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Cases for Legal Ethics

Cases for Legal Ethics

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CASES OF LEGAL ETHICS PART 1 IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.

: Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows: 1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. 2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). 3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case.

4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget. 5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3 At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's coaccused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4 Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) RESOLUTION CASTRO, C.J.: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the

common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502). When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,

Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. committee. PARAS. 23. We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar. the facts are disputed. particularly where. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT. In general. so far as . but embraces the preparation of pleadings. It is not limited to appearing in court. 262. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved. to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. practice . (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l).. 3rd ed. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. body. all advice to clients. Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. and HON. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. board. rel. said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. v. SALONGA. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1). vs. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. (State ex.. associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law..S. 173. However. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose.Agrava. at the time of their appointment. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably.. one who. No valid distinction. at the time of their appointment. including the Chairman. . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty.E. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation. is engaged in the practice of law. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. HON. Dudley and Co. (5 Am." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading. commissioner.176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. and in addition. and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . including the Chairman. before any court. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. premises considered. 193 N. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. as here. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. Mckittrick v. Otherwise stated. referee. counseling clients in legal matters. using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney. a majority thereof. CHRISTIAN MONSOD.. and the giving of all legal advice to clients.W. firms. Jr.. and conducting proceedings in attachment. (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. GUILLERMO CARAGUE. It embraces conveyancing. (Article X. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (105 Phil. they are always subject to become involved in litigation.. petitioner. a wide experience with men and affairs. 102 S. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate.. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: .:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. 340 Mo. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body... It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. respondents. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. to the proper administration of justice . and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred. JOVITO R. the foreclosure of a mortgage. 263). it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. conveyancing.C.sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky. a majority thereof. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. It is a grave responsibility. holders of a college degree. 2d 895. the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. conveying.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.. at least thirty-five years of age. However. 129 Ohio St. WHEREFORE. J. and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.. in a representative capacity. indeed necessary. and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. (Black's Law Dictionary. Sec. p. however. Dworken. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RENATO CAYETANO. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney.

. in or out of court. it will involve legal work. the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history. there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. [1986].144). 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law. To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit.] 179 A. . may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. 222. (Ibid. MR. Wolfram. (State Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Assoc. provides. cit. therefore. op. The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. We must consider the fact that the work of COA. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. 1986]. the answer is yes. or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. 194 N.2d 623. although many lawyers do not engage in private practice. 128 Conn. FOZ. 15).concerns the question set forth in the order. MR. the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today.. lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. of the Commission on Audit. p. that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice. of sound moral character. 593). Thank you. means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services. in or out of court." (Ibid. then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners. The Commissioner will please proceed. citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.). quoted in Rhode Is. The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous. MR. Mr.I. Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm.] . . This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.). At this point. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. (Ibid. Is he.]. Yes. Vol. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. 626 [1941]). FOZ. Cardell. OPLE. (Barr v. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. 22 A.. And. (Moran. training and experience. In this regard thus. 593). 665-666. Payne. v. saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity. In most firms. Presiding Officer. MR. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms. OPLE.). such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners. knowledge. (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy. 145 Conn. not reality. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. 325. as commonly understood." (Ibid. which requires the application of law. Mr. and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. p." MR. FOZ. therefore. the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.2d 863. which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.E. MR. The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co. it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. [R. counselling and public service. ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1). there are still uninformed . Yes." Groups of lawyers are called "firms. FOZ. unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. 140 A. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. Among others. And. legal procedure. although it is auditing. in effect. 139. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. it might be helpful to define private practice. many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. commonly understood to be the practice of law.). Comments on the Rules of Court. MR. This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. Nonetheless. (Gary Munneke. Jamir). even chairman. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. Before we suspend the session.: Minnesota.." Today. Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip. Yes. p. . FOZ. In either case. MR. 313. will necessarily involve legal work. p. we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA. Presiding Officer. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. Generally. Bar Assoc. OPLE. The term. OPLE. Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois]. 3 [1953 ed.). a corporate lawyer. among others. (Charles W. (Ibid.(Wolfram. v. to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service.

687). legal institutions. and other interested parties. Understandably. functioning at the legal policy level of decisionmaking now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. "Corporate Law Practice. particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation.). (Business Star. the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors. i." He is the "big-time" lawyer. and negotiation. at least theoretically. international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Of these special roles. automatic data processing. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks. and electronic computing equipment. the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. 11. In short. The business lawyer has been described as the planner. the diagnostician and the trial lawyer. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. for all intents and purposes. p. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers. p.). His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include. document drafting. unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice. supra. Certainly. Truth to tell. so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. the surgeon. legal processes. In our litigation-prone country.1990. "Corporate Finance Law. a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. p. Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways. of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. ( Emphasis supplied. each involving different legal doctrines. 11. a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law." has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. (Wolfram. By no means will most of this work involve litigation." Jan. are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Nonetheless. appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission). and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them. and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory. a business daily. surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective. a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla. tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers.e. Lawyers and other professional groups. Lawyers. inter alia: corporate legal research. the appraisal of major trends. (Business Star. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. 1989. (Ibid. 11. advice-giving. Instead. At any rate. earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry." (Business Star. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action. 4). The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation. particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning. "Corporate Finance Law. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. 4). legal skills. many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised." (Business Star. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. operational analysis. In several issues of the Business Star." May 25. know that in most developed societies today. an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process. or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. 4). Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. p.) In a big company. wherein a "model". "Corporate Finance Law.laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. . clients. After all. the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts. This brings us to the inevitable. one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action. p. Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed. 1989. acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings). for example. however. a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties. as in medicine. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling. the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous. For one. 4). In most cases. a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. (Ibid. to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems. 1989. a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. the most prominent is that of prosecutor." Jan. a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity." Jan. a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Moreover. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law. tax laws research. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen. A corporate lawyer.. many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does.

The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support. Yet. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. In general. and the need to think about a corporation's. p. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders. promoting team achievements within the organization. For that matter. such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. In the context of a law department. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does . social. and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities. Esprit. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. at the very least. and rates of flow. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm. [Be this as it may. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. "The Corporate Counsel. coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?." so to speak. They differ from those of remedial law. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older. managing expanded liability exposure. the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations." Jan. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence. 11. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities." it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. including structuring its global operations. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. Also. strategy at multiple levels. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel. In Europe. Managerial Jurisprudence. 4).Today. "Corporate Finance law. the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. 4). p.] the organization and management of the legal function. and psychological. 1991. interdependent environment. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles. thus: Preventive Lawyering. concern three pointed areas of consideration. the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process. including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make. The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning. three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. "Business Star". or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star. it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work." April 10. many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. he must. aid in negotiation settlement. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues. An understanding of the role of feedback loops. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. with a shared area linking them. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities. In a crisis situation. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. inventory levels. Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. 1989. managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. creating new and varied interactions with public decisionmakers. 1991. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas. enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical. managerial. economic. also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

" (See Ricardo J. Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U. lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Michael Hager. 1982. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Nos. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Romulo. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar. 1991. demand expertise in the law of contracts. which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal. economic. Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. Third and Fourth Quarters. Soliven.. particularly the modern concept of law practice. In the field of advocacy. Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama. he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. 143 SCRA 327. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising. In a loan agreement. during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v.) and having hurdled the bar. a lawyer-negotiator of contracts. which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987). Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry. 13). Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers. 11). 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified. Civil Service Commission. Atty. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination. (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion. (4) covenants. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.S. 3 and 4. 265). Jr. the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. Central Bank of the Philippines. they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. for instance. 1991. If he does. has worked with the under privileged sectors. but where they are. 1977. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms. (Ibid. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". (pp. such as the farmer and urban poor groups. and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970." Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal. and all the other legal requirements are satisfied. a quast judicial body. lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. for which he was cited by the President of the Commission. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist. 15. and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. (Guillermo V. On June 5. Necessarily. Civil Service Commission. (3) conditions of closing. 124. in initiating. petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract.not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission." submitted by L. it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Monsod. ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises. Atty. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec.P. p. 2. the finance manager. having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. (2) borrower's representation. Manila. p. in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies. and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 321). It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. Atty. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties. p. a negotiating panel acts as a team. an unpublished dissertation. there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel). Vol. they beat no drums. and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution. 1973). he worked with the Meralco Group. "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments. (Condensed from the work paper. but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. Monsod used to be a member. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution. filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31. entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations. On June 18. Graduate School of Law. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U. An appointment is essentially within the . (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts. and project work of the Bank. On the same day. U. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. In the same vein. 1987. the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. Thus. a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. p. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. he took his oath of office. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970). a lawyer-manager. in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development." Staff Paper No. (p.T. as in this case. and (5) events of default. then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery. regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development. and since 1986. once said: "They carry no banners.S. served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.

whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. are actually practicing law. charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. vs. L-3081. Clearly. This blinded the man. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. and the last Members for three years. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured. Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice. invoking the case of Aquino. In view of the foregoing. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion. In the instant case. say. For one thing. by operation of law. who has been practising law for over ten years. this petition is hereby DISMISSED. which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law. 1 Constitution). a member of the Philippine Bar. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U. 1949. but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. this is far from the constitutional intent. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. Additionally. and (4) acceptance e. Gonzales. Supreme Court would still reverse the U. Senate. suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice. that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed. two Members for five years.discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case. Thus.S. 1947. having entered his appearance as private prosecutor. the President issues the permanent appointment. This is different from the acts of persons practising law. et al. consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination. after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. three Members shall hold office for seven years. Finally. Sec. J. . the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. The condition of his appearance as such. much less a grave abuse of discretion. DefendantAppellant. the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation. Plaintiff-Appellee. may the Court reject the nominee. and fuming with righteous fury. Blanco. only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation. posting of bond. the Chief of Police of Alaminos. one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth. October 14. No blood shall flow from his veins. 28. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee. implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. Moreover. . he ceased to engage in private law practice. oath-taking. without reappointment. This matter. without first becoming lawyers. . Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations. VIII. I greatly doubt. Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. vs. is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law. the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion. consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President. Delilah was beside herself with anger. Monsod is a lawyer. 1959. most individuals. (Lacson v. etc. Law on Public Officers. perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say.. Delilah agreed on condition that — No blade shall touch his skin. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines. may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission. p. it would be incredible that the U. there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance . Romero. on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications.. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines. Upon the other hand. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C.: On September 4. In that sense. (2) In the same vein. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. and that he would not receive any payment for his services. . law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. perhaps. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved.S. et al. and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly. for has been clearly shown. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused. Once. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter. wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified. since no abuse. Laguna. (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. not the spirit of the agreement. accused the procurator of reneging on his word.g. subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. No. but by the spirit that giveth life. Of those first appointed. in making use of the law. Nov. L-1532. PAREDES. how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified. he would be considered on official leave of absence. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA. . The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.S. or in advising others on what the law means. (Art. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. the answer is in the negative. I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " .

the Secretary of Justice. the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. law library In view of the foregoing. the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.E. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos. the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior. without costs. Under date of January 4. In other words. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING. On the other hand. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. this Court holds that Asst. 1961. 31. M. with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. to represent the complainant in the case at bar. and which we consider plausible. allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. For one thing. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. law library WHEREFORE. Laguna. Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. Laguna. The offended party had. City Attorney Ariston D. now Sec. counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case. as already pointed out." this time invoking Section 32. The appeal should be dismissed. which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially.of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna. presided by the Hon. Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person. the decision appealed from should be. in all respects. which bars certain attorneys from practicing. it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. heretofore reproduced. Cotner. Rule 138. the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. a succession of acts of the same kind. Sec. for patently being without merits. Rule 138. as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs." He claims that City Attorney Fule. 127. 98 N. Rule 27. On December 17. 647). Hilarion U. Revised Rules of Court. 4 S. for it consists in frequent or customary actions. 35. p. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. 87 Kan. Jarencio. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public. Bryan. as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. who is a relative. 768). therefore. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance. the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos. 864. with costs against appellant. which rendered judgment on December 20. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. 522. or with the aid of an attorney. the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation.C. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .S. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability. 35. 42 LRA. the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. 644. as it is hereby affirmed. in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice.. 1. Revised Rules). Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge. 1961. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed.

(3) Discharge. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar. (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. opinions. and ensures. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. therefore. and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On December 1. Marcos on September 17. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated. 526 2 of the Court. 1973 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1971. such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. 2. to carry out the purposes of this Act. sentiments. and publish information relating thereto. jurisprudence. . out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated. (6) Encourage and foster legal education. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law. and make reports and recommendations thereon. arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Thereafter." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood. the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. at the outset. learning. SEC. (7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law. On August 16. as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. 1962. for this purpose.PART II January 9. integration fosters cohesion among lawyers. are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice. public service and conduct. Within two years from the approval of this Act. the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession. The purposes of an integrated Bar. professional competence. and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public. 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. Integration of the Bar will. law reform. giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. Act 6397. after due hearing. and Appropriating Funds Therefor. (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law. through their own organized action and participation. Case No. pleading. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar. 4 Since then. to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views. 3. a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration. as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. improve the administration of justice. fully and properly. (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity. make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law. SEC. In 1970. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers. signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. in general. 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires. In September. the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. among other things. It will suffice. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession. with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30. 1972. Bar integration. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 1972. practice and procedure. comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration. Written oppositions were admitted. Congress passed House Bill No. This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers.

the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. 13 of the Constitution. the administration of justice. but there can be no collective action without an organized body. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. and (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation. — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action. and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State. it may impose a membership fee for that purpose.(4) Shield the judiciary. The Supreme Court. and promulgate minimum fees schedules. and the admission to the practice of law. while the purpose of a tax is revenue. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar. and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer. the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. "to promulgate rules concerning pleading. (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country. the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: — Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. Freedom of Association. Regulatory Fee. given existing Bar conditions. improve the administration of justice. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. clothed with public interest. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. is a question of compelled financial support of group activities. The issue therefore. may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it. because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client. but also to his brethren in the profession. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar. not involuntary membership in any other aspect. and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service. under Article VIII. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Sec. and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position. Anent the first issue. 2. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. and to the nation. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation. such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege. the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. practice. in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services. — Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest." Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. on the importance of preventive legal advice. will "raise the standards of the legal profession. and." Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power. (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces. Otherwise stated. and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue. more specifically. (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. a privilege. . and assist it to maintain its integrity. impartiality and independence. and procedure in all courts. (8) Provide placement services." Indeed. (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards. 1. the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. therefore. (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research. it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body. (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers. membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. to the courts. moreover. but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or. as an officer of the court. it follows that as an incident to regulation. Moreover. which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.06 per cent) are non-committal. it is not retroactive. notably in England. (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. Freedom of Speech.855 (or 93. (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar. by proper work. (4) greater Bar facilities and services. of a total of 15. as he has always been. A lawyer is free. ACCORDINGLY.80 per cent) vote against it. (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar. because it will apply equally to all lawyers. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.04 per cent) are noncommital. while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. In addition. 14. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. Upon the other hand. Government authority will dominate the Bar.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed. effective lobbying will not be possible. a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration. Fair to All Lawyers. it is not unequal. (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court. young and old. 662 (or 4.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof. local Bar associations will be weakened. on the other hand. It is noteworthy. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation. and politics will intrude into its affairs.51 per cent) voted against it. 12. 1973. and to the public. while only 378 (or 2. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried. that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. of the 13. and vastly improved the administration of justice. Case No. enlarged professional consciousness. might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen. (5) elimination of unauthorized practice. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar." within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines. that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England. and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits. Finally. Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar. if his liberties were to be thus extended. In many other jurisdictions. the Court. and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed. even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members. it has restored public confidence in the Bar.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar. has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession. to the courts. at the time Bar integration takes effect. Canada and the United States. however. Canada and the United States. cliquism will be the inevitable result.555 (or 96. after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. and 157 (or 1. 4. Even the income tax would be suspect.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration. energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public. it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which. . 3. would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. the Bar will become an impersonal Bar. (8) more cohesive profession. and 285 (or 2. it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. it has been variously argued that in the event of integration. improve the administration of justice. The Court is fully convinced. to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar. it is not unfair. hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE. effective on January 16. The conscientious objector. by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of.

85-38359. multiplied a thousandfold. can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce.P. (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5.P. but also an injury to the public. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit. and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15. the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. Marquez several pieces of jewelry. ATTY. 85-38361. 22 in all three (3) cases. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that. in addition. 27. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5. 1 On 16 December 1988. .400. . suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. respondent. Traders Royal Bank.400. respondent received from one Herminia A. 85-38360. 85-38360 and 8538361. she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced. Blg. 3 (Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.250. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.00. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa. PHILIPPINES. all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. Blg. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder. CR No.00 in Criminal Case No. the practice is prescribed by the law. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but.PART III CANON 1 PEOPLE OF THE vs. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.A. . with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee. for insufficiency of funds. FE T. in Criminal Case No. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. Marquez. SO ORDERED. The Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals in C. TUANDA. . the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. and (b) three (3) for violation of B. with a total stated value of P36. respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.00.00. Tuanda. In Lozano v. 22. In that Resolution. 8538359. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment." We should add that violation of B. she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.00. she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.450.00. CR No. with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. 05093. and to pay a fine of P16. instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26. 85-38358.000.-G.00.00. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. On 17 December 1983.A. Sometime in February 1984.00. four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa. respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5.400. complainant in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Blg. for sale on a commission basis. the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6.P. in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989. PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989. a member of the Philippine Bar.400. On appeal.R. 22 in the following terms: The gravamen of the offense punished by B. respondent Fe T. Blg. after trial.R. and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude.000.450. Blg. respondent. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance." On 1 February 1989. issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5. respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. Martinez. Consequently. to pay a fine of P 6. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. In due time. docketed as Criminal Case No. docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos.P. and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest.00. Marquez. injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.000. noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court. in Criminal Case No.000.P. and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.00. and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15.-G. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor. asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C. the proper forum.

SEGUNDINO D. 1970 at Cebu City. MANIWANG respondent. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. 28. Segundino stopped visiting her. or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice.: Magdalena T. Oblena. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer. 1971. the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. 1975. They renewed their relationship. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. however. ARCIGA complainant. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. Decena. (Italics supplied) Sec. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. I and J). 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. which Magdalena also attended. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4. 1975. He went to Cebu in December. respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. Erlinda Ang. or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October.Magdalena remained in Cebu. involving moral turpitude. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Segundino passed the bar examinations. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay. . 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. have been filed or are pending in any court. Davao del Sur. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25. 1975 to contact her lover. In his opinion. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. she and Segundino went to her hometown. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar. Blg. After they had dinner one night in March. constitutes malpractice. K to Z). He continued his law studies in Davao City. then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. AQUINO. Thereafter. Magdalena went to Davao in July. Fearing that there was something amiss. The results were released on April 25. or other gross misconduct in such office. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4. Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife. grossly immoral conduct. 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. Capiz. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. 865). An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. 1973 of their child. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land. In Melendrez v. 1973 for the baptism of his child. violation of B. When Magdalena discovered in January. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law. it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Arciga in her complaint of February 24. they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Michael Dino Maniwang. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.P. 5 ACCORDINGLY. 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January. he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. he did not mind because he loved her very much. Several days after his oath-taking. Ivisan. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case. . 117 Phil. She went back to Ivisan. 1973 that she was pregnant. they had sexual congress. to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. vs." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case. In December. she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAGDALENA T.malpractice. Bukidnon. J.

he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy. SIMEON BARRANCO. February 28. they were going to get married. RESOLUTION ROMERO. JR. 322. Duran." (Mortel vs. Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Peralta. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. SO ORDERED. 114 Phil. 1102). There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous.J. who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles. Almirez. 117 Phil. see Villasanta vs. 27 SCRA 169. Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents. Simbol. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases.S. 389. marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies." (People vs. Administrative Case No. 535). which he refused to fulfill. succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Wong. Aspiras. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct. Paz. 865). the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. Abaigar vs. a public school teacher. (Royong vs. February 24. In 1955. 313). 450). whose sense of dignity. September 10. (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. . they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. be denied admission to the legal profession. Before be could take his oath. Puno refused to marry her. Toledo. According to the complainant. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena. she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Administrative Case No. complainant. after unsuccessful attempts in 1966. however. 1969. (Almirez vs. flagrant. Administrative Case No. Jr. 116 Phil. 768.: In a complaint made way back in 1971. falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. when old-fashioned morality still prevailed. 997. honor and morality is not well cultivated. Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. vs." "Through thick and thin. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual. Administrative Case No. anyway. Reyes vs. (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras. misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage. a married woman separated from her husband. See Sarmiento vs. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony. was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because. 19 SCRA 439). in life or in death. Josefina Mortel. 533. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt. 507. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925. middle and the last in my life. Villanueva. 256). 2nd 896). she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. 1206. 117 Phil. February 28. my Josephine you will always be the first. who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno. because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She used to give Puno money upon his request. respondent. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. Oblena. 101 Phil. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general. 1967. 959). or shameless. and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C. 106 Phil. and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. De la Cruz. Ruado. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful. 1979. two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. Administrative Case No. observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man. January 29. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. 1975. 547. 1967 and 1968. Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco. 123 Phil. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. where lawyer Eugenio V. 586). tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that. Puno. a married man. 481. that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her. while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage. under promise of marriage. Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children. Lopez. Viojan vs. 62 SCRA 382. (5) Where Flora Quingwa. 48 Phil. for better or for worse. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila. (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities. Agustin. and.93 SCRA 91). (See Montana vs. 100 Phil. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PATRICIA FIGUEROA. (Quingwa vs. J. although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse.. seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. Cui. 63 SCRA 667. complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts. disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar." will depend on the surrounding circumstances. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. 100 Phil. after such fake marriage. keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant. 1975.

the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Hence. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). Sevilla in June and July 1971. 1 It was after the child was born. ALFREDO CARGO." (Rollo. Since 1953. 1964. 5 Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17. 1974. albeit belatedly. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit. that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15. 1993. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE TOLOSA. respondent. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. to take the lawyer's oath. We agree. voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent. but grossly immoral." 6 It is a willful. who is now sixty-two years of age. the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971. credible. We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned. 8).00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. they were steadies. Complying with an order of this Court. Upon complainant's motion. Barrio Tenejeros. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. Rafael Barranco. should thus be allowed. On February 18. when she learned that respondent married another woman. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Jr. He gave only P10. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. Jr. To recapitulate. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. On June 18. J.Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. bitter and unforgiving to the end. On June 1. Unfortunately. citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay. respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. complainant alleged. 1980. 45 Sisa Street. SO ORDERED. . in response to complainant's opposition. complainant. On October 2.: On 7 April 1982. sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems. born on December 11. perpetually. p. this petition. Their intimacy yielded a son. the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco. Patricia Figueroa. or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. Iloilo from 1980-1986. WHEREFORE. 7 We find the ruling in Arciga v. the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 1982. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. respondent repeated his request. is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. Malabon.The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. The IBP's report dated May 17. both of whom possess no impediment to marry. Iloilo. not for any other reason. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart. 1988 when the Court. 4 On September 29. respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. 10 Respondent. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. flagrant. when they were both in their teens. report and recommendation. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. 9 Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. vs. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. 3 In 1988. 1979. 1988. 1974. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble. Respondent Simeon Barranco.

35-37). pp. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. 5. Quezon City. Barrio Tenejeros. May 12. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. p. 45 Sisa Street. 4.. 1 Galas St. pp. 5-8. 10-11. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. (Rollo. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. pp. That Priscilla. 20. Metro Manila. Galas. In fact. 13-15. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. Barrio Tenejeros. 1982. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. 1982. Barrio Tenejeros. pp. 1985.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. Metro Manila (tsn. 45 Sisa St. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. 37-39). June 15.. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. Malabon. Sept. 16. May 12. at the FEU Hospital. July 29. . Galas. Metro Manila. 1 Lopez Jaena St. to live with respondent at No.. 45 Sisa St. (Rollo. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. That respondent had been courting his wife. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. That while Priscilla was staying there. (Rollo. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. Tenejeros. c) That respondent only gave P35. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. Domingo. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. 1983. nor lived with her at No. 'B'. as assistance in her medical expenses. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. That again in Quezon City. Metro Manila from her earnings. 18-20. Quezon City. 8. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. pp.17. Galas.10. Tenejeros. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982..1 Lopez Jaena St. left their conjugal house and lived at No. pp. report and recommendation. Malabon. Exh. denying the further allegations of complainant. 2. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). pp. 6. June 21. and complainant. 45 Sisa Street. That sometime in June. Quezon City. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. 3. pp. his wife left their conjugal house at No. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). Metro Manila (tsn. in fact.. Priscilla (tsn. 7. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. because of her differences with complainant. 8. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. N' and 'Q'). 10. 1984). and visited her at the hospital everyday. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. May 12. 9. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. 9). 3. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. Malabon. 1983). and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. 1983). 'M'. 1982. Malabon. their residences being one house away from each other. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. 5. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. Domingo Church in 1980. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. Edgardo Miclat. The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. Malabon. Sept. 1983. 1983). 6. 7. Quezon City. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. pp. 33-35). Quezon City (tsn. 2. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. 'B-l' and 'K'). Tenejeros.. 4. Exh. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. Malabon. 8.. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. Malabon.Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage.

Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. "A") payable to the latter and which. At the same time. 'B'. 1978. 2. per agreement between the two of them. (Rollo. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to appear. but failed to complete his presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. Complainant was further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily. 39-40). 1978 when she was able to see respondent and gave to him the P5. "C"). The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified on her own behalf and submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante. Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27.In effect. complainant even begged respondent to return her money if he could not give the interests but respondent merely made promises. Moreover. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. . Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. from disbursing monies that may be due to respondent on account of his retirement from the University's service. B-1'. the University of the East. At the same time. "B") for the amount of P5." (Rollo.00 check for which respondent signed the receipt/promissory note. Atty. As officers of the court. Court required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the complaint. 1978.000. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SHIRLEY CUYUGAN vs. the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. 4. Afraid that her investment will not be returned. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. Sergio G. complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from leaving the country and an order restraining respondent's employer. Three days after August 7. Thus. She tried to seek respondent's signature on the receipt but it was only on August 7." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. p. 1978 against respondent (Exh. Atty. For this very reason.000. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by complainant. By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5.00 to Atty. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. complainant sought the help of the U.M Amante(signed) The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4.E Legal Department Head. Received by: S. The LIZASO. complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the interest on her investment but respondent failed to give her any. Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. pp. complainant. however. 1978 and which states: Mrs. 1978. in spite again of his differences with complainant. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. report and recommendation. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. 3. respondent RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p On 27 March 1979.000. and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. ATTY. More specifically. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. capital to be returned after two months. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear. was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the casino. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. 40). The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of the check. A written receipt (Exh. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. 1978 in the amount of P5. in spite of his differences with complainant. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. 'G'. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. 655615 dated August 4. Atty. The Court referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution dated 15 July 1981. Respondent also presented documentary evidence on his behalf. For the many weeks that followed. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent failed to come. 'F'. SERGIO AMANTE. In view of these. testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 1978. ACCORDINGLY. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. respondent Amante failed to offer formally his documentary evidence. 7.00 was signed by respondent on August 7. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Sergio Amante to be invested in business with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting Aug.00 (Exh.000. The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7 February 1990 in the following manner: On August 7. On 18 June 1981.

"1" is fully handwritten. Noriega who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with payment of respondent's fee. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being incredible if not manufactured for the following reasons: Furthermore. "B" do not. he claimed that complainant inserted the words in Exh. Conrado Aquino.000. it should be the respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of P5. all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement of her P5. 2. on 7 August 1978. the U.000. 1987.00) in payment of her loan. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5. The receipt/promissory note (Exh. it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh. Annex "1" — photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by three inches.00. the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the investigations/confrontations set by the U. such as the U. Lizaso. "D").E Faculty President and the University President himself. Sometime in June 1978. correspond to the . respondent affixed his signature.00 needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house. "B" are one and the same and that in view of the long and big vacant space between the handwritten words and his signature. 1978. the agreement between him and complainant was to invest the amount in respondent's business venture. which was substantially as follows. 2 Upon the other hand.000. Amante(signed) Exh. despite repeated demands therefor. "B" embodying the agreement that the P5. Fourth. addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No.000. subsequently marked as Exh. Antonio Ravelo. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from various school officials. the latter dangled the possibility of a second loan for P20.00 capital investment which respondent failed to do. upon complainant's repayment of her first loan.000. To provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent. complainant tendered to respondent Amante the P5. we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has discharged the burden of showing. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check confirms it. 655615 as payment of my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley C. "1" would affix his signature so far away below from the handwritten words. the exhibits submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. Lizaso Check No. Complainant was allegedly very slow in repaying the loan. This amply and clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent and presented by him to the bank. 1978 addressed to a certain Mr. To all these terms. even more so that respondent is a lawyer. 1978 embodying the following words: Received from Shirley C.E Faculty President. d) Finally.00 check referred to in the complaint.E Head of Legal Department. respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a receipt for P5. "1" that what remained is the receipt promissory note or Exh.E. "1".000. which loan fell due a month later. a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. 1 Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts. Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of respondent. leaving a big void or vacant space in between which any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage and manipulated to the prejudice of the signatory. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by respondent.E Faculty President. Resty Noriega (Exh. Moreover. "B" with the last handwritten line in Exh. at the time of encashment by respondent. that said amount has a guarantee of 10% profit per day starting August 7. U. and that complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings of Exh. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a second loan to complainant. [Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature below] Sergio G. Amante admitted he encashed the check.00 investment. that she had delivered P5. but' argued that he did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior obligation to him. already contained the words "capital investment" at the back thereof. According to respondent. is the alleged receipt dated August 4. the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a note of receipt when. complainant sought the help of the University President. the latter wrote a note dated November 7. in separate written complaints. The analysis of respondent's evidence by the Solicitor General follows: 1.00 shall be returned to complainant after two months from date thereof. Noriega. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or reimburse complainant's money. the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible.00 to complainant.00 to respondent Amante for investment purposes and that respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof. Third. by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. 1978 clearly expresses the terms of their oral agreement that the amount of P5. in the ordinary course of things as in the case at bar. "B" of the complainant and the same signature of respondent. Legal Department Head or the U. Mr. the stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the investigation of this disbarment case. to substantiate his own version of the evidence.000. Exh.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7. Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5. The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5. and that the capital of P5. "B") dated August 7. complainant allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20.000. Second. are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause of action against respondent. Furthermore. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check. if indeed complainant paid her loan to respondent.000.00 to complainant. by her letter of December 11.00 was entrusted to respondent to be invested by him in his business venture. dated August 7. "1" which consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of the top of Exh. he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only to dismiss the complaint outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was spreading within the university.000. At the same time. Aquino. however. Complainant presented this note to Mr.000. was of the opinion that this was a personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle. Annex "2". "H") authorizing complainant to collect in his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr. 1978 and the same to be returned two months thereafter. Noriega then returned the note to her with the advice that she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected by complainant. at all. "1" and Exh. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent Amante by harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint. Again. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow: First.000. Moreover. and purportedly signed by complainant. After careful examination of the records of this case.000. Thus. It totally negates respondent's claim that the check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to complainant.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B" of the Complaint.Because of this. complainant sought the help of Mr.000. 655615C (P5. prior to finally securing legal assistance from a private lawyer. 1978 (Exh. but the latter was not able to help her because respondent denied that he ever owed complainant anything.00 allegedly given in payment of complainant's loan from respondent. Instead.

"B".000. whether it be professional or non-professional. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings." If complainant.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June. if it were true that the paper showing Exh.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from the latter. the complainant no less. by promising to give her P20. Pelaez.000. 3.00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant. Mr. As early as 1923. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. 5 The nature of the office. hold. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. it appears strange that he has not required complainant to sign any receipt for the P5." We emphasize here that "conduct. pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor. when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney.000. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not have any tail loops that would correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice.00 loan. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. of course. borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank and to guarantee that personal loan. . justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar. Unfortunately. it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. while still guardian of the minor. "1". Moreover. who is not a lawyer. is quite hollow and very unlikely. To follow respondent's twisted reasoning.000. . But this is a general rule with many exceptions. 5.00 loan to respondent who promised to give her. he came into possession of certain property. 8 (Emphasis supplied) The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. 3 Thus. It also appears that when finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the disbarment proceedings.000. In that case. had never been presented by respondent in any of the confrontations set by the university officials between complainant and respondent.00 she gave him. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person. was expressed by Mr. indicative of moral unfitness. as well as between court and attorney. 1978. constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. just as well. there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a subsequent loan from respondent because she could. Justice Malcolm went on to say: The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. the courts retain the power to discipline him.. Abordo 9 in the following terms: that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession.000. it evokes wonder why complainant would secure a P5. respondent tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be falsified and which try to make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5. 1978 in order to invest it on respondent's business venture.000. In other words.000. For a lawyer. a member of the Bar. 7 with eloquence and restraint: As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted to him. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the P5. Any person. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. would be doubly expected to protect his loan by a similar receipt.00 if she pays the P5. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. indicative of moral unfitness for the profession. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good moral character. however.000. as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago. Exh. immoral or deceitful conduct. justifies suspension or disbarment. 10 Finally. that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. who knows that she will be given a P20. "B" is a physical continuation of Exh." Mr. it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. is the conclusion that Exh. respondent.000. it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan of P5. 6 (Emphasis supplied) The rationale of the rule that misconduct.000. get the same loan from the bank as she was able to. Justice Malcolm said: . and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. Pelaez. [A]s a general rule. As such guardian. In other words. we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest.000.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5. respondent was not able to. without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court. was appointed guardian of a minor child. whether relating to professional or non-professional matters. which does not contain any tail loops at all.last line of Exh. with all his legal expertise. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties." as used in this rule. she could have very well secured the same from the bank and not from the respondent.00 loan.00.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5. it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for such return and accounting.00. the respondent Vicente Pelaez. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character. So it is that we. the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez 4 the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence.00 but would merely partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15. a P20.000.00 loan he earlier gave to her. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys. was able to make him sign a receipt for P5. And yet. but was only presented during the investigation at bar. Immediately clear. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. therefore. as there was actually none to secure. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness. "1". and the court requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character. who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. just like Annex "1" (stub receipt).00 on August 4. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. In the case at bar. as the respondent is. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5. We are compelled to conclude that respondent attorney converted . that misconduct.000. It is true. anyway. "1" and "B" are not the same and are far different from each other. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck.000. is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. including some shares of stock in certain corporations. in common with other courts. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe. If complainant really needed the balance of P15. In disciplining the respondent. which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him. the last line of respondent's Exh. Lastly.

By his failure to present convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt.000. (Rollo. p. Subsequent demands for payment were then made by Luis. however. prompting the former to seek assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavit-complaint. by abusing the trust and confidence of complainant's son. 1978 reminding the latter of the P1. he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. In the interim.00 loan extended to him and at the same time demanding payment thereof. 25. to write respondent a letter dated February 3. in his reply. only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. Respondent failed to comply with his promise. Complainant. constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office. respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies. As far as the records of this case show. On October 15. left the country and afterwards wrote his father. complainant alleges. respondent Atty. Had respondent intended to settle his indebtness.'s absence from the country to justify such act of non-payment. to say the least. was appointed to the Bench and no report nor recommendation was made by him. Bersamira. vs.00 from Luis Constantino. 1984 the case was re-assigned to another Solicitor. 4). complainant and his wife took turns in trying to recover the debt from respondent. RESOLUTION BIDIN. He must perform his duties to the Bar. Luis. at the appointed place of payment. p. to the courts. A lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. not to mention his seeming indifference to the complaint brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the Solicitor General. As a matter of fact. authorizing the latter to collect the sum of money owed by respondent. . Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension. Constantino charges respondent Atty. PRUDENCIO G. It appears that sometime in August 1977. to his clients. (Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation. Jr. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law. Jr. After the investigation conducted by said Solicitor. J. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law. 214 SCRA 1 [1992] ). Jr. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation promising to pay it back promptly the following day. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. was able to obtain a loan in the amount of P1. This act. Saludares with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis Constantino. 1990.00 loan despite repeated demands by complainant who was duly authorized to collect the same. This prompted Luis. respondent failed to demonstrate that he still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment. complainant Luis G. Prudencio S.000. He reasons out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis. There is no doubt that respondent.000. he could have done so in several instances repayment was demanded of him.000. the case was deemed submitted for report and recommendation. respondent borrowed money in the amount of P1. Jr. 1978. the respondent admits said indebtness but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt. challenged the veracity of respondent's contentions and reiterated his previous allegation of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtness despite repeated demands. report and recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and complainant. Solicitor Bersamira. like the other demands. On March 12. and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs. CONSTANTINO. respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt.: In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21. was left unheeded. Javier. respondent filed his comment on the affidavit-complaint alleging among other things that the complaint was without basis and malicious in nature. categorically admits having borrowed money from complainant's son. Such a conduct. The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning. but to no avail. 1978. The Solicitor General further add that respondent's refusal to pay the debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer's oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. (Rollo. SALUDARES. Copies shall also be finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney.complainant's monies to his personal uses. We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of a debt validly incurred. The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer. He however. and is therefore a proper subject for disciplinary action. WHEREFORE. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.00 which he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands. 1979. Jr. Jr. the case was duly referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. borrowed P1. Despite complainant's repeated demands however. Respondent further cites the fact of Luis Jr. Luis. Puno. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. the Solicitor General rendered its report. was assigned to the Office of Solicitor Jesus G. Jr. wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice. respondent persistently refused to pay back the said amount. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUIS G. p. 3) The Solicitor General found that respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his debt was apparent from the averments in the affidavit-complaint and this fact was sufficiently established during the proceedings before the investigating Solicitor. On November 8. Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis. Sergio G. The Civil Relations Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24. Prudencio S. it is not enough that he denies the charges against him.00 from complainant's son Luis. 1979. purportedly for an urgent personal need. respondent. 19) This however. promising to pay it back the following day. 19 SCRA 439 [1967] ). In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May. Saludares be charged with violation of Section 27. Jr. Jr. respondent does not deny the fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the P1. left the country. is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. It is clear from the records that after Luis. Jr.000. ATTY. It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence.

2d 729 as cited in Tan vs.00 in October 1968. including equipment. honesty and integrity of the profession (Lyons vs. There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal. The lower court dismissed the complaint. the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. to the courts and to his clients. but must also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. His conduct should be characterized by candor. Bulacan. to his compadre Lo .000. selling all his business. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important that truthfulness and candor. competence and fairness (Roque vs. Amante. 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17. 1970. 1968. 3 This Court. Sabandal. improvements. Both his professional and personal conduct must be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. vs.000. and the private respondent Lo Bu. Hall [LQ App] 90 so2d 519. 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ).R. He is required not only in fact to be possessed of good moral character. all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting. as shown in its order dated March 23. Bulacan. In the case at bar. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action..chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. supplies and rights. he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22. The lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961.000. the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. 1974. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan.: The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. 1973. petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. after hinting of taking measures to avoid liability. Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. 212 SCRA 618 [1992] ). The original writ of execution had been returned wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their names. Valenzuela. It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. dated March 12. No." 7 chanrobles virtual law library Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect and confidence of the public. machineries. WHEREFORE. Extensive hearings were conducted. to the bar. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. Valenzuela. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June 27. 2 It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution. Saludares from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice. by the employment of techniques. 1970 6 for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution.. which certainly deserve no encouragement. dated March 11. 5 That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals. immoral or deceitful conduct.The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath. a point stressed in another motion dated February 2. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23. the Court directed the examination of Mrs. (Fellner vs.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. 1970. Clemencio. Certiorari and prohibition lie. 1970). now deceased. and for P40. "allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop . on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in Marcelo vs. ALVAREZ. Javier. much less approval. thereby degrading not only his person but his profession as well. A member of the Bar must act with integrity. J. Respondents. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts show that on January 16. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS.00 in September 1968. Ong Ting. 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). who was especially deputized to serve the writ. FERNANDO. 1973. L-36636. 4 In the meanwhile. It was docketed as G. 1968. and the foundry shop where Mrs. It is about time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union. Consequently. 1973. there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties.00 on December 22. did so on January 17 and 18. To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity. 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. SO ORDERED. it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. Petitioners. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent. honesty and professional decorum. Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan. Bar Association of Baltimore City. the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned. with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts. in its resolution dated July 17. materials. 131 A. in the New Century Foundry Shop. for P25. soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31. After his proposals to settle the present case for P5. showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs. 1973 denied his motions. reinstating it in its resolution of December 19. so long set at naught and disregarded. were successively rejected by complainant's counsel. supra). 1 Thereafter. and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed. denied the petition for certiorari of private respondent. Rule 1. 1973. 1973. petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. in its Order of March 19. This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court.

in Sanchez v. 1973. Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu. It is clearly fictitious. Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25. As a general rule. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft. 1975. when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. of course. the Court may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order. it was alleged that as a result of the fire. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that particular case. Court of Industrial Relations. 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. a 1962 decision. we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing . There is this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v.L. Having acquired jurisdiction. A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified.. He . If petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No. His daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier. decreed. for on the facts as found. his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. "even if erroneous. and ii was not surprising. . by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop.. 1973. Private respondent. That is the ordinary course of judicial procedure. What is worse. As emphasized by the ponente. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of being the alleged vendee. without the latter being made a party to the case. It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. Moreover. That is the most that can be said of his performance.. 1973. . herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself. had the temerity to deny such allegations. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood. dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. . ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale. through Justice Street. as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before this Court. 1970. petitioner in L-36636.. 1959. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." . It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop. in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded. 1973. In fact he did file two motions for that purpose. On February 3. 1969. alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari.. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses. Lo Bu. pursuant to the provision of Section 17.. . Busmente in his Answer to this petition. As much. dated February 25. .. followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. herein petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J. Acting Director of Prisons. It is not so however in this case. all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23. now Chief Justice. For even if such be the case." What is more. So it must be here. that is merely. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. Ong Ting. and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12. where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. herein above reproduced in its entirety. " This allegation was made despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu. indeed. when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name.000. One last point. Valenzuela. which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its resolution of July 17. "Ong Ting lost everything...'" 13 3. and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31. On February 10. Under the circumstances. praying for the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond.00. On January 7. In Cruz v. 1973. the CIR issued an order on January 30. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu. 17 Counsel Yolando F... 1973. by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. He failed. he was still residing in the premises of the shop . be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition. the alleged manager in absentia. To all intents and purposes then. 3021-ULP. in his special and affirmative defenses.... this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory. The alleged sale was no doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents.. as stated earlier. On February 27. and it is not enough..000. categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court. to accord deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the case. he did specifically maintain: "On January 26. Mrs. also prolix. As noted... 1973. the ostensible vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. an alias writ of execution was issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road. 1969. the bad faith being evident.00 . was. in 1967.000. Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice proceeding.. which he denied..chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2.. 1973.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. which he acknowledged so fully paid . " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. one day before the schedule sale. for the purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22. 1973. Rules of Court). Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice. there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v. as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. in order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties. Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. he gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30. Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the Supreme Court. may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final .00. there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been . that is the law of the case. there was a fictitious sale resorted to. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work. . filed on February 20. . the then Justice. in an expeditious or less expensive manner. from which he realized P20. this Court. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. In the latter motion. The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. promulgated in 1969. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case. Rule 135. 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26. 6. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts. herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2.' So it has been from 1919. " Then. to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR. 1973.. with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. assailed in the certiorari proceeding. being the court of last resort. . he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner labor union." 9 chanrobles virtual law library That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order. 1969.' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him." 8 The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu. denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in accordance with law. there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith. private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance..' .Bu. was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3. Lo Bu.B. His family continued to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. 1973. for P20. 1973 and February 2. He could. as a forced intervenor. both of which were denied... There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. At the time Ong Ting died. as in this case. Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5.

and Teodoro Locsin Jr. notably Chinese Filipinos. Luis Mauricio. June 20. July 8. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x. national. in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya. 1989. to give counsel and advice. giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial. the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited . mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity). Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court.1989. Drilon. as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara. and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8. the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19. direct or indirect. Jose B." Mr. II. on the day of the election. Drilon's) candidacy. Emil Jurado. Mr. June 20.000. 1989. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.000 to P20. before the Supreme Court en banc. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with. Drilon. were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. was an informal one. Ramon Nisce. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand. and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i. in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard. and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend. Sunday. soul. I. and of the IBP officers. appreciated to P50. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. PER CURIAM: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3. or regional. the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday. Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar. Mr. and Violeta C. led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association.e. is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. Cruz. that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates. no less than the dignity of the profession. requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client. then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth.was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal.1989)." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus. 1989). Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments." the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously." headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals. and.000. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.m." Mr. directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors. 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. at 2:00 o'clock p. the Court. upon invitation of the Court. Concepcion. and marking of. especially conciliators and employers. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon is employed." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. including vote-buying. attended the dialogue.P. in its en banc resolution dated June 15. Violeta C. In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5. the alleged use of government planes. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press. Responding to the critical reports. Attorneys Nereo Paculdo. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind. The Supreme Court en banc. and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting. in addition. Reyes. delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve. namely. heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence. or chapter. and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband. resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officerselect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec. Triple costs. respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya.disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates. except that of dismissing it. However. the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4.. Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart. The fundamental assumption was that officers. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. there is a widespread belief. and the editorial. 1989). the ballots. the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. June 10. 1989). appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations. ready and eager to do his every bidding.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE. for the consideration of the Court. in an article." In his second column.L. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted. June 17. money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates. 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC). Thereafter.

refused to identify. Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. entertainment. Drilon. food. as Chairman. 14[a]. on letters. as well as the advertisement thereof. (d) Formation of tickets. I. agency or instrumentality thereof. or to vote for or against a candidate. on election day. Their stories were based. (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. or any similar consideration to any person. has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza. Emilio A. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. (6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Atty. IBP ByLaws). A Delegate. IBP BY-Laws). quasi-judicial. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Daniel Martinez. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective. Padilla. transportation or any article of value. Art. of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper. or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial. or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections. offered or promised to any person. 4. Governor. 1989. Narvasa. in any form or manner. drinks. by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution. (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member. without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. 14[e]. and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. entertainment to delegates. (2) giving of food. as members. drink. 14[b]. III. judicial. Non-political Bar. the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited. they said. except on election day. (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. (10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. single slates. (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate. acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. (5) Giving free hotel accommodations. The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving. whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member. quasi-judicial. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31. No lawyer holding an elective. 14. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. Article I. invoking the Press Freedom Law. and the Court. Griño-Aquino. and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts. The newspaper columnists. Abraham F. officer or employee of the Integrated Bar. (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. and Associate Justices Teodoro R. but whom they. Henry Dy. quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision. to conduct the inquiry. quasi-judicial. Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Messrs. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. thus: "SEC. The Clerk of Court. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. a businessman. of election campaign material. or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. or combinations of candidates. Luis Mauricio. phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts. or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. the Hyatt. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee. IBP By-Laws). "' Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC.acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. directly or indirectly. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political. (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. after deliberating thereon. executive vicepresident. Gancayco. and Carolina C. the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president. IBP By-Laws). The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. judicial. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Atty. 14[c]. SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED . Sarmiento. (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. while holding an elective. (b) Distribution. IBP BY-Laws)." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected. 14[e]. Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. judicial.

BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers. He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: (b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-atArms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.' 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region. 10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph: No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.". The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said petitioners, of Manila,

court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,

one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's

After remand. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON. with Atty. vs. and for the third time. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October. Bolinao. L-14066. 1966. ACCORDINGLY. . however. 39407. curiously enough. it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined. that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit. Castañeda. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. 37830-R). et al. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels.1966 this Court.N. on May 2. Our decision of May 22. After hearing. praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. Ago appealed. The Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners. docketed as L-26116." his motions were denied. Atty. Upon their petition. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3. In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. and on June 30. except Lourdes Yu Ago." or about August 3. 1. Ago moved to stop the auction sale. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G. affirmed the judgment.R. The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8.. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. the enforcement of the writ. Failing to obtain reconsideration.923. from registering the latter's final deed of sale. praying for the same preliminary injunction. Jr.propensity to litigate. ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS. J. as his co-plaintiff. in part. 39438-R). On January 31. The respondents then filed on August 2. 1961. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation. antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court. CASTRO. 1963 to the highest bidders. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied. Court of Appeals. 1963 when he filed. and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. which. Jr. 1967 the court finally. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot. the Quezon City court countermanded. 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. 1963. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. Ago failed to redeem. 1966. Bolinas. and on April 17. 1966. 1962. 1961 this Court. from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G. Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above.87. Crispin D.R. AGO. now joined by his wife. PASTOR D. it rendered decision. No pronouncement as to costs. in Ago vs. Lourdes Yu Ago. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. 1964 Pastor Ago. failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Bolinao. "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15. and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City. and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9. writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court. affirmed the dismissal. the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. reconsideration was denied on July 18.N. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done. the trial court issued on August 25. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26. A. 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. lifted the restraining order. On November 1. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners. the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. upon his own admission. Atty. and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. in Ago vs. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). Perez. which issued the writ of possession. However.: The parties in this case. L-19718. its primacy is indisputable. 1967. 1965. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued. respondents.1äwphï1. petitioners. On May 3. the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407. Baizas and A.

6. maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance. a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case. 1974. but is merely an inchoate interest. the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture. (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. for. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. and temper his clients propensity to litigate. of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled. we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963. have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. or even the impossibility. for. which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here. considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities. 419. laches now effectively bars them from raising it. the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not. there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued. p. must now enjoy them. 3. the respondents Agos. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. (b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim. which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion).. but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice. here. grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants. abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison. the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended. Invoking Comilang vs. to do that which. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court. 2 5. (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint. and (9) it was only on May 2. and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. its primacy is indisputable. 815) . besides living with her husband Pastor. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client. is failure or neglect. constituting neither legal nor equitable estate. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago. Relying upon Omnas vs. could or should have been done earlier.2. in the present case. 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started. (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution. 4. 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. prevent them from living together. the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless. as in the case at bar. on the merit or lack of merit of his case. long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit. 67 Phil. (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house. the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined. the decision would actually separate husband and wife. a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former. The assumption is of course obviously wrong. in a general sense. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client. elementary justice demands that the petitioners. unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession. This half-share is not in esse. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. Laches. We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2. We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who. and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end. and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union. then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit. (3) she lives in the very properties in question. a mere expectancy. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity. 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. rather than traverse the incontrovertible. Buendia. of its enforcement. and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. dated April 20. 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld. (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale. to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents. (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. et al. (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17. Now. for. she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed. Rivera. Atty. by exercising due diligence. 7 7. Even then. (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961. with the assistance of counsel. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice. have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. and even up to the present. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986). (Expediente. ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses.

did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. which resulted in the replevin suit.877. Luison. The Complaint Upon the first cause of action. the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value. the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.08 in damages. actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141. that. in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction.877. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular. in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99. which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable. the Agos allege that on January 5. and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings. as shown.We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint. for the reasons hereunder stated. Discussion on The Causes of Action of The Supplemental Complaint And The Amended Supplemental Complaint Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint." (Sec. This third cause of action. Atty. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. and that the bank also acted in bad faith. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos. are baseless. that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank. without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint. For the same reason. taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. the Agos suffered P174. we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches. the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago. Anent this third cause of action. The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action. then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos. and because of said acts. & Mrs. Rule 39.500. the sheriff sold the properties for P141. The issue here. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed. the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas. supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31.000 up to May 5. the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor. the inclusion of a paragraph averring that. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. but. which. pursuant to an alias writ of seizure. he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment. the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. Juan Quijano. it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint. still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs. 1966. the defendants. Atty. therefore. 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff. Upon the second cause of action. that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith. 1964. ACCORDINGLY. Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale. and the business venture that he entered into. caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale.877. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. to their damage in the sum of P256.750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99.08 out of the judgment value of P172. and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint. it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago. which shall be paid by their lawyer. the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal. seized and took possession of certain machineries. to cause more damage. the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action. Jose M. the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.923. they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17. the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon.000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. as barred by laches. and no third-party claim has been filed. moreover. is the same issue that we have already resolved. depriving the Agos of the use thereof. for.37 in civil case 27251. in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith. which is. 23. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

.000. REGALADO. petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. 3 His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit.JON DE YSASI III. the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it. Inc. 1983. medical and dental expenses. 9 Additionally. Apolonio Sumbingco. the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent. 0452-84. fertilizing. 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12. light. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC. 1980. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16. if any of the complaints pertain to their work. The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father. Albeit with distaste. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary. were not acted upon. weeding. and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. thirteenth month pay for 1983. For this case is an action filed by an only son. he was under the care of Dr. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil. in refutation. Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d]. respondents. 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. payment of back wages. Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC. 1992. Cebu City. notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. In June. private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. 8 Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues. consequential. National Labor Relations Commission. said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC. thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions. 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August. gasoline.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. food. Inc. Prior thereto. they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. thirteenth month pay and other benefits. Private respondent. he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil. 0452-84. and JON DE YSASI. J. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof. docketed therein as RAB Case No. most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other. Bacolod City. and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved.). CEBU CITY. such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator. First. Regional Arbitration Branch No. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent. . 1991. the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. thereafter. his father's namesake. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. herein private respondent. Following his marriage on June 6. with other allowances covering housing. On July 31. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses. a deep sinuous ulcer. without due notice. avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. 1984. In November.: The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case. However. for brevity). 6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes. the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting: This case is truly unique. private respondent's auditor and legal adviser. occupying the upper floor of the house there. 1982. Patricio Tan. 1992. . the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and.). Furthermore. as well as attorney's fees. as well as for the remittance of his salary. he lived on the farm. (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. on October 17. or the surgical removal of the fistula. 1982. two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. et al. but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5. 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause. vs. planting. 1984. petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION). 1984. petitioner. For this purpose. Both demands. in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition. in April. 10 I. moral and exemplary damages. As farm administrator. said decision was affirmed in toto. this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. the Solicitor General remarked: . 1982. power. that is. he underwent fistulectomy. harvesting. In his manifestation dated September 14. During his recuperation which lasted over four months. private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. VI. After an exhaustive reading of the records. telephone. Negros Occidental sometime in April. 1983 to January. however. for infectious hepatitis from December. as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran. dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d). Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. And secondly.

Tan. that there is no abandonment. Similarly. Dr. The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. v. the Court rules that for abandonment to arise. once able to work. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human experience. 20 The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Inc. Prefatorily. he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. illustrates what constitute abandonment. Vol. January 22. . we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. p. Mere absence is not sufficient. who eventually decided the case. not defeat. 16 On the other hand. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. As a manager. especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions. The fact . petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. During the period of his illness and recovery. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his coemployee's health. Tan. 19 The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance: It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982. petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process. and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara. NLRC (184 SCRA 25). Vol. 12 Thus. Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge. without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process. Octavio. is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 1989 edition. presents no procedural infirmity. For want of substantial bases. other than the one who conducted the hearing. which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. NLRC (191 SCRA 328). 133). there must be a deliberate. 1987 at 49-50). cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center. Uy.Rule 46 and Section 1[g]. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment.. we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. who conducted the hearings therein from December 5. III. Inc. but not the least. Bacolod City (Tsn. February 19. petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency. ever mindful of the longstanding legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure. for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. Last. This Honorable Court. Rule 50) of the Rules of Court. This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn. 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. to wit: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. such as herein public respondent NLRC. In Dagupan Bus Company v. in several cases. Third. in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative. 17 After a careful review of the records of this case. justice. and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment. In any event. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking. First. (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. 1985. it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. There are significant indications in this case. For this reason. is justified by his illness and strained family relations. and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of. Dr. we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence. petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. or a labor arbiter for that matter. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. in fact or in law. 1984 to July 11. petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao. 1986 at 20-44). III. unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. redundancy. (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. .

petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm. when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm. That as such planter-member of BIPA. is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case. hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Filipino. 25 As earlier mentioned. in this regard he proved to be quite successful. petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. 1984. petitioner argues. 1982. it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until April. he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984. as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. According to private respondent. 1984. 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities. nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders. however. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go. of legal age. and not salaries as. there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. specifically stating — 32 executed That I. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work. viz. was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. It was only in April. and a resident of Hda. 30 and remitting to private respondent through Atty. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G. it is clear. prolonged though it may have been. pension or allowance. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor. in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements. there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. as well as the property values and monetary sums involved. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives. as private respondent contends. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks: It is also significant that the special power of attorney by private respondent on June 26. which petitioner took care of. The assertion regarding abandonment of work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and. his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April. am a sugarcane planter. If. or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. specifications and other details relative thereto. private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January.remains that on account of said illnesses. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him. and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December. whether as salary. none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. in fact. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times. private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. it would be awkward. Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent. he kept petitioner on the payroll. with or without deductions. . Moreover. to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment.A. relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. 1980 in favor of petitioner. and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION. I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member. 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son. it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. In the present case. this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal. or even out of place. 27 To stress what was earlier mentioned. Manucao.. 1983. as this is undeniably among his basic rights. We repeat. 31 It will be observed that all of these chores. while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee. the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. considering the nature of these transactions. While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator. Machineries. such as an employee.. True. no longer listed him as an employee. asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital. It was only in January. as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations. Inc. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. INC. 26 With these. and who is familiar with the terms. 22 With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. in his pleadings. married.. and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14. hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL. reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes. 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities." 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. for this reason. petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated. Inc. Private respondent. BISCOM Mill District. 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. JON de YSASI. 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner. the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician. deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.

35 and. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission. Besides. there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. Decision to dismiss. In cases of abandonment of work. Sec. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise: Sec. Sec. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code. 2. in opposition. which involves the taking of testimony. 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work. my check/checks aforementioned. Report of dismissal. 42 On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings. the dates of commencement and termination of employment. Notice of Dismissal. ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. Furthermore. petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits. said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name. Rule XIV. that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures. but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition. We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case. Sec. HOWEVER. both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and crossexamine a witness. 6. Ovejera of said office.That I have named. Answer and hearing. if he so desires. as witness for private respondent. by way of substantial compliance. petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. TO GET FOR ME and in my name. 7. That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor. 33 the issuance of withholding tax reports. regardless of designation. the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. allowance or ex gratia handout. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month. as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address. Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel. VI of the NLRC. it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed. the Solicitor General rejoins as follows: The Labor Arbiter held thus: . thereby foreclosing his opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers. That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK". As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. notice shall be served at the worker's last known address. much less a chance to be heard. of my On procedural considerations. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5. 40 The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV. the monthly sums received by petitioner. 11. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. 39 Private respondent. if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor. as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. whether denominated as salary. 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. Sec. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative. the reasons for their dismissal. specifically. appointed and constituted as by these presents I HEREBY NAME. his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work. 5. argues that Section 2. especially when there is just cause therefor. he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case. the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JON de YSASI III whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee. place and stead. place and stead. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. 41 Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case. Right to contest dismissal. pension. but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.

that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if. petitioner insists on an award of moral damages. we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General: The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. where reinstatement is no longer possible. 188 SCRA 295). or constituted oppression. In the present case. . for his part. under Article 2229. therefore. an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. vs. NLRC. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and. in addition to moral. it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. (Decision Labor Arbiter. he must not be rewarded re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates. . And in lieu of reinstatement. Similarly. vs. instead. 80587). the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. This however. affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. temperate. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. NLRC. payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. to wit: As a general rule. wounded feelings. however. we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. 279.R. 49 III. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton. (Wenphil Corp. an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. NLRC. Security of Tenure. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence. 0452-84 should be modified. and social humiliation. This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. good customs or public policy. we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy. it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the present case. 53 We do not feel. maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office. under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. is guilty of illegal dismissal. the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. v. liquidated or compensatory damages. In the present case. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. Rule XIV of the implementing rules. 47 Thus. 48 We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination. The public policy behind this is that. Moral damages. For this reason. 170 SCRA 69. are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. however. the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with. or was contrary to morals. . a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales. instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. Section 11). arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud. 188 SCRA 295). G. and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. Private respondent. oppressive or malevolent manner. However. this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement. would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. at 11-12. 43 II. (Morales vs. — In cases of regular employment. on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code. inclusive of allowances. a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan. it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. NLRC. provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. besmirched reputation. good customs or public policy. and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement. No. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded. not only was petitioner dismissed without due process. 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned. and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer. NLRC. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. They are not recoverable as a matter of right. In Wenphil. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers. Inc. recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided. Clearly. 50 Exemplary damages. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. as required under Section 5 (now. however. seemingly. Private respondent.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. but his dismissal is without just cause.While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment. the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. 173 SCRA 192. may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish. . 51 We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. On this score. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause. But in Pacific Cement Company. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. therefore. or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. 45 The Court. Finally. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. Jr. records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. Annex "C" Petition). it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. the facts of the case justify their allowance. differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service. the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial: Art. vs.000. And for this failure.

who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983. separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service. WHEREFORE.00. REYNERIO I. 1975. Decena. 1976. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years. Complaint. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C. preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. On 10 September 1982. in lieu of reinstatement. to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts. the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur. One final word. the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. In fine. PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979. It is just as much their responsibility. as revealed by the records. purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. a member of the Philippine Bar.00. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind.NLRC. when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid.000. Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987. 1975. a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. of familial bonds.000. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. In his answer dated 18 March 1980. vs. It is the Court's earnest hope. By resolution dated 14 April 1980. he gave the document to respondent.lâwphî1. Despite the assurance. among others. we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted. we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute. sans sentimentality. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982. the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. Complainants' Complaint. respondent. with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking. complainants. by means of fraud and deceit. the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same. with malpractice and breach of trust. p. 16. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest. a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D. Pedro S. after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case. Once again.000. 18. respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.00 loan. respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality. respondent prepared a new document on May 7. 56 Rule 1. end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. 1975. . neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I." 57 If he ever did so. In this new Real Estate Mortgage. if not more importantly. despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. therefore. had compromised that case without their authority. report and recommendation. replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5. Jamero. that respondent had. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. On the contrary. In as Report. records) over the same lot 3125-C. But all claims for damages should be dismissed.000. for both parties are equally at fault. 1976. 58 and. p. respondent exacted from complainants P500. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. to conduct the necessary investigation. rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. Confronted by this discrepancy. they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4. October and November. we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them. or at least entertained the thought. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. Jorge T. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document. records). Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. SO ORDERED. succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City. it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5. After the same was notarized. taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice. Accordingly.00.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence. for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice. the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. without qualification or deduction. ATTY. On 19 July 1988. who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda. instead of the strengthening. DECENA. their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. 54 The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties. authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30. The complainant spouses alleged. however." On this point. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants. the Solicitor General presented the following: FINDINGS Complainants allege that on August 5. that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision. that respondent. Almonte. In the same manner. the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City. 183 SCRA 651). complainants signed the same. but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10. the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms. and upon such assurance.

it is to be considered as complaining all such terms. Consequently.000.000. Hence. despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him. complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person. For their failure to pay the obligation.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing.00. no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6. per advice of respondent himself. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality.000. Six (6) months at P500. being a lawyer.1976. rec. it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. hoping that they could redeem their property. is allegedly the truth. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5.000. 2 of case).00. as amended. plus the P2.00 equals P 3. 6.300. as appearing on said document. thus making a total of P10. (b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.00. or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings. Evidence of written agreements. we find against respondent. and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. 7. the respondent on October 12. Folder No.000. and on June 20.00 was supposedly due on August 31. This claim is incorrect.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva. Section 7. One of the exceptions.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30. but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B. which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2. 1975. that is.000. Respondent did not accept the proffered P10. i.. it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.).00 on May 7. There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5. Complainants' Position Paper). He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property. therefore. 1979. complainants signed the document. .00 (the actual amount was only P 4. From the facts obtaining in the case. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B. In this connection.400. neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation.respondent insisted that complainants sign the same. applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants. computed as follows: the first loan of P5.00 complainants' loan to one Engr.000.00. and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. October 31. 1976. After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent.000. The term "agreement" includes wills. finally. title was transferred to him.00.000. Adding this amount to the previous P5. Complainants. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5.000.000. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage. With respect to the second loan. Hence. considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4. he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.00 from complainants. and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed.e. and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance.000. However. the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5. 1975 and November 30.000. This respondent failed to do.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April.500. or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.000. were voluntarily signed by the complainants.00 on August 5.00 and the inflated P10. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500. While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate. as aforequoted. it may be stated that complainants.000. 1976. beginning December 31. 1975.000. particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract. respectively. p.000. and.000.000. 1975 up to May 31.000.00 on September 30.00. it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. 1975 and another P10. respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12. Thus. When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres.00 was applied to interest. 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants. 1976). 1979.00. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500. and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5.00. as between the parties and their successors in interest. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions.00. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4. as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8. the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5.000. applies in this case. Upon learning of the sale in March. at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976.00 but only P4. which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20.00.00 to complainants and not P4. respondent.000.000. 3135. there can be. complainants tried to raise the amount of P10.000. returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30.00. After the document was notarized. they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10.00 obtained from respondent. which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection. that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage.00. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.000. was clear of any encumbrance. Respondent's Position Paper). P6. 1975.000. should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage. p. which amount plus the P2. that they obtained a loan of P5. All the requirements of Act No.000. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing. relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality. re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. except in the following cases: (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing.00. 1979 to pay their obligation.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10. respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8. 14. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. 1976.000. since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5. 1979.

but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0. complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel. 1979. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. complainants alleged that respondent.C. complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500. for only P12. socially and intellectually.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement. relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained. 7 SCRA 859). In addition thereto. perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2. It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2. Court for District of Nebraska C. and respondent. the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting: In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Again. when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and. more so.Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0. compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent. At this stage. respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment. the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500. who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No.00. The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves. 1976. 34. He accepted the amount of P500. U. A parting comment.00. the fact that respondent received P500. Admittedly. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31. there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question' Going now into the second charge. as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722). respondent is in a better position financially. regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. 1979. as counsel of the complainants in this case. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M. Respondent's denial is spacious. or good morals for which he may be suspended.00 to respondent. complainants made the offer.' Clearly. Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much.lâwphî1. Dist. complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500. the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. Oblena. 00 as payment of the loan.000. The Investigating Fiscal. Knowing this. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent. complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent.000. they did not bother to have them explained by another .1979. However.S. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. Complainants' Position Paper. against accused Reynaldo Pineda. respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z]. Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them. had this to say: With respect to the second charge. barely a month after May 30. the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. in the case at bar. he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount. respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years. Indeed. alleging that if the offer were true.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same.) showing that the P500. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent.000. respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2. Id. At any rate.000. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M. To the mind of the undersigned. and not its prohibition by statute.00 that had been given to respondent.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Besides. who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying.00 as advance payment.00. without however. On June 27. modesty. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents.000. honesty. being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. With its lapse of time. 2).00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment. a difference of a few thousand pesos. The doing of the act itself. for estafa. However. All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him. In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. record). p. 734. knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery.000.ñèt In view of all the foregoing.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants. but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30. fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants. Folder No.C.

through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero. the complainants presented a number of witnesses who. being "contrary to justice. satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer. were crossexamined by the counsel for respondent. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality". Likewise. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. in fact. may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier.lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5. having received the amount of P500. although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 4. Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure.00. We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated." he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover. a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity. the second is that. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2. The following acts of respondent: 1. honesty. of course. held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses. complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined." The standard required from members of the Bar is not.00 to the complainants. respondent's conduct. Where however. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General. their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest. did not turn over the P500.000. after their direct testimony. renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. but the full amount in cash.000. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession. Generally. the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. Reynerio I.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. . making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10. with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987. the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived. In those hearings. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude. from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements. we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General. (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form). that is. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character.00. out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. 2. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority.000. had become final and executory. in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. which puts his moral character in serious doubt. 3. for a period of three years. not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the nonsubmission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process. but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement. Santos. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings.000. modesty or good morals. respondent's liability merits mitigation. Hence. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500. Jamero. constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.00.00 instead of P4. and 6. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. 5. Even so. done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. (Emphasis supplied) and made the following recommendation: WHEREFORE. which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent.

to say the least. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant. Mr. Rule 112. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. Numeriano Ocampo. the said accused being a private individual. Province of Romblon. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. 1948. defendant-appellant. 1947. MORAN. with the accessory penalties provided for by law. the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Who is that Mr. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest. FRISCO HOLGADO. 1948. Court: Arraign the accused. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney. the trial court rendered the following judgment: [Criminal Case No. the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them. the trial court proceeded as follows: Court: Fiscal: Is this the case ready for trial? I am ready. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1948. Two days later. and without justifiable motive. or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel.J. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Q." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. WHEREFORE. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney. and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. your honor. unlawfully and feloniously. in the municipality of Concepcion. 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney. the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. Contrary to law. being a private person. plaintiff-appellee. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 2 SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION SENTENCE The accused. with costs. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. I plead guilty. This case is called for trial on May 8. . Under this provision." On may 8. C. what is his complete name? — A. Frisco Holgado. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. The accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum. did then and there wilfully. What do you plead? — A. 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney. the day set for the trial. it was not prudent. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. Q. V-118] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years. Court: — to the accused. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned. but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.In the instant case. stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the following INFORMATION That on or about December 11. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. Court: Sentenced reserved." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted. Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.. plaintiff-appellee. or on May 10. The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. respondent Reynerio I. section 3. Under the circumstances. vs.: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. when a defendant appears without attorney. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question. Ocampo. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above described. vs. Q.

00 Info ANNULMENT. 5222041 CLINIC. The Legal Clinic. R E SO L U T I O N REGALADO. (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP). THE LEGAL CLINIC. 1977. but. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. & Special Retiree's Visa. UN Ave." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. Adoption. 521-7251. as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and.. to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. (4) U. 521-7232. the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Visa Ext.. what is worse.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. . vs. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. as a member of the legal profession. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAURICIO C. the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. Mla. Investment in the Phil. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. J. we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that. Call Marivic. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services. LEGAL Ermita. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. valid MARRIAGE? marriage.P. 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7. VISA. unethical. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein. Annulment of Marriage. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE. Manila nr. INC. THE 7F Victoria Bldg.. the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. respondent. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET P560. 522-2041.Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and. he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. petitioner. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. INC. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI). The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law.. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Guam divorce. particularly in the rules of procedure. in either case. that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted. 521-0767 1 Tel. It must be added. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. ABSENCE. Quota/Non-quota Res. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA). 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude. Immigration Problems. State Bar of Arizona." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney. In its answer to the petition. But above all. without counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. INC. Victoria Bldg. is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. thereafter. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. ULEP. US Embassy CLINIC. Inc. demeaning of the law profession. in the instant case. Ocampo. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232. for on a DIVORCE. 429 UN Ave. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. their memoranda.. So ordered. Declaration of Absence. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA). and. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous.

B. this is outright malpractice. arguendo. Furthermore. property." as the respondent would have it." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services. whether true or not. consequences.Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case. obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. as the term medical clinic connotes doctors. where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms. evidence gathering. common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced. Inc. Thus. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In addition. At the very least. and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code. . local or foreign visas. however. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. the only logical consequence is that. obtaining documents like clearance. and that is: Article 26. (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood. it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law. assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth. Rule 1. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services. which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered. constitutes practice of law? The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. At worst. which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law. too. just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. It is also submitted that . that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: Article 1. Said advertisements." if not suggesting a "secret marriage. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest. to wit.. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers. For who could deny that document search. 1. It must not be forgotten. or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter. the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers. apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public." the inviolable social institution. to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic. Even if it be assumed. Inc. public order and public policy. The Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest." which is how the Family Code describes marriage. by simply going to Guam for a divorce. While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public. The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. as the respondent claims. Worse. By simply reading the questioned advertisements. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic. In addition. . it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems. there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized. or business registration. The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications. It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question. More importantly. It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it. appears with (the) scale(s) of justice. this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice. violation of Philippine law. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage. good customs and the public good. in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader. the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam. it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. or any other advertisements similar thereto. morals. or serves to induce. that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services). And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services. marriage. the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it.02. passports. . It may be conceded that. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed. as published in the advertisements subject of the present case. This is not only misleading." Such a name. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so. but encourages. 4 A. emphasize to Guam divorce. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law. it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed. the respondent's name. as earlier mentioned. first of all. as earlier discussed. morals." makes light of the "special contract of permanent union. i. "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services".e.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. If respondent is allowed to advertise.. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. storage and retrieval. without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law. standardized legal forms. the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. and 4. This. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). Immigration Laws. but includes drawing of deeds. Both the Bench and the Bar. are wit: 1. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical. and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law. it must be required to include. Philippine Lawyers' Association: The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position. Although respondent uses its business name. may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved. even if both are (equal) in skill. Jur. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law. however. But its advertised services. 5 2. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters. but also misleading and patently immoral. Inc. p. the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. rendering opinions. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating. Legal and Judicial Ethics. 2. 2 and 3. especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take. Such practice is unauthorized. from offering such services to the public in general. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit. electronic data gathering. Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. However. immigration problems. knowledge and experience. that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law. in the information given. particularly regarding foreign divorces. misleading and immoral advertising. when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law. incorporation.. The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research. As advertised. however. litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields. a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter. the legal principles and procedures related thereto. It is an odious vehicle for deception. 6 3. who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. 1984 ed. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical. however. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance. 3. it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law. but before allowance of such practice may be considered. with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. or. and more importantly. albeit outside of court. and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. Comment). secret marriages. particularly on visa related problems. Precisely. There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services. . clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic. there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. It must be emphasized. annulment of marriages. investigators for gathering of evidence. and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice. respondent "The Legal Clinic. Inc. Inc. such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. as enumerated above. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. Also. 270). for the protection of the public. in answer to the issues stated herein." and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also. the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar. at the very least. respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic. Alternatively. Obviously. and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin. the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training. 1. Admittedly. law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession. should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form. not legal services. that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright. This is absurd. Rule 138. The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. Philippine Bar Association: Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen. absence and adoption. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Unquestionably. It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law. From all indications. through experienced paralegals. the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. 39). with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services.respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers. such as computer experts. that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion. Indeed.

asked by his client to omit a fire tower. . It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. as provided for under the above cited law. the fact remains that at present. seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages.clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law. the issues before this Honorable Court. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic. Are they practicing law? In my opinion. Nogales. Likewise. But this is not the case. Inc. divorce. This is not practicing law. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable. no one . who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article. the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law. perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. as claimed. . and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. Bankers. . A good example is the architect. a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. in support of some measure that he recommends. In the case (of) In re Taguda. immigration. . declaration of absence. adoption and foreign investment. such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies. staffed purely by paralegals. But suppose the architect. and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. and seek advice on divorce. We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee. Inc. factory and tenement house statutes. Or the industrial relations expert cites. this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so. Inc. there are in those jurisdictions. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: 1. measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. however." Clearly. Women Lawyers' Circle: In resolving." 7 4. then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. 8 A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent. . It is not only presumed that all men know the law. . Only then. Atty. 10 6. who must be familiar with zoning. . In the same manner. In the meantime. No amount of reasoning that in the USA. are highly reprehensible. Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder. these do not exist in the Philippines. for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. — does not help matters. provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. . . U.Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case. when in fact it is not so. . replies that it is required by the statute. they are not. . and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law. The most . or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. visa extensions. . While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice." 9 5. except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. . If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like. courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country. do not constitute the practice of law . In the same vein.P. is a lawyer qualified to practice law. could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards. Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases. as there are doctors in any medical clinic. It seems .. 37. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition. however. is unprofessional. paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law. when it cannot nor should ever be attempted. annulment of marriage. It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. building and fire prevention codes. legal matters . Of necessity. but when we are serving others. and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend. Inc. liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. . And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic. where in this country there is none. if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising. 53 Phil. when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic. will be given to them if they avail of its services. It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here. acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines: Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which. it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic. the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements. . which are in essence. At present. Assuming that Respondent is.. whether run by lawyers or not. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law. .

. and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. or of a statute. This. and give legal advice. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Among the larger corporate employers. the text and the forms. he would be practicing law. it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter. .9. 53 A. and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar. then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. 203. 154-156. Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining. In the present case. if as part of a welfare program. just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows. . however. 1. 2d 800. the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit. that aside from purely giving information. . (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. to guide his client along the path charted by law. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give. it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that: (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney. cited in Statsky. he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits.important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. 1. If a non-lawyer. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person. It is not entirely improbable. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees. would be the practice of the law. For instance. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. . renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. since the situation is not presented by the proofs. Introduction to Paralegalism [1974]. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client. annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). we should consider his work for any particular client or customer. The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.31. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread. such as the Legal Clinic. of course. or by other representative. such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . 1. like securing a marriage license. The law only provides the frame within which he must work. and ther representative' one not a lawyer. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. and making arrangements with a priest or a judge.10. Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.. as a whole. 1946. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this.8 From the foregoing. (Auerbacher v. even arguing questions purely legal. In this phase of his work. or by counsel. . even as a minor feature of his work. well-established method of conducting business is unlawful. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law. All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole. Let me add that if. However. consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here. to guide his client's obligations to his employees. may not constitute practice of law. may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. he drew employees' wills. the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit. absence. Services on routine. with or without a mediator. that is. This is not per se the practice of law. . however. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. The record does fully support. acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress.11. September 11th. the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct: Rule 15. or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce. at pp. 1. however. More recently. straightforward marriages. if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case. constitutes the unlawful practice of law. An agency of the federal government. Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two. there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce. does not transform his activities into the practice of law. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. Rules and Regulations. Wood. separation. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer. Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government. It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.). S. In determining whether a man is practicing law. especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion. and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. Here. then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. . with advice as to how the forms should be filled out. there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court. is. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. conveying. 144). They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. 194 N. in or out of court. 18 In the recent case of Cayetano vs. et seq. as advertised. It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case. NYS 2D 270 [1973]. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings. 129 Ohio St. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. some of which we now take into account. 6. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law.S. This Court. par. 23. (State v. practicing law. Automobile Service Assoc. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman. Otherwise stated. 313. constitute "practice of law. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. and receives pay for it. therefore. 665-666. and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2. The practice of law. annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. is engaged in the practice of law. we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. and in addition. advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court. of course. Respondent. With all the solemnities. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. rel. pp. of sound moral character. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. and the giving of all legal advice to clients.] 197 A. although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.2). In general. board. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . however. so far as concerns the question set forth in the order. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. 173. quoted in Rhode Is. and conducting proceedings in attachment. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. associations or corporations as to their right under the law. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. training and experience. 3 [1973 ed. Generally. cited in Statsky. E. to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. a wide experience with men and affairs. It includes legal advice and counsel. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services". covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Dudley and Co. in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law.I. particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce. 2. but embraces the preparation of pleadings. and property according to law. 13 In the practice of his profession. supra at p. 340 Mo." thus: Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. all advice to clients. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. 262.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. . non-advisory. separation. 348. 263). Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. the foreclosure of a mortgage. legal procedures. It embraces conveyancing. W. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. liberty. v. (Moran. and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured. 2. committee. are available.]. which requires the application of law.remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute. in a representative capacity. referee. Dworken . conveyancing.10. before any court. . and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.). E. Monsod. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. 102 S. (5 Am. performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law.. 12 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law means any activity. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. and not legal services. 139. Vol. No valid distinction. 2d 895. no Philippine marriage can be secret. is also practicing law. (State ex. citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass]. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term. 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases." such would constitute practice of law (Comment. Bar Assoc. we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. commissioner. pending or prospective. Mckittrick v. knowledge. he is in the practice of law. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. . it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. "It is not controverted. [R. 650). Winder. body. 193N. p. C. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services.. 15 One who confers with clients. in such representative capacity. that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling. 14 When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer. 176-177). It is not limited to appearing in court." 11 A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic. one who. On this score. Family Code). 852). Jr. 1. Agrava (105 Phil. 101. a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations.12. in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent.11." . Comments on the Rules o Court. to that extent. v. firms.

educational or employment records or certifications. if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. and family law. they take your temperature. or the computerization of research aids and materials. and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court. which are strictly non-diagnostic. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. In providing information. Rogelio P. for example. Further. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. we start by analyzing the problem. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for. Now. . out-patient. by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals. has specialists in taxation and criminal law. the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. fact finding investigations. 20 The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. property. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order. and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. about foreign laws on marriage. who. encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers. counsellors and attorneys. through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering. such as computerized legal research. The purpose is to protect the public. protect. obtaining documentation like clearances. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. counsel with. Avenue in Manila. and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation. to wit: Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals. such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices. in medical terms. giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful. Inc. storage. passports. WILOCI. have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise. then you would need a litigator. labor. 23 Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. divorce and adoption. entitled "Rx for Legal Problems. 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star.P. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or. is entitled to practice law. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. Nogales. interpretation." explains Atty. operation and effect of law. or defend the rights claims. kung baga sa hospital. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. corporate legal departments. Atty. With its attorneys and so called paralegals. it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies. if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will. courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. That's what doctors do also. marriage. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law. not in the protection of While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow. 24 The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. or liabilities of their clients. litigation. said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor. locating parties or witnesses to a case. Again. and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. like birth." where an insight into the structure. Atty. local or foreign visas. or business registrations. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir. and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property. 21 That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country. with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found. contract drafting and so forth." Atty. N. Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. as the weight of authority holds. like foreign divorce. evidence gathering. That's how we operate. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13. document search. And once the problem has been categorized. like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea. and have been admitted to. but rather. then it's referred to one of our specialists. the court. as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U. No matter what the client's problem. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization. designing and installing computer systems. There are cases which do not. we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. or software for the efficient management of law offices. furnish a copy thereof to the client. are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. "when they come. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who.The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. and who is in good and regular standing. who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court. non-advisory. with respect to the construction. they observe you for the symptoms and so on." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice. transmission and reproduction of information and communication. Nogales: This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic. these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. medico-legal problems. require surgery or follow-up treatment. and gather evidence to support the case. and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property. The Legal Clinic. and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar. processing. too. is not limited merely giving legal advice. hindi kailangang ma-confine. Nogales and his staff of lawyers. or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. the bar. 22 It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. programs.

in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons. Bayot 38 an advertisement. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. magazine. 32 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements. undignified. dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false. the names of clients regularly represented. the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true. 29 In the Philippines. . of brief biographical and informative data. in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority. namely. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper. degrees and other educational distinction. As a member of the bar. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. legal authorships. Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. 30 Accordingly. 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation. in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. even for a young lawyer. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. As admitted by respondent. the names and addresses of references. vs. membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof. a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper. . advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action. addresses. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates. the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes." 42 The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose. with their written consent. there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education. cable addresses." (Canon 27. the importance of the lawyer's position. public or quasi-public offices. Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. As pointed out by FIDA. the magnitude of the interest involved. Inc. deceptive. fraudulent. management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. magazine. we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. schools attended with dates of graduation. the name of the law firm which he is connected with.the bar from competition. or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task. fair. those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.). 41 The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists. rules or regulations granting permission therefor. address. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. posts of honor. 44 Verily. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). and all other like self-laudation. being for the convenience of the profession. self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Code of Ethics." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. A lawyer cannot. while there are none in the Philippines. but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services. . telephone numbers. the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment. publicity to attract legal business. 27 We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility. The card may contain only a statement of his name. in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities. Law is a profession and not a trade. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. For that reason. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. branches of law practiced. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States. similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding. or in return for. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics. and. 40 Of course. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. Whatever may be its merits. Thus. which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent . but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law. is not objectionable. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership. Estanislao R. and the American Paralegal Association. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of. misleading. The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. honest. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. without violating the ethics of his profession. it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. 43 The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. telephone number and special branch of law practiced. . such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. We repeat. the fact of listings in other reputable law lists. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. constitutes malpractice. trade journal or society program. not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The exceptions are of two broad categories. or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct. such as the National Association of Legal Assistants. either personally or thru paid agents or brokers. associates. firm name or office address. 36 The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. date and place of birth and admission to the bar. we have adopted the American judicial policy that. legal teaching positions.

reads as follows: LUIS Attorney Notary CANDIDATE Province of Isabela B. even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. even if unfair. which letter. admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano. 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter. he can help you collect your loans although long overdue. imperative that this matter be promptly determined. to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. any activity. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. such as that being invoked by herein respondent. just like the rule against unethical advertising. directly or indirectly. ISABELA. criticisms at times. to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. as well as any complaint for or against you. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer. I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates. since. and can execute any kind of affidavit. et al.. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board. TAGORDA. a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. of course. Isabela. Tagorda. 49 Considering that Atty. who is the prime incorporator. The ruling in the case of Bates. Otherwise. reads as follows: ECHAGUE. expressly or impliedly. was created should be passed upon and determined. whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent. 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent. — As notary public. which. it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer. Luis B. While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic. The Legal Clinic. is a member of the Philippine Bar. and is willing to help and serve the poor. a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano. from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition. He offers free consultation. Inc. MALCOLM. he is hereby reprimanded." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule. Inc. J. the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith. subject to disciplinary action. Besides. In sum. it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative. in (NOTE. as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers. is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.: The respondent. and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession. can renew lost documents of your animals. 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances. major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic. in translation.corporation for services rendered. he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office. and from conducting. it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems. to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. This interdiction. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In re LUIS B. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan. Inc. . it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: Trustworthy from Professional from Honest from Dignified from 45% to 14% 71% 71% 65% to to to 14% 14% 14% light of the putative misuse thereof. cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services. albeit in a different proceeding and forum. Echague. vs. we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. under the present state of our law and jurisprudence. as in the case at bar. that is on the 16th of next month. I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day. It is. At this point in time. can make your application and final requisites for your homestead. to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. As a lawyer. State Bar of Arizona. No such exception is provided for. FOR THIRD TAGORDA Public MEMBER Secondly. Come or write to him in his town. to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach. on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials. ACCORDINGLY. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague. Rogelio P. The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action. Nogales. in translation. September 18. the prohibition stands.

or to employ agents or runners for like purposes. The facts being conceded. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts. those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office. (Sgd. his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. or to remunerate policemen. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one.I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. the importance of the lawyer's position. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself. But as mitigating. This cannot be forced. but it is indictable at common law. but must be the outcome of character and conduct. the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. or to pay or reward directly or indirectly. the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. first. 2 R. with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association. second. his youth and inexperience at the bar. Rossman [1909]. his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. 1929. Cas. and have been upheld as constitutional. defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling. L. the sick and the injured. said codal section was amended by Act No. therefore.. 1. whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. 19 L. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct. and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. ADVERTISING. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. hospital attaches or others who may succeed. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards. and. (State vs. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements. Yours respectfully. I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration. court or prison officials. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. 17 Ann. 1097. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. Accordingly. Mac Cabe [1893]. constitutes malpractice. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional. or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations. to seek his professional services. 231. the magnitude of the interest involved. C.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice.. STIRRING UP LITIGATION. It lowers the standards of that profession. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood. R. third. relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1. being a matter of personal taste or local custom. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. is not per se improper. DIRECT OR INDIRECT. and especially with his brother lawyers. A. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. except in rare cases where ties of blood. In view of all the circumstances of this case. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession.. 625. the ignorant or others." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. The provincial fiscal of Isabela. 53 Wash. or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.. The law is a profession and not a business. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit. it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. and all other like self-laudation. 28. physicians. and are intolerable. not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. is unprofessional. People vs. and sometimes of convenience.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. even for a young lawyer. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles. in influencing the criminal.

Baizas. Felicisima R. scheduling for Friday. and while Atty. stating that: Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES. 3 During the pendency of the appeal. 1974. and the copy of the Resolution of July 9. Alberto and Associates. Sebastian Enterprises.. respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale. 1974 and no cause was shown. Inc.-G. R. JR. which docketed the case as C. No. Donna Marie N. Sebastian Enterprises. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. on the grounds therein stated. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition. REYES. the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence. petitioner. The material operative facts of this case. on 9 September 1974. issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal: It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5. therefore. 1974. 1974. the plaintiff-appellee therein. with prayer for preliminary injunction. Salaysay. 53546-R. Crispin D. 8 No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review. furthermore. J.R.-G. that the resolution of September 9.A. respondents. set aside and reversed. Reyes. are not disputed. . and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. and containing the following allegations: 1. . and ANTONIO MARINAS. the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein. Natividad. especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. 3. Eulogio B. INC. therefore. a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI. in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. 2 Petitioner. DAVIDE. as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. the law firm of Baizas. he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. . 9 Pursuant thereto. B. On 19 February 1974. 2. petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court. this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes. vs. thru its then counsel of record. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court. In the Resolution of 13 November 1975. to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C. . Reyes. thus. unjust and unlawful decision. 10 On 6 November 1975. petitioner. Atty. 1 On 7 May 1973. . senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS. Alberto & Associates. 6 On 28 September 1974. EULOGIO B. 757-R. the latter having established her own law office. the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants.R. COURT OF APPEALS. The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12 . counsel of BRSEI (B. petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975. filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. dismissing the appeal. Reyes. It had. HON. NICANOR G. That late as it may be.CANON 3 B. 1974. 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas. had also left the firm. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. Nicanor G.R. Crispin Baizas. as gathered from the pleadings of the parties. in the interest of justice. requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17. 1974. Inc. Reyes. be set aside. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. against the Director of Public Works. copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17. as Deputy Sheriff. . 1974. the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty.A. SALAYSAY. petitioner. Ruby Alberto. 14 On 12 January 1976. Rodolfo Espiritu. In its Resolution of 9 October 1974. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. and is. respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. No. . is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair. . . on 13 November 1975. now deceased. and Antonio Marinas. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus.. respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration.). the auction sale thereof. Hence. this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. died. received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Pasay City Branch. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9. Reyes and Renne Marie N. earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. 5 As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties. Crispin D. Baizas died on January 16. his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19. and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief. timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. the same became final and executory. until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. praying. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. Motion Denied. on 9 July 1974. filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal. respondent Court. thru its counsel. since all that BRSEI is asking for. R. Eulogio B. Eulogio B.

thru its president Bernardo R. State.). this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21 L-41862 (B. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded. 22 SCRA 494. 62 Phil. the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. Otherwise. petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS. previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. as well as petitioner's reply to said comment. — Considering the allegations. C. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. Crispin D. and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said case. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. It says: 31 Petitioner. nevertheless. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action. has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment. On 10 September 1976. 27 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. 276. the Answer to the complaint. 6). through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino. Alberto & Associates. which they complied with on 5 April 1976. et al. Alquiza. August 31. 384. Alberto & Associates" was . which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. 84 ALR 595. had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice. still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause. this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief. 11 So. petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas. As this Court. 30 We said: Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal." Hence. de Ordoveza vs. 108 Phil. vs. respondents' comment thereon.In the Resolution of 21 January 1976. Atty. Baizas & Associates. the law firm "Baizas. 26 On 29 November 1976. it appears that Atty. evince that the law firm "Crispin D. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal. et al. no fraud is involved. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. Sebastian Enterprises. L-30543.R. There must be such a showing which would call for. 757-R. Court of Appeals. 275. As held in Chavez. However. the petition should be given due course. vs. Inc. 20 In the Resolution of 12 May 1976. it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal. this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision. it. et al.. however. 1970. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. on 31 May 1976. Vda. prompt and justify its exercise (sic). 176." On January 16. Reyes with his heirs. February 10. This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof. Since counsel did none of those things. Chavez vs. 34 Idaho 623. Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe. Petitioner. said: We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld. petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Court of Appeals. In consequence (sic) of his death. engaged the services of Atty. Ganzon. In the instant case. in said case. and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief. That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief. however. 29 Fla. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. 34 SCRA 728). Said case. If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction. et. Alberto & Associates. Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. 1974. 1968. L-23342. Crispin D. State vs. issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. Raymundo. petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part. 279).." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas. But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. Sebastian. in its Memorandum. 66 O. Ganzon. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel.. 28 Indeed. it cannot and must not be upheld. Cawili. 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co. 16 In compliance therewith. Answer to Cross-Claim.G. extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals. vs. Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration. After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court. But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower court. Ramirez. the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. al. 203 Pac. Inc. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.

. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. SP No. Hence. petitioner's counsel. is binding upon the latter.R. In the Negros Stevedoring case. . ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers. As revealed by the records. took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office. Then. Court of Appeals. Branch 22. On the other hand. J. Inc. Crispin Baizas. But. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since. it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court. Undoubtedly. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974. nor (sic) is it unavoidable. the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm. its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. QUISUMBING. In the abovementioned Yuseco case. fraud. said law firm was dissolved. thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal. reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers. In Gutierrez & Sons. whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them. received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. 19943 and September 1. the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted. With Baizas' death. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. . to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. WHEREFORE. 33 Moreover. IT SO ORDERED. the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.4 respectively. In effect. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Atty. 1994. supra. which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when. Crispin Baizas.. 35271 affirming the orders dated May 5. none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Atty. constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals. granting . which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause. petitioners. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence. Crispin Baizas. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution. later left the office after the death of Atty. son of deceased Crispin D. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO AND GREGORIO GERONIMO.: This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision1 dated April 28. respondents. the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner. it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan. Costs against petitioner. This Court held therein that: The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices. in such event. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS. Jose Baizas. the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas. and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court. the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. thus. 1995. the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or. vs. hence. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy. Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the associates took over petitioner's case. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court. a copy of which the former also received. As pointed out by respondents. an associate who was designated to handle the case. on 28 September 1974. this Court held: The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable. on 6 November 1975. That Atty.in a terribly confused state of affairs. the responsibility of Atty. petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. vs. . it appearing that some. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. 35 Based on the foregoing. 1994. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION SAN ANTONIO. 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS. if not many. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief. Petitioner chose not to comply with it. the death of the latter must have been known to the former.2 July 12. it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas. Baizas. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. Espiritu.

To secure the loan.000. the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed. 1993. Tuctucan.859). . SO ORDERED. This compromise agreement shall be in full settlement of the obligations of the plaintiffs with respect to Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated February 14. Branch 22. thus making their total obligation in the amount of Two Million Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P2.019. after the lapse of six months that private respondents delivered the three titles to petitioners. 1994 DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AMEND THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BASED ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. the said plaintiffs shall be deemed to have waived and renounced any all rights. the trial court approved the same in its order dated September 22. 3. RT-6652 with an area of 2. 1994.000. private respondents obtained an additional loan of Nine Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P991. defendants San Antonio will execute a deed of resale/reconveyance/redemption of that subject property covered by TCT No. Blk. Bulcan. the possession of the plaintiffs of the subject property covering TCT No. RT-6652 (T-296744) including its improvements and thenceforth bind themselves to respect the right of ownership. Bulcan. 1993. private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT No. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied on July 12. c. RT-6653 after private respondents paid them Two Million Pesos (P2. damages and counter-claims they may have against each other. Lot No. TCT No. 1990. The Orders of respondent court dated May 1[5]. That lot situated in Brgy. Bulacan. Blk. the compromise agreement dated August 25. and possession of the defendants San Antonio over said property. docketed as Civil Case No.028. Within six (6) months from signing of this compromise agreement simultaneous to which delivery of the title to the afore-mentioned properties in the names of the defendants San Antonio.556 square meters.390 square meters and TCT No. 1995. 9. the Court of Appeals denied the petition on April 28. No. RT-6652 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. For a consideration of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2. …RULING THAT THE ORDER DATED MAY 5. ACCORDINGLY. payable on or before February 15. b.the motion for execution of compromise judgment dated September 22.000. a. That in the meantime. SO ORDERED.000).000. 1989 and the Susog ng Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated July 16. morals and public policy. Tuctucan. RT-6653 (T209250) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan including its improvements. petitioners refused to accept the same or execute an instrument for the resale. T47229 was issued in the names of petitioners. 1993 in Civil Case No. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan together with its improvements. As the delivery was beyond the agreed six-month period. 1994. the terms and conditions of which are quoted as follows: COME NOW parties assisted by their respective counsels and before the Honorable Court most respectfully submit this compromise agreement. This compromise agreement is immediately executory (underscoring supplied). petitioners. Private respondents filed a motion for execution of the September 22. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals. the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. Municipality of Guiguinto.00) Philippine Currency in hand received today by the defendants spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio from the plaintiffs. 1994.7 Hence this petition for review wherein petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: I.6 In accordance with the stipulations in paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement. 1993 order with the trial court. subject matter of the complaint. For the release/resale/reconveyance of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. the spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio. 29832.00) within the same period. the terms and conditions of which are: 1. That lot including its improvements situated in Brgy. 6. and those related there. 30078. Before the one-year redemption period expired. TCT No. RT-6653 with an area of 10. The facts. for the purpose of the cancellation of the annulment of the sale in the title subject to the condition that should plaintiffs fail to deliver the titles to the three lots heretofore mentioned to the defendants San Antonio. hence. however. 2. RT-6653 (T-209250) shall it be respect. 233-M92. as culled from the records. II. Municipality of Guiguinto. This was granted on May 5. A second motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated September 1. being the highest bidder bought the two parcels of land. petitioners executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale covering TCT No. claims and demands whatsoever they may have over that property covered by TCT No. Bulcan covered by TCT No. plaintiffs obligate themselves to transfer the ownership of the following to the defendants San Antonio. 4. they submitted to the court on September 16. Subsequently. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due date. a compromise agreement dated August 25.33% per month. or to pay Two Million Pesos (P2. 3 consisting of 135 square meters. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No. 1994. 1993 is hereby APPROVED. RT-6652. 233-M-92. covered by TCT No. private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure with preliminary mandatory injunction. The parties are enjoined to comply faithfully with their obligation under said agreement. failed to transfer the ownership and deliver the titles of the three parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the agreement or to pay 2 Million Pesos within the six-month period from August 25. Lot 27 consisting of 78 square meters. RT-6652 (T-296744). 1993 reveals that the terms and conditions thereof are not contrary to law. covered by TCT No. are as follows: Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria Geronimo obtained a loan in the amount of One Million Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P1. Another lot situated in Brgy. 1993. 1994 are AFFIRMED. Municipality of Guiguinto. …RULING THAT THE DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. …RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT. thus: A careful perusal of the Compromise Agreement dated August 25.5 Finding the above to be in order. 6652 (T-296744) and TCT No.000) from petitioners. It was only on March 4. July 12. (SIC) 5. Tuctucan. 4. 1993. and September 1. After the parties presented their respective evidence. and is DISMISSED. 30079. As said earlier. Blk.859) with an interest of 3. the defendants San Antonio will execute the corresponding instrument of resale/reconveyance/redemption over that properly together with its improvements covered by TCT No. 1991. reconveyance or redemption of the property covered by TCT No. with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Private respondents. Guiguinto. That the parties further agree to set aside any claim. III. 38 consisting of 75 square meters. During the auction sale. Consequently.000. thus: WHEREFORE. both situated in Barrio Tabe.

1994. While indeed private respondents did not meet head on this issue. They assert that they were not seeking rescission of the compromise agreement but its full enforcement regardless of whether the delay is slight or substantial. petitioners raise the following issues for our resolution: 1. reconveyance or redemption despite their receipt of two million pesos.16 Compromise agreements are contracts. In their view. petitioners deny that they are guilty of delay for not executing the deed of resale. July 12.8 In sum. RT-6652. which was the execution of the deed of reconveyance. Branch 22. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. 1995.IV.10 In this case. as the judge was merely performing a ministerial duty.17 WHEREFORE. The compromise agreement approved by the trial court in its order dated September 22. Private respondents claim that the trial court. because it is in effect an amendment to the compromise agreement. the orders dated May 5. SO ORDERED. public order or public policy. But as shown in their decisions. private respondents admitted that petitioners already executed a Certificate of Redemption. The trial court therefore. The decision dated April 28. to deliver the titles to the three parcels of land described in the agreement. Lastly. once approved by final order of the court. are hereby declared NULL AND VOID. and resolution dated September 11. ownership over the land covered by TCT No. 1993. we find that this point serves only to confuse the Court on the real facts of the case. …APPLYING ARTICLE 1191 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. or put an end to one already commenced. 1993 to February 25. 35271 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. to accept the three titles beyond the six-month period. 1994. as it was only on March 4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . provided that private respondents had six months within which to deliver the titles. like the ones in this case.12 Private respondents could have done so earlier. delay by private respondents has not yet occurred. 14 For us. this was sufficient compliance of petitioners' duty under the Compromise Agreement.R. it will be unjust to petitioners if we compel them to accept the three titles despite the lapse of the agreed period. the compromise agreement clearly provided private respondents six months.11 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attributed to the Register of Deeds private respondents' delay in the delivery of the three titles. pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement. It was error therefore for the trial court to grant the writ of execution in favor of private respondents because it effectively compelled petitioners to accept delivery of the three titles in exchange for the release of the land covered by TCT No. 13 Nevertheless. They said that as early as August 25. This only shows that private respondents did not intend to truly comply with their obligations. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a valid contract. 1994. the court which rendered it loses jurisdiction over the case and it can no longer be modified except for clerical errors. i. did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? Petitioners claim that the trial court did. Hence. It has the force and effect of res judicata. Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law. A compromise agreement. via a writ of execution. we find that it should be properly addressed. private respondents failed to deliver the titles on February 25. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. delay sets in only when one part fulfills his obligation and the other is unable to perform his part of the obligation. has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it. VI. Private respondents are ordered to cease and desist from disturbing the ownership and possession by petitioners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. when they gave the titles to petitioners. they already executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale of the land covered by TCT No. a person obligated to deliver something incurs in delay only after demand. ownership of the land covered by TCT No. We find petitioners' petition impressed with merit. 1994 and September 1. Private respondents counter that there has been no modification of the final judgment when the trial judge issued the writ of execution. They explain that even on equitable considerations this was not allowed because once a decision becomes final. private respondents did not indicate as to which parcel of land petitioners did not execute a deed of resale. as the judge issued the writ of execution. 1995. is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code15 applicable in this case? According to petitioners. whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation. As herein petitioners have not yet made demand and as they have not yet performed their part of the agreement. Petitioners contend that judgement based on a compromise is conclusive upon the parties and is immediately executory. they must be complied with in good faith. 1993. RT-6652 even after the lapse of the six-month period. Did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? 2. RT-6653. Private respondents additionally point out that in reciprocal obligations. If after the lapse of the said period and no delivery is yet made by private respondents. beyond the six-month period deadline. 1994. Costs against private respondents. the petition is GRANTED. petitioners could rightfully refuse acceptance of the titles. Petitioners also contend that private respondents should not blame the Register of Deeds for the delay in the delivery of the three titles since private respondents submitted the registration documents to the Register of Deeds only on March 2. hence it cannot be modified. petitioners sought the appellate court's declaration that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. in issuing the writ. good customs. from August 25. Further. the Court of Appeals erred when it found that private respondents' delay did not constitute substantial breach to warrant rescission of the compromise agreement. V. beyond the six-month period. Accordingly. petitioners said. …NOT RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 6 THEREOF. 1994. Thus. 1994. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. As to the alleged delay on the part of petitioners in executing the Deed of Resale and Reconveyance.. private respondents deny that they delivered the three titles late and if ever the delivery was delayed it was the Register of Deeds who was to blame. but they did not. As the facts of this case show. … NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY COMPLIED WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Also. it was error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of contract. was merely performing a ministerial duty. cannot compel petitioners. private respondents submitted to the Register of Deeds the pertinent documents for registration of the three titles in petitioners' name only on March 2. Despite the fact that the compromise agreement involved two parcels of land up for redemption. If they failed. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos.9 In this case.e. In filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. morals. 1994. Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applicable in this case? On the first issue. While it becomes the trial court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution may be refused on equitable grounds. Bulacan. Likewise. SP No.

respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. (See Ruben E. ROMEO L. stressing that: . respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them. Agpalo. 5. 1. complainant. SO ORDERED. Vicente C. p. On May 26. KWAN and JOSE A. respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. a law firm organized in Illinois.00 as pocket money per trip. VICENTE C. sought to enjoin Juan G. J. it is only during the incumbency of Atty. cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. Rules of Court). what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office. Attorney Dacanay. respondents. Causing undue injury to a party. JR. CLARO TESORO. LUIS MA. J. GUERRERO. 1987. 1987. complainant vs. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. 1983 Ed. admitted to the bar in 1954. that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration . 15. On May 19. CURAMMENG. Jr. respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago. for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie. in his 1980 verified complaint.. 2. Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. Inc.... DACANAY. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum. 7. Respondents. V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers.: Lawyer Adriano E. the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality. Rule 138. Dishonesty. ATTY. using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie. Legal Ethics. 115. 1979. We hold that Baker & McKenzie.. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not. since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2.. house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision.. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements. vs. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare. Conduct unbecoming of public official. JR. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. Extortion. 10. RENOMERON respondent. Renomeron. Gabriel. SANDEJAS. On May 22. Rollo. Rollo. to H. respondent imposed additional registration requirements.E. respondents' memo).000) was sent to respondent through his niece. (p. 4. AQUINO.. LUCAS M. RAFAEL E. 3. Torres. (p. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics. 6. 1987. NATIVIDAD B. In a letter dated November 16. Renomeron. SALONGA. There was no action from the respondent. PER CURIAM:p This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. NUNAG. Inc.) WHEREFORE." Not having received any reply. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (V & G for short). Dacanay. COLLAS JR. or. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification. filed against Attorney Vicente C. he filed the instant complaint. are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. Collas. TORRES. practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres. Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial. Collantes. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr. in lieu thereof. the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives. VICENTE A. in his reply dated December 7. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. being an alien law firm. JOSE R. which contains the names of the ten lawyers. which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2. 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2. a client. 1987. aside from being members of the Philippine bar. COLLANTES.) . the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20. to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: 1..) As early as January 15. 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.ADRIANO E. Another request was made on February 16. asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International. 3. denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 6 FERNANDO T. EVANGELISTA.000. 1979 respondent Vicente A.

and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which. extortion. not in the original denomination of P100. a high sense of honor. After due investigation of the charges. Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA. 1983 Edition.On May 27. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. xxx xxx xxx In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement. Case No. 1579). notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents.) The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion. pp. the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation.00 bills but in P50. recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility. such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding. Bonifacio on February 22. to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter. emphasis supplied. to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved. disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics. the President of the Philippines. de la Cruz. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession. As recommended by the Secretary of Justice. 7. 64 SCRA 784. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer. Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16. We believe that. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. by Adm. Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. The answer is yes. on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece. Rules of Court. its exalted place. speedy. the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. a disbarment complaint against said respondent.) Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. People vs. or be heard in a formal investigation. The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved. respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment. . and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service. against respondent Register of Deeds. dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. Section 17. Ruben E.. 1419. and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension. respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator. respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action. with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. 1988.' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him. absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official. that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question. throughout the centuries. the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to . In his answer dated July 9. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service. in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party. for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. 165 dated May 3. The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds. Order No. Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct. In a Resolution dated July 27. Rollo. Ms. As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality. Upon receipt of the charges. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]).. 66-67). fair.1987 (Consulta No. The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and. retrieved from him the amount of P800. for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. (pp. the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4.790. he continued with his inaction. and efficient administration of justice. in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification. Rollo). [a] and [d]). The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. 1987. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws. 789.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. Exasperated by respondent's conduct. Attorney Leonardo Da Jose. 5. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The investigator. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration. 968). recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty. and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice. 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. and that. subpars. 17-18. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics. intellectual honesty. as a lawyer. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 1987. From a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138. subpars. its prestige. are expected those qualities of truth-speaking.00 bills. Agpalo. and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. effective immediately. 102 Phil. and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. De Luna. 1990. full candor. in this case. may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. have been compendiously described as moral character. 1987. that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof. 87-15).

The presiding judge of the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province has the power to cause the prosecution of criminal cases to go forward. PEDRO BARREDO. in the exercise of the sound judicial discretion conferred upon them. PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO. Suffice it to say that so strongly were we impressed by the forceful oral argument of counsel for the appellants with the possibility of a grave miscarriage of justice in the court below. Low (19 Phil. who saw and heard the witnesses testify and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of the account of the commission of the crime of attempted rape which was given on the witness-stand by the principal witnesses called for the prosecution. except. we think there can be no doubt of the power of the judges of Courts of First Instance to appoint special fiscals or prosecuting officers.01. the judge of the Court of First Instance is not only authorized but is required to appoint a temporary fiscal to represent the Government in such cases. legal appointment. to perform their duties. 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. and the trial conducted by a special fiscal. was not disposed to press the case. nor shall he. Judge Guevarra. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. that about the 2nd of October. and if the officer designated by law to prosecute such criminal cases fails or refuses to perform his duty. Code of Professional Responsibility). improvidently appointed by the trial judge without authority of law. who shall be paid out of the provincial treasury the same compensation per day as that provided by law for the regular provincial fiscal for the days actually employed. promising. as he himself. 1912. that we carefully and exhaustively abstracted and analyzed for ourselves the great mass of evidence brought here on this appeal. the effect of which need not be and is not now considered. 150 SCRA 269). The fiscal thus temporarily appointed shall discharge all the duties of the provincial fiscal as provided by law which the regular provincial fiscal fails or is unable to perform. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE UNITED STATES. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. and a careful examination of the record discloses nothing which would justify us in disturbing the findings in this regard of the trial judge. A large number of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense were called at the trial. WHEREFORE. In its last analysis. or his assistant. the mere fact that the judge acts unwisely or improvidently or under a misapprehension of facts when he makes an appointment in no wise affects the legality or the validity of the appointment. 150 SCRA 269.engage in unlawful. 142 SCRA 632. defendants-appellants. would justify us in holding that the trial judge erred in arriving at his conclusions as to their guilt. Moreover. four months and one day of prision correccional. wherein he set forth that on the 12th of June. that the provincial fiscal had not done anything further at the date . that on the 29th of the same month the accused waived a preliminary trial before the justice of the peace and prayed that the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance. without discovering anything which. vs. Court Administrator vs. 244): "If the provincial fiscal fails or refuses to discharge his duty in the prosecution of criminal cases. we do not think that in the case at bar the special fiscal was erroneously or improvidently appointed. J. and affords no ground for appellant's contention as to a lack of jurisdiction in the court below to entertain and decide a criminal action based on an information filed by a special fiscal legally appointed for that purpose. perhaps. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. would be impeded on account of the refusal on the part of the attorney. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1. in our opinion. the appointment when made was a valid. and even if it were admitted that the trial judge acted improvidently or unwisely or erroneously in making the appointment. the judge of the Court of First Instance for the province is authorized and required to appoint a temporary fiscal. Sison.: The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of the crime of attempted rape. plaintiff-appellee. He should therefore be disbarred. never-the-less to ask the court to appoint a special fiscal. 1912 the private prosecutrix filed a complaint against the defendants in this action in the court of the justice of the peace of Nagcarlang. Hermoso. CARSON."1awphil. in cases wherein it appears that there has been a manifest abuse of judicial discretion in making the appointment. they find that "the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. or fails or refuses to discharge his duty by reason of illness or other cause. as a result of the machinations of the personal and political enemies of one or all of the defendants. 1699 reads in part as follows: "Whenever the provincial fiscal is absent from the province.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent. it might occur that the whole court machinery. The appointment of the special fiscal was made in response to a petition filed by counsel for the private prosecutrix on November 8. but later declined to do so. together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. Code of Professional Responsibility. that the cause was remanded in the early days of July. then the judge or court must relieve such officer temporarily and appoint a qualified person to take his place. and indeed from the plain and explicit provisions of the statute. It is urged that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises because the information charging the commission of the crime was filed. (Rule 7. There can be no question of abuse of judicial discretion in the appointment of the special fiscal in the case at bar. final judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused necessarily turns upon the degree of credit which should be accorded the respective witnesses called for the prosecution and the defense. or fails or refuses to discharge thus duty by reason of illness or other cause. and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Hermoso. with reference to criminal cases. If the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province did not have authority to appoint a temporary fiscal when the exigencies of the service demanded it.net Construing and applying this statute we said in the case of Nuñez vs.03. 1912. dishonest. In his opinion the trial judge sets forth at some length the material evidence adduced at the trial. that thereafter the provincial fiscal promised to file a formal information against the accused. 278). whether in public or private life. and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys SO ORDERED. when. The attorney for the Moro Province and his assistant stand in the same position as a provincial fiscal with reference to this matter. Rodolfo G. and the record contains some two hundred and fifty pages of typewritten testimony and documentary evidence. It remains only to consider the contentions of counsel for the appellants touching the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain and adjudicate this action. 1912 the provincial fiscal conducted an investigation of the alleged crime at the urgent request of counsel for the private prosecutrix." From what was said in the case just cited. or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103). honorable. charging the commission of the crime on the 9th of that month. and a restatement and review of the evidence at this time would serve no useful purpose. Rep.. Section 1 of Act No." The power to appoint special fiscals being thus expressly conferred upon judges of Courts of First Instance. it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. and each of them was sentenced to two years.

whose investigations have satisfied him as to the innocence of persons charged with the commission of crime. directly or by construction. a complete act . to aid him in determining the course to be adopted at this stage of the proceedings that provision is made in section 2 of Act No. leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in the premises. requires the consent of the court. and others wherein while the prosecuting officer acts practically on his own responsibility. it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations. and that the judges should not therefore challenge the formal expression of his will in this regard. as counsel supported by authority contends. secs." The order is usually taken upon motion by the prosecuting officer and with leave of the court. discontinue a criminal prosecution in that form at any time before verdict ." (Anonymous. Some American states have followed the English rule. Nor is it in our judgment. This the Solicitor General did not ask. The legislature finding the power in so many hands. We agree with the contentions of counsel that a conscientious prosecuting official. 139. The minutes are the records of the acts of the court and no entry can be made thereon except with his consent.. provided that it should not thereafter be lawful for any district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi upon any indictment. and returned with an extended statement. Enc. and that a special fiscal should be appointed to prosecute the case in view of the manifest indisposition on the part of the provincial fiscal to bring the accused to trial. in which this official set out at length his reasons for declining to file an information. to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted. Ordinarily. 556. But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal. 483. Others have declined to adopt it. he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the facts. at least. 13. or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to that end. and 25 Wendell. that the evidence against them was unsatisfactory and unworthy of credence. But it is to be observed that it is expressly provided that: "This section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as justice of the peace in any preliminary investigation. should not institute criminal proceedings against such persons. in view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to file an information and bring the accused to trial. and to move the court to dismiss the proceedings. Cas. with the cognizance of the court. or in any other way discontinue or abandon the same without leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense charged.. and of the provincial fiscal held that in the interests of justice it would not be proper "to deny the petition of the injured woman" and appointed a special fiscal under the provisions of Act No. therefore. 1 Hill. The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in such cases is either to go forward with the prosecution or to move the court to dismiss the complaint. without the content of court. It must go on the minutes of the court and must transpire.) At common law the attorney general alone possessed this power. that the practice whereby the prosecuting officer in some jurisdiction enters upon the records of a criminal case that "He does not desire to prosecute further" — dicit nolle prosequi — is a very ancient one. of Plead. or if it appears to him from the record of the proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace. The nolle prosequi was not. we need hardly say that we think the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to prosecute the case." Upon a motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace. although we are aware it has often been done. Under the English rule the uncontrolled right to enter a "nolle prosequi" was the prerogative of the Attorney-General. 2.) In Virginiaa 1803. 1 and 2. and the investigations of the provincial fiscal have satisfied him that the accused person is innocent. and might. It is. McLeod. But even before that Act. In substance he stated that as a result of his investigations based upon the complaint of the private prosecutrix. When the justice of the peace remands an accused person for trial in the Court of First Instance. . he may deny the motion. within the power of the Solicitor General to nolle prosequi an indictment at his option without the approbation of the court. 2nd ed. The right of the Attorney.) Nor was the paper handed by the Solicitor-General to the clerk an entry of nolle prosequi. sec. 377. 1389. and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts. 1 Va. It probably exists unimpaired in the attorney general to this day. in part. But we are of the opinion that in the event that criminal proceedings have been instituted. expressly provide that in case the justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. (10. and some of the courts which do not consider themselves bound by common law precedents have declared the English practice unsound and have held the better rule to be "to ask leave of the court giving some good reason therefor. or in which a custom amounting nearly to law does. and fearing its abuse . . and it has been by several statutes delegated to district attorneys. Such a proceeding is to be coram judice. "amounting nearly to law" requiring the consent of the court in all cases wherein it is exercised.General to dismiss without consent of court was there maintained under the theory that that officer was the immediate representative of the King.. and can only be terminated therein by the court itself. 194. 1627. the court claims the right to control him if it chooses.. (People vs.) There are States in which a statute. 302 for official investigations by provincial fiscals.itc-a1f The modern tendency would seem to be to modify and control the power of prosecuting officers in this regard either by express legislative enactment or by the judicial recognition of a custom. and section 2 of Act No. the case becomes forthwith a criminal action pending in that court. it rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. and in either event to move with the promptitude necessary to secure the right of the accused to a speedy trial. 1912).. 194. or as a result of information furnished by the private prosecutor. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge or Court of First Instance" — not that he shall await the action of the provincial fiscal. and Practice. or otherwise. and proceed with the trial. In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power. By the act of 1870 it is expressly provided to the contrary. and in some it is not plain what the course is. It is true. that is to say in the presiding judge thereof. he was satisfied that the accused had not committed the crime with which they were charged. Vol. Thereafter the trial judge. that the case should not be dismissed. and that they were victims of a conspiracy of their personal and political enemies to ruin them by compelling them to stand trial for a heinous offense which they had not committed. but only as authorizing him to secure the attendance of witnesses before him in making necessary investigation for the purpose of instituting or carrying on criminal prosecutions.. 1699. Criminal Procedure. the General Court consisting of five judges unanimously decided: "That the District Attorney has not in any case the right to enter a nolle prosequi without leave of the court. we know of no authority for it: — The State is the party . It is for the justice of the peace to determine whether the accused shall be remanded for trial. of course.. Discretion in the matter of subjecting to trial persons remanded for trial in a Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace lies with the judge of the court.of the petition (November 9 [8]. upon full consideration of the statements of counsel for the private prosecutrix. This petition was endorsed over to the provincial fiscal by the presiding judge. sec. who now represent the attorney general in nearly everything pertaining to indictments and other criminal proceedings local to their respective countries.. under section precautions as he felt it his duty to adopt. and Act No. Holding as we do that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a finding as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Act No. (Bishop.

(Statham vs. and I should require. 136 prescribing the duties of the provincial fiscal provides that: "He shall be an officer of the Court and subject to its directions in relation to official matter pending in the Court of First Instance. in holding that evidence presented by the government. though from the nature of the case it must be Ex parte. and great evils may result and have resulted from placing such a power in the hands of one man . that probable cause be shown. ..and the Solicitor General only the agent to carry on the proceeding.R. and which. therefore. 410. 59. 528. Although in making a commitment the magistrate does not decide on the guilt of the prisoner. but is obliged to hold one accused of crime for trial if there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty. in such cases only is it lawful totally to discharge him.. 491). In this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge.) it was said: "Evidence that would justify a committing magistrate in finding that probable cause existed for the detention of a defendant need not necessarily be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty when he is placed on trial. .. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison or give bail.. and partly for the information of committing magistrates and prosecuting officers generally. 642) this court said: "After the complaint has been presented and certainly after trial has been commenced the Court and not the fiscal has full control of it. I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed. 11 L. He has not and ought not to have unlimited power of prosecution. This probable cause.. whether the accused shall be discharged or held to trial. and upon that question express no opinion. the committing magistrate is not required to find evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction. is not required to have submitted evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the person charged beyond a reasonable doubt. which. or by his deputy.A.)" In State vs. .. But we think that the evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to justify and require his proceeding promptly with the trial.S. N. 82 Pac.. In this connection it is proper to observe that a magistrate. when desiring to nolle prosequi a case after indictment found...S. and we do not pretend to say that he must have been convinced of the guilt of the accused. in deciding that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima facie case. in what place they are to be tried. and that this limitation upon their power extends to the dismissal of complaints upon which accused persons have been committed or admitted to bail to await the action of the judge of the Courts of First Instance.Y. 194 provides that when a justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. Willet vs. the question to be determined is.." Section 2 of Act No. as was the trial judge after hearing the evidence. 193. 41 Ga. 68 N. "If. 1 Abb. under the uniform practice since the announcement of the rule in the case of United States vs. though in most other respects. Valencia (1 Phil. He evidently was of opinion that it rested wholly in his discretion whether the case should or should not proceed to trial.) In the case of King vs. and has not been questioned by this court. . acting as committing magistrate. . In conclusion we here insert a number of citations of authority touching the degree of proof upon which an accused person may properly be required to stand trial for the crime with which he is charged. is not doubtful. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge of Court of First Instance. Rep.) .. of Act No. Beecher. But the common law is not in force in this Kingdom . An examination to see whether an accused person shall be . In failing so to do.. 25 Fed. it was said: "We are not called upon on this hearing to pass upon the sufficiency of this evidence to warrant the conviction of the defendant. 125. or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless. and as a logical and necessary consequence of the above cited provisions of the statutes in this regard. 554). 10 Ann. (Moulton vs. and that he had the uncontrolled power to decline to prosecute. consisting principally of affidavits." The rule in New York is thus stated in People vs. 130. In the case of United States vs. Burr.]. and if the latter. the judge viewed such evidence from the standpoint of a trial court. and we think that under all the circumstances the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to conduct the proceedings in his stead. giving the court or the presiding justice some satisfactory reason therefor.. As was said in a recent decision (In re Mitchell [Cal.Y. If.. partly in explanation and support of our ruling upon the action of the court below in holding that the provincial fiscal had failed to discharge his duty in the premises. he failed in the discharge of his duty.. 347): "In order to hold defendant and put him on his trial. without deciding upon guilt.Y. prefaced his opinion as follows: "On an application of this kind. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the Court. . Perkins vs. yet he does decide on the probable cause and a long and painful imprisonment may be the consequence of his decision. asks leave of the court that it may be so entered. and that he failed to discharge it when he neglected and declined to proceed with the prosecution. to be such as a court and jury might hear." 135 N. Chief Justice Marshall. Robertson (6 Hawaii. in holding a defendant to answer for a crime.S. 507. vs. Cas.Y." (U. `upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that no such crime has been committed. the Chief Justice said: "This being a mere inquiry.." In re Kelly (28 Nev. App. amounted to a substantial failure on his part to discharge his duty in the premises. Cas. Without reflecting upon the integrity of the good faith of the provincial fiscal. Moss. He manifestly erred in his belief that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix was insufficient to justify him in proceeding with the prosecution. and submitting the evidence to the court for its final determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. ought to be proved by testimony in itself legal. precedes the institution of a prosecution. (loc. 2 L. and I understand probable cause to be case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it. provincial fiscals have not the power to dismiss criminal actions pending in Courts of First Instance without leave of court. McGinley (153 Wis.'" (loc." says a very learned and accurate commentator. 477. cit." We conclude that in this jurisdiction. State (61 Neb. and whether they shall be confined or admitted to bail. it was said: "Upon just what ground the trial court condemned the action of the examining magistrate does not clearly appear. was sufficient to justify the commitments of Aaron Burr. Valencia. with or without the consent of the trial judge. 1081).. we think that he undoubtedly misconceived his duty. The uniform practice of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has been that the AttorneyGeneral by himself. Wells. nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused: but I ought to require. (supra).) The District-Attorney acts for the people in criminal cases except he must have the consent of the court to enter a nolle prosequi. and his attitude when called upon the explain his failure to prosecute at the urgent instance of counsel for the private prosecutrix. 187 N.. 14692a. in Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch 75. All that is required is that there be a sufficient legal evidence to make it appear that "a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. on a trial in chief. Men's minds may well differ as to the probative value of evidence submitted in support of an alleged fact. in the first volume of our reports. 309.) In Rhea vs. 5). grievous error was committed. Quinn. ed. The trial judge was manifestly of opinion that the long delay of the provincial fiscal before taking action in the case at bar. beyond a reasonable doubt." Section 62. 15. State. 718) the court said: "The proposition of the counsel for the Attorney-General that at the common law the Attorney-General of England and of States which have adopted this part of the common law has the right upon his sole responsibility to enter a nolle prosequi. Bungart vs." (Citing. cit. by the Court of Special Session: "A committing magistrate is not required to exact the full measure of proof necessary to secure a conviction. Shenk (142 N..S.S. But there must be proof "that a crime has been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof.) Again.

While the said case was pending preliminary investigation.. of the accused. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez. entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. 1936. to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. 1936. Steffens (27 Fed. through its president. in any reasonable view of it. 461). Fortunato N. Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Fortunato N. reinvestigated the case. State (140 Wis. Suarez. 387). The Bar Association of Tayabas. with the costs of this instance against the appellants. The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS. Later. Lieutenant Orais. P. with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. on petition. On June 30.: This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. 1936. Lieutenant Vivencio Orais. and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FORTUNATO N. he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14. 6426 corresponded. In re Van Campen (28 Fed. according to the information under date of July 8. justice of the peace of the said municipality. charging the petitioner herein. Lumsden (26 Fed. From this order.placed on trial for an offense charged against him. and the case thus dismissed. upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal. denied the motion. Ed. and dismissed the case. considered the court's order of August 14. Suarez. 16384). after hearing. without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever. 1936." In United States vs. No. Province of Tayabas. demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente . If there is evidence sufficient to give the magistrate any room whatever for the exercise of judgment. then and there willfully. who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance. in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. Perfecto R. 6426. asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution.. the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. SUAREZ. So ordered. as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision. was docketed and given due course. Petitioner. among other things. in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed. ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R.Y.. the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez. then his decision can not be reversed in the matter attempted in this instance. Cas. The justice of the peace of Calauag. moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. Layman (22 Idaho. Respondents. is a mere inquest. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20. moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez. — as a court in deciding questions of law and of evidence. did. we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge.I. 1936. the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas. filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ: Que el mencionado Juez Hon. 1935. So. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. the petitioner herein.. Cas. holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged.. Province of Tayabas.. as a jury in finding questions of fact. the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas. one of the respondents in this case. On August 14. prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition. Van de Carr (84 N. the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. being one of the accused. and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. 16835). 45431. J. SERVILLANO PLATON. Jacinto Yamson.R. and the judgment convicting and sentencing them in the court below should therefore be affirmed. it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the prisoner committed the offense charged. unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag. that all reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt must be removed. a motion for the dismissal of the case. The complaint. Ramon Valdez y Nieto. and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. But Fiscal Palacio. upon preliminary examination. in which. by a closely divided court. Tayabas. the appeal was dismissed. But the scope of investigation before the magistrate falls far short of a trial of a prisoner before the court and a jury. Gutierrez David. Crim. Judge Platon. and within the jurisdiction of this Court. Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas. 624). 15641). Damian Jimenez. Emiliano A. In re Squires (13 Idaho. Accordingly. was appointed to preside over case No. as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May. 1936. We find no error in the proceedings in the case at bar prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants and appellants. The examining magistrate has very broad latitude in the matter — if the evidence. declined to proceed. The court. Suarez. On May 11. Hon. satisfies him that a crime within the charge made has been committed and there is reasonable cause to believe the accused is the guilty party he is warranted in holding him to bail. alleging. the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon. without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. vs. that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. People vs. Palacio to handle the prosecution. While the case was pending in the latter court. 271). Fortunato N. Lundstrum vs. it was said: "A committing magistrate acts in a two fold capacity. Ex parte Patterson (50 Tex. 1935. It appears on May 9. one of the respondents herein. being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal. VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ. Palacio. Suarez with this court. conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez.y At the instance of the petitioner herein. LAUREL. denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case. any jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact within the broad field of probability. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused. en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz. — in other words. he filed on April 23. and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused. 1935. the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G. After such reinvestigation. Cas. Gala. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa. Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor. on September 23 1936." The following cases are also in accord on the point in question: United States vs. The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition. 1935. 141). despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados. that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez. Judge Serviliano Platon. State vs. and one Tomas Ruedas.. in the municipality of Calauag. at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. of the Philippine Constabulary. It is not required before the magistrate as it is before the jury. where the case was docketed as criminal case No.S. on May 5.

(Vease pag. el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado Fortunato N. solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. Rosa.el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio. y por haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado. de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes. de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia.U. Vallejo y otro. Santos. especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian.] Que el Hon. 11 Jur. vs. 202.U. 462. (E.) We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14. el que suscribe. E. however. 1936. que dice asi: El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado. existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N. Que despues de haberles arrestado. but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in . y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias del caso. Se debe tener en cuenta. y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas. a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. library Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas. que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos. por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado. y que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito. Aunque es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad'. sin embargo. por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag. that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who. the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case. 32 Jur. 482. etc. que para que exista este delito. Anexo O." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April 23. moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14. vs. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A").por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas. los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935. (E. Fil. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal. because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa.. se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag. en el juzgado de paz de Calauag. en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli. as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case. presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion. Fil. Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos.fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. Barredo. Suarez. 1. teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. denying the motion for dismissal. but adds: (a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion. quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag. con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna. y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria. uno de los acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion. dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia. no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma. Fil. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos. Jimenez. aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores. haanalizado este extremo. acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas. y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas. 36 Jur. y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello.. vs. teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas. la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno. ni que haya incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales. no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. juez de paz de Calauag. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. 1936. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador". y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha persecusion. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L. el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez. It appears. creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado. ademas. por tanto.. por el delito de detencion arbitraria. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos. 909. se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas. que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion. ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa. relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas.U. en nuestra humilde opinion. sin embargo. maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los sakdalistas. 1936: En sintesis.) Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas.

1980. incorporator. 1986. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION). T o t a l . 450. 1985. a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith. J. 1980." (69 United States Law Review.L. an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12. it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais. 1935. it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced. pp. 36 Phil. the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4. director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 1980. 1985. but that justice shall be done. which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas.Act. in the interest of justice.P7. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Aklan from Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation. 853. 6866 and 6867 in October. Rollo. the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6. 309. 37-40. abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify. 5 Corpus Juris. contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor . therefore. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States. 416. pg. in the municipality of Numancia.) Considering all the circumstances. 1984. and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1.. while he may strike hard blows. in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. ALAMPAY. to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum. As such. in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. of which the accused is the president.indeed. 156. to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia. dated October 10. except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense. The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. and amounts involved.to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum. If. Extraordinary Legal Remedies..the prosecution of public offenses. the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. Otherwise. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are. 6858. 1984. did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business. and Criminal Cases Nos. .730. 6856. 173-175). therefore. 6857. See generally Voorhees on Arrest. 1980 and some time subsequent thereto. the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. But. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. in any way. delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. 322). 1985. pp. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. Upon the other hand. 6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11. pp.. No. 6856 which is hereunder quoted: That on or about the month of July. 6860. we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon. sec. to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30. 399. 20. Aklan and as such. by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner. paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: SEC. 6859. Generoso Trieste. and to pay the cost of the action. and 6862 were allegedly committed in July.. the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. Criminal Cases Nos. Petitioner.C. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ... "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law. vs. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all. which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos." (pp. After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition. was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. SR. suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia. 1985..50 After trial. Decision. 6863 and 6864.)" The petition is hereby dismissed. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact. in appropriate cases.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws. voucher numbers. So ordered. convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases. Aklan. Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. (High. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. His term was to expire in 1986. 341). Aklan.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act. C-865. 6861. (United States vs. a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. 21190-10-174 in the amount of P558. it is unquestionable that they may. Respondent. Santos. 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10. without pronouncement regarding cost. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx . since such a duty is not ministerial. Rollo. Philippines. in August.. 855. A supplemental petition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GENEROSO TRIESTE. 1985. herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7. of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019.". 2 R. Sr. the abovenamed accused. Accordingly. are hereunder quoted: xxx xxx xxx The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h). June. petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia. the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. he should do so. Upon leave of the Court given. 1984. intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made.: c The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6. In this supplemental pleading. Criminal Cases Nos. in order to do justice and avoid injustice. non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment.. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass. he should be exculpated. being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia. p. 6. 1983. reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4. to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the public office. 3. (Rollo. had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds. and whose interest.

In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner. was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? 4. before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship. Yes. pp. or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. directly or indirectly. The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. (Rollo. be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General. testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen. Furthermore. There was no public bidding. do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President. as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law. xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing recital of facts. how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and . Aklan. 340-341) Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General. Oct. raised the following legal questions. Anyway. after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar. After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Yes. Sir. (Consolidated Comment. (pp. 26. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. 338-339). 1986. the following legal questions arise: 1. Corporation Code of the Philippines). 293). and. subsequently delivered by the supplier. in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding? A. Rollo. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former. was presented. Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen.. The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner.(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. Sir. b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. 299-300). pp. the law only requires submission of annual financial reports. Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC In any event. The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation. filed on October 7. the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations: library Prosecution failed to prove charges. Q. In other words. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act? 2. Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however. gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs. Q. 36-37. the Court in its resolution of January 16. contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. 1980. The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo. not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141. 1980. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen? A. showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation. Act No. Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions. contract or transaction. page 15) It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense. 1983) In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen. thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor. should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should be sustained. SEC records. 1986. which is said to have been effected on February 25. Treasurer Aniceto Vega. evidence discloses absence of bidding and award The prosecution's lone witness. upon acknowledging and concluding that: xxx xxx xxx Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3. as the prosecution evidence show. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the abovementioned law? 3. petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort. Rosene TriesteTuason. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief. as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel. Was damage or prejudice. caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto. a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14. pp. and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. Rollo. (Rollo. 1986. Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. Tsn. constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep.

Under official receipt issued by Trigen. and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature. were the purchases in question already paid? A. (Tsn. 1959. pp. the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen? xxx xxx xxx A. but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1. Already paid. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7). Exhibits A. A. Respondent Court said: . Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste. they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer. CONSULTA: I am sorry. 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial. Q. 11. . 301-303) xxx xxx xxx Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla: Q. G. Under what authority were they paid? A. D. Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer? A. did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment. I were prepared. May 6. . Congressional Record. The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers.delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself. Now. Previously. decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2. Yes. F. sir Q. accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E. 2 and 3 thereof. what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality? ESCAREAL: Payment made by Trigen? ATTY. Now. They had already been paid for. made to Trigen by the municipality? A. prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste? A. In short. B. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them. G. Your Honor. C. Vol. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. Maravilla. 1949). (Opinion No. Mar. (Resolution dated March 11. xxx xxx xxx Q. aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared. H. ATTY.. pp. Who authorized the payment? A. which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? A. sir. what exhibits particularly do you know were issued by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste? A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials. 1984. to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper.J. we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. Now. 5. Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered. Q. Yes. . sir. F. 94. Vega.. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen? A. ESCAREAL: y Q. Q. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. B. as you said. then Mr. Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award. D. (Rello. Q. . 306. No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment Now. petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not. page 7). page 603). Exhibit I and Exhibit H. CONSULTA: Q. You said they had already been paid for. xxx xxx xxx What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). do you know why Mr. Series 1961 and Opinion No. Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence. The municipal treasurer. Mr. authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293. C. 1984).

2. the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. in Criminal Cases Nos. 1984. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Ligaya G. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. Branch 51. Puerto Princess City. 3. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her. pp. Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases. Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29. to get the construction materials from Trigen. R-698-P August 23. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved. with her knowledge and consent. Br. ABAYA. R-705-RTJ. On October 28. WHEREFORE. Complainant. underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions. the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. Leonardo Cruz. Branch Clerk of Court. by verifying official hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants. After Atty. Sr. 1986. library SO ORDERED. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents. 4995 of the RTC. RTC. . being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. vs. Notwithstanding. Case No. 1986. report and recommendation. ABAYA. 2909 August 23. Respondents. I. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. No. Puerto Princess. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. entitled "People of the Philippines vs. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52. and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. Abaya. accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. Sr. 1984 and from April 23 to 27." for attempted murder. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. demanding. which by the way. Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30. Matter No. Complainant. vs. R-705-RTJ: a. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. Branch 52. Thus. Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends: 1. Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS. RTC. Puerto Princess City 2 with: 1. according to complainants. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits. Respondent. . 1986.There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had. A. docketed as Adm. 1984. finding the herein petitioner. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest. of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein. where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic). 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5. 51. power. Austria in AC-2909. the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan. 4 We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. Atty. It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery. RTC. Adm. was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period.M. Puerto Princess City. therefore. No.. 3. is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment. Br. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were. C. Atty. 1980. the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. vs. 52. Matter No. RTC. filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12. Emphasis supplied). LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. 1983 to May 31. 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30. dated November 2. Matter No. (Rollo. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18. LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO. 2. ABAYA. R-705RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. 6856 to 6867. as amended. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51. used his influence. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter.M. the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge. Respondent. 1986. in his capacity as Mayor. then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). and advantageous to the municipality. . Based on the evidence presented by the parties.J. has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal. 52. thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money.c By resolution of December 11. 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1. This Court will do no less and. most reasonable. JUDGE EMMANUEL M. encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature. Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality. A. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same alleged offense. FERNAN. 1986. Generoso Trieste. complainants. Br.The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51.. then Presiding Judge of RTC. a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer.1986 docketed as Adm. Branch 52.: In a complaint under oath dated July 21. . Herrera for investigation. 307-308. Branch Clerk of Court.1986 against one of his accusers.

Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted. He surmised that Mrs. he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her. 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez.000. she should. testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. 5304 entitled "People vs.1985 in his chambers. we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon. We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya. Fuertes' diary. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. a school teacher. nanghihingi ng pera. Mrs." (This is terrible.200. Fuertes.Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges. Leonila Fuertes. Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder. in consideration of the sum of P 2. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. .00 given by Mrs.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15. 5304 was denied. It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. Nonetheless. on August 13. 12 August 15. Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units). Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader. he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes. 9 Roselyn Teologo." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness. but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. 10 Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. thus: August 13. 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. she delivered the amount of Pl. gave P2. Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya.000 and I brought the money to Judge.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. library Mrs. Miclat about the matter. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said subjects. Under the circumstances. but only about P1. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. Fuertes' son. he told her that he has a problem. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Leonila Fuertes. who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. the officerin-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. 1984. he is asking money. the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours. He is talking care Nanette na idinay ko. civil or criminal. Fuertes' conversation remarked. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). b.M. Ten Commandments (3 units). 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions. 13 July 2. 5304. 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case.c We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. Yet she charged him with a serious offense. as in fact. said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter.00.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom. He asked me for my case was 50-50. All she presented were so-called practice notes. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5.M. 11 Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. who is a good friend of the Judge. the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session. transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case. 13-A Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. not because of any outside interference. Moreover. and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself. Mrs.The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52. It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration. Miclat. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52. Fuertes perjured herself just to . Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College. a school teacher. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand. now Judge Angel R. telling him that was all she could afford. 8 Be that as it may. showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted. Baloco. Mrs. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. When Mrs. 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness. then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. Fuertes had been there. countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31. "Grabe ito. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs.200. Mrs. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. would impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. Genilo Jr. the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units).000. but because the evidence of guilt was strong. He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. I went to town to see Baby Francisco. the latter's arrival on August 13. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment. she could not produce any single order. Fuertes. Fuertes' testimony: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief. to 8:15 P.. 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without intervention from your respondent. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party. under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. He testified that Mrs. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid.

Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. Teologo. such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: . but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end . as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera.M.her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order. except earned leave credits. stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. 2909 The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A. Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day. she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court. They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. 1986. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected killers of her son. the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court. the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. From him.. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. Case No. Atty. the latter demoted him to process server. In summation. he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people. 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. A. 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16. Austria against Judge Abaya. Lastly. A week later. Austria's proddings. April 22. hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3. II. As he had previously resigned. However. shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery. 21 Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. . Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya. which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency. only for Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge. she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. we find Judge Emmanuel M. This is patently illegal. medical allowance and year-end bonus. 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. the payment of said benefits having been in checks. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it. By these acts. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas. declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl. RTC Palawan. we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. and who was appointed stenographer on September 3. 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4. (should be 13) 1985. who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. As requested. in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications. set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16. Upon the other hand.accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. 1986 in Criminal Case No. which carried certain conditions. we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.. . and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs.00 every payday. Case No. he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. 1986. Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350..00. Edgardo Servando.1986. Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward. That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men. In this regard. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. In the meantime.It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment. on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. fanned by Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it. R-698-P and Adm. 15 Nilo Jamora.M. Judge Abaya requested Atty. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. On the latter date. Fuertes.000. 1986. 2909 against Atty. one of the complainants herein. as then acting City Fiscal. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. On April 21. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price. We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as abovedescribed the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. even if true. then Clerk of Court of Branch 52. for indeed.000. No. On January 16. 16 Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge. This order.to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400. a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch. the promulgation was set on April 22. No. While the investigating officer.00 from as fringe benefits. albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya.. 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15. the testimony of Mrs. he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31. 14 c. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide. 18 We are in accord with this observation. 1986. He further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money. Atty. labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion. he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order. which undertaking he complied with.

Matter No. R-705-RTJ. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed. and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. Annex I). Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar. and may also. but also subversive of public order and public policy. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES. assets. 28 June 1956. 2909. 1383. Abaya. respondent. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. cities. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged. and appropriating the sum of P2. she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. Signing orders in the name of. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership. On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited. 22 Generally speaking. guardians. after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter.000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). In Adm. and. equipment. and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees.. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No.As a lawyer and branch clerk of court. 4415-4417). and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules. 542. or to guardianship. finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. administrators. choses in actions. reports. 1829 approving Resolution No. or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons. inventories. properties. That would not only be contrary to law. liabilities. PEDRO M. that his professional fee shall be P1." (Annex A. the resignation of Atty. 23 However. accounts. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). the Court hereby orders: 1. PADILLA. and municipal districts in the Philippines. . The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. petitions. the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JULIO D. receive the accounts of executors. trusteeships. 2. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel. and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them. if any. except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya. should the judgment be appealed. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). except his earned leave credits.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. vs. trustees. and receivers. On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal. and evidence to the judge. Matter No. and P500 after judgment shall have become final or. Abaya. if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report. for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if warranted. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality. together with his findings in relation to the same. municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. (Annex B).In the absence of the judge.500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint. 24 We find Atty. HON. On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F. J. machinery. 5. or receiverships. Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 127 providing. Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records. and forthwith transmit such reports. Ligaya GonzalesAustria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31. Atty. appropriations. if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of. to the appellate courts. WHEREFORE. She could have probably released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities. representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ. On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). jurisdiction. Annabelle Cardenas and Atty. R-698-P and Adm. In Adm. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. municipalities. On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer . among others. for precisely as a lawyer. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. SR. she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of. and can never be the subject of agency. then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5. notes. when directed so to do by the judge. the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. ENRIQUEZ. obligations. petitioner. Gaz. Batangas. On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957. was passed. bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces. except her earned leave credits. and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works. and by reason of his highest qualification. the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. and all evidence relating to them. On the same date. Case No. On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan.: This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. adopted and passed Resolution No. P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge.

upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No.. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality. legatee. "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. series of 1950. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4. therefore. this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows: . . he. Under the foregoing provisions of law. . Rule 45. the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. and. On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court. . 2888. 2241. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice. . 542. 1383 was valid and constitutional. 97 Phil. 51 Off. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed. . 3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment.4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. The Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. The petitioner's contention is untenable. pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. a special attorney may be employed by its council. or child. . 94. is pecuniarily involved as heir. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers. it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision. could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Gaz. but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal. As such he shall.to the complaint (Annex J). 1683. 143. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500. who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel. The decision under review is affirmed. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province. including district health officers. and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. SEC. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. as amended by Executive Order No. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government. or his wife. Control. Silvosa. 46 Off. 5913. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. 5917. The fact that the Secretary of Justice had. Gaz. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees... Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. . the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. among others. The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. on the other hand. without pronouncement as to costs. the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. . 1682. SEC. 2884. creditor or otherwise.1 and when in the case involving the municipality. 392. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. when so requested. where he swore. submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. In Mondano vs. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. on several occasions. based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L). .

Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. respondent herein [sic]. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M. CJ In his complaint. the same title was . respondent. VENANCIO VIRAY.00) but his parents Atty. Complainant alleged that in May 1996. Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. 1969 during the transaction on May 22. president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. 362813 PR 9907. complainant. JR. the Undersigned noted that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a]. [i]n 1987 and 1997. These therefore negate respondent's allegation that he [has been] commissioned as notary public since 1965 to the present. in the alleged documents he had PTR for that purpose [. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank Inc.CANON 7 VICTOR NUNGA.00) loan in . to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise. Her Report dated 4 August 1998 reads as follows: Victor D. . vs. he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father's resignation as its president. Venancio Viray had been commissioned to act as notary public for the said province on January 2.000. and January 8. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. but is facing criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling. 1987. According to Respondent. Navarro. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No.000. 1983 to December 31. he allegedly discovered that one of the bank's assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. Complainant submitted certification and the respective orders of the Clerk of Court and presiding judges . In fact. 1981 to December 31. and] he would not [have obtained] a commission without the PTR. DAVIDE. After issues were joined. only complainant complied with the order. allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. The annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. Lydia A. From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters. .000. Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc.00) on July 15. 1982. 1984.1âwphi1. Venancio M.nêt The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment.] Viray. a minor born February 2. 1996 and had no record of any notarial reports. January 10. After going over the records of this case. favor of Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn't commissioned as notary public. and Mrs. A few month[] thereafter. while his father is facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission.. and previous certification issued by the Clerk of Court of Pampanga to the effect that Respondent Atty. . Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M. in support of his contention. Nunga. he could not annex all the needed documents to support the allegations. The Investigating Commissioner was atty. Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn't capable to buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400. 1995 to December 31. Venancio Viray. . Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in the said transaction. ATTY. Viray. there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public.

214 SCRA 1 [1992]). meaningless. the Notarial Law. 272 SCRA 408. Inasmuch as Respondent was not able to counteract the averments of Complainant which were duly supported with evidence[]. Title IV. (Citing Marcelo v. Llosa. Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11. . indulging in deliberate falsehood. to the courts and to his clients. Cabanting. We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1. It is invested with substantive public interest. routinary act. which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. too. immoral or deceitful conduct. the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code. The respondent's contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public. Book I. We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty. 1987 and the inscription for cancellation of mortgage on the dorsal side of TCT 362813 as June 4. (Maligsa v." By such misconduct as a notary public. which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Elaborating on this. Revised Administrative Code). by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2002. the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one. he is. for all legal intents and purposes. For this reason. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. the courts. the years the Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized by Respondent as appearing to be May 22. Arrieta v. honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Javier. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public. 1991. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar promulgated Resolution No. it is respectfully recommended that if Respondent is presently commissioned as notary public. In view of the foregoing. Yet. He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since "1965 to date" he has always been commissioned as a notary public. dishonest. and [he should] not be granted any commission as notary public up to December 31.Complainant likewise submitted a copy of the Resolution which dismissed the cases filed against the Complainant and his father and the xerox copy of the TCT No. to the bar. and the administrative offices in general. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity. Cabanting (supra): A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. in fact as of those dates 1987 and 1991 he was not commissioned as notary public. notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. 282 SCRA 248. 362813 PR 9907 where the special power of attorney and the annotations for the cancellation of mortgage showed inscription of the same in the notarial register of Venancio Viray on June 4. Then. more specifically. such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so. he was unable to . we said in Maligsa v. On 5 November 1998. . the same should be revoked. 252-253 [1997]). 413 [1997]. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. 1991 [sic]. rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question. it is apparent that Respondent violated the provisions of the notarial law by having affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when . Nowhere from the records and evidence[] submitted was there any proof that Respondent was commissioned as notary public in 1987 and 1991. XIII-98-196 adopting the Report of the Investigating Commissioner and recommending that respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws.

Cebu. Navarro." Two questions present themselves for the resolution. As modified. to guarantee the loan. These are the facts. On April 13. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years. he borrowed P2. if any.1âwphi1. residing at Cebu. effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution. Republic Act No. which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation. and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3) years. the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law. without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. is revoked. to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to. respondent ATTY. and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years. Juan Sumulong for respondent. therefore. a minor. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. Shortly thereafter. Even In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ. and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made. he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. to guarantee the payment of his personal debt. On March 20.800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. 1921. J.What aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son. including twenty shares of the E.: . MALCOLM. the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light.. The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission. It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. the shares of stock in question. which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. and for the rendition of the appropriate order.nêt SO ORDERED. taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank. pledging. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment. the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. who was then only eighteen years old and. he came into possession of certain property. attorney. for full investigation of the facts involved.. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code. 6809. 1918. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year. "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward. which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved. To quote counsel for the respondent. WHEREFORE. As such guardian. the age of majority was twenty-one years. Pelaez. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor. However. Michael & Co. Inc. Needless to state. or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons. without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use. 105 Ill. . and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. 474). But this is a general rule with many exceptions. Here it was held. it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. and he mortgages the same. by a divided court. it was held that this statute is not an enabling act.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. Appleton ([1883]. The nature of the office. 743). We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. it was said: It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. Indeed. is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. 398.. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings. 398. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. sec. As will be observed. there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment. however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee. 73 Kan.. It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court. (Gen. as well as between court and attorney. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. his conduct. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney. In the opinion written by Mr.. The Illinois court. and in all proper cases. vs. 404). The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906]. without his professional advice. that it may be exercised without any special statutory authority. but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice . . admits that although the general rule is. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent. and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard. nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. . that an attorney-atlaw will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity. the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar.where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment. Stat. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. but as an individual. for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust..' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment. however. Passing now to the second point — as a general rule. the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust. unless positively prohibited by statute. the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer. 1901. that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust. The . The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. Chief Justice Johnston. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial.

much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. Judgment affirmed. and that were we sitting in first instance.bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. we would probably incline to a more severe sentence. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent. 8). "the only blot upon the escutcheon. J. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an AffidavitComplaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. respondent. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her)." (The undersigned attorney. denying the further allegations of complainant. 45 Sisa Street.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant." (Rollo. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. p. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. Barrio Tenejeros. ALFREDO CARGO. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. appointed testamentary guardian. Malabon. and visited her at the hospital everyday. he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe. etc. etc. . So ordered. "It forms. Moreover. and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981." he says. however.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complying with an order of this Court. report and recommendation. vs." We feel. Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. nombrado tutor testamentario. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera. JOSE TOLOSA. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. complainant.: On 7 April 1982.

Sept. 1982. Domingo. 1315. Metro Manila (tsn.. p. and complainant. 20. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. 1982. Barrio Tenejeros. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. (Rollo. pp. nor lived with her at No. July 29. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. 1983). 1983. 2. Domingo Church in 1980. Malabon. Exh. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. Quezon City (tsn.. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. 35-37). 4. a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant.17. Tenejeros.10. 18-20. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. Galas. Edgardo Miclat. Quezon City. (Rollo. pp. 3. May 12. That respondent had been courting his wife. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. Malabon. 6. 5-8. 10-11. May 12. That again in Quezon City. 45 Sisa St. Barrio Tenejeros. Malabon. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. June 15. 1983. 9). 'B-l' and 'K'). as assistance in her medical expenses. Tenejeros. 'M'. That while Priscilla was staying there. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. pp. 10. to live with respondent at No. 1982. Priscilla (tsn. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. Metro Manila (tsn. Tenejeros. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: . at the FEU Hospital. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto.. 8. Malabon. 8. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. Galas. May 12. 1984). 45 Sisa Street. 'B'. 33-35). pp. In fact. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. Metro Manila from her earnings. pp. 1985. Quezon City. Malabon.The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. 16. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. pp. 1 Galas St. 5. Quezon City. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. Exh. pp. 45 Sisa Street. That sometime in June.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. Malabon. Metro Manila. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. June 21.. 7. she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). c) That respondent only gave P35. pp. his wife left their conjugal house at No.. 1983).1 Lopez Jaena St. N' and 'Q'). Sept. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. 1983). That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E').

45 Sisa St. For this very reason. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. ACCORDINGLY. More specifically. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. pp. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. (Rollo. Metro Manila. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. 4. p. As officers of the court. Malabon. (Rollo. 8. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. in spite of his differences with complainant. 1 Lopez Jaena St. 9. 'F'. 3. At the same time. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. however. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. in spite again of his differences with complainant. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. because of her differences with complainant. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. In effect. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. left their conjugal house and lived at No. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. 39-40)." (Rollo. 37-39). That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. 2. 4. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. their residences being one house away from each other. Quezon City. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family.2. 6. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. Galas. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. At the same time." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. 40). That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. 5. in fact. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. 7. B-1'. Thus. That Priscilla. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. pp. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. 'B'.. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. 3. .. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. Barrio Tenejeros. 'G'.

1950. all improvements placed by the partnership shall belong to Mrs. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 3. P80. Yulo. defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the palintiff Mrs. plaintiffsappellants. Eusebio & Tiburcio for appellants. Pursuant to the above offer. dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. (3) that Mrs. 1948. 1948 to December 31. 1947. In this letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. YANG CHIAO SENG.000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng and P20. they executed a supplementary agreement. 1945. Punzalan. Yulo on April 5. or Mrs. "B"). In view of the above notice. Yang. Manila. Yulo a monthly participation of P3. Limited. assisted by her husband JOSE C. Yulo. Yabut. Mrs. 1946. Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. The last contract was executed between the owners and Mrs. but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31. 1947. 1950. In the Court of First Instance." which was to exist from July 1. On October 27. 1949. with the condition that if the land is expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business. 1947. The judgment was appealed. (4) that after December 31. Yulo has not paid to . extending the partnership for a period of three years beginning January 1. or if the owner constructs a permanent building thereon.000. Both parties appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals. Mrs. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner. Yulo. the parties executed a partnership agreement establishing the "Yang & Company. LABRADOR. The benefits are to be divided between them at the rate of 50-50 and after December 31. Rosario U. J. Yulo. and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated as of July 31. Bienvenido A. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff. But on April 12. 1949. vs. 1945 to December 31. 1955. It states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and talking pictures. (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years and six months. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business. Yulo and Mr. YULO. 1949. Yulo.: Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs.000 payable quarterly in advance within the first 15 days of each quarter. Cruz.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 8 ROSARIO U. In June . Yulo and her husband. 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. 1950. All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Mrs. The capital is fixed at P100. provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees of patrons of the theatre. the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second party. Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on in lobbies of theatres in operation. then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises. presiding. The principal conditions of the offer are (1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs.000. Tan. proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. the two cases were afterwards heard jointly. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. then the partnership shall be terminated even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired. in case of loss. The record discloses that on June 17. Yulo. the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. defendant-appellee. and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100. but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2). which plaintiff evidently accepted. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall continue for an indefinite period of time. Ocampo for appellee. 1945 to December 31. the attorney for the owners notified Mrs. 1950. Hon. Augusto Francisco and Julian T. by Mrs. shall be limited to her capital contribution (Exh. YULO. The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. affirmed the judgment. on April 30. starting from July 1. On February 9.

finding the above motion. 1951 until defendant vacates the same. the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at the time fixed for the hearing. so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. "E"). The court. or any other amount. he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs. The prayer includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10. would be granted.000. plaintiff became the absolute owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor.000 as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1. 1950. In answer to the complaint. The final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was in the interest of justice. and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant.000.the lessors the rentals from August. 1950 the partnership between Mrs. Yulo instituted this action on May 26. and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property. The court heard evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41.000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1. denied plaintiff's claim for damages or supposed participation in the profits. did not err in setting aside its former judgment. well-founded. Mrs. The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and allowing a new trial. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100. however. dismissed the complaint. the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business. he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental value of the land is only P1. 1951 is P5. 1954. that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff Rosario Yulo. alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has refused to pay her share from December. The lower court. therefore. Mrs. therefore. In said motion it is claimed that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for postponement filed by both parties. defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of lease and not of partnership. As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the theatre. 1949 to December.100. . on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. This decision. It is against this decision that the appeal has been prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court. It. was set aside on a motion for reconsideration.000 for her participation in the business up to December. 1950. As to the other claims. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease and not of partnership. 1949. that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35. 1950. The court. P5. that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the sublease of the said property. that after December 31. 1949 to October. Yulo has suffered damages in the amount of P160. at which time only the plaintiff appeared.000. as a result of which. In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon. Yulo in arrears (Exh. set aside its decision and a new trial was held. After trial the court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership. In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of the sublease and not of partnership. therefore. and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between them. the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay therefor from January. etc. As that parties agreed to postpone the trial because of a probable amicable settlement. The first hearing was had on April 19. in view of a possible amicable settlement. and P3. 1955. Yulo and Yang terminated. This assignment of error is without merit.000 from November. that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code.000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5.000 for the attorney's fees. 1945 until defendant vacates the property.

13-14. In the third place. on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. and Morton F. The herein petitioners . are one of lease and not of partnership. 1968). (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum. The following statements. Plaintiff claims the sum of P41.The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. Clearly. opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Erlito R. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD. sixth.. Erlito R. She was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done.000 capital. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27. Santiago. plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17. 1968. (Last sentence. In the second place. including the Executive Secretary) have made these false. But the original letter of the defendant. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. and Jose Beltran Sotto. Ibid. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July.. Jose Beltran Sotto: a. p. or industry to a common fund.. The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money. etc. with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC. property. last two lines on bottom of the page). seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page). c. (Art. MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Graciano Regala and Associates. 1949.). Jose Beltran Sotto. In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. between plaintiff and defendant. dated April 13. p. all that she did was to receive her share of P3. 10. They (petitioners. On November 21. Santiago. to the effect that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts. HON.. with costs against plaintiff-appellant. so the Solicitor General avers. We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it in toto. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease.000 automatically ceased as of said date. Meads. "B". whether the expenses were legitimate. Civil Code. Uy. vs.: After the July 31. par. J. are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. 1945 (Exh.. . the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. contain the following statements: d. 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co. ET AL. it does not appear that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business. "A". Exh. and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.. Juanito M. Vicente L. 1968. not a partnership. . RESOLUTION SANCHEZ. Santiago. 16. Exhs.. 1. expressly states that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the lease. respondents. her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing. whether the earnings were correct. she did not furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre.. "A". 1767. 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals. Caling. three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). 1968. Sotto. Regala and Associates.17. the Solicitor General points out. which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners. and Jose B. "A").000 a month. Erlito R. plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20. b. this Court issued a show-cause order. which shows that both parties considered this offer as the real contract between them.. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. members of the Bar. ET AL. the partnership agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3. . petitioners. Uy. Were she really a partner.000 as representing her share or participation in the business from December. Graciano C. (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. and "C. pp. In the first place. Graciano Regala. Uy.

not for no reason at all. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Santiago. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics. the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31. democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public. in the light of our upbringing and schooling. which is elementary. (Second sentence. Atty. it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. 7. which law has not been declared unconstitutional. Erlito R. 1968 decision. Never has any civilized. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. 1968). Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. his client would be deprived of due process of law.. Unfortunately for our people. again for himself and Attys. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision. and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11. and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral? . (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court. which in full reads: 6. As to the Chief Justice. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31. Erlito R. 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case. Atty. On November 21. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. . (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it. paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31. asked Mr. a government agency or just plain fraud ." The "incidents" cited are as follows: (a) said decision is in violation of the law. 1968.. even under many of the incumbent justices. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions. could be defended. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts.. It enumerates "incidents" which. in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. par.. The motion to inhibit filed on September 21. 1968 was rendered in this case. Vicente L. the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering. and that no matter what the circumstances are. 10. that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. and Graciano Regala and Associates. However. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. 1967.e. according to the motion. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates. counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7. and it is thus difficult. Uy. brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion. 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L.

1968. Uy explained his side of the case. he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates. as counsel for MacArthur. that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f). which was accepted. 1968 order. Atty." We now come to Atty. it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit. 1968 that Atty. 1968. In brief." In Atty. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Jose Beltran Sotto. 1968 to December 31. 1968. that on July 14. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. Atty. claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1. 1968. that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer. A second contempt proceeding arose when. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government. xxx xxx xxx 6.. Vicente L. to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government. . 1968. Meads. On December 5. he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. offered to retain his services. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. it must be stated that as early as October 7. 1968. Erlito R. respondent MacArthur. as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27. 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072). registered an amended motion to inhibit. Atty. Juanito M. and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness. On the part of Atty. On February 4. in addition. that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case. who may take part. Graciano C. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness".. and we quote: "Justices. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21. even while he was on leave of absence. that in view of the rejection. In his explanation of December 2. either its executive or judicial branches or both. it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12. 1968. Rule 138. lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. It was on December 2. Jose Beltran Sotto.. he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence. taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31. Rule 51. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . 1965. On January 8. on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine . and contained the following paragraphs: 4. 1969. that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case. — . one Morton F. had been violated.. in MacArthur's behalf. Regala. Vicente L. though. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose. on July 14." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. On March 1. required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits. he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21. 1969. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. as required by law. Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1. 1967. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. 1968. he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29. Santiago. 1969.And. 1969. He made the admission. According to him. "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience. additional arguments were filed by Atty. Justice Castro inhibit themselves. Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement. through new counsel. 1969. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised.

He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. this Court. Vicente L. that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. He speaks of this Court as a "civilized. In his motion to inhibit. until restitution or compensation is made. much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Vicente L." In this backdrop. He explained that.Government. Vicente L. erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country. at 9:30 a. Santiago gave his explanation. 1968 was rendered. Vicente L. whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. including the sugar price premium. Santiago. "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President. We start with the case of Atty. 1969. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. Santiago and Morton Meads. that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case. this Court heard Attys. his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court. Atty. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31." It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. requiring Atty. In his third motion for reconsideration. 1. 1969. Meads". Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza. 1969. a short time before the decision of July 31. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14. should not be dealt with for contempt of court. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. Santiago and by one Morton F. because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision. Atty. he went to Atty. "although the process has already begun. but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually. not Santiago. find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate.. that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. Santiago left. the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. According to Meads. August 27. that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. 1969. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. which could make their actuation suspect.m." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism. The motion was then filed. according to Santiago. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. Atty. he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself. Caling filed his return. After reading the motion. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer. 1969. 1969. While Caling was reading the document. and . and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration. Juanita M. and Morton Meads.. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Atty. Atty. In defending himself from the contempt charge. On August 15. told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife. 1968 as "false.. he . Juanita M. Morton Meads answered. Vicente L. on August 4. to file the same. he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling. we. Vicente L. Caling gave his go-signal. on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court. indeed. from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed. Vicente L. Caling. In fact. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. Vicente L. only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party. resolved "to require Atty." On July 30. Juanito M. 1969. to direct that the three. and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty." On August 13. The truth. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. 1969. Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. On August 27. on or before August 16. 1969. Caling. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion. personally appear Before this Court on Thursday. democratic tribunal". Santiago.

Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. a judge from the very nature of his position.. this Court finds in the language of Atty. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any boardpetitioner. Nevertheless. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed."4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. Mr. who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. to this. Atty. "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise. Jose Beltran Sotto. For. of disbelief. spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. 20 SCRA 441.. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice. discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. as a corollary. What is disconcerting is that Atty. a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. 444. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. as many suppose. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' " A lawyer is an officer of the courts.6 From this. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. we repeat. We would in fact. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference. And yet. and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For one thing. he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. judges may grossly err in their decisions.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. Section 20(b). be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country."7 The precepts. counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. inhibition is also asked of. their clients' success is wholly subordinate. including the President"." After citing acts of two judges of first instance. "like the court itself. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court.' That same canon. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity . Decidedly not an expression of faith. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. the teachings." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". 2. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor. Ferrer (1967). their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. but to the administration of justice. the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.' And more. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Counsel is presumed to know this. their first duty is not to their clients. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. to the courts.deleted this paragraph in his rough draft. and that no matter what the circumstances are."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court."5 As rightly observed by Mr. For. We next take the case of Atty. Justice Castro. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. Really. it erects no shield. as follows: "By now. oath-bound servants of society. or their agents or principals. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. he is. in categorical terms. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. and no other."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. He describes a . lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney. should also inhibit themselves. the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur. including the president.

Second. it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. indeed. including the sugar price premium. More specifically. It was improper for Atty. Uy. under Section 3 (a). protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed.. 1968. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — SECTION 1. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 1965 ." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government." However. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 11 We." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. in every manner appertaining thereto.. raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12. He should be held exempt from contempt. Rules of Court.. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices. in furtherance of justice.. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved. A simple job. now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth. The fourth motion for reconsideration is. Once in a small nipa shack. out of context. He is exonerated. Meads. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. In doing so. 12 Atty. guilty of contempt. the conduct of its ministerial officers. and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. First.. It lifted Section 1. who was admitted to the Bar in 1966. and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it. Graciano C. as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties. under Section 3 (d) of the same rule. whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication. hold that Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent.. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication .. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. here comes a chance for him. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31. it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control. for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Regala. No explanation has been made why this has been done. if the parties or either of them. Caling. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face". laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. who may take part. did not attempt to explain this point. improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case.. 4. an act of contumacy. Such language is not arguably protected. therefore."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. 702. that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. 3. 5. however. . Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably . We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. 708.. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.. For. however. He is. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer. unnecessary statements were injected. to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government. and that he too has committed. 83 Phil. Rule 51. it offends the court before which it is made. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . Sotto is People vs. Young. accordingly. who may take part. Justices. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Third. — . Erlito R. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty." . Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness. express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. Now. It was filed without express leave of court.

this Court hereby finds: 1. Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. Uy not guilty of contempt of court. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. and Atty. even if the Chief Justice and Mr. Regala and Associates and Atty. Atty. particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts. Meads and Atty. it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Morton F. and 2. contrary to the instructions to bidders. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. and holds Attys. P100. Furthermore. who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond. P200. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. Santiago. for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. P1. attorney-at-law. To preserve its dignity. if only for one reason. he spent. Santiago. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. Atty. Morton F. He is guilty of contempt. this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. Santiago. he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. Vicente L." The dignity of the Court. Juanita M. It goes against the grain of circumstances. MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. Indeed. Erlito R. experience teaches. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Meads. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do. 7. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute. Vicente L. still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. As for Morton F. As we held in our decision of July 31. and fines Atty. that according to Meads himself. Punctilio of honor. It would seem apropos to say again that. So ordered. we prefer to think. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He has control of the proceedings. For. It should be emphasized. 8. And We repeat. the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond. is not entitled to any consideration. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. and Atty.This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. Caling. the Solicitor General. Caling. For the reasons given. Vicente L. . witnesses and suitors. Meads. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. Santiago. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case. 9. Caling. jurors. too. can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. Santiago in the sum of P1. Vicente L. On the first contempt charge. Santiago and Atty. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. Caling guilty of contempt of court. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court. Sotto. he would not have signed the motion. for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Atty. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. Meads who is an alien. this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur.. 1969. Juanito M. on July 14. 6. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. No appearance for the respondent. On the other hand. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In re FELICIANO GOMEZ. Vicente L. And yet. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. and fines Atty. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. an additional P1. We must not forget. Graciano C. On the second contempt charge. a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.000. We go back to Atty. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time. is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. the Secretary of Justice. too.000. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. One last word. the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. "[a]dmittedly. 1968.000. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. Santiago. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. judicial officers.

the charges have personal aspects. Laguna. on January 25. a newspaper of the city of Manila. and respondent was required to file. In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22.1 and became final on December 24. SILAY CITY. an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from notice thereof. Cailles contested the election successfully. the Laguna election case was taken up point by point and decided by principles. are relegated to the courts for redress. Negros Occidental. there tyrrany begins. and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. It appears that Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in 1919. RAFAEL C. 1922. The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is. the papers shall be attached to the personal record of Attorney Feliciano Gomez. with reference to the conduct of Feliciano Gomez. J.L. permit the law-officer to go forward with the instant proceedings. The judgment of the higher tribunal was rendered on December 9. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance" (Code of Ethics.at-law . Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. 1968 by Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. in effect. Although the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed.:1äwphï1. because although contempts are impersonal in nature. with affidavits. judges. without further action.S. for the position of provincial governor of Laguna. As some one has well said. when a case is finished. The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of respondent dated September 5. in this court.C. it should be recalled. 690. and on his obligations as an officer of the court "to maintain towards it a respectful attitude. No. The charges of Mr. that courts. 1968. out of friendship for Cailles. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion. 512. are subject to the same criticism as other people. 1922. RESOLUTION ANTONIO. We feel also. (Patterson vs. Colorado [1907]. and later in the Supreme Court. therefore. So ordered. that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment. in which it is alleged that Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court. the case was referred on December 17. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. Accordingly. BRANCH I.. like other persons. CLIMACO. We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive.MALCOLM. we should not. is an extremely embarrassing one. following a secret conference. first in the Court of First Instance. Gomez. In reality. 1968 and his decision acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21. and after the filing of respondent's answer. 6 R. and are substantiated by four affidavits. et seq. did not relate to a pending cause. Gomez is charged with having said. 454. because of chagrin at losing cases. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ IN RE: THE HON. 1968. Gomez was proclaimed elected. that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles. an unsuccessful litigant and an attorney. widow of the deceased Norberto Tongoy. that while the Attorney-General is to be commended for his zealous interest in the maintenance of the Judiciary. 1).: The Attorney-General has filed an information. had offered them a banquet. After. he will realize the impropriety of his action.)lävvphì1·né+ We conclude. entitled "People the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor. On January 19. under the circumstances." for Robbery in Band with Homicide. we have come to the conclusion that he matter should not be dignified by further proceedings. in Criminal Case No. and after a realization that to punish for contempt of court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. of Cadiz. at a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban. 1921. so that when finished there was not a member of the court who knew what the outcome would be until the vote was tabulated in the decision. and there. Zulueta. . 1921. however. the complaint was given due course. and Eva Mabug-at. close scrutiny of the case. and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. gross ignorance of the law.. because Governor-General Wood. The position of the members of this court in considering the facts laid before them. respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in office. had invited the members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision. 205 U. pp. When Attorney Feliciano Gomez comes to reflect on his conduct. where the liberty of the press and freedom of public comment ends. J..ñët In a verified complaint filed on October 15. et al.

SO ORDERED. 1968. and when required to comment on said appeal. the case with respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution or with its conformity. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime. Zulueta. In the meantime. for investigation and report. Primitivo Mata. of Cadiz. through Justice Fernando. which reads as follows: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE . Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. the investigator stated: Under the first indictment. 1968. 1969. that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. On January 30. were dropped. the aforementioned complaint against respondent was instituted as aforestated. After the case was submitted for decision. while of the persons charged as accomplices and accessories. 1968 to the effect that prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal in view of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. In his Report. the investigator submitted his Report recommending the exoneration of respondent.. seven (7) persons as accomplices. Silay City. A cursory perusal of the decision will at once show that said acquittal was predicated on other well-considered facts and circumstances so thoroughly discussed by the lower court in its decision and the least of those was its observation arising from the ocular inspection. this Court. on September 21. promulgated its Resolution dismissing the appeal (G. the unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of acquittal was not premised solely on the results of said ocular inspection. filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against thirteen (13) persons as principals. on October 15. L-29599). No. Barredo. complainants bewail as gross malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law.R. after conducting the requisite investigation thereon. in the following manner: (a) Before arraignment: — Jorge Canonoyo (b) After arraignment: — Agustin Cañete Rosendo Cañete Arsenio Luyao Elias Giducos Pedro Layon Antonio Placencia (c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the information and utilized as state witness. 1968. presided over by the respondent. as erroneously contended by prosecutor. and Rene Fernandez before the Amended Information of April 26. or more particularly. now an Associate Justice of this Court. including Isabelo Montemayor. Paulino Quijano. Thereafter. Julio Elmo. 690.<äre||anº•1àw> The case was assigned to Branch I. with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Constancio Pangahin.1968 to the Hon. 1968. submitted his comment on November 28. and (d) Accused Honorato de Sales. and made the observation that "While the validity of the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Nicasio Yatco. and two (2) persons as accessories. in Criminal Case No. 1968. Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed aforementioned decision to this Court. the following behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case: I. respondent promulgated his decision in the case acquitting Carlos Caramonte. Negros Occidental. dated September 5. On April 11. Subsequently. Solicitor General Antonio P. only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged principals. Cristeta Jimenez. respondent issued an order. remained at large).

the security guards. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. Without anybody to guide him. from the order of September 5. by a judge who. the honorable trial judge. had to acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of the municipality of Bantayan. due to political pressure and against his will and better judgment. The fact is. less in the presence of the prosecution and concluded that such alleged secret ocular inspection was the basis of the Order of September 5. the decision of the respondent Judge shows that in rendering judgment of acquittal in the case before him. 1968. was made by the respondent Judge as the sole basis for the acquittal of Carlos Caramonte. may have a strong motive. or at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday. who is reputed to be brilliant. C and the damaging inferences derived from his staying from the ceremony when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan were inducted into office. is null and void. without anybody to guide him. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. the decision pertinently reads: Is Caramonte guilty? In spite of the admission of Caramonte's Exh. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in the alleged crime. the capital of the province. 690 for "Robbery in Band with Homicide" was closed and submitted for Decision on July 1. A painstaking scrutiny of the records as well as the evidence presented by the parties does not show any concrete proof that respondent Judge did conduct a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by the complainants. Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent Judge took judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an ocular inspection he conducted on the date alleged by the complainants. extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September 1968. Why respondent Honorable Judge went out of his way to gather those immaterial and "fabricated" evidence in favor of the accused is shocking to the conscience. province of Cebu. said respondent entertained serious doubts as to the guilt of Caramonte because of the failure of anyone — in the Chua and in the Uy households. however. and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. an Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to violate his oath of office. to wit: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry during industry operating in the Visayas. Thus. Criminal Case No. there is likewise nothing in the record to support the charge of the complainants that the order of September 5. In fact. 1968. a psychologist or a psychiatrist would explain that the Order of September 5th is that of an anguished mind. In fact. To say the least. it is gross ignorance of the law. respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. the respondent Judge took judicial notice "that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. 1968.and GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW After both parties submitted their respective Memorandum attached herewith as Annexes "C" and "D". In any event. Why did respondent judge show his hand unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps. there is doubt in the mind of the Court as to his actual participation in then bold raid in Cadiz City on December 31. — which Order. and that the neighborhood is welllighted and well-populated. the lone witness presented by the complainants in this case did not even make an insinuation supporting such serious allegation of said complainants. 1967. away from Bacolod City. 1968. SO ORDERED. 11 August 1968. issued a reckless. But what of a judge who knowingly commits a "revolting injustice" or through gross ignorance of the law? It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the complaint that complainants bemoaned the fact that the respondent Judge conducted a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Sunday. August 11. A murderer. 1967. as any student of law would tell you. and illegal per se. About one and a half (1-½) months thereafter. because of the failure of anyone — the adults and the . that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. Like an amateur murderer respondent judge left telltale clues all around. 1968. he visited the places which he thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00 o'clock of the dark night of December 31. Because of that undeniably biased ocular inspection.

the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to say on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one of the robbers. 1967. A — I was in my house. Q — About what time did you notice those pirates forced themselves inside your residence? A — Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening. sir. Q — Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened that evening in your house? A — The robbers broke into our house. Q — What was the first thing you noticed when the pirates as you said arrived? A — I was about to sleep when they came up. my children and my wife. Q — Please tell the Court what happened? Q — How did they come out. The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand. A — No. the security guards. Q — After nearly one hour. . Q — Who untied you that evening? A — My son untied me after the men left. Q — What did the robbers do with your wife and children? A — Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the floor face down. Q — How many minutes did the armed robbers stay pin your house? Q — At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. xxx xxx xxx Q — Do you remember anything unusual that happened that evening in your house? A — Yes. sir. Mrs. They and the other members of the household were tied up by the robbers. On her part. A — I don't know because I was lying flat on the floor. did the robbers who came up your house leave? Court — This witness did not identify any of the accused? Fiscal — No. sir. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the witness stand that: xxx xxx xxx Q — What did the robbers do when they came up your house? A — They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor face down. three of them went straight up my house. Thereafter. where were you? A — Almost one hour. Q — How many floors has your house? A — Two floors.children in the Chua and in the Uy households. Your Honor. pirates. you cannot tell? A — Several men. I cannot tell what did they do to my wife and children. Q — What did the robbers do in your house? A — They ransacked my house. 31. some of them were taken to the seashore to prevent the police from firing on the retreating robbers: Mateo Chua said at the trial: Q — At that time were not your family inside your house? A — Yes. who then ransacked the two houses for about an hour. came up my house and broke into my house.

Q — What was that which happened? xxx xxx xxx Q — So what did you do after that? A — Because there was a policeman there. what did they do? A — We were downstairs when they broke into our house. 1967? A — About four or five. Q — What did you do after hearing that? A — My companion Antonio Placencia called me because he was the one who had talked to those persons. I did not have a chance to look at them. using the axe at the door and then after entering the first floor they went up. 31. Q — And what was his answer? . Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony: Q — At about 10:00 o'clock of that same evening of December 31. Q — What did you answer? A — At that time we were on duty at the gate of the house of Mateo Chua and then we heard the voice of a man and a woman. Q — What did you do after that? A — Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use the telephone and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the other side so we went to him and told him that there were armed men in the seashore and Antonio Uy told us. Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers? The police battled with the raiders from a distance of about 60 meters. according to Patrolman Armando Maravilla. sir. how many robbers broke into your house that evening of Dec. what happened? A — Then we were told not to go to the seashore because there were armed men. Q — After you heard those voices of a man and a woman. Two security guards employed by Uy (Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged families thru the raid. Q — What did you do after that? xxx xxx xxx Q — After the four or five persons fired their shots inside your house. because I was frightened. A — At about that time we heard a voice of a man and woman and they asked us where we were guarding. Q — Were they armed? A — Yes. Q — Were you able to call the Police Department by telephone? A — We went to the house of Erning Tan because there is a telephone there connected with the Police Department and the stand is also at the window overlooking the Caltex Station.Q — More or less. So Antonio Placencia told me to call the Police Department and tell them that there are armed men in the seashore. xxx xxx xxx Q — Can you identify any of the robbers that came up your house from among the accused in courtroom? A — I cannot. "If anything happen don't resist because my children might be hit." The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened? A — Yes. sir. A — My companion also suggested that we better call the Police Department by telephone because that was already 10:50 in the evening. 1967. He told me not to go to the seashore because there were armed men there. we asked him where our companion security guard was.

A — He went down and returned to his own house. they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as far as they know. Q — What did Mr. A — Yes. what did you do? . be proved beyond reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno. The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large fishing industry. 212). pp. the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. what happened? Q — Were you able to reach his house? A — When I went down. the police. B). For serious misconduct to exist. there has been an insinuation that "respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted. xxx xxx xxx Q — After the shots lasted. it is xxx xxx xxx Q — What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news? A — Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. Of course. In fact. the charges must. and in rendering a judgment of acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law or to disregard well-known legal rules. or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Antonio Horrilleno. He said. sir. Uy that his wife was brought along by the armed men. in all likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics." Q — What happened after that? A — Because we were there with him. and in this venture. there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. 43 Phil. Q — What did you hear? A — We heard several shots. the mother of Antonio Uy came to him and informed Mr. there has been no proof that in issuing the order of September 5. the security guards and other employees of the fishing business. the neighbors — to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to his participation therein. Q — When you went down. where did you go? A — After the shooting stopped. A — I followed him. He said. (Decision. Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan. under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code. Under the circumstances. have been said to be governed by the rules of law applicable to penal cases." Inasmuch as proceedings against judges as the case at bar. Uy went down and returned to his own house. the failure of anyone — members of the Chua and Uy households. Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood. we went to office to hide. "Why are you walking there? Come up. sir. "If they want to get something. province of Cebu. A — Yes. Antonio Uy saw me so he reprimanded me. — which indicates that many people in the compound must or could have seen some or all of the robbers — and no one could say that Caramonte was one of them. Q — When Mr. in spite of the biting language of the complainants in their complaint and in their memorandum. obviously in bad faith. therefore. In the case at bar. and it is incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt. Be that as it may. Uy do because you were there. Q — Where did you go? xxx xxx xxx A — To his house and I called the rest of the guards. 12-16). just allow them to get it. we heard something. 1968 (Exh. Q — Did you notice anything while you were hiding there? A — Yes.A — The policeman informed us that he did not report for duty and that it was Guarino who reported for duty that evening. sir." Q — And then you obeyed his order? You came up. and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall. (In re Impeachment of Hon. supra).

or a span of eight — to protect the interests of the State against what complainants herein term to be an "illegality. 29. Since this is an administrative case against him the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was arbitrary. 1968. que en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que . But as the records show. 1968 on September 13. 64-65. sir. Furthermore. the undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along that line. A prosecutor should lay the court fairly and fully every fact and circumstance known to him to exist. 690 does appear to be commendable. 1968." Of course. testified — Atty. you mean the "Uy-Chua Compound"? Q — I mean the statements in the order are true? A — Yes. con voluntad reflexiva. 1968 showed you that order of Judge Climaco wherein he stated that he was taking judicial notice that Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. 690. p. respondent Judge as stated in his answer. corrupt. it appears from the record that the Office of the City Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September 5. it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta. sir. a paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted partially. respondent Judge erred or not. con malicia. 5. Fortunately. indeed. In the pursuit of that solemn obligation. and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly. and to perform their duties impartially and with but one object in view. Your Honor. Legal and Judicial Ethics. the very witness of the complainants affirmed the correctness of the matters taken judicial notice of by the respondent Judge. (pp. or maliciously. Whether in taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5. without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused (Malcolm. "Es tan preciso. t. that this attitude of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. It may be pertinent to state at this juncture. it is believed.n. in Criminal Case No. as the prosecutor of the case. the prosecution in the said case did not take any steps — from September 13 to September 21. or oppressive.). it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence. Prosecuting officer presumed to be men learned in the law. "que la falta se cometa a sabiendas. p. the complainants herein lean on the argument that — Fiscal Zulueta — Because if I do that. or corruptly. There is. if there were any. partial. respondent Judge would realize his mistake which we believe malicious (p. after reading that order. and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. or arbitrarily or oppressively. Aquino — Q — When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13. Q — But the statements here in the order are true? A — Yes. that said compound is only a five hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in Cadiz and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. Thus. did you make any comment to Fiscal Zulueta? A — No. esto es. xxx xxx xxx In issuing the order of Sept. As heretofore stated.s. t. 124). 123) and to this may be added without regard to any personal conviction or presumption of what the Judge may do or is disposed to do. Agustin Javier. If it were true as alleged by the complainants that the issuance of such order was and that the matters taken judicial notice of therein were wrong. lone witness for the complainants.n. this is not the proper forum to dwell on the matter.believed they failed. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.) The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion). to seek for the reconsideration of such order and at the same time to invite the attention of the court to the alleged errors. that being that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law and that no innocent man be punished (Malcolm. Mr. 1968. of a high character. personal conviction should be ignored lest it may lead to a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved.s." commented Viada. was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. therefore.

with a warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe sanction. 855. respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the aforestated charges. that diligence. vs. 602. Legal and Judicial Ethics. and there is nothing on the basis thereof which would in any manner justify their inclusion in the pleadings. MARIO TATLONGHARI. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." (Malcolm. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. that although he has acted without malice. 3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice. logically and reasonably. he failed to observe in the performance of his duty. ZOILO R." (Section 20 (f). Zulueta.). FERRER.R. 580. it must be shown. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied. nevertheless. 1949 ed. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[as] an officer of the court.. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. . We find that the decision respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. it is his own and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. is not liable criminally. Culkin. Esta es la prevaricacion verdadera. 97. la preocupacion o el error. is. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES.). of Cadiz City. "like the court itself. prudence and care required by law.. (People vs. As noted in the aforecited report.por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por ignorancia.).). much less could it be held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence. 4 It is also well-settled that a judicial officer. 2 Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. From a review of the record. WHEREFORE. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.). We cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Rule 138. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve." (People ex rel." 1 To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. For." (In re Sotto. INC and GORDON W. con la que solo inspira la enemistad. and in a very clear and indisputable manner. 82 Phil. such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. according to Groizard. It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. when required to exercise his judgment or discretion. the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his complaint and memorandum." (5 Martin. for any error he commits. he is. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. 572. op. respondents.. Karlin vs. in the contrary it results. 160. 60 A. Rules of Court. 851.. p. MACKAY petitioners. . that is to say. provided he acts in good faith. 5 We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated in an earlier case: 6 A lawyer is an officer of the courts.). p. cit. SANTO MARILAG and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. el odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y corrompida. We have analyzed the facts. 595. in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 77 Phil. censured for his use of offensive and abusive language in the complaint and other pleadings filed with this Court. Carillo.L.

restate. on the ground of unjustified dismissal. Inc. (NARIC) vs. et al. 5(a). Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon. failure to give additional compensation for such work is a violation of the said law. Manila Railroad Co. 1959] where we held: . or the claimant must seek his reinstatement. No. that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations. and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec.. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: '. Night differential pay. declared — Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875 the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work. G. 1962. Siguion Reyna. L-17905. the principal respondents were dismissed from their employment. But they seek reinstatement. The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIR's denial of petitioners' motion to dismiss — grounded on want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter — the principal respondents' complaint and said court's refusal to reconsider the order of denial. vs. 875. and 5. (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec..R. Belo & Armonio for petitioners.. et al. To be read as controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate. for the benefit of the bench and the bar. 10. therefore. 1964. Bautista. vs. 1. Right to such pay is. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays. speaking thru Mr. (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444). et al. thus — We may. Here. L-12075. night work is not overtime but regular work. Hon. Tan. by explicit articulation in Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Consequently. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case [National Rice & Corn Corp. No. NARIC Workers' Union. which accumulated since their illegal separation. and that respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its "general jurisdiction and broad powers" under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations. May 29. In default of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Reinstatement with back wages. 2. or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law. We believe petitioner to be in error. guaranteed a workman. Gaz. Jose S. beyond which it is not permitted to act. [Paflu et al. Republic Act 875]'. where this Court.Ponce Enrile. Jose T. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays. 5836]. on this score. Valmonte for respondents. On the claim for might differentials. and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest. is within the coverage of the prevailing rule enunciated in Campos. 4.. February 29. 13. the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship. L-16440. Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because as held in two previous cases.. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal.. J. et al. Mariano B. 3. (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602). the CIR has jurisdiction. Republic Act 875). et al.2 2. 52 Off. the case.. Hence.: Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as CIR] to hear and determine a case1 seeking — 1. vs. Montecillo. or under the Minimum Wage Law. or must have a nearing on an unfair labor practice charge. May 25. And. no extended discussion is necessary. SANCHEZ.

would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor. and back wages and damages incident thereto.R. No. We had occasion to remark that :4 "[t]o draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. Again. 1957] but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done at daytime. May 29. el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia. no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche. but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature — for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. et al. and payment of salary increases and separation pay — out of the CIR's jurisdiction and place them in the hands of ordinary courts. and back wages and the damages incident thereto.. y consiguientemente. cultural and sociological reasons. Felipe Guevara. To force . and payment of salary increases and separation pay. CIR. . namely. vs... moral.R. 1958. City Automotive Co. supra. No. May 31. L-12075.R. et al.. Almin et al. 103. 1959. reinstatement. L-17788. Si este tribunal tiene en casos de disputa.. la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos. employment". Detective & Protective Bureau. L-11655. 1959. 315]. The other demands. Prisco vs. la de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia. it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime work. in Paflu et al.. Naric Workers' Union. National Labor Union. citing Shell Co.. G. CIR. [Naric vs. [Luis Recato Dy. November 28. the company contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. No. 19601 or for payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs. G. we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for night differentials are within the compass of the CIR's jurisdiction. L-9055. he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. vs. et al. the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work. April 29. 1962]. we hold that the CIR is with authority to act on this grievance.R.. May 23. se debe determinar es si entre las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa. G. et al. or in connection with. In fact. True. Withal.R. 3. vs. G. medical. May 25. Just recently. et al. No. Tan. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law). G. et al.'While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned case. and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty. 81 Phil. No. We held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process. and in a series of cases thereafter. G.R. es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro.' Apropos the issue of jurisdiction. at 325-326]. to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide. the record does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65 respondents and the petitioner had ceased. L-8738.3 Earlier.. and so it justified the additional compensation in the Shell case for 'hygienic. No. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. vs. are matters which arose out of the same employment. Since employer-employee relationship is sought to be re-established. After the passage of Republic Act 875. ibid.. Inc.' [ Shell Co. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this fashion: 'La cuestion que. Besides. a nuestro juicio. It is because of this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said demands — for reinstatement. the Industrial Court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of. contra National Labor Union. this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo. And this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work. L13806.

additional expense incurred — these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. 1958. all of which. ATTY. that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to turn over to them the certificates of title. and that if he (respondent)had known that the transfer certificates of title in question were in the possession of complainant he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time. Costs against petitioner. Laput did not comply with request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her case. By virtue of this motion. J. when the widow. So ordered. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 1957. without notice to complainant. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- being unfair and unethical. FRANCISCO E. the Court of First Instance of Cebu. were prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question. Laput to produce them. LAPUT.lâwphi1. Nieves Rillas Vda. . 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 219 — filed with this Court charging the respondent with malice. the CASIANO U. 1955. Respondent also denied that he was the author of the first motion complained of. Casiano U. it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of action here 'be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of Industrial Relations. and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration. respondent and his client Mrs. the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of title. LABRADOR. he went over the records Special Proceedings No. . Barrera. and yet Atty. anxiety augmented. to the undersigned administration pending my appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration" and that although Atty.ñet Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of records and transfer certificates of title. bad faith.".: This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. 1958. complainant herein (Atty. among which are transfer certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province. and that with the duplicate titles. other pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him. Indeed. filed a "Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner's copy". the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed. Laput "to surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the estate and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . 1957. Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn over a the records. de Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby. 1959. REMOTIGUE. within ten days from notice.the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered into the records of Special Proceedings No. the true facts being that the administratrix. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said special proceedings. vs. filed with the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid certificates of title. filed the pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Case No. the respondent. praying that he be issued owner's duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost. on October 8. effort wasted. for the reason that she could not locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action. Mrs. aside from . that as early as November 18. in spite of the written opposition of complainant. The Solicitor General. if any. on December 3. that the court finally approved the sales made. 1957. Laput". ordered complainant Laput "to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court.' "5 Upon the view We take of this case. 1956 and on September 16. and on December 3. the administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate. The time to be lost. without notice. petitioner. that on February 21. F. Laput was not served copy of this pleading. In a motion dated September 16. 1958. or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots. to whom this Court referred this case for investigation. all to the prejudice of said complainant. bank books. respondent. another motion. and assets. report and recommendation found that since January 11. on October 17. respondent asked the court to order Atty.

if not altogether bizzare behavior. Soriano. Cebu Branch. et al.1awphîl. CLEMENTE M. complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint. Mencias. Hence. as early as December 27. to wit: this terminated case (L-24114). was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix. Wittingly or unwittingly. Atty. and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented. October 8. motions. therefore. 1969. went to him to engage his professional services in two cases. Atty. the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice.699. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. for in this latter case. RESOLUTION . The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix. the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's complete exoneration should be. 1969. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance. and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault. by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143. and order of the Court.P. 1969. PHHC and U. entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114. 1955.15. et al. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. Clemente M.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput. Mariano. Parenthetically. as it hereby. ELPIDIO TIBURCIO. he (Atty. while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. Tiburcio. later on increased to P5. the amount of P4. Herminio C.561.. J. it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143. et al. Laput shows that respondent's answers correct.767. his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26. however. 1954. vs. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8.699. 1969. thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27. serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. His subsequent explanation did not. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases. 1955. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court.66." The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings. et al. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CASTRO. ET AL. that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case. a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19. EULOGIO MENCIAS. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio. and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5. At their conference. Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. It was on the same date. Laput) believed that he had still the right to retain the certificates of title in question. Antonio J.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases.nèt An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. MARCELINO TIBURCIO. an area of only about 19 hectares is IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. And so Atty." (L-30546). as early as December 19. and of the documents belonging to the estate in his possession. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations. is approved. Hon.: By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10.329. complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer certificates of title in question. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969. in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents. vs.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. HON.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines. Atty. etc. SORIANO IN L-24114. that the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed. and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or bad faith.66 by the estate.48 out of total of P31. the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio.passbook of the estate's deposit in the Philippine National Bank.

we are far from being convinced that he really did so. Soriano is hereby ordered.involved. as well as of the public. generating as it does in the minds of the litigants. Clemente M. in the present case. however. Rizal Avenue. Doria. of the premier control over the case. which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building. Atty. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. as claimed by Atty. therefore. Diaz to no avail. in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession. Dalangpan. he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. It is the sense of this Court. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment. in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. Bonifacio T. et al. at the very least. as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. Had he been less precipitate in his actions. when Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents. especially the Varsity Hills case. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court. Clemente M. that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar. besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment. Doria. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. categorically denied having given. Further still. Soriano has joined one Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident. was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court. at the hearing of this incident. he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10. we note that Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel. certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. if it were true. Atty. at the hearing of this incident. something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Atty. were it not for his candor. 1969. Soriano should have done. then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. 2 Atty. If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila. we find Atty. then he should. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession. Nemesio Diaz. 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer. Furthermore. What Atty. he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Atty. to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. In the incident before us. a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Atty. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case. Clearly. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 9 . We find Atty. And if this cannot be had. Manila).

JR. 4 On July 6. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors.. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken. That the Hon. a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendantappellant . that the grounds relied upon ".. denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. c. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA. " 6 On July 19. respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. As a consequence thereof. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default. Defendant has valid. to wit: a. levied on three motor vehicles. on October 1. 1 Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29. petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12. 1977. 1972. vs. 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court. Santos II. despite due notice." herein petitioner.L. docketed as Civil Case No. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default. Isabelo V. a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII). it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. petitioner. 1977. more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law. filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. acting upon the writ of execution. Vida Jr. his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. through a different counsel.R. b. respondents. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.JOSE GUBALLA. Mercado & Associates. 680-V. legal and justiciable defenses. an associate of the same law firm. Vida Jr.. THE HON.. 52610R. RICARDO G. and this Petition must be denied for lack of . of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment.L. 5 In an Order dated July 12. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 7 Hence the instant Petition. could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals .. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff. The appealed case was handled by Atty. and. Santos 11. issued by respondent Judge. another member of the law firm. . . who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently. of the law firm of Vida Enriquez. EDUARDO P. That this Hon. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. petitioner. the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. J: In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction. and d. in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. Benjamin Bautista. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner. CAGUIOA.. The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved. Isabelo V. .2 SANTOS. No. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr.. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. 1977. 3 A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. Atty. through Atty. Carlos. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado. 1971. 1977. presided by respondent Judge for execution. petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.

merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve, WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
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Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives. Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day. In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate. In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents. Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners. R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought. Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4 Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest. However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00 1990 605.00 570.00 1991 165.00 2,300.00 ———— ———— ———— P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8 WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. SO ORDERED. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAPTER III CANON 10 VICENTE MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, respondent. RESOLUTION

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5 On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.) Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

Sutton. it is averred — "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible. likewise. 1957)" although. of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. for: (a) petitioner's theory. Respondent. 1971. that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is unbelievable. (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little damage. indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising. that. she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard. the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of merit. Considering further. no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed from. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true. although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on. petitioner states. Villaseca. No. referring to a portion of the same quotation. that — in the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals — "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case". must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel. The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12. likewise." which is. because in law there is none. (Cesica v. Yap. the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court. it was obvious that she was far from contrite. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals. as its machinist. that of the petitioner. as did the trial court. the impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach.FERNANDO. appellant acted as pilot and. Ordoñez. to say the least. untrue. in fact. (b) these circumstances. thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly. the latter being bigger than. Vicente Muñoz v. On the contrary. J. it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court. there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year. L-9590. At such a hearing. and that. why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making aforementioned misrepresentations. overloaded. April 30. at the same time. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor". that. both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum.: We have before us a task far from pleasant. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor. within ten (10) days from notice. G. Sutton appeared. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when. on page 8 of the petition. in fact. Her liability is clear. more specifically with reference to a duty owing this Tribunal." " 1 A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14. upon examination of the evidence. of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as such. such optimism was misplaced. When given an opportunity to make proper amends." although. but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision. Delia T. connected with the law firm of Salonga. which is not true. and (d) although appellant's boat carried several passengers. Parlade. 1971. summing up evidence for the defense. on page 6 of the petition. So we rule.R. in fact. including children. on page 9 of the petition.part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant. and was. that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence. reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. respondent Delia T. Where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting]. the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of complainant's boat — where the complainant was seated. the Court of Appeals found. that. that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of Appeals. and is therefore. on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed from. as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. and makes reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals. which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat. and Associates. Under the circumstances. While her demeanor was respectful. If so. as charged in the information. Even when subjected to intensive . thereby hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death — so that. that the petition quotes. to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant.R. a member of the Philippine Bar. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat. requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. There was no attempt at justification. L-33672. immediately after the collision . the Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause. whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts.

or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. Ordoñez. that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. that it does not go far enough. the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December 1. or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved. What is more.. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Yap. appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22. often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions." 5. 1971. with knowledge of its invalidity. Yap and Custodio O. the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. together with Messrs. Delia T. Sutton. or the language of a decision or a textbook or. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand. It is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The mood. Ordoñez joins Atty. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo. Delia T. however. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton. the language or the argument of opposing counsel. Parlade & Associates. or a statute that has been repealed. oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to. for the apology to gain significance. with the assistance of Atty. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible. pursuant to an order dated October 18. This Court does not view matters thus. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned. That undersigned attorney. she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. which her evasive answers gave rise. 3. which reads: "22. Sutton. did seek to make amends thus: "1. . 1971. 2. Pedro L. That with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney. That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. That the undersigned Delia T. 1971." 3 What is more. Attorney Sedfrey A. Sedfrey A." 2 The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper. there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. she was not to be budged from such an untenable position. and did make with the proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of regret. signed jointly by Sedfrey A. partners in the firm of Salonga.questioning by several members of the Court. the obligation to the bench." If there were a greater sincerity on her part. Ordoñez. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. 4. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause. the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court were explained by her. While expressing regret and offering apology. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class. [Candor and Fairness]. especially to this Court. Some members of the Court feel. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. — The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. for candor and honesty takes precedence. seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit.. the testimony of a witness. Ordoñez. Sedfrey A. . even at this stage. There ought to be. and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim. To purge herself of the contempt. and that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court. no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. That undersigned Delia T. Parlade.

as well as the other senior partners. Sutton is severely censured. Attorney Sedfrey A. It must be stated. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on her record. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . Ordoñez.At the same time. should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm. is deep-seated. both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted. perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. however. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel. the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners. respondent Delia T. WHEREFORE. must be commended. that in the future he. especially in his relationship to this Court.

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