CASES OF LEGAL ETHICS PART 1 IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.

: Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows: 1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. 2 — He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). 3 — He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case.

4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget. 5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3 At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's coaccused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4 Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1) RESOLUTION CASTRO, C.J.: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the

common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502). When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,

They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. (State ex. and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. 193 N. and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. one who. firms. GUILLERMO CARAGUE. . It embraces conveyancing. there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Sec. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects. (105 Phil. holders of a college degree. is engaged in the practice of law. and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. a majority thereof. including the Chairman.S. referee. and conducting proceedings in attachment. but embraces the preparation of pleadings...E. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Dudley and Co. at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. at the time of their appointment. v. the facts are disputed. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. rel.. counseling clients in legal matters. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there. board. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1). negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation. (Article X. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. a majority thereof. 23. 340 Mo. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. 2d 895. as here. Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and. before any court. Otherwise stated. committee. conveyancing. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney. and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. SALONGA. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. particularly where.. a wide experience with men and affairs. 3rd ed. vs. to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.C. at the time of their appointment. (5 Am. however. 262. and HON. said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. petitioner. it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. the foreclosure of a mortgage. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. WHEREFORE. However. 173. HON. (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. they are always subject to become involved in litigation.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably. However.. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l). Jr. 102 S.. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. J. No valid distinction. It is not limited to appearing in court. all advice to clients. p... CHRISTIAN MONSOD. the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. in a representative capacity. commissioner. practice . and the giving of all legal advice to clients.Agrava. 129 Ohio St. shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. and in addition. PARAS. conveying. 263). Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and.. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar. indeed necessary.sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky. Mckittrick v. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney. or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. including the Chairman. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------RENATO CAYETANO. associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate. body. in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management. In general. so far as . (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co..W..:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. (Black's Law Dictionary. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . JOVITO R. respondents." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT. at least thirty-five years of age. and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. to the proper administration of justice . premises considered. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved.. It is a grave responsibility. Dworken.

). FOZ." MR. FOZ. therefore. such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law. provides.144). unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. of the Commission on Audit.E.. as commonly understood. will necessarily involve legal work. which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession. p. many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. therefore. although it is auditing. Payne. which requires the application of law. (Barr v.2d 623. Among others. At this point. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates. citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass. Vol.. knowledge. although many lawyers do not engage in private practice. it might be helpful to define private practice. Generally.(Wolfram. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". 140 A. in or out of court. Bar Assoc. 145 Conn. 194 N. OPLE. p. Wolfram. then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners. and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.: Minnesota. In most firms. . FOZ.] 179 A. And. 222. Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners. not reality.. Yes. .). (Ibid. Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. 15). Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. Automobile Service Assoc. the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history. Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois]. (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity. to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service. 325. legal procedure. in or out of court. it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. v. Yes. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. (Charles W. p. [R. Jamir). 593). 22 A. 139. op. The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. of sound moral character. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms. 593). This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.concerns the question set forth in the order. Presiding Officer. 128 Conn. Yes. (State Bar Ass'n v. 665-666. the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. 1986].).2d 863. To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit. (Gary Munneke. (Ibid. quoted in Rhode Is. Cardell. MR. ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1)." (Ibid. 3 [1953 ed. once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today. FOZ. MR. that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice. The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Before we suspend the session. saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. 313. FOZ. OPLE. The term. there are still uninformed . v. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thank you. MR. among others. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. the answer is yes. Mr. Mr. . MR. Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co. cit. in effect. we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA. counselling and public service. [1986].). p." Today. lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. Comments on the Rules of Court.]. Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm. means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services. it will involve legal work." (Ibid. Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer. Presiding Officer.] . even chairman. We must consider the fact that the work of COA. The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous. 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm.). or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." Groups of lawyers are called "firms. Nonetheless. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. commonly understood to be the practice of law. training and experience. (Moran. MR. 626 [1941]). (Ibid. In either case. MR. OPLE. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. And. In this regard thus. Is he.I.. a corporate lawyer.

(Ibid. the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice." Jan. advice-giving. a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla. and electronic computing equipment. "Corporate Law Practice. inter alia: corporate legal research. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include. in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts. legal skills. In our litigation-prone country. international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. a business daily. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. document drafting. a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. however. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous. is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house. 1989. are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. 11. In short. "Corporate Finance Law. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice. (Business Star. wherein a "model". p. the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action. By no means will most of this work involve litigation. "Corporate Finance Law. at least theoretically. 1989. i. substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. 11. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law. Understandably. Nonetheless. earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. 4). a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks. acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings)." has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. In several issues of the Business Star. a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. the appraisal of major trends. automatic data processing. particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. Truth to tell.laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. Lawyers. many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. each involving different legal doctrines. so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Certainly." (Business Star. the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors. as in medicine. Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways. the most prominent is that of prosecutor. tax laws research. a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties." He is the "big-time" lawyer. the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. 4). Moreover. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law. to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems. for all intents and purposes. ( Emphasis supplied. unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen." Jan. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.1990. Lawyers and other professional groups. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. clients. many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers. legal processes. and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid. functioning at the legal policy level of decisionmaking now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. p. p." (Business Star. The business lawyer has been described as the planner.. (Business Star." May 25. 687). 1989. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein. one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action. "Corporate Finance Law. legal institutions. and negotiation. 4). the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. for example. p. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed. . For one.) In a big company. A corporate lawyer. and other interested parties. 4). the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling. the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.). In most cases. tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. (Wolfram. p. the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance." Jan. Instead. herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice. appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission). and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them. supra. and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Of these special roles. a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. At any rate. particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management. This brings us to the inevitable. 11. surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective.e. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. the diagnostician and the trial lawyer.). After all. operational analysis. know that in most developed societies today. the surgeon.

( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops. Yet. more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders. p. many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. 4). (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities." it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. "Business Star". he must. inventory levels. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. with a shared area linking them.Today. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?. In general. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older. concern three pointed areas of consideration. p. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel. They differ from those of remedial law. it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities. 1991. For that matter. managing expanded liability exposure. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence. three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles. strategy at multiple levels. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make. In the context of a law department. In Europe. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does . The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles." so to speak. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global. coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. aid in negotiation settlement. and rates of flow. the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. "Corporate Finance law.] the organization and management of the legal function." Jan. the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues. social. 1991. Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25. "The Corporate Counsel. Esprit. economic. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. including structuring its global operations. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. interdependent environment. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. managerial. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. at the very least. and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. promoting team achievements within the organization. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees." April 10. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel. 11. thus: Preventive Lawyering. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas. 1989. In a crisis situation. and psychological. Also. Managerial Jurisprudence. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. 4). [Be this as it may. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process. and the need to think about a corporation's. creating new and varied interactions with public decisionmakers. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.

2. p. but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel). "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.S. (Ibid. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution. Third and Fourth Quarters. and project work of the Bank. and all the other legal requirements are satisfied. having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. In a loan agreement. a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry.S.not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987). Monsod. Atty. 3 and 4. in initiating. such as the farmer and urban poor groups. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar. (pp. the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal. On the same day. ( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. economic. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising. p. (p. 13). Thus. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. particularly the modern concept of law practice. 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified. In the same vein. (Guillermo V. and since 1986. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970). a quast judicial body. they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. for instance." Staff Paper No. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned. Central Bank of the Philippines. and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. (3) conditions of closing. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development. a lawyer-negotiator of contracts. Manila. 1991. in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Michael Hager. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". Atty. 15. and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. he took his oath of office. p." Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination. Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U." submitted by L. If he does. he worked with the Meralco Group. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission. the finance manager. demand expertise in the law of contracts. 1977. On June 18. the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. a negotiating panel acts as a team.T.P. 11). perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. 143 SCRA 327. it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. an unpublished dissertation. during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast. In the field of advocacy. but where they are.) and having hurdled the bar. (Condensed from the work paper. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. 321). Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. Atty. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist. men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery. and (5) events of default. Civil Service Commission. 1987. in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development. U. An appointment is essentially within the . 1973). entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations. (4) covenants. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U. "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers. a lawyer-manager. they beat no drums. ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises. Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. p. (2) borrower's representation. served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate. Vol. Soliven. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. 1991. petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer. Romulo." (See Ricardo J. the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution. 124. has worked with the under privileged sectors. for which he was cited by the President of the Commission. Graduate School of Law. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts. Nos. Jr. Civil Service Commission. the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. 1982. Necessarily.. (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion. On June 5. 265). then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. Monsod used to be a member. has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. as in this case. once said: "They carry no banners. and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.

the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. this petition is hereby DISMISSED. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Upon the other hand. L-3081. say. wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified. oath-taking. Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice. (Art. and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly. . et al. Clearly. he ceased to engage in private law practice. No blood shall flow from his veins. I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . Moreover. invoking the case of Aquino. 1949. a member of the Philippine Bar.discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. he would be considered on official leave of absence. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion. in making use of the law. may the Court reject the nominee. Blanco. this is far from the constitutional intent. suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice. without first becoming lawyers. only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. Additionally. law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years.S.S. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured. . Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. For one thing. 28. is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law. L-1532. the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This matter. implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. the answer is in the negative. Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Sec. . Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. who has been practising law for over ten years. (Lacson v. the President issues the permanent appointment." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance . 1959. charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. are actually practicing law. not the spirit of the agreement. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City. Plaintiff-Appellee. In the instant case. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Nov. or in advising others on what the law means. 1947. and that he would not receive any payment for his services. Once. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar. posting of bond. In that sense. accused the procurator of reneging on his word. (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Delilah was beside herself with anger. may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission. and (4) acceptance e. PAREDES. that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed. (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines. VIII.. . Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C. how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified. This is different from the acts of persons practising law. Delilah agreed on condition that — No blade shall touch his skin. (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U. consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President. on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. two Members for five years. In view of the foregoing. consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination. one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth. J. how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation. the Chief of Police of Alaminos.: On September 4. Monsod is a lawyer. there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power. SO ORDERED.g." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation.. and the last Members for three years. Senate. was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case. having entered his appearance as private prosecutor. et al. perhaps. as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law. Laguna. and fuming with righteous fury. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused. This blinded the man. Law on Public Officers. which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA. etc. perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say. Supreme Court would still reverse the U. October 14. subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. No. the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion. by operation of law. p.S. much less a grave abuse of discretion. most individuals. Romero. vs. Of those first appointed. without reappointment. The condition of his appearance as such. after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. DefendantAppellant. whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved. Finally. . vs. three Members shall hold office for seven years. (2) In the same vein. for has been clearly shown. I greatly doubt. since no abuse. 1 Constitution). Gonzales. Thus. it would be incredible that the U. but by the spirit that giveth life.

heretofore reproduced. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. a succession of acts of the same kind. as it is hereby affirmed. shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Laguna. as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General. Sec. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . The offended party had." He claims that City Attorney Fule. to represent the complainant in the case at bar. 647). 1961. without costs. in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. the Secretary of Justice. 864.C. Hilarion U. 35. Laguna.S. the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. 1961. M. 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public. For one thing. 127. 768). There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability. as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. 522. which rendered judgment on December 20. 87 Kan. 42 LRA. On the other hand. Under date of January 4. this Court holds that Asst. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy: Essentially. for it consists in frequent or customary actions. who is a relative. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos.of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. 31. as already pointed out. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person. Rule 27. law library In view of the foregoing. 35. for patently being without merits. the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused. now Sec. 1. Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge. Practice is more than an isolated appearance. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. therefore. with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. with costs against appellant. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Revised Rules). law library WHEREFORE. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity." this time invoking Section 32. the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation. and which we consider plausible. the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. Cotner. Jarencio. or with the aid of an attorney. In other words. the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action. counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case. Bryan.. On December 17. 4 S. allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. presided by the Hon. in all respects. 644. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Rule 138. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos. The appeal should be dismissed. which bars certain attorneys from practicing. CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING. it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior. p. Rule 138.E. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. the decision appealed from should be. 98 N. Revised Rules of Court. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna. Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party. the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. City Attorney Ariston D. the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos.

This law provides as follows: SECTION 1. Written oppositions were admitted. (4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood. as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. improve the administration of justice. the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. are: (1) Assist in the administration of justice. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated. (5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law. fully and properly. SEC. public service and conduct. giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. practice and procedure. and publish information relating thereto. The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views. the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession. Thereafter. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar. (2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers. 1972. thus: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. 1971. (3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members. opinions. the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. among other things. law reform. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires. out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated. jurisprudence. 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On December 1. 4 Since then. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. and ensures. through their own organized action and participation. integration fosters cohesion among lawyers. such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.PART II January 9. learning. to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report. (2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar. In 1970. 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. sentiments. make it possible for the legal profession to: (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law. therefore. and make reports and recommendations thereon. (3) Discharge. 1962. (6) Encourage and foster legal education. . Marcos on September 17. Bar integration. Within two years from the approval of this Act. the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession. 526 2 of the Court. Integration of the Bar will. SEC. It will suffice. professional competence. to carry out the purposes of this Act." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. 2. and (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. 1973 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. after due hearing. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. On August 16. and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers. Case No. 1972. (7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law. arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. pleading. a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. The purposes of an integrated Bar. pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. 3. Congress passed House Bill No. The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. for this purpose. and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public. the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30." The petition in Adm. with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. in general. at the outset. comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration. In September. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law. convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration.

while the purpose of a tax is revenue. Otherwise stated. The Supreme Court. . For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege. but there can be no collective action without an organized body. (8) Provide placement services. in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. and assist it to maintain its integrity. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State. (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research. 2. it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power. Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar. membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount." Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities." Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. on the importance of preventive legal advice. and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer. may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 13 of the Constitution. (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces. but also to his brethren in the profession. moreover. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report: Constitutionality of Bar Integration Judicial Pronouncements. (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers. (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law. under Article VIII. the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). given existing Bar conditions. and (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation. the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. Moreover. (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations. the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. to the courts. and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. not involuntary membership in any other aspect. improve the administration of justice. as an officer of the court. no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses." Indeed. the administration of justice. clothed with public interest. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar. more specifically. The issue therefore. In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue. a privilege. and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service. Sec. The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: — Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.(4) Shield the judiciary. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. is a question of compelled financial support of group activities. (7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers. Regulatory Fee. it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body. 1. Freedom of Association. from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it. practice. — Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest. because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client. "to promulgate rules concerning pleading. which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum. but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or. and promulgate minimum fees schedules. it follows that as an incident to regulation. therefore. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. impartiality and independence. and to the nation. such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. and the admission to the practice of law. Anent the first issue. and. — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action. will "raise the standards of the legal profession. and procedure in all courts. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation.

(4) greater Bar facilities and services. by proper work. The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. and vastly improved the administration of justice. . at the time Bar integration takes effect. and 285 (or 2. Canada and the United States. that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England. has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar. A lawyer is free.80 per cent) vote against it. Upon the other hand. while only 378 (or 2. if his liberties were to be thus extended. and politics will intrude into its affairs. improve the administration of justice. To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. 3.Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar. as he has always been. and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.855 (or 93. The conscientious objector. while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. enlarged professional consciousness. and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members. (5) elimination of unauthorized practice.090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses. young and old. hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE. 662 (or 4. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. it is not unfair. it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which. might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Finally. 12. Canada and the United States. notably in England. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits. a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration. It is noteworthy." within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried.51 per cent) voted against it. In many other jurisdictions. and to the public. Freedom of Speech. that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable.The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. Case No. it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established. would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public. none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen. it has been variously argued that in the event of integration. ACCORDINGLY. it has restored public confidence in the Bar. The Court is fully convinced. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. of a total of 15. (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar. cliquism will be the inevitable result.06 per cent) are non-committal. local Bar associations will be weakened. and 157 (or 1. (8) more cohesive profession. on the other hand. (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns. effective on January 16. however. by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed. Even the income tax would be suspect.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration. it is not retroactive. In addition. of the 13. Government authority will dominate the Bar. even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. because it will apply equally to all lawyers. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government. they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed.555 (or 96. to the courts. 4.04 per cent) are noncommital.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration. the Bar will become an impersonal Bar. (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar.802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission. effective lobbying will not be possible. 14. 1973. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar. the Court. to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes. (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar. Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar. Fair to All Lawyers. Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation. it is not unequal.

the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. . In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989. 22 in the following terms: The gravamen of the offense punished by B." We should add that violation of B. The Court of Appeals. in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989. docketed as Criminal Case No. PHILIPPINES. the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. a member of the Philippine Bar. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order." On 1 February 1989. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. Blg. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. 05093. after trial. Marquez. suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. ATTY. Tuanda. Blg. 85-38360 and 8538361. Blg.250. in addition. respondent. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor. respondent Fe T.00.000. the Court of Appeals in C. respondent. 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B. the proper forum. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.000. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction. 1 On 16 December 1988. 8538359.400. 85-38359. asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C. for sale on a commission basis. TUANDA. Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. in Criminal Case No.00. Traders Royal Bank. she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court. The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions. FE T. the practice is prescribed by the law. instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26. Marquez several pieces of jewelry. with a total stated value of P36. respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.P. noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court.A.-G.00 in Criminal Case No. but also an injury to the public. complainant in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that.00. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. 22.R. the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. to pay a fine of P 6.00. 85-38361. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but. respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiffappellee. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule. multiplied a thousandfold. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit. four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa. Sometime in February 1984.00. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5. PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989. the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder.P. . for insufficiency of funds.00. In Lozano v. and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15. and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6.450. In due time. 22 in all three (3) cases. issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5. can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce. On 17 December 1983. In that Resolution.P. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B. the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5. and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced.400. . On appeal.400.00. Martinez.000. respondent received from one Herminia A.P. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar. injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. in Criminal Case No. and to pay a fine of P16. SO ORDERED. respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank. 85-38360. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. 85-38358. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5.A. CR No.450.00. and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude.-G. Marquez.000.P. 3 (Italics supplied) Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Blg. Blg. Consequently.PART III CANON 1 PEOPLE OF THE vs.00. . The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda.R. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance. docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. and (b) three (3) for violation of B.00. with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.400. 27. CR No. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation.

she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man.: Magdalena T. then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Blg. (Italics supplied) Sec. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. ARCIGA complainant. which Magdalena also attended. K to Z). Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. MANIWANG respondent. respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.P. 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case. Capiz. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. 28. 1971. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. Segundino passed the bar examinations. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. They renewed their relationship. Segundino stopped visiting her. he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him. Erlinda Ang. 1973 of their child. Several days after his oath-taking. I and J). In Melendrez v. She went back to Ivisan. grossly immoral conduct. Arciga in her complaint of February 24. violation of B. they had sexual congress. 1975 to contact her lover. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land. 1970 at Cebu City. and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar. 5 ACCORDINGLY. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.malpractice. 4 this Court stressed that: the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. however. he did not mind because he loved her very much. Fearing that there was something amiss. involving moral turpitude. 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. When Magdalena discovered in January. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4. Oblena. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law. Ivisan. 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations.Magdalena remained in Cebu. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 865). Davao del Sur. Thereafter. they had repeated acts of cohabitation. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. vs. 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. In his opinion. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. After they had dinner one night in March. The results were released on April 25. or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past. Magdalena went to Davao in July. it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him. Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He continued his law studies in Davao City. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. 1975. . Segundino remarked that even if that be the case. 1975. He went to Cebu in December. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife. or other gross misconduct in such office. Michael Dino Maniwang. or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. constitutes malpractice. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January. Decena. SEGUNDINO D. 1973 for the baptism of his child. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25. . she and Segundino went to her hometown. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAGDALENA T. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. AQUINO. In December. Bukidnon. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. 1973 that she was pregnant. 117 Phil. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section. J. or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice. have been filed or are pending in any court.

Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. (Quingwa vs. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful. (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras. Puno. Cui. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. 1206. Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children. Administrative Case No. although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse. while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage. 256). Peralta. 100 Phil.It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. 865). 48 Phil. 116 Phil. 63 SCRA 667." "Through thick and thin. (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila. my Josephine you will always be the first. February 28. Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco. Almirez. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Josefina Mortel. 768. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. 1967 and 1968. under promise of marriage. 1975. Paz. 997. Abaigar vs. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Jr. Puno refused to marry her. 450). after such fake marriage. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct. (Royong vs. 1967. falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno. Ruado. which he refused to fulfill. (Almirez vs. disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 547. (5) Where Flora Quingwa. 1975. they were going to get married..S. 507. Viojan vs. who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles. misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual. 62 SCRA 382. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony. for better or for worse. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. Reyes vs. February 24. (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities. 114 Phil. De la Cruz. 1102). he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy. when old-fashioned morality still prevailed. middle and the last in my life. Administrative Case No. 117 Phil. JR. Toledo. (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. flagrant. February 28. Agustin. Aspiras. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. a married woman separated from her husband. Simbol. SIMEON BARRANCO. or shameless.: In a complaint made way back in 1971. Duran. Villanueva." will depend on the surrounding circumstances. be denied admission to the legal profession. however. In 1955. Administrative Case No. (See Montana vs. that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her. 27 SCRA 169. 389. marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies. J. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general. tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that. (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena. She used to give Puno money upon his request." (Mortel vs. According to the complainant. See Sarmiento vs. was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because. observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man. complainant. 1979. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. vs. January 29. complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts. 313). Before be could take his oath. and. they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs.93 SCRA 91). 322. respondent. see Villasanta vs. Wong. she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. . 586). and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C. Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. SO ORDERED. Administrative Case No. two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. 100 Phil. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. 117 Phil. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent. keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant." (People vs. 106 Phil. where lawyer Eugenio V. 123 Phil. Oblena. Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. in life or in death. September 10. a married man. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. 481. after unsuccessful attempts in 1966. and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. 101 Phil. RESOLUTION ROMERO. whose sense of dignity. 533. 1969.J. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925. a public school teacher. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. 535). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents. 959). 2nd 896). Administrative Case No. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt. honor and morality is not well cultivated. anyway. 19 SCRA 439). --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PATRICIA FIGUEROA. Lopez.

the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love. We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. they were steadies.Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. To recapitulate. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JOSE TOLOSA. respondent repeated his request. 1974. albeit belatedly. the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco. Since 1953. Sevilla in June and July 1971. 1974. when she learned that respondent married another woman. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. but grossly immoral. Rafael Barranco. WHEREFORE. He gave only P10. 1988. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems. the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. in response to complainant's opposition. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations." (Rollo. 1 It was after the child was born. Hence. 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. 1979. . that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Jr. 4 On September 29. the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17. citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. 1988 when the Court. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. p. sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. 1993.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. who is now sixty-two years of age. We agree. respondent.The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. On October 2. respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse. Their intimacy yielded a son. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman. Unfortunately. to take the lawyer's oath. We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned. Respondent Simeon Barranco. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971. both of whom possess no impediment to marry. when they were both in their teens. resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. should thus be allowed. ALFREDO CARGO. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. 1964. credible. bitter and unforgiving to the end. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. complainant. is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. report and recommendation. 10 Respondent. flagrant. Upon complainant's motion. Iloilo from 1980-1986. Complying with an order of this Court. born on December 11.: On 7 April 1982. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. 3 In 1988. Jr. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address." 6 It is a willful. the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble. Iloilo. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. complainant alleged. On June 1. respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. J. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay. the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. 7 We find the ruling in Arciga v. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams. The IBP's report dated May 17. vs. On February 18. On June 18. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. Malabon. 1982. 2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15. respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. 8). Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral. even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. Barrio Tenejeros. Patricia Figueroa. SO ORDERED. voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent. 5 Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17. 1980. 9 Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. perpetually. 45 Sisa Street. this petition. not for any other reason. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit.

5. because of her differences with complainant. Malabon. 33-35). The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. 1983). and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street.Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. Quezon City. at the FEU Hospital. Malabon. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). (Rollo. Malabon. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant.. 1982. 5. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. 18-20. May 12. Priscilla (tsn. 1983. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). 9. Quezon City (tsn. June 15. Metro Manila (tsn. 1982. 20. Metro Manila from her earnings. their residences being one house away from each other. 6.. Quezon City. Tenejeros. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. Quezon City.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. 4. June 21. 1983). to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken.17. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. and visited her at the hospital everyday. in fact. Quezon City. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. 7. 13-15. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. Malabon. pp. 'B-l' and 'K'). Sept. Sept. 8. 10-11. his wife left their conjugal house at No. Metro Manila (tsn. report and recommendation. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. 1 Lopez Jaena St.10. May 12. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. In fact. to live with respondent at No. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment.. 2. 45 Sisa Street. Barrio Tenejeros. 6. 3. 'B'. (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. p. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No.1 Lopez Jaena St. That while Priscilla was staying there. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. pp. g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. 1983). she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. Malabon. 4. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. pp. 9). N' and 'Q'). Galas. 1985. 16. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. That respondent had been courting his wife.. 3. 45 Sisa St. . Galas. 45 Sisa Street. Exh. pp.. Exh. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. May 12. Barrio Tenejeros. Barrio Tenejeros. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. 37-39). Tenejeros.. 10. pp. 1983. pp. 7. 8. Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. denying the further allegations of complainant. Domingo. 45 Sisa St. Galas. That Priscilla. 5-8. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. That sometime in June. Malabon. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. 'M'.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. 1982. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. pp. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital.. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. as assistance in her medical expenses. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. 8. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. and complainant. 35-37). Edgardo Miclat. c) That respondent only gave P35. That respondent and complainant are neighbors. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. (Rollo. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. (Rollo. 1984). Malabon. pp. nor lived with her at No. Tenejeros. left their conjugal house and lived at No. July 29. 2. Metro Manila. Metro Manila. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. That again in Quezon City. pp. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. 1 Galas St. Domingo Church in 1980.

. respondent RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:p On 27 March 1979. In view of these. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. The complainant's case was summarized by the Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation dated 7 February 1990 in the following manner: On August 7. report and recommendation. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. 'G'. The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing at the back of the check. The LIZASO. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27. As officers of the court. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by complainant. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. from disbursing monies that may be due to respondent on account of his retirement from the University's service. but failed to complete his presentation of evidence despite repeated notices to do so. "B") for the amount of P5.000. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. Sergio Amante to be invested in business with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting Aug. capital to be returned after two months. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SHIRLEY CUYUGAN vs. Court required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the complaint. Atty. Received by: S." (Rollo. ACCORDINGLY. complainant even begged respondent to return her money if he could not give the interests but respondent merely made promises.E Legal Department Head. complainant. More specifically. Atty. 1978. ATTY. Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings.00 to Atty. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent failed to come. (Rollo. however. Three days after August 7. pp. the Court referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. complainant tried to see respondent in order to collect the interest on her investment but respondent failed to give her any. Afraid that her investment will not be returned. in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. The second scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to appear. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. 2. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso entrusted the amount of P5.M Amante(signed) The complainant originally prepared the check and the receipt on August 4.000. 1978 in the amount of P5. 7." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court.000. 1978 against respondent (Exh.In effect. 4. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. 39-40). p. Complainant was further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily. 3. A written receipt (Exh. respondent Amante failed to offer formally his documentary evidence. At the same time. complainant wrote a letter to this Court requesting an order restraining respondent from leaving the country and an order restraining respondent's employer. complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. Atty. 'F'. was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the casino. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. 1978 when she was able to see respondent and gave to him the P5. in spite again of his differences with complainant.00 was signed by respondent on August 7.00 (Exh. lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. For the many weeks that followed. By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980. At the same time. The Court referred this request to the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution dated 15 July 1981. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. Siojo informed her that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear. 1978.00 check for which respondent signed the receipt/promissory note. 655615 dated August 4. For this very reason. "C"). Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held hearings at which the complainant appeared and testified on her own behalf and submitted documentary evidence to support her allegations of misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante. 1978 and which states: Mrs. Moreover. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. Thus. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. 1978. the University of the East. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. "A") payable to the latter and which. in spite of his differences with complainant. per agreement between the two of them. and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. complainant sought the help of the U. Sergio G. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. On 18 June 1981. B-1'. 40). She tried to seek respondent's signature on the receipt but it was only on August 7.000. 'B'. 1978. Respondent also presented documentary evidence on his behalf. SERGIO AMANTE.

655615 as payment of my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley C. all directed to seeking the return or reimbursement of her P5. "B" do not. The analysis of respondent's evidence by the Solicitor General follows: 1. Respondent said he had no real intention of extending a second loan to complainant. Lizaso Check No. Moreover. at all. leaving a big void or vacant space in between which any ordinary layman knows may be used to another's advantage and manipulated to the prejudice of the signatory. The bank's microfilm copy of the reverse side of the check confirms it. "1" is fully handwritten. such as the U. After careful examination of the records of this case. the stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the investigation of this disbarment case. Respondent Amante allegedly lent P5. Furthermore. To provide complainant with an incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent. Annex "1" — photocopy of a stub in an actual size as short and as small as one inch by three inches. Complainant was allegedly very slow in repaying the loan. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the Solicitor General follow: First. if indeed complainant paid her loan to respondent. Mr. and that the capital of P5. is the alleged receipt dated August 4. If there was any truth to the genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by respondent. Aquino.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit "B" of the Complaint. complainant allegedly approached respondent for a loan of P20. "B") dated August 7. the stub receipt had never been presented by respondent in any of the investigations/confrontations set by the U. that she had delivered P5. "H") authorizing complainant to collect in his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr. Said receipt unquestionably bears the signature of respondent. Conrado Aquino.00 investment. respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2" being a copy of a receipt for P5. at the time of encashment by respondent.00 was received by respondent as her capital to be invested in respondent's business venture with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day starting August 7.00 allegedly given in payment of complainant's loan from respondent. respondent affixed his signature.000. Thus.000. Third. 655615C (P5. he should have immediately presented this in the scheduled confrontations if only to dismiss the complaint outright or the malicious rumor he claimed complainant was spreading within the university. Moreover. however. Noriega then returned the note to her with the advice that she should secure a letter from respondent to specify the amount to be collected by complainant.000. to substantiate his own version of the evidence. by clear and convincing evidence. despite repeated demands therefor. and that complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings of Exh.00 to complainant. [Unusually long vacant space between the above words and signature below] Sergio G. in the ordinary course of things as in the case at bar. it taxes credulity on why respondent in Exh. the situation raises the question why complainant would give and sign such a note of receipt when. was of the opinion that this was a personal agreement best left between the two of them to settle. already contained the words "capital investment" at the back thereof.000. Exh. Amante admitted he encashed the check. "D"). Again. 1978.000. on 7 August 1978.000.00. Second. Most persuasive in lending credence to this is the fact that the check. Respondent's note does not show an admission of his obligation to return or reimburse complainant's money. The tenacity and resourcefulness with which complainant repeatedly sought help from various school officials. it should be the respondent who should sign and give a receipt for the check of P5.000. "1" which consisted of only one word "loan" would readily show that the handwritten loops appearing on the edge of the cut portion of the top of Exh. 1978 embodying the following words: Received from Shirley C. It totally negates respondent's claim that the check was in payment of a previous loan given by him to complainant.E Faculty President. even more so that respondent is a lawyer.00 shall be returned to complainant after two months from date thereof. 2. the latter dangled the possibility of a second loan for P20. we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant has discharged the burden of showing. Complainant presented this note to Mr. 1978 clearly expresses the terms of their oral agreement that the amount of P5. Mr. the exhibits submitted by respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated by respondent. According to respondent. "1". Lizaso. Noriega. Sometime in June 1978. Annex "2". "B" with the last handwritten line in Exh. After complainant had repeatedly demanded the return of her P5. Amante(signed) Exh. complainant sought the help of Mr. the agreement between him and complainant was to invest the amount in respondent's business venture.00 was entrusted to respondent to be invested by him in his business venture. Antonio Ravelo. a comparison of the edge of the cut top portion of Exh. This evidence can only elicit disbelief as being incredible if not manufactured for the following reasons: Furthermore.Because of this.000.00) in payment of her loan. Legal Department Head or the U.00 check referred to in the complaint.000. addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of respondent and embodying ten words: "Attached is check No. Fourth. correspond to the . The receipt/promissory note (Exh. which was substantially as follows. the U. dated August 7. the latter wrote a note dated November 7. which loan fell due a month later. complainant sought the help of the University President.E Head of Legal Department.00 capital investment which respondent failed to do.000. upon complainant's repayment of her first loan.000. "1" would affix his signature so far away below from the handwritten words. "1" and Exh.00 needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on complainant's house.00 to complainant. by her letter of December 11.000. he claimed that complainant inserted the words in Exh. the Solicitor General found respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and implausible. This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then tried to extort money from respondent Amante by harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint. but' argued that he did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior obligation to him.000. U. At the same time. 1978 (Exh. but the latter was not able to help her because respondent denied that he ever owed complainant anything. subsequently marked as Exh. 1987. 1978 and the same to be returned two months thereafter. that said amount has a guarantee of 10% profit per day starting August 7. 1978 addressed to a certain Mr. complainant tendered to respondent Amante the P5.E Faculty President.00 to respondent Amante for investment purposes and that respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof. 2 Upon the other hand. "B" of the complainant and the same signature of respondent. To all these terms. Resty Noriega (Exh. "B" embodying the agreement that the P5. and purportedly signed by complainant.E Faculty President and the University President himself. d) Finally. "1" that what remained is the receipt promissory note or Exh. The respondent also denied having signed the receipt for P5.E. 1 Respondent Amante presented a different version of the facts. prior to finally securing legal assistance from a private lawyer. This amply and clearly substantiate the material fact that at the time the check was received by respondent and presented by him to the bank. are evincive of the credibility and faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause of action against respondent. in separate written complaints. "B" are one and the same and that in view of the long and big vacant space between the handwritten words and his signature. Noriega who informed her that the note is not clear enough to entrust complainant with payment of respondent's fee. Instead.000.

000. . it must be remembered that complainant secured from the Prudential Bank a loan of P5. is the conclusion that Exh. Justice Malcolm went on to say: The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. which does not contain any tail loops at all. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. So it is that we. without the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court.000. "1". with all his legal expertise. . 3 Thus. justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar. And yet. it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness.000. while still guardian of the minor. the last line of respondent's Exh. "1" containing the handwritten word "loan" does not have any tail loops that would correspond with those appearing on the edge of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh. "1" as respondent would want the undersigned Hearing Officer to believe. was appointed guardian of a minor child. Pelaez. by promising to give her P20.000. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. there was no necessity for complainant to obtain a subsequent loan from respondent because she could. respondent.000. indicative of moral unfitness. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the P5. Lastly. Moreover. a P20. constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. just as well. Justice Malcolm said: . and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys. borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank and to guarantee that personal loan. "1" and "B" are not the same and are far different from each other. the complainant no less. [A]s a general rule. It is true.00. as well as between court and attorney. whether relating to professional or non-professional matters. as the respondent is. therefore. who knows that she will be given a P20. respondent tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in evidence documents that appear to be falsified and which try to make it appear that complainant had delivered the P5.000. including some shares of stock in certain corporations. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. "B" is a physical continuation of Exh. We are compelled to conclude that respondent attorney converted . But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if. it appears strange that he has not required complainant to sign any receipt for the P5. "1". that misconduct. was able to make him sign a receipt for P5. In the case at bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character. when the attoney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. If complainant really needed the balance of P15. is quite hollow and very unlikely. if it were true that the paper showing Exh. respondent was not able to. however.00 she gave him.00 if she pays the P5. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. who is not a lawyer. had never been presented by respondent in any of the confrontations set by the university officials between complainant and respondent. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties.000.000.last line of Exh. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice. Mr. Abordo 9 in the following terms: that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. but was only presented during the investigation at bar. anyway.00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant. In that case. non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy.00 loan would very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5. 10 Finally.000. immoral or deceitful conduct.00. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person. the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez 4 the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. But this is a general rule with many exceptions." as used in this rule. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence.000. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. the respondent Vicente Pelaez. she could have very well secured the same from the bank and not from the respondent. 5 The nature of the office. As early as 1923. For a lawyer. Respondent's claim that he enticed complainant to pay him the alleged P5.00 loan from the bank just to pay a P5. get the same loan from the bank as she was able to.. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. 6 (Emphasis supplied) The rationale of the rule that misconduct. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck. To follow respondent's twisted reasoning. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. Immediately clear." If complainant. Unfortunately. was expressed by Mr. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. and the court requires for such admission the possession of a good moral character." We emphasize here that "conduct. of course. Exh.00 loan. that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him. whether it be professional or non-professional. in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties.000. 7 with eloquence and restraint: As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted to him. 5.00 loan he earlier gave to her. a member of the Bar. It also appears that when finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor General in the disbarment proceedings. In other words. in common with other courts. it evokes wonder why complainant would secure a P5.00 loan to respondent who promised to give her.00 but would merely partially offset said amount and received instead the balance of P15. In other words.00 loan he allegedly gave her "sometime in June.000. As such guardian." Mr. the courts retain the power to discipline him. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v.00 on August 4. hold.000. "B". just like Annex "1" (stub receipt). In disciplining the respondent. he came into possession of certain property.00 to respondent in payment of a prior loan from the latter. Pelaez. 1978. Any person. is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties. 1978 in order to invest it on respondent's business venture.000.000. as there was actually none to secure. as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago. indicative of moral unfitness for the profession. 8 (Emphasis supplied) The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest. 3. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of a good moral character.00 loan. justifies suspension or disbarment. would be doubly expected to protect his loan by a similar receipt. pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor. it appears to the Court that respondent failed to return and account for complainant's money notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for such return and accounting.

000. It appears that sometime in August 1977. 214 SCRA 1 [1992] ). however. 1978. it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. ATTY. was appointed to the Bench and no report nor recommendation was made by him. the case was duly referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. p. The Civil Relations Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint to this Court on April 24. Had respondent intended to settle his indebtness. CONSTANTINO. respondent does not deny the fact that he has refused and still refuses to repay the P1. He however. the case was deemed submitted for report and recommendation. Jr. prompting the former to seek assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through an affidavit-complaint. Jr. constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer of the court and is a clear violation of respondent's oath of office.000. Puno. was assigned to the Office of Solicitor Jesus G. complainant and his wife took turns in trying to recover the debt from respondent. We cannot simply close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed by respondent in evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Complainant. respondent had no intention to honor and/or pay his just debt. Bersamira. Prudencio S. Subsequent demands for payment were then made by Luis. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. was able to obtain a loan in the amount of P1. 1978. Respondent failed to comply with his promise. He must perform his duties to the Bar. Respondent procured the loan purportedly for an urgent personal obligation promising to pay it back promptly the following day. p. wherein respondent failed to appear despite due notice. respondent persistently refused to pay back the said amount. failed to appear at the appointed place of the payment. to write respondent a letter dated February 3.000. This act. Jr. like the other demands. J. the Solicitor General rendered its report. promising to pay it back the following day.00 from complainant's son Luis. The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer. Respondent further cites the fact of Luis Jr. 3) The Solicitor General found that respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his debt was apparent from the averments in the affidavit-complaint and this fact was sufficiently established during the proceedings before the investigating Solicitor. 19 SCRA 439 [1967] ). Solicitor Bersamira. Prudencio S. complainant Luis G. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LUIS G. p. This prompted Luis. and is therefore a proper subject for disciplinary action. The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us to conclude that from the very beginning. to say the least.complainant's monies to his personal uses. categorically admits having borrowed money from complainant's son. A lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. WHEREFORE. respondent. the respondent admits said indebtness but has not given any just and valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt.00 loan extended to him and at the same time demanding payment thereof. Jr. respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies. Despite complainant's repeated demands however. By his failure to present convincing evidence to justify his non-payment of the debt. Copies shall also be finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney. to his clients. at the appointed place of payment. respondent borrowed money in the amount of P1. Sergio G. borrowed P1. Saludares with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the non-payment of a loan which the latter obtained from complainant's son Luis Constantino. complainant alleges. RESOLUTION BIDIN.: In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21. . left the country. Luis. On October 15. respondent Atty. left the country and afterwards wrote his father. not to mention his seeming indifference to the complaint brought against him made apparent by his unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General further add that respondent's refusal to pay the debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer's oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It has been held that when a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence.000. In compliance with this Court's resolution dated May. only to be repeatedly turned away empty-handed. 1979. 19) This however.00 which he unjustifiably refused and still refuses to pay despite repeated demands. Jr. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. 1979. There is no doubt that respondent. is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. As a matter of fact. respondent filed his comment on the affidavit-complaint alleging among other things that the complaint was without basis and malicious in nature. PRUDENCIO G. Jr. This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had entered into with complainant. (Rollo. purportedly for an urgent personal need. by abusing the trust and confidence of complainant's son. SALUDARES. It is clear from the records that after Luis. 1984 the case was re-assigned to another Solicitor. Jr.'s absence from the country to justify such act of non-payment. 25. Luis. (Rollo. Jr. report and recommendation pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court and complainant. challenged the veracity of respondent's contentions and reiterated his previous allegation of respondent's unjustified refusal to settle his indebtness despite repeated demands. he could have done so in several instances repayment was demanded of him. he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which is at all times expected of him (Quingwa vs. After the investigation conducted by said Solicitor. Such a conduct. Saludares be charged with violation of Section 27. Jr. and to society with honor and dignity (Marcelo vs.00 from Luis Constantino. In the interim. Jr.000. was left unheeded. authorizing the latter to collect the sum of money owed by respondent. Javier. to the courts. 4). in his reply. Attached is a copy of the complaint for suspension. On March 12. vs. He reasons out that he was unable to repay the loan because Luis. respondent failed to demonstrate that he still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Constantino charges respondent Atty. (Solicitor General's Report and Recommendation. 1978 reminding the latter of the P1. 1990. On November 8. As far as the records of this case show.00 loan despite repeated demands by complainant who was duly authorized to collect the same. Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines and his Lawyer's Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from the practice of law. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law. but to no avail.

000. Ong Ting and her family reside at Maisan. Saludares from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from notice. to his compadre Lo . the Court directed the examination of Mrs. did so on January 17 and 18. 131 A. 1970 6 for the satisfaction and enforcement of which the third alias writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioner labor union starts with the following: "This concerns complainant's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. It is about time that there be an effective vindication of the rights of petitioner labor union. and the foundry shop where Mrs. thereby degrading not only his person but his profession as well. 1973. 1970. Clemencio. (Fellner vs. 4 In the meanwhile. FERNANDO. This dishonest conduct was compounded by respondent's act of interjecting paltry excuses for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and just debt. machineries. competence and fairness (Roque vs. Bulacan. so long set at naught and disregarded. the Court hereby ORDERS the Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S. LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS. and the private respondent Lo Bu. soon executed a deed of absolute sale on December 31. 2d 729 as cited in Tan vs. is the "New Century Foundry Shop" (return of the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. vs. J. Amante. but must also be perceived to be leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 212 SCRA 618 [1992] ). L-36636.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts show that on January 16. improvements. Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. 1973.The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably establish respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath. It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. Ong Ting established the New Century Foundry Shop. and for P40. A member of the Bar must act with integrity. SO ORDERED. 198 SCRA 1 [1991] ). which certainly deserve no encouragement. He must comport himself in a manner which will secure and preserve respect and confidence of the public. showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso vs. to the bar. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful. with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. 1968. 1973. including equipment. It is taken to task for entertaining an appeal from the Court of First Instance on a replevin suit which was correctly dismissed as it had all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor practice controversy. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important that truthfulness and candor. there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties. 1968. WHEREFORE. Both his professional and personal conduct must be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. in its resolution dated July 17. 5 That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals. and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed. materials." 7 chanrobles virtual law library Then comes this relevant portion: "From the evidence and the records. 1973 denied his motions.: The jurisdiction of respondent Court of Appeals is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. in its Order of March 19.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari. after hinting of taking measures to avoid liability. supplies and rights. the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. immoral or deceitful conduct.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1.00 in October 1968.00 on December 22. much less approval. by the employment of techniques. Valenzuela. all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting. petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It was docketed as G. one moreover already passed upon and sustained by this Court.000. a point stressed in another motion dated February 2. 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17. 1970. The order of the Court of Industrial Relations in the unfair labor practice case dated June 27.00 in September 1968. the Court finds that after the Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned. 2 It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. 1974. To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity. There was a grave infirmity then in the Court of Appeals having dismissed the appeal. for P25. he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22. Hall [LQ App] 90 so2d 519. as shown in its order dated March 23. Javier. dated March 12. Bulacan. His conduct should be characterized by candor. 1973. dated March 11. Rule 1. In the case at bar. honesty and integrity of the profession (Lyons vs. now deceased. Extensive hearings were conducted.. in the New Century Foundry Shop. Valenzuela. it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession. Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila. The original writ of execution had been returned wholly unsatisfied as respondents had no visible properties found in their names. Respondents.R. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. He and his family resided in the premises of the shop at 118 Maisan Road. selling all his business. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in Marcelo vs. denied the petition for certiorari of private respondent. "allowing the Sheriff to serve the Writ and returnable within 60 days and the said writ should be directed to Cosmos Foundry Shop or New Foundry Shop which is the firm name use(d) by the respondent in lieu of the Cosmos Foundry Shop . Consequently. Ong Ting and the Cosmos Foundry Shop concerning the latter's and Ong Ting's property and income. Petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint. honesty and professional decorum. Bar Association of Baltimore City. reinstating it in its resolution of December 19.. He is required not only in fact to be possessed of good moral character. No. with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts. Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which unfortunately had dragged on since 1961. 1 Thereafter. ALVAREZ. 1970). 3 This Court. supra). to the courts and to his clients. it is clear to the Court that the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to honor his just debt to complainant's son constituted dishonest and immoral conduct. 1973.000. asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. 206 SCRA 473 [1992]). Certiorari and prohibition lie. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent. 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. The lack of competence of respondent Court of Appeals to proceed further is thus rather obvious. Ong Ting. were successively rejected by complainant's counsel. After his proposals to settle the present case for P5. Sabandal. who was especially deputized to serve the writ.

1969. filed on February 20. and it is not enough. There was thus a ruling as to the bad faith that characterized his pretension of being the alleged vendee. and inasmuch as the auction sale of his properties was set for January 31. for on the facts as found. and ii was not surprising. Private respondent. and a verified motion for reconsideration of the Decision on May 12. may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final . . 1973. which he denied. The sad plight of petitioner labor union had been previously noted. Busmente in his Answer to this petition. there is a reaffirmation of the doctrine by this Tribunal in People v.000.. 1973 respondent-appellee Cosmos Foundry Workers Union interposed its opposition to herein petitioner-appellant's urgent motions dated January 26. that is the law of the case. . such a plea could be looked upon with sympathy. we cannot squeeze blood out of nothing . De Guzman: 12 "The latest case in point as of the time the order complained of was issued is Kabigting v. .Bu. in an expeditious or less expensive manner. that is merely." 9 chanrobles virtual law library That was why in the dispositive portion of the aforesaid order. His family continued to reside therein without paying any rental to Lo Bu. it was alleged that as a result of the fire. 1973. dated February 25.. Rule 135. herein petitioner-appellant received an order from respondent CIR.00.. where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance. The alleged sale was no doubt intended to circumvent any judgment this Court might render unfavorable to respondents. in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded. That is the ordinary course of judicial procedure. pursuant to the provision of Section 17. 3021-ULP.L. Lo Bu. In fact he did file two motions for that purpose. It is clearly fictitious. decreed.. the CIR issued an order on January 30. from which he realized P20. 1973.. " This allegation was made despite the recent alleged sale to Lo Bu. which he acknowledged so fully paid . Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself.. followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third.. Deutsche-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft.. herein above reproduced in its entirety. In Cruz v. now Chief Justice. be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition. one day before the schedule sale. in order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties.. indeed. which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila precisely because in the meanwhile the finality of the writ of execution became definitely settled when this Court issued its resolution of July 17.' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. 1973. Under the circumstances. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. there is the pronouncement that the law of the case 'does not apply solely to what is embodied in [this Court's] decision but likewise to its implementation carried out in fealty to what has been . It would be repugnant to the principle of social justice 14 and the mandate of protection to labor 15 if there be further delay in the satisfaction of a judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. And such a declaration by this Court is well within its jurisdiction because what is being sought is the enforcement or implementation of its order. Reyes that a ruling constituting the law of the case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts. categorically declared that a decision that has become the law of the case "is not subject to review or reversal in any court. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions 11 it was shown that to avoid the legal consequences of an unfair labor practice. petitioner in L-36636. What is worse... On February 3. 1973 and February 2. to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR. was." What is more. as a forced intervenor. At the time Ong Ting died. the ostensible vendee was precluded from taking advantage of the situation. ordering the Sheriff of Manila not to proceed with the auction sale. 1969. Notwithstanding such sale to Lo Bu. He could. A new petition before an inferior court on the same grounds was unjustified. promulgated in 1969. in Sanchez v. 1973. He . On January 7. 1973. there was a fictitious sale resorted to. when in Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. . Makalintal: 'It need not be stated that the Supreme Court. On February 10. "Ong Ting lost everything. assailed in the certiorari proceeding. of course. 1973. without the latter being made a party to the case. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any give case constitutes the law of that particular case. by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. His daughter Gloria Ong became the cashier. It is not so however in this case.' So it has been from 1919. he was a principal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of petitioner labor union.000. He simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu. 1973. His young 19-year-old son Delfin Ong became in-charge of the shop and the workers. On February 27. herein petitioner-appellant [Lo Bu] filed another urgent motion dated February 2. In the latter motion. was clearly indicated by this Court in its resolution of April 3." . " 18 Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable.00.. One last point. As emphasized by the ponente. for P20. Petitioner appellant's urgent motion aforesaid was set for hearing on February 5. in his special and affirmative defenses. Bulacan for the satisfaction of the judgment in this unfair labor practice proceeding. the bad faith being evident. . 1959. denying his urgent motions and ordering the Sheriff of Manila to proceed with the auction sale of his properties "in accordance with law. "even if erroneous.'" 13 3.00 . his petition for certiorari having been dismissed by this Court. 12276 should further be reviewed his remedy was to ask for a reconsideration thereof. .. If petitioner had any ground to believe that the decision of this Court in Special Proceeding No. As much. a 1962 decision. in 1967... Having acquired jurisdiction. 1973. this Court. As noted. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labor's just claim. there was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith.. dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. Court of Industrial Relations. being the court of last resort. Ong Ting. Valenzuela. 1969." 8 The absence of good faith on the part of respondent Lo Bu as the alleged vendee was made clear thus: "There was no actual turn over of the business to Lo Bu. Mrs. to accord deference to the fundamental principle of the law of the case. for the purpose of annulling the third writ of execution issued in accordance with the dispositive portion of the order of the Court of June 22.. 6. all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23. To all intents and purposes then. he gave his name as the manager and the capital of the business as P30. Moreover. the then Justice. when Lo Bu applied for the original registration of the firm name. he did specifically maintain: "On January 26.B. There would be no basis for legitimate grievance on the part of petitioners. It was set forth in the Petition 16 that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop.. as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in Case No. That is the most that can be said of his performance. Acting Director of Prisons.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. alleged that petitioners have a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law being the appellees in the pending case in the Court of Appeals sought to be dismissed in this suit for certiorari.. this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory. As a general rule. also prolix. 17 Counsel Yolando F. herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses. Ong Ting filed a verified urgent motion to reopen the case on January 25. as in this case. the alleged manager in absentia. Ong Ting became the manager and she supervised the work. praying for the return of his properties on the ground that the judgment creditor (respondent-appellee) failed to put up an indemnity bond.. the Court may employ means to carry it into effect (Sec. with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. had the temerity to deny such allegations. he was still residing in the premises of the shop ... " Then..000. 1973. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. So it must be here. as stated earlier. Lo Bu. by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop. . For even if such be the case. 10 It denied the petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent.. through Justice Street.. Olarte where it was stressed by Justice J. 1970. . Rules of Court).' . He failed. The import of the resolution is too plain to be misunderstood. There is this excerpt from the recent decision of Mangayao v. 1973. The deed does not bear the conformity of Mrs. 1975. an alias writ of execution was issued against the properties held in the name of the New Century Foundry Shop at 118 Maisan Road. both of which were denied. as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceeding before this Court.

PER CURIAM: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3. including vote-buying. June 20. and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband. Drilon is employed. 1989. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with. were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. I. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity). Sunday. on the day of the election. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officerselect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand. Drilon's) candidacy. entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8. soul. except that of dismissing it. in an article. at 2:00 o'clock p. Thereafter. the Court. June 17. June 10. some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial. no less than the dignity of the profession. Mr. all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE. Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. and. giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x. the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Ramon Nisce. Responding to the critical reports.000. appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.000 to P20. the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited .was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal. or regional. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. Jose B.e. exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar. direct or indirect. notably Chinese Filipinos. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments..P. 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya. directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors. the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday. before the Supreme Court en banc. and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting. Reyes." the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously. and marking of.disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates." headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals. is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates. the alleged use of government planes. However. attended the dialogue. 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. Emil Jurado. 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC). in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i. delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve.1989." In his second column. and Violeta C. to give counsel and advice. Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart. for the consideration of the Court. July 8. 1989). Luis Mauricio. Triple costs. there is a widespread belief. Attorneys Nereo Paculdo.m. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind. upon invitation of the Court." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus. The Supreme Court en banc. led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association. 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. 1989). especially conciliators and employers. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3. In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). in its en banc resolution dated June 15. and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend. requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client. based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth. and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary." Mr." Mr. Mr. money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates. national. was an informal one.1989). The fundamental assumption was that officers. the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4. June 20. then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. II. Cruz. 1989. but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. 1989).000. and the editorial. heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence.L. and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and. Drilon. entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press. Concepcion. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court. appreciated to P50. in addition. ready and eager to do his every bidding. or chapter. womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5. as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara. that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates. namely. Drilon. the ballots. respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal. and of the IBP officers. and Teodoro Locsin Jr. Violeta C.

or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. (6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial. drink. or combinations of candidates. and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. as well as the advertisement thereof. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited. 14[a]. entertainment to delegates. after deliberating thereon. 14[e]. (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. 14[c]. Art. agency or instrumentality thereof. No lawyer holding an elective. refused to identify. judicial. acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. food. Messrs. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. (7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective. The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving. Atty. on election day. IBP By-Laws). or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections. 14. IBP BY-Laws). to conduct the inquiry. (b) Distribution. (d) Formation of tickets. thus: "SEC. the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president. Luis Mauricio. of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper. Article I. phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts. drinks. the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED . Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate. they said. and Associate Justices Teodoro R. on letters. offered or promised to any person. the Hyatt. 14[e]. transportation or any article of value. directly or indirectly. Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 14[b]. or to vote for or against a candidate. as members. Narvasa. Emilio A. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Gancayco. quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision. A Delegate. Their stories were based. by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution. and Carolina C. (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. Non-political Bar. (2) giving of food. IBP BY-Laws). (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. IBP By-Laws). The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. The Clerk of Court. judicial. and the Court. (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. but whom they. as Chairman. Griño-Aquino. except on election day. entertainment. Padilla. Daniel Martinez. Henry Dy. Abraham F. (5) Giving free hotel accommodations. (10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote. quasi-judicial. 1989. Atty. or any similar consideration to any person. judicial. At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee. whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political. Sarmiento. "' Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: SEC. a businessman. officer or employee of the Integrated Bar. The newspaper columnists. single slates. while holding an elective." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: (d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected. in any form or manner. invoking the Press Freedom Law. and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon. Governor. Drilon. quasi-judicial. of election campaign material. III. IBP ByLaws). quasi-judicial. I. (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member. executive vicepresident. 4. or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers. He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and biodata of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: (b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-atArms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.' 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region. 10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph: No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year. 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.". The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said petitioners, of Manila,

court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,

one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari. The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's

Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor. 1962. The said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision. the enforcement of the writ. from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. and for the third time.1äwphï1. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done. AGO. affirmed the judgment. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above. Bolinas. ACCORDINGLY. LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS.propensity to litigate. 1967 the court finally. 1963. The respondents then filed on August 2. 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G. Lourdes Yu Ago. On May 3. petitioners. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140).923. Ago moved to stop the auction sale. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties. ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court. docketed as L-26116. PASTOR D. Failing to obtain reconsideration. vs. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3. A. its primacy is indisputable. L-14066. On January 31. the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26. it rendered decision. Civil Case No. CASTRO. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court.R. Court of Appeals. and on April 17. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. curiously enough. the latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. and on June 30. respondents. was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. in Ago vs. 1966. and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. 1961 this Court. Bolinao. the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City. . shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. Crispin D. 1966. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. the trial court issued on August 25. 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. in Ago vs. and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. Castañeda. as his co-plaintiff. praying for the same preliminary injunction. writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15." his motions were denied. Jr. the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied. and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. 1963 to the highest bidders. 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. upon his own admission. 1. reconsideration was denied on July 18. which issued the writ of possession. 1961. with Atty. the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction. 1967. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. 39407. The Court of First Instance of Manila. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G. On November 1.. and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9. In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8. After hearing. Ago appealed. Perez. No pronouncement as to costs. on May 2. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3. 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172. 1964 Pastor Ago. from registering the latter's final deed of sale. now joined by his wife. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation. 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. 1965. however. have been commuting to this Court for more than a decade. the Quezon City court countermanded. Atty. "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No." or about August 3.R. J. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.: The parties in this case. 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined. 1963 when he filed. Upon their petition. L-19718. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners. antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.N.N. Jr. Baizas and A. and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership. ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407. affirmed the dismissal. 39438-R). which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. Bolinao. in part. 1966. Atty. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. which.87.1966 this Court. except Lourdes Yu Ago. after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15. 37830-R). et al. Our decision of May 22. Ago failed to redeem. After remand. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25. lifted the restraining order. However. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed.

ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law. Relying upon Omnas vs. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended. with the assistance of counsel. 67 Phil. (3) she lives in the very properties in question. We find that (a) the complaint was filed on May 2. (Expediente. (a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. in a general sense. the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants. maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). is failure or neglect. 419. a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. and temper his clients propensity to litigate. (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not. Luison. to do that which. the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture. laches now effectively bars them from raising it. 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started. and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 4 (b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity. Rivera. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case. of its enforcement.. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless. the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined. here. its primacy is indisputable. to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities. for.2. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. dated April 20. the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. but is merely an inchoate interest. (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963. 2 5. and (9) it was only on May 2. 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice. which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion). (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint. what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago. for. but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession. there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house. et al. have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment. grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer. and (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance. it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who. she does not claim ignorance of his business that failed. the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined. and even up to the present. by exercising due diligence. Now. The case invoked is not at par with the present case. The respondents. considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities. the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. 815) . A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client. the decision would actually separate husband and wife. far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice. 1974. The assumption is of course obviously wrong. p. as in the case at bar. prevent them from living together. and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union. the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint. the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. Invoking Comilang vs. (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint. 6. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client. (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution. This half-share is not in esse. on the merit or lack of merit of his case. long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches. then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit. 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem. 3. abetted by their lawyer Jose M. rather than traverse the incontrovertible. (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale. elementary justice demands that the petitioners. 4. or even the impossibility. a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former. (b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim. and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses. Even then. (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17. 7 7. Atty. but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution. have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986). Buendia. a mere expectancy. must now enjoy them. could or should have been done earlier. for. of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. besides living with her husband Pastor. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise. (2) the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961. constituting neither legal nor equitable estate. the respondents Agos. 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. in the present case. 6 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court.

depriving the Agos of the use thereof.877. which. then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos. for the reasons hereunder stated. 1964. Juan Quijano. the sheriff sold the properties for P141. moreover. to their damage in the sum of P256. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed. as shown. the defendants. in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith. Anent this third cause of action. it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court. the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon. supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable. did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. which shall be paid by their lawyer.750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99. and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings. to cause more damage. and the business venture that he entered into.000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal. Discussion on The Causes of Action of The Supplemental Complaint And The Amended Supplemental Complaint Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. and because of said acts. he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment.000 up to May 5. while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation. For the same reason. 1964. the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo. pursuant to an alias writ of seizure. the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor.877. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action. the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value. in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs. The Counterclaim As a counterclaim against the Agos. but.37 in civil case 27251. which is. which resulted in the replevin suit." (Sec. the Agos allege that on January 5. and no third-party claim has been filed. illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141. the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint. are baseless. for. the Agos suffered P174. The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions. It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was irregular. ACCORDINGLY. the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7. that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank. which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable. Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99. 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff. The Supplemental Complaint Upon the first cause of action.750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75. 23. they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31. the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint. & Mrs. actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment. The issue here.08 out of the judgment value of P172.923. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago. 1966. seized and took possession of certain machineries. that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas. the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question. and it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred. The Amended Supplemental Complaint The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint. that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith.500. the inclusion of a paragraph averring that. taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess. The Complaint Upon the first cause of action. as barred by laches. is the same issue that we have already resolved. This third cause of action. Atty. Atty. and that the bank also acted in bad faith. in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction. the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint. Upon the second cause of action.We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint. we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches. the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago. Jose M. caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale. without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . Luison. Rule 39. still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs. that. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Rules of Court) The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale. therefore.08 in damages.877.

planting. or the surgical removal of the fistula. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. et al. The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father. 1991. and JON DE YSASI. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. 0452-84. 1984. in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition. said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC. In June. Patricio Tan. (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement. as well as for the remittance of his salary. National Labor Relations Commission. 1992. weeding. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary. 3 His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit. 1982. In November. harvesting. as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran. 1982. 10 I. Regional Arbitration Branch No. but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5. Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC.000. private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. with other allowances covering housing. herein private respondent. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent. the Solicitor General remarked: . 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause. most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other. the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9 Additionally. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC. REGALADO. Furthermore. gasoline. Cebu City. Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d]. the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it. On July 31. Apolonio Sumbingco. docketed therein as RAB Case No. as well as attorney's fees. thereafter. 1984. dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. 0452-84. however. Both demands. 6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses. Albeit with distaste. in April. power. As farm administrator. 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. on October 17. J. Prior thereto. VI. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved. against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages. two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. Following his marriage on June 6.). thirteenth month pay for 1983. 1980. respondents. 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12. For this case is an action filed by an only son. he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and. For this purpose. for brevity). CEBU CITY. he was under the care of Dr. fertilizing.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes. notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. food. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. consequential. petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation. petitioner. in refutation. thirteenth month pay and other benefits. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. 1983. the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting: This case is truly unique. vs. were not acted upon. Private respondent. erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d). that is. occupying the upper floor of the house there. In his manifestation dated September 14. and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.). 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. After an exhaustive reading of the records. he lived on the farm.: The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case. moral and exemplary damages. for infectious hepatitis from December. 1982. 1992. and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. a deep sinuous ulcer. 8 Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues. 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Bacolod City. 1983 to January. without due notice. During his recuperation which lasted over four months. . telephone. said decision was affirmed in toto. 1984. this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. . thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16. First. the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. if any of the complaints pertain to their work. they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. private respondent's auditor and legal adviser. However. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof. he underwent fistulectomy. And secondly. were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. medical and dental expenses. light. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August. Inc. avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator. he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil. . payment of back wages. Inc.JON DE YSASI III. such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator. his father's namesake. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil. private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions. Negros Occidental sometime in April. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION).

18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. Similarly. Inc. This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn. petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. Bacolod City (Tsn. During the period of his illness and recovery. we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency. . Uy. First. This Honorable Court. 20 The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. NLRC (191 SCRA 328). Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his coemployee's health. is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.Rule 46 and Section 1[g]. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment. 1985. p. redundancy. Rule 50) of the Rules of Court. Vol. Dr. presents no procedural infirmity. in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative. We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process. that there is no abandonment. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center. Tan. January 22. he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. who conducted the hearings therein from December 5. 1987 at 49-50). There are significant indications in this case. unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code. 16 On the other hand. other than the one who conducted the hearing. Third. is justified by his illness and strained family relations. there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment. the Court rules that for abandonment to arise. 1986 at 20-44). III. 19 The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance: It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982. Prefatorily.. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. In Dagupan Bus Company v. unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. not defeat. petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. 17 After a careful review of the records of this case. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. v. Mere absence is not sufficient. the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Inc. 133). which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal. to wit: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. As a manager. (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted. we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. ever mindful of the longstanding legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure. 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge. once able to work. who eventually decided the case. 12 Thus. there must be a deliberate. and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. 1989 edition. especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions. justice. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. but not the least. . For want of substantial bases. and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara. (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. Dr. In any event. 1984 to July 11. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence. After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human experience. For this reason. such as herein public respondent NLRC. and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. in fact or in law. without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process. it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao. Vol. III. Octavio. petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao. NLRC (184 SCRA 25). Tan. and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of. February 19. or a labor arbiter for that matter. illustrates what constitute abandonment. in several cases. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. The fact . petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Last.

In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives. he kept petitioner on the payroll. there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. Inc. and who is familiar with the terms. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent. hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. of legal age. married. In the present case. 31 It will be observed that all of these chores. relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital. and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14. as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. as well as the property values and monetary sums involved. and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case. with or without deductions. and not salaries as. in his pleadings. in this regard he proved to be quite successful. 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail. private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January. It was only in January. or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. no longer listed him as an employee. We repeat. 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities. Manucao. 26 With these. petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated. petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. specifically stating — 32 executed That I. am a sugarcane planter. and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. Machineries. If. which petitioner took care of. Inc. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go. It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. however. in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements. 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son. Filipino. Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him. as this is undeniably among his basic rights. the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator.. with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts." 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor. this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal. or even out of place. petitioner argues. . 1980 in favor of petitioner. 30 and remitting to private respondent through Atty. That as such planter-member of BIPA. nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship. 1984. his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April. whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until April. viz. 1983. True. he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984. and a resident of Hda. while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee. private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner. it is clear. hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL. to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician. in fact. it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone.remains that on account of said illnesses. I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member. pension or allowance. petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him. 25 As earlier mentioned. Private respondent. private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion. 1984. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.. specifications and other details relative thereto. 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders. It was only in April. The assertion regarding abandonment of work. 1982. as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations..A. was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. Moreover. INC. 27 To stress what was earlier mentioned. is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983. BISCOM Mill District. none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. such as an employee. for this reason. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982. whether as salary. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks: It is also significant that the special power of attorney by private respondent on June 26. deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator. as private respondent contends. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G. considering the nature of these transactions. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work. when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm. 22 With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and. JON de YSASI. prolonged though it may have been. it would be awkward. According to private respondent. reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes. there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job.

In cases of abandonment of work. but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel.That I have named. the reasons for their dismissal. specifically. Besides. 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work. That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor. 6. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JON de YSASI III whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed. there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. by way of substantial compliance. allowance or ex gratia handout. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise: Sec. which involves the taking of testimony. that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks. 39 Private respondent. remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. as witness for private respondent. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month. 11. argues that Section 2. specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers. Sec. That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK". Notice of Dismissal. VI of the NLRC. the monthly sums received by petitioner. if he so desires. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez. pension. Rule XIV. 40 The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV. Sec. he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. my check/checks aforementioned. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5. the Solicitor General rejoins as follows: The Labor Arbiter held thus: . We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and crossexamine a witness. in opposition. were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. 5. 33 the issuance of withholding tax reports. petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. HOWEVER. and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel. especially when there is just cause therefor. regardless of designation. 42 On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case. PROVIDED. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. TO GET FOR ME and in my name. appointed and constituted as by these presents I HEREBY NAME. but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition. Report of dismissal. Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. Decision to dismiss. place and stead. the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. Sec. whether denominated as salary. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings. 35 and. said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative. Right to contest dismissal. Answer and hearing. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. thereby foreclosing his opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case. As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner. the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee. if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare. as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code. as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures. ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. Sec. notice shall be served at the worker's last known address. the dates of commencement and termination of employment. 41 Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case. 2. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission. Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor. of my On procedural considerations. Ovejera of said office. 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 7. place and stead. much less a chance to be heard. Furthermore. petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.

50 Exemplary damages. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. at 11-12. Rule XIV of the implementing rules. . — In cases of regular employment. the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. Section 11). vs. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. Jr. however. and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee. But in Pacific Cement Company. or constituted oppression. Security of Tenure. 43 II. v. (Decision Labor Arbiter. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates. or was contrary to morals.R. NLRC. are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. 80587). The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement. . under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence.While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. however.000. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded. 53 We do not feel. 188 SCRA 295). the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial: Art. differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales. Annex "C" Petition). liquidated or compensatory damages. 51 We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. G. in addition to moral. but his dismissal is without just cause. maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office. records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. where reinstatement is no longer possible. good customs or public policy. vs. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. No. In Wenphil. the facts of the case justify their allowance. Moral damages. oppressive or malevolent manner. arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. inclusive of allowances. on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code. is guilty of illegal dismissal. we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy. In the present case. it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. vs. In the present case. the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not complied with. he must not be rewarded re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. However. for his part. and social humiliation. it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. NLRC. 49 III. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. They are not recoverable as a matter of right. Private respondent. Private respondent. NLRC. under Article 2229.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided. And for this failure. 0452-84 should be modified. 48 We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination. Finally. as required under Section 5 (now. would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. 279. 173 SCRA 192. petitioner insists on an award of moral damages. Similarly. we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan. payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. 47 Thus. however. or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. temperate. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. Clearly. seemingly. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. And in lieu of reinstatement. an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. . This however. it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and. and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement. may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish. 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton. For this reason. affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5. good customs or public policy. instead. provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. therefore. NLRC. On this score. . the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. 170 SCRA 69. to wit: As a general rule. (Wenphil Corp. wounded feelings. The public policy behind this is that. 188 SCRA 295). It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General: The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer. not only was petitioner dismissed without due process. petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service. In the present case. the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power. the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause. 45 The Court. besmirched reputation. an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. therefore. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers. it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. NLRC. Inc. 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are concerned. (Morales vs.

It is the Court's earnest hope. for both parties are equally at fault. Confronted by this discrepancy. In this new Real Estate Mortgage. p. it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5. that respondent had. the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur. separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service. In his answer dated 18 March 1980. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind." 57 If he ever did so. 183 SCRA 651). taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice. One final word. the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City. Jamero. October and November. 1976.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C. Decena. we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute. to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts. respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5. On the contrary. a member of the Philippine Bar. . they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4. SO ORDERED. their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983. among others. had compromised that case without their authority. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. however. complainants.000. without qualification or deduction. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September. the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I.000. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest. when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case. respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality. In fine. succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City. with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. But all claims for damages should be dismissed. After the same was notarized. complainants signed the same. rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.00 loan. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. 18. 56 Rule 1. ATTY. records) over the same lot 3125-C. purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987. the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms. vs. a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. The complainant spouses alleged. sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. instead of the strengthening.00. DECENA. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice. in lieu of reinstatement.000. the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same. PER CURIAM: In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN. neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. and upon such assurance. a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D. It is just as much their responsibility. WHEREFORE. respondent prepared a new document on May 7. but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10. of familial bonds. In the same manner. for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. Despite the assurance. we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. 58 and. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. The document was brought by complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. By resolution dated 14 April 1980. to conduct the necessary investigation. 1975. a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted. therefore. by means of fraud and deceit.lâwphî1." On this point. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. respondent. report and recommendation. a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5. despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. Complaint.00. that respondent. In as Report. Pedro S. end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them. authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30. the Solicitor General presented the following: FINDINGS Complainants allege that on August 5.00. with malpractice and breach of trust. if not more importantly. he gave the document to respondent. the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982. p. Accordingly. after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case. REYNERIO I. On 10 September 1982. as revealed by the records. Complainants' Complaint. Almonte. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. 16. we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. Jorge T. Once again.000. sans sentimentality. that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision. 1976. respondent exacted from complainants P500. or at least entertained the thought. the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. records). Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years. 1975. On 19 July 1988. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants. 1975.NLRC. 54 The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties. and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence.

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10. which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection.000. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent. From the facts obtaining in the case. complainants signed the document.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6.000.000. complainants tried to raise the amount of P10. applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16. except in the following cases: (a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. 1975. that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage.1976. 14. being a lawyer. is allegedly the truth. he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants. With respect to the second loan. considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4. it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality. and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. 1979. were voluntarily signed by the complainants. Adding this amount to the previous P5. finally. rec. Upon learning of the sale in March. title was transferred to him.00.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva. 1975.00 on September 30. Consequently. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth.00. For their failure to pay the obligation.00 obtained from respondent. 3135.400. particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants. However. we find against respondent. 1976.e. Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. 1979.000. the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions. While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate.00 on August 5. Folder No. computed as follows: the first loan of P5.00. was clear of any encumbrance. 7. which amount plus the P2. Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5. beginning December 31. 1979 to pay their obligation.000. respectively.00. since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5. the respondent on October 12. Hence. but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B.00 equals P 3.00. P6. After the document was notarized. respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for P12. it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice. Evidence of written agreements. 1975 and another P10. Section 7. at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976. no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing. p. i. Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a formality.00. failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned. as appearing on said document. He maintains that what appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants.000. 1979.000.000. The term "agreement" includes wills. complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person. 6.000. or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.000. should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage. 1975 and November 30. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500. the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. as between the parties and their successors in interest. After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent. 1975 up to May 31. it may be stated that complainants. applies in this case.00 was applied to interest. plus the P2. that is. re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent.000. 1976. and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5.00. 2 of case).000.00. or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings.000. 1975. .000. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30. and on June 20. Six (6) months at P500..respondent insisted that complainants sign the same. Complainants. Thus. although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage. and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20. October 31.000. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500. hoping that they could redeem their property.000. This claim is incorrect.00. When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres. 1976). Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5. respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8. as amended.00. There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original loan of P5. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract.).00. One of the exceptions.00 on May 7. respondent.000.00 to complainants and not P4.00.000. In this connection.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April.300.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10. despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him. (b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. it is to be considered as complaining all such terms. as aforequoted.000. returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30.00 and the inflated P10. This respondent failed to do. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5.00 but only P4.00 was supposedly due on August 31. and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed.00 complainants' loan to one Engr.000.000. 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed.000. p. per advice of respondent himself. again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Complainants' Position Paper). He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property. which per computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing. 1976.000.000.00 from complainants. Respondent's Position Paper).00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5. he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.000. While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4.000. they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10. that they obtained a loan of P5. as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8. neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. Hence. thus making a total of P10.500.000. there can be. and.00. All the requirements of Act No.00 (the actual amount was only P 4.000. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5. therefore.

7 SCRA 859).00. Complainants' Position Paper.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement. compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500. Respondent's denial is spacious. the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. in the case at bar. All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless. At any rate. Folder No. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M. 1976. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the respondent. socially and intellectually. perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2. respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2. complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. complainants alleged that respondent. regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. as counsel of the complainants in this case.C. but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was made on May 30. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. 1979. had this to say: With respect to the second charge. respondent is in a better position financially. respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment.000.000. Besides. Indeed. At this stage.00. there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question' Going now into the second charge. The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves. complainants made the offer.C. alleging that if the offer were true. against accused Reynaldo Pineda. 1979.Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0. Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500. p. honesty. He accepted the amount of P500. A parting comment.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him. In addition thereto. Admittedly. or good morals for which he may be suspended. It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2. complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent. barely a month after May 30.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants. and not its prohibition by statute. the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M. U.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants. giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.lâwphî1. Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them.00 as advance payment. relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained.000. more so. for estafa. Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. Id.000. However. record).S. 00 as payment of the loan. modesty.00.ñèt In view of all the foregoing. he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount.000. being then the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500. fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C. In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered.00 that had been given to respondent. knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery. upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0. They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents.) showing that the P500. Again. 734. without however.' Clearly. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about. who was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 34. Dist. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional attitude (Royong v. complainants then filed a motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.00 to respondent.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. However.000. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent. they did not bother to have them explained by another . three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31. To the mind of the undersigned. respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years. a difference of a few thousand pesos. Court for District of Nebraska C. when the complainants had already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and. Oblena. On June 27. 2). for only P12. With its lapse of time. The doing of the act itself. Knowing this.1979. who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500. and respondent. respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z]. the fact that respondent received P500. The Investigating Fiscal. the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting: In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722). Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.

did not turn over the P500. The following acts of respondent: 1. not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the nonsubmission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses. that is. In those hearings. 2. the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest. with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality". from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers. it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity. respondent's conduct. Even so. Hence. which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent. Jamero. they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. 5. but the full amount in cash. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10.00. a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity.000. Decena be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years.00. in fact.000. compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses. We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated. for a period of three years. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants. Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure. Likewise. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was P5. being "contrary to justice.00 to the complainants. constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500. 3. although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar. satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form). Generally. having received the amount of P500. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear." he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients. . but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Reynerio I. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority. misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession. the complainants presented a number of witnesses who. Santos. its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived. the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys." The standard required from members of the Bar is not. respondent's liability merits mitigation. Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. of course. which puts his moral character in serious doubt. we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General. their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500. honesty. were crossexamined by the counsel for respondent. after their direct testimony. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General. done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. 4.000. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. Where however. complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined.00. We agree with the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude. (Emphasis supplied) and made the following recommendation: WHEREFORE.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement. the second is that.00 instead of P4. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements. renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law. and 6.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation.lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2.000. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings. modesty or good morals. in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. held several hearings during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. had become final and executory. through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.

the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. Frisco Holgado. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. 1948. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it minimum period to death. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. Under the circumstances. what is his complete name? — A. considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned. it was not prudent. he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney. It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted. in the municipality of Concepcion. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. with costs. plaintiff-appellee. respondent Reynerio I. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years.. FRISCO HOLGADO. Numeriano Ocampo. to say the least. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. 1948. and 4 — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. the day set for the trial. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. the trial court proceeded as follows: Court: Fiscal: Is this the case ready for trial? I am ready. V-118] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. plaintiff-appellee. or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the following INFORMATION That on or about December 11." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. the said accused being a private individual. What do you plead? — A. unlawfully and feloniously. Court: Sentenced reserved. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above described. but I was instructed by one Mr.: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention. This case is called for trial on May 8. Rule 112." On may 8. Contrary to law. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty. Q. Mr. did then and there wilfully. Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question. MORAN. Under this provision. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. being a private person. vs. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. Ocampo. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. . the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions with them. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning.In the instant case. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. defendant-appellant. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 2 SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION SENTENCE The accused. Q. Who is that Mr. or on May 10. the trial court rendered the following judgment: [Criminal Case No. the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him.J. section 3. and without justifiable motive. with the accessory penalties provided for by law. Court: — to the accused. Ocampo. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. when a defendant appears without attorney. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney. Two days later. and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney. Q. I plead guilty. 1948. The accused is entitled to one-half of his preventive imprisonment. and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest. the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. 1947. Province of Romblon. your honor. vs. C. Court: Arraign the accused. WHEREFORE.

Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney. The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent. (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP). unethical. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: Annex A SECRET P560. Quota/Non-quota Res. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. 521-0767 1 Tel. Investment in the Phil. VISA. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. & Special Retiree's Visa.Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. Declaration of Absence. 5222041 CLINIC. R E SO L U T I O N REGALADO. in either case. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment. But above all.. Guam divorce. as a member of the legal profession. The Legal Clinic. (4) U. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA). and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that. 429 UN Ave.P. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam. Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein. and. respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one.. respondent. demeaning of the law profession. what is worse. as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MAURICIO C. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude. 1977. and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Victoria Bldg. ABSENCE. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. THE LEGAL CLINIC. Ocampo. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). . he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. Annulment of Marriage. to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7. State Bar of Arizona. 521-7251. Annex B GUAM DIVORCE. Call Marivic. So ordered. J. In its answer to the petition. ULEP.. for on a DIVORCE. LEGAL Ermita. their memoranda. It must be added." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. without counsel.. It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI).. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney.00 Info ANNULMENT. petitioner. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services. but. INC. Immigration Problems. INC. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. thereafter. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. in the instant case. Mla. the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. 522-2041. Manila nr. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA)." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. INC. Inc. Adoption. UN Ave. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. Visa Ext. valid MARRIAGE? marriage. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232. vs. particularly in the rules of procedure. the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. US Embassy CLINIC. 521-7232.

in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader. . While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public. too. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. but encourages. and that is: Article 26. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. 4 A. this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice. morals. . thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar. where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. In addition. and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered. The Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition. as the term medical clinic connotes doctors. appears with (the) scale(s) of justice. the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers. the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. It is also submitted that . the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Rule 1. which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license. public order and public policy. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services. In addition. the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam. More importantly. It may be conceded that. the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law." the inviolable social institution. At the very least. evidence gathering. which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. as earlier discussed. The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. the respondent's name. or serves to induce. marriage. or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. This is not only misleading. to wit. It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it. The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced. Even if it be assumed. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so. arguendo. as the respondent claims. obtaining documents like clearance. assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth." Such a name.e." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services. It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question. and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code. B. common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed. members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law." as the respondent would have it. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Worse. good customs and the public good. to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic. consequences. whether true or not. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest." if not suggesting a "secret marriage. or any other advertisements similar thereto. passports. obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed. however. as earlier mentioned. it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. constitutes practice of law? The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. property. by simply going to Guam for a divorce. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic. i. this is outright malpractice. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers. . Inc.. Furthermore. or business registration. it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems. that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services). apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public. we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter. this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy. The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications. there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized. 1. At worst." makes light of the "special contract of permanent union. it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms. morals. It must not be forgotten." which is how the Family Code describes marriage. local or foreign visas.Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case. as published in the advertisements subject of the present case.02. just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services". For who could deny that document search. which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. first of all. (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood. By simply reading the questioned advertisements. that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows: Article 1. emphasize to Guam divorce. Thus. the only logical consequence is that. violation of Philippine law. Inc. Said advertisements.

a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law. p. and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. secret marriages. Inc. As advertised. the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. But its advertised services. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Philippine Lawyers' Association: The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position. Legal and Judicial Ethics." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. respondent "The Legal Clinic. . the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical. through experienced paralegals. advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law. with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. absence and adoption. respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic. Obviously. especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. rendering opinions. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating. standardized legal forms. Inc. 6 3. or. particularly regarding foreign divorces. this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance. the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. 270). Rule 138. the legal principles and procedures related thereto. Although respondent uses its business name. Such practice is unauthorized. Inc. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit. who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. albeit outside of court. From all indications. storage and retrieval. and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin. at the very least. annulment of marriages. Indeed. Also. when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law. without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation. This is absurd. Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. in the information given. 2 and 3. but before allowance of such practice may be considered. that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law.respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. however. Alternatively. that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright. If respondent is allowed to advertise. This. litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. It must be emphasized. Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. Precisely. however. and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Unquestionably. in answer to the issues stated herein. are wit: 1." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. immigration problems. clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice. Philippine Bar Association: Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen. such as computer experts. but includes drawing of deeds. not legal services. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form." and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession. It is an odious vehicle for deception. many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields. Both the Bench and the Bar. knowledge and experience. 5 2. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. investigators for gathering of evidence. and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.. and more importantly. 3. electronic data gathering. particularly on visa related problems. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).. the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training. Immigration Laws. Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law. the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters. but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. for the protection of the public. there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. Comment). a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter. may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved. The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. it must be required to include. 2. However. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical. as enumerated above. it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law. such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. misleading and immoral advertising. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers. It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law. but also misleading and patently immoral. with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services. The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research. not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also. even if both are (equal) in skill. Jur. Admittedly. from offering such services to the public in general. however. 1984 ed. 39). incorporation. 1. but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice. and 4. that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion. that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take.

The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic. declaration of absence. are highly reprehensible. acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: 1. 8 A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent. Bankers. . who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article. factory and tenement house statutes.. the fact remains that at present. But this is not the case. when it cannot nor should ever be attempted. and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. where in this country there is none. which are in essence. immigration. Nogales. A good example is the architect. is a lawyer qualified to practice law. when in fact it is not so. and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend. This is not practicing law. for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. Inc. as claimed. Only then. At present. replies that it is required by the statute. (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country. ." 9 5. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines: Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which. if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers. It is not only presumed that all men know the law. No amount of reasoning that in the USA.P. Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition. . Inc. Are they practicing law? In my opinion. the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. . He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic. do not constitute the practice of law . the issues before this Honorable Court. Assuming that Respondent is. becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising. It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. no one . ." Clearly. 53 Phil. U. these do not exist in the Philippines. We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee. 10 6. such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies. the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law. provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. as there are doctors in any medical clinic. except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. . — does not help matters. is unprofessional. Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder. there are in those jurisdictions. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. The most ." 7 4. legal matters . who must be familiar with zoning. could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. however. Of necessity. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary. . Inc. But suppose the architect. In the case (of) In re Taguda. will be given to them if they avail of its services. the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law. . it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic. It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here. adoption and foreign investment. courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. In the meantime. . this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so. paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law. however. It seems . 37. seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages. it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals. Women Lawyers' Circle: In resolving. . Inc. In the same manner. but when we are serving others. but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . In the same vein.. perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. whether run by lawyers or not. as provided for under the above cited law. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards.Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case. visa extensions. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable. asked by his client to omit a fire tower. liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice. . and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. they are not. a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like. building and fire prevention codes. . Or the industrial relations expert cites. the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements. divorce. then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves. and seek advice on divorce. staffed purely by paralegals. and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic. Likewise. . . in support of some measure that he recommends. . annulment of marriage. Atty. Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law.

Wood. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce. as a whole. or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business. like securing a marriage license. that is. This is not per se the practice of law.10. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). or of a statute. But such is not the fact in the case before me. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here. with or without a mediator. however. It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar. September 11th. it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. of course. then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. may not constitute practice of law. In the present case. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. and give legal advice. 53 A. the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. since the situation is not presented by the proofs. cited in Statsky. The record does fully support. especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers.important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. if as part of a welfare program. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows. at pp. even arguing questions purely legal. consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff. there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law.). In determining whether a man is practicing law. he would be practicing law. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion. . just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan.8 From the foregoing.9. Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two. even as a minor feature of his work.11. well-established method of conducting business is unlawful. In this phase of his work. Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining. that aside from purely giving information. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits. and making arrangements with a priest or a judge. .. the text and the forms. if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon CunetaGabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case. he drew employees' wills. An agency of the federal government. All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole. The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government. annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. . S. Services on routine. absence. The law only provides the frame within which he must work. such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . constitutes the unlawful practice of law. . however. and ther representative' one not a lawyer. would be the practice of the law. 1. 1. (c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread. . Introduction to Paralegalism [1974]. there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce. For instance. to guide his client along the path charted by law. (Auerbacher v. then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. Let me add that if.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. 1946. However. such as the Legal Clinic. or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so. If a non-lawyer. 1. it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that: (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person. . and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct: Rule 15. (b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar. . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit. Among the larger corporate employers. annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. This. 2d 800. however. More recently. does not transform his activities into the practice of law. it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion. straightforward marriages. or by other representative. Rules and Regulations. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take. separation. or by counsel. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees. may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. Here. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney. 1. 203. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. to guide his client's obligations to his employees. with advice as to how the forms should be filled out. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress. the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal . we should consider his work for any particular client or customer. 154-156. It is not entirely improbable. . Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.31.

par. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute. or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill. and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. conveyancing. the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts. 144). 263)." such would constitute practice of law (Comment.stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. however.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. With all the solemnities. practicing law. [R. although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. training and experience. conveying. It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case. 340 Mo. 262. separation. advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court. Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. before any court. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. C. 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases. 3 [1973 ed.. Jr. the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. Respondent. legal procedures. he is in the practice of law. 102 S. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services". and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured. annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. 1. and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life. in a representative capacity. It includes legal advice and counsel. we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. 193N. is. states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic. and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. 2. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar. and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. quoted in Rhode Is. 348. E. Generally. enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations. 173. in such representative capacity.2). It is not limited to appearing in court. we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent. Winder. to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.]. as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments. p. 176-177). and in addition.S. et seq. and receives pay for it." thus: Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. rel. Otherwise stated. a wide experience with men and affairs. pending or prospective. and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. no Philippine marriage can be secret. body. which requires the application of law. In general. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill. and property according to law. therefore." 11 A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. . 313. referee. liberty. is also practicing law. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term. board. (Moran.12.10.] 197 A. Practice of law means any activity. so far as concerns the question set forth in the order. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. to that extent. performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. is engaged in the practice of law. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. Monsod. particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce. non-advisory. formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2. where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. "It is not controverted. 6. one who. we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law. Mckittrick v. W. of sound moral character. v. (State ex. Comments on the Rules o Court.11. Agrava (105 Phil. in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. they are always subject to become involved in litigation. Family Code). 665-666. 852). Dudley and Co. assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body. . E. v. 650). committee. the foreclosure of a mortgage. This Court. 129 Ohio St. 14 When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer. and not legal services. Bar Assoc. or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings. in or out of court. 18 In the recent case of Cayetano vs. 13 In the practice of his profession. supra at p. NYS 2D 270 [1973]. but embraces the preparation of pleadings. commissioner. No valid distinction. It embraces conveyancing. Automobile Service Assoc. knowledge. and conducting proceedings in attachment. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings. 2d 895. 15 One who confers with clients. are available. for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person. as advertised. and the giving of all legal advice to clients. 139. The practice of law. can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. 194 N. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose. Vol." . citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass]. that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling. all advice to clients. (5 Am.I. Dworken . 12 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. 23. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court. it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings. 2. (State v. . and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services. 101. pp. constitute "practice of law. On this score. engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law. cited in Statsky. associations or corporations as to their right under the law. of course. firms.. some of which we now take into account.).remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law. or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there.

These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar. furnish a copy thereof to the client. it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law. as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U. and who is in good and regular standing. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea. and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation. counsel with. Atty. is entitled to practice law. transmission and reproduction of information and communication. medico-legal problems. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13. such as computerized legal research. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. as the weight of authority holds. by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study. it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. hindi kailangang ma-confine. for example. they take your temperature. and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. not in the protection of While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow. 20 The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. but rather. has specialists in taxation and criminal law. or defend the rights claims. local or foreign visas. designing and installing computer systems. The Legal Clinic. That's how we operate. require surgery or follow-up treatment. have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise. obtaining documentation like clearances. 23 Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. No matter what the client's problem. in medical terms. if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. educational or employment records or certifications. and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property. with respect to the construction. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Further. or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. evidence gathering. 21 That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court. the court. The purpose is to protect the public. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals. There are cases which do not. That's what doctors do also." explains Atty." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you." where an insight into the structure. programs. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir. out-patient. and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court. litigation. Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star. then it's referred to one of our specialists. they observe you for the symptoms and so on. who. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for. And once the problem has been categorized. the bar. or business registrations. non-advisory. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms. property. and have been admitted to. and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies. marriage. counsellors and attorneys. courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. or software for the efficient management of law offices. with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. Atty. Again. like foreign divorce. Nogales: This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic. "when they come. which are strictly non-diagnostic. Nogales and his staff of lawyers. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who. 22 It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. labor. 24 The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. or liabilities of their clients. corporate legal departments. With its attorneys and so called paralegals. protect. locating parties or witnesses to a case. if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. Nogales. operation and effect of law. then you would need a litigator. fact finding investigations. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or. WILOCI. through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering. Inc. In providing information. passports.P. we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful. divorce and adoption. we start by analyzing the problem. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found. entitled "Rx for Legal Problems. Rogelio P. main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor. such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices. too. is not limited merely giving legal advice. . What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property. about foreign laws on marriage. are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law." Atty. encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers. kung baga sa hospital. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Avenue in Manila. to wit: Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers. and gather evidence to support the case. like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. storage. contract drafting and so forth. processing. marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country. or the computerization of research aids and materials. like birth. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order. and family law. Now. these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. N. interpretation. document search.The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained.

33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false. magazine. vs. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public." 42 The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose. Bayot 38 an advertisement. 40 Of course. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct. the name of the law firm which he is connected with. Code of Ethics. trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. we have adopted the American judicial policy that. or in return for. the magnitude of the interest involved. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. publicity to attract legal business. the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. address. . 41 The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists. and all other like self-laudation. legal authorships. telephone numbers. dignified and objective information or statement of facts. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. 36 The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. Thus. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. the names and addresses of references. 29 In the Philippines. respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action. or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 30 Accordingly. while there are none in the Philippines. As pointed out by FIDA. he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the moneychangers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. honest." (Canon 27. and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education. or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics. but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. telephone number and special branch of law practiced. the names of clients regularly represented. posts of honor. 44 Verily. the importance of the lawyer's position. 43 The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. and. being for the convenience of the profession. with their written consent. fraudulent. in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons. We repeat. taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task. the fact of listings in other reputable law lists. For that reason. which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. As admitted by respondent. in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. such as the National Association of Legal Assistants. namely." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States. a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.). As a member of the bar. associates. a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper. we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. either personally or thru paid agents or brokers. similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding. undignified. 32 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. constitutes malpractice. cable addresses. public or quasi-public offices. legal teaching positions. some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services. in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority. The pertinent part of the decision therein reads: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession. but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility. and the American Paralegal Association. management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. fair. Whatever may be its merits. the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment. the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true. schools attended with dates of graduation. . it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. is not objectionable.the bar from competition. misleading. not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. date and place of birth and admission to the bar. such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments. without violating the ethics of his profession. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. Inc. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. The card may contain only a statement of his name. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates. deceptive. firm name or office address. in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities. Law is a profession and not a trade. . degrees and other educational distinction. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of. Estanislao R. magazine. The exceptions are of two broad categories. 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation. addresses. branches of law practiced. it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper. which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent . The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. rules or regulations granting permission therefor. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct. A lawyer cannot. of brief biographical and informative data. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). . Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. even for a young lawyer. 27 We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. trade journal or society program.

Inc. Otherwise. can renew lost documents of your animals. the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent. I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. 1928 MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the Provincial Board. J. from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition. MALCOLM. directly or indirectly. No such exception is provided for. The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague. As a lawyer. Nogales. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer. and is willing to help and serve the poor. The ruling in the case of Bates. major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic. in (NOTE. was created should be passed upon and determined. Inc. albeit in a different proceeding and forum. he is hereby reprimanded. reads as follows: ECHAGUE. and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession. it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: Trustworthy from Professional from Honest from Dignified from 45% to 14% 71% 71% 65% to to to 14% 14% 14% light of the putative misuse thereof. I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office. even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state. cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services. State Bar of Arizona. It is. can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. September 18. admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano. as in the case at bar.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano. FOR THIRD TAGORDA Public MEMBER Secondly. as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers. Isabela. is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. that is on the 16th of next month. can make your application and final requisites for your homestead. This interdiction. a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela. he can help you collect your loans although long overdue. reads as follows: LUIS Attorney Notary CANDIDATE Province of Isabela B. subject to disciplinary action. just like the rule against unethical advertising. While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic. In sum. .. to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire. 49 Considering that Atty. is a member of the Philippine Bar. Tagorda. Come or write to him in his town. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------In re LUIS B. since. the prohibition stands. He offers free consultation. 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent. to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. in translation. I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems. in translation. on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule. whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.corporation for services rendered. and from conducting. which. TAGORDA. Luis B. ACCORDINGLY. — As notary public. to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative. we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. which letter. criticisms at times. expressly or impliedly. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Legal Clinic. such as that being invoked by herein respondent. Rogelio P. Inc. Echague. At this point in time. 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter. any activity. even if unfair. we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates. it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer.: The respondent. et al. to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. under the present state of our law and jurisprudence. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely. and can execute any kind of affidavit. who is the prime incorporator. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan. a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. imperative that this matter be promptly determined. ISABELA. the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith. operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. Besides. but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. vs. to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach. as well as any complaint for or against you. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays. of course.

his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. third. to seek his professional services." The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association. It lowers the standards of that profession. 53 Wash. under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice. first. and are intolerable. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should. C. 1097. the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Cas. constitutes malpractice. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain. the importance of the lawyer's position. People vs. therefore. (State vs. is not per se improper. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. Accordingly.) It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. STIRRING UP LITIGATION. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27. 625. his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts.I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. second. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . and all other like self-laudation. either personally or through paid agents or brokers. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. That should be distinctly understood. those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office. the sick and the injured. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. R. the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. 231. or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. Yours respectfully. and. Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law. or to pay or reward directly or indirectly.. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague. Mac Cabe [1893]. relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are. or to employ agents or runners for like purposes. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. his youth and inexperience at the bar. and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards. is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. the magnitude of the interest involved. ADVERTISING. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional. whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements. it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. the ignorant or others. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit. in influencing the criminal. but it is indictable at common law.. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. except in rare cases where ties of blood. 2 R. even for a young lawyer. with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case. but must be the outcome of character and conduct. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1. But as mitigating. The provincial fiscal of Isabela. and have been upheld as constitutional. hospital attaches or others who may succeed. Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts. said codal section was amended by Act No. 1929. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself. 28. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. Rossman [1909]. 19 L. or to remunerate policemen.. DIRECT OR INDIRECT. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct. The law is a profession and not a business. In view of all the circumstances of this case. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind. The facts being conceded. L.. This cannot be forced. being a matter of personal taste or local custom. A. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles. (Sgd. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. and especially with his brother lawyers.) LUIS TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public. physicians. defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling. DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. 1. I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration. and sometimes of convenience. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit. or by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations. court or prison officials. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. 17 Ann. is unprofessional. suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded.

stating that: Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant. No. received notice to file Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. No. vs. the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence. and while Atty.: This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus. in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff. In its Resolution of 9 October 1974. . the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other defendants. 2. therefore. The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair. 53546-R. The material operative facts of this case. against the Director of Public Works. dismissing the appeal. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. the law firm of Baizas. Crispin Baizas. Nicanor G. petitioner. timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. on 13 November 1975. this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes. and ANTONIO MARINAS. Upon prior leave of the respondent Court. Alberto and Associates. The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12 . respondent Provincial Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5 November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale. and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin for execution. on the grounds therein stated. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES. HON. Reyes. with prayer for preliminary injunction. . praying. he was substituted by his heirs — Enrique N. furthermore. petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975. respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. the same became final and executory. respondents. It had. Inc. Baizas. Atty. and Antonio Marinas.). the auction sale thereof. issued another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal: It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed (for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5. That late as it may be. 5 As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution. copy of which was received by said counsel on July 17. Donna Marie N. Natividad. Crispin D.-G. had also left the firm. especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death of Atty. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. 53546-R denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Eulogio B. Salaysay. 1974. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court.R. senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS. REYES. Alberto & Associates. Reyes and Renne Marie N. and the copy of the Resolution of July 9. Reyes. the plaintiff-appellee therein. this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE..R. 1974. DAVIDE. B. . Sebastian Enterprises. as gathered from the pleadings of the parties. 3 During the pendency of the appeal. 2 Petitioner. be set aside. The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. Rodolfo Espiritu. Sebastian Enterprises. Inc. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties. 1974. petitioner. thus. which docketed the case as C. unjust and unlawful decision. 1 On 7 May 1973. . INC. . thru its counsel. Baizas died on January 16. Ryes — who are now the private respondents in this present petition. his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on February 19. and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. In the Resolution of 13 November 1975. On 19 February 1974. as Deputy Sheriff. JR. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. J. scheduling for Friday. petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals. Eulogio B. Motion Denied. 8 No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for review. EULOGIO B. until 5 April 1974 within which to comply. since all that BRSEI is asking for. 6 On 28 September 1974. . 14 On 12 January 1976. in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. 1974. and that appellant be granted a reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-½) months since counsel received copy of the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief. Felicisima R. SALAYSAY.A. the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner herein. thru its then counsel of record. Pasay City Branch. on 9 July 1974. Hence. to review the Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974. earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.A. . Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief. therefore. set aside and reversed.-G. on 9 September 1974. Eulogio B. respondent Court. filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.. as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. 1974) within the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9. . the latter having established her own law office. NICANOR G. and is. Crispin D. and containing the following allegations: 1. Ruby Alberto. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9 Pursuant thereto.R. 1974. R. that the resolution of September 9. 10 On 6 November 1975. died. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty. now deceased. 3. . petitioner. in the interest of justice. a clear and unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI. filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal. the affairs of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration. it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas. Reyes. counsel of BRSEI (B.CANON 3 B. COURT OF APPEALS. are not disputed. respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. 1974. Reyes. 1974 and no cause was shown. R. requiring appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17. 757-R.

Ramirez. Crispin Baizas and the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS. 276. in its Memorandum. 27 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. 108 Phil. Vda. Reyes with his heirs. no fraud is involved. engaged the services of Atty. which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. 22 SCRA 494. it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal. Cawili. Inc. et al. Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court. has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action. Alquiza. the appellate court has no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. requiring the lower court to return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. however. having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs. however. 2nd 433 citing Lovett vs. 176. it cannot and must not be upheld. 1968. State vs. which they complied with on 5 April 1976. On 10 September 1976. et al. 28 Indeed. on 31 May 1976. 66 O. the petition should be given due course. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea. Atty. 384. 62 Phil. it appears that Atty. — Considering the allegations. respondents' comment thereon. L-23342. vs. et. 203 Pac. 279). and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in said case. If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction. this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. In (sic) sensed that there was some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the appeal. It says: 31 Petitioner. Alberto & Associates" was . Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22 November 1976. Ganzon.G. Court of Appeals. through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino." On January 16. 84 ALR 595. al. 26 On 29 November 1976. Court of Appeals. Alberto & Associates. what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel. and after entry of judgment and remand of the records to the lower court — and cancelled the entry of judgment. 29 Fla. Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a mimeographed brief to be filed for them (See People vs. But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower court. his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe. After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court. still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause. et al. In consequence (sic) of his death. 757-R. Since counsel did none of those things. the Answer to the complaint. Baizas to handle its defense in Civil Case No. 34 Idaho 623. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack.R. petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to which it attached the said Amended Petition. in said case. vs. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D.. That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief. 1974. this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision." Hence. petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm name to "Baizas. Chavez vs. Said case. had a peculiar or singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found sufficient to justify such action. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. C.. 1970. But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. prompt and justify its exercise (sic). 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co. Raymundo. this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21 L-41862 (B. previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief. petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Sebastian Enterprises. Answer to Cross-Claim. Inc. said: We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld. extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. 34 SCRA 728). 20 In the Resolution of 12 May 1976." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas. Crispin D. de Ordoveza vs. Alberto & Associates. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. As held in Chavez.In the Resolution of 21 January 1976. this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days from receipt of notice. Crispin D. Baizas & Associates. nevertheless. August 31. This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof. petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on its part. February 10. Sebastian. There must be such a showing which would call for. as well as petitioner's reply to said comment. the law firm "Baizas. vs. thru its president Bernardo R.). 6). 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment on 29 April 1976. In the instant case. and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented and admitted. this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals — reinstating an appeal after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief. 30 We said: Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal.. State. Such a right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded. the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. issues and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. evince that the law firm "Crispin D. However. To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief. Petitioner. 16 In compliance therewith. Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration. L-30543. it. As this Court. Court of Appeals. 275. 11 So. Otherwise. Ganzon.

32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS. Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period. Court of Appeals. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the Brief. Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since. petitioners. 35 Based on the foregoing. But. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO AND GREGORIO GERONIMO. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites enumerated in the Rules of Court. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS. 35271 affirming the orders dated May 5. whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them. Costs against petitioner. Crispin Baizas. cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution. which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Branch 22. Hence. received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. J. constitutes (sic) an UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. son of deceased Crispin D. With Baizas' death. This Court held therein that: The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence. No notice was served upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. vs.R. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan. On the other hand. the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or. took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office. IT SO ORDERED. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. the non-dissolution of said law firm "Baizas. so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. thus. petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. on 6 November 1975. which has the consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court. supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal. Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE. In the Negros Stevedoring case. which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices. vs.: This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision1 dated April 28.. 34 This fact should have made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. this Court held: The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable.in a terribly confused state of affairs. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly authorized by petitioner. and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court. 19943 and September 1. thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal. Inc. is binding upon the latter. supra. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. Petitioner chose not to comply with it. QUISUMBING. Atty. As revealed by the records. it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. if not many. Baizas. in such event. respondents. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers. . 1995. Then. to take any further appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. . SP No. the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause. ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Espiritu. Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the associates took over petitioner's case. We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. In Gutierrez & Sons. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION SAN ANTONIO.2 July 12. In the abovementioned Yuseco case. reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers. none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. an associate who was designated to handle the case. As pointed out by respondents. WHEREFORE. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief. later left the office after the death of Atty. on 28 September 1974. the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9 October 1974. petitioner's counsel. In effect. 1994. the death of the latter must have been known to the former. the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is lifted. Crispin Baizas. there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. Jose Baizas. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. a copy of which the former also received. the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm. That Atty. the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Atty. The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty.4 respectively. said law firm was dissolved. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner. it appearing that some. the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of Atty. 1994. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance. this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy. 33 Moreover. Crispin Baizas. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas. its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when. granting . . the responsibility of Atty. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.. it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt of the records for the respondent Court. hence. fraud. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals. Undoubtedly.

RT-6652. 1993 in Civil Case No.00) within the same period. claims and demands whatsoever they may have over that property covered by TCT No. being the highest bidder bought the two parcels of land. private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land covered by TCT No. petitioners. 1990. Tuctucan. the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE. b. After the parties presented their respective evidence. 30079.859) with an interest of 3. the said plaintiffs shall be deemed to have waived and renounced any all rights. Tuctucan. The facts. That lot situated in Brgy. …RULING THAT THE DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN. Tuctucan.00) Philippine Currency in hand received today by the defendants spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio from the plaintiffs. A second motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated September 1. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied on July 12. as culled from the records. the trial court approved the same in its order dated September 22. damages and counter-claims they may have against each other. 1993. thus making their total obligation in the amount of Two Million Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P2. Consequently. Lot No. with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. are as follows: Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria Geronimo obtained a loan in the amount of One Million Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P1. docketed as Civil Case No. 1993. the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed. petitioners refused to accept the same or execute an instrument for the resale. 9. the terms and conditions of which are: 1. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No.33% per month.000) from petitioners.5 Finding the above to be in order. hence.000. Blk. the compromise agreement dated August 25. 1993 reveals that the terms and conditions thereof are not contrary to law. both situated in Barrio Tabe. they submitted to the court on September 16. 1995. This was granted on May 5. and possession of the defendants San Antonio over said property. . covered by TCT No. …RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY THE AMENDMENT OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT. SO ORDERED. morals and public policy. It was only on March 4. 3 consisting of 135 square meters. a. RT-6652 (T-296744) including its improvements and thenceforth bind themselves to respect the right of ownership. Municipality of Guiguinto. Municipality of Guiguinto. Blk. the terms and conditions of which are quoted as follows: COME NOW parties assisted by their respective counsels and before the Honorable Court most respectfully submit this compromise agreement. 29832. No.028. Before the one-year redemption period expired.000. for the purpose of the cancellation of the annulment of the sale in the title subject to the condition that should plaintiffs fail to deliver the titles to the three lots heretofore mentioned to the defendants San Antonio. 30078.390 square meters and TCT No. c. Bulcan covered by TCT No. III.6 In accordance with the stipulations in paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement. Municipality of Guiguinto. the possession of the plaintiffs of the subject property covering TCT No. That the parties further agree to set aside any claim. defendants San Antonio will execute a deed of resale/reconveyance/redemption of that subject property covered by TCT No. the defendants San Antonio will execute the corresponding instrument of resale/reconveyance/redemption over that properly together with its improvements covered by TCT No.019. This compromise agreement shall be in full settlement of the obligations of the plaintiffs with respect to Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated February 14. and September 1. During the auction sale. That in the meantime. Bulcan. Private respondents. 1993. Another lot situated in Brgy. To secure the loan. 3. 6652 (T-296744) and TCT No. 1993. 1994. That lot including its improvements situated in Brgy. 2. Blk. For the release/resale/reconveyance of the other property involved in the case described in TCT No.000. 1991. TCT No. however. T47229 was issued in the names of petitioners. the spouses Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio. 1994. As the delivery was beyond the agreed six-month period. failed to transfer the ownership and deliver the titles of the three parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the agreement or to pay 2 Million Pesos within the six-month period from August 25. or to pay Two Million Pesos (P2. RT-6652 (T-296744) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan together with its improvements. and those related there. private respondents obtained an additional loan of Nine Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos (P991. 1993 is hereby APPROVED. reconveyance or redemption of the property covered by TCT No.000). Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals. and is DISMISSED. 38 consisting of 75 square meters. RT-6652 (T-296744). RT-6653 with an area of 10. Guiguinto. 4. covered by TCT No. As said earlier. 233-M-92. II. 1994. thus: A careful perusal of the Compromise Agreement dated August 25. payable on or before February 15. Lot 27 consisting of 78 square meters. private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure with preliminary mandatory injunction.556 square meters. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due date. a compromise agreement dated August 25. thus: WHEREFORE. …RULING THAT THE ORDER DATED MAY 5. 1989 and the Susog ng Kasulatan ng Sanglaan dated July 16. Bulcan. The parties are enjoined to comply faithfully with their obligation under said agreement. 4. RT-6652 with an area of 2. petitioners executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale covering TCT No. July 12. This compromise agreement is immediately executory (underscoring supplied). Within six (6) months from signing of this compromise agreement simultaneous to which delivery of the title to the afore-mentioned properties in the names of the defendants San Antonio. RT-6653 (T209250) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan including its improvements. RT-6653 (T-209250) shall it be respect. Private respondents filed a motion for execution of the September 22.000. 233-M92. the Court of Appeals denied the petition on April 28.859). Subsequently. plaintiffs obligate themselves to transfer the ownership of the following to the defendants San Antonio. 6. SO ORDERED. (SIC) 5. ACCORDINGLY. Bulacan.the motion for execution of compromise judgment dated September 22. RT-6653 after private respondents paid them Two Million Pesos (P2. TCT No. For a consideration of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2. 1994. The Orders of respondent court dated May 1[5]. subject matter of the complaint. 1994 DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AMEND THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BASED ON A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. after the lapse of six months that private respondents delivered the three titles to petitioners.7 Hence this petition for review wherein petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: I. RT-6652 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. 1993 order with the trial court.000. Branch 22. 1994 are AFFIRMED.

Did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? 2. Likewise. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. While it becomes the trial court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution may be refused on equitable grounds. Private respondents counter that there has been no modification of the final judgment when the trial judge issued the writ of execution. Private respondents are ordered to cease and desist from disturbing the ownership and possession by petitioners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. Lastly. it was error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of contract.R. to deliver the titles to the three parcels of land described in the agreement. 1993. RT-6652 even after the lapse of the six-month period. whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation. 1994. we find that it should be properly addressed. because it is in effect an amendment to the compromise agreement. Further. Petitioners contend that judgement based on a compromise is conclusive upon the parties and is immediately executory. as the judge issued the writ of execution. we find that this point serves only to confuse the Court on the real facts of the case. provided that private respondents had six months within which to deliver the titles. petitioners could rightfully refuse acceptance of the titles. as the judge was merely performing a ministerial duty. hence it cannot be modified. The trial court therefore. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Private respondents additionally point out that in reciprocal obligations. petitioners deny that they are guilty of delay for not executing the deed of resale. private respondents deny that they delivered the three titles late and if ever the delivery was delayed it was the Register of Deeds who was to blame. has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. It has the force and effect of res judicata. Despite the fact that the compromise agreement involved two parcels of land up for redemption. ownership of the land covered by TCT No. the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it.e.16 Compromise agreements are contracts. Also. As to the alleged delay on the part of petitioners in executing the Deed of Resale and Reconveyance. in issuing the writ. If they failed. The compromise agreement approved by the trial court in its order dated September 22. a person obligated to deliver something incurs in delay only after demand. which was the execution of the deed of reconveyance. VI. Bulacan. public order or public policy. is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code15 applicable in this case? According to petitioners. 1994. Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law. As herein petitioners have not yet made demand and as they have not yet performed their part of the agreement. private respondents submitted to the Register of Deeds the pertinent documents for registration of the three titles in petitioners' name only on March 2. Private respondents claim that the trial court. from August 25. This only shows that private respondents did not intend to truly comply with their obligations. once approved by final order of the court. Thus. Branch 22. RT-6652 would be transferred to petitioners. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a valid contract. beyond the six-month period deadline. We find petitioners' petition impressed with merit. V. Hence. SP No.8 In sum. 1994. They assert that they were not seeking rescission of the compromise agreement but its full enforcement regardless of whether the delay is slight or substantial.17 WHEREFORE. delay sets in only when one part fulfills his obligation and the other is unable to perform his part of the obligation. 1994. was merely performing a ministerial duty.10 In this case. pursuant to the terms of the compromise agreement. via a writ of execution. It was error therefore for the trial court to grant the writ of execution in favor of private respondents because it effectively compelled petitioners to accept delivery of the three titles in exchange for the release of the land covered by TCT No. The decision dated April 28. morals. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . did the trial court err in granting the writ to execute the compromise judgment? Petitioners claim that the trial court did. …APPLYING ARTICLE 1191 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. the orders dated May 5.IV. petitioners raise the following issues for our resolution: 1. … NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY COMPLIED WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. 1994 and September 1. Petitioners also contend that private respondents should not blame the Register of Deeds for the delay in the delivery of the three titles since private respondents submitted the registration documents to the Register of Deeds only on March 2. this was sufficient compliance of petitioners' duty under the Compromise Agreement. While indeed private respondents did not meet head on this issue. are hereby declared NULL AND VOID.11 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attributed to the Register of Deeds private respondents' delay in the delivery of the three titles. 14 For us. private respondents did not indicate as to which parcel of land petitioners did not execute a deed of resale. delay by private respondents has not yet occurred. SO ORDERED. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. They said that as early as August 25. private respondents failed to deliver the titles on February 25. private respondents admitted that petitioners already executed a Certificate of Redemption. …NOT RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 6 THEREOF. 1994.9 In this case. 1994. As the facts of this case show. 1993 to February 25. when they gave the titles to petitioners. beyond the six-month period. they must be complied with in good faith. like the ones in this case. or put an end to one already commenced. they already executed a Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of Sale of the land covered by TCT No. 1995. ownership over the land covered by TCT No. reconveyance or redemption despite their receipt of two million pesos. Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applicable in this case? On the first issue. They explain that even on equitable considerations this was not allowed because once a decision becomes final. the court which rendered it loses jurisdiction over the case and it can no longer be modified except for clerical errors. 35271 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. 1994. In filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. the petition is GRANTED. the Court of Appeals erred when it found that private respondents' delay did not constitute substantial breach to warrant rescission of the compromise agreement. i. good customs.. it will be unjust to petitioners if we compel them to accept the three titles despite the lapse of the agreed period. 1993. July 12. but they did not. petitioners sought the appellate court's declaration that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. RT-6652. Accordingly. the compromise agreement clearly provided private respondents six months. as it was only on March 4. cannot compel petitioners. and resolution dated September 11. 1995. 13 Nevertheless. If after the lapse of the said period and no delivery is yet made by private respondents. RT-6653. But as shown in their decisions. In their view. petitioners said. to accept the three titles beyond the six-month period. A compromise agreement.12 Private respondents could have done so earlier. Costs against private respondents.

Rollo. SO ORDERED.. complainant vs. that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration . 7. Dacanay. Rule 138.: Lawyer Adriano E. ATTY. 3. since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2. or. Renomeron. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. PER CURIAM:p This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. LUCAS M. in his 1980 verified complaint. respondents. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr. house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision. p. On May 22. to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS. AQUINO. V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment.000. respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them.. DACANAY. asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International. the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. 3. JOSE R. to H. in lieu thereof. We hold that Baker & McKenzie. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G.) .000) was sent to respondent through his niece. Another request was made on February 16.ADRIANO E. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions." Not having received any reply.) As early as January 15. 1987. respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. aside from being members of the Philippine bar. vs. ROMEO L. complainant. stressing that: . Rules of Court). LUIS MA. respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. Collas. 1987. JR. denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. SANDEJAS. 15. Dishonesty. Torres. VICENTE A. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2. the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20. Inc. (p. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.. respondents' memo).000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys.. Respondents. what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office.. admitted to the bar in 1954. J. 4.E. EVANGELISTA. are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres. Attorney Dacanay. COLLANTES. GUERRERO. Gabriel.. 5.00 as pocket money per trip. 1979 respondent Vicente A. Extortion. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics. RENOMERON respondent. Conduct unbecoming of public official. Although V & G complied with the desired requirements. Rollo. (V & G for short). for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum. Legal Ethics. Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transaction before him. Causing undue injury to a party.) WHEREFORE. KWAN and JOSE A. Inc. On May 19. cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. Vicente C. a law firm organized in Illinois. In a letter dated November 16. CURAMMENG. 10. 1979. he filed the instant complaint. the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality. 1983 Ed. NATIVIDAD B. filed against Attorney Vicente C. SALONGA. J. being an alien law firm. JR.. Renomeron. (See Ruben E. using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie. Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not. 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours. CLARO TESORO. which contains the names of the ten lawyers. 1987. it is only during the incumbency of Atty. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 6 FERNANDO T. (p. COLLAS JR. 6. VICENTE C. sought to enjoin Juan G. Collantes. 1987. TORRES. RAFAEL E. Agpalo. respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. 1. Jr. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: 1. There was no action from the respondent.. On May 26. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification. a client. which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2. NUNAG.. 2. Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. 115. Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. in his reply dated December 7. respondent imposed additional registration requirements. the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives. Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago.

[c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare. and efficient administration of justice. 17-18. From a lawyer. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics. . 1990. 64 SCRA 784. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). in this case. Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official.1987 (Consulta No. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws. may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138.) Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. speedy. Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.790. People vs. We believe that. De Luna. 102 Phil. a disbarment complaint against said respondent. respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator. and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. fair. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings. subpars. rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. 1987. are expected those qualities of truth-speaking. The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents involved. Exasperated by respondent's conduct. The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and. NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. The answer is yes. full candor. Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16. Bonifacio on February 22. its prestige. Ruben E. retrieved from him the amount of P800. 1579). subpars. and that.) The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). In his answer dated July 9. As recommended by the Secretary of Justice. 1983 Edition. The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension.00 bills but in P50. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing. throughout the centuries. 1987. as a lawyer. and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. The investigator. with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion. or be heard in a formal investigation. 789. by Adm. dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419. such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding. to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents involved. and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. 87-15). Case No. to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter. Rules of Court. (pp. Attorney Leonardo Da Jose. Rollo). Upon receipt of the charges. Order No. (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality. recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty. Agpalo.. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession. notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation. Rollo. pp. for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. intellectual honesty. that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof. its exalted place. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. xxx xxx xxx In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement. As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. 5. Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4. the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. he continued with his inaction. [a] and [d]). 7. imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification. and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service. After due investigation of the charges. against respondent Register of Deeds.00 bills. have been compendiously described as moral character. 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics. 66-67). the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. In a Resolution dated July 27. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece. for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration. 165 dated May 3. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer. Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him. Ms. emphasis supplied. respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment. Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA. recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Section 17. and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service. not in the original denomination of P100.' although the respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him. respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action. 1987. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph.On May 27. the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. effective immediately. and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to . 1988.. extortion. 968). He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. de la Cruz. a high sense of honor. that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question. the President of the Philippines.

it might occur that the whole court machinery. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. final judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused necessarily turns upon the degree of credit which should be accorded the respective witnesses called for the prosecution and the defense. that thereafter the provincial fiscal promised to file a formal information against the accused. (Rule 7. The attorney for the Moro Province and his assistant stand in the same position as a provincial fiscal with reference to this matter. 150 SCRA 269). who saw and heard the witnesses testify and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the substantial truth of the account of the commission of the crime of attempted rape which was given on the witness-stand by the principal witnesses called for the prosecution. defendants-appellants. and the trial conducted by a special fiscal. The fiscal thus temporarily appointed shall discharge all the duties of the provincial fiscal as provided by law which the regular provincial fiscal fails or is unable to perform.. legal appointment. honorable. Low (19 Phil. 278). Judge Guevarra. perhaps. Section 1 of Act No. they find that "the provincial fiscal is absent from the province. the judge of the Court of First Instance for the province is authorized and required to appoint a temporary fiscal." The power to appoint special fiscals being thus expressly conferred upon judges of Courts of First Instance. it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. It is urged that the court was without jurisdiction in the premises because the information charging the commission of the crime was filed. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------THE UNITED STATES. wherein he set forth that on the 12th of June. J. as a result of the machinations of the personal and political enemies of one or all of the defendants. 1912. never-the-less to ask the court to appoint a special fiscal. and a careful examination of the record discloses nothing which would justify us in disturbing the findings in this regard of the trial judge. the appointment when made was a valid. was not disposed to press the case. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. who shall be paid out of the provincial treasury the same compensation per day as that provided by law for the regular provincial fiscal for the days actually employed.03. In his opinion the trial judge sets forth at some length the material evidence adduced at the trial. 1912 the provincial fiscal conducted an investigation of the alleged crime at the urgent request of counsel for the private prosecutrix. and reliable" may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. that the provincial fiscal had not done anything further at the date .net Construing and applying this statute we said in the case of Nuñez vs. Rodolfo G. would justify us in holding that the trial judge erred in arriving at his conclusions as to their guilt. nor shall he. whether in public or private life. Code of Professional Responsibility). as he himself. or his assistant. 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. 1699 reads in part as follows: "Whenever the provincial fiscal is absent from the province.01.: The appellants in this case were convicted in the court below of the crime of attempted rape. that about the 2nd of October. and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE." From what was said in the case just cited. improvidently appointed by the trial judge without authority of law. we think there can be no doubt of the power of the judges of Courts of First Instance to appoint special fiscals or prosecuting officers. Code of Professional Responsibility. charging the commission of the crime on the 9th of that month. and affords no ground for appellant's contention as to a lack of jurisdiction in the court below to entertain and decide a criminal action based on an information filed by a special fiscal legally appointed for that purpose. There can be no question of abuse of judicial discretion in the appointment of the special fiscal in the case at bar. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. 1912. to perform their duties. without discovering anything which. vs. or fails or refuses to discharge his duty by reason of illness or other cause. plaintiff-appellee. together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. PEDRO BARREDO. Court Administrator vs. four months and one day of prision correccional. If the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province did not have authority to appoint a temporary fiscal when the exigencies of the service demanded it. Suffice it to say that so strongly were we impressed by the forceful oral argument of counsel for the appellants with the possibility of a grave miscarriage of justice in the court below. and the record contains some two hundred and fifty pages of typewritten testimony and documentary evidence. and indeed from the plain and explicit provisions of the statute. except. In its last analysis. PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO. Moreover. or by reason of personal interest in a prosecution or other matter is disqualified to act therein as provincial fiscal. with reference to criminal cases. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. in the exercise of the sound judicial discretion conferred upon them.) This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent.engage in unlawful. Hermoso. 142 SCRA 632. The presiding judge of the Court of First Instance for the Moro Province has the power to cause the prosecution of criminal cases to go forward. that we carefully and exhaustively abstracted and analyzed for ourselves the great mass of evidence brought here on this appeal. CARSON. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines. Hermoso. when. promising. but later declined to do so. would be impeded on account of the refusal on the part of the attorney. He should therefore be disbarred. 244): "If the provincial fiscal fails or refuses to discharge his duty in the prosecution of criminal cases. 1912 the private prosecutrix filed a complaint against the defendants in this action in the court of the justice of the peace of Nagcarlang."1awphil. and even if it were admitted that the trial judge acted improvidently or unwisely or erroneously in making the appointment. in cases wherein it appears that there has been a manifest abuse of judicial discretion in making the appointment. and a restatement and review of the evidence at this time would serve no useful purpose. that the cause was remanded in the early days of July. immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1. It remains only to consider the contentions of counsel for the appellants touching the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain and adjudicate this action. The appointment of the special fiscal was made in response to a petition filed by counsel for the private prosecutrix on November 8. Rep. and each of them was sentenced to two years. or fails or refuses to discharge thus duty by reason of illness or other cause. that on the 29th of the same month the accused waived a preliminary trial before the justice of the peace and prayed that the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance. the mere fact that the judge acts unwisely or improvidently or under a misapprehension of facts when he makes an appointment in no wise affects the legality or the validity of the appointment. the judge of the Court of First Instance is not only authorized but is required to appoint a temporary fiscal to represent the Government in such cases. Sison. A large number of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense were called at the trial. then the judge or court must relieve such officer temporarily and appoint a qualified person to take his place. and if the officer designated by law to prosecute such criminal cases fails or refuses to perform his duty. 150 SCRA 269. or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103). we do not think that in the case at bar the special fiscal was erroneously or improvidently appointed. in our opinion. the effect of which need not be and is not now considered. dishonest.

But if he is not satisfied with the reason assigned by the fiscal. and of the provincial fiscal held that in the interests of justice it would not be proper "to deny the petition of the injured woman" and appointed a special fiscal under the provisions of Act No. The nolle prosequi was not. sec. and it has been by several statutes delegated to district attorneys. and 25 Wendell. it rests in the sound discretion of the judge whether to accede to such motion or not. This petition was endorsed over to the provincial fiscal by the presiding judge. and that the judges should not therefore challenge the formal expression of his will in this regard. and that a special fiscal should be appointed to prosecute the case in view of the manifest indisposition on the part of the provincial fiscal to bring the accused to trial. that is to say in the presiding judge thereof. Holding as we do that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a finding as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. that the case should not be dismissed. upon full consideration of the statements of counsel for the private prosecutrix. Vol. Under the English rule the uncontrolled right to enter a "nolle prosequi" was the prerogative of the Attorney-General.) There are States in which a statute. The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in such cases is either to go forward with the prosecution or to move the court to dismiss the complaint. and Act No. But it is to be observed that it is expressly provided that: "This section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as justice of the peace in any preliminary investigation. or as a result of information furnished by the private prosecutor. 2nd ed. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts. 1912). of course. It is true. 556. he was satisfied that the accused had not committed the crime with which they were charged. Discretion in the matter of subjecting to trial persons remanded for trial in a Court of First Instance by a justice of the peace lies with the judge of the court. 1389. in view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to file an information and bring the accused to trial. and in some it is not plain what the course is.. under section precautions as he felt it his duty to adopt. within the power of the Solicitor General to nolle prosequi an indictment at his option without the approbation of the court. Criminal Procedure. a complete act . as counsel supported by authority contends. provided that it should not thereafter be lawful for any district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi upon any indictment.of the petition (November 9 [8]. in which this official set out at length his reasons for declining to file an information. but only as authorizing him to secure the attendance of witnesses before him in making necessary investigation for the purpose of instituting or carrying on criminal prosecutions. requires the consent of the court. 1 and 2. although we are aware it has often been done. and proceed with the trial. and fearing its abuse . that the practice whereby the prosecuting officer in some jurisdiction enters upon the records of a criminal case that "He does not desire to prosecute further" — dicit nolle prosequi — is a very ancient one. When the justice of the peace remands an accused person for trial in the Court of First Instance. or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to that end. Nor is it in our judgment. 483. without the content of court. 194. In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power. Enc. 1 Va. the General Court consisting of five judges unanimously decided: "That the District Attorney has not in any case the right to enter a nolle prosequi without leave of the court. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge or Court of First Instance" — not that he shall await the action of the provincial fiscal. should not institute criminal proceedings against such persons. But even before that Act. sec. he will dismiss the action in accordance with the suggestion of an experienced fiscal who has personally investigated the facts. to dismiss or dicit nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted. at least. it then becomes his duty to advise the court wherein the proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations..) In Virginiaa 1803. 1627. In substance he stated that as a result of his investigations based upon the complaint of the private prosecutrix. It probably exists unimpaired in the attorney general to this day. (People vs. McLeod. But we are of the opinion that in the event that criminal proceedings have been instituted. 1 Hill. 13. that the evidence against them was unsatisfactory and unworthy of credence. the case becomes forthwith a criminal action pending in that court." Upon a motion of the provincial fiscal to dismiss a complaint upon which an accused person has been remanded for trial by a justice of the peace. By the act of 1870 it is expressly provided to the contrary. or if it appears to him from the record of the proceedings in the court of the justice of the peace. or otherwise. discontinue a criminal prosecution in that form at any time before verdict .itc-a1f The modern tendency would seem to be to modify and control the power of prosecuting officers in this regard either by express legislative enactment or by the judicial recognition of a custom. and the investigations of the provincial fiscal have satisfied him that the accused person is innocent. It is. and pending further proceedings. and section 2 of Act No.) At common law the attorney general alone possessed this power. we need hardly say that we think the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to prosecute the case. and can only be terminated therein by the court itself. 302 for official investigations by provincial fiscals. in part. and might. he may deny the motion. directly or by construction. expressly provide that in case the justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial.. (10. . secs. therefore. The right of the Attorney.. whose investigations have satisfied him as to the innocence of persons charged with the commission of crime. It must go on the minutes of the court and must transpire. the court claims the right to control him if it chooses. "amounting nearly to law" requiring the consent of the court in all cases wherein it is exercised." The order is usually taken upon motion by the prosecuting officer and with leave of the court. of Plead." (Anonymous. Some American states have followed the English rule. The minutes are the records of the acts of the court and no entry can be made thereon except with his consent. The legislature finding the power in so many hands.. It is for the justice of the peace to determine whether the accused shall be remanded for trial. and that they were victims of a conspiracy of their personal and political enemies to ruin them by compelling them to stand trial for a heinous offense which they had not committed. Thereafter the trial judge. leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in the premises. or in any other way discontinue or abandon the same without leave of the court having jurisdiction to try the offense charged. 139. 1699. Cas. . (Bishop. 377.. and to move the court to dismiss the proceedings. to aid him in determining the course to be adopted at this stage of the proceedings that provision is made in section 2 of Act No. and returned with an extended statement. who now represent the attorney general in nearly everything pertaining to indictments and other criminal proceedings local to their respective countries. and some of the courts which do not consider themselves bound by common law precedents have declared the English practice unsound and have held the better rule to be "to ask leave of the court giving some good reason therefor. we know of no authority for it: — The State is the party . We agree with the contentions of counsel that a conscientious prosecuting official. with the cognizance of the court. Ordinarily. Act No.General to dismiss without consent of court was there maintained under the theory that that officer was the immediate representative of the King. and in either event to move with the promptitude necessary to secure the right of the accused to a speedy trial. or in which a custom amounting nearly to law does. and Practice. This the Solicitor General did not ask. Others have declined to adopt it. Such a proceeding is to be coram judice.. and others wherein while the prosecuting officer acts practically on his own responsibility. 2. 194..) Nor was the paper handed by the Solicitor-General to the clerk an entry of nolle prosequi.

. . as was the trial judge after hearing the evidence. therefore.S. 15.S. `upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that no such crime has been committed. under the uniform practice since the announcement of the rule in the case of United States vs. to be such as a court and jury might hear. (supra). 68 N. and submitting the evidence to the court for its final determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 554). and has not been questioned by this court. He manifestly erred in his belief that the evidence relied upon by the private prosecutrix was insufficient to justify him in proceeding with the prosecution..R. 82 Pac. This probable cause. App. Cas. Bungart vs. He has not and ought not to have unlimited power of prosecution.S. . in holding a defendant to answer for a crime.. 1081)...S..Y. and I understand probable cause to be case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it. which.A. But we think that the evidence was undoubtedly sufficient to justify and require his proceeding promptly with the trial.. 5). Chief Justice Marshall. 507..) The District-Attorney acts for the people in criminal cases except he must have the consent of the court to enter a nolle prosequi. Rep. and as a logical and necessary consequence of the above cited provisions of the statutes in this regard. and I should require. in such cases only is it lawful totally to discharge him. 10 Ann. . the Chief Justice said: "This being a mere inquiry. nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused: but I ought to require. In this we are inclined to agree with the trial judge." (Citing. As was said in a recent decision (In re Mitchell [Cal. 642) this court said: "After the complaint has been presented and certainly after trial has been commenced the Court and not the fiscal has full control of it. and that he failed to discharge it when he neglected and declined to proceed with the prosecution. such person shall be committed or admitted to bail "to await the action of the judge of Court of First Instance. giving the court or the presiding justice some satisfactory reason therefor. yet he does decide on the probable cause and a long and painful imprisonment may be the consequence of his decision. 528.and the Solicitor General only the agent to carry on the proceeding.S. 477. Valencia. But there must be proof "that a crime has been committed and that there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. is not doubtful." says a very learned and accurate commentator. 2 L. asks leave of the court that it may be so entered. In conclusion we here insert a number of citations of authority touching the degree of proof upon which an accused person may properly be required to stand trial for the crime with which he is charged. State (61 Neb." Section 62. and if the latter. "If. it was said: "We are not called upon on this hearing to pass upon the sufficiency of this evidence to warrant the conviction of the defendant.. (loc. N.) Again. If.. vs. Perkins vs. 41 Ga. Moss. 187 N. 136 prescribing the duties of the provincial fiscal provides that: "He shall be an officer of the Court and subject to its directions in relation to official matter pending in the Court of First Instance. 1 Abb. is not required to have submitted evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the person charged beyond a reasonable doubt. amounted to a substantial failure on his part to discharge his duty in the premises. 194 provides that when a justice of the peace binds the accused person over to a regular trial. and that he had the uncontrolled power to decline to prosecute.. (Statham vs. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the Court.. 193. and whether they shall be confined or admitted to bail. Wells.. and upon that question express no opinion. But the common law is not in force in this Kingdom . on a trial in chief. though from the nature of the case it must be Ex parte. 125.. Without reflecting upon the integrity of the good faith of the provincial fiscal. without deciding upon guilt. Men's minds may well differ as to the probative value of evidence submitted in support of an alleged fact. All that is required is that there be a sufficient legal evidence to make it appear that "a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof.'" (loc.. when desiring to nolle prosequi a case after indictment found. I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed. An examination to see whether an accused person shall be ..Y. State. . 410. whether the accused shall be discharged or held to trial. grievous error was committed.)" In State vs. and great evils may result and have resulted from placing such a power in the hands of one man ." (U. beyond a reasonable doubt. Quinn. Willet vs.) In Rhea vs." Section 2 of Act No. and we think that under all the circumstances the trial judge properly appointed a special fiscal to conduct the proceedings in his stead. and partly for the information of committing magistrates and prosecuting officers generally. and his attitude when called upon the explain his failure to prosecute at the urgent instance of counsel for the private prosecutrix. in what place they are to be tried. He evidently was of opinion that it rested wholly in his discretion whether the case should or should not proceed to trial. . in Ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch 75. was sufficient to justify the commitments of Aaron Burr. and we do not pretend to say that he must have been convinced of the guilt of the accused. of Act No. in the first volume of our reports. Robertson (6 Hawaii. 309. 11 L. ed. in holding that evidence presented by the government. in deciding that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima facie case.) In the case of King vs.. Cas. (Moulton vs. 14692a.) it was said: "Evidence that would justify a committing magistrate in finding that probable cause existed for the detention of a defendant need not necessarily be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty when he is placed on trial.. 130.Y." We conclude that in this jurisdiction. 718) the court said: "The proposition of the counsel for the Attorney-General that at the common law the Attorney-General of England and of States which have adopted this part of the common law has the right upon his sole responsibility to enter a nolle prosequi. cit.. 491). ought to be proved by testimony in itself legal.) .]. the judge viewed such evidence from the standpoint of a trial court. or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless. ." The rule in New York is thus stated in People vs. prefaced his opinion as follows: "On an application of this kind. 347): "In order to hold defendant and put him on his trial. we think that he undoubtedly misconceived his duty. and that this limitation upon their power extends to the dismissal of complaints upon which accused persons have been committed or admitted to bail to await the action of the judge of the Courts of First Instance. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison or give bail. cit. he failed in the discharge of his duty. 59. the question to be determined is. Beecher." 135 N. The uniform practice of the Supreme Court and the circuit courts has been that the AttorneyGeneral by himself. though in most other respects. In this connection it is proper to observe that a magistrate. Although in making a commitment the magistrate does not decide on the guilt of the prisoner. Burr. by the Court of Special Session: "A committing magistrate is not required to exact the full measure of proof necessary to secure a conviction.Y. it was said: "Upon just what ground the trial court condemned the action of the examining magistrate does not clearly appear. the committing magistrate is not required to find evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction. precedes the institution of a prosecution. Shenk (142 N. partly in explanation and support of our ruling upon the action of the court below in holding that the provincial fiscal had failed to discharge his duty in the premises. provincial fiscals have not the power to dismiss criminal actions pending in Courts of First Instance without leave of court. with or without the consent of the trial judge. McGinley (153 Wis. The trial judge was manifestly of opinion that the long delay of the provincial fiscal before taking action in the case at bar. consisting principally of affidavits. In the case of United States vs. acting as committing magistrate." In re Kelly (28 Nev. 25 Fed. but is obliged to hold one accused of crime for trial if there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty. In failing so to do. Valencia (1 Phil. that probable cause be shown. and which. or by his deputy.

Province of Tayabas. Suarez. VIVENCIO ORAIS and DAMIAN JIMENEZ.. 1936. Hon. and moved that a practicing attorney or a competent attorney in the Bureau of Justice be designated in his stead. But the scope of investigation before the magistrate falls far short of a trial of a prisoner before the court and a jury. Ex parte Patterson (50 Tex. in any reasonable view of it. upon petitioner of the provincial fiscal. While the case was pending in the latter court. 1936. We find no error in the proceedings in the case at bar prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants and appellants. 1936. So. to compel the respondent judge to reinstate criminal case No. the preliminary examination was conducted by the justice of the peace of Lopez. entered its appearance as amicus curiae and likewise objected to the dismissal of the case. Perfecto R. Damian Jimenez. it was said: "A committing magistrate acts in a two fold capacity. ruling that there was prima facie case against the accused. Crim. On May 11. On June 30. despues de que el Juzgado de Paz de Lopez habia declarado que existen meritos para proseguirse contra los mismos y despues de que un Juez de Primera Instancia de la misma categoria que el Juez Platon habia rehusado sobreseer la causa por creer que existian meritos para proceder contra los acusados. the then presiding judge of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. demuestran de un modo claro y concluyente . 387). Ramon Valdez y Nieto. on May 5. On August 14. moved for the temporary dismissal of the case. Palacio to handle the prosecution. then his decision can not be reversed in the matter attempted in this instance.Y. 45431. 6426 corresponded. it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the prisoner committed the offense charged. The justice of the peace of Calauag. and with the purpose of concealing the illegality of said arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez said accused Vivencio Orais conniving with the other accused. denied the motion. conniving with the other accused Vivencio Orais with the same purpose of concealing the illegality of the arrest and detention of said Fortunato Suarez. SERVILLANO PLATON. among other things. It is not required before the magistrate as it is before the jury. a motion for the dismissal of the case. So ordered. 1935. The court. one of the respondents in this case. moved by personal grudge and ill-feeling which he entertained against Attorney Fortunato Suarez. It appears on May 9. P. being one of the accused. 1935. and the judgment convicting and sentencing them in the court below should therefore be affirmed. any jurisdiction to decide the questions of fact within the broad field of probability. After such reinvestigation. State vs. Que el mencionado Juez Hon. Fiscal Yamson after going over the case likewise entered a nolle prosequi. From this order. the deputy provincial fiscal of Tayabas. Fortunato N. Ed. after consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted in the case. in which. — in other words. prepared and subscribed under oath before said Fortunato Suarez with the commission of the crime of sedition. State (140 Wis. Steffens (27 Fed. Lumsden (26 Fed. on petition. 16835)." The following cases are also in accord on the point in question: United States vs. then and there willfully. Later. Cas. 1936.. Lieutenant Orais. LAUREL. Fortunato N. that the provincial fiscal had no courage to prosecute the accused. The examining magistrate has very broad latitude in the matter — if the evidence. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso manifiesto de discrecion al sobreseer la mencionada causa contra los otros dos recurridos Vivencio Orais y Damian Jimenez. the provincial fiscal of Sorsogon. The petitioner has now filed with this Court the present petition. the appeal was dismissed. was docketed and given due course." In United States vs. as follows: That on or about the 9th day of May.: This is an original petition for the peremptory writ of mandamus filed by Fortunato N. declined to proceed. 461). unlawfully and feloniously arrest and detain said Attorney Fortunato Suarez in the train while the latter was going to Calauag. reinvestigated the case. Attorney Godofredo Reyes again vigorously objected to this motion on the ground that there was sufficient proof to warrant the prosecution of the accused..placed on trial for an offense charged against him. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FORTUNATO N. was appointed to preside over case No. according to the information under date of July 8. of the Philippine Constabulary. that all reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt must be removed. Respondents. 1935. vs. Suarez with this court. Attorney Godofredo Reyes entered his appearance as private prosecutor. Lundstrum vs. in turn charged Lieutenant Vivencio Orais and Damian Jimenez in the justice of the peace court of Calauag with the crime of arbitrary detention committed. 1936. Van de Carr (84 N. Judge Serviliano Platon. with the costs of this instance against the appellants.. Layman (22 Idaho. who thereafter bound the defendants over to the Court of First Instance. on September 23 1936. by a closely divided court. Fortunato N. did. in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. of the accused. 1936. Gutierrez David. filed a complaint under oath with the justice of the peace of Calauag.y At the instance of the petitioner herein.. Petitioner. considered the court's order of August 14. satisfies him that a crime within the charge made has been committed and there is reasonable cause to believe the accused is the guilty party he is warranted in holding him to bail. J. through its president. after hearing. the petitioner herein. we are asked to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to reinstate the criminal case which had been ordered dismissed by the said judge. he moved for reconsideration of the court's order of August 14. that the said justice of the peace Damian Jimenez. 16384). denying the motion for dismissal presented by the provincial fiscal. But Fiscal Palacio. No. designated Deputy Provincial Fiscal Perfecto R. Province of Tayabas. is a mere inquest. being apparently of the same opinion as the provincial fiscal.R. The complaint. 624). Accordingly. without legal grounds whatsoever willfully and unlawfully issued an order declaring that there were merits in the complaint thereby sanctioning the illegal and unjust arrest and detention of Fortunato Suarez who was kept in the municipal jail of Calauag for eight hours. Cas.. the provincial fiscal of Tayabas. This motion was granted by the justice of the peace of Calauag on May 20. The Bar Association of Tayabas. 141). SUAREZ. In re Van Campen (28 Fed.I. 1935. and one Tomas Ruedas. Judge of Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Cas. and within the jurisdiction of this Court. and dismissed the case. and the case thus dismissed. Servillano Platon incurrio en un abuso grave de discrecion por cuanto que las pruebas existentes en la causa. Judge Platon. Suarez. holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the accused of the crime charged. he filed on April 23. Suarez. upon preliminary examination. 15641). asked the court to appoint Attorney Godofredo Reyes as acting provincial fiscal to handle the prosecution. 6426. Lieutenant Vivencio Orais. — as a court in deciding questions of law and of evidence. The PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TAYABAS. en las cuales se fundo el fiscal provincial al presentar la querella en el Juzgado de Paz.S. with sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. the petitioner herein appealed to this Court and the case was here docketed as G. as stated in the opening paragraph of this decision. as a jury in finding questions of fact. People vs. and vigorously objected to the motion of dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal. 271). In re Squires (13 Idaho. Palacio. Tayabas. Gala. alleging. 6426 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas so that the case may proceed to trial in the ordinary course. and the case was thus transferred to that sala for action. justice of the peace of the said municipality. Jacinto Yamson. where the case was docketed as criminal case No.. If there is evidence sufficient to give the magistrate any room whatever for the exercise of judgment. at the request of the judge a quo was assigned by the Department of Justice to handle the prosecution of the case. one of the respondents herein. Emiliano A. While the said case was pending preliminary investigation. without warrant of arrest and without any legal ground whatsoever. The case in this state when Judge Emilio Pena was appointed to the place of Judge Gutierres David. charging the petitioner herein. the accused Vivencio Orais being then a public officer to wit: a second lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary duly appointed and qualified as such and detailed in the Province of Tayabas. The petitioner gives the following grounds for the issuance of said writ: Que el mencionado Juez Hon. in the municipality of Calauag.

that subsequently Fiscal Yamsom who. Fil. y que lo mismo podia tenerlugar en esta Provincia de Tayabas. Suarez y su companero Tomas Ruedas. trayendo al propio tiempo a colacion lo ocurrido en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. Barredo. el hecho de que despues de haber arrestado al abogado Fortunato N." The grounds for this action of the provincial fiscal are stated in his said motion for dismissal of April 23. ni que haya incitado a los sakdalistas a actos de violenciacontra el gobierno constituido o contra las autoridades y oficiales.U. dias antes de ocurrir el suceso de autos.) A falta de prueba sobre estos hechos. El delito de detencion arbitraria esta previsto y castigado en el articulo 124 del Codigo Penal Revisado. Suarez. [Las expresadas pruebas constan a paginas 65 al 106 del adjunto alegato anexo ("A"). no vemos razon alguna para que el Teniente Orais tenga motivos de vengarse de estos por dicha causa. la detencion tenia que haber sido sin motivo legal alguno. los hechos son: que el dia 9 de mayo de 1935. 1936. juez de paz de Calauag. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them. 32 Jur. Jimenez. 11 Jur. de las declaraciones de los testigos tanto de la acusacioncomo de la defensa en lo que son consistentes. Judge Servillano Platon granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case. de que los sakdalistas estaban perseguidos en Calauag por las autoridades municipales y la constabularia. Aunque es verdad que el Teniente Orais ha sido acusado ante el Juzgado de pazde Sariaya por 'abusos de autoridad'. 202. because 'despues' de una reinvestigacion de los hechos que dieron margen a la presente causa. Servillano Platon incurrio en un grave abuso de discrecion al juzgar dichas pruebas con un criterio de un Tribunal "sentenciador" cuando que su unica mision era considerarlas bajo el criterio de un tribunal meramente "investigador".U. sin embargo. uno de los acusados en el municipiode Sariaya por el delito de conspiracion para cometer sedicion. 1936. en nuestra humilde opinion. y que a la acusacion corresponde determinarexactamente si se ha cometido o no el delito. en ocasion en que el abogado Fortunato N. Santos. haanalizado este extremo. teniendo en cuenta las circunstancias extraordinarias reinantes entonces en Calauag a raiz de los disturbios y desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. 909. etc. (Vease pag. sin embargo. ademas. La presente causa se ha iniciado a denuncia del abogado Sr. vs. existe a favor de Teniente Orais la presuncion de haber cumplidocon su deber al arrestar al abogado Fortunato N.por lo menos eran abusivas para con las autoridades del gobierno. aquel para defender a los sakdalistas acusados en este municipio.) We have not overlooked the fact that this motion for dismissal was denied by Judge Gutierrez David of August 14. denying the motion for dismissal. en el juzgado de paz de Calauag. y haciendo aplicacion de lo que nos dice la misma ley en lo en que consiste la detencion arbitraria. (E. Fil. se encontraron en el tren que iba a Calauag. que el abogado ayudaria a los sakdalistas incintandoles a la sedicion. moved for reconsideration of the Court's order of August 14. creemos que habia algun motivo legal para la detencion del abogado Sr. Se debe tener en cuenta. el que suscribe. ha llegado a la conclusion de que no hay base justificativa para la prosecucion de esta causa. que para que exista este delito. que dice asi: El funcionario o empleado publico que detuviere a una persona sinmotivo legal alguno sera castigado. acondicionandolos con las palabras proferidas porel abogado Suarez que si en su concepto no son sediciosas y subversivas. Rosa de la Provincia de Laguna. 36 Jur. Anexo O. Godofredo Reyes contra el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia y el juez de paz Damian L.U. It appears. but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in . el aqui acusado Teniente Vivencio Orais presento denuncia inmediatamente ante su coacusado Damian Jimenez.. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. ambos tuvieron un cambio de palabras con motivo del mismo asunto que les llevaba alli. Fil. no existe prueba alguna en los autos de esta causa que dicho acusado haya arrestado al abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. por el delito de detencion arbitraria. dicho Teniente Vivencio Orais pidio el sobreseimiento provisional de su denuncia. E. Suarez y Tomas Ruedas. however. que se levantaron contra el gobierno por los abusosy matanzas de sakdalistas en dichos pueblos.) Should the writ of mandamus prayed for be issued? We observe that after the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. por infraccion del articulo 142 del Codigo Penal Revisado. con las circunstancias y los antecedentes de la situacion porque atravesaba entonces la Provincia de Tayabas al igual que la Provincia de Laguna. as stated above was assigned by the Department of Justice to conduct the prosecution of the case.el delito cometido y la responsibilidad de los acusados. diciendo a este que ya tenia arreglado a los sakdalistas en Calauag. se desprende claramente que el abogado Suarez ha hecho manifestaciones que pueden considerarse como sediciosas y subversivas. but adds: (a) En lo que respecta al acusado Teniente Orais. the same fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case. no consta en los autos de dicha causa que el abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas hayan intervenido como abogado ni parte ofendida o testigos en la misma. y este para atender a sus deberes officiales en relacion con el orden publico algo anormal. especialmente con las de la Provincia de Tayabas a las cuales se referian. conduciendoleal municipio como asi lo hizo con respecto a Tomas Ruedas.fue el motivo por el cual el arresto al abogado Suarez. In this motion for reconsideration not only does Fiscal Yamson reiterate the arguments advanced by Fiscal Valdez y Nieto in the latter's motion for dismissal... y que el podia incitar a lossakdalistas. y que era un abuso de las autoridades dicha persecusion. teniendo en cuenta que con anterioridad el teniente Oraishabia recibido informes de que los sakdalistas en Calauag habian sido entrevistados por Tomas Ruedas. presento una denuncia contra estos por el delito de sedicion. Asi entendido el aspecto legal de la cuestion. Vallejo y otro. quien salio al encuentro de Suarez cuando llego a la estacion del tren en Calauag. library Aunque el abogado Suarez niega que el haya profiredo palabras sediciosas. por causa de los mismos sakdalistas en dicho municipio de Calauag. Tampoco existe pruebas de que el teniente Orais haya sido inducido por motivos de venganza o resentimiento alguno contra dicho abogado Suarez y Tomas Ruedas al arrestales en el dia de autos. (E. vs. vs. aunque por instrucciones de sus superiores. 1. 462. y examinada la misma con la debida atencion que su importancia require asi como las circunstancias del caso. 1936: En sintesis. y estaba justificada por haber ellos mismos dado lugar a ello.] Que el Hon. relacionando los hechos que determinaron laalegada detencion arbitraria de que fue objecto el abogado FortunatoN. Que despues de haberles arrestado. por tanto. a raiz de los disturbiosy desordenes publicos que tuvieron lugar en los municipios de Cabuyao y Sta. solamente por el mero gusto de arrestarles. 482. y por haber el abogado Suarez proferido en tono acalorado. maxime teniendo en consideracion el estado caotico porque atravesaba el municipio de Calauag con motivo de la campana ordenada porel gobierno contra los sakdalistas. Sin perder de vista que la base angular de todos los procesoscriminales son los delitos. Rosa. Suarez y el teniente Vivencio Orais de la constabularia.

non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment. 173-175). Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. 341). 416. he should be exculpated. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor . p. 1984. Petitioner.L. voucher numbers. ALAMPAY. 1984. 6856 which is hereunder quoted: That on or about the month of July. (United States vs.. 1985. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Accordingly. 309. "under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law. Upon the other hand. the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4. without pronouncement regarding cost. sec. Criminal Cases Nos. 1985. June. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. of twelve (12) separate violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. are hereunder quoted: xxx xxx xxx The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h). Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11. it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not. therefore. did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a business. in order to do justice and avoid injustice. in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais and the justice of the peace of Lopez. The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. in the face of the circumstances surrounding the arrest as set forth in the two motions for dismissal by the provincial fiscal of Tayabas.730. contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest.. 1980. No. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case. incorporator. 37-40. The submission made by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx . a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith. So ordered. in the municipality of Numancia. Upon leave of the Court given. This is especially true in a matter involving the examination of evidence and the decision of questions of law and fact. 6858.)" The petition is hereby dismissed. and Criminal Cases Nos. and 6862 were allegedly committed in July. ..) Considering all the circumstances. SR. while he may strike hard blows. which facts and circumstances must have been investigated and duly weighed and considered by the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. pp. 5 Corpus Juris. Aklan. director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices . (Rollo. to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the public office. Decision.. therefore. Extraordinary Legal Remedies. Aklan was ordered to take effect immediately. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced. a departure from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. 6856. dated October 10. to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30. but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.C. See generally Voorhees on Arrest.P7.indeed. of which the accused is the president. an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan dated September 12." (pp. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor General. 6863 and 6864. Santos. in the interest of justice. 1986. but that justice shall be done. 3.: c The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6.. Generoso Trieste. we cannot say that Judge Servillano Platon. abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify. to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum. 6866 and 6867 in October. pp. reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. Criminal Cases Nos. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States. 399. Aklan. After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the petition. 6. 1935. and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1. 6861. the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6. he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are.. (High. J. he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.. 1980. 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October 10. being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia. 36 Phil.. 1985. paragraph (h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows: SEC. 2 R. and whose interest. it should be observed that in the case of Lieutenant Orais.Act. intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made. except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense.. Sr. 450.to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum. 855. In the language of Mr.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws.". suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia. 1980 and some time subsequent thereto. 1985. by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner. since such a duty is not ministerial. 322).80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act. and amounts involved. to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia. pg. 21190-10-174 in the amount of P558. Philippines. which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6859. the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. A supplemental petition. pp. in any way. 1980. C-865. 1983. delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer. 1984. the arrest effected by Lieutenant Orais cannot be said to have be entirely unjustified. Respondent. the abovenamed accused. 6856-6867 of said Court. 1985. As such. In this supplemental pleading. 853. the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy. vs." (69 United States Law Review. had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass. 20. in appropriate cases. 6857. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GENEROSO TRIESTE. T o t a l . Otherwise. Aklan from Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation.the prosecution of public offenses. in August. Aklan and as such. If. 6860.50 After trial. and to pay the cost of the action. the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law. he should do so. But. Rollo. Rollo. 156. herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7. was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with the original counsel on record of petitioner. it is unquestionable that they may. petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION). convicting the petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases.

Treasurer Aniceto Vega. 299-300). was presented. The elements essential in the commission of the crime are: a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business. he had already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law. pp. and. raised the following legal questions. After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. page 15) It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the elements of the offense. 26. evidence discloses absence of bidding and award The prosecution's lone witness. constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. as well as the consolidated comment and the reply thereto filed by petitioner's counsel. Rosene TriesteTuason. was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? 4. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the abovementioned law? 3. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not mean that the sale did not take place. how can one ever imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and . petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort. Was damage or prejudice. 1986. filed on October 7. In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner. Yes. Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. Corporation Code of the Philippines). The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo. Aklan. (pp. (Consolidated Comment. The sale was made by corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the establishment of Trigen? A. gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective briefs. 1986. contract or transaction. Sir. Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC In any event. do not reflect the sale and petitioner still appears as the firm's President. should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Yes. SEC records. Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction. It have not even submitted its financial annual report ever since. The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen 'Corporation. Q. 1980. testified that there never was a public bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen. xxx xxx xxx From the foregoing recital of facts. before the petitioner assumed the Mayorship. 36-37. b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity. Rollo. Rollo. as the prosecution evidence show. not sales or disposal of stocks (Section 141. 340-341) Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General. Tsn.. a financial or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions. The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is weak. contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. (Rollo. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement. Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however. 1980. and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has.(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business. the law only requires submission of annual financial reports. Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14. a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). 1986. Anyway. directly or indirectly. Sir. The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner. after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar. 1983) In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen. the following legal questions arise: 1. thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor. pp. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. 3019 otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act? 2. Oct. There was no public bidding. Q. caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto. Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with Trigen. pp. 293). (Rollo. the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its own volition place on record the following observations: library Prosecution failed to prove charges. 338-339). the Court in its resolution of January 16. be recited anymore as this was obviated when a new Solicitor General. which is said to have been effected on February 25. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief. subsequently delivered by the supplier. Act No. Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to the SEC. upon acknowledging and concluding that: xxx xxx xxx Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3. in all these transactions there never really was any public bidding? A. In other words. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former. Furthermore. showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation. or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

but his liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers under certifications 1. they had already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already prepared by the municipal treasurer. Now. Q. Yes. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen? A. authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293. 301-303) xxx xxx xxx Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla: Q. made to Trigen by the municipality? A. I were prepared. Now. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal treasurer. Already paid. to make it appear that the transactions were regular and proper. Mar. (Opinion No. were the purchases in question already paid? A.delivery of construction materials to Trigen as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself. then Mr. Q. H. CONSULTA: Q.. . . did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the information? Can there be intervention after payment. Vol. pp. pp. Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the purchase and payment of construction materials. The municipal treasurer. F. G. . Q. F. as you said. aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were prepared. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal vouchers marked Exhibits E. petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not. 1984. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence. which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no public bidding at all. Q. B. In short. Maravilla. 2 and 3 thereof. D. and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature. G. Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and award. B. the materials had already been delivered and paid by the municipality to Trigen? xxx xxx xxx A. ATTY. Under what authority were they paid? A. Exhibit I and Exhibit H. Congressional Record. Exhibits A. . page 603). Respondent Court said: . (Resolution dated March 11. 94. do you know why Mr. 1959. 11. C. Yes. 1949). The prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers. C. page 7). prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste? A. we submit the kind of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. what exhibits particularly do you know were issued by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste? A. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them. (Rello. sir. Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered. sir Q. CONSULTA: I am sorry. No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment Now. accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award. sir.. Q. 1984). ESCAREAL: y Q. Your Honor. The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. May 6. 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new trial. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to be signed by the mayor. 5. xxx xxx xxx What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. Now. They had already been paid for. Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). xxx xxx xxx Q. It was sometime after delivery of the construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers (pages 5 to 7). Series 1961 and Opinion No. Who authorized the payment? A. decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2. Vega. Mr. Under official receipt issued by Trigen. (Tsn. You said they had already been paid for. 306.J. Do you know of any receipts issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were signed by Mayor Trieste. D. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts? A. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were already paid by the municipal treasurer? A. A. what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality? ESCAREAL: Payment made by Trigen? ATTY. Previously.

the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. Respondents. Respondent. 307-308. ABAYA. which by the way. being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. Ligaya G. according to complainants. 1986. Notwithstanding. receiving bribed (sic) money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52. Atty. Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were. Br. Herrera for investigation. . After Atty. in his capacity as Mayor. 1986. This Court will do no less and. 1980. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer. Emphasis supplied). LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. vs. 52. Matter No. 6856 to 6867. where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge. Branch 52. to get the construction materials from Trigen. accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved. RTC. Puerto Princess City. in Criminal Cases Nos. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. 2909 August 23. report and recommendation. .There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had. Thus. dated November 2. He didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter. thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same alleged offense. vs. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her. WHEREFORE.M. Complainant. Generoso Trieste. On October 28. vs. Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30. 1983 to May 31. Branch Clerk of Court. Austria in AC-2909. R-705-RTJ: a. R-705-RTJ. complainants. 4995 of the RTC. the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan. has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3. A. then Presiding Judge of RTC. 2. Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby recommends: 1. A.c By resolution of December 11. Branch 52. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Sr. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave credits. she was paid her salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked. with her knowledge and consent. underdelivery or overpricing regarding any of the transactions. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51. R-705RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. Matter No. 3. Puerto Princess City 2 with: 1. then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14 to 30. Based on the evidence presented by the parties. of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio. C. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting. Atty. It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery. docketed as Adm. ABAYA. LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents. 1986. and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. by verifying official hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants. 1984. RTC. and advantageous to the municipality. 1984.The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51. Br. pp. ABAYA. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5. Puerto Princess. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas. Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court. RTC.: In a complaint under oath dated July 21.M. most reasonable. Respondent. He asserted that these charges were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. filed in compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12. I. 1986. . Abaya. a new judgment is now rendered ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. Case No. 698-P he earlier filed on July 18. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. 3. the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. FERNAN. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA. used his influence. R-698-P August 23. JUDGE EMMANUEL M. 1983 and rendered service for the period from October 1. demanding. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019. Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29. Matter No. Puerto Princess City.. 1989 JUDGE EMMANUEL M. 51. 1984 and from April 23 to 27. power.1986 against one of his accusers. therefore. finding the herein petitioner. Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment. Sr. Branch 51. 4 We now consider these well-thought out recommendations. Br. Matter No. encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.1986 docketed as Adm. Complainant. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal. 2. 1986. No. 52. .J. Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE CARDENAS." for attempted murder. as amended. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. the Court resolved to consolidate these related cases. the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. entitled "People of the Philippines vs. No. Branch Clerk of Court. was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never reported for work during said period. library SO ORDERED. Adm. (Rollo. where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic). RTC. Leonardo Cruz..

Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers. she could not produce any single order. stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. 10 Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary "without intervention from your respondent. We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to Mrs. "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid. would impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. "Grabe ito. Yet she charged him with a serious offense. she delivered the amount of Pl. thus: August 13. Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party. Leonila Fuertes. in consideration of the sum of P 2. He testified that Mrs. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader. Nonetheless. 5304 was denied. Baloco. 8 Be that as it may. Mrs. Fuertes. to 8:15 P." (This is terrible. Demanding and Receiving Bribe Money against Judge Abaya. He is talking care Nanette na idinay ko. library Mrs.200. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. who was temporarily assigned to Batangas City. Fuertes' testimony: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. countering that the latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's demand. 13-A Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. When Mrs. 5304. Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was granted. a school teacher. The Judge told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. now Judge Angel R. 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally.M. Fuertes is not a disgruntled litigant. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and Mrs. Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship (3 units). 12 August 15. and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom for about 20 minutes.1985 in his chambers.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. she should. although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief.00 given by Mrs. the Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court session.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15. Fuertes. 1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52. Fuertes' conversation remarked. He alleged that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. He asked me for my case was 50-50. as in fact. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. Mrs. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. but only about P1. Miclat. her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said subjects. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty.Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges. Fuertes. 1984. 50-50 dahil walang eyewitness. 9 Roselyn Teologo. 13 July 2. We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.200. 11 Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. the latter's arrival on August 13. he instructed her not to tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5. b." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no eyewitness.M. Fuertes' son. nanghihingi ng pera. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked.00. Judge Abaya directed her to the adjoining courtroom where he told her. RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G.. 5304 entitled "People vs. Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. he was informed later on that Mrs. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He surmised that Mrs. he told her that he has a problem. who is a good friend of the Judge. Ten Commandments (3 units). Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs.000. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school records of the Holy Trinity College. Fuertes asked the Judge what he wanted. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya. but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs. Leonila Fuertes. I went to town to see Baby Francisco. civil or criminal. Mrs. . the school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units). Under the circumstances.M. 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty. complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid case.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused would be denied. 5 While she claimed to have been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours. a school teacher. Fuertes' testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. not because of any outside interference. the officerin-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No. Genilo Jr.000 and I brought the money to Judge. and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting.c We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence.The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya while temporarily assigned to Branch 52. he is asking money. transcript or official stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case. Fuertes had been there. but because the evidence of guilt was strong. Fuertes perjured herself just to . Moreover. All she presented were so-called practice notes. testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P. on August 13. It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom. Fuertes' diary. telling him that was all she could afford.000. gave P2. we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder. Miclat about the matter.

00. only for Atty. even if true.. we hereby order the forfeiture of his retirement benefits. By these acts. the promulgation was set on April 22. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the probation order and promulgated it. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. the payment of said benefits having been in checks. In summation. we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.000. and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made to him by Mrs. (should be 13) 1985. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge. as recommended by the investigating officer Justice Herrera. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4. 2909 The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A. On April 21. He further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money. shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy administration of justice. Lastly.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400. . No. he likewise abused the trust and confidence of the people. In this regard. such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. However. labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion. we find Judge Emmanuel M. 15 Nilo Jamora. II. Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16. They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs. one of the complainants herein. then Clerk of Court of Branch 52. The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. 1986. Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy. 16 Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge. This is patently illegal. Fuertes in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15. While the investigating officer. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having promulgated it. for indeed. with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge overlooked to sign the order. Teologo. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his resignation not been accepted. Austria's proddings. Atty.. but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya. Austria against Judge Abaya. Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward.. which undertaking he complied with. the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court. he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31. 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. Atty. This order. he was unable to comply as he did not then have cash.accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. The office of a judge exists for one solemn end . Judge Abaya requested Atty. 1985 which granted accused Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. Case No. medical allowance and year-end bonus. RTC Palawan. On January 16. stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation order dated April 22. 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. On the latter date. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men. the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. As requested. the latter demoted him to process server. declared that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl. she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya. We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as abovedescribed the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. hence the promulgation of the probation order was again reset to June 3.000. on the solicitation of Judge Abaya. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas.M. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery. 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila. In the meantime. in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for Pl. which carried certain conditions. 18 We are in accord with this observation. and who was appointed stenographer on September 3. 21 Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. 1986 in Criminal Case No. R-698-P and for disbarment in Adm. a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch.1986. Upon the other hand. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. Austria to discover that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order.. A week later. . 14 c. From him. It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. is not a valid justification for her to simulate the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. except earned leave credits. Case No. the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria. Edgardo Servando. No. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price.M. the testimony of Mrs. Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the suspected killers of her son. 1986. R-698-P and Adm. 1986. 1986. fanned by Atty. who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over two (2) branches. albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya. which exaction ceased only in March 1986 when Atty. Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day. 2909 against Atty. Fuertes. set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16. 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. as then acting City Fiscal. he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her authority. Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and requisites attached to his office. As thoroughly explained by Justice Herrera: .00 from as fringe benefits. 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. A. she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the Clerk of Court.It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their continued employment. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications.00 every payday. April 22. As he had previously resigned.

On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records. Annabelle Cardenas and Atty." (Annex A. among others.500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint. and by reason of his highest qualification. On the same date.. adopted and passed Resolution No. then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. WHEREFORE. if any. On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan. and can never be the subject of agency. choses in actions. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES. if that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency. guardians. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. Matter No. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include the same in his report. she ought to know that under no circumstances is her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. Gaz. Ligaya GonzalesAustria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31. or to guardianship. 1987 and any and all benefits accruing during her government service are declared forfeited. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. vs. SR. after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court. Abaya. assets. and may also. and all evidence relating to them. equipment. together with his findings in relation to the same. Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer . supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities. 1383. the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications. trusteeships. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. receive the accounts of executors. Case No.: This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. Batangas. and evidence to the judge. J.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees. 542. Matter No. except her earned leave credits. when directed so to do by the judge. Abaya. petitioner. except his earned leave credits. to the appellate courts. accounts. PADILLA. that his professional fee shall be P1.000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). and municipal districts in the Philippines. Atty. except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya. a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. the Court hereby orders: 1. ENRIQUEZ. 127 providing. or receiverships. obligations. petitions. should the judgment be appealed. jurisdiction. . and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary. inventories. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. PEDRO M. 22 Generally speaking. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality. The issuance of the order in question is strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to delegate. Annex I). notes. and receivers. Signing orders in the name of. 4415-4417). the resignation of Atty. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel. On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. In Adm. cities. R-705-RTJ. reports. was passed. In Adm. for precisely as a lawyer. 2909. properties. Her SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is further decreed. representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ. for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records. On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). respondent. That would not only be contrary to law. and. 5. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of. bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces. and forthwith transmit such reports. The duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is well defined under Section 5.In the absence of the judge. and appropriating the sum of P2. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly devoid of merit. or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons. P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. municipalities. appropriations. the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel M. administrators. 28 June 1956. trustees. (Annex B). she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership. and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of tile Bar. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal charges against respondents if warranted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------JULIO D. and P500 after judgment shall have become final or.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules. 2. 24 We find Atty. but also subversive of public order and public policy. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged. On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F. HON. She could have probably released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of them. R-698-P and Adm. 23 However. On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal. municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off. finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. liabilities. machinery.As a lawyer and branch clerk of court. 1829 approving Resolution No.

As such he shall. including district health officers. 97 Phil. series of 1950. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court. Silvosa. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. on the other hand. the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. 1683.. a special attorney may be employed by its council. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality. without pronouncement as to costs. or his wife. The petitioner's contention is untenable. of the Rules of Court Annex N). 1682. Rule 45. . 542. creditor or otherwise. 1383 was valid and constitutional. . SEC. would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. 5913. In Mondano vs. 94. . this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows: . 392. submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. Gaz. . On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee.1 and when in the case involving the municipality. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment. provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. where he swore. when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. 2884. Control. the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court. the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney. 5917. 2241. on several occasions. The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. or child. but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision. as amended by Executive Order No. the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4. "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter. among others. based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L). means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province. the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. Under the foregoing provisions of law. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court. 51 Off. is pecuniarily involved as heir. he. . SEC. .. when so requested. who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case. legatee. Gaz. upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor. who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. . . The fact that the Secretary of Justice had. .4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. therefore. could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. 143. — The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice. 2888. except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. and. The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law. Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500. The Revised Administrative Code provides: SEC. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed.to the complaint (Annex J). pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The decision under review is affirmed.. 46 Off. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

000. Navarro. Complainant submitted certification and the respective orders of the Clerk of Court and presiding judges . there was no year in his practice of law that he was not commissioned as notary public. a minor born February 2. 362813 PR 9907. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. the same title was . Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. Nunga. vs. Lydia A.1âwphi1.. Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so at the time the said documents were executed. [i]n 1987 and 1997. only complainant complied with the order. and previous certification issued by the Clerk of Court of Pampanga to the effect that Respondent Atty. January 10. Complainant alleged that in May 1996. . 1987. .00) but his parents Atty. After going over the records of this case. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that date. ATTY. complainant. From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters. respondent herein [sic]. Viray. in the alleged documents he had PTR for that purpose [. Manansala to Jesus Carlo Gerard M. respondent. A few month[] thereafter. he could not annex all the needed documents to support the allegations.00) loan in . Venancio Viray had been commissioned to act as notary public for the said province on January 2. 1969 during the transaction on May 22. The Investigating Commissioner was atty. to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise. 1984. and January 8. According to Respondent. favor of Crown Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn't commissioned as notary public. The annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. After issues were joined. 1981 to December 31. JR. Her Report dated 4 August 1998 reads as follows: Victor D. but is facing criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and [for] trespass to dwelling. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines conducted an investigation. VENANCIO VIRAY. 1983 to December 31.000. . 1982.CANON 7 VICTOR NUNGA. the Undersigned noted that although both parties were required to submit their respective memorand[a].nêt The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment. president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without a commission to do so. Venancio M. DAVIDE. CJ In his complaint. and Mrs. In fact. while his father is facing a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission. in support of his contention. Venancio Viray. Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in the said transaction.000. Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn't capable to buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400.] Viray. allegedly used by Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M. . and] he would not [have obtained] a commission without the PTR. he allegedly discovered that one of the bank's assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. 1995 to December 31. These therefore negate respondent's allegation that he [has been] commissioned as notary public since 1965 to the present.00) on July 15. he was appointed by the board of directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father's resignation as its president. 1996 and had no record of any notarial reports.

Title IV. the courts. He tried to impress upon the investigating commissioner that since "1965 to date" he has always been commissioned as a notary public. 413 [1997]. to the courts and to his clients. Cabanting. 362813 PR 9907 where the special power of attorney and the annotations for the cancellation of mortgage showed inscription of the same in the notarial register of Venancio Viray on June 4. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar promulgated Resolution No. (Citing Marcelo v. too. Inasmuch as Respondent was not able to counteract the averments of Complainant which were duly supported with evidence[]. it is respectfully recommended that if Respondent is presently commissioned as notary public." By such misconduct as a notary public. In view of the foregoing. Book I. Llosa. to the bar. we said in Maligsa v. Nowhere from the records and evidence[] submitted was there any proof that Respondent was commissioned as notary public in 1987 and 1991. the same should be revoked. which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. honesty and integrity of the legal profession. dishonest. 1987 and the inscription for cancellation of mortgage on the dorsal side of TCT 362813 as June 4. in fact as of those dates 1987 and 1991 he was not commissioned as notary public. For this reason. 272 SCRA 408.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. Yet. routinary act. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1. the years the Absolute Deed of Sale was notarized by Respondent as appearing to be May 22. We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty.Complainant likewise submitted a copy of the Resolution which dismissed the cases filed against the Complainant and his father and the xerox copy of the TCT No. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 2002. he was unable to . he is. . performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws. Then. Javier. . by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not. the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code. Arrieta v. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public. It is invested with substantive public interest. 1991 [sic]. indulging in deliberate falsehood. it is apparent that Respondent violated the provisions of the notarial law by having affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when . The respondent's contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a commission for him to act as notary public. XIII-98-196 adopting the Report of the Investigating Commissioner and recommending that respondent's commission as a notary public be revoked and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. the Notarial Law. the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. immoral or deceitful conduct. for all legal intents and purposes. rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question. (Maligsa v. 252-253 [1997]). more specifically. 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. and [he should] not be granted any commission as notary public up to December 31. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. For one. and the administrative offices in general. Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter 11. We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. Revised Administrative Code). 282 SCRA 248. Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity. Elaborating on this. notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. 1991. meaningless. Cabanting (supra): A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society. On 5 November 1998.

J. the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law. but MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. a minor. 6809. the shares of stock in question. including twenty shares of the E. therefore. without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. and suspended from the practice of law for also three (3) years. Republic Act No. respondent ATTY. the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. WHEREFORE.nêt SO ORDERED. he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As modified. Juan Sumulong for respondent. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code.800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter.What aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct? Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank. pledging. which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13 December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation. "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward. These are the facts. 1921. attorney. which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year. Michael & Co. the age of majority was twenty-one years. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment. to guarantee the loan. It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar. As such guardian..1âwphi1. for full investigation of the facts involved. the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission. which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made. effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution. deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. residing at Cebu. respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar." Two questions present themselves for the resolution. Inc. However. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor. and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years. Cebu. who was then only eighteen years old and. Needless to state. without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.. On March 20. MALCOLM. if any. is revoked. To quote counsel for the respondent. taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent. 1918. Navarro. to guarantee the payment of his personal debt.: . Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years. Pelaez. he came into possession of certain property. On April 13. and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. Even In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ. or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons. and for the rendition of the appropriate order. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. he borrowed P2. to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.

If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law. his conduct. Passing now to the second point — as a general rule. Chief Justice Johnston. . 474). It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. 1901. and in all proper cases. the trust relation which exists between attorney and client. nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. (Gen. unless positively prohibited by statute.. but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties. The nature of the office. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar. The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906]. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession. 404).. for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust. is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys. and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney. 743). but as an individual. We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use. and he mortgages the same. Here it was held. . Stat. but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice . that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. . the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer. that an attorney-atlaw will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity. uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. 398. it was held that this statute is not an enabling act. In the opinion written by Mr. a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent.. the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust. through misconduct outside of his professional dealings. the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it. by a divided court. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment. that it may be exercised without any special statutory authority. It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court. and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard. it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. 73 Kan. a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence. The . it was said: It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. admits that although the general rule is. The Illinois court. which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. sec.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust. Appleton ([1883]. as well as between court and attorney. it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. without his professional advice. 398. or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial.' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment. Indeed.where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment. vs. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown. As will be observed. The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character. 105 Ill. however.. however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee.

J. Malabon. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981. (c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so. complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an AffidavitComplaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. etc. JOSE TOLOSA. ." he says. etc. and (e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. p. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. "It forms. that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent. and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35. Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982. denying the further allegations of complainant. much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former. ALFREDO CARGO. Barrio Tenejeros. RESOLUTION FELICIANO. he begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe. it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986. "the only blot upon the escutcheon." (Rollo." We feel. Metro Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address. to wit: (a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken. however. at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary. Moreover.: On 7 April 1982.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation. So ordered. By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982. vs. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complying with an order of this Court. Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations. and visited her at the hospital everyday." (The undersigned attorney. complainant. asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera. respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. we would probably incline to a more severe sentence. (d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood. and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto.bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward. 45 Sisa Street. report and recommendation. Judgment affirmed. appointed testamentary guardian. his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her). (b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981. respondent. and that were we sitting in first instance. nombrado tutor testamentario.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. 8).

she acquired household appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn. Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner: . 20. d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto.. pp. pp. June 15.. N' and 'Q'). Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St. Quezon City. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No. physical injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant. Malabon. incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). 1983. Malabon.. Galas. Tenejeros. The Solicitor General then submitted the following FINDINGS 1. Malabon. 1982. May 12. nor lived with her at No. 6. 8. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street. Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l'). g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then. May 12. to live with respondent at No. Galas. Sept. pp. 1982. at the FEU Hospital. Metro Manila. Malabon. 35-37). a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with complainant. f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 5.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital. c) That respondent only gave P35. that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother. and complainant. pp. That respondent had been courting his wife. that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant. 3. Exh. That again in Quezon City. that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment. as assistance in her medical expenses. Metro Manila from her earnings. (Rollo. p. Tenejeros. 1983. his wife left their conjugal house at No. 18-20. July 29. pp. 1983). Barrio Tenejeros. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Sept.1 Lopez Jaena St. June 21. pp.17. May 12. 1 Galas St. Metro Manila (tsn. 16.. Quezon City. an incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn. Edgardo Miclat. 1982. Domingo. that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital. 1984). In fact. Domingo Church in 1980. e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street. respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn. 1983). Quezon City (tsn. Malabon.10. 'B'. 4. Quezon City. 1983). Barrio Tenejeros. 7. That while Priscilla was staying there. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May. 2. 45 Sisa St.. 10. b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla. 1 Lopez Jaena Street. that respondent went there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). 'B-l' and 'K'). Priscilla (tsn. Metro Manila (tsn. 9). 10-11. 33-35). Tenejeros. 'M'. That sometime in June. 45 Sisa Street. 1315. pp. 1985. Malabon. 8. pp. 5-8. (Rollo.The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms: 1. Exh.

in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife. 1 Lopez Jaena St. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. 'B'. the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following: 1. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage. As officers of the court. however. the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. Barrio Tenejeros. 'G'. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. 4. that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent. 'F'. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital. the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. More specifically. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon. p. (Rollo. and they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'. a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice. (Rollo. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened. but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house. 8. 40). B-1'. 3. 37-39). left their conjugal house and lived at No. where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year.. 39-40). 45 Sisa St. thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded. because of her differences with complainant. the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant. pp. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 7. ['G-1'] and ['I']) 5. and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future. the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. 2. 9. in spite again of his differences with complainant. 6. Malabon." (Rollo. in fact. Galas. At the same time. That Priscilla. we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. ACCORDINGLY. At the same time. Quezon City. 4." which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court. pp.2. 3. Thus. their residences being one house away from each other. For this very reason. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No.. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO. . lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. in spite of his differences with complainant. In effect. Metro Manila. 5. That respondent and complainant are neighbors.

then the partnership shall be terminated even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired. assisted by her husband JOSE C. Yulo. J. on April 30. Limited. 1948. 1949. defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the palintiff Mrs.000 payable quarterly in advance within the first 15 days of each quarter. or Mrs. Tan. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall continue for an indefinite period of time. and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated as of July 31. The record discloses that on June 17." which was to exist from July 1. Punzalan. The benefits are to be divided between them at the rate of 50-50 and after December 31. 1948 to December 31.000. Yulo. YULO. YULO. extending the partnership for a period of three years beginning January 1.: Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises. Yabut. or if the owner constructs a permanent building thereon. Cruz. which plaintiff evidently accepted. dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. The principal conditions of the offer are (1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs. provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees of patrons of the theatre. (3) that Mrs. Yulo. YANG CHIAO SENG. "B"). Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. 1947. In June . Yang. the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second party. Yulo. defendant-appellee. In the Court of First Instance. In this letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. presiding. 1955. Yulo a monthly participation of P3. Augusto Francisco and Julian T. by Mrs. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff.000. Manila. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner. with the condition that if the land is expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business. On October 27. but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2). 1945 to December 31. but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. the attorney for the owners notified Mrs. LABRADOR. Yulo has not paid to . All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. vs. plaintiffsappellants. Yulo and Mr. 1949. Both parties appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals. proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. (4) that after December 31. 1945 to December 31. Mrs. Yulo. 1950. On February 9.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 8 ROSARIO U. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31. Ocampo for appellee. the two cases were afterwards heard jointly. Pursuant to the above offer. Bienvenido A. Mrs. they executed a supplementary agreement. affirmed the judgment. and judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Mrs. Hon. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 3. in case of loss. shall be limited to her capital contribution (Exh. all improvements placed by the partnership shall belong to Mrs. the parties executed a partnership agreement establishing the "Yang & Company. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. 1950. the Municipal Court of Manila rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. In view of the above notice. Yulo. Eusebio & Tiburcio for appellants. 1945. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business. and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100. Mrs. The judgment was appealed. P80. 1950. The capital is fixed at P100. The last contract was executed between the owners and Mrs. 1947. But on April 12. Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on in lobbies of theatres in operation. 1949. 1947. Yulo on April 5. 1946. 1950.000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng and P20. Rosario U. starting from July 1. Yulo and her husband. It states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and talking pictures. (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years and six months.

1949 to December. was set aside on a motion for reconsideration.000 from November. that after December 31. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100. and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the supposed existence of a partnership between them.000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1. "E"). and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property. that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the sublease of the said property.000 as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1. or any other amount. P5. The court heard evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41. Mrs. 1951 until defendant vacates the same. at which time only the plaintiff appeared. did not err in setting aside its former judgment. 1950. therefore. 1950 the partnership between Mrs. as a result of which. finding the above motion.000 for the attorney's fees. the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the theatre. that in view of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff Rosario Yulo. that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay therefor from January. denied plaintiff's claim for damages or supposed participation in the profits. he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental value of the land is only P1. Mrs. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease and not of partnership. dismissed the complaint.000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5. 1951 is P5. 1950. therefore. 1949 to October. defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of lease and not of partnership. would be granted. The first hearing was had on April 19.the lessors the rentals from August.000. 1955. 1945 until defendant vacates the property. In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of the sublease and not of partnership. therefore. The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and allowing a new trial. The court. on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. In answer to the complaint. set aside its decision and a new trial was held. It. plaintiff became the absolute owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor. The final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was in the interest of justice. well-founded. This decision. After trial the court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned in the Articles of Partnership. In said motion it is claimed that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for postponement filed by both parties. 1950. Yulo in arrears (Exh. The court. the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at the time fixed for the hearing. and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant.000. In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon. Yulo instituted this action on May 26. and P3. that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35. so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has refused to pay her share from December. he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the rentals due from Mrs. As that parties agreed to postpone the trial because of a probable amicable settlement. The lower court.100. The prayer includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10. that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil Code. . Yulo has suffered damages in the amount of P160. however. As to the other claims. the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business. 1954.000 for her participation in the business up to December. etc. This assignment of error is without merit. Yulo and Yang terminated.000. in view of a possible amicable settlement. 1949. It is against this decision that the appeal has been prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court.

Erlito R. pp. whether the earnings were correct.. The following are the requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money. her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing.). Ibid. (Last sentence. and "C. Sotto. The following statements. sixth. In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. expressly states that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the lease. Santiago. are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Were she really a partner. and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. the Solicitor General points out. it does not appear that she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business.. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. Civil Code. she did not furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. In the first place. Santiago. with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original letter of defendant of June 17. which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises which she had leased from the owners. Exh. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum. petitioners.000 a month.. Graciano Regala and Associates. three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14). MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty.000 as representing her share or participation in the business from December. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease. dated April 13. Graciano C. to the effect that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts. and Morton F. not a partnership.. Exhs. But the original letter of the defendant. and Jose Beltran Sotto.. including the Executive Secretary) have made these false. Uy. The herein petitioners . "A".The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International. Clearly.. the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. par. the partnership agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3. respondents. 16. 10. all that she did was to receive her share of P3.000 capital. between plaintiff and defendant. which shows that both parties considered this offer as the real contract between them. plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20. property. RESOLUTION SANCHEZ. 1968. 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC. On November 21. 13-14. . In the second place.. b. 1945 (Exh. "A"). c. 1968). 1968.: After the July 31.. ET AL. Regala and Associates. this Court issued a show-cause order. p. and Jose B. contain the following statements: d. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. Caling. We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it in toto. Juanito M. so the Solicitor General avers. 1968.. are one of lease and not of partnership. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July. p. HON. "A". Graciano Regala. vs. on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. 1767. members of the Bar. seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page). (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. etc. . or industry to a common fund. 1. Jose Beltran Sotto: a. Plaintiff claims the sum of P41.17. . Jose Beltran Sotto. ET AL. She was absolutely silent with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done. (Art. last two lines on bottom of the page). In the third place. Erlito R.000 automatically ceased as of said date. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief. opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD. Meads. Uy. Uy. They (petitioners. "B". whether the expenses were legitimate. 1949. Erlito R. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27. Vicente L. with costs against plaintiff-appellant. 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co. Santiago. J.

it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering.e. and it is thus difficult.. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision. asked Mr. even under many of the incumbent justices. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct. On November 21. and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason. (Second sentence. not for no reason at all. Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. (b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates. in the light of our upbringing and schooling. Atty.. Unfortunately for our people. Vicente L. which law has not been declared unconstitutional. par. his client would be deprived of due process of law. (c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature. judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11. (g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions. (h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. 1967. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion. As to the Chief Justice. again for himself and Attys. could be defended. 7. brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners. that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. and that no matter what the circumstances are. 10. 1968. in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context. the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31. the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31. 1968 was rendered in this case. It enumerates "incidents" which. 1968 decision. Erlito R. democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public. (i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the trial court. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts." The "incidents" cited are as follows: (a) said decision is in violation of the law. a government agency or just plain fraud .." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics. Erlito R. The motion to inhibit filed on September 21. paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case. which in full reads: 6. Never has any civilized. and Graciano Regala and Associates. Santiago. Uy. (e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it. . and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral? . Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. or were comments legitimate and justifiable. 1968). (d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party. according to the motion.. 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L. Atty. which is elementary. erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31. However. counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7.

and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1. Justice Castro inhibit themselves. Erlito R. it must be stated that as early as October 7. 1969. Rule 138. Jose Beltran Sotto. in addition. 1968 that Atty. On the part of Atty. that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer. 1969. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of November 21. Meads. and contained the following paragraphs: 4. taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31. A second contempt proceeding arose when." We now come to Atty. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. 1969. he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. Regala. He made the admission. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29. that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f). 1967. additional arguments were filed by Atty.. on July 14. either its executive or judicial branches or both. Atty. 1968. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. offered to retain his services.. that on July 14. though. one Morton F. Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement. Graciano C. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness". and we quote: "Justices. it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12. he denied participation in any of the court papers subject of our November 21. as further clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo. that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case. required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits. in MacArthur's behalf. xxx xxx xxx 6. "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience. who may take part. 1968. 1968. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government. Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised. registered an amended motion to inhibit. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose. — . that in view of the rejection. 1968. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from July 1. 1968. In his explanation of December 2. he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence. 1968. Juanito M. on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine . 1968.And. he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. In brief.. He there averred that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10. lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. . to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government. He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. It was on December 2. 1968 to December 31. through new counsel. as required by law. On February 4. that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case. 1968. According to him. 1968 order. 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072). even while he was on leave of absence. had been violated. Vicente L. 1969. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. On December 5. he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates. On January 8. Atty. 1969. On March 1. Uy explained his side of the case. it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit. Jose Beltran Sotto. he took pains to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. as counsel for MacArthur. which was accepted. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. Atty. 1965.. respondent MacArthur. Vicente L." In Atty. Rule 51. Santiago.

Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they. not Santiago. that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife. to file the same. Atty. Atty. Santiago gave his explanation. a short time before the decision of July 31. On August 27. that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case." In this backdrop. Caling gave his go-signal. he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself. according to Santiago. Caling filed his return. Juanita M. He speaks of this Court as a "civilized. In his third motion for reconsideration. Vicente L." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza. Juanito M. Santiago came to his office and requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion. 1969. Santiago and Morton Meads. and . which could make their actuation suspect. Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer. 1969. erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. he went to Atty. Santiago. The truth. on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court. Vicente L. Atty. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually. Caling. Atty. that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Vicente L.m." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt incidents seriatim. on or before August 16. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. including the sugar price premium." On July 30. on August 4.. Vicente L. warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country. at 9:30 a. this Court heard Attys. 1969. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Vicente L. resolved "to require Atty. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. 1969. The motion was then filed. from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed. "although the process has already begun. He explained that.. only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration. until restitution or compensation is made. he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling. and Morton Meads. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro." It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful." On August 13. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.. In defending himself from the contempt charge. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14. 1969. and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. 1969. We start with the case of Atty. personally appear Before this Court on Thursday. that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case. Morton Meads answered. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision. Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. In his motion to inhibit. to direct that the three. August 27. he . 1969. Vicente L. 1968 as "false. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. Caling. Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely accurate. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes. requiring Atty. In fact. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. According to Meads. This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18. Santiago left. this Court. 1969. told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President. Santiago. whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. Meads". but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. While Caling was reading the document. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. 1969. He disavowed the truth of Atty. indeed. his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court. 1. After reading the motion. we. find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Vicente L. much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion. his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31. On August 15. Atty.Government. and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. Caling. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Juanita M. 1968 was rendered. should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same. democratic tribunal".

counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust. oath-bound servants of society. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice. lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney. to this. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. For. as many suppose. the teachings. inhibition is also asked of. Justice Castro.' " A lawyer is an officer of the courts. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. their clients' success is wholly subordinate.' That same canon. For one thing. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. as a corollary. be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. this Court finds in the language of Atty. 20 SCRA 441. or their agents or principals. should also inhibit themselves. "like the court itself. Jose Beltran Sotto. 2."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of justice. The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. We next take the case of Atty. Mr.."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. and no other. He describes a . but to the administration of justice. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them."7 The precepts. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. judges may grossly err in their decisions. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. it erects no shield. as follows: "By now. Ferrer (1967).deleted this paragraph in his rough draft. What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. Atty. there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. their first duty is not to their clients. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. 444. in categorical terms." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any boardpetitioner. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6." After citing acts of two judges of first instance. it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. a judge from the very nature of his position."4 It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. We would in fact. their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.6 From this. makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor. a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. And yet.' And more. the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Nevertheless. and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity . we repeat. including the President". and that no matter what the circumstances are. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise. who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position. ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur. Counsel is presumed to know this. Decidedly not an expression of faith. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence. to the courts. spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. Really. including the president. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. of disbelief."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court. Section 20(b). For. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. he is. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court."5 As rightly observed by Mr.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.

whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. 3. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. He is exonerated. inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control. The fourth motion for reconsideration is.proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face". who may take part.. It lifted Section 1. Once in a small nipa shack.. where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer. accordingly. .. Justices. Erlito R. He is."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. 1965 . indeed. hold that Atty. the provision in its entire thought should be read thus — SECTION 1. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... Rule 51. amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually . More specifically. 5. protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed. including the sugar price premium. it offends the court before which it is made. 12 Atty. — All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication. 1968. and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it. raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12." However. guilty of contempt." 10 Not far from the case of Atty. improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved. Now. however. who was admitted to the Bar in 1966. in furtherance of justice. Uy. now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth. under Section 3 (a). unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.. the conduct of its ministerial officers. here comes a chance for him. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices. Young. only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. Caling. that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. In doing so. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. 4. for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties. 702." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. No explanation has been made why this has been done. A simple job.. however. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States government. 83 Phil. therefore. in every manner appertaining thereto. It was filed without express leave of court. under Section 3 (d) of the same rule. to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government. Rules of Court. Meads. Graciano C. He should be held exempt from contempt. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness. express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. if the parties or either of them. Santiago to have included the name of the firm of Atty. out of context. who may take part. Such language is not arguably protected. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty.. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. For." 11 We. Sotto is People vs. and that he too has committed. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. did not attempt to explain this point... — . an act of contumacy. unnecessary statements were injected. Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31. 708. Third. Second. the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ." . and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote. First. it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant. Regala. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted. It was improper for Atty." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.

It would seem apropos to say again that. still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character. witnesses and suitors. For. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys Vicente L. too. experience teaches. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. Atty. Vicente L. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. So ordered. No appearance for the respondent. Caling. jurors. Atty. Meads who is an alien. who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Santiago in the sum of P1. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case. Vicente L." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond. Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable. 8. that according to Meads himself. this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. on July 14. Regala and Associates and Atty. we prefer to think. To preserve its dignity. One last word. Caling. Juanito M." The dignity of the Court. Meads and Atty. Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. P100. he would not have signed the motion. 1968. . 9. On the second contempt charge. Morton F. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Such act has no aboveboard explanation. the Solicitor General. Caling guilty of contempt of court. He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion. he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. "[a]dmittedly. It should be emphasized.This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. attorney-at-law. For the reasons given.000. he spent. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago. for such action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. the Secretary of Justice. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. And yet. He has control of the proceedings. can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. Graciano C. Punctilio of honor. judicial officers. On the first contempt charge. too. As for Morton F. 6.000. Vicente L. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In re FELICIANO GOMEZ. As we held in our decision of July 31. Vicente L. Erlito R. and fines Atty. this Court hereby finds: 1. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. Juanita M. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time. Atty.000. Santiago. And We repeat. Santiago. P1. Santiago and Atty. Santiago. for whatever action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Santiago. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court. this Court had really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. Caling. He is guilty of contempt. if only for one reason. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.. quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. Meads. the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed. Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. contrary to the instructions to bidders. and Atty. and 2. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Sotto. a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. even if the Chief Justice and Mr. and Atty. Santiago. On the other hand. is not entitled to any consideration. We go back to Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Uy not guilty of contempt of court. 7. 1969. is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond. Indeed. and fines Atty. an additional P1. P200. We must not forget. and holds Attys. Vicente L. Meads. Morton F. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. Furthermore. it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case.

first in the Court of First Instance.L. 1). 1968. (Patterson vs. The position of the members of this court in considering the facts laid before them. widow of the deceased Norberto Tongoy.:1äwphï1. No. Although the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed. the Laguna election case was taken up point by point and decided by principles. et seq. under the circumstances. Gomez. Negros Occidental. We feel also. Zulueta. The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is. because Governor-General Wood. In reality. we should not. Gomez was proclaimed elected. and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. 512. and later in the Supreme Court. because although contempts are impersonal in nature. Gomez is charged with having said.: The Attorney-General has filed an information. in Criminal Case No. Cailles contested the election successfully. and there. where the liberty of the press and freedom of public comment ends. the complaint was given due course.)lävvphì1·né+ We conclude. with affidavits. and Eva Mabug-at. when a case is finished. BRANCH I. 6 R.ñët In a verified complaint filed on October 15. As some one has well said. for the position of provincial governor of Laguna. without further action. JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion. In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22. in effect. . had offered them a banquet. close scrutiny of the case. did not relate to a pending cause. that while the Attorney-General is to be commended for his zealous interest in the maintenance of the Judiciary. The judgment of the higher tribunal was rendered on December 9. Laguna. Accordingly. It appears that Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in 1919. is an extremely embarrassing one. 1968. that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment. an unsuccessful litigant and an attorney. On January 19. on January 25. an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from notice thereof. with reference to the conduct of Feliciano Gomez. it should be recalled." for Robbery in Band with Homicide. 1921.. CLIMACO. Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. et al. and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. the case was referred on December 17. RAFAEL C. 1968 and his decision acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on September 21.C. and are substantiated by four affidavits. gross ignorance of the law. like other persons. We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. pp. RESOLUTION ANTONIO. 690. in which it is alleged that Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court. at a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban. that courts. 1921.. out of friendship for Cailles. and on his obligations as an officer of the court "to maintain towards it a respectful attitude. When Attorney Feliciano Gomez comes to reflect on his conduct. therefore. the papers shall be attached to the personal record of Attorney Feliciano Gomez. respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in office. J.1 and became final on December 24. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ IN RE: THE HON. So ordered. are relegated to the courts for redress. he will realize the impropriety of his action. are subject to the same criticism as other people. had invited the members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision. permit the law-officer to go forward with the instant proceedings. following a secret conference.MALCOLM. SILAY CITY. and after the filing of respondent's answer. 205 U. a newspaper of the city of Manila. of Cadiz. however. and respondent was required to file. 1968 by Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. there tyrrany begins. not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance" (Code of Ethics.at-law . entitled "People the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor. Colorado [1907]. we have come to the conclusion that he matter should not be dignified by further proceedings. 454. J. and after a realization that to punish for contempt of court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. After. that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles. 1922. judges. the charges have personal aspects.. in this court. because of chagrin at losing cases. The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of respondent dated September 5. 1922. so that when finished there was not a member of the court who knew what the outcome would be until the vote was tabulated in the decision. The charges of Mr.S.

<äre||anº•1àw> The case was assigned to Branch I. and made the observation that "While the validity of the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt. Nicasio Yatco. now an Associate Justice of this Court. through Justice Fernando. this Court. after conducting the requisite investigation thereon. submitted his comment on November 28. Cristeta Jimenez. No.1968 to the Hon. the aforementioned complaint against respondent was instituted as aforestated. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. In his Report. filed a charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against thirteen (13) persons as principals. L-29599). in the following manner: (a) Before arraignment: — Jorge Canonoyo (b) After arraignment: — Agustin Cañete Rosendo Cañete Arsenio Luyao Elias Giducos Pedro Layon Antonio Placencia (c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the information and utilized as state witness. complainants bewail as gross malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law. Subsequently. 690. Solicitor General Antonio P. dated September 5. Silay City. After the case was submitted for decision. which reads as follows: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. Paulino Quijano. Zulueta. Barredo. On April 11. 1968 to the effect that prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal in view of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 1968. Thereafter. respondent promulgated his decision in the case acquitting Carlos Caramonte. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE . on September 21. or more particularly. the unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of acquittal was not premised solely on the results of said ocular inspection. Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed aforementioned decision to this Court. and Rene Fernandez before the Amended Information of April 26. the investigator submitted his Report recommending the exoneration of respondent. were dropped. including Isabelo Montemayor. seven (7) persons as accomplices.. and two (2) persons as accessories. Julio Elmo. Constancio Pangahin. the following behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case: I. A cursory perusal of the decision will at once show that said acquittal was predicated on other well-considered facts and circumstances so thoroughly discussed by the lower court in its decision and the least of those was its observation arising from the ocular inspection. Primitivo Mata. 1968. and (d) Accused Honorato de Sales. that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. 1968. promulgated its Resolution dismissing the appeal (G. remained at large).R. Negros Occidental. respondent issued an order. SO ORDERED. On January 30. It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. 1968. 1969. the investigator stated: Under the first indictment. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime. with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. on October 15. of Cadiz. only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged principals. presided over by the respondent. as erroneously contended by prosecutor. 1968. for investigation and report. the case with respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution or with its conformity. In the meantime. and when required to comment on said appeal. in Criminal Case No. while of the persons charged as accomplices and accessories.

had to acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of the municipality of Bantayan. the decision of the respondent Judge shows that in rendering judgment of acquittal in the case before him. to wit: The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry during industry operating in the Visayas. 11 August 1968. away from Bacolod City. as any student of law would tell you. In any event. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. 1968. he visited the places which he thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00 o'clock of the dark night of December 31. A painstaking scrutiny of the records as well as the evidence presented by the parties does not show any concrete proof that respondent Judge did conduct a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by the complainants. issued a reckless. may have a strong motive. from the order of September 5. 1968. Because of that undeniably biased ocular inspection. and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and wellpopulated. less in the presence of the prosecution and concluded that such alleged secret ocular inspection was the basis of the Order of September 5. a psychologist or a psychiatrist would explain that the Order of September 5th is that of an anguished mind. Why respondent Honorable Judge went out of his way to gather those immaterial and "fabricated" evidence in favor of the accused is shocking to the conscience. an Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to violate his oath of office. by a judge who. without anybody to guide him. and that the neighborhood is welllighted and well-populated. 1968. 690 for "Robbery in Band with Homicide" was closed and submitted for Decision on July 1. Without anybody to guide him. province of Cebu. Criminal Case No. respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. C and the damaging inferences derived from his staying from the ceremony when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan were inducted into office. Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent Judge took judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an ocular inspection he conducted on the date alleged by the complainants. there is likewise nothing in the record to support the charge of the complainants that the order of September 5. that the said compound is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. 1968. SO ORDERED. the lone witness presented by the complainants in this case did not even make an insinuation supporting such serious allegation of said complainants. because of the failure of anyone — the adults and the . who is reputed to be brilliant. extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September 1968. 1967. A murderer. In fact. — which Order. the security guards. is null and void. due to political pressure and against his will and better judgment. Why did respondent judge show his hand unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps. About one and a half (1-½) months thereafter. and illegal per se. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in the alleged crime. the respondent Judge took judicial notice "that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. August 11. In fact. however. or at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday. But what of a judge who knowingly commits a "revolting injustice" or through gross ignorance of the law? It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the complaint that complainants bemoaned the fact that the respondent Judge conducted a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Sunday. was made by the respondent Judge as the sole basis for the acquittal of Carlos Caramonte. The fact is. there is doubt in the mind of the Court as to his actual participation in then bold raid in Cadiz City on December 31. said respondent entertained serious doubts as to the guilt of Caramonte because of the failure of anyone — in the Chua and in the Uy households. To say the least. Like an amateur murderer respondent judge left telltale clues all around.and GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW After both parties submitted their respective Memorandum attached herewith as Annexes "C" and "D". the honorable trial judge. the decision pertinently reads: Is Caramonte guilty? In spite of the admission of Caramonte's Exh. 1968. 1967. it is gross ignorance of the law. Thus. the capital of the province.

Thereafter. . A — No. who then ransacked the two houses for about an hour. 1967. Q — What did the robbers do in your house? A — They ransacked my house.children in the Chua and in the Uy households. sir. came up my house and broke into my house. A — I was in my house. some of them were taken to the seashore to prevent the police from firing on the retreating robbers: Mateo Chua said at the trial: Q — At that time were not your family inside your house? A — Yes. Your Honor. did the robbers who came up your house leave? Court — This witness did not identify any of the accused? Fiscal — No. sir. Q — How many floors has your house? A — Two floors. xxx xxx xxx Q — Do you remember anything unusual that happened that evening in your house? A — Yes. On her part. sir. my children and my wife. Q — Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened that evening in your house? A — The robbers broke into our house. A — I don't know because I was lying flat on the floor. Mrs. Q — What was the first thing you noticed when the pirates as you said arrived? A — I was about to sleep when they came up. where were you? A — Almost one hour. Q — What did the robbers do with your wife and children? A — Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the floor face down. Q — After nearly one hour. the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to say on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one of the robbers. 31. Q — Please tell the Court what happened? Q — How did they come out. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the witness stand that: xxx xxx xxx Q — What did the robbers do when they came up your house? A — They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor face down. three of them went straight up my house. you cannot tell? A — Several men. Q — Who untied you that evening? A — My son untied me after the men left. The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand. They and the other members of the household were tied up by the robbers. Q — How many minutes did the armed robbers stay pin your house? Q — At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. Q — About what time did you notice those pirates forced themselves inside your residence? A — Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening. I cannot tell what did they do to my wife and children. pirates. the security guards.

according to Patrolman Armando Maravilla. Q — What did you do after hearing that? A — My companion Antonio Placencia called me because he was the one who had talked to those persons. Q — What did you do after that? xxx xxx xxx Q — After the four or five persons fired their shots inside your house. "If anything happen don't resist because my children might be hit. Q — What did you do after that? A — Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use the telephone and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the other side so we went to him and told him that there were armed men in the seashore and Antonio Uy told us. how many robbers broke into your house that evening of Dec. Two security guards employed by Uy (Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged families thru the raid.Q — More or less. Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony: Q — At about 10:00 o'clock of that same evening of December 31. A — At about that time we heard a voice of a man and woman and they asked us where we were guarding. we asked him where our companion security guard was. Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers? The police battled with the raiders from a distance of about 60 meters. So Antonio Placencia told me to call the Police Department and tell them that there are armed men in the seashore. 1967. what happened? A — Then we were told not to go to the seashore because there were armed men. Q — What was that which happened? xxx xxx xxx Q — So what did you do after that? A — Because there was a policeman there. because I was frightened. what did they do? A — We were downstairs when they broke into our house. do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened? A — Yes. Q — What did you answer? A — At that time we were on duty at the gate of the house of Mateo Chua and then we heard the voice of a man and a woman. using the axe at the door and then after entering the first floor they went up. 31. 1967? A — About four or five. A — My companion also suggested that we better call the Police Department by telephone because that was already 10:50 in the evening. I did not have a chance to look at them. Q — Were they armed? A — Yes. sir. sir. Q — And what was his answer? ." The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. Q — Were you able to call the Police Department by telephone? A — We went to the house of Erning Tan because there is a telephone there connected with the Police Department and the stand is also at the window overlooking the Caltex Station. xxx xxx xxx Q — Can you identify any of the robbers that came up your house from among the accused in courtroom? A — I cannot. Q — After you heard those voices of a man and a woman. He told me not to go to the seashore because there were armed men there.

Uy went down and returned to his own house. Q — What did Mr. they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as far as they know. "If they want to get something. have been said to be governed by the rules of law applicable to penal cases. Q — Where did you go? xxx xxx xxx A — To his house and I called the rest of the guards. under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative Code. 12-16). Q — When Mr. in all likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics. in spite of the biting language of the complainants in their complaint and in their memorandum. — which indicates that many people in the compound must or could have seen some or all of the robbers — and no one could say that Caramonte was one of them. For serious misconduct to exist. Q — What did you hear? A — We heard several shots. Be that as it may. the failure of anyone — members of the Chua and Uy households. pp. and in this venture. 43 Phil. the charges must. the mother of Antonio Uy came to him and informed Mr. the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. Uy that his wife was brought along by the armed men. there has been an insinuation that "respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted. A — I followed him. 1968 (Exh. we heard something. province of Cebu. there has been no proof that in issuing the order of September 5. therefore. be proved beyond reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno. obviously in bad faith. He said." Q — And then you obeyed his order? You came up. and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall. Q — When you went down. sir." Inasmuch as proceedings against judges as the case at bar. Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood. it is xxx xxx xxx Q — What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news? A — Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. "Why are you walking there? Come up. the neighbors — to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to his participation therein. sir. Q — Did you notice anything while you were hiding there? A — Yes. or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Of course. just allow them to get it. Under the circumstances. supra). sir. He said. Uy do because you were there. In the case at bar. where did you go? A — After the shooting stopped. the security guards and other employees of the fishing business. xxx xxx xxx Q — After the shots lasted. and it is incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable doubt.A — The policeman informed us that he did not report for duty and that it was Guarino who reported for duty that evening. the police. Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan. Antonio Uy saw me so he reprimanded me. A — He went down and returned to his own house. A — Yes. The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large fishing industry. and in rendering a judgment of acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law or to disregard well-known legal rules. In fact. 212). A — Yes. what happened? Q — Were you able to reach his house? A — When I went down. B)." Q — What happened after that? A — Because we were there with him. (In re Impeachment of Hon. we went to office to hide. Antonio Horrilleno. what did you do? . (Decision.

"Es tan preciso. 690. that this attitude of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. partial. of a high character. testified — Atty. the complainants herein lean on the argument that — Fiscal Zulueta — Because if I do that. did you make any comment to Fiscal Zulueta? A — No. 123) and to this may be added without regard to any personal conviction or presumption of what the Judge may do or is disposed to do.) The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion). that being that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law and that no innocent man be punished (Malcolm. the very witness of the complainants affirmed the correctness of the matters taken judicial notice of by the respondent Judge. you mean the "Uy-Chua Compound"? Q — I mean the statements in the order are true? A — Yes." Of course. the prosecution in the said case did not take any steps — from September 13 to September 21. t.s. sir. Aquino — Q — When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13.believed they failed. 1968. con malicia. 1968. sir. Fortunately. p. after reading that order. esto es. 29. There is. Whether in taking judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5. therefore. it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta. But as the records show. it appears from the record that the Office of the City Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September 5.n. Since this is an administrative case against him the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the issuance of such order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was arbitrary. p. lone witness for the complainants. It may be pertinent to state at this juncture. (pp. this is not the proper forum to dwell on the matter. or a span of eight — to protect the interests of the State against what complainants herein term to be an "illegality. it is believed. the undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along that line. con voluntad reflexiva. 1968 showed you that order of Judge Climaco wherein he stated that he was taking judicial notice that Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas. Q — But the statements here in the order are true? A — Yes. it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence. a paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted partially. xxx xxx xxx In issuing the order of Sept. As heretofore stated. "que la falta se cometa a sabiendas. Legal and Judicial Ethics." commented Viada. or maliciously. corrupt. Agustin Javier. Thus. without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused (Malcolm. Mr. in Criminal Case No.n. 690 does appear to be commendable. t. and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. which contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly. Furthermore. Your Honor. que en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que . and to perform their duties impartially and with but one object in view. respondent Judge erred or not. A prosecutor should lay the court fairly and fully every fact and circumstance known to him to exist. respondent Judge as stated in his answer. indeed. If it were true as alleged by the complainants that the issuance of such order was and that the matters taken judicial notice of therein were wrong. if there were any.s. as the prosecutor of the case. 1968. or arbitrarily or oppressively. 64-65. 124). 5. or oppressive. personal conviction should be ignored lest it may lead to a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved. In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. that said compound is only a five hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in Cadiz and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. 1968 on September 13.). Prosecuting officer presumed to be men learned in the law. respondent Judge would realize his mistake which we believe malicious (p. In the pursuit of that solemn obligation. to seek for the reconsideration of such order and at the same time to invite the attention of the court to the alleged errors. or corruptly.

We cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. when required to exercise his judgment or discretion. he is. From a review of the record. MARIO TATLONGHARI." (Malcolm. is not liable criminally. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. la preocupacion o el error. SANTO MARILAG and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. p.por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por ignorancia. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the aforestated charges.).L." (People ex rel. and there is nothing on the basis thereof which would in any manner justify their inclusion in the pleadings. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. and in a very clear and indisputable manner.. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES. Zulueta. Carillo. 5 We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated in an earlier case: 6 A lawyer is an officer of the courts. with a warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe sanction. p. for any error he commits. WHEREFORE. such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. 572. that is to say. according to Groizard. that although he has acted without malice. 77 Phil. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity. in the notorious violation of the legal precept. cit. Rule 138. 1949 ed. of Cadiz City. Legal and Judicial Ethics. he failed to observe in the performance of his duty. For. 60 A.). 855. it must be shown. the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his complaint and memorandum. even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[as] an officer of the court. is. 160. As noted in the aforecited report.)." 1 To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. We find that the decision respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. 82 Phil. in the contrary it results. . it is his own and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. 602." (In re Sotto. prudence and care required by law. much less could it be held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence. censured for his use of offensive and abusive language in the complaint and other pleadings filed with this Court. "like the court itself. nevertheless. 580. MACKAY petitioners. ZOILO R. It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. INC and GORDON W.. FERRER. Rules of Court. Esta es la prevaricacion verdadera. 595.R. op. 4 It is also well-settled that a judicial officer. provided he acts in good faith.. 851. 2 Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.). "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. respondents. to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Culkin. . unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." (5 Martin. con la que solo inspira la enemistad.). (People vs." (Section 20 (f). 97.). el odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y corrompida. We have analyzed the facts. logically and reasonably. that diligence.. prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. vs. 3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice. Karlin vs.

[Paflu et al. vs.. Hence. therefore. Gaz. et al. that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. Tan. May 25. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.2 2. thus — We may. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay. 10. or under the Minimum Wage Law. Bautista. the principal respondents were dismissed from their employment. Republic Act 875]'. J. et al. vs. In default of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. We believe petitioner to be in error. Consequently. 3. Here. and (b) the controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest. L-12075. beyond which it is not permitted to act. the case. 1. On the claim for might differentials. Montecillo. or must have a nearing on an unfair labor practice charge. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: '. Manila Railroad Co. et al. May 29. 52 Off. (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602). et al. where this Court. Siguion Reyna. Reinstatement with back wages. Mariano B. the CIR has jurisdiction. 2. But they seek reinstatement. 5(a). and 5. Valmonte for respondents. L-17905. 1962. on the ground of unjustified dismissal. 5836]. 1959] where we held: . guaranteed a workman. And. and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice [Sec. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays.. No. by explicit articulation in Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. To be read as controlling here is Philippine Engineers' Syndicate. no extended discussion is necessary. for the benefit of the bench and the bar. Right to such pay is.. 13. declared — Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 875 the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work.R. the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship. which accumulated since their illegal separation. Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case [National Rice & Corn Corp. failure to give additional compensation for such work is a violation of the said law. (1) when the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec.Ponce Enrile. is within the coverage of the prevailing rule enunciated in Campos. The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIR's denial of petitioners' motion to dismiss — grounded on want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter — the principal respondents' complaint and said court's refusal to reconsider the order of denial. Hon. 875. NARIC Workers' Union.. February 29. Republic Act 875).. and that respondent court's authority to try the case cannot be implied from its "general jurisdiction and broad powers" under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations. Jose S. Belo & Armonio for petitioners. Petitioner insists that respondents' case falls in none of these categories because as held in two previous cases. 4. Inc. or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law. 1964. et al. (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act 444). (NARIC) vs.: Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as CIR] to hear and determine a case1 seeking — 1.. G. night work is not overtime but regular work. restate. SANCHEZ.. Night differential pay. or the claimant must seek his reinstatement. No. vs. L-16440. Jose T. on this score. speaking thru Mr. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays.

Just recently. ibid. it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime work. or in connection with.. and in a series of cases thereafter. la de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia. 19601 or for payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work [Nassco vs. to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court to decide. vs. Naric Workers' Union. National Labor Union. and payment of salary increases and separation pay. [Luis Recato Dy. No. a nuestro juicio. cultural and sociological reasons. esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo. 81 Phil. but We find no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature — for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. G. citing Shell Co. Since employer-employee relationship is sought to be re-established. Felipe Guevara. G. G.. reinstatement. and back wages and damages incident thereto. 1962]. vs. May 31. et al. 1959. employment". es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro.R. L13806.R. G. at 325-326]. 315]. G. True. L-12075. Almin et al. [Naric vs. are matters which arose out of the same employment. we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for night differentials are within the compass of the CIR's jurisdiction. and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty. L-9055. et al. April 29. 1959. moral. May 25. November 28. We held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes via the collective bargaining process. would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor. we hold that the CIR is with authority to act on this grievance.3 Earlier.. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law). Again. Withal. In fact. and back wages and the damages incident thereto. L-8738. No.' [ Shell Co.R.R. and so it justified the additional compensation in the Shell case for 'hygienic.. G. Tan. 103. 1958. vs.. 1957] but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done at daytime.. medical.'While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned case. May 23. this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) vs. We had occasion to remark that :4 "[t]o draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. May 29. No. CIR. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. se debe determinar es si entre las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa. No. No. the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. et al. City Automotive Co.' Apropos the issue of jurisdiction. et al. Detective & Protective Bureau. no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche. in Paflu et al. he should also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. Prisco vs. supra. .R. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work.. namely. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. Besides. et al. la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos..R. the record does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65 respondents and the petitioner had ceased. And this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work. this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this fashion: 'La cuestion que. el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia. After the passage of Republic Act 875. CIR. Si este tribunal tiene en casos de disputa. et al.. and payment of salary increases and separation pay — out of the CIR's jurisdiction and place them in the hands of ordinary courts. contra National Labor Union. the company contended that there was no law that required the payment of additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. Inc. No. L-11655.. To force . y consiguientemente. The other demands. It is because of this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said demands — for reinstatement. L-17788. the Industrial Court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of. vs. 3.

ordered complainant Laput "to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court. that on February 21. aside from . Casiano U. Respondent also denied that he was the author of the first motion complained of. the CASIANO U. Laput to produce them. filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said special proceedings. Indeed. In a motion dated September 16. 1956 and on September 16. it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of action here 'be cognizable and heard by only one court: the Court of Industrial Relations. Case No. 1958. bank books. additional expense incurred — these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. without notice. the Court of First Instance of Cebu. petitioner. . 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The Solicitor General. on October 17. Nieves Rillas Vda. he went over the records Special Proceedings No. the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of title. on December 3. Barrera. for the reason that she could not locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action. 1957. FRANCISCO E. Laput". that as early as November 18. to whom this Court referred this case for investigation. LAPUT. and assets.' "5 Upon the view We take of this case. and that with the duplicate titles. praying that he be issued owner's duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost.ñet Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of records and transfer certificates of title. or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots. and yet Atty. bad faith. 1957. he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration. Laput was not served copy of this pleading. 1957. and that if he (respondent)had known that the transfer certificates of title in question were in the possession of complainant he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. report and recommendation found that since January 11. complainant herein (Atty. respondent asked the court to order Atty. without notice to complainant. de Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby. filed a "Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner's copy". Laput did not comply with request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her case. 1959. filed with the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid certificates of title. Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading "to turn over a the records. were prejudicial to complainant's recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question. Laput "to surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the estate and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . vs. effort wasted. on October 8. other pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him. in spite of the written opposition of complainant. another motion. respondent and his client Mrs. ATTY. if any. J. to the undersigned administration pending my appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration" and that although Atty. Costs against petitioner. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- being unfair and unethical. the respondent. among which are transfer certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province. when the widow. within ten days from notice. 1958. that the court finally approved the sales made. 1958. respondent.". the administratrix sought authority from the court to sell real property of the estate in order to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate. Mrs. 219 — filed with this Court charging the respondent with malice. REMOTIGUE. . So ordered. LABRADOR.lâwphi1. F. all to the prejudice of said complainant. he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time. that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to turn over to them the certificates of title. filed the pleading entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. all of which.: This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. anxiety augmented. Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien" entered into the records of Special Proceedings No. and on December 3. 1955. the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed. and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed committing unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. the true facts being that the administratrix. By virtue of this motion. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. The time to be lost.

Tiburcio. that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case. and of the documents belonging to the estate in his possession. ELPIDIO TIBURCIO. Mencias. Atty. he (Atty.767.561. a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19. motions. J. thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27. is approved. Parenthetically. Laput shows that respondent's answers correct. PHHC and U. the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent's complete exoneration should be." The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings. the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice.66. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines.699. It was on the same date.33 hectares of land would find no justification if Atty. 1954. The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix." (L-30546). He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the respondents Tiburcio. Clemente M. 1969. by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143. that the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed..: By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10. if not altogether bizzare behavior. while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or bad faith. 1955. Atty. Antonio J. the amount of P4. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput. RESOLUTION . Laput) believed that he had still the right to retain the certificates of title in question.15. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CASTRO. Cebu Branch. Hon.P. CLEMENTE M. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969. as it hereby. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance. ET AL. was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix. later on increased to P5. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented. which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. SORIANO IN L-24114. His subsequent explanation did not. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations. HON. et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Herminio C. et al. And so Atty. Wittingly or unwittingly.699. to wit: this terminated case (L-24114). it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143. vs. Mariano. his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26. therefore.1awphîl. however. EULOGIO MENCIAS. as early as December 19. 1969. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives.329. Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Hence. October 8.nèt An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. 1969. et al. entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. 1955. Soriano.48 out of total of P31.passbook of the estate's deposit in the Philippine National Bank. and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault. and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5. and order of the Court. and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. At their conference. complainant stubbornly kept to himself the transfer certificates of title in question. as early as December 27. the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio. etc.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case. serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. et al. for in this latter case. MARCELINO TIBURCIO. vs. an area of only about 19 hectares is IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. went to him to engage his professional services in two cases. 1969. in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents.66 by the estate.

Atty. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation. Doria. Rizal Avenue. We find Atty. in the present case. something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. of the premier control over the case. Soriano is hereby ordered. as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause. Soriano has joined one Atty. Atty. besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment. Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents. generating as it does in the minds of the litigants. he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram. at the very least. therefore. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction. that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer. Diaz to no avail. Soriano should have done. he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. Clemente M. were it not for his candor. 2 Atty. is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. And if this cannot be had. Furthermore. however. who was counsel of record in that case even prior to October 10. we find Atty. in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CANON 9 . Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar. certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. 1969. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel. as well as of the public. if it were true. Doria as counsel for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. If this office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila. we are far from being convinced that he really did so. then that circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case.involved. as claimed by Atty. give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious finger into the vortex of the case. which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Doria. then he should. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. Atty. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession. Nemesio Diaz. a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. What Atty. It is the sense of this Court. at the hearing of this incident. The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment. to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. Soriano on file in the Bar Division of this Court. 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case. Clemente M. Further still. Soriano at the hearing of this incident. Bonifacio T. in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession. at the hearing of this incident. Clearly. 3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. In the incident before us. was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court. categorically denied having given. especially the Varsity Hills case. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice. we note that Atty. Atty. when Atty. an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. Had he been less precipitate in his actions. Dalangpan. Manila). et al. that he must be as he is hereby severely censured.

petitioner. 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court.L. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA. docketed as Civil Case No. levied on three motor vehicles. Vida Jr. 680-V. 1977. respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Isabelo V.. As a consequence thereof. Benjamin Bautista. a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII). respondents. That this Hon. 5 In an Order dated July 12. EDUARDO P. filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. c. 7 Hence the instant Petition.. The factual antecedents may be recited as follows: Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved. 1977. legal and justiciable defenses. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Atty. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors." herein petitioner. respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals . and d. " 6 On July 19. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. . 1977. RICARDO G. J: In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction. 1972. petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12. CAGUIOA.R. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendantappellant . that the grounds relied upon ". 1977. through a different counsel. Santos 11. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado. 1971. The appealed case was handled by Atty. and. of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. Mercado & Associates. Isabelo V. more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law. 3 A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. acting upon the writ of execution. his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default.2 SANTOS. issued by respondent Judge. of the law firm of Vida Enriquez. . However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29.JOSE GUBALLA. vs. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff. on October 1. Carlos. denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. an associate of the same law firm.. another member of the law firm. b. in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr.L.. Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken. Defendant has valid. to wit: a. JR. it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. despite due notice. and this Petition must be denied for lack of . Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default. Vida Jr. through Atty. the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. . 4 On July 6. Santos II. petitioner.. who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently.. 52610R. presided by respondent Judge for execution. No. THE HON.. That the Hon. 1 Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner.

merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve, WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
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Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees. We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives. Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day. In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate. In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents. Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners. R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company." Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought. Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4 Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor. Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest. However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00 1990 605.00 570.00 1991 165.00 2,300.00 ———— ———— ———— P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8 WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof. SO ORDERED. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAPTER III CANON 10 VICENTE MUÑOZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, respondent. RESOLUTION

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5 On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.) Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

" " 1 A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14. appellant acted as pilot and. and Associates. Considering further. upon examination of the evidence. There was no attempt at justification. Delia T. respondent Delia T. which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat. (b) these circumstances. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of candor. and that. more specifically with reference to a duty owing this Tribunal. which is not true. that — in the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals — "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the case". she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless disregard.part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant. Vicente Muñoz v. to say the least. petitioner states. but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. the impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach. When given an opportunity to make proper amends. that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the Court of Appeals. that. reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when. why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making aforementioned misrepresentations. and was. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting]. Villaseca. both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her memorandum. Sutton. the Court resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause. whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts. immediately after the collision . within ten (10) days from notice. and makes reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals. and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. 1957)" although. no conflicting findings of fact are made in the decision appealed from. likewise. L-33672. untrue. in fact. that of the petitioner. for: (a) petitioner's theory. in fact. minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor". in fact. thereby hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death — so that. connected with the law firm of Salonga. G. So we rule. While her demeanor was respectful. On the contrary. as charged in the information. thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly. Under the circumstances. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true. on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed from. although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on. of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as such. of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. on page 6 of the petition. in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision. Only her relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. No. it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court. the latter being bigger than. at the same time.FERNANDO. (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little damage. must be held accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel. Her liability is clear.R. 1971. as did the trial court.R. overloaded. a member of the Philippine Bar. L-9590.: We have before us a task far from pleasant. it was obvious that she was far from contrite. referring to a portion of the same quotation. as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as. such optimism was misplaced. because in law there is none. there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant. Respondent. Even when subjected to intensive . on page 8 of the petition. and is therefore. the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court. that. If so. the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of complainant's boat — where the complainant was seated. as its machinist. is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat. Sutton appeared. and (d) although appellant's boat carried several passengers. (Cesica v. including children. that the petition quotes. that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence." although. indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising. the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of merit. 1971. on page 9 of the petition. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals. summing up evidence for the defense. likewise." which is. requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. it is averred — "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible. The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12. J. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G. that. At such a hearing. Ordoñez. we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year. April 30. that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is unbelievable. Parlade. the Court of Appeals found. Yap.

Ordoñez and Delia Sutton. which reads: "22. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T. and did make with the proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of regret. especially to this Court. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar. 1971. Sedfrey A. Attorney Sedfrey A. Pedro L. the circumstances surrounding her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court were explained by her. oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to. The mood. Some members of the Court feel. often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions. Yap." If there were a greater sincerity on her part. she was not to be budged from such an untenable position. Sedfrey A. however. There ought to be. which her evasive answers gave rise. Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics. [Candor and Fairness]. signed jointly by Sedfrey A. the testimony of a witness. 2. the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. Sutton. 1971." 2 The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. pursuant to an order dated October 18. 1971.questioning by several members of the Court. the language or the argument of opposing counsel. Ordoñez. it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth. did seek to make amends thus: "1. To purge herself of the contempt. Sedfrey A. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. That undersigned Delia T. That undersigned attorney. no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper. Ordoñez. even at this stage. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. Ordoñez joins Atty.. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit. the obligation to the bench. there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements. for candor and honesty takes precedence. that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled. Sutton. appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22. together with Messrs." 3 What is more. Delia T. Parlade & Associates." 5. That with all the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney. with the assistance of Atty. What is more. Yap and Custodio O. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Ordoñez. partners in the firm of Salonga. . Parlade. Delia T. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class. It is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. with knowledge of its invalidity. or in argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause. Delia T. 3. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned. for the apology to gain significance. and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim. While expressing regret and offering apology. that it does not go far enough.. or the language of a decision or a textbook or. 4. This Court does not view matters thus. and that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court. That undersigned Atty. That the undersigned Delia T. the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December 1. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible. she ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. . — The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. or a statute that has been repealed. or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo.

perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners. however. as well as the other senior partners. especially in his relationship to this Court. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on her record.At the same time. WHEREFORE. It must be stated. Sutton is severely censured. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . both in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted. Attorney Sedfrey A. that in the future he. is deep-seated. should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel. must be commended. Ordoñez. respondent Delia T.

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