he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. he came into possession of certain property. residing at Cebu. he borrowed P2. and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3) years. Juan Sumulong for respondent. the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light. Republic Act No. deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years. and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years. MALCOLM. pledging. attorney. for full investigation of the facts involved. and for the rendition of the appropriate order.. to guarantee the loan." Two questions present themselves for the resolution.1âwphi1. and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. including twenty shares of the E. without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. is revoked. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor. J. Shortly thereafter. Cebu. the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. 6809. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission. Michael & Co. to guarantee the payment of his personal debt. to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.nêt SO ORDERED. "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward. It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. if any. These are the facts. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. Needless to state. which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. To quote counsel for the respondent. On March 20.800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation. the age of majority was twenty-one years. As modified. Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year. Pelaez.

the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. 73 Kan. As will be observed. that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character.. The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. unless positively prohibited by statute. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Chief Justice Johnston.where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment. Appleton ([1883]. and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use. . sec. and he mortgages the same. the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust. The . If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust.. 1901. 105 Ill. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice . . but as an individual. vs. The Illinois court. admits that although the general rule is. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The nature of the office. that it may be exercised without any special statutory authority.' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney. 743). It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court. however.. The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906]. Passing now to the second point — as a general rule. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. as well as between court and attorney. by a divided court. it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial. . the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted. Stat. In the opinion written by Mr. is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. without his professional advice.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. his conduct. but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent. 398. 398. the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it. 474). it was said: It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer. and in all proper cases. for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust. but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard. there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment. and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. Here it was held. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. 404). Indeed. it was held that this statute is not an enabling act. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence. (Gen.. that an attorney-atlaw will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity.

etc. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. vs. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. and that were we sitting in first instance. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complying with an order of this Court. "the only blot upon the escutcheon. 45 Sisa Street. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an AffidavitComplaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. J. Moreover.bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward. ALFREDO CARGO. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. p.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe. complainant. So ordered. JOSE TOLOSA. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981." (Rollo. 8). Barrio Tenejeros. . and visited her at the hospital everyday. respondent. appointed testamentary guardian. however. Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986." (The undersigned attorney. Malabon.: On 7 April 1982. report and recommendation. denying the further allegations of complainant. we would probably incline to a more severe sentence. Judgment affirmed. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. etc. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35." he says. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former." We feel. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. "It forms. that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. nombrado tutor testamentario.

Malabon. 'B-l' and 'K'). 5-8. (Rollo. to live with respondent at No. 1985. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St.The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. 1983). 1983). Malabon. Sept. (Rollo. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. 'B'.1 Lopez Jaena St. 9). Domingo Church in 1980. In fact. Galas. 1 Galas St. pp. Barrio Tenejeros. 1982. 'M'. That while Priscilla was staying there. 1983. 8. That respondent had been courting his wife. pp. pp. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. pp. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').. Tenejeros. Metro Manila from her earnings.. 45 Sisa Street. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. Metro Manila (tsn. 1983). at the FEU Hospital. nor lived with her at No. 5. 20. 6. Quezon City. Edgardo Miclat. July 29. Priscilla (tsn. June 15. 1983. 8. 10-11. Domingo. pp. 18-20. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. 45 Sisa Street. N' and 'Q'). Exh. Galas. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. and complainant. 1984). Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). 45 Sisa St. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. Malabon. Sept. 3. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. Metro Manila. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. May 12. Malabon.10. his wife left their conjugal house at No. a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. 4. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 33-35). 2. Exh. Tenejeros. June 21... d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. That sometime in June. as assistance in her medical expenses. Malabon. pp. May 12. Barrio Tenejeros. Quezon City. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. Tenejeros. Metro Manila (tsn. 1982. c) That respondent only gave P35. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. Malabon. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. 1982. 7. May 12. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: .17.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. That again in Quezon City. 10. 16. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). Quezon City. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. pp. 35-37). pp. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. p. 1315.. Quezon City (tsn.

lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. For this very reason. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. 1 Lopez Jaena St. 7. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. B-1'. however. At the same time. 5. 9. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. Malabon. left their conjugal house and lived at No. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 'F'. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. As officers of the court. pp. 2.. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. Galas. In effect. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. in spite again of his differences with complainant." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court.2. p. ACCORDINGLY. Quezon City. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. 37-39). At the same time. Thus. Barrio Tenejeros. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. their residences being one house away from each other. pp. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. More specifically.. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. because of her differences with complainant. 4. 'B'. 4. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. Metro Manila. . that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. (Rollo. (Rollo. in spite of his differences with complainant. 'G'. 6. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. 39-40). 40). 45 Sisa St. in fact. 8. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend." (Rollo. That Priscilla. 3. 3.

by Mrs. with the condition that if the land is expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business. LABRADOR. In this letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31. J. 1950. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner." which was to exist from July 1. 1950. provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees of patrons of the theatre. P80. assisted by her husband JOSE C. In June . vs. Yulo. Yang. Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on in lobbies of theatres in operation. then the partnership shall be terminated even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired. Yabut.000. 1945 to December 31. 1949. 1949. shall be limited to her capital contribution (Exh. Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. (4) that after December 31. Mrs. and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated as of July 31. But on April 12. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business. but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises. The judgment was appealed. YULO. Cruz. Hon. Ocampo for appellee. Yulo. The record discloses that on June 17.000 payable quarterly in advance within the first 15 days of each quarter. the attorney for the owners notified Mrs. Yulo. 1950. (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years and six months. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff. The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. Yulo. It states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and talking pictures. 1946. 1945. "B"). Punzalan. 1955. and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 8 ROSARIO U. affirmed the judgment. Yulo. The capital is fixed at P100. the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. Mrs. 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. 1948 to December 31. they executed a supplementary agreement. 1949. starting from July 1. In view of the above notice. 1947. or if the owner constructs a permanent building thereon. Manila. 1947. In the Court of First Instance. 1945 to December 31. YANG CHIAO SENG.000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng and P20. Bienvenido A. the parties executed a partnership agreement establishing the "Yang & Company. the two cases were afterwards heard jointly. extending the partnership for a period of three years beginning January 1. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. Both parties appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals. and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Mrs. Rosario U. dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. presiding. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall continue for an indefinite period of time. Augusto Francisco and Julian T. Yulo has not paid to . YULO. all improvements placed by the partnership shall belong to Mrs. which plaintiff evidently accepted.: Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The benefits are to be divided between them at the rate of 50-50 and after December 31. Yulo on April 5. On October 27. Yulo and Mr. Limited. Eusebio & Tiburcio for appellants. Yulo. The principal conditions of the offer are (1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs. The last contract was executed between the owners and Mrs. or Mrs. on April 30. 1948. On February 9. Mrs. in case of loss. (3) that Mrs. the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second party. Pursuant to the above offer. Tan. but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2). 1947.000. 1950. proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. defendant-appellee. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 3. Yulo a monthly participation of P3. defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the palintiff Mrs. plaintiffsappellants. Yulo and her husband.

however. and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property. that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff Rosario Yulo. and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant. The lower court. The first hearing was had on April 19. 1949. In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of the sublease and not of partnership. In said motion it is claimed that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for postponement filed by both parties. would be granted. It. P5.the lessors the rentals from August. was set aside on a motion for reconsideration.000 for the attorney's fees. It is against this decision that the appeal has been prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court. 1949 to October. 1945 until defendant vacates the property.000 from November. This decision. 1950. plaintiff became the absolute owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor. 1950 the partnership between Mrs. and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between them. The court.000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1. 1949 to December. the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at the time fixed for the hearing. In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon. therefore.000. 1950. that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay therefor from January. did not err in setting aside its former judgment. Mrs. As to the other claims. The prayer includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10. he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental value of the land is only P1.000. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease and not of partnership.100. Yulo in arrears (Exh. he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs. well-founded. in view of a possible amicable settlement. so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. that after December 31. finding the above motion. Yulo instituted this action on May 26. set aside its decision and a new trial was held. 1950. that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the sublease of the said property.000 for her participation in the business up to December. The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and allowing a new trial. 1955. the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. Yulo has suffered damages in the amount of P160. 1954. After trial the court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership. "E"). 1951 is P5. defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of lease and not of partnership. on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. and P3. or any other amount. Yulo and Yang terminated. As that parties agreed to postpone the trial because of a probable amicable settlement. Mrs. The court heard evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41. The court. As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the theatre. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100. This assignment of error is without merit. at which time only the plaintiff appeared. that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35. In answer to the complaint. . dismissed the complaint. therefore. alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has refused to pay her share from December. the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business. The final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was in the interest of justice.000 as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1.000. therefore. 1951 until defendant vacates the same. denied plaintiff's claim for damages or supposed participation in the profits. that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code. as a result of which. etc.000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5.

HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD. petitioners.. 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. But the original letter of the defendant. 1767. 1968.17. between plaintiff and defendant. opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. including the Executive Secretary) have made these false. members of the Bar. 1945 (Exh. b. J. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27. 1968. expressly states that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the lease. . 16. 10. with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. whether the expenses were legitimate. the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.. contain the following statements: d. MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. c. dated April 13. Santiago. Juanito M. Ibid. sixth. Santiago. respondents. Civil Code. Uy. She was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done. p.. Graciano Regala. plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20. Graciano C. "A"). and "C. In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease. three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).. she did not furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. They (petitioners. The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money. Uy. so the Solicitor General avers. Jose Beltran Sotto. Regala and Associates.). plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17. the Solicitor General points out. the partnership agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3. Plaintiff claims the sum of P41.: After the July 31. on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. The following statements. Exhs.The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. last two lines on bottom of the page). and Morton F. "A". 1968. and Jose B. In the third place.. (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. Santiago. Clearly. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July. 1949. with costs against plaintiff-appellant. are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. "B". are one of lease and not of partnership. Graciano Regala and Associates. . "A". Meads. RESOLUTION SANCHEZ. Erlito R. Were she really a partner. all that she did was to receive her share of P3. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum. 1. 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals. which shows that both parties considered this offer as the real contract between them. Jose Beltran Sotto: a. Vicente L. 1968). Caling. Exh. In the second place. Sotto. Erlito R. par. pp.000 capital.000 automatically ceased as of said date. and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.. (Art. Uy.000 as representing her share or participation in the business from December. etc. it does not appear that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business. or industry to a common fund. On November 21. seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page). which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners. ET AL. The herein petitioners . 13-14. not a partnership. ET AL.000 a month.. In the first place. (Last sentence. We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it in toto. this Court issued a show-cause order. and Jose Beltran Sotto. to the effect that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief. whether the earnings were correct. Erlito R. vs. . her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing. p. property.

1968). Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion. paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context. Santiago. 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. and it is thus difficult. which in full reads: 6." The "incidents" cited are as follows: (a) said decision is in violation of the law. a government agency or just plain fraud . Erlito R. 1968 was rendered in this case. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. even under many of the incumbent justices. (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court. his client would be deprived of due process of law. 1967. and Graciano Regala and Associates. it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. Erlito R. The motion to inhibit filed on September 21. which law has not been declared unconstitutional. the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. (Second sentence. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering. 1968 decision. asked Mr. erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31. and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31.e. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Atty.. again for himself and Attys. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. 7. Unfortunately for our people. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. not for no reason at all. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests. or were comments legitimate and justifiable. democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public. Vicente L. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral? . The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false. 10. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions. brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. ... and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts. in the light of our upbringing and schooling. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it. It enumerates "incidents" which. judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11. and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. par. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. Uy. counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7. However.. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case. As to the Chief Justice. Never has any civilized. On November 21. and that no matter what the circumstances are. 1968. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics. Atty. 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case. the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. which is elementary. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. could be defended. according to the motion.

Graciano C. Jose Beltran Sotto. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29. 1969. in MacArthur's behalf. that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer. claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1. he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. — . and contained the following paragraphs: 4. In his explanation of December 2. Rule 138. On December 5. Rule 51. xxx xxx xxx 6. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose. even while he was on leave of absence." In Atty. as required by law. It was on December 2. Uy explained his side of the case. Atty. registered an amended motion to inhibit.. 1969. Vicente L. 1968. had been violated. and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness. offered to retain his services. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government.. 1965. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. who may take part. Meads. though. in addition. 1967. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . On January 8. respondent MacArthur. 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072).. required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits. On February 4. 1968. as counsel for MacArthur. either its executive or judicial branches or both. through new counsel. In brief. one Morton F. to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government. On March 1. 1968 order. 1968 to December 31. Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3. On the part of Atty. Juanito M. 1968 that Atty." We now come to Atty. lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. He made the admission. that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised. 1969. 1968. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21. he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.And. 1968. additional arguments were filed by Atty. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case. 1968. Atty. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness". Santiago. he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31. Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement. Justice Castro inhibit themselves. and we quote: "Justices. on July 14. he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21. 1968. that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f). he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. Erlito R. Atty. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine . 1969. "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience. 1968. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1. 1968. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit. that on July 14. that in view of the rejection.. it must be stated that as early as October 7. 1969. which was accepted. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10. he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates. Vicente L. Jose Beltran Sotto. A second contempt proceeding arose when. as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27. Regala. it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21. According to him. . Rule 71 of the Rules of Court." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more.

not Santiago. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Santiago. and . he went to Atty. a short time before the decision of July 31. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. Atty. 1968 was rendered. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion. After reading the motion. Caling. Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate. 1969." It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country. resolved "to require Atty. The motion was then filed. Meads". on August 4. While Caling was reading the document. much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion. Caling filed his return. find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed. including the sugar price premium. In fact.. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court. On August 15. This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18. that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case. this Court. 1. this Court heard Attys." On August 13. only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party. Atty. Vicente L. and Morton Meads. and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling. told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Juanito M. Santiago. Santiago and Morton Meads. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. Atty. He explained that. and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. We start with the case of Atty. The truth. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. requiring Atty. In defending himself from the contempt charge. because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision. Santiago left. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. he .. that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same. should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Caling. Juanita M. Vicente L." In this backdrop. Caling. Vicente L. Caling gave his go-signal. Atty. In his motion to inhibit. that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. personally appear Before this Court on Thursday. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. democratic tribunal". indeed. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court. at 9:30 a. "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President.Government. Juanita M. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. Vicente L. until restitution or compensation is made. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer. Atty. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it. In his third motion for reconsideration. erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. Morton Meads answered. 1969. is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration. 1968 as "false. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". Santiago gave his explanation. his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31. Vicente L. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared." On July 30. to direct that the three. Vicente L.. on or before August 16. 1969.m. According to Meads. 1969. to file the same. that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. which could make their actuation suspect. 1969. "although the process has already begun. 1969. but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. we. 1969. whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they. Vicente L. Vicente L. 1969. he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. August 27. He disavowed the truth of Atty. He speaks of this Court as a "civilized. 1969. according to Santiago. On August 27.

but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. including the President". not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office. 2. For. and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any boardpetitioner. lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney." After citing acts of two judges of first instance. their first duty is not to their clients. Really. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. the teachings. it erects no shield. and no other. Decidedly not an expression of faith. this Court finds in the language of Atty. And yet. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967). Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. as many suppose.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise. 20 SCRA 441. and that no matter what the circumstances are. spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.. including the president. Section 20(b). He describes a . Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur.."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President."4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. to the courts." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. in categorical terms. to this. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. or their agents or principals. We next take the case of Atty." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue.' That same canon. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference."5 As rightly observed by Mr. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6."7 The precepts. who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. 444. We would in fact.' " A lawyer is an officer of the courts. as follows: "By now. For. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor. a judge from the very nature of his position.' And more. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence. Jose Beltran Sotto. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility. he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.deleted this paragraph in his rough draft. Mr. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. Nevertheless. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. their clients' success is wholly subordinate. Atty. Counsel is presumed to know this. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. oath-bound servants of society. be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. of disbelief. "like the court itself. counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. we repeat. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision.6 From this. judges may grossly err in their decisions. but to the administration of justice. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. For one thing. What is disconcerting is that Atty. inhibition is also asked of. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. as a corollary. he is. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court. which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. should also inhibit themselves. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. Justice Castro.

" He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. 12 Atty. the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . 4. Uy. the conduct of its ministerial officers. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it. whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission. More specifically. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. however. for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. hold that Atty. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . therefore. the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — SECTION 1." . Young. out of context. raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12. 83 Phil."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. Now. Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. — . It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31. now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth. Erlito R. The fourth motion for reconsideration is. under Section 3 (d) of the same rule. and that he too has committed. 702. guilty of contempt. in every manner appertaining thereto. inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control. He is exonerated.. A simple job." However. however.. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. It lifted Section 1. 5. it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court.. He should be held exempt from contempt. under Section 3 (a)... . This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. indeed. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication. Once in a small nipa shack. improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. did not attempt to explain this point. here comes a chance for him. Sotto is People vs. Justices. 1968. 1965 ." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court. it offends the court before which it is made." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. Rules of Court.proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face". Such language is not arguably protected. Meads. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. who was admitted to the Bar in 1966. express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission.. laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. if the parties or either of them. First. Rule 51. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Caling.. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.. where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. In doing so.. For. 3. It was improper for Atty. that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. Second. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. unnecessary statements were injected. and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. an act of contumacy." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer." 11 We. 708. who may take part. He is. it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. in furtherance of justice. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Regala. accordingly. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness. who may take part. including the sugar price premium. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication. Graciano C. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context.. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty.

and fines Atty. On the first contempt charge. 8. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. an additional P1. 7. Meads and Atty. that according to Meads himself. quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. Vicente L. Caling. this Court hereby finds: 1. and Atty.000. Vicente L. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time. Morton F. Caling guilty of contempt of court. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. Santiago. that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court. We go back to Atty. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. Punctilio of honor. Atty. And yet. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men.000. 1969. P200. 6. On the second contempt charge. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. Santiago. for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. Caling. Santiago and Atty. Regala and Associates and Atty. for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do. a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Meads. Graciano C. contrary to the instructions to bidders. the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. attorney-at-law. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago. witnesses and suitors. Indeed. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts. the Solicitor General. is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. One last word. we prefer to think. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court. he would not have signed the motion. he spent. it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Santiago. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Sotto. Vicente L. 1968. still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. Santiago in the sum of P1. . the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. Meads. he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. the Secretary of Justice. Atty. MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. Meads who is an alien. Santiago. To preserve its dignity. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. and 2. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. P1. Juanito M. As we held in our decision of July 31. this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond. 9. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute. It would seem apropos to say again that. And We repeat. experience teaches. P100. So ordered. No appearance for the respondent. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. too. It goes against the grain of circumstances. too. Furthermore. Morton F. On the other hand. if only for one reason. and fines Atty.This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. Such act has no aboveboard explanation. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. Erlito R. Caling. We must not forget. can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. As for Morton F.000. Atty. is not entitled to any consideration. He has control of the proceedings. "[a]dmittedly. Vicente L." The dignity of the Court. Uy not guilty of contempt of court. Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In re FELICIANO GOMEZ. Vicente L. For the reasons given. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. even if the Chief Justice and Mr. He is guilty of contempt. jurors. It should be emphasized. For. on July 14. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. Juanita M.. Santiago. and holds Attys. and Atty. judicial officers.

in this court. is an extremely embarrassing one. The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is. an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from notice thereof. and after the filing of respondent's answer. because of chagrin at losing cases. (Patterson vs. 1922. 6 R. judges. The charges of Mr. a newspaper of the city of Manila. respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in office..ñët In a verified complaint filed on October 15. because Governor-General Wood. on January 25. and respondent was required to file.. 1968. permit the law-officer to go forward with the instant proceedings. Although the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed. close scrutiny of the case. After. that while the Attorney-General is to be commended for his zealous interest in the maintenance of the Judiciary. the complaint was given due course. without further action. No. under the circumstances. et al. it should be recalled. RAFAEL C. and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. there tyrrany begins. Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. 1922. in effect. The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of respondent dated September 5. with reference to the conduct of Feliciano Gomez. where the liberty of the press and freedom of public comment ends. RESOLUTION ANTONIO. J. the charges have personal aspects. that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles. and Eva Mabug-at. and later in the Supreme Court. 454. When Attorney Feliciano Gomez comes to reflect on his conduct.MALCOLM. In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22.L. an unsuccessful litigant and an attorney. We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. when a case is finished. As some one has well said. in which it is alleged that Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court. that courts. 1968. out of friendship for Cailles. So ordered. Cailles contested the election successfully. that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ IN RE: THE HON. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance" (Code of Ethics. et seq. SILAY CITY. widow of the deceased Norberto Tongoy. J. The position of the members of this court in considering the facts laid before them.C. Colorado [1907]. are relegated to the courts for redress. so that when finished there was not a member of the court who knew what the outcome would be until the vote was tabulated in the decision. we should not. 1921. he will realize the impropriety of his action. pp.. Zulueta. following a secret conference.: The Attorney-General has filed an information. in Criminal Case No.at-law . and are substantiated by four affidavits. 1921. and after a realization that to punish for contempt of court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. of Cadiz. we have come to the conclusion that he matter should not be dignified by further proceedings.:1äwphï1. however. 512. like other persons. because although contempts are impersonal in nature. It appears that Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in 1919. and on his obligations as an officer of the court "to maintain towards it a respectful attitude. Gomez is charged with having said. 690. 1). 1968 and his decision acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21. for the position of provincial governor of Laguna. On January 19.)lävvphì1·né+ We conclude. . at a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion. gross ignorance of the law. In reality.1 and became final on December 24. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. the papers shall be attached to the personal record of Attorney Feliciano Gomez. Accordingly." for Robbery in Band with Homicide.S. did not relate to a pending cause. We feel also. first in the Court of First Instance. and there. 205 U. had offered them a banquet. are subject to the same criticism as other people. the case was referred on December 17. had invited the members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision. CLIMACO. with affidavits. Gomez was proclaimed elected. 1968 by Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. The judgment of the higher tribunal was rendered on December 9. therefore. BRANCH I. and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. Gomez. entitled "People the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor. Negros Occidental. Laguna. the Laguna election case was taken up point by point and decided by principles.

the aforementioned complaint against respondent was instituted as aforestated. Nicasio Yatco. 1969. SO ORDERED. now an Associate Justice of this Court. Paulino Quijano. complainants bewail as gross malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law. respondent promulgated his decision in the case acquitting Carlos Caramonte. with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. on September 21. that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged principals. Constancio Pangahin. It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. and when required to comment on said appeal. After the case was submitted for decision. and (d) Accused Honorato de Sales. remained at large).R. in the following manner: (a) Before arraignment: — Jorge Canonoyo (b) After arraignment: — Agustin Cañete Rosendo Cañete Arsenio Luyao Elias Giducos Pedro Layon Antonio Placencia (c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the information and utilized as state witness.. Barredo. A cursory perusal of the decision will at once show that said acquittal was predicated on other well-considered facts and circumstances so thoroughly discussed by the lower court in its decision and the least of those was its observation arising from the ocular inspection. the following behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case: I. 1968. and two (2) persons as accessories. Silay City. presided over by the respondent. 1968 to the effect that prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal in view of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. including Isabelo Montemayor. promulgated its Resolution dismissing the appeal (G. seven (7) persons as accomplices. On January 30. and made the observation that "While the validity of the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt. as erroneously contended by prosecutor. in Criminal Case No. dated September 5. on October 15. or more particularly. submitted his comment on November 28. this Court.1968 to the Hon. through Justice Fernando. which reads as follows: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. the case with respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution or with its conformity. Solicitor General Antonio P. 1968. In his Report. respondent issued an order. and Rene Fernandez before the Amended Information of April 26. Zulueta. of Cadiz. In the meantime. after conducting the requisite investigation thereon. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. while of the persons charged as accomplices and accessories. Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed aforementioned decision to this Court. Cristeta Jimenez. No. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE . 1968. the unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of acquittal was not premised solely on the results of said ocular inspection. On April 11. for investigation and report. Thereafter. Subsequently. the investigator submitted his Report recommending the exoneration of respondent.<äre||anº•1àw> The case was assigned to Branch I. the investigator stated: Under the first indictment. filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against thirteen (13) persons as principals. 1968. Julio Elmo. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime. Primitivo Mata. L-29599). 1968. were dropped. 690. Negros Occidental.

A murderer. Criminal Case No. province of Cebu. 1968. a psychologist or a psychiatrist would explain that the Order of September 5th is that of an anguished mind. extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September 1968. the capital of the province. may have a strong motive. an Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to violate his oath of office. In fact. The fact is. there is doubt in the mind of the Court as to his actual participation in then bold raid in Cadiz City on December 31. SO ORDERED. 1968. who is reputed to be brilliant. he visited the places which he thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00 o'clock of the dark night of December 31. Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent Judge took judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an ocular inspection he conducted on the date alleged by the complainants. 1968. to wit: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry during industry operating in the Visayas. from the order of September 5. by a judge who. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. issued a reckless. A painstaking scrutiny of the records as well as the evidence presented by the parties does not show any concrete proof that respondent Judge did conduct a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by the complainants. 690 for "Robbery in Band with Homicide" was closed and submitted for Decision on July 1. In fact. said respondent entertained serious doubts as to the guilt of Caramonte because of the failure of anyone — in the Chua and in the Uy households. there is likewise nothing in the record to support the charge of the complainants that the order of September 5. and that the neighborhood is welllighted and well-populated. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in the alleged crime. Because of that undeniably biased ocular inspection. had to acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of the municipality of Bantayan. less in the presence of the prosecution and concluded that such alleged secret ocular inspection was the basis of the Order of September 5. is null and void. the security guards. 11 August 1968. the respondent Judge took judicial notice "that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. About one and a half (1-½) months thereafter. To say the least. the honorable trial judge. or at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. Like an amateur murderer respondent judge left telltale clues all around. In any event. and illegal per se. was made by the respondent Judge as the sole basis for the acquittal of Carlos Caramonte. Without anybody to guide him. without anybody to guide him. 1967. 1968. and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. the decision pertinently reads: Is Caramonte guilty? In spite of the admission of Caramonte's Exh. because of the failure of anyone — the adults and the . the decision of the respondent Judge shows that in rendering judgment of acquittal in the case before him. Why respondent Honorable Judge went out of his way to gather those immaterial and "fabricated" evidence in favor of the accused is shocking to the conscience. it is gross ignorance of the law. Thus. But what of a judge who knowingly commits a "revolting injustice" or through gross ignorance of the law? It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the complaint that complainants bemoaned the fact that the respondent Judge conducted a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Sunday. however. the lone witness presented by the complainants in this case did not even make an insinuation supporting such serious allegation of said complainants. — which Order. August 11. as any student of law would tell you. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz.and GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW After both parties submitted their respective Memorandum attached herewith as Annexes "C" and "D". due to political pressure and against his will and better judgment. 1967. Why did respondent judge show his hand unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps. away from Bacolod City. 1968. C and the damaging inferences derived from his staying from the ceremony when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan were inducted into office.

1967. where were you? A — Almost one hour. 31. the security guards. xxx xxx xxx Q — Do you remember anything unusual that happened that evening in your house? A — Yes. They and the other members of the household were tied up by the robbers. sir. A — I don't know because I was lying flat on the floor. you cannot tell? A — Several men. came up my house and broke into my house. I cannot tell what did they do to my wife and children. Q — Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened that evening in your house? A — The robbers broke into our house. . Your Honor. Q — After nearly one hour. Q — How many floors has your house? A — Two floors. The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand. who then ransacked the two houses for about an hour. Q — How many minutes did the armed robbers stay pin your house? Q — At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. Q — What did the robbers do in your house? A — They ransacked my house. On her part. Mrs. Q — What did the robbers do with your wife and children? A — Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the floor face down. did the robbers who came up your house leave? Court — This witness did not identify any of the accused? Fiscal — No.children in the Chua and in the Uy households. A — No. my children and my wife. Q — Who untied you that evening? A — My son untied me after the men left. pirates. Q — What was the first thing you noticed when the pirates as you said arrived? A — I was about to sleep when they came up. A — I was in my house. some of them were taken to the seashore to prevent the police from firing on the retreating robbers: Mateo Chua said at the trial: Q — At that time were not your family inside your house? A — Yes. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the witness stand that: xxx xxx xxx Q — What did the robbers do when they came up your house? A — They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor face down. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to say on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one of the robbers. Q — About what time did you notice those pirates forced themselves inside your residence? A — Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening. Thereafter. sir. three of them went straight up my house. Q — Please tell the Court what happened? Q — How did they come out. sir.

Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony: Q — At about 10:00 o'clock of that same evening of December 31. "If anything happen don't resist because my children might be hit. A — My companion also suggested that we better call the Police Department by telephone because that was already 10:50 in the evening. Q — After you heard those voices of a man and a woman. what happened? A — Then we were told not to go to the seashore because there were armed men. sir. Q — What did you do after that? A — Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use the telephone and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the other side so we went to him and told him that there were armed men in the seashore and Antonio Uy told us. He told me not to go to the seashore because there were armed men there. Two security guards employed by Uy (Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged families thru the raid. how many robbers broke into your house that evening of Dec. 1967. A — At about that time we heard a voice of a man and woman and they asked us where we were guarding. Q — And what was his answer? . 1967? A — About four or five. Q — What did you do after that? xxx xxx xxx Q — After the four or five persons fired their shots inside your house. Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers? The police battled with the raiders from a distance of about 60 meters. what did they do? A — We were downstairs when they broke into our house. So Antonio Placencia told me to call the Police Department and tell them that there are armed men in the seashore. I did not have a chance to look at them. according to Patrolman Armando Maravilla. do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened? A — Yes. using the axe at the door and then after entering the first floor they went up. we asked him where our companion security guard was. xxx xxx xxx Q — Can you identify any of the robbers that came up your house from among the accused in courtroom? A — I cannot. Q — What did you answer? A — At that time we were on duty at the gate of the house of Mateo Chua and then we heard the voice of a man and a woman. 31. Q — What was that which happened? xxx xxx xxx Q — So what did you do after that? A — Because there was a policeman there. sir." The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. Q — Were they armed? A — Yes. Q — What did you do after hearing that? A — My companion Antonio Placencia called me because he was the one who had talked to those persons. because I was frightened.Q — More or less. Q — Were you able to call the Police Department by telephone? A — We went to the house of Erning Tan because there is a telephone there connected with the Police Department and the stand is also at the window overlooking the Caltex Station.

in all likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics. be proved beyond reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno." Q — And then you obeyed his order? You came up. Be that as it may. and it is incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt. Uy that his wife was brought along by the armed men. Under the circumstances. 43 Phil. what did you do? . Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan. the security guards and other employees of the fishing business. they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as far as they know. therefore. xxx xxx xxx Q — After the shots lasted. supra). it is xxx xxx xxx Q — What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news? A — Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. the neighbors — to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to his participation therein. the police. Q — What did Mr. we went to office to hide. Uy do because you were there. Q — When Mr.A — The policeman informed us that he did not report for duty and that it was Guarino who reported for duty that evening. In the case at bar. In fact. where did you go? A — After the shooting stopped. sir. the failure of anyone — members of the Chua and Uy households. He said. B). what happened? Q — Were you able to reach his house? A — When I went down. the charges must. sir. A — Yes. Q — What did you hear? A — We heard several shots. "If they want to get something. A — Yes. in spite of the biting language of the complainants in their complaint and in their memorandum. Uy went down and returned to his own house. and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall. Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood. A — I followed him. obviously in bad faith. For serious misconduct to exist." Q — What happened after that? A — Because we were there with him. just allow them to get it. Q — When you went down. have been said to be governed by the rules of law applicable to penal cases. and in rendering a judgment of acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law or to disregard well-known legal rules. the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. Q — Did you notice anything while you were hiding there? A — Yes. Antonio Horrilleno. under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code. Q — Where did you go? xxx xxx xxx A — To his house and I called the rest of the guards. there has been no proof that in issuing the order of September 5. (Decision. Antonio Uy saw me so he reprimanded me. — which indicates that many people in the compound must or could have seen some or all of the robbers — and no one could say that Caramonte was one of them. A — He went down and returned to his own house. He said. there has been an insinuation that "respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted. province of Cebu. sir. Of course. 212). The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large fishing industry. the mother of Antonio Uy came to him and informed Mr. (In re Impeachment of Hon. "Why are you walking there? Come up. pp." Inasmuch as proceedings against judges as the case at bar. we heard something. 12-16). 1968 (Exh. there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. and in this venture.

s. 690. this is not the proper forum to dwell on the matter.s. t. it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta. It may be pertinent to state at this juncture. personal conviction should be ignored lest it may lead to a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved. There is. lone witness for the complainants. 64-65. Since this is an administrative case against him the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was arbitrary. 1968. respondent Judge as stated in his answer. or maliciously. Agustin Javier. If it were true as alleged by the complainants that the issuance of such order was and that the matters taken judicial notice of therein were wrong. Legal and Judicial Ethics. of a high character. Thus." Of course. que en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que . xxx xxx xxx In issuing the order of Sept. But as the records show. that said compound is only a five hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in Cadiz and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated." commented Viada. 1968. Furthermore. In the pursuit of that solemn obligation. A prosecutor should lay the court fairly and fully every fact and circumstance known to him to exist. 1968 showed you that order of Judge Climaco wherein he stated that he was taking judicial notice that Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas.n. it is believed. it appears from the record that the Office of the City Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September 5. and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. the very witness of the complainants affirmed the correctness of the matters taken judicial notice of by the respondent Judge. Aquino — Q — When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13. and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. con voluntad reflexiva. that being that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law and that no innocent man be punished (Malcolm. in Criminal Case No. testified — Atty. it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence. p. and to perform their duties impartially and with but one object in view. corrupt. sir. Mr. or arbitrarily or oppressively.believed they failed. 690 does appear to be commendable. or oppressive. respondent Judge would realize his mistake which we believe malicious (p. p. as the prosecutor of the case. that this attitude of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. or corruptly. As heretofore stated. or a span of eight — to protect the interests of the State against what complainants herein term to be an "illegality. t. 124). 1968 on September 13. without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused (Malcolm.n. if there were any. Your Honor. the complainants herein lean on the argument that — Fiscal Zulueta — Because if I do that. after reading that order. Whether in taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5. 5. esto es. con malicia. partial. did you make any comment to Fiscal Zulueta? A — No. Q — But the statements here in the order are true? A — Yes. you mean the "Uy-Chua Compound"? Q — I mean the statements in the order are true? A — Yes. therefore. sir. a paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted partially. 29. which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly. (pp. Prosecuting officer presumed to be men learned in the law.) The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion). the prosecution in the said case did not take any steps — from September 13 to September 21. 123) and to this may be added without regard to any personal conviction or presumption of what the Judge may do or is disposed to do. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. 1968. the undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along that line. to seek for the reconsideration of such order and at the same time to invite the attention of the court to the alleged errors.). Fortunately. "Es tan preciso. "que la falta se cometa a sabiendas. indeed. respondent Judge erred or not.

of Cadiz City. As noted in the aforecited report. From a review of the record.L. ZOILO R. Carillo. We have analyzed the facts.. vs. respondents. 97. For. even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied. Rule 138.. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. FERRER. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[as] an officer of the court. is." (People ex rel. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES. he is. Culkin. 3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity.). . Karlin vs. and there is nothing on the basis thereof which would in any manner justify their inclusion in the pleadings. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." (Section 20 (f). p. 2 Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. 572. according to Groizard. Legal and Judicial Ethics. nevertheless. 855. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. con la que solo inspira la enemistad. "like the court itself. Zulueta. p. MACKAY petitioners. the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his complaint and memorandum. it is his own and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice." (In re Sotto. We find that the decision respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based.). in the contrary it results.). 851. la preocupacion o el error. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.). he failed to observe in the performance of his duty. 160. . 60 A. and in a very clear and indisputable manner." (Malcolm. such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. when required to exercise his judgment or discretion.). 77 Phil. prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service.. Esta es la prevaricacion verdadera. is not liable criminally. respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the aforestated charges.por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por ignorancia." 1 To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. logically and reasonably. 4 It is also well-settled that a judicial officer. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. that diligence. Rules of Court. prudence and care required by law. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 595. It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. el odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y corrompida. INC and GORDON W.). that although he has acted without malice.R. (People vs. for any error he commits. that is to say. it must be shown. 5 We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated in an earlier case: 6 A lawyer is an officer of the courts. cit. 82 Phil. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. much less could it be held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence. MARIO TATLONGHARI. with a warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe sanction.. 1949 ed. censured for his use of offensive and abusive language in the complaint and other pleadings filed with this Court. We cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. 602. SANTO MARILAG and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. provided he acts in good faith. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve." (5 Martin. 580. op. WHEREFORE.

the principal respondents were dismissed from their employment. 4. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case [National Rice & Corn Corp.R. et al. that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. thus — We may. The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIR's denial of petitioners' motion to dismiss — grounded on want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter — the principal respondents' complaint and said court's refusal to reconsider the order of denial. therefore. on this score. night work is not overtime but regular work. Manila Railroad Co. But they seek reinstatement. 13. Hon. (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602). L-16440.. is within the coverage of the prevailing rule enunciated in Campos. and 5. for the benefit of the bench and the bar. (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec. the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship. Jose S. G. et al.Ponce Enrile. restate. No. To be read as controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate. Mariano B. Jose T. Bautista. and that respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its "general jurisdiction and broad powers" under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations. 1962.. L-12075. 875. vs. or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal. 52 Off. Montecillo. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Belo & Armonio for petitioners. vs. and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec. No. (NARIC) vs. Republic Act 875]'.2 2. et al. L-17905. On the claim for might differentials. Inc. or the claimant must seek his reinstatement. 2. Consequently. and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest.. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays. failure to give additional compensation for such work is a violation of the said law. Night differential pay. declared — Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875 the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work. or under the Minimum Wage Law. the case. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: '. Gaz. which accumulated since their illegal separation. guaranteed a workman. Tan. SANCHEZ. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon. or must have a nearing on an unfair labor practice charge. Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because as held in two previous cases. 1964. In default of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay. beyond which it is not permitted to act.. May 29. Reinstatement with back wages.. 5836].. (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444). Valmonte for respondents. Republic Act 875). by explicit articulation in Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. [Paflu et al.: Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as CIR] to hear and determine a case1 seeking — 1. on the ground of unjustified dismissal. vs. Siguion Reyna. 5(a). Hence. May 25. And. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays. J. NARIC Workers' Union. et al. 10. Right to such pay is. We believe petitioner to be in error. where this Court. Here. the CIR has jurisdiction. speaking thru Mr. no extended discussion is necessary. 1959] where we held: . 3. 1.. et al. February 29.

A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. We held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process. National Labor Union. No. this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this fashion: 'La cuestion que. L-17788. No. No. No. 1957] but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done at daytime. 103. L-9055. G.. Detective & Protective Bureau. at 325-326]. the Industrial Court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of.'While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned case. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law). supra. . but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature — for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. Just recently. It is because of this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said demands — for reinstatement.. L-12075.. moral. employment". es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro. in Paflu et al. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work. 19601 or for payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs. The other demands. Naric Workers' Union. Since employer-employee relationship is sought to be re-established. no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche. this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia. y consiguientemente. CIR. et al. May 31. L13806.R. et al. 1958. 315]. medical. Si este tribunal tiene en casos de disputa. would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor. et al.' Apropos the issue of jurisdiction. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. True. and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty. we hold that the CIR is with authority to act on this grievance.. and back wages and damages incident thereto. [Naric vs. and payment of salary increases and separation pay — out of the CIR's jurisdiction and place them in the hands of ordinary courts. la de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia. vs. To force . CIR. et al. vs. the company contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No.. G. 3. Almin et al. 81 Phil. [Luis Recato Dy.' [ Shell Co. namely. and so it justified the additional compensation in the Shell case for 'hygienic. to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide. we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for night differentials are within the compass of the CIR's jurisdiction.R. cultural and sociological reasons.R. he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. 1959. 1959. Again. G. April 29. contra National Labor Union. 1962]. May 25. May 23. Felipe Guevara.R. la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos.R. No. G. or in connection with. In fact. et al. reinstatement. the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. se debe determinar es si entre las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa.. esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo.R. L-8738.. Tan. and back wages and the damages incident thereto.. May 29. et al. and in a series of cases thereafter. G. citing Shell Co. a nuestro juicio. And this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work.3 Earlier. are matters which arose out of the same employment. L-11655. After the passage of Republic Act 875. City Automotive Co. Withal. Inc. Besides.. and payment of salary increases and separation pay.. vs. We had occasion to remark that :4 "[t]o draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. Prisco vs. G. No. ibid. November 28. vs. it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime work. the record does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.

2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. for the reason that she could not locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action. were prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question. and yet Atty.". Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn over a the records. that on February 21. all to the prejudice of said complainant. Costs against petitioner. that the court finally approved the sales made. on October 17. respondent and his client Mrs. ordered complainant Laput "to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court. if any. it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of action here 'be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of Industrial Relations. complainant herein (Atty. additional expense incurred — these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of title. 1955. So ordered. Laput "to surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the estate and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . In a motion dated September 16. all of which. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. LAPUT. Laput to produce them. to whom this Court referred this case for investigation. filed with the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid certificates of title. the true facts being that the administratrix. Respondent also denied that he was the author of the first motion complained of.: This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. without notice to complainant. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- being unfair and unethical. anxiety augmented. that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to turn over to them the certificates of title. . The time to be lost. Laput". respondent asked the court to order Atty. Casiano U. Mrs. other pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him. that as early as November 18. The Solicitor General. Nieves Rillas Vda. praying that he be issued owner's duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost. petitioner. he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration. within ten days from notice. the respondent. J. he went over the records Special Proceedings No. the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed. in spite of the written opposition of complainant. 1959. aside from . on October 8. filed a "Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner's copy". and that with the duplicate titles. report and recommendation found that since January 11. or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots. 1957. Indeed.ñet Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of records and transfer certificates of title. without notice. 1958. and assets. and that if he (respondent)had known that the transfer certificates of title in question were in the possession of complainant he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. FRANCISCO E. he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time. Laput was not served copy of this pleading. 1957. bank books. Barrera. By virtue of this motion. Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered into the records of Special Proceedings No. 219 — filed with this Court charging the respondent with malice. de Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby. when the widow. and on December 3. . LABRADOR. Laput did not comply with request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her case. ATTY. to the undersigned administration pending my appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration" and that although Atty. another motion. on December 3. among which are transfer certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province.the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. effort wasted.lâwphi1. F. vs. the CASIANO U. bad faith.' "5 Upon the view We take of this case. the Court of First Instance of Cebu. the administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate. respondent. filed the pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said special proceedings. and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. 1958. Case No. 1956 and on September 16. 1957. 1958. REMOTIGUE.

et al. it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143. Hon. et al. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CASTRO. vs. is approved. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969. and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. Mencias. and of the documents belonging to the estate in his possession. ELPIDIO TIBURCIO. HON.329. SORIANO IN L-24114. complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer certificates of title in question. et al. entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114." The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings. by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio. as it hereby. The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix. MARCELINO TIBURCIO. 1969. etc. It was on the same date. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented. in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents. the amount of P4. later on increased to P5. 1955. however. Herminio C. his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26. and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault. and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5. went to him to engage his professional services in two cases. 1954. was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix. therefore. Laput) believed that he had still the right to retain the certificates of title in question. and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or bad faith.561. Wittingly or unwittingly. and order of the Court. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case. Clemente M. Hence. that the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed.P. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance. Laput shows that respondent's answers correct. complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint. as early as December 19. Antonio J. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. vs. And so Atty. Soriano. the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice. Cebu Branch. At their conference. as early as December 27. 1969. His subsequent explanation did not. et al. RESOLUTION . Atty. the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio. motions. EULOGIO MENCIAS.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty.1awphîl.15.66 by the estate.nèt An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. Tiburcio. PHHC and U. thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27. the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's complete exoneration should be. ET AL. if not altogether bizzare behavior. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. Atty. CLEMENTE M. 1969. serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. Atty. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations. while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. October 8. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases.699. J. Parenthetically. a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19. 1969.767. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. he (Atty. to wit: this terminated case (L-24114).passbook of the estate's deposit in the Philippine National Bank. that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case.66. 1955.699. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines." (L-30546).. an area of only about 19 hectares is IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.48 out of total of P31. Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty.: By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10. Mariano. for in this latter case.

Had he been less precipitate in his actions. was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court. at the hearing of this incident. Soriano at the hearing of this incident. Clemente M. et al. Bonifacio T. especially the Varsity Hills case. at the very least. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. Atty. that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Soriano should have done. were it not for his candor. Furthermore. categorically denied having given. It is the sense of this Court. Dalangpan. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. when Atty. we note that Atty. Nemesio Diaz. We find Atty. besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment. is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. Atty. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram. What Atty. give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Clemente M. we are far from being convinced that he really did so.involved. And if this cannot be had. as claimed by Atty. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. we find Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents. Atty. In the incident before us. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court. 1969. Doria. that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer. an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. Rizal Avenue. Atty. he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar. as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. Doria. which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice. in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. then he should. generating as it does in the minds of the litigants. if it were true. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 9 . of the premier control over the case. he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Clearly. however. Further still. in the present case. 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. at the hearing of this incident. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. Manila). who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10. as well as of the public. then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. Soriano has joined one Atty. therefore. Soriano is hereby ordered. Diaz to no avail. 2 Atty. a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute.

an associate of the same law firm. acting upon the writ of execution. 3 A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge..L. That the Hon. petitioner. As a consequence thereof. legal and justiciable defenses. JR." herein petitioner. through a different counsel. and this Petition must be denied for lack of . . it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter.. Atty. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors. CAGUIOA. filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendantappellant . Isabelo V.. . petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. b. who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently. Mercado & Associates. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. despite due notice. 1977. 1972. EDUARDO P. more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner. The appealed case was handled by Atty. 1977. a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII). his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado. another member of the law firm. levied on three motor vehicles. that the grounds relied upon ". presided by respondent Judge for execution.. 1977. denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. " 6 On July 19. to wit: a. That this Hon. 1977. Santos II... issued by respondent Judge.JOSE GUBALLA. . c. of the law firm of Vida Enriquez. J: In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction. The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved. and. respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ".R. through Atty. THE HON. and d. 4 On July 6. the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision.L. No. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. Santos 11. 5 In an Order dated July 12. respondents. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken. 680-V.2 SANTOS. Isabelo V. 1971. Carlos. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default. Defendant has valid. vs. 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court. could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals . docketed as Civil Case No.. Vida Jr. respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. 1 Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6. RICARDO G. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7 Hence the instant Petition. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. petitioner. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29. Benjamin Bautista. 52610R. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA. petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff. on October 1. Vida Jr.

merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve, WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
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Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives. Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day. In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate. In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents. Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners. R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought. Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4 Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest. However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00 1990 605.00 570.00 1991 165.00 2,300.00 ———— ———— ———— P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8 WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. SO ORDERED. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAPTER III CANON 10 VICENTE MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, respondent. RESOLUTION

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5 On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.) Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making aforementioned misrepresentations. Ordoñez. to say the least. that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of Appeals. (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little damage. Delia T. Her liability is clear. no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed from. 1971. but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. the Court of Appeals found. is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat. Yap. Parlade. the latter being bigger than. it was obvious that she was far from contrite. immediately after the collision . and that. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor. must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel. So we rule. Respondent. While her demeanor was respectful. At such a hearing. she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard. and is therefore. overloaded. 1971. the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court. thereby hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death — so that. in fact. which is not true. of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant. indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising. both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum. that. the impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach. thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. untrue. that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is unbelievable. and Associates. upon examination of the evidence. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed from. in fact. the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of complainant's boat — where the complainant was seated. J.R. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G. it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court.FERNANDO.R. If so. G.: We have before us a task far from pleasant. appellant acted as pilot and. referring to a portion of the same quotation. Considering further. that. in fact. petitioner states. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true. The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12. Even when subjected to intensive . summing up evidence for the defense. and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. (Cesica v. more specifically with reference to a duty owing this Tribunal. connected with the law firm of Salonga. respondent Delia T. within ten (10) days from notice. a member of the Philippine Bar. Where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting]. we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Sutton. Under the circumstances." although. the Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause. There was no attempt at justification. requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. as its machinist. as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as. there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. that the petition quotes. Vicente Muñoz v. and makes reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals. such optimism was misplaced. which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat. for: (a) petitioner's theory. the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of merit. minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor". (b) these circumstances. L-33672." which is. whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts. as charged in the information. of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as such. on page 9 of the petition. No. it is averred — "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible. April 30. and was. as did the trial court. in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision. On the contrary. that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence. that — in the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals — "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case". that. on page 6 of the petition. 1957)" although. at the same time. on page 8 of the petition. likewise. and (d) although appellant's boat carried several passengers. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals. because in law there is none. L-9590. When given an opportunity to make proper amends. Sutton appeared. reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. likewise.part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant. that of the petitioner. Villaseca. including children." " 1 A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14. although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on.

Delia T. That the undersigned Delia T. Yap and Custodio O. partners in the firm of Salonga. which reads: "22. This Court does not view matters thus. she was not to be budged from such an untenable position. even at this stage. and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim. Ordoñez. that it does not go far enough. — The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. 1971. the obligation to the bench. Attorney Sedfrey A. [Candor and Fairness]. for the apology to gain significance. Parlade & Associates. Ordoñez joins Atty." If there were a greater sincerity on her part. which her evasive answers gave rise. That with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney. that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. or the language of a decision or a textbook or. It is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken.. Ordoñez. there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements. Sutton. While expressing regret and offering apology. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton. Some members of the Court feel. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class. did seek to make amends thus: "1." 3 What is more. 3. That undersigned Atty. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand. with knowledge of its invalidity. That undersigned attorney. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned. no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. 1971. the language or the argument of opposing counsel. Pedro L. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar. often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics. appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22. Sutton. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause. it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. . It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper. or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to. Delia T. the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December 1. Sedfrey A. 1971. Sedfrey A. To purge herself of the contempt. and that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court. with the assistance of Atty. the testimony of a witness." 2 The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. together with Messrs. Ordoñez. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit. signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Delia T. to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled.. and did make with the proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of regret. That undersigned Delia T. seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. Parlade. for candor and honesty takes precedence. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo. the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court were explained by her. 4. 2. Yap. pursuant to an order dated October 18. What is more." 5. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. . There ought to be. the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. or a statute that has been repealed. however.questioning by several members of the Court. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. The mood. Sedfrey A. especially to this Court.

At the same time. the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners. both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted. WHEREFORE. respondent Delia T. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on her record. especially in his relationship to this Court. as well as the other senior partners. however. Sutton is severely censured. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel. perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm. It must be stated. Attorney Sedfrey A. is deep-seated. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . Ordoñez. must be commended. that in the future he.

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