CASES OF LEGAL ETHICS PART 1 IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.

: Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows: 1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. 2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). 3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case.

4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget. 5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3 At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's coaccused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4 Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) RESOLUTION CASTRO, C.J.: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the

common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502). When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,

particularly where. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. (Black's Law Dictionary. and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. 3rd ed. and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . including the Chairman. a majority thereof. JOVITO R. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. Otherwise stated. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. is engaged in the practice of law. It is a grave responsibility. (State ex. and conducting proceedings in attachment. Dudley and Co. and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. petitioner. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. at the time of their appointment. at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. J... a majority thereof. We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.. firms. in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RENATO CAYETANO. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred. associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. in a representative capacity. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. GUILLERMO CARAGUE. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. and HON.S. indeed necessary. in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management. 2d 895. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. premises considered. at the time of their appointment. 129 Ohio St. HON. using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. rel.. a wide experience with men and affairs. practice . Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. 263). referee. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. conveying. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. It is not limited to appearing in court. body. as here. 340 Mo. CHRISTIAN MONSOD. 23. at least thirty-five years of age.W. board. 173. p. PARAS.. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. holders of a college degree. vs. including the Chairman. (5 Am. negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation. conveyancing. the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. Sec. Mckittrick v. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. v. Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and..176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court.sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky. however. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person.. respondents. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. but embraces the preparation of pleadings.. In general. to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. the foreclosure of a mortgage. commissioner.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably. so far as . SALONGA. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. one who. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved. (Article X. counseling clients in legal matters. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1).:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.Agrava. all advice to clients. and the giving of all legal advice to clients. No valid distinction. 102 S..E. there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.C.. Jr. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney. committee. it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. 193 N. and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective. (105 Phil. However. before any court.. the facts are disputed. It embraces conveyancing. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l). enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. and in addition. said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. to the proper administration of justice . . WHEREFORE. However. Dworken. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading.. 262.

145 Conn. The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous. it might be helpful to define private practice. Thank you. v. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer. FOZ. to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service.].). If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession.(Wolfram. in or out of court. many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history. 593). OPLE. (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy.E. Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois]. the answer is yes. 140 A. 128 Conn.). 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity. The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . in effect. In this regard thus. knowledge. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners. 593). citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass. 15). quoted in Rhode Is. v. (Ibid. Yes. and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. OPLE. Cardell." (Ibid. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms.. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.. Wolfram. lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. (Ibid. legal procedure.. 22 A. therefore. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. MR. Among others. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice. Presiding Officer.: Minnesota." Groups of lawyers are called "firms.] . which requires the application of law. Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Mr. cit.] 179 A. [R. 222. And. (State Bar Ass'n v. . Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co. 1986].144). may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.). Presiding Officer. p. although many lawyers do not engage in private practice. and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.). we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA. although it is auditing. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. MR. Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip.concerns the question set forth in the order. p. Automobile Service Assoc. FOZ. training and experience. (Barr v. MR. MR.2d 863. not reality. the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". OPLE. FOZ. Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm. Payne.2d 623. as commonly understood. The term. (Charles W. To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. Comments on the Rules of Court. Jamir).). And. 325. . (Moran. [1986]. Nonetheless. it will involve legal work. unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." (Ibid. will necessarily involve legal work. In either case. 3 [1953 ed. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. The Commissioner will please proceed. among others. FOZ. or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. p. 665-666. of sound moral character. Generally. 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. op. which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Vol. 194 N. MR. there are still uninformed . (Gary Munneke. 626 [1941]). provides. Mr. 313. OPLE. such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. . MR. saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. Bar Assoc. (Ibid. counselling and public service. even chairman. ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1). means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services. p. 139. In most firms. At this point." MR. once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today. Before we suspend the session. then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners. a corporate lawyer.. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. Is he." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Yes. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. of the Commission on Audit. MR. therefore." Today. there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates. in or out of court. commonly understood to be the practice of law.I. the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. Yes.

automatic data processing. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers. Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways. and other interested parties. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation. (Business Star. earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. know that in most developed societies today.) In a big company. a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC).laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. and electronic computing equipment. In our litigation-prone country." May 25.e. document drafting. substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. "Corporate Law Practice. a business daily. the most prominent is that of prosecutor. 4). "Corporate Finance Law. Moreover. advice-giving. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen." Jan. tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. clients. (Wolfram. p. functioning at the legal policy level of decisionmaking now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein." has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. In short. so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. In several issues of the Business Star. 4). at least theoretically. a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. the diagnostician and the trial lawyer. p. p. 687). of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. "Corporate Finance Law. many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. 11. i. 11. and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them. or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law." Jan. Lawyers and other professional groups. for all intents and purposes." He is the "big-time" lawyer. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks. a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. supra. ( Emphasis supplied. the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. p. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning. the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors.). operational analysis." (Business Star. the surgeon. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law. a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems. wherein a "model". a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla. 1989. (Ibid. The business lawyer has been described as the planner. Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective. legal processes. p. "Corporate Finance Law. particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management." (Business Star. in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts. (Business Star. By no means will most of this work involve litigation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. In most cases. legal skills. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. 11. Lawyers. the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. 1989. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. This brings us to the inevitable. a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties. an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process." Jan. and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice. Understandably. the appraisal of major trends. appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission). His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include. for example. 1989. acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings).). the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action. are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. 4). international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. For one. Certainly. A corporate lawyer. the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. tax laws research. Instead. legal institutions. and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory. Nonetheless. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. inter alia: corporate legal research. Of these special roles. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. . as in medicine. each involving different legal doctrines. one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action. however. the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law.1990. Truth to tell. and negotiation. (Ibid. At any rate. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed. After all. 4). the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice.

This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. An understanding of the role of feedback loops. aid in negotiation settlement. Managerial Jurisprudence. it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation. In a crisis situation. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. interdependent environment. concern three pointed areas of consideration. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. Yet. and the need to think about a corporation's. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence. p. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis.] the organization and management of the legal function. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities. [Be this as it may. 4). "The Corporate Counsel. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical. "Business Star". also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues. or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. and rates of flow. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel.Today. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older. Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities. In general. including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make. managerial. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?. 1991. In Europe. promoting team achievements within the organization. 11." Jan. managing expanded liability exposure. three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Esprit. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. For that matter. including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. They differ from those of remedial law. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel. p. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. he must." April 10. many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. In the context of a law department. at the very least. the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. "Corporate Finance law. social. economic. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does . The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. including structuring its global operations." so to speak. Also. creating new and varied interactions with public decisionmakers. 1989." it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support. with a shared area linking them. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. and psychological. 4). 1991. strategy at multiple levels. thus: Preventive Lawyering. inventory levels. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers. Soliven. 1991. the finance manager. has worked with the under privileged sectors. 1991. 1977. (Ibid. having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. (pp. Jr. 124. and since 1986. 143 SCRA 327.S. a negotiating panel acts as a team. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission. (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion. a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. An appointment is essentially within the . but where they are. which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal. particularly the modern concept of law practice. Atty. once said: "They carry no banners. the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development. there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel). but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. 15. Atty. Vol. p. U. Atty. Nos. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Romulo. perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies. lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. (Guillermo V. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties. Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama. ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate. Monsod. On June 18.P. the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar. 3 and 4. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. Besides in the leading case of Luego v.." Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal. an unpublished dissertation. 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified. (3) conditions of closing. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. 13). 2." Staff Paper No. Central Bank of the Philippines. (Condensed from the work paper. In a loan agreement. which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987). Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U. In the same vein. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned. p. he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. 265). ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises. the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. p. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. Civil Service Commission. during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast. Michael Hager. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Necessarily. for instance. for which he was cited by the President of the Commission. Monsod used to be a member. (2) borrower's representation.not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (4) covenants. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (See Ricardo J. it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. in initiating. 11). economic. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. 1973)." submitted by L. Civil Service Commission. and project work of the Bank.) and having hurdled the bar. the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms. has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. a lawyer-manager. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970. as in this case. and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. demand expertise in the law of contracts. entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations. he worked with the Meralco Group. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts.T. in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development. in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". 1987. and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution. and (5) events of default. "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments. they beat no drums. Manila. and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist. p. a lawyer-negotiator of contracts. In the field of advocacy. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery. and all the other legal requirements are satisfied. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Graduate School of Law. If he does. 1982. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. On June 5. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination. Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. a quast judicial body. 321). such as the farmer and urban poor groups. filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.S. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U. then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970). (p. lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. he took his oath of office. Third and Fourth Quarters. On the same day.

p.S. the answer is in the negative. a member of the Philippine Bar. there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power. Supreme Court would still reverse the U. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee. Sec. who has been practising law for over ten years. (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U. the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations. charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. invoking the case of Aquino. etc. Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. This blinded the man. 1949. In the instant case.. The condition of his appearance as such. may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. 1947. may the Court reject the nominee. No blood shall flow from his veins. and that he would not receive any payment for his services. perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say. perhaps. Delilah agreed on condition that — No blade shall touch his skin. Law on Public Officers. In view of the foregoing. accused the procurator of reneging on his word. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. et al. Moreover. J. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA. .. which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . Blanco.S. et al. without first becoming lawyers. Romero. 1959. vs. the Chief of Police of Alaminos. . three Members shall hold office for seven years. consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination. or in advising others on what the law means. the President issues the permanent appointment. (2) In the same vein. this is far from the constitutional intent. SO ORDERED. October 14. whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. (Lacson v. on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. Of those first appointed. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. most individuals. L-1532. posting of bond. one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth.discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. two Members for five years. 28. . Clearly.S. having entered his appearance as private prosecutor. VIII. he ceased to engage in private law practice. PAREDES. (Art. 1 Constitution). is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar. . are actually practicing law. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City.: On September 4. vs. was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case. how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured. This matter. in making use of the law. subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Finally. DefendantAppellant. for has been clearly shown. since no abuse. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C. oath-taking. and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly. this petition is hereby DISMISSED. Senate. much less a grave abuse of discretion. consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President. Plaintiff-Appellee. . and (4) acceptance e. Thus. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion. (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. No. Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines. suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice. Additionally. after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. Gonzales. For one thing. how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation. Upon the other hand. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.g. he would be considered on official leave of absence. the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion. but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance . This is different from the acts of persons practising law. as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law. by operation of law. and fuming with righteous fury. the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. not the spirit of the agreement. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. In that sense. but by the spirit that giveth life. L-3081. law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified. that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed. Monsod is a lawyer. Once. Laguna. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused. Nov. Delilah was beside herself with anger. I greatly doubt. say. and the last Members for three years. it would be incredible that the U. upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation. without reappointment.

647). As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos. 35. presided by the Hon. 31. Cotner. the Secretary of Justice. 127. Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. Revised Rules of Court. Revised Rules). The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. heretofore reproduced. Practice is more than an isolated appearance. with costs against appellant. counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case. 1. this Court holds that Asst. Bryan. Hilarion U. or with the aid of an attorney. Jarencio." this time invoking Section 32. as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 1961. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. 4 S. City Attorney Ariston D. the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. therefore.C. who is a relative. 864. law library In view of the foregoing. shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially. because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. as it is hereby affirmed. 98 N. M. Rule 27. a succession of acts of the same kind. in all respects. which rendered judgment on December 20. it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public. to represent the complainant in the case at bar. Rule 138. On December 17. the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. 87 Kan. p.S. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability. Under date of January 4. now Sec. For one thing. law library WHEREFORE. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior. 644. as already pointed out. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed. the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. for it consists in frequent or customary actions. In other words. for patently being without merits. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING. the decision appealed from should be. as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. and which we consider plausible. the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna. Laguna. 522.E. which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. Sec. Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge. Rule 138. On the other hand. 35. The offended party had. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person. The appeal should be dismissed. Laguna. without costs. 768). with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose." He claims that City Attorney Fule. 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. 1961. which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party..of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. 42 LRA.

There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. . as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. Marcos on September 17. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views. It will suffice. signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. (6) Encourage and foster legal education. learning. 1962. out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated. (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law. to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report. Bar integration. public service and conduct. at the outset. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession. 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law. 2. jurisprudence. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. 1971. and make reports and recommendations thereon. Thereafter. professional competence. opinions. sentiments. among other things." The petition in Adm. Integration of the Bar will. (7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. and ensures. (3) Discharge. the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession. In September. integration fosters cohesion among lawyers." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E.PART II January 9. 526 2 of the Court. Congress passed House Bill No. and publish information relating thereto. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. In 1970. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law. (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members. to carry out the purposes of this Act. are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice. Act 6397. after due hearing. On August 16. and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public. 1972. with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. The purposes of an integrated Bar. fully and properly. SEC. SEC. (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers. its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers. Written oppositions were admitted. as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood. practice and procedure. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On December 1. Case No. 1972. arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30. Within two years from the approval of this Act. and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration. in general. law reform. and Appropriating Funds Therefor. pleading. and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants. improve the administration of justice. 3. (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated. through their own organized action and participation. for this purpose. therefore. 4 Since then. 1973 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar.

impartiality and independence. — Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest. — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege. Moreover. the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Otherwise stated. (8) Provide placement services. 2. (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research. and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position. (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers. but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or. and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. and the admission to the practice of law. no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses. and to the nation. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. under Article VIII. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: — Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. on the importance of preventive legal advice. and promulgate minimum fees schedules. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards. it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body. and assist it to maintain its integrity. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar. while the purpose of a tax is revenue. the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses." Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service. the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. but also to his brethren in the profession. Anent the first issue. as an officer of the court. such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Freedom of Association. because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client. membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. more specifically. Sec. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services. and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer. will "raise the standards of the legal profession. (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations. it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. . The issue therefore. and procedure in all courts. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. it follows that as an incident to regulation. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. to the courts. which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. Regulatory Fee. practice. 1. (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces." Indeed. the administration of justice. not involuntary membership in any other aspect. The Supreme Court. clothed with public interest.(4) Shield the judiciary. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar. and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State. (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation. and. (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. is a question of compelled financial support of group activities. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue. a privilege. improve the administration of justice. moreover. 13 of the Constitution. the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. given existing Bar conditions. (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers. therefore." Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power. the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power. — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action. from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it. and (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation. For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. but there can be no collective action without an organized body. "to promulgate rules concerning pleading.

The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. effective lobbying will not be possible.51 per cent) voted against it. and politics will intrude into its affairs. it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed. and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation. on the other hand. 14. (8) more cohesive profession. (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar. To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. and vastly improved the administration of justice. 3.090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses. a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration. while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns.04 per cent) are noncommital. effective on January 16. and 157 (or 1. energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public.555 (or 96. (4) greater Bar facilities and services. even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar. hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE. It is noteworthy. it has restored public confidence in the Bar. if his liberties were to be thus extended. and 285 (or 2. it is not unfair. 4. while only 378 (or 2. it has been variously argued that in the event of integration. (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration. of the 13. to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes. that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable. would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. and to the public. might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. because it will apply equally to all lawyers. to the courts. and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. Government authority will dominate the Bar. as he has always been. Fair to All Lawyers. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government." within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines. Canada and the United States. none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen. it is not retroactive.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration. 662 (or 4.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar. Canada and the United States. In addition. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission.06 per cent) are non-committal. notably in England. the Court. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court. that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof. A lawyer is free. Case No. after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. local Bar associations will be weakened. Finally. and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. the Bar will become an impersonal Bar. it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.80 per cent) vote against it. 1973. . In many other jurisdictions. at the time Bar integration takes effect. enlarged professional consciousness. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar. cliquism will be the inevitable result. it is not unequal. Upon the other hand. 12. has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession. The conscientious objector. Even the income tax would be suspect. ACCORDINGLY. young and old. Freedom of Speech. however. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried. The Court is fully convinced. improve the administration of justice. by proper work.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. of a total of 15.855 (or 93. (5) elimination of unauthorized practice.

Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest.00. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but.000. In that Resolution. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. docketed as Criminal Case No. 22 in all three (3) cases.R. CR No. .400. and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15. can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce. multiplied a thousandfold.000.00 in Criminal Case No. CR No. 05093. respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. the practice is prescribed by the law. with a total stated value of P36. Marquez. respondent Fe T.A. to pay a fine of P 6.400. 85-38360.000.00. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions." On 1 February 1989. PHILIPPINES.400. in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989.450. 22. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5. asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that. and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order.00. TUANDA. . a member of the Philippine Bar.A. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor. but also an injury to the public. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. 85-38361.P. (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction.00. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder. ATTY. Blg. the proper forum. issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5. The Court of Appeals.-G. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation. FE T. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar. the Court of Appeals in C. Blg. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. Blg. Blg. the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. in addition. four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa. Marquez several pieces of jewelry.P. respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee. in Criminal Case No.00. respondent. suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law.00. Martinez.000. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance. Tuanda. and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15. for insufficiency of funds. 85-38358. for sale on a commission basis.450. On appeal. with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. 8538359.00. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. 85-38359. and to pay a fine of P16. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5.00. On 17 December 1983. 85-38360 and 8538361. PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989. she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos.P. she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court. respondent received from one Herminia A.R. she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced. In Lozano v. 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B. and (b) three (3) for violation of B. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. . the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa.P. noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court. Traders Royal Bank.PART III CANON 1 PEOPLE OF THE vs. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Sometime in February 1984. instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26. Blg. SO ORDERED. the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1.250. all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. 3 (Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. 27. complainant in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. after trial. In due time. respondent." We should add that violation of B. 1 On 16 December 1988.-G. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.00. in Criminal Case No. and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit. Marquez. . 22 in the following terms: The gravamen of the offense punished by B. and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.400.00. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Consequently.P. and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude.

When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him. . An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. Bukidnon. Several days after his oath-taking. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. or other gross misconduct in such office. she and Segundino went to her hometown. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 1975. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife. After they had dinner one night in March. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. Thereafter. Fearing that there was something amiss. 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. they had sexual congress. 1975 to contact her lover. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. In December. 1971. 865). Davao del Sur. Blg. involving moral turpitude. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. When Magdalena discovered in January. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4. 1973 that she was pregnant. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. J. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. which Magdalena also attended. Oblena. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. AQUINO. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. The results were released on April 25. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. 1973 for the baptism of his child. and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. Magdalena went to Davao in July. she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. grossly immoral conduct. to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. 1973 of their child. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25.: Magdalena T. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAGDALENA T. 1970 at Cebu City. vs. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him. 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case. 5 ACCORDINGLY. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. 117 Phil. 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Arciga in her complaint of February 24. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. Segundino passed the bar examinations. He went to Cebu in December. K to Z). I and J). A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct. . SEGUNDINO D.malpractice.Magdalena remained in Cebu. Erlinda Ang. He continued his law studies in Davao City. respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay. the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. They renewed their relationship.P. they had repeated acts of cohabitation. or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. Capiz. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. Ivisan. She went back to Ivisan. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4. constitutes malpractice. he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. MANIWANG respondent. violation of B. (Italics supplied) Sec. Michael Dino Maniwang. however. Decena. or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. 1975. ARCIGA complainant. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. he did not mind because he loved her very much. or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice. 28. it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer. have been filed or are pending in any court. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. In his opinion. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. Segundino stopped visiting her.

547. (See Montana vs. 389. Toledo. 1967. 62 SCRA 382.J. Simbol. 1102). see Villasanta vs. January 29. for better or for worse. (Quingwa vs. JR. which he refused to fulfill. See Sarmiento vs. under promise of marriage. whose sense of dignity. a married man. Villanueva. Agustin. who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt." will depend on the surrounding circumstances. In 1955. observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man. Peralta." (People vs. and. SO ORDERED. February 28. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar.S. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage. 117 Phil. and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C. 586). She used to give Puno money upon his request. 1975. complainant. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony. (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Administrative Case No. Puno refused to marry her. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. or shameless. and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. 481. J. 19 SCRA 439). however. 959). Administrative Case No. 48 Phil. they were going to get married. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual. 116 Phil. a married woman separated from her husband. 535). 1979. 2nd 896). Ruado. Administrative Case No. February 24. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. be denied admission to the legal profession. (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras. Administrative Case No. 1206. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage. 100 Phil. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925. Reyes vs." "Through thick and thin. Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco. 507. (5) Where Flora Quingwa.It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant. she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. Puno. 1967 and 1968. a public school teacher. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. where lawyer Eugenio V. Viojan vs. (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena. she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. 768. Almirez. 533. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila. (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities.: In a complaint made way back in 1971. 1969. 123 Phil. (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. 313). falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. De la Cruz. two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. RESOLUTION ROMERO. Abaigar vs. Jr. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general. 322. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct. succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous." (Mortel vs. 27 SCRA 169. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. 450). 865). Wong. when old-fashioned morality still prevailed. Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children. 117 Phil.. 997. Paz. Administrative Case No. anyway. February 28. who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles. 114 Phil. 1975. 100 Phil. (Almirez vs. although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse. Duran. marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies. seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. Oblena. misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage. Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. my Josephine you will always be the first. 101 Phil. Lopez. SIMEON BARRANCO. middle and the last in my life. that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her. Cui. Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents. 106 Phil. they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. flagrant. after unsuccessful attempts in 1966. complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts. Before be could take his oath. after such fake marriage. According to the complainant. Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Aspiras. 63 SCRA 667. he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy. 256).93 SCRA 91). Josefina Mortel. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. respondent. September 10. (Royong vs. in life or in death. vs. tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that. . --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PATRICIA FIGUEROA. because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent. honor and morality is not well cultivated.

born on December 11. his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer." 6 It is a willful. for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love. Hence. 1974. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay. 9 Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. 1988. respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams. The IBP's report dated May 17. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE TOLOSA. to take the lawyer's oath. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. credible. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). Iloilo from 1980-1986. when she learned that respondent married another woman. 8). complainant alleged. voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15. respondent. respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral. even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock." (Rollo. 3 In 1988. or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. albeit belatedly. complainant. Unfortunately. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Patricia Figueroa. respondent repeated his request. Iloilo. the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Rafael Barranco. that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. J. Their intimacy yielded a son. the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. Complying with an order of this Court. who is now sixty-two years of age. not for any other reason. flagrant. Jr. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. but grossly immoral. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble. Malabon. Respondent Simeon Barranco. Jr. 1980. 1 It was after the child was born. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. both of whom possess no impediment to marry. should thus be allowed. perpetually.: On 7 April 1982. 1993. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit. Barrio Tenejeros. On June 1. We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. report and recommendation. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems. in response to complainant's opposition. On February 18. p. resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. 1979. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay. sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. . Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. 1974. ALFREDO CARGO. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971. SO ORDERED. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. 1964. 7 We find the ruling in Arciga v. Sevilla in June and July 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. We agree. 5 Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street. who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. On June 18. 10 Respondent. 1988 when the Court. To recapitulate. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. Upon complainant's motion. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. On October 2. 1982. vs. Since 1953.Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. bitter and unforgiving to the end. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse. this petition. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. He gave only P10. they were steadies. when they were both in their teens.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. 4 On September 29. WHEREFORE. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco.

1 Lopez Jaena St.17. 'M'. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. 4. 8. July 29. Priscilla (tsn. Exh. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. and visited her at the hospital everyday. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. 5. Galas.10. 1983. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. Metro Manila. In fact. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. 6.. Quezon City (tsn. June 15.. That Priscilla. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. pp. 45 Sisa Street. 5-8. and complainant. 33-35). That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. That again in Quezon City. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. in fact. to live with respondent at No. 3. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. 1983.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. . incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). 10. That while Priscilla was staying there. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. 18-20. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. 1 Lopez Jaena St. Barrio Tenejeros. 1982. June 21. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. 13-15. Tenejeros. (Rollo. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. Quezon City. 1983). Tenejeros. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Malabon. 1985. Malabon. May 12. nor lived with her at No. Metro Manila from her earnings. 8. Tenejeros. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. Edgardo Miclat. 10-11. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. That sometime in June. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. 1984).. Quezon City. pp. Domingo Church in 1980. his wife left their conjugal house at No. pp. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. 3. 9. 16. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. 6. N' and 'Q'). to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). 1983). That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. May 12. 45 Sisa St. 1982. pp. Domingo. 37-39). Malabon. 1982. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. 1 Galas St. 5. 'B'. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. (Rollo. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. pp. 7. Metro Manila (tsn. The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. 20. Metro Manila (tsn. pp.Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. Exh. their residences being one house away from each other. May 12. Galas. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. (Rollo. Barrio Tenejeros. 45 Sisa Street. left their conjugal house and lived at No. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. 35-37). that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital.. Galas. report and recommendation.. 7. denying the further allegations of complainant. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn.. 'B-l' and 'K'). that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house.. Barrio Tenejeros. Sept. because of her differences with complainant. Malabon. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 9). Malabon. p. 2. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. 2. That respondent had been courting his wife. as assistance in her medical expenses. 45 Sisa St. Quezon City. Metro Manila. c) That respondent only gave P35. 8. 1983). 4. at the FEU Hospital. pp. pp. Sept. Malabon. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. pp. Malabon. Quezon City. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982.

"C"). the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. "B") for the amount of P5. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. the University of the East. p. SERGIO AMANTE. capital to be returned after two months.00 (Exh. complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. per agreement between the two of them. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the interest on her investment but respondent failed to give her any. 40).M Amante(signed) The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4. Received by: S. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." (Rollo. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. Afraid that her investment will not be returned. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. At the same time.000. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by complainant. 1978 when she was able to see respondent and gave to him the P5. 1978 and which states: Mrs. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27. testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. B-1'. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5. Sergio Amante to be invested in business with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting Aug. the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. complainant. Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. Atty. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. in spite of his differences with complainant. The LIZASO. however. respondent RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p On 27 March 1979. 1978. Atty.00 was signed by respondent on August 7. "A") payable to the latter and which. Three days after August 7. from disbursing monies that may be due to respondent on account of his retirement from the University's service. 1978 against respondent (Exh. Moreover. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. complainant sought the help of the U. complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from leaving the country and an order restraining respondent's employer. (Rollo. For this very reason. 1978. ACCORDINGLY. The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of the check. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day.00 to Atty. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SHIRLEY CUYUGAN vs. Atty. . 'F'. She tried to seek respondent's signature on the receipt but it was only on August 7. complainant even begged respondent to return her money if he could not give the interests but respondent merely made promises. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to appear. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. On 18 June 1981. Court required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the complaint. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. In view of these.000. 3. 1978. Sergio G.000. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. Thus. As officers of the court. At the same time. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. The Court referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution dated 15 July 1981. Respondent also presented documentary evidence on his behalf. A written receipt (Exh. 39-40). Complainant was further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. 2.00 check for which respondent signed the receipt/promissory note. in spite again of his differences with complainant. Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.In effect. respondent Amante failed to offer formally his documentary evidence. 1978 in the amount of P5. ATTY. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified on her own behalf and submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante. Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. report and recommendation. 'G'. 655615 dated August 4. By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. 4. More specifically. but failed to complete his presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. pp.E Legal Department Head.000. The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7 February 1990 in the following manner: On August 7. 'B'. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent failed to come. was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the casino. For the many weeks that followed. 1978. 7.

a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. 1987. "1" would affix his signature so far away below from the handwritten words. Exh.00 to complainant. is the alleged receipt dated August 4. that said amount has a guarantee of 10% profit per day starting August 7. Complainant presented this note to Mr. Legal Department Head or the U. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent Amante by harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint.000.E. and that the capital of P5. To provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent. "H") authorizing complainant to collect in his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr. Second. Conrado Aquino.000.00 investment. even more so that respondent is a lawyer. U. the agreement between him and complainant was to invest the amount in respondent's business venture. the U. but the latter was not able to help her because respondent denied that he ever owed complainant anything.00 to complainant. Amante(signed) Exh.00 allegedly given in payment of complainant's loan from respondent. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5. This amply and clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent and presented by him to the bank. Third. 1978 addressed to a certain Mr. "B" of the complainant and the same signature of respondent. At the same time. Mr.000. Annex "2". Thus. Lizaso.000.E Faculty President and the University President himself.000. addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No. d) Finally. complainant allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20. Sometime in June 1978. The receipt/promissory note (Exh. Aquino. the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the investigations/confrontations set by the U. it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh. if indeed complainant paid her loan to respondent. the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a note of receipt when. was of the opinion that this was a personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle. but' argued that he did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior obligation to him. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check confirms it. "B" with the last handwritten line in Exh. 2.00 check referred to in the complaint.000. we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has discharged the burden of showing. the exhibits submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. It totally negates respondent's claim that the check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to complainant. correspond to the . According to respondent. Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5. "B") dated August 7.000. The analysis of respondent's evidence by the Solicitor General follows: 1.000. To all these terms. Noriega then returned the note to her with the advice that she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected by complainant. the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible. 655615C (P5.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B" of the Complaint.E Faculty President.000. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from various school officials. "1" that what remained is the receipt promissory note or Exh. After careful examination of the records of this case. "1" is fully handwritten. complainant sought the help of Mr. dated August 7. Lizaso Check No. which was substantially as follows. he claimed that complainant inserted the words in Exh.000. prior to finally securing legal assistance from a private lawyer. subsequently marked as Exh. the stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the investigation of this disbarment case. despite repeated demands therefor. 1978 clearly expresses the terms of their oral agreement that the amount of P5. the latter dangled the possibility of a second loan for P20. 2 Upon the other hand. in separate written complaints. Amante admitted he encashed the check. to substantiate his own version of the evidence. "1".00 needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house. 1978 (Exh. on 7 August 1978.000. Again. already contained the words "capital investment" at the back thereof.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7. Fourth. Resty Noriega (Exh. he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only to dismiss the complaint outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was spreading within the university. at all. Moreover. respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a receipt for P5. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by respondent. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a second loan to complainant. Annex "1" — photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by three inches. and purportedly signed by complainant. Antonio Ravelo. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being incredible if not manufactured for the following reasons: Furthermore.00 was entrusted to respondent to be invested by him in his business venture. 1 Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts.000. 1978. "B" embodying the agreement that the P5. "1" which consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of the top of Exh. all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement of her P5. such as the U. "B" do not.000.E Faculty President.00 capital investment which respondent failed to do. complainant sought the help of the University President. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow: First. "B" are one and the same and that in view of the long and big vacant space between the handwritten words and his signature. [Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature below] Sergio G. in the ordinary course of things as in the case at bar. respondent affixed his signature. complainant tendered to respondent Amante the P5. The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5. the latter wrote a note dated November 7.00. Complainant was allegedly very slow in repaying the loan. 1978 and the same to be returned two months thereafter. and that complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings of Exh. which loan fell due a month later.E Head of Legal Department. are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause of action against respondent. Noriega who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with payment of respondent's fee. upon complainant's repayment of her first loan. Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of respondent. leaving a big void or vacant space in between which any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage and manipulated to the prejudice of the signatory. "1" and Exh. at the time of encashment by respondent.00 to respondent Amante for investment purposes and that respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof. Noriega. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check. 1978 embodying the following words: Received from Shirley C. however. by her letter of December 11. Moreover.000. Instead. that she had delivered P5. by clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore.Because of this. it should be the respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of P5. "D").00 shall be returned to complainant after two months from date thereof. Mr.00) in payment of her loan. 655615 as payment of my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley C. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or reimburse complainant's money.

as well as between court and attorney. "B" is a physical continuation of Exh. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not have any tail loops that would correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh. would be doubly expected to protect his loan by a similar receipt. whether relating to professional or non-professional matters. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. 7 with eloquence and restraint: As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted to him. Pelaez. Justice Malcolm went on to say: The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. 3 Thus. "1". but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. "B". Justice Malcolm said: . however. hold. was expressed by Mr. Pelaez. if it were true that the paper showing Exh. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar.000.last line of Exh. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.000. immoral or deceitful conduct.00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant. in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck. the courts retain the power to discipline him. the complainant no less. 1978 in order to invest it on respondent's business venture. by promising to give her P20. had never been presented by respondent in any of the confrontations set by the university officials between complainant and respondent. it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for such return and accounting. .000. In other words. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. 1978. 5.000. get the same loan from the bank as she was able to.000. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person.. 3. without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court. it evokes wonder why complainant would secure a P5. just as well. we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest. 10 Finally. pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5. it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan of P5. indicative of moral unfitness. as there was actually none to secure. including some shares of stock in certain corporations. non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. As early as 1923.00 loan to respondent who promised to give her. is the conclusion that Exh. And yet. when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. justifies suspension or disbarment.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from the latter. therefore. Abordo 9 in the following terms: that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. indicative of moral unfitness for the profession. the last line of respondent's Exh. he came into possession of certain property. whether it be professional or non-professional.00 loan. the respondent Vicente Pelaez. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character. As such guardian.00 she gave him. In that case. In other words. 8 (Emphasis supplied) The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso.000. borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank and to guarantee that personal loan. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings.000. Any person. just like Annex "1" (stub receipt).000." We emphasize here that "conduct.00.00 if she pays the P5. Unfortunately. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys. Immediately clear. Mr. a member of the Bar. that misconduct. which does not contain any tail loops at all.000. . To follow respondent's twisted reasoning. the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez 4 the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. respondent tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be falsified and which try to make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.000. which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.00 on August 4. but was only presented during the investigation at bar. "1". but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. Moreover.000. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice. in common with other courts.00 but would merely partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good moral character.000. For a lawyer. who knows that she will be given a P20. she could have very well secured the same from the bank and not from the respondent.000. In disciplining the respondent. who is not a lawyer.000. justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.000. with all his legal expertise. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the P5. anyway." as used in this rule. If complainant really needed the balance of P15. respondent. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. was appointed guardian of a minor child. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. [A]s a general rule. is quite hollow and very unlikely." Mr. It also appears that when finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the disbarment proceedings. was able to make him sign a receipt for P5. constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. a P20. So it is that we. Lastly.00. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe. It is true. while still guardian of the minor. it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v." If complainant. 6 (Emphasis supplied) The rationale of the rule that misconduct. it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. respondent was not able to. it appears strange that he has not required complainant to sign any receipt for the P5.00 loan he earlier gave to her. as the respondent is.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5. there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a subsequent loan from respondent because she could. as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago. We are compelled to conclude that respondent attorney converted . "1" and "B" are not the same and are far different from each other. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Exh. 5 The nature of the office. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if. and the court requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character. of course. is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. In the case at bar.00 loan.

000.'s absence from the country to justify such act of non-payment. Jr. the Solicitor General rendered its report. the case was deemed submitted for report and recommendation. to write respondent a letter dated February 3. 1979. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law. respondent persistently refused to pay back the said amount. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Copies shall also be finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney. he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. Had respondent intended to settle his indebtness. failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment. Jr. 4). categorically admits having borrowed money from complainant's son. authorizing the latter to collect the sum of money owed by respondent. was left unheeded. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law. It is clear from the records that after Luis. is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. Puno. and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs. SALUDARES. respondent does not deny the fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the P1. Jr. left the country.000. only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. On November 8. 1978. left the country and afterwards wrote his father. by abusing the trust and confidence of complainant's son. He reasons out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. Respondent failed to comply with his promise. It appears that sometime in August 1977. he could have done so in several instances repayment was demanded of him. This prompted Luis. 1984 the case was re-assigned to another Solicitor. Saludares be charged with violation of Section 27. in his reply. CONSTANTINO.00 which he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands. (Rollo.complainant's monies to his personal uses. respondent. however. the case was duly referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Despite complainant's repeated demands however. borrowed P1. Such a conduct. The Civil Relations Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24. (Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation. respondent filed his comment on the affidavit-complaint alleging among other things that the complaint was without basis and malicious in nature. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUIS G. Jr. respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies. the respondent admits said indebtness but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt. report and recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and complainant. Complainant. Jr. 25. 19) This however.00 from complainant's son Luis. There is no doubt that respondent. p. prompting the former to seek assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavit-complaint. In the interim. The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer. respondent borrowed money in the amount of P1. Sergio G. The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. to his clients. Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis. respondent Atty. He however. 1979. it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. ATTY. wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation promising to pay it back promptly the following day. 214 SCRA 1 [1992] ). Constantino charges respondent Atty. Jr. but to no avail. was appointed to the Bench and no report nor recommendation was made by him. After the investigation conducted by said Solicitor. and is therefore a proper subject for disciplinary action. The Solicitor General further add that respondent's refusal to pay the debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer's oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence. Subsequent demands for payment were then made by Luis. vs. respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt. As a matter of fact. complainant Luis G. constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office. challenged the veracity of respondent's contentions and reiterated his previous allegation of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtness despite repeated demands. Prudencio S. Bersamira. This act. not to mention his seeming indifference to the complaint brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the Solicitor General. Respondent further cites the fact of Luis Jr. 1978.000. Luis. like the other demands. (Rollo. Jr. He must perform his duties to the Bar. Jr. Jr. WHEREFORE. Solicitor Bersamira. We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Jr. Luis. Saludares with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis Constantino.000. 3) The Solicitor General found that respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his debt was apparent from the averments in the affidavit-complaint and this fact was sufficiently established during the proceedings before the investigating Solicitor. . was able to obtain a loan in the amount of P1. 19 SCRA 439 [1967] ).000.00 loan extended to him and at the same time demanding payment thereof.: In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21. promising to pay it back the following day.00 from Luis Constantino.00 loan despite repeated demands by complainant who was duly authorized to collect the same. By his failure to present convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt. J. Javier. was assigned to the Office of Solicitor Jesus G. As far as the records of this case show. On March 12. PRUDENCIO G. p. Prudencio S. complainant and his wife took turns in trying to recover the debt from respondent. respondent failed to demonstrate that he still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. purportedly for an urgent personal need. RESOLUTION BIDIN. p. 1978 reminding the latter of the P1. at the appointed place of payment. 1990. In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May. A lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. On October 15. to the courts. Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension. complainant alleges. to say the least.

to the bar. No. and the private respondent Lo Bu. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect and confidence of the public. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. The lower court dismissed the complaint. 5 That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals. His conduct should be characterized by candor. Ong Ting. thereby degrading not only his person but his profession as well. to his compadre Lo ." 7 chanrobles virtual law library Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records. The original writ of execution had been returned wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their names. 1974. Javier. machineries. 1970. with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts. including equipment. 1973. 2d 729 as cited in Tan vs. Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. Consequently. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari. 1968. the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. denied the petition for certiorari of private respondent. asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. as shown in its order dated March 23. Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan. to the courts and to his clients. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important that truthfulness and candor. 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961. in its Order of March 19. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent. showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June 27. dated March 11. 1973. honesty and professional decorum. Hall [LQ App] 90 so2d 519. Both his professional and personal conduct must be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31. a point stressed in another motion dated February 2. supra). He is required not only in fact to be possessed of good moral character. were successively rejected by complainant's counsel. he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22. In the case at bar..000. materials. and for P40. Respondents. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy. who was especially deputized to serve the writ. 1968. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS.. To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. Sabandal. there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties. (Fellner vs. improvements. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.00 in September 1968. after hinting of taking measures to avoid liability. WHEREFORE. all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting. in the New Century Foundry Shop. 1973.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful. FERNANDO. Rule 1. reinstating it in its resolution of December 19. "allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop . Bulacan.R.The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath.: The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. ALVAREZ. This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. Petitioners. 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ).000. After his proposals to settle the present case for P5. selling all his business. competence and fairness (Roque vs. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court. J. There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal. Clemencio. Certiorari and prohibition lie. The lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. Extensive hearings were conducted. 212 SCRA 618 [1992] ). vs. 131 A. much less approval. the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned. 3 This Court. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts show that on January 16. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. the Court directed the examination of Mrs. 1 Thereafter. honesty and integrity of the profession (Lyons vs. now deceased. with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. 2 It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road. It was docketed as G. 1970 6 for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. It is about time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union. Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila. Valenzuela. and the foundry shop where Mrs. the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. dated March 12. Amante. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23. 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). 1973 denied his motions. 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in Marcelo vs. immoral or deceitful conduct. and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed. by the employment of techniques. for P25. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action.00 in October 1968. which certainly deserve no encouragement. 1970.00 on December 22. 1973. in its resolution dated July 17. 1970). but must also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Saludares from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice.000. A member of the Bar must act with integrity. 4 In the meanwhile. is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. SO ORDERED. supplies and rights. Valenzuela. It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession. did so on January 17 and 18. L-36636. Bar Association of Baltimore City. Bulacan. so long set at naught and disregarded. petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. 1973. on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond.

.. as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before this Court. assailed in the certiorari proceeding.. the CIR issued an order on January 30. 1969. an alias writ of execution was issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road. 1973. He . .' So it has been from 1919. he gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30.000. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice. 1975. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of being the alleged vendee. praying for the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond. the ostensible vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation.. filed on February 20.. and it is not enough. in Sanchez v. in order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties. denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in accordance with law. in 1967. .chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. It is clearly fictitious. " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v. and ii was not surprising. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. 1970. Ong Ting. dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. His daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier. his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. 1973. Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. "Ong Ting lost everything. . where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its resolution of July 17. He could. through Justice Street. alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari. 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. the Court may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. without the latter being made a party to the case. " Then. 1969. He failed. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. there was a fictitious sale resorted to. 1973 and February 2. as a forced intervenor. petitioner in L-36636. What is worse. this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory.. in an expeditious or less expensive manner. . Lo Bu. .. dated February 25. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J. ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale. Moreover.. Having acquired jurisdiction.. Valenzuela. Busmente in his Answer to this petition. 3021-ULP.000. 1959. To all intents and purposes then. On February 3.B. as in this case.. herein above reproduced in its entirety. the then Justice.'" 13 3. be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition.. was.. the bad faith being evident. As much.00 .00. private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance. by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. a 1962 decision.. as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. One last point.. 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26. of course. may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final . There is this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v. and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31. His family continued to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. Mrs. 1973. for P20. in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded.00. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that particular case. As a general rule. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu. it was alleged that as a result of the fire. In the latter motion. herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2. to accord deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the case. Private respondent. In Cruz v. ." . A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood. that is merely. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft. promulgated in 1969. this Court. indeed. Lo Bu. we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing . to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order. Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5. . "even if erroneous. The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. for on the facts as found. herein petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR.L. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work." 9 chanrobles virtual law library That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order. categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court. Court of Industrial Relations. 1973. The alleged sale was no doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents." 8 The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu. 1973.. when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. decreed. there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v. one day before the schedule sale. there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith. As emphasized by the ponente. herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself.. in his special and affirmative defenses. for the purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22.. pursuant to the provision of Section 17.. from which he realized P20. the alleged manager in absentia. 1973. 6. 1973. as stated earlier..' .. and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12. It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop. That is the ordinary course of judicial procedure." What is more. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. that is the law of the case. On January 7. was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3. being the court of last resort.' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him. with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the Supreme Court. Under the circumstances. now Chief Justice.. which he acknowledged so fully paid . At the time Ong Ting died. . Rule 135.. Rules of Court). In fact he did file two motions for that purpose. Acting Director of Prisons. 1973.. 1973.Bu. which he denied. That is the most that can be said of his performance... 17 Counsel Yolando F. Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25. he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner labor union. " This allegation was made despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu. by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop. On February 10. Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice proceeding. he did specifically maintain: "On January 26. had the temerity to deny such allegations. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case. For even if such be the case. On February 27. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts. both of which were denied. If petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No. all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23.000. It is not so however in this case. As noted. 1973. also prolix. 1973. Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu. he was still residing in the premises of the shop . So it must be here.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been . 1969. when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v.

Jose B. 1989). directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors. Reyes." In his second column. was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE.000 to P20. Drilon. II. 1989). Ramon Nisce. attended the dialogue. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U. all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x. namely. was an informal one. but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. 1989. in an article. no less than the dignity of the profession. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity). PER CURIAM: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3." the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously. Mr. and. 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor. giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. Sunday. the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited . and the editorial. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. ready and eager to do his every bidding. Responding to the critical reports. and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting. and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend.disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates. the Court. The Supreme Court en banc.was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal. except that of dismissing it. for the consideration of the Court. soul. July 8. Drilon's) candidacy. especially conciliators and employers. June 20." Mr. direct or indirect. including vote-buying.. Luis Mauricio. and of the IBP officers. June 10. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand. led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association. entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5." Mr. resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officerselect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence. Drilon is employed. the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday.000. June 20. Emil Jurado.m. in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard. Concepcion. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments. that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates. at 2:00 o'clock p. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. before the Supreme Court en banc. Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart.e. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19. is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. Thereafter. national. some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial.000. Mr. based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth. and marking of. requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client. money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates. the alleged use of government planes. the ballots. the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus. and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other. to give counsel and advice. Triple costs. Cruz.1989). Violeta C. and Violeta C.L. in addition. as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara. Drilon. Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec. entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press. or regional. exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar. 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya. there is a widespread belief. 1989). the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3. and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. June 17. 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC). upon invitation of the Court. or chapter. In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1989. on the day of the election. I. The fundamental assumption was that officers. appreciated to P50. Attorneys Nereo Paculdo. in its en banc resolution dated June 15.P. 1989. However. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal. and Teodoro Locsin Jr." headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals. the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4. notably Chinese Filipinos." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted. appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP. in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya. were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve.

Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. quasi-judicial. quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision. and Associate Justices Teodoro R. without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper. (d) Formation of tickets. by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution. 14[e]. or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial. and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Art. on election day. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. as well as the advertisement thereof. after deliberating thereon. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza. Luis Mauricio. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. Narvasa. Henry Dy. Messrs. judicial. Padilla. The newspaper columnists. transportation or any article of value. Article I. or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts. quasi-judicial. Non-political Bar. (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member. or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections. Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. IBP BY-Laws). A Delegate. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Atty. Governor. the Hyatt. (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate. III. a businessman. or any similar consideration to any person. 14[c]. Sarmiento. (10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving. on letters.acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. 14. executive vicepresident. or to vote for or against a candidate. (5) Giving free hotel accommodations. (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee. (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon. SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED . Abraham F. No lawyer holding an elective. "' Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC. agency or instrumentality thereof. 1989. entertainment. single slates. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. 4. invoking the Press Freedom Law. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected. IBP BY-Laws). IBP By-Laws). while holding an elective. Daniel Martinez. directly or indirectly. IBP ByLaws). or combinations of candidates. (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. 14[a]. refused to identify. 14[b]. the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. Gancayco. (6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Atty. officer or employee of the Integrated Bar. of election campaign material. to conduct the inquiry. the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president. offered or promised to any person. judicial. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective. Griño-Aquino. (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. (2) giving of food. or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. but whom they. or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. Emilio A. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited. quasi-judicial. Drilon. except on election day. I. and Carolina C. (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. food. as members. and the Court. has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. they said. thus: "SEC. drink. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. IBP By-Laws). The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts. (b) Distribution. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. The Clerk of Court. 14[e]. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. entertainment to delegates. whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member. judicial. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31. in any form or manner. drinks. Their stories were based. Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. as Chairman.

BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers. He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: (b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-atArms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.' 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region. 10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph: No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.". The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said petitioners, of Manila,

court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,

one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's

1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172. On January 31. After hearing. J. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation. which issued the writ of possession. after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15. Bolinas. 1962. Perez. now joined by his wife. Crispin D. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25. A.1966 this Court. failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. the trial court issued on August 25. and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued. The respondents then filed on August 2. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners. from registering the latter's final deed of sale. L-19718. have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied. the enforcement of the writ. Civil Case No. which. it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. ACCORDINGLY. and on June 30. the Quezon City court countermanded. Atty.R. the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. petitioners. Lourdes Yu Ago. the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. 39407.1äwphï1. After remand. 1. the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City.923. Baizas and A. from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. Ago moved to stop the auction sale. the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26. The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.R. 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8. Jr. Court of Appeals. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. affirmed the judgment. 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Ago appealed. which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The Court of First Instance of Manila. 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. Failing to obtain reconsideration. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No.N. affirmed the dismissal. antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. its primacy is indisputable. Castañeda. in Ago vs. except Lourdes Yu Ago. Bolinao. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G. CASTRO. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15. However. on May 2. reconsideration was denied on July 18. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above. 1966. in part.. AGO. 1961 this Court.propensity to litigate. 37830-R). and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client.N. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON. vs. 1964 Pastor Ago. On November 1. praying for the same preliminary injunction. 39438-R). in Ago vs. however. Our decision of May 22. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court. the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3. ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3. so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407. 1967. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners.87. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. Upon their petition. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. No pronouncement as to costs.: The parties in this case. L-14066. with Atty. as his co-plaintiff. docketed as L-26116. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. and for the third time." or about August 3. and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. Ago failed to redeem. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done. it rendered decision. 1967 the court finally. Bolinao. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. 1965." his motions were denied. Atty. lifted the restraining order. et al. PASTOR D. 1961. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot. 1963 when he filed. and on April 17. was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. upon his own admission. 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G. 1966. Jr. In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court. 1966. respondents. "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. On May 3. LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS. that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor. 1963 to the highest bidders. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit. . curiously enough. 1963. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction.

The respondents. on the merit or lack of merit of his case. the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued. We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2. for. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless. and even up to the present. of its enforcement. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale. here. 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started. we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). 4. 419. and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union. (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case. 67 Phil. Luison. for. 815) . Atty. 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. et al. 3. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago. of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled. (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint. the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture. abetted by their lawyer Jose M. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses. the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined. 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The assumption is of course obviously wrong. (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution. Rivera. is failure or neglect. in a general sense. constituting neither legal nor equitable estate. ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law. dated April 20. a mere expectancy. besides living with her husband Pastor. to do that which. the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined. what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. or even the impossibility. unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession. considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities. then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit. p. Buendia. (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. Relying upon Omnas vs. and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here. This half-share is not in esse. which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion). a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. as in the case at bar. 2 5. the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint. must now enjoy them. maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice. and temper his clients propensity to litigate. 7 7. (3) she lives in the very properties in question. but is merely an inchoate interest. its primacy is indisputable. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity. (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963. Laches. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client. (b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property.. the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance. a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court. but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution. in the present case. laches now effectively bars them from raising it. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. prevent them from living together. for. could or should have been done earlier. far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice. to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit. (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who. the decision would actually separate husband and wife. the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed. Invoking Comilang vs. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986). and (9) it was only on May 2. the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client. grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not. (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint. (Expediente. rather than traverse the incontrovertible. Now. 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended.2. elementary justice demands that the petitioners. 6. have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house. have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. by exercising due diligence. with the assistance of counsel. the respondents Agos. Even then. and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end. 1974. (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961.

which. in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs. the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted.877. as barred by laches. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. Anent this third cause of action. for. & Mrs. as shown. Atty. in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith.750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99.500.750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75. but. Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale. illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141. that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith.000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. 1964. the inclusion of a paragraph averring that. that. therefore. the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid." (Sec. The issue here.877. pursuant to an alias writ of seizure.000 up to May 5. seized and took possession of certain machineries. taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. This third cause of action. that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint. depriving the Agos of the use thereof. are baseless. the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos. 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff. the Agos suffered P174. moreover. Discussion on The Causes of Action of The Supplemental Complaint And The Amended Supplemental Complaint Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. The Complaint Upon the first cause of action. which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . which shall be paid by their lawyer. supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable. the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.08 out of the judgment value of P172.We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99. then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos. which resulted in the replevin suit. Luison. which is. 23. we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches. to their damage in the sum of P256. actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor. it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint. and the business venture that he entered into. for the reasons hereunder stated. The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. Jose M. he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon. the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess. For the same reason. the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction. the defendants. and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.08 in damages. while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.37 in civil case 27251.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31. Upon the second cause of action.923. and no third-party claim has been filed. and because of said acts. the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question. is the same issue that we have already resolved. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action. 1966. and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings. the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint. to cause more damage. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint. the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago. the Agos allege that on January 5. caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale. and that the bank also acted in bad faith. Rule 39.877. the sheriff sold the properties for P141. 1964. still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs. ACCORDINGLY. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular. that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas. Atty. Juan Quijano. the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value.

thereafter. avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. Inc. During his recuperation which lasted over four months. 3 His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit. On July 31. they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 9 Additionally. 10 I. with other allowances covering housing. (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement.). . the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent. Negros Occidental sometime in April. 1982. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC. In his manifestation dated September 14. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. on October 17. the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. fertilizing. harvesting. 1983 to January. VI. whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions. petitioner. Apolonio Sumbingco. 1984. Private respondent. were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16. without due notice. 1992. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August. et al. 1991. in April. occupying the upper floor of the house there. he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and. 0452-84. weeding. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved. private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it. or the surgical removal of the fistula. 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Both demands. if any of the complaints pertain to their work. however. private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes. payment of back wages. Albeit with distaste. such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator. and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. gasoline. power. he underwent fistulectomy. herein private respondent. the Solicitor General remarked: . Regional Arbitration Branch No. petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition. for infectious hepatitis from December. thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. said decision was affirmed in toto. 1982. dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. were not acted upon. As farm administrator. as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran. And secondly. docketed therein as RAB Case No. moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. Furthermore. 6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. his father's namesake. that is. 1992. For this purpose. First. thirteenth month pay for 1983. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION). for brevity). 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 1980. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses. as well as for the remittance of his salary. and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. . Prior thereto. . as well as attorney's fees. 1984.JON DE YSASI III. he lived on the farm. REGALADO. Following his marriage on June 6. J. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. 1984. Inc.000. thirteenth month pay and other benefits. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. and JON DE YSASI. telephone. he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil. planting. said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC. The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof. most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other. but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5. a deep sinuous ulcer. private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d). The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent. In June. For this case is an action filed by an only son. CEBU CITY. private respondent's auditor and legal adviser. against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages. In November.). However. Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d]. 1983. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary. Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. 8 Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues. respondents. 1982. the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting: This case is truly unique. 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12. the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. After an exhaustive reading of the records. in refutation. medical and dental expenses.: The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case. Cebu City. 0452-84. vs.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. National Labor Relations Commission. he was under the care of Dr. Bacolod City. light. notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause. food. petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation. consequential. two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. Patricio Tan. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.

he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. NLRC (191 SCRA 328). we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process. or a labor arbiter for that matter. Octavio. p. The fact . 1985. In Dagupan Bus Company v. petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence. v. Inc. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center. illustrates what constitute abandonment. For want of substantial bases. 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process. There are significant indications in this case. It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge. 1989 edition. petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. Bacolod City (Tsn. Tan. Uy. This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn. 19 The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance: It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982. to wit: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment. (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Vol. is justified by his illness and strained family relations. it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. For this reason. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. Tan. Prefatorily. such as herein public respondent NLRC. 12 Thus. 16 On the other hand. The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. justice. there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. 17 After a careful review of the records of this case. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment. As a manager. 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. During the period of his illness and recovery. First. ever mindful of the longstanding legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure. . The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. In any event. redundancy. Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation. Third. who conducted the hearings therein from December 5. which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his coemployee's health. unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.. we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. in several cases. 20 The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. other than the one who conducted the hearing. NLRC (184 SCRA 25). in fact or in law. 1984 to July 11. III. petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. This Honorable Court.Rule 46 and Section 1[g]. 1986 at 20-44). (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. the Court rules that for abandonment to arise. presents no procedural infirmity. it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 133). we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency. there must be a deliberate. that there is no abandonment. the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of. especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Inc. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Last. and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. February 19. 1987 at 49-50). . retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking. in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative. January 22. Mere absence is not sufficient. who eventually decided the case. petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. Rule 50) of the Rules of Court. After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human experience. Dr. not defeat. III. but not the least. Dr. and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. Vol. petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao. once able to work. Similarly. is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.

petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. 31 It will be observed that all of these chores. 26 With these. 1984. such as an employee. While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator. It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. petitioner argues. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case. specifically stating — 32 executed That I. INC. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor. is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983. private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. True. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work. 1980 in favor of petitioner. 27 To stress what was earlier mentioned. petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. Machineries.remains that on account of said illnesses. Manucao. was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. Private respondent. It was only in January. private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. which petitioner took care of. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982. it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital. and who is familiar with the terms. deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. as well as the property values and monetary sums involved. in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements. 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent. private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January. as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. and a resident of Hda. while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee. 1982.. whether as salary. pension or allowance. "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm. petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm.A. none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. viz. If. this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal. Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him. and not salaries as. however. there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. specifications and other details relative thereto. as private respondent contends. 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks: It is also significant that the special power of attorney by private respondent on June 26. with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son. According to private respondent. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G. for this reason. considering the nature of these transactions." 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities. it is clear.. nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. of legal age. prolonged though it may have been. Filipino. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times. 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders. it would be awkward. 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. or even out of place. hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. Inc. as this is undeniably among his basic rights. 1983. 25 As earlier mentioned. relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. married. 22 With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL. BISCOM Mill District. 30 and remitting to private respondent through Atty. It was only in April. am a sugarcane planter. . and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION. and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14. or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities. he kept petitioner on the payroll. no longer listed him as an employee. in this regard he proved to be quite successful. as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations. in fact. the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician. he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984.. Inc. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and. I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member. The assertion regarding abandonment of work. We repeat. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him. Moreover. That as such planter-member of BIPA. with or without deductions. his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April. there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. JON de YSASI. in his pleadings. whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until April. In the present case. and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. 1984. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives. to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment.

— The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. Sec. both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and crossexamine a witness. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission. Besides. As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings.That I have named. That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor. it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures. pension. which involves the taking of testimony. remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. the Solicitor General rejoins as follows: The Labor Arbiter held thus: . — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK". 11. Ovejera of said office. much less a chance to be heard. allowance or ex gratia handout. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case. argues that Section 2. Sec. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5. my check/checks aforementioned. In cases of abandonment of work. there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. PROVIDED. Right to contest dismissal. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise: Sec. his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. of my On procedural considerations. 42 On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case. the reasons for their dismissal. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case. especially when there is just cause therefor. 40 The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV. 2. 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work. if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare. APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JON de YSASI III whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed. the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. Report of dismissal. as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address. Answer and hearing. We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez. in opposition. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Sec. as witness for private respondent. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. Notice of Dismissal. as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks. Furthermore. HOWEVER. Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor. if he so desires. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month. petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative. Rule XIV. notice shall be served at the worker's last known address. the dates of commencement and termination of employment. TO GET FOR ME and in my name. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee. the monthly sums received by petitioner. said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name. but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition. 6. specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers. he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. 7. appointed and constituted as by these presents I HEREBY NAME. whether denominated as salary. 35 and. 5. were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. Decision to dismiss. regardless of designation. Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes. 33 the issuance of withholding tax reports. ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. by way of substantial compliance. place and stead. 41 Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel. Sec. place and stead. it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed. petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. thereby foreclosing his opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel. 39 Private respondent. specifically. VI of the NLRC.

however. 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton. liquidated or compensatory damages. 173 SCRA 192. wounded feelings. therefore. In the present case. payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if. inclusive of allowances. an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. Annex "C" Petition). records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. or was contrary to morals. and social humiliation.While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment. a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales. vs. . NLRC. the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. And for this failure. 43 II. But in Pacific Cement Company. at 11-12. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. (Wenphil Corp. the facts of the case justify their allowance.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General: The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. therefore. it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. 47 Thus. Inc. an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal.000. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. 53 We do not feel. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence. in addition to moral. 188 SCRA 295). on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code. the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. Moral damages. this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement. Private respondent. seemingly. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. . the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement. 188 SCRA 295). 80587). Similarly. — In cases of regular employment. No. good customs or public policy. he must not be rewarded re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. . 170 SCRA 69. (Morales vs. under Article 2229. NLRC. In the present case. recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided. 0452-84 should be modified. Rule XIV of the implementing rules. instead. or constituted oppression. it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. (Decision Labor Arbiter. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and. 50 Exemplary damages. Finally. differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. Section 11). arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud. it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. however. is guilty of illegal dismissal. Clearly. On this score. 279. as required under Section 5 (now. 48 We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. For this reason. instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. Private respondent. They are not recoverable as a matter of right. we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy. but his dismissal is without just cause. 49 III. v. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. In Wenphil. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded. to wit: As a general rule. NLRC. a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan. oppressive or malevolent manner. it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. where reinstatement is no longer possible. This however. NLRC. Security of Tenure. may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish. The public policy behind this is that. petitioner insists on an award of moral damages. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. 51 We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. 45 The Court. maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office. temperate. the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause. good customs or public policy. Jr. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates. vs. provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee. under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. G. In the present case. and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer. petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service. besmirched reputation. NLRC. affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. And in lieu of reinstatement. vs. would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. . the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial: Art. however. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers. 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned.R. are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. However. for his part. or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. not only was petitioner dismissed without due process.

and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking. a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D. One final word. in lieu of reinstatement. In fine. . a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.NLRC. Confronted by this discrepancy. Jamero. or at least entertained the thought. 56 Rule 1. 18." 57 If he ever did so.000. succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City. Once again. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September. the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur. but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10. if not more importantly. 183 SCRA 651). REYNERIO I. therefore. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. In this new Real Estate Mortgage. to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid. that respondent. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized.00 loan. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. by means of fraud and deceit. Accordingly. WHEREFORE. records) over the same lot 3125-C. the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.00. for both parties are equally at fault. 58 and. Complaint. It is the Court's earnest hope. a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence. vs. complainants signed the same. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years. end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. 16. p. respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice. records). taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice. complainants. In as Report. Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982.000. 1976. the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. On the contrary. In the same manner. On 10 September 1982. the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City. we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. report and recommendation. The complainant spouses alleged. when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case. neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979. respondent prepared a new document on May 7. after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case. despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same. it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5.00. Complainants' Complaint. instead of the strengthening. ATTY. we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute. DECENA. respondent exacted from complainants P500. however. with malpractice and breach of trust. 54 The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties. a member of the Philippine Bar. p. 1975. 1975." On this point. a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest. had compromised that case without their authority. we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them. Despite the assurance.00. respondent.lâwphî1. he gave the document to respondent. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C. By resolution dated 14 April 1980. rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. without qualification or deduction. and upon such assurance. of familial bonds.000. sans sentimentality.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5. among others. Jorge T. with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. 1976. authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30. On 19 July 1988. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision. their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. October and November. But all claims for damages should be dismissed. 1975. the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.000. In his answer dated 18 March 1980. who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. Decena. separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service. purportedly with interest at 19% per annum.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document. It is just as much their responsibility. Pedro S. sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. the Solicitor General presented the following: FINDINGS Complainants allege that on August 5. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. to conduct the necessary investigation. who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda. respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality. SO ORDERED. replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5. the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. Almonte. they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4. the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. that respondent had. as revealed by the records.

Consequently.00. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts.00. there can be. All the requirements of Act No. 7. and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. title was transferred to him.000. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April. 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed.000. After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent. 1975 and November 30. were voluntarily signed by the complainants.000. Hence. and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed.000. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.400. it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth.00.00 (the actual amount was only P 4. which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20. 1979.00. 3135.00.00.. 1976. at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976. When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500. that they obtained a loan of P5. although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage. as amended. After the document was notarized. and on June 20. p.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions. 1976. thus making a total of P10. complainants signed the document. However.00.00. as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8. 2 of case). neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing.000.e.respondent insisted that complainants sign the same. Upon learning of the sale in March. they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10.000. While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate. relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality.000.000. rec.00 but only P4.000.00. it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.000.00 on August 5.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6. Six (6) months at P500. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract.000. Evidence of written agreements.00 and the inflated P10.000. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.00 on September 30. plus the P2. which amount plus the P2. i. as between the parties and their successors in interest. computed as follows: the first loan of P5.000. Folder No. Respondent's Position Paper).000. the respondent on October 12. since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4. considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4. There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5. it is to be considered as complaining all such terms. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent.00. beginning December 31.000. being a lawyer.00. that is. 1975. Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization.00.000. 1975.00 to complainants and not P4. applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16. and.00.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B. From the facts obtaining in the case. we find against respondent. . 1975 and another P10.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10. therefore.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. (b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice.000. no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.000.1976. or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings. was clear of any encumbrance. 1979. respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12. This claim is incorrect. it may be stated that complainants. except in the following cases: (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing. respondent.000. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing. again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality.000. which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection.000. should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage.000.000.00 obtained from respondent. returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30. 6. 1976.00 was applied to interest. and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5. applies in this case. complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person. The term "agreement" includes wills. One of the exceptions. is allegedly the truth. P6.00 from complainants. and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract. For their failure to pay the obligation.00 on May 7.000. Respondent did not accept the proffered P10. that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5. the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. This respondent failed to do.300.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva. hoping that they could redeem their property.). finally. complainants tried to raise the amount of P10. he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it. 1975. 1979 to pay their obligation. Adding this amount to the previous P5. he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30. the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5. Section 7.00 was supposedly due on August 31. re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. per advice of respondent himself. particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants.000. respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8.000. October 31. 1975 up to May 31. as appearing on said document. which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property. failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.500. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants. Complainants' Position Paper). as aforequoted. With respect to the second loan. 1976). Hence.000. and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B.000. In this connection. 1979.00 equals P 3. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5. Complainants. respectively. p. or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. 14. Thus.

fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs.000.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.1979. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents.C.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.000. the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order.' Clearly.S. 734.C. for only P12. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500. he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount. as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C. Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them. complainants made the offer. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent. Oblena. Indeed. To the mind of the undersigned. complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent. At any rate. and not its prohibition by statute. and respondent. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M. The doing of the act itself. complainants alleged that respondent. 34. respondent is in a better position financially.00 to respondent. He accepted the amount of P500.Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0. record). At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.000. Admittedly. the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. The Investigating Fiscal. or good morals for which he may be suspended. On June 27.00 that had been given to respondent. In addition thereto. the fact that respondent received P500. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same. against accused Reynaldo Pineda. but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30. when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and. honesty. complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel. they did not bother to have them explained by another . Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M. All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless. Knowing this. three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31. The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves. With its lapse of time. respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].00.000. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.00 as advance payment. perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2. Again. However. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. a difference of a few thousand pesos. the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting: In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. A parting comment.) showing that the P500. 00 as payment of the loan. upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0. Besides. Id. Folder No. giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment. However. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722). 2). Dist. regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. p. as counsel of the complainants in this case.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. socially and intellectually. Respondent's denial is spacious. had this to say: With respect to the second charge. the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice. 1979. complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2.000. but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years.000. At this stage. U.00. who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying. Court for District of Nebraska C. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2. barely a month after May 30. respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment. 1979.ñèt In view of all the foregoing. 7 SCRA 859). 1976. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement. relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained. without however. in the case at bar. In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. modesty.00. Complainants' Position Paper. compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.lâwphî1. for estafa.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants. more so. complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500. there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question' Going now into the second charge. alleging that if the offer were true. knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants. being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda.

compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim. honesty. the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to.00 instead of P4. Where however. did not turn over the P500. that is. constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law." he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover. 4. were crossexamined by the counsel for respondent. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. Reynerio I. Jamero. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession.000. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. modesty or good morals.000. done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. after their direct testimony. After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses. Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure. their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority. the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived. although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500. out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. the second is that. they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. in fact. which puts his moral character in serious doubt. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time. Santos." The standard required from members of the Bar is not.lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation. .000.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. 2. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. The following acts of respondent: 1. Likewise. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements.00. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. In those hearings. for a period of three years. but the full amount in cash. complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. Even so. having received the amount of P500. We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement.00 to the complainants. which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent. had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality". exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest. being "contrary to justice. in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear.00. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General. from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers.00. the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses. not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the nonsubmission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process. and 6. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. the complainants presented a number of witnesses who. 3. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. 5. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. (Emphasis supplied) and made the following recommendation: WHEREFORE. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987. respondent's liability merits mitigation. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings. through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero. Generally. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants. satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. of course.000. Hence. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5. respondent's conduct. (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form).

" On may 8. The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above described. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney.: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information. he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. but I was instructed by one Mr. Frisco Holgado. with the accessory penalties provided for by law. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. to say the least. and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Under the circumstances. plaintiff-appellee. FRISCO HOLGADO. I plead guilty. WHEREFORE. Ocampo. 1948. Court: Arraign the accused. . Mr.In the instant case. Q. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. Two days later. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. the trial court proceeded as follows: Court: Fiscal: Is this the case ready for trial? I am ready. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. 1947. it was not prudent. unlawfully and feloniously. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. Q. Court: Sentenced reserved.. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum. MORAN. in the municipality of Concepcion. Ocampo. the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him.J. the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. what is his complete name? — A. or on May 10. Under this provision. 1948. with costs. What do you plead? — A. Rule 112. did then and there wilfully. stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the following INFORMATION That on or about December 11. vs. defendant-appellant. It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 2 SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION SENTENCE The accused. 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. section 3. vs. compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. Contrary to law. the said accused being a private individual. The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest. respondent Reynerio I. considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney. Numeriano Ocampo. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. The accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment. V-118] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. your honor. Q. C. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant. when a defendant appears without attorney. and without justifiable motive. 1948. and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. This case is called for trial on May 8. Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question. the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them. the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. plaintiff-appellee. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention. 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. being a private person. the day set for the trial. Province of Romblon. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. Court: — to the accused. Who is that Mr. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. the trial court rendered the following judgment: [Criminal Case No. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.

what is worse. he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. . particularly in the rules of procedure. 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7. as a member of the legal profession. (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP). vs. LEGAL Ermita. But above all. & Special Retiree's Visa. US Embassy CLINIC. unethical. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAURICIO C. Annulment of Marriage. Visa Ext. as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and. the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. in either case. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. 521-7232. 429 UN Ave. 5222041 CLINIC. R E SO L U T I O N REGALADO. that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Declaration of Absence. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. INC. INC. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI). And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.. Immigration Problems. INC. ULEP. we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Mla. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. (4) U. It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous. the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. without counsel. Adoption. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance. So ordered. to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Manila nr.00 Info ANNULMENT. In its answer to the petition. UN Ave. Investment in the Phil. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. Inc. for on a DIVORCE. 521-7251. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. State Bar of Arizona. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein. respondent. VISA. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services.. in the instant case. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. 522-2041. J. petitioner. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. It must be added. valid MARRIAGE? marriage. 521-0767 1 Tel. ABSENCE. The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney. (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA). Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Victoria Bldg. Call Marivic. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment. Guam divorce. but. and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and. Quota/Non-quota Res. 1977. The Legal Clinic." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. THE LEGAL CLINIC. (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA). and. the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R.Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court... thereafter." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET P560.P. their memoranda. demeaning of the law profession.

and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services. . — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications. to wit. For who could deny that document search. morals. consequences. that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: Article 1. by simply going to Guam for a divorce. or business registration. obtaining documents like clearance. It may be conceded that.e. assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth. The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood. While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest. At the very least. it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition. we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter. it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems. It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it. members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed. the only logical consequence is that. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar. just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers. local or foreign visas. this is outright malpractice. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services. It must not be forgotten. the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam. whether true or not. obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services". The use of the name "The Legal Clinic. or serves to induce. public order and public policy. as earlier discussed. In addition. to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic. 1. passports. which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage." which is how the Family Code describes marriage. emphasize to Guam divorce. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services. In addition. but encourages. violation of Philippine law. Even if it be assumed. The Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so. too. The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced. that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services). Furthermore. morals. there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. marriage. or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does." makes light of the "special contract of permanent union. evidence gathering. where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. as earlier mentioned. Inc. common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law. Inc. good customs and the public good." as the respondent would have it." if not suggesting a "secret marriage. More importantly." the inviolable social institution. and that is: Article 26. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. Worse. apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public. the respondent's name. constitutes practice of law? The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. Thus. first of all. this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice. property. . and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered. as published in the advertisements subject of the present case. as the respondent claims. 4 A. it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law. It is also submitted that . the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers. which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services.Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case. Said advertisements. or any other advertisements similar thereto. This is not only misleading. Rule 1. It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question. If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed. it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.02. the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. arguendo. . however.. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. By simply reading the questioned advertisements. as the term medical clinic connotes doctors. B. in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader. appears with (the) scale(s) of justice. i. At worst." Such a name.

this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical. Indeed. From all indications. but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice." and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. in the information given. Jur. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers. It must be emphasized. as enumerated above. 270). For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take. If respondent is allowed to advertise.. Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law. As advertised. 2 and 3. and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. standardized legal forms. litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical. Alternatively. that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion. Legal and Judicial Ethics. but before allowance of such practice may be considered. The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research. however. it must be required to include. from offering such services to the public in general. particularly on visa related problems. or. Also. especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law. Unquestionably. but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. incorporation. and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). are wit: 1. without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation. it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law. such as computer experts. Inc. many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields. who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. in answer to the issues stated herein. electronic data gathering. 2. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Philippine Bar Association: Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen. and more importantly. when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law. 5 2. through experienced paralegals. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law. The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. 39). but includes drawing of deeds. It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law. Admittedly. Rule 138. even if both are (equal) in skill. It is an odious vehicle for deception. there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. Inc. may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved. the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec.respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers. however. rendering opinions. clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice. Comment). misleading and immoral advertising. should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form. a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter. such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating. Such practice is unauthorized. annulment of marriages. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training. absence and adoption. 3. not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also. 6 3. however. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession. the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws. Inc. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit. Although respondent uses its business name." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. This. Precisely. albeit outside of court. and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law. with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services. 1. However. But its advertised services. immigration problems. and 4. Philippine Lawyers' Association: The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position. respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic. storage and retrieval." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. not legal services. that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law. Both the Bench and the Bar. respondent "The Legal Clinic. the legal principles and procedures related thereto. 1984 ed. the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. This is absurd. Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. p. investigators for gathering of evidence. particularly regarding foreign divorces. at the very least. but also misleading and patently immoral. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance. advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar. for the protection of the public. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. knowledge and experience. secret marriages. Obviously. that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright. Immigration Laws. .

then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. the fact remains that at present. and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. . . for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. Only then. liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. and seek advice on divorce. measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. Inc. becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. — does not help matters. At present. U. . seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages. is a lawyer qualified to practice law. divorce. and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. who must be familiar with zoning. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. declaration of absence. No amount of reasoning that in the USA. except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers. . who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article. . . building and fire prevention codes. a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Or the industrial relations expert cites. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law.Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case. Inc. and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend. Women Lawyers' Circle: In resolving. We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee. Nogales. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. Atty. is unprofessional. Likewise. which are in essence. But suppose the architect. If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like. . But this is not the case. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. but when we are serving others. In the same manner. Bankers. courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements. . While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards. paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: 1. they are not. . It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. adoption and foreign investment. there are in those jurisdictions. This is not practicing law.P. the issues before this Honorable Court. It seems . no one . factory and tenement house statutes. immigration. where in this country there is none. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. . will be given to them if they avail of its services. the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services.. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic. Of necessity. Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder. replies that it is required by the statute. 10 6. It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here. 8 A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law. staffed purely by paralegals. as claimed. such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies. Assuming that Respondent is. . While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice. but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic. Inc. annulment of marriage. Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases. In the case (of) In re Taguda. these do not exist in the Philippines. or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. legal matters . A good example is the architect. do not constitute the practice of law . (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country. .. when in fact it is not so. acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. . this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so. however. Are they practicing law? In my opinion. Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves. when it cannot nor should ever be attempted. Inc." Clearly. whether run by lawyers or not. could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic. It is not only presumed that all men know the law. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. . In the same vein. visa extensions. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines: Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which. ." 9 5. as provided for under the above cited law. 37. it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals. but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . in support of some measure that he recommends. asked by his client to omit a fire tower. as there are doctors in any medical clinic. however. and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. . the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law. 53 Phil. are highly reprehensible. Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition." 7 4. the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law. The most . In the meantime. it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic.

or by counsel. (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar. . at pp. does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion. to guide his client's obligations to his employees. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer. however. he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar. the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct: Rule 15.11. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney. Among the larger corporate employers. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. of course. Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two. annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. Services on routine. 1. there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce. September 11th. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law. since the situation is not presented by the proofs. consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff. and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits. well-established method of conducting business is unlawful. 2d 800. acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress. 53 A. 1. 1. (Auerbacher v. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give. . the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal . 154-156.). The record does fully support. like securing a marriage license. The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. if as part of a welfare program. may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. however. the text and the forms. we should consider his work for any particular client or customer. . as a whole. This is not per se the practice of law. If a non-lawyer. and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. . straightforward marriages. it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . This. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. such as the Legal Clinic. if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case. and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. absence. especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. with advice as to how the forms should be filled out.8 From the foregoing. he would be practicing law. just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. 203. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines.10. S. the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit. All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole. that is. cited in Statsky. there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. however. However.31. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees.. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread. . then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. even arguing questions purely legal. renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. constitutes the unlawful practice of law. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems. Here. More recently. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract. . Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining. 1946. he drew employees' wills. . In determining whether a man is practicing law. Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government. separation. may not constitute practice of law. then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. or of a statute. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here. Wood. it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that: (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. It is not entirely improbable. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion. Let me add that if. and give legal advice. or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so. For instance. But such is not the fact in the case before me. 1. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce. it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter. even as a minor feature of his work. Introduction to Paralegalism [1974].08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. and making arrangements with a priest or a judge. The law only provides the frame within which he must work. and ther representative' one not a lawyer. would be the practice of the law. In the present case. to guide his client along the path charted by law. In this phase of his work. . that aside from purely giving information. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION.9. with or without a mediator. or by other representative. It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows. or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business. An agency of the federal government. Rules and Regulations.

rel. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term. 2. .]. and not legal services.stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life. 3 [1973 ed." . and the giving of all legal advice to clients. and conducting proceedings in attachment. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Vol. constitute "practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. liberty. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. Agrava (105 Phil. 263). 6. v. associations or corporations as to their right under the law. 665-666. Dudley and Co. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. in such representative capacity. separation. 852). 262. 176-177)." thus: Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent.2). Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. 12 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. W.] 197 A.S. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. before any court. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. Bar Assoc. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar. No valid distinction. supra at p. is. as advertised. 650). pp. is engaged in the practice of law. Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. 194 N. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. 173. that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services". Dworken .I. 15 One who confers with clients. conveying. annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. committee. knowledge. 340 Mo. in a representative capacity. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. This Court. Winder. Practice of law means any activity. E. quoted in Rhode Is. states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic. and receives pay for it. which requires the application of law. It includes legal advice and counsel. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law. It embraces conveyancing." 11 A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar." such would constitute practice of law (Comment. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court. and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured. non-advisory. It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case. [R. (Moran. Automobile Service Assoc. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings. 102 S. 348. he is in the practice of law. 101. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.12. Monsod. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. practicing law. advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court. 144).). The practice of law. legal procedures. On this score. "It is not controverted. of sound moral character. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. Otherwise stated. (State ex. are available. firms. body. C. (State v. and in addition. 313. board.. With all the solemnities. conveyancing. performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Comments on the Rules o Court. in or out of court. 193N. and property according to law. in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. however. some of which we now take into account. p. but embraces the preparation of pleadings. citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass]. . one who.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. Respondent. Generally.11. although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce. is also practicing law. a wide experience with men and affairs. 2d 895. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman. Jr. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. pending or prospective. no Philippine marriage can be secret. therefore. Mckittrick v.10. a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations. 13 In the practice of his profession. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. NYS 2D 270 [1973]. . v. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings.. all advice to clients. 14 When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer. 23. 129 Ohio St. to that extent. 18 In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Family Code). training and experience. et seq. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. cited in Statsky. formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2. par. 1. and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. referee. we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law. In general. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. commissioner. we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent. It is not limited to appearing in court. 2. 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases. E. the foreclosure of a mortgage. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute. of course. so far as concerns the question set forth in the order. (5 Am. 139. to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

not in the protection of While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow. Nogales: This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic. With its attorneys and so called paralegals. designing and installing computer systems. to wit: Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers. 24 The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star. WILOCI. if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will. Inc. passports. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. Now. Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms. they take your temperature. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13. and family law. divorce and adoption. giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful. medico-legal problems. storage. Atty. like foreign divorce. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. interpretation. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who. with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court. is not limited merely giving legal advice. by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study. who. who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court.The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. about foreign laws on marriage. 20 The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices." Atty. marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country. then you would need a litigator. the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals. Nogales. for example. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again. and gather evidence to support the case. educational or employment records or certifications. 22 It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. the court. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals. or the computerization of research aids and materials. property. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. And once the problem has been categorized. or software for the efficient management of law offices. such as computerized legal research. or business registrations. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you. has specialists in taxation and criminal law. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar. transmission and reproduction of information and communication. and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property. In providing information. out-patient. labor. Atty. through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering. That's what doctors do also. like birth. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. 21 That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. kung baga sa hospital. hindi kailangang ma-confine. and who is in good and regular standing. There are cases which do not. the bar. then it's referred to one of our specialists. litigation. Further. processing. document search. operation and effect of law. . and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies. Nogales and his staff of lawyers. counsel with. if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. evidence gathering. is entitled to practice law. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for. or liabilities of their clients. these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or. locating parties or witnesses to a case. local or foreign visas. too." where an insight into the structure. said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. That's how we operate. or defend the rights claims. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation. it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law. and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. contract drafting and so forth. The purpose is to protect the public.P. entitled "Rx for Legal Problems. No matter what the client's problem. furnish a copy thereof to the client. non-advisory. counsellors and attorneys. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law. "when they come. main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor. and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. corporate legal departments. as the weight of authority holds. they observe you for the symptoms and so on." explains Atty. are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 23 Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. marriage. in medical terms. The Legal Clinic. and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. obtaining documentation like clearances. and have been admitted to. N. require surgery or follow-up treatment. we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. with respect to the construction. Rogelio P. encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir. fact finding investigations. it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise. which are strictly non-diagnostic. protect. and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. programs. as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order. but rather. Avenue in Manila. we start by analyzing the problem.

" (Canon 27. such as the National Association of Legal Assistants. taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task. Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. fraudulent. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. degrees and other educational distinction. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment. such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 30 Accordingly. publicity to attract legal business. he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation. membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of. the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true. which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States. As admitted by respondent. Estanislao R. but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.the bar from competition." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. without violating the ethics of his profession. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer cannot. or in return for. . it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper. Thus. vs. with their written consent. and all other like self-laudation. honest. As pointed out by FIDA." 42 The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose. . Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. and. the importance of the lawyer's position. We repeat. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership. . The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. namely. some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services. and the American Paralegal Association. or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. magazine. standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. 32 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements. undignified. addresses. in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities. it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. of brief biographical and informative data. 40 Of course. rules or regulations granting permission therefor. cable addresses. branches of law practiced. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. legal authorships. Bayot 38 an advertisement. schools attended with dates of graduation. the names of clients regularly represented. fair. 29 In the Philippines. Law is a profession and not a trade. but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law. associates. we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics. address. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false. . trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. telephone numbers. even for a young lawyer. Code of Ethics. magazine. The card may contain only a statement of his name.). trade journal or society program. the magnitude of the interest involved. in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority. 27 We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. Inc. 36 The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. The exceptions are of two broad categories. while there are none in the Philippines. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates. similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education. or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct. respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action. date and place of birth and admission to the bar. 41 The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent . For that reason. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper. 43 The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. being for the convenience of the profession. not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. deceptive. misleading. telephone number and special branch of law practiced. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). the name of the law firm which he is connected with. the fact of listings in other reputable law lists. self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. public or quasi-public offices. posts of honor. is not objectionable. legal teaching positions. the names and addresses of references. Whatever may be its merits. firm name or office address. in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons. 44 Verily. either personally or thru paid agents or brokers. As a member of the bar. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. we have adopted the American judicial policy that. dignified and objective information or statement of facts. the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. constitutes malpractice.

which. to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan. he is hereby reprimanded. Rogelio P. a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board. in (NOTE. it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative.: The respondent. operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates. ACCORDINGLY. of course. it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer. The ruling in the case of Bates. Besides. such as that being invoked by herein respondent. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day. as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers. major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic. expressly or impliedly. and is willing to help and serve the poor. a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela. While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic. Isabela. cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services. Otherwise. imperative that this matter be promptly determined. He offers free consultation.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano. reads as follows: LUIS Attorney Notary CANDIDATE Province of Isabela B. No such exception is provided for. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. State Bar of Arizona. since. 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer. albeit in a different proceeding and forum. — As notary public. that is on the 16th of next month. under the present state of our law and jurisprudence. can renew lost documents of your animals. he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office. The Legal Clinic. Inc. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession. subject to disciplinary action. 49 Considering that Atty. as in the case at bar. I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. . is a member of the Philippine Bar. criticisms at times. FOR THIRD TAGORDA Public MEMBER Secondly. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances. 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent. just like the rule against unethical advertising. ISABELA. J. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In re LUIS B. September 18. As a lawyer. he can help you collect your loans although long overdue. directly or indirectly. as well as any complaint for or against you. even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state. on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials. reads as follows: ECHAGUE. admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano. the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith. can make your application and final requisites for your homestead. in translation. Inc. The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action. At this point in time. even if unfair. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague. any activity. to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. Inc." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule. This interdiction. Tagorda. Luis B. et al. to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. It is. whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Nogales. but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition. it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems. TAGORDA. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. was created should be passed upon and determined. it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: Trustworthy from Professional from Honest from Dignified from 45% to 14% 71% 71% 65% to to to 14% 14% 14% light of the putative misuse thereof. MALCOLM. vs. Echague. which letter.corporation for services rendered. and from conducting. to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services.. who is the prime incorporator. to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely. we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. and can execute any kind of affidavit. Come or write to him in his town. in translation. In sum. the prohibition stands. 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter.

The provincial fiscal of Isabela. L. 1929. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. C. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. being a matter of personal taste or local custom. second. first. but it is indictable at common law. 17 Ann. or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. People vs. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself. or to employ agents or runners for like purposes. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . and sometimes of convenience. Cas. This cannot be forced. it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case. those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office. 1. A. and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. physicians. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit. his youth and inexperience at the bar. 1097. STIRRING UP LITIGATION. whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. Accordingly. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. and have been upheld as constitutional. 28. the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. In view of all the circumstances of this case. circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are. the magnitude of the interest involved. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. even for a young lawyer. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. said codal section was amended by Act No. ADVERTISING. but must be the outcome of character and conduct. and all other like self-laudation. defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling. hospital attaches or others who may succeed.. DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. the ignorant or others. therefore. the importance of the lawyer's position. 2 R. That should be distinctly understood. Mac Cabe [1893]. DIRECT OR INDIRECT.I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations. court or prison officials. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct. and are intolerable. is unprofessional. But as mitigating.. to seek his professional services. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.. or to remunerate policemen. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. constitutes malpractice. 53 Wash. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. The law is a profession and not a business. his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. third. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind. the sick and the injured. Yours respectfully. the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. and especially with his brother lawyers. relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards. 19 L. his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. R. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. is not per se improper. except in rare cases where ties of blood. (Sgd. Rossman [1909]. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. 231. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. and. It lowers the standards of that profession. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional. in influencing the criminal. The facts being conceded. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1. 625. or to pay or reward directly or indirectly.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice. I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.. (State vs. suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded.

Inc. and is. respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration. 6 On 28 September 1974. counsel of BRSEI (B. and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. REYES. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief. the law firm of Baizas. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court. 14 On 12 January 1976. and containing the following allegations: 1. Atty. issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal: It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5. in the interest of justice.A. Baizas died on January 16. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI. as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. 1974 and no cause was shown. DAVIDE. Crispin Baizas.CANON 3 B. filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal.R. and Antonio Marinas. . The material operative facts of this case. this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. B. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. now deceased. .-G. to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C. Reyes. . 1974. The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12 . Reyes.A. and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution. 1974. Hence. On 19 February 1974. the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence. are not disputed. he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. 9 Pursuant thereto. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties. requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17. It had. No. the auction sale thereof. Eulogio B. on 9 September 1974. on 13 November 1975. petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals. it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. 757-R. had also left the firm. therefore. in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal.). Baizas. R.R. set aside and reversed. the plaintiff-appellee therein. SALAYSAY. 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. JR. received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. Crispin D. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 5 As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution. the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. . thru its then counsel of record. 10 On 6 November 1975. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. and the copy of the Resolution of July 9. 3 During the pendency of the appeal.. Reyes. Eulogio B. since all that BRSEI is asking for. Donna Marie N. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition. furthermore. R. copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17. and while Atty. be set aside. 1974. therefore. senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS. the same became final and executory. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes. 1 On 7 May 1973. That late as it may be.-G. unjust and unlawful decision. 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9. Ruby Alberto. In its Resolution of 9 October 1974. petitioner. as gathered from the pleadings of the parties. Nicanor G. and ANTONIO MARINAS. .R. Reyes and Renne Marie N. petitioner. is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair. J. 2 Petitioner. respondent Court. Motion Denied. In the Resolution of 13 November 1975. praying. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu. the latter having established her own law office. 8 No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review. Sebastian Enterprises. Natividad. Alberto & Associates. Alberto and Associates. Salaysay. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES. Reyes. against the Director of Public Works. vs. this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. thus.. and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief. Sebastian Enterprises. INC. as Deputy Sheriff. Felicisima R. dismissing the appeal. COURT OF APPEALS. HON. 2. 1974. petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975. 3. that the resolution of September 9. . The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 53546-R. NICANOR G. 1974. respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. Eulogio B. respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale. filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. scheduling for Friday. Crispin D. timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. thru its counsel.: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus. . died. . 1974. EULOGIO B. on the grounds therein stated. his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19. on 9 July 1974. Inc. earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. with prayer for preliminary injunction. stating that: Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant. the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein. the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court. respondents. Pasay City Branch. No. which docketed the case as C. in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff. petitioner. .

. the Answer to the complaint. Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. 27 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. 28 Indeed. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal. the law firm "Baizas. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea. 20 In the Resolution of 12 May 1976. 1974. Court of Appeals. this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. Crispin D. previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. Chavez vs. But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. — Considering the allegations. But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower court. petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. however. On 10 September 1976. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. Court of Appeals. vs. the petition should be given due course. his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe. 279). As held in Chavez.. L-30543. 30 We said: Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal. 276. State. however. through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino. et al. this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief. 1968. 84 ALR 595. February 10. and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded. Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration. petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS. 1970. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Ganzon. Inc. However. Cawili. Reyes with his heirs. petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. 275. There must be such a showing which would call for. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. Atty. the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. no fraud is involved. Ramirez. 66 O. de Ordoveza vs. vs. 176. in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. in its Memorandum. To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief. having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief. has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Alberto & Associates." On January 16. August 31. It says: 31 Petitioner. 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co. Since counsel did none of those things. petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas. 26 On 29 November 1976. nevertheless. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal. al. 6). Vda. State vs. Petitioner. this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision. 16 In compliance therewith.R. in said case." Hence. As this Court. it. 34 SCRA 728). 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause. 108 Phil. vs. Alberto & Associates. as well as petitioner's reply to said comment. This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof. had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. In the instant case. 203 Pac. Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Inc. what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel. Raymundo. Alquiza. 384. 757-R. Answer to Cross-Claim. 22 SCRA 494." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas. and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said case. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. 29 Fla. After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court. it appears that Atty. this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21 L-41862 (B. issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. In consequence (sic) of his death. Crispin D. Baizas & Associates. on 31 May 1976. L-23342. et al. evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Court of Appeals. 62 Phil. Said case. C.. Alberto & Associates" was . and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment. it cannot and must not be upheld.). Otherwise. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action. Sebastian Enterprises. thru its president Bernardo R. Ganzon. which they complied with on 5 April 1976. which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Sebastian. 34 Idaho 623.In the Resolution of 21 January 1976. respondents' comment thereon.G. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. said: We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld. prompt and justify its exercise (sic). ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. et al. the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. engaged the services of Atty. If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction. this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice. et. 11 So.

SP No. In the abovementioned Yuseco case. which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974. Crispin Baizas. vs. which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court.R. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts.. the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas. the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. This Court held therein that: The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal. We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. WHEREFORE. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals. Branch 22. Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or. cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution. the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause. in such event. the death of the latter must have been known to the former.: This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision1 dated April 28. 1994. received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. Court of Appeals. it appearing that some. on 28 September 1974. nor (sic) is it unavoidable. which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court. this Court held: The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable. took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. Undoubtedly. 35271 affirming the orders dated May 5. Crispin Baizas. In effect. J. 1995. reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers. In the Negros Stevedoring case. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. Atty. That Atty. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. In Gutierrez & Sons. . On the other hand. so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance. it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court. 19943 and September 1. IT SO ORDERED. the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. supra. petitioner's counsel. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal.in a terribly confused state of affairs. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. . Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices. on 6 November 1975. supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. a copy of which the former also received. petitioners. QUISUMBING. With Baizas' death. to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. Costs against petitioner. As revealed by the records. . Then. fraud. said law firm was dissolved. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO AND GREGORIO GERONIMO. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. hence. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court. 35 Based on the foregoing. the responsibility of Atty. Atty. respondents. the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan. is binding upon the latter. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. 1994. the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. But. an associate who was designated to handle the case. son of deceased Crispin D. Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the associates took over petitioner's case. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when. later left the office after the death of Atty. the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS. petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. Baizas. none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas. Jose Baizas. this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION SAN ANTONIO. Hence.4 respectively. and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court. Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since. it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. thus. vs. Crispin Baizas. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. if not many. granting .. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence. Espiritu. 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS. the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner. Inc.2 July 12. there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. 33 Moreover. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it. As pointed out by respondents. constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them.

or to pay Two Million Pesos (P2. 4. Bulcan covered by TCT No. hence. Municipality of Guiguinto. c. 1994.00) within the same period. That lot situated in Brgy. This compromise agreement shall be in full settlement of the obligations of the plaintiffs with respect to Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated February 14. Bulcan. 1993. 1993 reveals that the terms and conditions thereof are not contrary to law. Bulacan. Blk. RT-6653 with an area of 10. III. 6.000) from petitioners. thus: A careful perusal of the Compromise Agreement dated August 25. defendants San Antonio will execute a deed of resale/reconveyance/redemption of that subject property covered by TCT No. covered by TCT No. Lot No. the spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio.556 square meters. The facts. (SIC) 5. 233-M92. damages and counter-claims they may have against each other. are as follows: Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria Geronimo obtained a loan in the amount of One Million Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P1. after the lapse of six months that private respondents delivered the three titles to petitioners. Bulcan.859). II.6 In accordance with the stipulations in paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement. RT-6652 (T-296744). As said earlier. No. failed to transfer the ownership and deliver the titles of the three parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the agreement or to pay 2 Million Pesos within the six-month period from August 25. 6652 (T-296744) and TCT No. July 12. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan together with its improvements. 1991.00) Philippine Currency in hand received today by the defendants spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio from the plaintiffs. A second motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated September 1. That the parties further agree to set aside any claim. 4. 1994. Municipality of Guiguinto.000. To secure the loan. 1994 are AFFIRMED.028. the terms and conditions of which are: 1. That lot including its improvements situated in Brgy.000.000).390 square meters and TCT No. petitioners executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale covering TCT No.33% per month. Tuctucan. …RULING THAT THE DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied on July 12. subject matter of the complaint. Guiguinto. 1993 order with the trial court. the Court of Appeals denied the petition on April 28. reconveyance or redemption of the property covered by TCT No. the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed. Municipality of Guiguinto. the terms and conditions of which are quoted as follows: COME NOW parties assisted by their respective counsels and before the Honorable Court most respectfully submit this compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply faithfully with their obligation under said agreement. …RULING THAT THE ORDER DATED MAY 5. a compromise agreement dated August 25. 3. SO ORDERED. For the release/resale/reconveyance of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. claims and demands whatsoever they may have over that property covered by TCT No. Tuctucan. b. 1994. 29832. morals and public policy. 3 consisting of 135 square meters. RT-6652 (T-296744) including its improvements and thenceforth bind themselves to respect the right of ownership.000. petitioners refused to accept the same or execute an instrument for the resale. TCT No.the motion for execution of compromise judgment dated September 22. and possession of the defendants San Antonio over said property. for the purpose of the cancellation of the annulment of the sale in the title subject to the condition that should plaintiffs fail to deliver the titles to the three lots heretofore mentioned to the defendants San Antonio. RT-6653 after private respondents paid them Two Million Pesos (P2. Private respondents filed a motion for execution of the September 22. RT-6652 with an area of 2.859) with an interest of 3. being the highest bidder bought the two parcels of land. 30078. As the delivery was beyond the agreed six-month period.000. and September 1. This was granted on May 5. . Consequently. That in the meantime. T47229 was issued in the names of petitioners. plaintiffs obligate themselves to transfer the ownership of the following to the defendants San Antonio. 1994.019. both situated in Barrio Tabe. Blk. …RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT. the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. TCT No. Before the one-year redemption period expired. the said plaintiffs shall be deemed to have waived and renounced any all rights. with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. This compromise agreement is immediately executory (underscoring supplied). private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 233-M-92. thus making their total obligation in the amount of Two Million Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P2. 1990. The Orders of respondent court dated May 1[5]. RT-6652. covered by TCT No. 1995. a. 1994 DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AMEND THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BASED ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Tuctucan. RT-6652 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. 1989 and the Susog ng Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated July 16. RT-6653 (T209250) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan including its improvements. It was only on March 4. and is DISMISSED. petitioners. Blk. they submitted to the court on September 16. RT-6653 (T-209250) shall it be respect. the compromise agreement dated August 25. After the parties presented their respective evidence. however. Private respondents. private respondents obtained an additional loan of Nine Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P991. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals. 9. 1993 is hereby APPROVED. the possession of the plaintiffs of the subject property covering TCT No. Another lot situated in Brgy. 1993.000. as culled from the records. 30079. 1993. SO ORDERED. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. the trial court approved the same in its order dated September 22. and those related there.5 Finding the above to be in order. 1993 in Civil Case No. ACCORDINGLY. thus: WHEREFORE. For a consideration of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2. Lot 27 consisting of 78 square meters. private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure with preliminary mandatory injunction. 1993.7 Hence this petition for review wherein petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: I. 2. Branch 22. During the auction sale. payable on or before February 15. docketed as Civil Case No. the defendants San Antonio will execute the corresponding instrument of resale/reconveyance/redemption over that properly together with its improvements covered by TCT No. Subsequently. 38 consisting of 75 square meters. Within six (6) months from signing of this compromise agreement simultaneous to which delivery of the title to the afore-mentioned properties in the names of the defendants San Antonio. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due date.

Accordingly. hence it cannot be modified. The trial court therefore. private respondents failed to deliver the titles on February 25. But as shown in their decisions. As to the alleged delay on the part of petitioners in executing the Deed of Resale and Reconveyance.IV. 1994. to accept the three titles beyond the six-month period. It has the force and effect of res judicata. delay by private respondents has not yet occurred.9 In this case. Lastly.11 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attributed to the Register of Deeds private respondents' delay in the delivery of the three titles. from August 25. petitioners could rightfully refuse acceptance of the titles.17 WHEREFORE. …NOT RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 6 THEREOF. petitioners raise the following issues for our resolution: 1. or put an end to one already commenced. reconveyance or redemption despite their receipt of two million pesos. …APPLYING ARTICLE 1191 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. If they failed. provided that private respondents had six months within which to deliver the titles. delay sets in only when one part fulfills his obligation and the other is unable to perform his part of the obligation. 14 For us. Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law. a person obligated to deliver something incurs in delay only after demand. 35271 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. like the ones in this case. is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code15 applicable in this case? According to petitioners. it will be unjust to petitioners if we compel them to accept the three titles despite the lapse of the agreed period. the orders dated May 5. as the judge issued the writ of execution. 1994. We find petitioners' petition impressed with merit. it was error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of contract. 1993 to February 25. As the facts of this case show. 1994. are hereby declared NULL AND VOID. Petitioners also contend that private respondents should not blame the Register of Deeds for the delay in the delivery of the three titles since private respondents submitted the registration documents to the Register of Deeds only on March 2. Private respondents are ordered to cease and desist from disturbing the ownership and possession by petitioners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. when they gave the titles to petitioners. Also. In filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. beyond the six-month period. we find that this point serves only to confuse the Court on the real facts of the case. Petitioners contend that judgement based on a compromise is conclusive upon the parties and is immediately executory. It was error therefore for the trial court to grant the writ of execution in favor of private respondents because it effectively compelled petitioners to accept delivery of the three titles in exchange for the release of the land covered by TCT No. 1995. but they did not. public order or public policy. and resolution dated September 11. petitioners sought the appellate court's declaration that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. They said that as early as August 25. whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation. Thus. to deliver the titles to the three parcels of land described in the agreement. Branch 22. This only shows that private respondents did not intend to truly comply with their obligations. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a valid contract. Hence. has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? 2. They assert that they were not seeking rescission of the compromise agreement but its full enforcement regardless of whether the delay is slight or substantial. Private respondents claim that the trial court. The decision dated April 28. Bulacan. ownership over the land covered by TCT No. i. as the judge was merely performing a ministerial duty. petitioners said. petitioners deny that they are guilty of delay for not executing the deed of resale. … NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY COMPLIED WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. ownership of the land covered by TCT No. private respondents deny that they delivered the three titles late and if ever the delivery was delayed it was the Register of Deeds who was to blame. this was sufficient compliance of petitioners' duty under the Compromise Agreement. Costs against private respondents. the court which rendered it loses jurisdiction over the case and it can no longer be modified except for clerical errors. as it was only on March 4. was merely performing a ministerial duty. In their view. pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement. via a writ of execution. If after the lapse of the said period and no delivery is yet made by private respondents. 1994. we find that it should be properly addressed. SO ORDERED. A compromise agreement. Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applicable in this case? On the first issue. Despite the fact that the compromise agreement involved two parcels of land up for redemption. private respondents did not indicate as to which parcel of land petitioners did not execute a deed of resale. the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . 1993. RT-6652 even after the lapse of the six-month period. the petition is GRANTED. private respondents admitted that petitioners already executed a Certificate of Redemption. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. 13 Nevertheless. did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? Petitioners claim that the trial court did. good customs. As herein petitioners have not yet made demand and as they have not yet performed their part of the agreement.10 In this case. which was the execution of the deed of reconveyance. The compromise agreement approved by the trial court in its order dated September 22. the compromise agreement clearly provided private respondents six months. While it becomes the trial court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution may be refused on equitable grounds. VI. the Court of Appeals erred when it found that private respondents' delay did not constitute substantial breach to warrant rescission of the compromise agreement. 1993. in issuing the writ. once approved by final order of the court. They explain that even on equitable considerations this was not allowed because once a decision becomes final. Private respondents additionally point out that in reciprocal obligations.16 Compromise agreements are contracts. they already executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale of the land covered by TCT No. morals. 1994.e. cannot compel petitioners. RT-6653. July 12. they must be complied with in good faith. 1994.8 In sum. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 1994 and September 1. 1994. because it is in effect an amendment to the compromise agreement. private respondents submitted to the Register of Deeds the pertinent documents for registration of the three titles in petitioners' name only on March 2.12 Private respondents could have done so earlier. While indeed private respondents did not meet head on this issue. beyond the six-month period deadline. 1995. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. Further. SP No.R. RT-6652. Likewise.. V. Private respondents counter that there has been no modification of the final judgment when the trial judge issued the writ of execution.

Gabriel. respondents' memo). complainant vs. complainant. which contains the names of the ten lawyers. J. house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision. Jr. Rollo. or. Rule 138. AQUINO. Renomeron. (p.. 1987. JOSE R. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. 1979..000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. (V & G for short). Inc. (p. cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1. 6. RAFAEL E. On May 19.) As early as January 15. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification. TORRES." Not having received any reply. p. respondents.. GUERRERO. Collantes. KWAN and JOSE A. 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.. 1987. On May 22.000. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare. since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2. it is only during the incumbency of Atty. a law firm organized in Illinois. We hold that Baker & McKenzie. a client.E. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements.. PER CURIAM:p This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2. V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. admitted to the bar in 1954. 4. in his 1980 verified complaint. respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them. respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter.) . 5. 2. Dishonesty.. vs.. There was no action from the respondent. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. 3. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay. SO ORDERED. practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres. J. Inc. 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: 1. JR. Extortion. 15. DACANAY. VICENTE A. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. CURAMMENG. the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives. JR. ATTY. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 7. for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. 1987. respondent imposed additional registration requirements. for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. in his reply dated December 7. Legal Ethics. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics. Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. ROMEO L. what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Vicente C.. LUCAS M. in lieu thereof. to H.ADRIANO E. RENOMERON respondent. stressing that: . Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago. Respondents. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions. Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 6 FERNANDO T. to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS. COLLAS JR. Collas. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not. 1987. Causing undue injury to a party. filed against Attorney Vicente C. NUNAG. Another request was made on February 16. the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20. SALONGA. CLARO TESORO. he filed the instant complaint. 10. respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. Agpalo. sought to enjoin Juan G. denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. aside from being members of the Philippine bar. 1979 respondent Vicente A. NATIVIDAD B. (See Ruben E.. being an alien law firm. Conduct unbecoming of public official. Torres. the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. LUIS MA. Attorney Dacanay. On May 26. 1983 Ed. COLLANTES. EVANGELISTA. respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G.00 as pocket money per trip. Rollo. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.000) was sent to respondent through his niece. 3. Renomeron. In a letter dated November 16. 115. that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration .: Lawyer Adriano E. the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality. SANDEJAS. VICENTE C. using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie. asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International.) WHEREFORE. Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial.

speedy. for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws. in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics. and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice.790. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. 1983 Edition. xxx xxx xxx In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement. Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16. the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4. From a lawyer. and efficient administration of justice. its prestige. 968). subpars. 64 SCRA 784. The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds. The investigator. Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. throughout the centuries. emphasis supplied. In a Resolution dated July 27. by Adm. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. full candor. The answer is yes. to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved. Case No. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. or be heard in a formal investigation. and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. against respondent Register of Deeds. Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA. Attorney Leonardo Da Jose. and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service. 1987. 66-67). 1990. Rollo. its exalted place. After due investigation of the charges. a high sense of honor. not in the original denomination of P100. retrieved from him the amount of P800. Exasperated by respondent's conduct. absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official. respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment. As recommended by the Secretary of Justice. to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. Rollo). People vs. extortion. recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty. In his answer dated July 9.) The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). 1987. that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof. and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office. have been compendiously described as moral character. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece. 7. with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. 17-18. effective immediately. Order No. in this case. [a] and [d]). De Luna. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession.1987 (Consulta No. 102 Phil. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing. rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. 1987.00 bills. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents. recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. de la Cruz. Ruben E. and that. 1419. disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics. subpars. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. 789. 1579). intellectual honesty. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration. 5. We believe that. and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility. The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare. and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which. (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality. 165 dated May 3.00 bills but in P50. Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party. the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to . Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service. Section 17.) Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings. (pp. the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator. respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action. the President of the Philippines. Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct. Ms. a disbarment complaint against said respondent. and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding. 87-15). Bonifacio on February 22. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138. Rules of Court.On May 27. 1988. As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension. 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him. he continued with his inaction.. imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. as a lawyer. Agpalo. that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question. fair. are expected those qualities of truth-speaking. Upon receipt of the charges. pp. .

150 SCRA 269. In his opinion the trial judge sets forth at some length the material evidence adduced at the trial. Moreover. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal." The power to appoint special fiscals being thus expressly conferred upon judges of Courts of First Instance. that we carefully and exhaustively abstracted and analyzed for ourselves the great mass of evidence brought here on this appeal. and even if it were admitted that the trial judge acted improvidently or unwisely or erroneously in making the appointment. four months and one day of prision correccional. except. legal appointment. or his assistant. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. and the record contains some two hundred and fifty pages of typewritten testimony and documentary evidence. 1699 reads in part as follows: "Whenever the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. 1912. the judge of the Court of First Instance is not only authorized but is required to appoint a temporary fiscal to represent the Government in such cases.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent. would justify us in holding that the trial judge erred in arriving at his conclusions as to their guilt. 1912 the private prosecutrix filed a complaint against the defendants in this action in the court of the justice of the peace of Nagcarlang. that thereafter the provincial fiscal promised to file a formal information against the accused. and the trial conducted by a special fiscal. Suffice it to say that so strongly were we impressed by the forceful oral argument of counsel for the appellants with the possibility of a grave miscarriage of justice in the court below. or fails or refuses to discharge thus duty by reason of illness or other cause. it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. we do not think that in the case at bar the special fiscal was erroneously or improvidently appointed. we think there can be no doubt of the power of the judges of Courts of First Instance to appoint special fiscals or prosecuting officers. 278). The attorney for the Moro Province and his assistant stand in the same position as a provincial fiscal with reference to this matter. the effect of which need not be and is not now considered. they find that "the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. as a result of the machinations of the personal and political enemies of one or all of the defendants. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. Code of Professional Responsibility). the judge of the Court of First Instance for the province is authorized and required to appoint a temporary fiscal. without discovering anything which. in the exercise of the sound judicial discretion conferred upon them. was not disposed to press the case. plaintiff-appellee. but later declined to do so.01.net Construing and applying this statute we said in the case of Nuñez vs.03."1awphil. (Rule 7. charging the commission of the crime on the 9th of that month. improvidently appointed by the trial judge without authority of law. wherein he set forth that on the 12th of June. and affords no ground for appellant's contention as to a lack of jurisdiction in the court below to entertain and decide a criminal action based on an information filed by a special fiscal legally appointed for that purpose. perhaps. Sison. with reference to criminal cases. Hermoso. that the provincial fiscal had not done anything further at the date . A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Court Administrator vs. or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103). The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. J. PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO. If the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province did not have authority to appoint a temporary fiscal when the exigencies of the service demanded it.. PEDRO BARREDO. The presiding judge of the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province has the power to cause the prosecution of criminal cases to go forward. immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1. nor shall he. that about the 2nd of October. Judge Guevarra. CARSON. 142 SCRA 632. WHEREFORE. it might occur that the whole court machinery. 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. In its last analysis. 1912 the provincial fiscal conducted an investigation of the alleged crime at the urgent request of counsel for the private prosecutrix. when. who saw and heard the witnesses testify and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of the account of the commission of the crime of attempted rape which was given on the witness-stand by the principal witnesses called for the prosecution. Code of Professional Responsibility. and if the officer designated by law to prosecute such criminal cases fails or refuses to perform his duty. The appointment of the special fiscal was made in response to a petition filed by counsel for the private prosecutrix on November 8. and a careful examination of the record discloses nothing which would justify us in disturbing the findings in this regard of the trial judge. would be impeded on account of the refusal on the part of the attorney. whether in public or private life. and a restatement and review of the evidence at this time would serve no useful purpose. It is urged that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises because the information charging the commission of the crime was filed. never-the-less to ask the court to appoint a special fiscal. There can be no question of abuse of judicial discretion in the appointment of the special fiscal in the case at bar. and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Rodolfo G. and indeed from the plain and explicit provisions of the statute. vs. in our opinion. in cases wherein it appears that there has been a manifest abuse of judicial discretion in making the appointment. and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys SO ORDERED. Section 1 of Act No. defendants-appellants. to perform their duties. 244): "If the provincial fiscal fails or refuses to discharge his duty in the prosecution of criminal cases. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE UNITED STATES. that on the 29th of the same month the accused waived a preliminary trial before the justice of the peace and prayed that the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance. final judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused necessarily turns upon the degree of credit which should be accorded the respective witnesses called for the prosecution and the defense. dishonest." From what was said in the case just cited. together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. that the cause was remanded in the early days of July. as he himself. who shall be paid out of the provincial treasury the same compensation per day as that provided by law for the regular provincial fiscal for the days actually employed.engage in unlawful. and each of them was sentenced to two years. 150 SCRA 269). A large number of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense were called at the trial. He should therefore be disbarred.: The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of the crime of attempted rape. It remains only to consider the contentions of counsel for the appellants touching the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain and adjudicate this action. Hermoso. honorable. the mere fact that the judge acts unwisely or improvidently or under a misapprehension of facts when he makes an appointment in no wise affects the legality or the validity of the appointment. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines. The fiscal thus temporarily appointed shall discharge all the duties of the provincial fiscal as provided by law which the regular provincial fiscal fails or is unable to perform. or fails or refuses to discharge his duty by reason of illness or other cause. 1912. Low (19 Phil. Rep. the appointment when made was a valid. promising. then the judge or court must relieve such officer temporarily and appoint a qualified person to take his place.

secs. expressly provide that in case the justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. 1699. we know of no authority for it: — The State is the party . or otherwise. at least. 1 Va. of Plead. Others have declined to adopt it. although we are aware it has often been done. Ordinarily. a complete act ." The order is usually taken upon motion by the prosecuting officer and with leave of the court. Holding as we do that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a finding as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in such cases is either to go forward with the prosecution or to move the court to dismiss the complaint. Some American states have followed the English rule. This petition was endorsed over to the provincial fiscal by the presiding judge. that the evidence against them was unsatisfactory and unworthy of credence.. and 25 Wendell. sec. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts.. It probably exists unimpaired in the attorney general to this day. without the content of court. 1389. 483. 1 and 2. and Practice. It is true. and that a special fiscal should be appointed to prosecute the case in view of the manifest indisposition on the part of the provincial fiscal to bring the accused to trial. (10. The minutes are the records of the acts of the court and no entry can be made thereon except with his consent. that is to say in the presiding judge thereof." (Anonymous. upon full consideration of the statements of counsel for the private prosecutrix. who now represent the attorney general in nearly everything pertaining to indictments and other criminal proceedings local to their respective countries. 139. as counsel supported by authority contends. But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal. 1 Hill. The nolle prosequi was not. in view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to file an information and bring the accused to trial. The legislature finding the power in so many hands. When the justice of the peace remands an accused person for trial in the Court of First Instance. Such a proceeding is to be coram judice. and some of the courts which do not consider themselves bound by common law precedents have declared the English practice unsound and have held the better rule to be "to ask leave of the court giving some good reason therefor. and pending further proceedings. we need hardly say that we think the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to prosecute the case. discontinue a criminal prosecution in that form at any time before verdict . 2. he may deny the motion. it rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. The right of the Attorney. and to move the court to dismiss the proceedings. Nor is it in our judgment. 194. But even before that Act. the case becomes forthwith a criminal action pending in that court.itc-a1f The modern tendency would seem to be to modify and control the power of prosecuting officers in this regard either by express legislative enactment or by the judicial recognition of a custom. It is. therefore. directly or by construction. with the cognizance of the court. But it is to be observed that it is expressly provided that: "This section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as justice of the peace in any preliminary investigation. or in which a custom amounting nearly to law does.) In Virginiaa 1803. and can only be terminated therein by the court itself. 302 for official investigations by provincial fiscals. Enc. whose investigations have satisfied him as to the innocence of persons charged with the commission of crime. to aid him in determining the course to be adopted at this stage of the proceedings that provision is made in section 2 of Act No. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge or Court of First Instance" — not that he shall await the action of the provincial fiscal. in part. We agree with the contentions of counsel that a conscientious prosecuting official. that the case should not be dismissed. and might. 377. Cas. 2nd ed.of the petition (November 9 [8].. This the Solicitor General did not ask. Vol. or in any other way discontinue or abandon the same without leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense charged. or as a result of information furnished by the private prosecutor. he was satisfied that the accused had not committed the crime with which they were charged.. or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to that end. and of the provincial fiscal held that in the interests of justice it would not be proper "to deny the petition of the injured woman" and appointed a special fiscal under the provisions of Act No. and that they were victims of a conspiracy of their personal and political enemies to ruin them by compelling them to stand trial for a heinous offense which they had not committed. and section 2 of Act No. and the investigations of the provincial fiscal have satisfied him that the accused person is innocent. Thereafter the trial judge.) There are States in which a statute. and fearing its abuse . In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power. 556. "amounting nearly to law" requiring the consent of the court in all cases wherein it is exercised. and proceed with the trial.General to dismiss without consent of court was there maintained under the theory that that officer was the immediate representative of the King. the General Court consisting of five judges unanimously decided: "That the District Attorney has not in any case the right to enter a nolle prosequi without leave of the court.. (People vs. of course. provided that it should not thereafter be lawful for any district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi upon any indictment. It must go on the minutes of the court and must transpire. or if it appears to him from the record of the proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace. the court claims the right to control him if it chooses. In substance he stated that as a result of his investigations based upon the complaint of the private prosecutrix. but only as authorizing him to secure the attendance of witnesses before him in making necessary investigation for the purpose of instituting or carrying on criminal prosecutions.) At common law the attorney general alone possessed this power. 1627. It is for the justice of the peace to determine whether the accused shall be remanded for trial. sec. Under the English rule the uncontrolled right to enter a "nolle prosequi" was the prerogative of the Attorney-General. 194. 13. Act No. (Bishop. . should not institute criminal proceedings against such persons. and in some it is not plain what the course is. requires the consent of the court..) Nor was the paper handed by the Solicitor-General to the clerk an entry of nolle prosequi. and it has been by several statutes delegated to district attorneys. .. Discretion in the matter of subjecting to trial persons remanded for trial in a Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace lies with the judge of the court. Criminal Procedure. he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the facts.. leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in the premises." Upon a motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace. and that the judges should not therefore challenge the formal expression of his will in this regard. to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted. that the practice whereby the prosecuting officer in some jurisdiction enters upon the records of a criminal case that "He does not desire to prosecute further" — dicit nolle prosequi — is a very ancient one. and others wherein while the prosecuting officer acts practically on his own responsibility. under section precautions as he felt it his duty to adopt. 1912). it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations. But we are of the opinion that in the event that criminal proceedings have been instituted. By the act of 1870 it is expressly provided to the contrary. in which this official set out at length his reasons for declining to file an information. McLeod. within the power of the Solicitor General to nolle prosequi an indictment at his option without the approbation of the court. and in either event to move with the promptitude necessary to secure the right of the accused to a speedy trial. and Act No. and returned with an extended statement.

.R. or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless.) The District-Attorney acts for the people in criminal cases except he must have the consent of the court to enter a nolle prosequi. The trial judge was manifestly of opinion that the long delay of the provincial fiscal before taking action in the case at bar. giving the court or the presiding justice some satisfactory reason therefor. partly in explanation and support of our ruling upon the action of the court below in holding that the provincial fiscal had failed to discharge his duty in the premises. McGinley (153 Wis. This probable cause. provincial fiscals have not the power to dismiss criminal actions pending in Courts of First Instance without leave of court. Shenk (142 N. 2 L.and the Solicitor General only the agent to carry on the proceeding. State (61 Neb.. 136 prescribing the duties of the provincial fiscal provides that: "He shall be an officer of the Court and subject to its directions in relation to official matter pending in the Court of First Instance..S. Valencia.Y.A. 642) this court said: "After the complaint has been presented and certainly after trial has been commenced the Court and not the fiscal has full control of it. and which. I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed. (loc. vs. the question to be determined is.) Again. 41 Ga.) . and that this limitation upon their power extends to the dismissal of complaints upon which accused persons have been committed or admitted to bail to await the action of the judge of the Courts of First Instance. nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused: but I ought to require.. cit. beyond a reasonable doubt. we think that he undoubtedly misconceived his duty.) In the case of King vs. Chief Justice Marshall. In this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge. (supra). State. 528. consisting principally of affidavits.. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the Court.Y.S.)" In State vs. is not doubtful. Men's minds may well differ as to the probative value of evidence submitted in support of an alleged fact.. Moss. Willet vs. . 10 Ann. 554). `upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that no such crime has been committed. ought to be proved by testimony in itself legal. with or without the consent of the trial judge. In the case of United States vs. Beecher. and if the latter. Quinn. But we think that the evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to justify and require his proceeding promptly with the trial." (U. when desiring to nolle prosequi a case after indictment found.) it was said: "Evidence that would justify a committing magistrate in finding that probable cause existed for the detention of a defendant need not necessarily be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty when he is placed on trial. . to be such as a court and jury might hear.. 410. and we think that under all the circumstances the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to conduct the proceedings in his stead. in deciding that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima facie case. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge of Court of First Instance. it was said: "We are not called upon on this hearing to pass upon the sufficiency of this evidence to warrant the conviction of the defendant. . in holding a defendant to answer for a crime.. precedes the institution of a prosecution. and as a logical and necessary consequence of the above cited provisions of the statutes in this regard." The rule in New York is thus stated in People vs." 135 N. 14692a.. An examination to see whether an accused person shall be . of Act No. Bungart vs. which. All that is required is that there be a sufficient legal evidence to make it appear that "a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. and has not been questioned by this court.. 5). 309." In re Kelly (28 Nev.Y.) In Rhea vs. or by his deputy.. and I should require. therefore. 25 Fed. though from the nature of the case it must be Ex parte. 1 Abb. In conclusion we here insert a number of citations of authority touching the degree of proof upon which an accused person may properly be required to stand trial for the crime with which he is charged. and partly for the information of committing magistrates and prosecuting officers generally. 491). Valencia (1 Phil.. 193. in holding that evidence presented by the government. on a trial in chief. yet he does decide on the probable cause and a long and painful imprisonment may be the consequence of his decision.S. though in most other respects. was sufficient to justify the commitments of Aaron Burr. asks leave of the court that it may be so entered. it was said: "Upon just what ground the trial court condemned the action of the examining magistrate does not clearly appear. in the first volume of our reports. in what place they are to be tried.. and we do not pretend to say that he must have been convinced of the guilt of the accused. In failing so to do. 187 N. and whether they shall be confined or admitted to bail. But there must be proof "that a crime has been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. the committing magistrate is not required to find evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction. ed. 11 L. In this connection it is proper to observe that a magistrate.. as was the trial judge after hearing the evidence. 718) the court said: "The proposition of the counsel for the Attorney-General that at the common law the Attorney-General of England and of States which have adopted this part of the common law has the right upon his sole responsibility to enter a nolle prosequi. 507. 59. and great evils may result and have resulted from placing such a power in the hands of one man . and his attitude when called upon the explain his failure to prosecute at the urgent instance of counsel for the private prosecutrix. He has not and ought not to have unlimited power of prosecution. 82 Pac. Without reflecting upon the integrity of the good faith of the provincial fiscal. .. He evidently was of opinion that it rested wholly in his discretion whether the case should or should not proceed to trial. 68 N. cit. Rep. in such cases only is it lawful totally to discharge him. . grievous error was committed. the judge viewed such evidence from the standpoint of a trial court." Section 2 of Act No.. 194 provides that when a justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial.." Section 62. amounted to a substantial failure on his part to discharge his duty in the premises." (Citing. Robertson (6 Hawaii. in Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch 75. Cas. 125. If. he failed in the discharge of his duty. He manifestly erred in his belief that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix was insufficient to justify him in proceeding with the prosecution. 15. under the uniform practice since the announcement of the rule in the case of United States vs.. N.S. acting as committing magistrate. . Otherwise he must either be committed to prison or give bail.Y. without deciding upon guilt.S. and submitting the evidence to the court for its final determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. and upon that question express no opinion. "If. As was said in a recent decision (In re Mitchell [Cal. Cas. and that he failed to discharge it when he neglected and declined to proceed with the prosecution. 347): "In order to hold defendant and put him on his trial." says a very learned and accurate commentator. (Statham vs. 130. (Moulton vs. Although in making a commitment the magistrate does not decide on the guilt of the prisoner. and that he had the uncontrolled power to decline to prosecute.'" (loc. the Chief Justice said: "This being a mere inquiry. Burr. But the common law is not in force in this Kingdom . prefaced his opinion as follows: "On an application of this kind.. 477. whether the accused shall be discharged or held to trial. by the Court of Special Session: "A committing magistrate is not required to exact the full measure of proof necessary to secure a conviction. and I understand probable cause to be case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it. Perkins vs. 1081). that probable cause be shown. App.]." We conclude that in this jurisdiction. Wells. is not required to have submitted evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the person charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The uniform practice of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has been that the AttorneyGeneral by himself. but is obliged to hold one accused of crime for trial if there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty.

denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag. in the municipality of Calauag. through its president. justice of the peace of the said municipality. being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal. as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision. being one of the accused. 624).. denied the motion. But Fiscal Palacio. at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. The examining magistrate has very broad latitude in the matter — if the evidence. — as a court in deciding questions of law and of evidence. Que el mencionado Juez Hon. No. But the scope of investigation before the magistrate falls far short of a trial of a prisoner before the court and a jury. and the judgment convicting and sentencing them in the court below should therefore be affirmed. that all reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt must be removed.. he filed on April 23. Cas. The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS. en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz. and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. and the case thus dismissed. and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead.: This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas. Steffens (27 Fed. it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the prisoner committed the offense charged. without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. 16835). considered the court's order of August 14. Emiliano A. asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution. upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal. Suarez. by a closely divided court. was docketed and given due course. After such reinvestigation.. demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente . reinvestigated the case. P. Perfecto R. charging the petitioner herein. VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ. On May 11. the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez. filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag. and within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Bar Association of Tayabas. 1936. So. 15641).. and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused.. Fortunato N. moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez. While the said case was pending preliminary investigation. Petitioner.S. 6426 corresponded. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. Province of Tayabas. Lundstrum vs. and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal.I. 1936. then his decision can not be reversed in the matter attempted in this instance. of the Philippine Constabulary. Tayabas. Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas. 1936. Palacio." The following cases are also in accord on the point in question: United States vs. SUAREZ. on petition. 16384). Judge Platon. Ex parte Patterson (50 Tex. the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20. was appointed to preside over case No. Jacinto Yamson. Cas. 6426. Hon. we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge. Palacio to handle the prosecution. Gutierrez David. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ: Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa. moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. Respondents. entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. It appears on May 9. a motion for the dismissal of the case. of the accused. prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition.. Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor.. with the costs of this instance against the appellants. J. Judge Serviliano Platon. one of the respondents herein. 45431. People vs. Suarez. as a jury in finding questions of fact. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. Later. any jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact within the broad field of probability.R. In re Van Campen (28 Fed. the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. In re Squires (13 Idaho. according to the information under date of July 8. Ramon Valdez y Nieto. on May 5. he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14. While the case was pending in the latter court. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FORTUNATO N. — in other words. 271).placed on trial for an offense charged against him. 141). The justice of the peace of Calauag. on September 23 1936. Lieutenant Orais. alleging. that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez. the petitioner herein. in which. in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed. LAUREL. who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance. Accordingly. satisfies him that a crime within the charge made has been committed and there is reasonable cause to believe the accused is the guilty party he is warranted in holding him to bail. 387). designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May. it was said: "A committing magistrate acts in a two fold capacity. is a mere inquest. It is not required before the magistrate as it is before the jury. to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. Crim. Lieutenant Vivencio Orais. where the case was docketed as criminal case No. 1936. SERVILLANO PLATON. that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. Suarez." In United States vs. the appeal was dismissed. Gala. Fortunato N. State vs. From this order. conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez. one of the respondents in this case. Damian Jimenez. ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. 1936. We find no error in the proceedings in the case at bar prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants and appellants. Van de Carr (84 N. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez. The complaint. 1935. the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon. So ordered. If there is evidence sufficient to give the magistrate any room whatever for the exercise of judgment. State (140 Wis. Fortunato N. The court. 1936. in any reasonable view of it. among other things. The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition. Suarez with this court. despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados. the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. and one Tomas Ruedas. then and there willfully. upon preliminary examination.Y. 1935. did. 1935. without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever. after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case. Cas. On August 14. 461). with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. 1935. and dismissed the case. Province of Tayabas. holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. Lumsden (26 Fed. On June 30.y At the instance of the petitioner herein. Layman (22 Idaho. declined to proceed. vs. Ed. after hearing. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them.U. no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma. y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal. de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes. 11 Jur. se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas. that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha persecusion. library Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas. 462. ademas. que para que exista este delito. Rosa. (Vease pag. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion.) We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14. but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in . Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. (E. existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos. el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado Fortunato N. y por haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez. ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli. E. moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14. maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los sakdalistas. y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas. ni que haya incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales... no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. Fil.por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno. y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas. 1936: En sintesis. a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April 23. la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno. 1936. por el delito de detencion arbitraria. vs. y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez. y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias del caso. haanalizado este extremo. quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag. juez de paz de Calauag. en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia. teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. 909. denying the motion for dismissal. trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. It appears.) Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. Aunque es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad'. de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia. en el juzgado de paz de Calauag. con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna. Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos. el que suscribe. acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas. Fil. 1936. Jimenez. y que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito. etc. especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian. Suarez. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas.] Que el Hon. teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas. se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag. sin embargo. que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos. the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr.U. vs. creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. Barredo. presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion. aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio. sin embargo. por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado.U. aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores. 36 Jur. 482.. but adds: (a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas.el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". (E. dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia. Vallejo y otro. dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. however. because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa. diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. 202. conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas. 32 Jur. no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. en nuestra humilde opinion. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal. 1. Que despues de haberles arrestado. as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case. vs. los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935. ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa. El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado. Anexo O. por tanto. solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. Se debe tener en cuenta. Santos. uno de los acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion. que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion. que dice asi: El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado. Fil.

855. in the municipality of Numancia. SR. 6866 and 6867 in October. contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest. in August. As such. the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds. J. Upon leave of the Court given. Rollo..L. vs. After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition. except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GENEROSO TRIESTE.. 1985. reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. 6. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. 6857.. to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum. dated October 10. 1980 and some time subsequent thereto. See generally Voorhees on Arrest. the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4. to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia. June. The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. In the language of Mr. Aklan." (pp. 6860.. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States. So ordered. 1980. it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais. convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases. the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. (Rollo. and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1.P7. but that justice shall be done. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. 20. Decision. 6856. Extraordinary Legal Remedies. 1980. a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith. 853. in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment. by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner. 1983. 1985. which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. and amounts involved. suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia. of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. In this supplemental pleading. 6856 which is hereunder quoted: That on or about the month of July. pp. it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not. 1985. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass. If. Accordingly. 5 Corpus Juris. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are.Act. p. 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. in the interest of justice. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor . Generoso Trieste. abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify. T o t a l . 1935. without pronouncement regarding cost. 1985. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. No. Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately." (69 United States Law Review. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices . in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas.)" The petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent. pp.730.: c The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6. Upon the other hand. the abovenamed accused. to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30. which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. and to pay the cost of the action.. Criminal Cases Nos. while he may strike hard blows. did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx . 450. director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. in any way. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12. Aklan from Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation. petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia. Criminal Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864.the prosecution of public offenses.. he should be exculpated. and whose interest.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act. 156. the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. 37-40. therefore. .50 After trial. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact. 2 R. 36 Phil. sec.". ALAMPAY. pp. The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4. incorporator. 399. Aklan.to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum. 6858. 6861. C-865.. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION). But. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6.C. in appropriate cases. A supplemental petition. 322). 6859. 1984. Rollo. it is unquestionable that they may. (High. in order to do justice and avoid injustice. Santos. Otherwise. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced. 21190-10-174 in the amount of P558. a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. voucher numbers. 309. he should do so. Sr. and Criminal Cases Nos.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws. Petitioner. of which the accused is the president. 1984. paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: SEC. 1984. 1986. Aklan and as such. 6856-6867 of said Court. His term was to expire in 1986. 416.. being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia. (United States vs. delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. and 6862 were allegedly committed in July. pg. 3. 1980. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11. are hereunder quoted: xxx xxx xxx The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h). 341). intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made. to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the public office. Philippines. therefore. 173-175). 1985.) Considering all the circumstances.. the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law.indeed. since such a duty is not ministerial. herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7. was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon.

The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act? 2. The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner. directly or indirectly. Act No. evidence discloses absence of bidding and award The prosecution's lone witness. in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding? A. not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141. Q. which is said to have been effected on February 25. (Consolidated Comment. b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. 340-341) Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General. thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor. the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations: library Prosecution failed to prove charges. Rosene TriesteTuason. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement. In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner. Was damage or prejudice. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the abovementioned law? 3. the law only requires submission of annual financial reports. (Rollo. pp. After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto. (pp.. and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has. how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and . 26. Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however. Sir. In other words. upon acknowledging and concluding that: xxx xxx xxx Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. Treasurer Aniceto Vega. was presented. be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General. There was no public bidding. contract or transaction. Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC In any event. (Rollo. Oct. 1983) In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen. and. The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. Yes. 299-300). Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship. was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? 4. raised the following legal questions. 293). subsequently delivered by the supplier. the Court in its resolution of January 16. xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing recital of facts. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen? A. pp. Corporation Code of the Philippines). as the prosecution evidence show. Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. 1980. Aklan. as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law. 338-339). the following legal questions arise: 1. Tsn. Rollo. Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14. 36-37. 1980. Anyway. pp. filed on October 7. constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. 1986. Furthermore. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former. a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions. gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs. SEC records. showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation. testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen. The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation. Q. 1986.(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business. page 15) It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense. a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. Sir. petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort. 1986. or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. Yes. as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel. Rollo. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President. after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar. should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should be sustained. he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs.

I were prepared. ATTY. Respondent Court said: . Congressional Record. F. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste. F. Now. 306. 2 and 3 thereof. ESCAREAL: y Q. Q. C. prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste? A. Vega. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer? A. 5. Q. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence. .. 1984). When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer. Your Honor. Mr. Q. C. aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared. xxx xxx xxx Q. Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award. Now. to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper. H. the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen? xxx xxx xxx A. Exhibit I and Exhibit H. xxx xxx xxx What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.. You said they had already been paid for. Under what authority were they paid? A. Yes. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them. Q. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7). They had already been paid for. pp. Vol. CONSULTA: Q. 1984. Already paid. page 603). 1959. (Rello. which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? A. The municipal treasurer. then Mr. Maravilla. do you know why Mr. we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. Yes. 94. G. petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not. 1949). Series 1961 and Opinion No. were the purchases in question already paid? A. . The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. D. Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E. (Opinion No. what exhibits particularly do you know were issued by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste? A. pp. A. accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award. 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial. decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2. D. sir Q. Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). made to Trigen by the municipality? A. B. authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293. Who authorized the payment? A. 11. . (Resolution dated March 11. May 6. . what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality? ESCAREAL: Payment made by Trigen? ATTY. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment Now. sir. In short. Under official receipt issued by Trigen. Mar. (Tsn. Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered. CONSULTA: I am sorry. did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment. 301-303) xxx xxx xxx Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla: Q. Now. B. Exhibits A. page 7). they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer. and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature. G.delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself. Q.J. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen? A. Previously. The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. as you said. sir.

Complainant. most reasonable. demanding. Branch Clerk of Court. Br. This Court will do no less and. as amended. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents. the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan. . 4995 of the RTC.: In a complaint under oath dated July 21. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA.c By resolution of December 11. JUDGE EMMANUEL M. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest. docketed as Adm. Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality. vs. ABAYA. Puerto Princess. where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic). Adm. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18. ABAYA. 1980. RTC. No. Complainant. library SO ORDERED.M. is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment. R-698-P August 23. report and recommendation. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. Leonardo Cruz. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature. Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29. with her knowledge and consent. 1986. being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. 6856 to 6867. 51. receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52. dated November 2. Matter No. Matter No. 2909 August 23. Branch 51. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were. Branch Clerk of Court. Sr. Br. Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30. . The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits. therefore. A. 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30. Puerto Princess City 2 with: 1." for attempted murder. Branch 52. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved. Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. used his influence. 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1. then Presiding Judge of RTC. Puerto Princess City. and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Puerto Princess City. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court.1986 docketed as Adm. 1986. of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.. 1984. (Rollo. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting. finding the herein petitioner. R-705-RTJ. R-705RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases. Based on the evidence presented by the parties. No. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her. the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. vs. FERNAN. vs. RTC. Matter No. according to complainants. underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions. 3.M. Respondent. then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Thus. 1986. complainants. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. Atty. On October 28. 1984. A. Ligaya G. Respondents. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter. the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. . Respondent. R-705-RTJ: a. Sr. 3. in his capacity as Mayor. Herrera for investigation. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. After Atty. Austria in AC-2909. Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein. Matter No. by verifying official hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants. 1986. entitled "People of the Philippines vs.The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51. Abaya. 2. I. power. Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS..1986 against one of his accusers. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. C. 1983 to May 31. has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3. It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery. the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5. Atty. the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same alleged offense. 1986. . Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends: 1. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal. Branch 52. LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO. RTC. where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge. in Criminal Cases Nos. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M.There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had. Emphasis supplied). RTC. accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice. Case No. and advantageous to the municipality. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. 4 We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste. 52. was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period. which by the way. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. WHEREFORE. 307-308. 2. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. Notwithstanding. 1984 and from April 23 to 27. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer. filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12. Br. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. pp.J. to get the construction materials from Trigen. Generoso Trieste. thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money. 52. ABAYA.

00 to Judge Abaya on August 15. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder. b. He testified that Mrs. Miclat about the matter. 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs.. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes. the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). in consideration of the sum of P 2. she should. Leonila Fuertes. would impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31. on August 13. "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid. he told her that he has a problem. Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother. library Mrs. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just to . 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said subjects. 13-A Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes' testimony: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session. under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Fuertes. thus: August 13. but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. All she presented were so-called practice notes.00 given by Mrs. telling him that was all she could afford. a school teacher. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand. not because of any outside interference. gave P2. 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. she delivered the amount of Pl. Genilo Jr. We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. Fuertes had been there.1985 in his chambers.000. to 8:15 P. Leonila Fuertes. he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case. he is asking money. civil or criminal. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). 9 Roselyn Teologo. Fuertes' conversation remarked. nanghihingi ng pera. Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked. "Grabe ito. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Mrs. we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5.c We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence. Ten Commandments (3 units). showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P. . said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment.200. Mrs. Nonetheless. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs. When Mrs. It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. but because the evidence of guilt was strong. Yet she charged him with a serious offense. Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units). 5304 entitled "People vs.The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. 8 Be that as it may. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. as in fact.200. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College. Under the circumstances. now Judge Angel R.M. Moreover.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom. and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting. 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted. Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness. He is talking care Nanette na idinay ko. he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party." (This is terrible. who is a good friend of the Judge. Fuertes' diary. transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case. He asked me for my case was 50-50. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers. Baloco. 10 Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. but only about P1. testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P. Fuertes. I went to town to see Baby Francisco. Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without intervention from your respondent. Mrs.00.M.000. Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted. 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief. 11 Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. 12 August 15. 13 July 2. the latter's arrival on August 13. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. 1984. she could not produce any single order. RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units). Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her.Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52. 5304. a school teacher. and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness. Fuertes' son. the officerin-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch.000 and I brought the money to Judge. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours. 5304 was denied. Miclat.M.

Atty. and who was appointed stenographer on September 3. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it. which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. Judge Abaya requested Atty. That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.M. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide. 2909 The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A. as then acting City Fiscal. RTC Palawan. In summation. April 22. fanned by Atty. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. Upon the other hand.000. Atty.M.00. such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected killers of her son. As he had previously resigned. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency. As requested. the promulgation was set on April 22. On the latter date. 1986. Case No. While the investigating officer. we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. 1986 in Criminal Case No. (should be 13) 1985. Fuertes. 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation.. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward. Atty. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end . Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. No. Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya. she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. which carried certain conditions.1986. From him. A week later. set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: . Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge.. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350. shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. On April 21. as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm.000. the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people. stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order.00 every payday. and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion. the testimony of Mrs. In this regard. in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl. 15 Nilo Jamora. We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as abovedescribed the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. 21 Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive.00 from as fringe benefits. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4. This is patently illegal. except earned leave credits. a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch. On January 16.her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya. he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31. This order.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400. which undertaking he complied with. medical allowance and year-end bonus. Teologo. II. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery. No. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas. 16 Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge. for indeed. the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court. 1986. Lastly. 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. we find Judge Emmanuel M. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. . even if true. 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya.It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment. They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16. he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash. he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price. but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya. 2909 against Atty. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. However. the latter demoted him to process server. with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court. who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day. A. He further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money. Austria against Judge Abaya. 1986. hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. Austria's proddings. 18 We are in accord with this observation. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it. Edgardo Servando. we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt..accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty.to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. only for Atty. on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. R-698-P and Adm. 1986. then Clerk of Court of Branch 52. 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. . one of the complainants herein. the payment of said benefits having been in checks.. 14 c. Case No. By these acts. In the meantime. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15. declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl.

PEDRO M. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership. trustees. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. Gaz. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if warranted. Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records. inventories.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. equipment. Annex I). 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JULIO D. jurisdiction. vs. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged. 5. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of." (Annex A. cities. 127 providing. accounts. or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). 24 We find Atty. but also subversive of public order and public policy. Atty. properties. Case No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality. the resignation of Atty. except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of. except his earned leave credits. municipalities. On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F. together with his findings in relation to the same. and by reason of his highest qualification. In Adm. appropriations. petitioner. finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. and forthwith transmit such reports. for precisely as a lawyer. WHEREFORE. if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. In Adm. Abaya. 28 June 1956. machinery. SR. administrators. On the same date. Matter No. notes. and all evidence relating to them. HON. the Court hereby orders: 1. Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible.: This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer . among others. obligations. Matter No. Batangas. bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces. after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court.In the absence of the judge. to the appellate courts. reports. adopted and passed Resolution No. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel. 4415-4417). 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited. and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. and municipal districts in the Philippines. petitions. 22 Generally speaking. and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works. 2.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. and evidence to the judge. Signing orders in the name of. She could have probably released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. 23 However. ENRIQUEZ. On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. and may also. R-698-P and Adm. for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar. 1829 approving Resolution No. was passed. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5. except her earned leave credits. the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications. and can never be the subject of agency. supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities. Ligaya GonzalesAustria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31.. representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ. respondent. if any. . The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. liabilities. On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. should the judgment be appealed. and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees. a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya. and P500 after judgment shall have become final or. On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan. choses in actions. (Annex B). P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). that his professional fee shall be P1. That would not only be contrary to law. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES.500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint. Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. and receivers. PADILLA. when directed so to do by the judge. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them. trusteeships. and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules. or to guardianship. R-705-RTJ. 2909. and. J. 1383. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal. assets. 542. or receiverships. receive the accounts of executors.As a lawyer and branch clerk of court. guardians. if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report. and appropriating the sum of P2. On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.

. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500. series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 46 Off."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. . the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law. 5913. the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. Under the foregoing provisions of law. series of 1950. creditor or otherwise. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. 1683.. 2888. a special attorney may be employed by its council. . the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. Gaz. The petitioner's contention is untenable. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province. would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor. In Mondano vs.. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. 94. and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. is pecuniarily involved as heir.. . this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows: . SEC. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers. of the Rules of Court Annex N). 143. 542. . except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. including district health officers. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government. or his wife. . The Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. . 2884. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. 1383 was valid and constitutional. 1682. 2241. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. therefore. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel. it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.1 and when in the case involving the municipality. as amended by Executive Order No. SEC. The decision under review is affirmed. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K).2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal. . legatee. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. and. upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. without pronouncement as to costs. On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4. The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. on the other hand. submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. 97 Phil. Rule 45. On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. 392.to the complaint (Annex J). or child. based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L). "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. Control. where he swore. 5917. . the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The fact that the Secretary of Justice had. 51 Off. when so requested. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). 3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment.4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. he. On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court. would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. Silvosa. Gaz. As such he shall. the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed. provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. on several occasions. among others. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case. pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. Venancio M. .00) loan in . Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in the said transaction. he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father's resignation as its president. VENANCIO VIRAY. respondent herein [sic].000. The Investigating Commissioner was atty. Viray. 1983 to December 31.000.00) on July 15. there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. 1982. 1987. . In fact. Venancio Viray had been commissioned to act as notary public for the said province on January 2. 1984. After issues were joined. the same title was .. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. Complainant alleged that in May 1996. January 10. 362813 PR 9907.CANON 7 VICTOR NUNGA. but is facing criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling. . the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. the Undersigned noted that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a]. and Mrs. president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. vs. These therefore negate respondent's allegation that he [has been] commissioned as notary public since 1965 to the present. ATTY. [i]n 1987 and 1997. Lydia A. a minor born February 2. complainant. in the alleged documents he had PTR for that purpose [. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M. Navarro. Complainant submitted certification and the respective orders of the Clerk of Court and presiding judges . From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters. Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn't capable to buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400. 1996 and had no record of any notarial reports. JR. Her Report dated 4 August 1998 reads as follows: Victor D. Nunga. 1981 to December 31. DAVIDE. he allegedly discovered that one of the bank's assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. favor of Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn't commissioned as notary public. CJ In his complaint. Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise. and previous certification issued by the Clerk of Court of Pampanga to the effect that Respondent Atty.] Viray. . Venancio Viray. and January 8. According to Respondent. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. he could not annex all the needed documents to support the allegations.00) but his parents Atty. 1995 to December 31. After going over the records of this case.nêt The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment. A few month[] thereafter. only complainant complied with the order. and] he would not [have obtained] a commission without the PTR. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M.1âwphi1. in support of his contention. allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300.000. respondent. Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. while his father is facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission. 1969 during the transaction on May 22.

In view of the foregoing. We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty. indulging in deliberate falsehood. he was unable to . Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity. Title IV. more specifically. the same should be revoked. honesty and integrity of the legal profession. XIII-98-196 adopting the Report of the Investigating Commissioner and recommending that respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. Yet. for all legal intents and purposes. 1987 and the inscription for cancellation of mortgage on the dorsal side of TCT 362813 as June 4. and [he should] not be granted any commission as notary public up to December 31. which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. For this reason. 2002. Javier. (Maligsa v. in fact as of those dates 1987 and 1991 he was not commissioned as notary public. 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since "1965 to date" he has always been commissioned as a notary public. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar promulgated Resolution No. 282 SCRA 248. Cabanting. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. Book I. to the courts and to his clients. The respondent's contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public. Nowhere from the records and evidence[] submitted was there any proof that Respondent was commissioned as notary public in 1987 and 1991. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Then. On 5 November 1998. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so. the courts. the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. and the administrative offices in general.Complainant likewise submitted a copy of the Resolution which dismissed the cases filed against the Complainant and his father and the xerox copy of the TCT No. by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not. to the bar. it is apparent that Respondent violated the provisions of the notarial law by having affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when . (Citing Marcelo v. Inasmuch as Respondent was not able to counteract the averments of Complainant which were duly supported with evidence[]. It is invested with substantive public interest. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. meaningless. 1991 [sic]. 272 SCRA 408. Arrieta v. notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. . too. . the Notarial Law. the years the Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized by Respondent as appearing to be May 22.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws. routinary act. the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code. which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. immoral or deceitful conduct. rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question. 1991. we said in Maligsa v. dishonest. For one." By such misconduct as a notary public. We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. it is respectfully recommended that if Respondent is presently commissioned as notary public. 362813 PR 9907 where the special power of attorney and the annotations for the cancellation of mortgage showed inscription of the same in the notarial register of Venancio Viray on June 4. Revised Administrative Code). he is. 413 [1997]. Llosa. 252-253 [1997]). Cabanting (supra): A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public. Elaborating on this.

which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved. effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution. which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission. MALCOLM. respondent ATTY. 6809. Even In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ.. who was then only eighteen years old and. the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law. Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank." Two questions present themselves for the resolution. to guarantee the payment of his personal debt. which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Michael & Co. and for the rendition of the appropriate order.. Inc. To quote counsel for the respondent.: . "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward. he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. if any.What aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son. for full investigation of the facts involved. taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent. Pelaez. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code. Cebu. is revoked. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment. J. the age of majority was twenty-one years. and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. he came into possession of certain property. the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year. therefore. On March 20. As such guardian. The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor. and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3) years. or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons. without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. he borrowed P2. On April 13. WHEREFORE. Juan Sumulong for respondent. residing at Cebu. However. but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. including twenty shares of the E. These are the facts. pledging. a minor.nêt SO ORDERED. Needless to state. Navarro. the shares of stock in question. and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years. It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. attorney.1âwphi1. the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. 1918. which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made. Republic Act No. Shortly thereafter. to guarantee the loan. respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship.800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. As modified. 1921. to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.

As will be observed. the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it. however. but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted. The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906]. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice .' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use. vs. Appleton ([1883]. admits that although the general rule is. nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. The nature of the office. that it may be exercised without any special statutory authority. We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court. and he mortgages the same. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. 105 Ill. and in all proper cases.where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment. his conduct. and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character. 398. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. by a divided court. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney. but as an individual. that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust. Indeed. In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence. and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.. sec.. 1901. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. . The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. Here it was held. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. as well as between court and attorney. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. (Gen. there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment.. or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial. the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. unless positively prohibited by statute. that an attorney-atlaw will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity. without his professional advice. The Illinois court. however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. Stat. it was said: It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. 474). 398. the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. Passing now to the second point — as a general rule. . 73 Kan. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character.. it was held that this statute is not an enabling act. The . The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. . 743). 404).

at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. appointed testamentary guardian. . Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. ALFREDO CARGO. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. Judgment affirmed. asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). "It forms. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. 8). So ordered. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Barrio Tenejeros. "the only blot upon the escutcheon. however. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. etc. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. and that were we sitting in first instance." We feel. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. respondent. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an AffidavitComplaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Malabon. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. complainant. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. etc. p. Moreover.bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward." (The undersigned attorney. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complying with an order of this Court." (Rollo.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. and visited her at the hospital everyday. J. we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.: On 7 April 1982. nombrado tutor testamentario. denying the further allegations of complainant." he says. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. 45 Sisa Street. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. report and recommendation. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent. and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez. JOSE TOLOSA. vs. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated.

c) That respondent only gave P35. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. to live with respondent at No. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. Malabon. 45 Sisa St. 1982. (Rollo. 16. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. Quezon City. Metro Manila from her earnings. Barrio Tenejeros. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). 33-35)..00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital.. 10-11. pp. 9). 20. 1983). p. Metro Manila. Malabon. Tenejeros. June 15. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. That again in Quezon City. May 12. 45 Sisa Street. Exh. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. 6. That respondent had been courting his wife. 1 Galas St. Tenejeros. 1985. pp. 1315. 10. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. May 12. Barrio Tenejeros. 1984). nor lived with her at No. 1983). 'M'. pp. Malabon. Quezon City. and complainant. 1983). 1982. Malabon. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. Exh. 1982. at the FEU Hospital. a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. 35-37). pp. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. Metro Manila (tsn. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 7. 1983. Priscilla (tsn. 45 Sisa Street. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: . 1 Lopez Jaena Street. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. 18-20. 'B-l' and 'K'). 4. 1983. Metro Manila (tsn. pp. his wife left their conjugal house at No. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. pp. Malabon. Quezon City (tsn. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. pp. That sometime in June. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. 3. Quezon City.17. May 12.. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. Galas. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. Sept.. Domingo Church in 1980. July 29. Edgardo Miclat. Galas. N' and 'Q'). Tenejeros. Malabon. Sept. 8. 8. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. as assistance in her medical expenses. In fact. That while Priscilla was staying there.1 Lopez Jaena St.. 5. (Rollo. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. Domingo. June 21. 'B'. 2. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). 5-8. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. pp.10.

. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. 40). Quezon City. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. pp. p. 4. 1 Lopez Jaena St.. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. 39-40). in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. (Rollo. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. 2. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. 6." (Rollo. their residences being one house away from each other. 8. In effect. in spite again of his differences with complainant. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. 7. Thus. That Priscilla. pp. 4. 5." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. 'G'. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. More specifically. 37-39). . that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. At the same time. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. 9. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. ACCORDINGLY. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. At the same time. 3.2. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. Metro Manila. because of her differences with complainant. left their conjugal house and lived at No. 3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. As officers of the court. 'F'. Barrio Tenejeros. in spite of his differences with complainant. 'B'. (Rollo. For this very reason. in fact. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. however. 45 Sisa St. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. B-1'. Galas. Malabon. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No.

Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years and six months. The capital is fixed at P100. Cruz. 1947. It states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and talking pictures. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31. but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. Ocampo for appellee. P80. "B"). 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. J. Yulo on April 5. then the partnership shall be terminated even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired. or Mrs. the two cases were afterwards heard jointly. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff. YULO. shall be limited to her capital contribution (Exh.000 payable quarterly in advance within the first 15 days of each quarter. Yulo. 1945 to December 31. plaintiffsappellants. In view of the above notice. Hon. which plaintiff evidently accepted. 1948.000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng and P20. The last contract was executed between the owners and Mrs. vs. The judgment was appealed. 1949.: Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. all improvements placed by the partnership shall belong to Mrs. Yulo. Punzalan. 1955. Tan. 1947. presiding.000. Limited. extending the partnership for a period of three years beginning January 1. YULO. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. Yulo a monthly participation of P3. YANG CHIAO SENG. defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the palintiff Mrs. All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. 1947. or if the owner constructs a permanent building thereon. On February 9. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall continue for an indefinite period of time. 1946. defendant-appellee. Eusebio & Tiburcio for appellants. 1948 to December 31. and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100. but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2). affirmed the judgment. Yulo. In June . Yulo. The record discloses that on June 17. Bienvenido A. Yang. by Mrs. assisted by her husband JOSE C. (4) that after December 31. Yulo. 1945 to December 31. Manila. Yulo and Mr. 1949. the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. Mrs. But on April 12. the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second party. 1945.000. starting from July 1. On October 27. Rosario U. Yulo. Mrs. Yabut. Pursuant to the above offer. and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated as of July 31. The benefits are to be divided between them at the rate of 50-50 and after December 31. In the Court of First Instance. Mrs. Both parties appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals. in case of loss. provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees of patrons of the theatre. the attorney for the owners notified Mrs. proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. In this letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. they executed a supplementary agreement." which was to exist from July 1. 1950. 1950. Yulo has not paid to . Yulo and her husband. Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on in lobbies of theatres in operation. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 3. and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Mrs. dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. Augusto Francisco and Julian T. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business. 1950. then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises. 1950. with the condition that if the land is expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business. the parties executed a partnership agreement establishing the "Yang & Company. on April 30.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 8 ROSARIO U. The principal conditions of the offer are (1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs. (3) that Mrs. 1949. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner. LABRADOR.

The final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was in the interest of justice. etc. In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon. that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35. that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff Rosario Yulo. 1955. It is against this decision that the appeal has been prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court. that after December 31. As that parties agreed to postpone the trial because of a probable amicable settlement. P5. the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business. he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental value of the land is only P1. 1954. The court.100. would be granted. and P3. at which time only the plaintiff appeared. In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of the sublease and not of partnership. 1949 to December. The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and allowing a new trial. After trial the court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership. and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property. finding the above motion.000. denied plaintiff's claim for damages or supposed participation in the profits. 1951 until defendant vacates the same. was set aside on a motion for reconsideration. therefore. Yulo instituted this action on May 26. so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100. Yulo and Yang terminated. Mrs. 1945 until defendant vacates the property. and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant. The court heard evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41. as a result of which. The lower court. The prayer includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10.000 from November.000 for the attorney's fees. 1950 the partnership between Mrs.000 as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1. well-founded. The court. As to the other claims. The first hearing was had on April 19. he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs.000 for her participation in the business up to December. on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. 1950. that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the sublease of the said property. . dismissed the complaint. that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay therefor from January.000. Mrs.the lessors the rentals from August.000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1. This decision. 1951 is P5. 1950. 1949. 1949 to October. In answer to the complaint. or any other amount. It.000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5. In said motion it is claimed that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for postponement filed by both parties. alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has refused to pay her share from December. however. therefore. Yulo has suffered damages in the amount of P160. As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the theatre. that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code. 1950. plaintiff became the absolute owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor. the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at the time fixed for the hearing. defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of lease and not of partnership. therefore. set aside its decision and a new trial was held. in view of a possible amicable settlement. This assignment of error is without merit. the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. "E"). did not err in setting aside its former judgment. Yulo in arrears (Exh. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease and not of partnership. and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between them.000.

dated April 13. The following statements. Were she really a partner. Santiago. Graciano C. . The herein petitioners . contain the following statements: d.000 as representing her share or participation in the business from December. 1968. p. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. pp. whether the expenses were legitimate. Exh. members of the Bar. ET AL.. last two lines on bottom of the page). . (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief. On November 21.000 automatically ceased as of said date. 1968).. to the effect that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts. are one of lease and not of partnership.. Erlito R. Clearly. In the second place. Santiago. "B". Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. p. property. with costs against plaintiff-appellant.: After the July 31. Meads. In the first place. Sotto. it does not appear that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business. Civil Code.. this Court issued a show-cause order. Erlito R. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease. They (petitioners.. Caling. 16.000 capital. HON. whether the earnings were correct. 1968. are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. the partnership agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3. she did not furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. so the Solicitor General avers. on his behalf and purportedly for Attys.000 a month. c. her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing. expressly states that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the lease. Erlito R. and Morton F.. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. Exhs. ET AL.17. including the Executive Secretary) have made these false. and Jose B. or industry to a common fund. "A". and "C. opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July. which shows that both parties considered this offer as the real contract between them. b. "A"). plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20. Graciano Regala. 1968.. all that she did was to receive her share of P3. (Last sentence. with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. Vicente L. In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17. She was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done. Uy. 1767. But the original letter of the defendant. (Art. and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. Regala and Associates. and Jose Beltran Sotto. Jose Beltran Sotto: a. 10. The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum. In the third place. We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it in toto.. petitioners.. 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co. Santiago. Jose Beltran Sotto. the Solicitor General points out. Juanito M. 1949. Graciano Regala and Associates. Uy. "A". 1. seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page). J. not a partnership. 1945 (Exh. par. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD. vs. 13-14. three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). sixth. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC. etc.). Uy. RESOLUTION SANCHEZ. between plaintiff and defendant. the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error. respondents. (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals. Ibid. MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Plaintiff claims the sum of P41. . which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners.

counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7. and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. his client would be deprived of due process of law. it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. 1967. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. and Graciano Regala and Associates. As to the Chief Justice. and it is thus difficult. Santiago. 1968 decision. even under many of the incumbent justices. and that no matter what the circumstances are. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. a government agency or just plain fraud .. judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11. . The motion to inhibit filed on September 21. Erlito R. 1968.. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering. 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case. could be defended. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. which law has not been declared unconstitutional. Uy. brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners. the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31. and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31. asked Mr. (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics. It enumerates "incidents" which. On November 21..e. Erlito R. or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. according to the motion. par. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral? . their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision. the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case. Atty. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. not for no reason at all. However. 1968). Never has any civilized. in the light of our upbringing and schooling. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion. which in full reads: 6. which is elementary. democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public. 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L." The "incidents" cited are as follows: (a) said decision is in violation of the law. (Second sentence. Unfortunately for our people. again for himself and Attys. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts. (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates. Vicente L. and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. 1968 was rendered in this case. 10. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests. erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31. 7. paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.. Atty.

His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. On March 1. Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement. 1968. he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence. Juanito M. 1968. Atty. as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27. that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer. he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21. 1969. 1969. 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072).. as required by law. Graciano C. In brief. Rule 51. Jose Beltran Sotto. that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f). 1968 to December 31. as counsel for MacArthur. it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12." We now come to Atty. he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience. required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits. — . On January 8." In Atty. Uy explained his side of the case. 1968. it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit. had been violated. either its executive or judicial branches or both. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1. According to him. On the part of Atty. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . 1969. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised. claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1. taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31. Meads. he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. 1968 that Atty. Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3. 1968 order. He made the admission. on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine . In his explanation of December 2. . in MacArthur's behalf. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.. Justice Castro inhibit themselves. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness". Rule 138. Atty. 1968. 1969.And. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. even while he was on leave of absence. Vicente L. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10. It was on December 2. Erlito R. one Morton F. On December 5. through new counsel. though. that in view of the rejection. that on July 14. respondent MacArthur. A second contempt proceeding arose when. additional arguments were filed by Atty. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. 1968. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29. lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. 1969. and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness. registered an amended motion to inhibit. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose. 1967. on July 14. and contained the following paragraphs: 4. in addition. Vicente L. offered to retain his services. he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates.. it must be stated that as early as October 7. Jose Beltran Sotto. who may take part. 1968. 1965. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21. and we quote: "Justices. Regala." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. xxx xxx xxx 6. to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government. On February 4. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government. that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case. which was accepted. 1968. 1968. Santiago.. Atty. he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case.

He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The truth. Atty. on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court." It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. Vicente L. Caling. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer. 1969." On July 30. Santiago gave his explanation. 1969..Government. This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18. 1.m. According to Meads. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14. he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling. After reading the motion. On August 27. requiring Atty. indeed. his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court. on or before August 16. In his motion to inhibit. 1969. Santiago and by one Morton F. Vicente L. is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. according to Santiago. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Juanito M.. resolved "to require Atty. until restitution or compensation is made. because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision. we. He speaks of this Court as a "civilized. Caling filed his return. not Santiago. Atty. Meads". He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. this Court. Vicente L. In fact. to file the same. on August 4. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza.. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate. He disavowed the truth of Atty. find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. 1968 was rendered. at 9:30 a. and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Vicente L. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. Atty. In defending himself from the contempt charge. Santiago left. 1968 as "false. Juanita M. In his third motion for reconsideration. While Caling was reading the document. Vicente L. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. The motion was then filed. a short time before the decision of July 31. Caling gave his go-signal. that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. democratic tribunal". 1969. from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed. He explained that. he went to Atty. Atty. this Court heard Attys. 1969. told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. he . Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually. We start with the case of Atty. Morton Meads answered. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. Vicente L. erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. Santiago. Vicente L. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it. On August 15. including the sugar price premium. that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same. "although the process has already begun. 1969. that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. Atty. that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case. 1969. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. which could make their actuation suspect. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they. Santiago and Morton Meads." In this backdrop. 1969. only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party. 1969. he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself. and Morton Meads. Vicente L. but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country. personally appear Before this Court on Thursday. Juanita M. "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President. and . to direct that the three. his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion. Caling." On August 13. Caling. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. should not be dealt with for contempt of court. that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. August 27." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism. Santiago.

the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Mr."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney." After citing acts of two judges of first instance. he is. there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed. inhibition is also asked of. Jose Beltran Sotto. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. Justice Castro. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. We would in fact. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise. and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any boardpetitioner. spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. and no other. a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. as follows: "By now. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. including the President"."4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client.6 From this. which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur. Decidedly not an expression of faith. the teachings. but to the administration of justice. Atty. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice. "like the court itself. in categorical terms. Ferrer (1967). "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold. Really. judges may grossly err in their decisions. Counsel is presumed to know this. oath-bound servants of society. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. as a corollary. it erects no shield. we repeat. as many suppose.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice."5 As rightly observed by Mr." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. What is disconcerting is that Atty. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. And yet. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. and that no matter what the circumstances are. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. For. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity . the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false. including the president. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. their first duty is not to their clients. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. He describes a . "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. 20 SCRA 441. their clients' success is wholly subordinate. a judge from the very nature of his position. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court.' And more. counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor."7 The precepts. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. 2.' That same canon.. For." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office. should also inhibit themselves. to the courts. be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country.deleted this paragraph in his rough draft. 444. and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. to this. We next take the case of Atty. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. Section 20(b). The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. of disbelief. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity.' " A lawyer is an officer of the courts. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. this Court finds in the language of Atty. who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. For one thing.. or their agents or principals." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Nevertheless.

We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. including the sugar price premium. for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. guilty of contempt. where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer.. 702. 708.. the conduct of its ministerial officers. it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. who may take part. an act of contumacy. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted. and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed. raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12.. the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — SECTION 1. it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court.. 1968. the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . hold that Atty. 4. Uy. however. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. . laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.. now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication. whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission.. It was filed without express leave of court." 11 We." However. under Section 3 (d) of the same rule. inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young. in furtherance of justice." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. It was improper for Atty. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. No explanation has been made why this has been done. Rule 51. accordingly. Graciano C.. indeed. Such language is not arguably protected. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. under Section 3 (a). it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. Once in a small nipa shack. as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties. therefore. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . who may take part. that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. here comes a chance for him. He should be held exempt from contempt. unnecessary statements were injected. who was admitted to the Bar in 1966. 5. express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances.." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices." . — . to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government. First. if the parties or either of them. It lifted Section 1. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Regala. More specifically. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved. For. Erlito R. Third. He is. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . in every manner appertaining thereto.proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face". however. Caling. out of context. 83 Phil. and that he too has committed. improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. A simple job. Meads. 1965 . Now. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. The fourth motion for reconsideration is. Justices. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty... did not attempt to explain this point. 3." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. He is exonerated." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer. In doing so. 12 Atty. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. Second. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication. Rules of Court. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life.

" 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond. One last word. this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. Caling. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. P1. Juanito M. Vicente L. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. And We repeat. and holds Attys. too. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. Santiago and Atty. Punctilio of honor. Furthermore. 9. 1968. Santiago. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. Meads and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. he spent. 8. and fines Atty.000. he would not have signed the motion. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. Santiago. Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute. We must not forget. Vicente L. Santiago." The dignity of the Court. Vicente L. It would seem apropos to say again that. on July 14. Vicente L. It should be emphasized. 7. Vicente L. On the second contempt charge. 6. even if the Chief Justice and Mr. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. Regala and Associates and Atty. Graciano C. is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion. So ordered. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case. too. can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court. experience teaches. Caling.000. Morton F. P100. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do. Caling. Meads who is an alien. We go back to Atty. Atty. still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor.. and Atty. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. Atty. Uy not guilty of contempt of court. jurors. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. Juanita M. and Atty. and 2. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In re FELICIANO GOMEZ. the Solicitor General. the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. attorney-at-law. P200. And yet. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time. this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. Atty. it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Morton F. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court. Caling guilty of contempt of court. Sotto. we prefer to think. 1969. Indeed. for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. As we held in our decision of July 31. On the first contempt charge. For the reasons given. No appearance for the respondent. the Secretary of Justice. Meads. an additional P1. It goes against the grain of circumstances. that according to Meads himself. Meads. contrary to the instructions to bidders. To preserve its dignity. He has control of the proceedings.000. a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. this Court hereby finds: 1. For. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. As for Morton F. is not entitled to any consideration. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago. On the other hand. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Santiago in the sum of P1. He is guilty of contempt. "[a]dmittedly. judicial officers. Erlito R. who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Santiago. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. and fines Atty. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts. Such act has no aboveboard explanation. . witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation. Santiago. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. if only for one reason. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid.

in this court. under the circumstances.MALCOLM. had offered them a banquet. an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from notice thereof. respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in office. first in the Court of First Instance. without further action. that courts. 1). On January 19.: The Attorney-General has filed an information. and there. and are substantiated by four affidavits. 1921.at-law . As some one has well said. when a case is finished. where the liberty of the press and freedom of public comment ends. there tyrrany begins. The judgment of the higher tribunal was rendered on December 9. like other persons. 1968 and his decision acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21.L. In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. 1922. Gomez. because Governor-General Wood. 512. entitled "People the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor. we should not. J. the papers shall be attached to the personal record of Attorney Feliciano Gomez. with reference to the conduct of Feliciano Gomez.. J. The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of respondent dated September 5. because of chagrin at losing cases.. the Laguna election case was taken up point by point and decided by principles. is an extremely embarrassing one. are relegated to the courts for redress. a newspaper of the city of Manila. of Cadiz. 1968 by Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. on January 25. RAFAEL C. widow of the deceased Norberto Tongoy. following a secret conference. We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. at a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban.. the complaint was given due course. the case was referred on December 17. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion. gross ignorance of the law.C. however. and later in the Supreme Court. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ IN RE: THE HON. pp. and after a realization that to punish for contempt of court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. so that when finished there was not a member of the court who knew what the outcome would be until the vote was tabulated in the decision. The charges of Mr. 1968. We feel also." for Robbery in Band with Homicide. After. et al. 6 R. because although contempts are impersonal in nature. Gomez was proclaimed elected. Negros Occidental. had invited the members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision. 1968.)lävvphì1·né+ We conclude. an unsuccessful litigant and an attorney. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance" (Code of Ethics.ñët In a verified complaint filed on October 15. 454. In reality. (Patterson vs. So ordered. The position of the members of this court in considering the facts laid before them. and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. we have come to the conclusion that he matter should not be dignified by further proceedings. BRANCH I. The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is. and after the filing of respondent's answer. close scrutiny of the case. 205 U. are subject to the same criticism as other people. Laguna. that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment. did not relate to a pending cause.:1äwphï1. CLIMACO. et seq. in Criminal Case No.1 and became final on December 24. Gomez is charged with having said. for the position of provincial governor of Laguna. out of friendship for Cailles. and Eva Mabug-at. permit the law-officer to go forward with the instant proceedings. RESOLUTION ANTONIO. Cailles contested the election successfully. in which it is alleged that Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court. Colorado [1907]. that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles. 1922. . the charges have personal aspects. SILAY CITY. 1921. When Attorney Feliciano Gomez comes to reflect on his conduct. it should be recalled. judges. and on his obligations as an officer of the court "to maintain towards it a respectful attitude. It appears that Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in 1919. Accordingly. and respondent was required to file. that while the Attorney-General is to be commended for his zealous interest in the maintenance of the Judiciary. therefore. in effect. and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. Although the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed. 690. with affidavits. No.S. Zulueta. he will realize the impropriety of his action.

now an Associate Justice of this Court. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. 1968. the aforementioned complaint against respondent was instituted as aforestated. No. in Criminal Case No. of Cadiz. in the following manner: (a) Before arraignment: — Jorge Canonoyo (b) After arraignment: — Agustin Cañete Rosendo Cañete Arsenio Luyao Elias Giducos Pedro Layon Antonio Placencia (c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the information and utilized as state witness. seven (7) persons as accomplices. as erroneously contended by prosecutor. the following behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case: I. Negros Occidental. A cursory perusal of the decision will at once show that said acquittal was predicated on other well-considered facts and circumstances so thoroughly discussed by the lower court in its decision and the least of those was its observation arising from the ocular inspection. this Court. were dropped. respondent promulgated his decision in the case acquitting Carlos Caramonte. On January 30. remained at large). presided over by the respondent. On April 11. Thereafter. Solicitor General Antonio P. 1968. submitted his comment on November 28. 690. Silay City. respondent issued an order.<äre||anº•1àw> The case was assigned to Branch I. or more particularly. including Isabelo Montemayor. while of the persons charged as accomplices and accessories. which reads as follows: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. 1968. Zulueta. Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed aforementioned decision to this Court. filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against thirteen (13) persons as principals. with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. and (d) Accused Honorato de Sales.. Subsequently. L-29599). dated September 5. 1968. the investigator submitted his Report recommending the exoneration of respondent. the case with respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution or with its conformity. Constancio Pangahin. In the meantime. 1969. 1968 to the effect that prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal in view of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. complainants bewail as gross malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law.R. and when required to comment on said appeal. only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged principals. and Rene Fernandez before the Amended Information of April 26. 1968. and made the observation that "While the validity of the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt. through Justice Fernando. the unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of acquittal was not premised solely on the results of said ocular inspection. after conducting the requisite investigation thereon. Barredo. Primitivo Mata. After the case was submitted for decision. promulgated its Resolution dismissing the appeal (G. Paulino Quijano. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. on September 21.1968 to the Hon. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE . on October 15. Cristeta Jimenez. In his Report. Nicasio Yatco. that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. and two (2) persons as accessories. SO ORDERED. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime. the investigator stated: Under the first indictment. for investigation and report. Julio Elmo.

In any event. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in the alleged crime. it is gross ignorance of the law. he visited the places which he thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00 o'clock of the dark night of December 31. is null and void. issued a reckless.and GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW After both parties submitted their respective Memorandum attached herewith as Annexes "C" and "D". may have a strong motive. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. said respondent entertained serious doubts as to the guilt of Caramonte because of the failure of anyone — in the Chua and in the Uy households. 1968. Why respondent Honorable Judge went out of his way to gather those immaterial and "fabricated" evidence in favor of the accused is shocking to the conscience. province of Cebu. and illegal per se. the honorable trial judge. In fact. an Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to violate his oath of office. there is doubt in the mind of the Court as to his actual participation in then bold raid in Cadiz City on December 31. 1968. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. the security guards. 1968. August 11. About one and a half (1-½) months thereafter. and that the neighborhood is welllighted and well-populated. To say the least. and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. a psychologist or a psychiatrist would explain that the Order of September 5th is that of an anguished mind. In fact. or at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday. because of the failure of anyone — the adults and the . the decision pertinently reads: Is Caramonte guilty? In spite of the admission of Caramonte's Exh. Why did respondent judge show his hand unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps. Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent Judge took judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an ocular inspection he conducted on the date alleged by the complainants. SO ORDERED. had to acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of the municipality of Bantayan. Criminal Case No. without anybody to guide him. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. away from Bacolod City. extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September 1968. A murderer. less in the presence of the prosecution and concluded that such alleged secret ocular inspection was the basis of the Order of September 5. however. C and the damaging inferences derived from his staying from the ceremony when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan were inducted into office. to wit: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry during industry operating in the Visayas. there is likewise nothing in the record to support the charge of the complainants that the order of September 5. Because of that undeniably biased ocular inspection. who is reputed to be brilliant. the lone witness presented by the complainants in this case did not even make an insinuation supporting such serious allegation of said complainants. as any student of law would tell you. Like an amateur murderer respondent judge left telltale clues all around. the decision of the respondent Judge shows that in rendering judgment of acquittal in the case before him. by a judge who. 690 for "Robbery in Band with Homicide" was closed and submitted for Decision on July 1. the respondent Judge took judicial notice "that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. Without anybody to guide him. A painstaking scrutiny of the records as well as the evidence presented by the parties does not show any concrete proof that respondent Judge did conduct a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by the complainants. 1968. the capital of the province. 1968. was made by the respondent Judge as the sole basis for the acquittal of Carlos Caramonte. due to political pressure and against his will and better judgment. 11 August 1968. respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. 1967. But what of a judge who knowingly commits a "revolting injustice" or through gross ignorance of the law? It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the complaint that complainants bemoaned the fact that the respondent Judge conducted a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Sunday. 1967. from the order of September 5. — which Order. The fact is. Thus.

On her part. They and the other members of the household were tied up by the robbers. I cannot tell what did they do to my wife and children. A — No. the security guards. Q — What did the robbers do in your house? A — They ransacked my house. came up my house and broke into my house. Q — Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened that evening in your house? A — The robbers broke into our house. xxx xxx xxx Q — Do you remember anything unusual that happened that evening in your house? A — Yes. where were you? A — Almost one hour. Mrs. 1967. Q — What was the first thing you noticed when the pirates as you said arrived? A — I was about to sleep when they came up. Q — Who untied you that evening? A — My son untied me after the men left. A — I was in my house. who then ransacked the two houses for about an hour. three of them went straight up my house. Q — How many minutes did the armed robbers stay pin your house? Q — At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. Q — How many floors has your house? A — Two floors. Thereafter. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to say on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one of the robbers. The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand. sir. A — I don't know because I was lying flat on the floor. you cannot tell? A — Several men. 31. did the robbers who came up your house leave? Court — This witness did not identify any of the accused? Fiscal — No. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the witness stand that: xxx xxx xxx Q — What did the robbers do when they came up your house? A — They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor face down. sir. my children and my wife. Q — What did the robbers do with your wife and children? A — Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the floor face down.children in the Chua and in the Uy households. Q — After nearly one hour. sir. Q — About what time did you notice those pirates forced themselves inside your residence? A — Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening. . Your Honor. pirates. some of them were taken to the seashore to prevent the police from firing on the retreating robbers: Mateo Chua said at the trial: Q — At that time were not your family inside your house? A — Yes. Q — Please tell the Court what happened? Q — How did they come out.

Q — And what was his answer? . "If anything happen don't resist because my children might be hit. Q — Were they armed? A — Yes. So Antonio Placencia told me to call the Police Department and tell them that there are armed men in the seashore. xxx xxx xxx Q — Can you identify any of the robbers that came up your house from among the accused in courtroom? A — I cannot. Q — Were you able to call the Police Department by telephone? A — We went to the house of Erning Tan because there is a telephone there connected with the Police Department and the stand is also at the window overlooking the Caltex Station. what did they do? A — We were downstairs when they broke into our house. Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony: Q — At about 10:00 o'clock of that same evening of December 31. A — At about that time we heard a voice of a man and woman and they asked us where we were guarding." The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened? A — Yes. Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers? The police battled with the raiders from a distance of about 60 meters. Q — What did you do after that? A — Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use the telephone and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the other side so we went to him and told him that there were armed men in the seashore and Antonio Uy told us. 31. because I was frightened. Q — What did you do after hearing that? A — My companion Antonio Placencia called me because he was the one who had talked to those persons. I did not have a chance to look at them. 1967? A — About four or five. Q — What did you do after that? xxx xxx xxx Q — After the four or five persons fired their shots inside your house. Q — After you heard those voices of a man and a woman. sir. how many robbers broke into your house that evening of Dec. we asked him where our companion security guard was. A — My companion also suggested that we better call the Police Department by telephone because that was already 10:50 in the evening. what happened? A — Then we were told not to go to the seashore because there were armed men. sir. Q — What was that which happened? xxx xxx xxx Q — So what did you do after that? A — Because there was a policeman there. 1967. according to Patrolman Armando Maravilla.Q — More or less. Two security guards employed by Uy (Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged families thru the raid. using the axe at the door and then after entering the first floor they went up. Q — What did you answer? A — At that time we were on duty at the gate of the house of Mateo Chua and then we heard the voice of a man and a woman. He told me not to go to the seashore because there were armed men there.

sir. He said. (Decision. A — He went down and returned to his own house. Q — What did you hear? A — We heard several shots. the security guards and other employees of the fishing business. the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. Under the circumstances." Q — What happened after that? A — Because we were there with him. He said. A — Yes. For serious misconduct to exist. Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood." Inasmuch as proceedings against judges as the case at bar. — which indicates that many people in the compound must or could have seen some or all of the robbers — and no one could say that Caramonte was one of them. "Why are you walking there? Come up. there has been no proof that in issuing the order of September 5. (In re Impeachment of Hon. Q — When you went down. in spite of the biting language of the complainants in their complaint and in their memorandum. A — Yes. 212). in all likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics. what did you do? . the neighbors — to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to his participation therein. In the case at bar. 1968 (Exh. just allow them to get it. sir." Q — And then you obeyed his order? You came up.A — The policeman informed us that he did not report for duty and that it was Guarino who reported for duty that evening. Q — When Mr. "If they want to get something. and in this venture. obviously in bad faith. Q — Did you notice anything while you were hiding there? A — Yes. and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall. Of course. Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan. we went to office to hide. where did you go? A — After the shooting stopped. A — I followed him. Antonio Horrilleno. Antonio Uy saw me so he reprimanded me. Uy went down and returned to his own house. the charges must. what happened? Q — Were you able to reach his house? A — When I went down. it is xxx xxx xxx Q — What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news? A — Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. and it is incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt. we heard something. the failure of anyone — members of the Chua and Uy households. Q — Where did you go? xxx xxx xxx A — To his house and I called the rest of the guards. under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code. the mother of Antonio Uy came to him and informed Mr. they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as far as they know. B). the police. Be that as it may. province of Cebu. Uy do because you were there. pp. In fact. xxx xxx xxx Q — After the shots lasted. supra). The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large fishing industry. 43 Phil. be proved beyond reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno. or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Uy that his wife was brought along by the armed men. Q — What did Mr. 12-16). there has been an insinuation that "respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted. sir. and in rendering a judgment of acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law or to disregard well-known legal rules. therefore. have been said to be governed by the rules of law applicable to penal cases.

testified — Atty. indeed. 124). it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta. that said compound is only a five hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in Cadiz and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. to seek for the reconsideration of such order and at the same time to invite the attention of the court to the alleged errors. respondent Judge would realize his mistake which we believe malicious (p. "Es tan preciso. 1968 showed you that order of Judge Climaco wherein he stated that he was taking judicial notice that Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. 1968. which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly." Of course. or a span of eight — to protect the interests of the State against what complainants herein term to be an "illegality. 690 does appear to be commendable. 123) and to this may be added without regard to any personal conviction or presumption of what the Judge may do or is disposed to do. did you make any comment to Fiscal Zulueta? A — No. 1968. Aquino — Q — When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13. As heretofore stated. Since this is an administrative case against him the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was arbitrary. after reading that order. 64-65. 1968. Fortunately.s. Q — But the statements here in the order are true? A — Yes. corrupt. without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused (Malcolm. Furthermore. xxx xxx xxx In issuing the order of Sept. Whether in taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5. (pp. Thus. respondent Judge as stated in his answer. If it were true as alleged by the complainants that the issuance of such order was and that the matters taken judicial notice of therein were wrong. p. "que la falta se cometa a sabiendas. and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. or maliciously. que en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que . Your Honor. t. sir.believed they failed. 690.s. esto es. the complainants herein lean on the argument that — Fiscal Zulueta — Because if I do that. In the pursuit of that solemn obligation." commented Viada. the undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along that line. Mr. But as the records show.n. 1968 on September 13. 5. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. it appears from the record that the Office of the City Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September 5. There is.) The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion).n. it is believed. you mean the "Uy-Chua Compound"? Q — I mean the statements in the order are true? A — Yes. that this attitude of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. if there were any. in Criminal Case No. or oppressive. the very witness of the complainants affirmed the correctness of the matters taken judicial notice of by the respondent Judge. therefore. of a high character. was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. sir. this is not the proper forum to dwell on the matter. t. lone witness for the complainants. partial. or corruptly. or arbitrarily or oppressively. that being that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law and that no innocent man be punished (Malcolm. as the prosecutor of the case. Agustin Javier. respondent Judge erred or not. It may be pertinent to state at this juncture. p. con voluntad reflexiva. personal conviction should be ignored lest it may lead to a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved. Prosecuting officer presumed to be men learned in the law. a paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted partially. Legal and Judicial Ethics.). it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence. 29. and to perform their duties impartially and with but one object in view. con malicia. A prosecutor should lay the court fairly and fully every fact and circumstance known to him to exist. the prosecution in the said case did not take any steps — from September 13 to September 21. and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

nevertheless. is not liable criminally. SANTO MARILAG and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. according to Groizard. vs..." (5 Martin. it is his own and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice." (Section 20 (f). 595.). censured for his use of offensive and abusive language in the complaint and other pleadings filed with this Court. 77 Phil. For. p. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. provided he acts in good faith. 4 It is also well-settled that a judicial officer. is.). 855. 82 Phil. cit." 1 To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. FERRER. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. that although he has acted without malice. con la que solo inspira la enemistad. As noted in the aforecited report. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[as] an officer of the court. op. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. 97. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. and there is nothing on the basis thereof which would in any manner justify their inclusion in the pleadings. of Cadiz City. 572. (People vs. la preocupacion o el error. he is. that is to say. Carillo. . 851. 3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice. ." (Malcolm.). It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. prudence and care required by law. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. in the contrary it results. and in a very clear and indisputable manner. for any error he commits. WHEREFORE. with a warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe sanction.L. MACKAY petitioners. respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the aforestated charges. respondents. Legal and Judicial Ethics.). 2 Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Rule 138." (People ex rel. that diligence. "like the court itself. We have analyzed the facts. Esta es la prevaricacion verdadera. Rules of Court. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. much less could it be held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence. 1949 ed. Karlin vs.. INC and GORDON W. the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his complaint and memorandum. 5 We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated in an earlier case: 6 A lawyer is an officer of the courts. p. We cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment.). he failed to observe in the performance of his duty. el odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y corrompida. when required to exercise his judgment or discretion.por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por ignorancia.. Zulueta. even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied. it must be shown. such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. From a review of the record. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. ZOILO R. 602.). 160." (In re Sotto. Culkin. logically and reasonably. 580. in the notorious violation of the legal precept. We find that the decision respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. 60 A. MARIO TATLONGHARI.R.

on the ground of unjustified dismissal. 4. And. 10. therefore.. Montecillo. Hon. NARIC Workers' Union. by explicit articulation in Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.. the principal respondents were dismissed from their employment. We believe petitioner to be in error. the case. Republic Act 875]'. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays. J. In default of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. for the benefit of the bench and the bar. 3. failure to give additional compensation for such work is a violation of the said law. vs. beyond which it is not permitted to act. Here. (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec. Republic Act 875). 875. February 29. or under the Minimum Wage Law. et al. vs. Manila Railroad Co. Mariano B. Bautista. (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602).Ponce Enrile. the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship. speaking thru Mr. 1964.2 2. L-16440. To be read as controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate. Hence. Belo & Armonio for petitioners. vs. 1959] where we held: . No. 52 Off. et al. or the claimant must seek his reinstatement. Jose S.: Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as CIR] to hear and determine a case1 seeking — 1. 1. Valmonte for respondents. Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because as held in two previous cases. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. 1962. no extended discussion is necessary. May 29. the CIR has jurisdiction.. [Paflu et al.. which accumulated since their illegal separation. L-12075. (NARIC) vs. and that respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its "general jurisdiction and broad powers" under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case [National Rice & Corn Corp.R. (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444). Gaz. et al. thus — We may. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon. No. 5836]. Consequently. 13. restate.. But they seek reinstatement. G. and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest. guaranteed a workman. The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIR's denial of petitioners' motion to dismiss — grounded on want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter — the principal respondents' complaint and said court's refusal to reconsider the order of denial. On the claim for might differentials. Reinstatement with back wages. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: '. 5(a). Siguion Reyna. SANCHEZ.. is within the coverage of the prevailing rule enunciated in Campos. et al. or must have a nearing on an unfair labor practice charge. or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law. declared — Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875 the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work. that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. Inc. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay. and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec. May 25. where this Court. night work is not overtime but regular work.. on this score. Jose T. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays. et al. Right to such pay is. and 5. Night differential pay. 2. Tan. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal. L-17905.

R. esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo. and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty..' Apropos the issue of jurisdiction.. citing Shell Co. et al. but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature — for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. la de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia. this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. medical. Again. supra. at 325-326]. 103. the record does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65 respondents and the petitioner had ceased. ibid. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. Si este tribunal tiene en casos de disputa.R.R. 315]. and payment of salary increases and separation pay. No. April 29.'While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned case. G. vs. la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos. L13806. To force . and back wages and the damages incident thereto.' [ Shell Co. May 25. After the passage of Republic Act 875.. se debe determinar es si entre las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa. vs. vs. a nuestro juicio. and payment of salary increases and separation pay — out of the CIR's jurisdiction and place them in the hands of ordinary courts.. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law). G. namely. or in connection with. contra National Labor Union. L-9055. Detective & Protective Bureau. Felipe Guevara.. G. vs. Besides. The other demands. We held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process. it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime work. to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide. et al. G. 1962]. reinstatement. No. May 29. Prisco vs. Tan. el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia. 3. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work. 1957] but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done at daytime. 1959. G.. CIR. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. 1958. Just recently. no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche. and so it justified the additional compensation in the Shell case for 'hygienic. 81 Phil. cultural and sociological reasons. et al. No. L-12075. L-8738. et al. are matters which arose out of the same employment. and in a series of cases thereafter. In fact. he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. We had occasion to remark that :4 "[t]o draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. y consiguientemente. Inc. And this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work. in Paflu et al. Withal. and back wages and damages incident thereto.. would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor. we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for night differentials are within the compass of the CIR's jurisdiction. employment"..R. the company contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. moral. No. the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. et al. CIR.R. National Labor Union. Almin et al.. we hold that the CIR is with authority to act on this grievance. True. L-17788. May 31. L-11655. Since employer-employee relationship is sought to be re-established. City Automotive Co. this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this fashion: 'La cuestion que.R. [Luis Recato Dy. . 19601 or for payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs. 1959. No. es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro. Naric Workers' Union. May 23. G. No.3 Earlier. It is because of this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said demands — for reinstatement. [Naric vs. the Industrial Court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of. et al. November 28..

1957. Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn over a the records. ordered complainant Laput "to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court. In a motion dated September 16. that the court finally approved the sales made. the true facts being that the administratrix. ATTY. bank books. in spite of the written opposition of complainant.the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. . the respondent. LAPUT. anxiety augmented. de Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby. within ten days from notice. and that with the duplicate titles. without notice to complainant. aside from . and that if he (respondent)had known that the transfer certificates of title in question were in the possession of complainant he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. all to the prejudice of said complainant. bad faith. petitioner. 1958. another motion. Indeed.' "5 Upon the view We take of this case. it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of action here 'be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of Industrial Relations. report and recommendation found that since January 11. to whom this Court referred this case for investigation. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 1959. he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time.". Laput". that as early as November 18. to the undersigned administration pending my appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration" and that although Atty. all of which. FRANCISCO E. F. the administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate. Laput to produce them. on October 8. among which are transfer certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province. that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to turn over to them the certificates of title. Nieves Rillas Vda. the CASIANO U. or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots. he went over the records Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of title. if any. praying that he be issued owner's duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost. when the widow. So ordered. on October 17. respondent asked the court to order Atty. he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration. 1957. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said special proceedings. Respondent also denied that he was the author of the first motion complained of. without notice. 1958. J.ñet Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of records and transfer certificates of title.lâwphi1. filed a "Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner's copy". effort wasted. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- being unfair and unethical.: This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. the Court of First Instance of Cebu. vs. Laput did not comply with request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her case. By virtue of this motion. and assets. additional expense incurred — these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. and yet Atty. and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. 1957. and on December 3. 1955. for the reason that she could not locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action. 219 — filed with this Court charging the respondent with malice. that on February 21. 1956 and on September 16. filed with the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid certificates of title. respondent. The time to be lost. complainant herein (Atty. Costs against petitioner. the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed. . Laput was not served copy of this pleading. other pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him. Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered into the records of Special Proceedings No. Laput "to surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the estate and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . were prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question. Casiano U. The Solicitor General. on December 3. Case No. REMOTIGUE. 1958. Barrera. respondent and his client Mrs. Mrs. filed the pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. LABRADOR.

Soriano. to wit: this terminated case (L-24114). His subsequent explanation did not. J. which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. for in this latter case. 1954. 1969. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8. CLEMENTE M. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases.: By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10.passbook of the estate's deposit in the Philippine National Bank.1awphîl.66 by the estate. complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer certificates of title in question. went to him to engage his professional services in two cases. Herminio C. therefore. October 8. it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143. 1969. vs. however. Tiburcio. an area of only about 19 hectares is IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. Laput) believed that he had still the right to retain the certificates of title in question. serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. Wittingly or unwittingly. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations. Mencias.699." (L-30546). and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault.767. and of the documents belonging to the estate in his possession.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio." The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings. Antonio J. et al. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. if not altogether bizzare behavior. and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or bad faith. 1969. his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26. Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. the amount of P4. that the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed. Atty. as early as December 19. a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19. later on increased to P5. in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents. as early as December 27. thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio. ET AL. motions. while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. et al. The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix. by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143. HON. And so Atty. ELPIDIO TIBURCIO.329. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case. the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio. entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs.561. 1969. he (Atty. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented. SORIANO IN L-24114. At their conference. that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case. complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint.66. etc. vs.48 out of total of P31. Parenthetically. Mariano.15. MARCELINO TIBURCIO. Hence. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969.699. and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5. the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's complete exoneration should be. as it hereby. Clemente M. is approved. the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice.P. Cebu Branch. 1955.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput. Hon. RESOLUTION . EULOGIO MENCIAS. Laput shows that respondent's answers correct.nèt An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix. et al. PHHC and U. et al. It was on the same date. Atty. Atty. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CASTRO.. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines. 1955. and order of the Court. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance.

In the incident before us. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. Furthermore. Doria. Atty. We find Atty. Bonifacio T. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar. Further still. Soriano has joined one Atty. It is the sense of this Court. Nemesio Diaz.involved. as claimed by Atty. is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. we are far from being convinced that he really did so. at the very least. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. Soriano at the hearing of this incident. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Atty. Rizal Avenue. he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Clearly. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. when Atty. at the hearing of this incident. he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession. If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila. that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building. then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram. besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his actions. And if this cannot be had. Clemente M. we find Atty. Diaz to no avail. therefore. if it were true. Doria. Atty. categorically denied having given. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice. who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10. of the premier control over the case. et al. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. were it not for his candor. 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. we note that Atty. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 9 . Clemente M. then he should. Soriano is hereby ordered. generating as it does in the minds of the litigants. that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. Atty. Dalangpan. Manila). however. as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. as well as of the public. 2 Atty. in the present case. to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. 1969. was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court. a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents. What Atty. at the hearing of this incident. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment. especially the Varsity Hills case. Soriano should have done.

.. EDUARDO P. " 6 On July 19. his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. . docketed as Civil Case No. the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA.. that the grounds relied upon ". petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12. legal and justiciable defenses. The appealed case was handled by Atty. 1972. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. ... it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter.L. That the Hon. Carlos. filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. issued by respondent Judge. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors. THE HON. 1977. As a consequence thereof. J: In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction. to wit: a.2 SANTOS. 52610R. through Atty. Atty.R. respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. 5 In an Order dated July 12. through a different counsel. Isabelo V. 1977. and. 4 On July 6. petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. on October 1. and this Petition must be denied for lack of . RICARDO G. Vida Jr. c. No.L. could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals . and d. 1971. an associate of the same law firm. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 1 Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6. despite due notice. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default. of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently. petitioner. petitioner. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken. 7 Hence the instant Petition.. a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendantappellant . presided by respondent Judge for execution. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado. Santos 11. Santos II. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default. of the law firm of Vida Enriquez. another member of the law firm. vs. 3 A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge.JOSE GUBALLA.. JR.. more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law. Defendant has valid. The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved. CAGUIOA. respondents. Benjamin Bautista. Vida Jr. Mercado & Associates. denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. levied on three motor vehicles. 680-V. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff. 1977. in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. Isabelo V. respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". b. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29. 1977." herein petitioner. acting upon the writ of execution. 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court. a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII). That this Hon.

merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve, WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
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Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives. Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day. In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate. In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents. Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners. R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought. Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4 Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest. However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00 1990 605.00 570.00 1991 165.00 2,300.00 ———— ———— ———— P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8 WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. SO ORDERED. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAPTER III CANON 10 VICENTE MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, respondent. RESOLUTION

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5 On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.) Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

Villaseca. is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor. the impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach. requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. it is averred — "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible. untrue. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when. why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making aforementioned misrepresentations. upon examination of the evidence. Even when subjected to intensive . While her demeanor was respectful. as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as. as charged in the information. and (d) although appellant's boat carried several passengers.R. Sutton appeared. that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence. such optimism was misplaced. must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel. on page 6 of the petition. in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision. for: (a) petitioner's theory. but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. immediately after the collision . of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. On the contrary.: We have before us a task far from pleasant." which is. Where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting]. on page 8 of the petition. and was. she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed from. Considering further. to say the least. in fact. which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat. and Associates. it was obvious that she was far from contrite. in fact. 1957)" although.part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant." although.FERNANDO. because in law there is none. minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor". the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court. Sutton. J. on page 9 of the petition. thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly. If so. including children. both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum. of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as such. although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on. the latter being bigger than. Yap. that of the petitioner. (Cesica v. that. whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts. Her liability is clear. overloaded. respondent Delia T.R. (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little damage. No. appellant acted as pilot and. that — in the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals — "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case". that. Parlade. 1971. no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed from. more specifically with reference to a duty owing this Tribunal. that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of Appeals. 1971. referring to a portion of the same quotation. Ordoñez. connected with the law firm of Salonga. and makes reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals. Respondent. as its machinist. likewise. G. petitioner states. Delia T. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising. it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court. (b) these circumstances. in fact. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G. a member of the Philippine Bar. L-9590. April 30. likewise. Vicente Muñoz v. At such a hearing. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true. there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. and is therefore. the Court of Appeals found. to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant. thereby hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death — so that. as did the trial court. the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of complainant's boat — where the complainant was seated. that. within ten (10) days from notice." " 1 A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14. the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of merit. that the petition quotes. There was no attempt at justification. which is not true. at the same time. So we rule. Under the circumstances. that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is unbelievable. and that. The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12. we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year. L-33672. When given an opportunity to make proper amends. the Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause. reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. summing up evidence for the defense. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals.

. the testimony of a witness. 3. however. she was not to be budged from such an untenable position. That undersigned Atty. Delia T. [Candor and Fairness]. or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. 2. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar. Yap and Custodio O. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand. partners in the firm of Salonga. seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. and that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court. for candor and honesty takes precedence. to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled. or a statute that has been repealed. That the undersigned Delia T. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Ordoñez joins Atty. . it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo. Ordoñez. Sedfrey A." 5. Sedfrey A. The mood. That with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney. Yap. with the assistance of Atty. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible. Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. 1971. together with Messrs. often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions. 1971. the language or the argument of opposing counsel. the obligation to the bench. the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December 1." 2 The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton. That undersigned attorney. Some members of the Court feel. Sutton. there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements. While expressing regret and offering apology. Sedfrey A. Sutton. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. Delia T. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. for the apology to gain significance. To purge herself of the contempt. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper. What is more. Ordoñez." If there were a greater sincerity on her part. That undersigned Delia T. oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to. and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim. Delia T. that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. and did make with the proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of regret. 1971.. did seek to make amends thus: "1. Parlade. the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court were explained by her. which her evasive answers gave rise..questioning by several members of the Court. There ought to be. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics. 4. This Court does not view matters thus. especially to this Court. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. — The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. that it does not go far enough. appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22. with knowledge of its invalidity. signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause. It is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. Pedro L. which reads: "22. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class. Parlade & Associates. or the language of a decision or a textbook or. pursuant to an order dated October 18. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned." 3 What is more. even at this stage. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit.

as well as the other senior partners. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on her record.At the same time. the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . It must be stated. WHEREFORE. Ordoñez. especially in his relationship to this Court. is deep-seated. respondent Delia T. should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel. perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Attorney Sedfrey A. both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted. however. Sutton is severely censured. that in the future he. must be commended.

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