4 INTERPRETATION THEORY In the provious two chapters we have examined approaches to social science ‘that emphasize the importance of generalizations in social explanation. In thle chapter we turn to-an approach that emphasizes instead the importance oF the patel of sift cuter and hols thatthe cea goa! 97 socal inquiry i the inderprelalion of meaningfal_human_practices. This approsch distinguishes between explanation and understanding: Explanation fnwolves Identifying general causes of en event, whereas undersanding sodal confext (Vou Wright 1571:5-6). The goal of social inquiry is to or significa arrangements end practices “This approach is thus Viermenentic] It treats socal phonomona as a 1x 1 be decoded through lmaginafive reconstruction of the significance of various clements ofthe social action or event, The interpretive framework thus olds That socal science is radically unlike natural science because it unavoidably depends upon the interpretation of meaningful hurnan behavior and soclal practices. Natural science is conceaned with objective causal processes, Dut Sockal science is concerned with meaningful actions and practices. The former tay be objectively described and explained; the later eequire interpretation and understanding. Explanation, thep. isthe goal of the natural sciences, and understanding isthe gos] of the social sconces. “The philosopher Charles Taylor describes the intezpeetive framework in his essay “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” (C. Taylor 19830). He argues that socal scence nist be interpretive and hermeneutic and that Socal ingucy that depende exclusively on objective factors (causal relations, Socal siuctures, abstract rationality) will ineviGBIy fo Thus he writes, “Aly thesis amounts to an alternative sefement of the main proposition of interpretive social science, that an adequate account of human action must rmake the agents more understandable, On this view, it cannot be a suficient bjective of socal theory that just predict. the actual pattern of socal Or historical events... A satisfactory explanation must also make conse Of the agents” (C. Taylor 1985b:116), “The interpeetive program for codal science can be representnd as main= taining a number of interrelated points: ee river 63 Interpretation Theory 6 + Individual actions and beliefs can only be understood through an act Of interpretation, By which the inquirer attempts fo discover the meaning tbr significanes of those actions or beliefs for the agent. + There is radicel diversity across culfures concerning the way in which social life is conceptualized, and these differences give rise to diverse social worlds cial practices (bargeining, promising, going to work, parenting) are Consttuted_by_the-meanings-that-partiipants attribute to. ther + There are no “brute facts” in social science—faets that do not allude to specific cultural meanings “The import ofthese postions is faily clea. To provide a satisfactory analysis of given social phenomenon, itis necessary to aztive at an interpretation Of the meanings that agents within that caltee asign t0 thelr actions and social relations. Social scence is therefore unavoidably hermeneutical, and those socal sciences that ail to provide such underslanding are furdamestally misairected Veena tre Consider an example of interpretation by a leading interpretive anthro- pelogist, Cfo Georiz (Example 4.1). In Geertzs inrpretation of the Gultural’ significance of cockfighting in Bali, he attempts to connect this apparently superficial socal practice to doap olemos of Balinese solfhoed, Ue inderprets the patern of lange-scale betting on cockights as emblemizing Social relationships in local sacety-—kinghip, village, and status ationships ‘And he construos the cocifght itso as an emblem—positive or negative — for clemenis of Balinese life. Note what this account does not provide, It does not tell us what processes or mechanisms brought shot cdckéghting {@ causal explanation). And it does not attempt to show how indivicual Balinese men pursue their own interests or purposes through cockfighting @ tational choice explanation). This account, then, does not provide an ‘2planation of the practic; instead it offers « reading ofthe practice in its coniext, intended t9 elucidate the meaning of the practice for us. INTERPRETATION AND AGENCY ‘The central notion in the approach studied in this chapter is that of an interpraistion of an. action or practice. Interpretation involves viewing, in- lividual actions and social practices as expressive of human meanings. We Inay use the conception of agency to refer fo the fact that Fuiman beings ate deliberate, sy resi aa econ tn othr unr aed wants, Agents’ understanding, consis of a number of Tealures! a “fepreseniaion of the world in which they find themsslves, 4 set of vahoes ee ee limits on action beyond which transizession i shameful, a concepticn of their own powers and capadiiies, and so forth, The rational choice model ‘of explanation adopts @ particulary thin and abstract perspective on agency, emphasizing causal belies, meterial interests, and instrimental reasoning.‘Models of Explanation Example 4.1 A Balinese cockfight Balinose men spend a great deal of time involved in cockfights—grooming ang! taining the birds, feeding them, watching the fights and betting on them, discussing the strengths and weaknessos of the competing bieds, and so en. Why Is this activity (port) such a prominent part of Balinese village bie? Cliford Gecrte offers a detailed interpretation of the signiticance of cockighting in Ball that alms © locate the activity within the rger compess of Balinese culture, He discusses the jokes and language associated with cocifighting and the social meanings to which cockfighting & related. Perticuarly important, in Geertz’s accoun, is the Balinete distaste for animal-lice behavior in human beings animals represent the “Powers of Darkness” (Geertz 1971¢:420), Geertz feonstups the fascination with corkfighting as a surrogate for the struggle between good and evi: “In the cocktight, man and beast, good and evil, ego and id the creative power of aroused masculinity and the destructive power of loosened animaiily fuse In 2 bloody drama of hatred, cruelty, violence, and deat” (Geertz 1871@:420-21). He concludes, “To treat the cockiight as a text is to bring out a feature of i... that treating it 35 a rte or 2 paste, the two most obvious alternatives, would tend to obscure its use of emotion for cogniive ends... In the cockight, then, the Balinese forms and discovers his temperament and hie society's temper at the same time. .. . The culture of a people & an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropelogst fttains t0 read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong” (Geert 19716499, 451, 452) Data: ethnographic findings in a Balinese village Explanatory model: interpretation of the significance of a complex cultural practice Source: Cliford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notos on tho Balinese Cockfight” (19712) Bat i is also possible to specify more nuanced descriptions of the slate of agency of the Individual, inducing extensive description of the individual's ‘Values, worldview, assumptions, end modes of thought. And the central claim of interpretive social Science is that more detailed accounts of agency are needed If we ate to make sense of individual ard social ection, To give an interoretation of an action, then, involves giving a description of the cultural context and state of mind of the agent in a way that makes his or her action intelligible to-us, The goal of interpretation is to make sense of an action oF practice—to discemn the meaning of the pracice in the context of a system of meaningful cultural symbols and representations. Consider a simple exemple, Suppose we observe a man walking down the Sireot, He passes under a ladder looks up, and then hurries tO a wooden bench neaiby. He taps on the bench with his knuckles, mops his brow Grops his bag, and then continues along the street, An alien observer would find this sequence of events and actions puzzling; It is plainly a series of dlliberate actions undertaken in reaponse to the shifing onvironmont, but itt appears to be unmotivated, The maris action does not wear its meaning Interpretation Theory n on its sleeve. Now suppose that we offer an interpretation of the scene. The man is a poorly educated peasant, with strong but simple religious beleis. He believes that certain even's in ordinary lite are portens of things to come: Black cats, ladders, and broken mirrors portend bad luck. He believes that theve are things one can do to ward off bad luck, such os knocking on wood. Seeing that he has inadvertently walked under a ladder {bad luck), he husries to the nearest wooden object and knocks on wood {a remedy). Relieved that he has done what he can to protect himself, he mops his brow (a customary, refleive way of expressing relief in his culsure) fanc resumes his walk. Dropping the bag is just an accident; it has no ‘meaning ané supports no further interpretation. The story 1 have just told amounts to an interpretation of the manis/ behavior it is an account of his beliofs and understanding of the meaning ff events in the world that makes sense of his subsequent actions. This! story represents interpretation at two levels frst an interpretation of common Social meanings in the mars culture (the significance of black cats ond ladders), and” sécond_an_inlerpretation of particular actions by the man {knocking on wood ancl mopping his brow). There is a strong and deliberate parallel between interpreting human action and interpreting a literary text. The investigator is presented with an ensemble of meaningful elements and aiterpts to discover the significant connections among, them. (This is what makes interpretation a hermeneutic process.) Once such a description has been provided, the investigator has shown that the agents behavior is not “atational"; rather i fits into a larger cultural and normative system, and the whole sysiem is coherent. The conception of means-end rationality is one possible model of human action that may give us an interpretive framework within which to understand ‘he agert’s action, But we may also interpret an action as a symbolic display, a5 a dramatic device, as a ritualistic performance, et, How should the social scientist investigate meaningful social action? Is there an “interpretive method” that can guide him in making an inter preiation? An imporiant formulation of this ides of a method epproprlate fo social science can be found in Max Weber's concept of veretshen.' This ‘method distinguishes between social science and natural science, according to Weber. In The Methodology ofthe Social Sciences, he describes the method ‘in these terms: “In the social sciences we are concemed with psychological anid intellectual phenomena the empathic understanding of which is naturally a problem of a specifically diferent type from those Which the schemes of the exact natural sciences in general can of senk to salve” (Weber 1940-74), A few pages later he writes, “We have designated as “cultural sciences’ those disciplines which analyze the phenomena of lie in terms of their cultural significance. The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and tho batie of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered inelligibie by a system of analytical laws... The concept of culture is a ‘alue-concept” (Weber 1949:76) ‘According to the method of intezpretation, the goal of the social scientist fe to active et a hypothesis about the agents state of ming in performingn Models of beptnation fa given action—the beliefs, values, and purposes that bring the agent to perform the action, Weber refers to this process as. “explanstory under- ftanding": “This is rational understanding of the motivation, which consists, in placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning” (Weber 1978:8), He sometimes uses the term “empathy” to characterize this process, but he does not suppose thet there is a distinctive faculty that Permits us to interpret the agents state of mind, Instead It Is a matier of ‘considering possible beliefs, purposes, and values that might generate the tction and then attempting to determine through direct and indirect evidence whether the interpretation is correct (Weber 1978:8-9). The method of Derstehen, then, is based on a process of hypothesis-formation through which ‘the investigator forms a conjeeture conceming the state of mind of the agent and then tries to test this conjecture against the agent’ actions and speech. Clifford Geertz describes an interpretive method in many of his works, He writes in Local Knowledge: ‘what the anthropologist has to do... 6 tack between the two sorts of ceseriptions—berween increasingly fine-comb observations... a ncteasingly ‘synoptic characterzations . in Such a way shat, held nthe mlnd together, they presen credible leshed-out picture of human form oflife. "Transation,” here, is not a simple recasting of others ways of pasting (ings In terms of ‘our own ways of potting them... but deplaying the logic of their ways of Putting thom in the loeutions of eurs; a conception which agein brings it ror closer to what a cnt does ta ilamine a poem than what an astronomer does t0 aecoune fora star. (Geert 1985:10) It ie reasonable to conclude from the vagueness of both Weber's and Geertz’s descriptions that there is no distinctive method of interpretation — no set of rules that permits us to derive an interpretation from a description ff social behavior. Instead the problem confronting the interpretive social scientist is the familiar one of hypathesis-formation, The interpretive social scientist must arrive at a hypothesis about the meaning of an action that makes sense of the action in light of the known facis. And—as in other areas of sclence—ihere is no recipe for a good hypothesis When presented with an interpretation of an action or practice—for ‘example, the story about the man and the ladder—we are forced fo consider the problem of verification: How are we to determine whether the inter pretation is true or false? What criteria of adequacy are available for deciding, between conficting interpretations? What empirical tools can be used t0 probe the meaning of the actions and. practioes we observe? The criterion that plays the most prominent role in discussions of method by interpretive sccil scientists is cehereuce—the requirement that the elements of the Interpretation should hang together as a consistent, meaningful whole, This ‘approach raises two problems, however. First, what sort of coherence Is at Issue? The notion of logical coherence {is available but too weak 10 do the job for it requires only that there be no logical contradictions in the account provided. Suppose, for example. Interpretation Theory ns thatthe sony ofthe man athe lar is modifed 6 thatthe man is a highly clusted engineer, Our inerpreaion now appears somewhat ne consistent for we are attributing supersitious belies to a man who Dy Frofesion trained to be rational abet causal processes There 1 nothing Togealy contaciciry about such an sumption, rather the tail of a farsttiounose and causal raionalty seem unlikely to g0 Together Us Sifeule to provide a convincing account ofthe nation of incompetblty that fe at rk here It is akin to an expression of seshotic coherence the idea tat some symbole slemnte co har together, whereas her do ‘ot But ths ide i to subjective fo serve as useful erterion ef truth Second, the requirement of coherence Is foo weik because ft does not give usa ass fhe making empirical figment about interpretations. When tre are offered an interprstion of an even’ or practic, we wert to new ‘more than that is consistent interpretation (a! sue in some posite od We wart aves to bee hat rae at nN word)” And" thie appoass unavoidably fo require that wo offer expicl Eeidonce in support ofthe inlerprtatien we need some way of sig out servations of the pacspests and ther bacground culture to support eran Iterprtaons and exclade others, Torturly is posible fo offer empl support for an inkrpetation, We can tam tothe evidence of the agen’ own avowals oy avers fort other members ofthe same culture, We can ask the man, in the ease above Why he kaceced on wood and he may reply along fines thet strongly Supper: the interpretation wo have advanced. But its also possite thet his fetimony wil discredit on interpretation, For example, he may sy thet His hand had falen asleep ant he tapped his Knuckles to shake of an Uuplescant sensation, This explanation diecredis ou interpretation bocce itinplic that there no connection between his walking unde: the Ice and His tapping the wooden bench, The agents testimony Is not deve, Sf couse we tay ge that he sufers fm sel-deception, that he ds hot understand As own motives, that _he ie embaracced to seit hi Supertouness, and co on. But sach acai on cur prt requis that We have oher sources of empirical support for our contrary Interpnetation. We raya corer he eviece of hai we hve sere sh incidents, with miary acaptve behave, we may regard the rou tohavira regulartes as evitence forthe ‘aun of the inerpcaion thet members of this culture ere superstitions Tet us now pose a question of central concern in this book. Is an Interpreten ot an action or practice explmutory? Orit rather ecaintve Kind of description? Ii clear to start with tate plausible interpretation of an ection ox practice is explanatory inthe weakest senses provides ts With infomation we dot previousy have nthe conte of which the action or pace is intelighle or compcehensci. When we ask wy the maan knocked on wood, the rpiythat he is superiticussetbtos ws Eecauye it permite sto ndentand his aston. However i seems reecratle fo sate tht explanation segues more than thy Recall our discussion of74 ‘odes of Explanation “why-necessary”” questions in Chapter 1, There it was held that explanations, paradigmatically involve identifying necessary or probable sequences of fevents. In this light we have explained an event when we have identified the antecedent circumstances thet made the event necessary or probable. [An interpretation does not conform to this medal. Instead we may better construe an interpretation as a description of a semiotic state of affairs (the way things stand in terms of meanings for a culture or individual). Here, then, to provide an interpretation is to provide a description of a distinctive sort; whatit describes is a configuration of meanings ina culture or individual. It can also be argued that Interpretations provide the basis for genuine explanations of social phenomena. Hore we may follow the line of argument that Donald Davidson pursues in his analysis of reasons as causes (Davidson. 1963/80), According to Davidson, the fact that a person has a reason to do x is properly understood ax a cause of his actually doing x. We may extend this argument to interpretations by holding that the fact that a person. understands an action in a certain way—for example, he regards it as the proper ritual performance in the circumstances—is a canse of his subsequent performance of the action, Thus interpretations capture states of the world. that can function as causal conditions (states of agency), and therefore interpretations can serve as the basis for explanations. Consider an example of a social analysis that depends on analysis of social meanings--Michael Adas’s account of millenarian rebellions in the colonial world (Example 4.2). Adas attempts to understand millenarian rebellions “from within”—in terms of the religious ideas and practices that, characterized these movements. He then tries to provide a causal analysis, of the emergence of these symbol systems in various parts of the non- Westen world. This later effort takes him e step away from Geertz’ analysis cof Balinoce cockfighting in Example 4.1, however, for Geertz implies that interpretation is the beginning, and end of social explanation and that causal analysis is out of place in sovial inquiry. SOCIAL ACTION Let us now look more closely at some of the elements of interpretation theory. A central topic in this approach is the view that socal action is inherently meaningful: It is_not possible to provide meaning-neutral de~ scriptions of social actions or practices. Weber writes of the conceprof social Action In-these-terme-~“Sceiotngy— is a science concerning itself with, the interpretive understanding Of social action and thereby with @ causal explanation of its course and consequences. We shall speak of ‘action’ insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior—be 1 overt or covest, omission or acquiescence. Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course” (Weber 1978:4), This passage makes two central points frst that actions are ky definition partially constituted by « subjective ‘meaning or intention on the part of the agent; second that a social action Interpretation Theory 7" Example 4.2 Millenarian rebellion Religiously inspired rebellions occurred against colonial rule in various parts of the non-Western world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: lava, New Zealand, indi, East Africa, and Burma, In each caze colonial bureaucracies he inflated local society to impose taxes and regulations, and each rebellion was Crganized around 2 syncrotc region and a charismatic leader prophesizing 2 ‘chaning age—a millenarian ideology. Michael Ades aftempts 10 explain the relations between these circumstances. This problem breake dawn into two topics: Why did rebellion occur egainst colonialism? And why dd It 30 ‘commonly take the millenarian form? Adas belioves the answer to the fist question is straighiforward: Colonized peoples had many pressing and legttimate ievances that could not be resolved except through viclent protert. His answer (0 the second question, however, Is more complex, There were millennial trations in several (though not all) of these societies, It was erica, however, that there should be « prophetic leader who could mold a coherent Ideology Capable oF mobiizirg followers (Adas 1979:116), And aiven the apparenty ser whelming strength of European colonial powers—miltary resources, scientific knovilecge, and administrative eapacity—millerarian, magical ideologies were the inst effective way of inducing lage numbers of followers in local society. "Through these prophetic figures and their divinely inspirad revelations, a belief in the efficacy of resistance and the possibilty of escape from their raubles was bom and nurtured among deprived, colonized peoples” (Adas 19794121), Miilenarianism, then, was an Inteighble ideological response to the material power of colonial stats, and it provided the basis for large-scale mobilization aginst the coloniel powers, Data data descrbing milenarian potest meverens in Asia, Ae, and the Explanatory modek:millenarian movements canbe understoad as a common cultural responce to the ccanomic and ideological incursions of Western Cultures into. non-Western societies Source: Michael Adis, Prophots af Rebellion: Milenacian Protest Movements ‘Against the Europeen Colonial Order (1979) is one whose subjective meaning is oriented toward the actions of others. When I return a library book on the due date, the meaning of the action 4s my intention to avoid the fine. When I get up at dawn to drive to the ‘beach carly and avoid the traflic, my action is a social action because my intention is oriented toward the actions of others (in this case to avoid the consequences of the actions of other persons). tis clear enough what is meant in stating that action is meaningful; this simply reflects the intentional charactor of action, the idea that agents hhave purposes and their own understanding of the meaning of theit bodily motions. But what dose it moan to say that all social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful? Here the icea is that socal phenomena are not ‘objective in the way that natural entities are, Instead social phenomena are (partially) constituied by the assumptions, concepts, and intentions of the16 Models of Explanaticn persons who participate in them, Electromagnetic fields have objective properties tht ere independent ofthe weys in which human beings conceive Of them. It i plausible to hold, by contrast, that human institutions and practices are inherently dependent on the ways im which participating persens onceive of them—or at least that ie the position taken by interpretation theory. Clifford. Geortz makes the point in these terms: “Interpretive ex- planation . . . tans its attention on what institutions, actions, images, Interances, events, customs... mean to thase whose institutions, actions, custom, and so on they are. As a retult, tissues notin nws Ike Boyle’, ‘oF forcos like Voltas, or mechanisms like Darwin’s, but in constructions ike Burckhardt, Weber, or Freud's: systematic anpackings of the conceptual world in which condotiere, Calvinists, or paranoids live” (Geertz 1983:22). “The interpretation thecrst concedes that there are meaning-neutral things thst we can say about types of social relations —og., exchange systems, Kinchip syetome, or patron-clientrelations—but helda that theee character. tear at eee sabe ne et ios work in a particular culeuet consider the idea of a kinship system-UIP Fg Shake a prelininary-etfort to dofine this Sa eee nee terms a the structure of sacial relations aniong blood relations end mariage relations i a particular culture. This defrition then allows us to identify Kinship systems in a variety of cultures—e.g, Nuer. Berber, and Boston Brahmin culties. Houeuver interpretation theorists hal that thi is pointless abstraction because it takos us no closer to an understanding of how kinship ‘works in these different ewltures what the socal significance of kinship i= for Nuet, Berber, and Boston Brahmin men and women. And in onder (© auddress this question we must descend from the abstract plane to the level OF the conerate subjective understendings of kinship relations found among, the participants in these various cultures: what values constrain the choice cof marsiage pertners; what obligetions are experienced towerd one's elders; what foras of loyalty affection, or aversion are experienced toward brothers, sisters, cousins, and children. Orly when we have provided a speesfie account of the significance of Kinship relations for Berber men and women have we smede a genuine contribution to the understanding of kinship at all fr the Kinship system only has social effects through the particular meanings that participants attribute to it These arguments suggest that the human sciences require interpretation, then, on tive levels, To understand individual meanings and actions itis necessary to interpret them,-and fo understand social practices it is necessaty ‘understand the meanings and values thai thei pacliciparts attribute to ‘hem, Trverpretation of individual action may take a variety of forms, el Ret ¢-goal-dinected activity action or as symbolic participatory action. Social pashomena are in part conaituted by the interpretive schomes that members Df 8 society employ to orgonize their social worlds, to explain their own behavior 10 justify or condemn the ections of others and the seorkings of institutions, and the like. It is impossible, then, to properly understand Soval practices and institutions unless we properly intenpret the significance Of the actions and meanings af the persons Who embody them Interpretation Theory 7 MODELS OF SOCIAL ACTION ‘To interpret meaningful social action we need some paradigm examples of typos of meaningful human behavier, that is, we noed come background {ideas about the various forms that meaningful social action takes. We have already seen one such paradigm—Geertzs frontal assault on the meaning, (fa given social practice (Balinese cockfigating). In this case Geertz attempts to piece together an accotint ofthe cultural eymbols that frame the cockight, ‘much as a literary critic might identify the literary conventions in the context ‘of which we should read Te Brothers Karamazov. There are several other models that have influenced the general perspective of interpretive social Science, however, and, without hoping to offer @ complete treatment, {will discuss several of these models in the next few pages—ritual, drama, rule following, and practice. The utility of the interpretive approtch aa 4 con- tuibution to social science depends chiefly on the degree to which interpretive Social scientists sueveed in idontifying symbolic structuzes within human behaves. ‘An important concept in interprotive social science is that of ritual: @ ‘rle-guided sequence of behavior consecrated by religious meanings (Ceertz 1971b.112), Here we have a conception of social meaning thet emphasizes repetitive symbelle behavior. The central model Is not goal-directed action ut dramatic participation, Weber conception of social action remains rationalistic; it recommends that we understand an action in terms of the purposes and intentions of the agent, But anthropologists like Geertz and. Vicior Turner have broadened the notion of meaningful action by focusing. con other paradigm examples—behavior that is participatory, rule-guided, and dramatic rather than prudential and goal-pursuing. Consider, for example, Geeriz’s description of 2 Javanese funeral. “The ‘mood of a Javanese funeral is not one of hysterical bereavement, unrestrained sobbing, or even of formalized cries of grief for the deceased's departure Hather, itis 2 calm, undemonstrative, almost languid letting go, a brief lvalized selinguishrnent of a reletionship ao longer possible. Tears ate aot approved of and certainly not encouraged: the effort is 10 get the job done, ‘not to linger aver the pleasures of griet. ... The whale momentum of the Javanese rita system is supposed to earry one through grief without severe emotional disturbance” (Geertz 19714:153), Here we have a model of social faction that involves inklividuals’ carrying out a sequence of actions that are prestrlbed by social convention and that correspond to meaningful: human needs—grief, in this case—but that are not prudential or goal-directed. Insteaci we can say that the participants are taking part in a socially regulated, performance hat collsivaly embodies a meanighlrespone toa biological event—death, Another important contributor to Interpretive social science is Victor ‘Turner. He approaches the problem of interpreting social action by using the organizing concept of @ drama. The notion of a drama—an extended interaction between 2 number of charactors over time—permits him to ‘emphasize the temporal structure ef social action and the creative agency.nm Models of Explanation through which social actions unfold, “Social dramas and social enterprises represent sequences of social events, which, seen retrospectively by an ‘observer, can be shown to have structure, Such ‘temporal’ siucture, unlike sMomporal structure... is organized primarily through relations in time rather than in space” (Tumer 1974:35-36). The notion of a drama is thus 4 device in terms of which to represent meaningful human activity extended over time. "Social dramas . . . can be isolated for study in societies at all levels of scale and compledty” (Turner 1974:33), A socal drama 's a structured and temporally extended situation in which a number of actors play out their interests, concerns, and intentions within the context of a eulturlly defined world, Turner writes, "Social drome, then, are nits of harmonic or disharmonie processes, arising in confit situations. Typically, they have four main phases of public action. . . . 1. Breach of regular, norm-governed social relations occurs betiveen persons or groups with the same system of social relations. .. . 2, Following breach of regular, norm- governed social actions, @ phase of mounting crisis supervenes. , .. 3. This brings us to the third phase, redressze action, In order to limit the spread ff crisis, certain adjustive and rodrestive ‘mechanisms’... informal or formal, institutionalized or ad hoc, are swiftly brought into operation by leading or structurally representative members ofthe disturbed cocial system, 4. The final phase 1 distinguished consists elther in the reiegation Of the disturbed social group or of the social recognition and legitimization of inreparable schism between the contesting patties” (Turner 1974:37-41), Turner offers, then, a paradigin of interpielation of social processes: To undersiand o sodil-arrangement of outcome we must focus on the process — through. kick that outcome nd that prot may DeantesOSd in the framework oF focal drama, Therefore wo can understand a wide ‘aFioly of social phenam@ne ip a Fange of cultures using the framework of a social drama. This leads the investigator to focus on both the meanings thet participan’s attribute 10 a sequence of events and thele interactive behavior over time—ihe ways in which their behavior is affected by previcus actions of other participants. ‘Another important theocetial attempt so provide a framework for inter preting repetitive behavior (eg, ritual, ctiquetic, or marriage practicas) is Pierse Bourdiew's Outline of a Theory of Practice (1877). Many aspects of human behavior appear to be rule guided, such as grammatical spesch, polite behavior in formal social occasions, marriage patterns, and religious Fitual, Anthropologists have often attempted to conceive of such behavior in ters of ¢ mode) of rule following, with the reoul that a given behavior is mocely the instance of the culo applying in particular drcumsiances. The rules generate the behavior. Bouse azguet that this modal is deeply imisleading, however, because it does not give sufficient priority to human practice (practical, deliberate human accion within the contedt of social, cultural, nd material constraints). As the model of humen socal behavior, he offers the analogy of an extended interaction betwoan two intelligent actors (for ovamplo, two boxers jackeying, for advantage within the context Intorprtaton Theory 9 of the rules of a prize fight) in place of the idea of an authoritative system cf rules, “In dog-iights, as in the fighting of children or boxers, each move triggers off a counter-move, every stance of the body becomes a sign pregnant with a meaning that the opporent has to grasp while it is sill incipient, reading in the beginnings of a stroke or a sidestep the imminent future, ie, the blow or the dummy” (Bourdieu 1977:1), Bourdian considers the idea that repetitive beaavior might be best char acterized by the notion of rule-governed action and argues that this framework underplays the role of deliberation and strategic thinking. He introduces the des of a “habitus’—"the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations [that] produces practices which tend to reproduce the reg- ulasities imminent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle” (Bourdieu 1977:78). One of the virtues of this concept ig the fact that It permits us to consider habitual behavior as both rule guided and agent centered; it offers yet another model in terms of which to understand the meanings that underlie human action. Bourdieu considers the two paradigms in application to kinship systems and the practice of exogamy (marriage restricted to women from outside the man’s lineage). The “legalistic” (rule-following) model holds that a set of kinship rules determine kinship behavior, whereas Bourdieu contends ‘that kinship and marciage behavior is the outcome of many independent strategic choices by individuals and families. “Thus, far from obeying a orm which would designave an obligatory spouse from among the whole set of official kin, the arrangement of marrlages depends directly on the stete of the practical Kinship relations, relationships through the men usable by the men and relationships through the women usable by the women, and on the state of the power relations within the ‘house,’ that is, between the lineages united by marriage in the previous generation, which allow ‘and favour the cultivation of ane or the other feld of relationships” (Bourse 197752), ‘The symbolic, dramaturgical, and practice-orfented approaches give rise toa rich program of research for the anthropologist can identify the rituals, conventions, and symbolic performances that underlie much collective life in 2 given culturo and can then piece together the meaningful connections: ‘amorig various elements of these performances, This provides a basis for understanding social action at two levels, The agents action is understood ‘once we have loceted it within a particular conventionally defined symbolic performance, and the performance type iself Is understood when itis located ‘within the larger system of symbolic activities. Consider two examples that illustrate concrete investigations of the meaningful conceptions and self-identities of various human groups (Ex- amples 43 and 4.4), Fach of these examples involves tho use of interpretive tools to make sense of historical phenomena. In Example 4.3 Arthur Wolf provides an interpretation of Chinese folk religion, This account focuses on ‘stablishing the relationships between the meaning of a complex of religious beliofs and. practicos and the “social metaphysics” characteristic of rural0 IMadels of bxplanation Interpretation Thoory a Example $3 Popular culture in China Poor rural people in China practiced a religion that included rua dlrected te od, ghosts, and ancestors. These practices were significantly diferent from official end high-culture reiion in China. Amthur Wolf attempis to provice a coherent interpretation of the signifeance of these belies and rituals and show ‘hat ths system of meanings corresponds closely to the way In which poe Chinese tural people perceived the social world around them. “Ths significance 's gely determined by the worshippers. conception of thelr sacial vot. The most important point 10 be made about Chinese religion is that it mires the sock landscape of ts adherents” (Wolf, ed. 1978-131). For example, Wolf ‘nds thatthe local gods were erganized in “dsrets” that paralloled the admintratve organization of oficial 2s there was an offical responsible for a Cettain locale, so there was an “earth god’ (V'u Ti Kung) with paralet responsibtities. Each earth god is represented by a clay igure in a small temple Ans when earth gods fain ther responsiblties—for example, when they cannot control the weathor-—they may be punished in the same way tha officials are punished: They can be banished to other areas or destroyed. Wolf quotes an cbserver "A yoat or <0 ago, at Nanling Hsien during a drought, 3 god vaas publicly tried by the magisrato for neglact of duty, condemned, left in the hot sun to see how he liked it himself, and finaly, after enduring every kind of insult, was broken in pieces” (WolT 1978:144). He corstnues popular Chinese religion, then, 25 a projection of the social worldview of the Chinese rural ower ase Data: ethnographic data drain from interviews with poor rural Taiwanese in the 19608 Explanatory model interpretation of religious beliels and explanation of those elise In terms of a correspondence between the spintual world and the buraaueratc structure of the Chinese imperial sate Source: Arthur P. Wolf "Gods, Chests, and Ancestors” (1978) Chinese society. In Example 44 E, P Thompson considers the historical processes through which members of a group come to share important symbolic understandings of thoir group and its place in the social world. He provides a detailed reconstruction of the historical development of the English working class—the meanings, values, anc commitments that a historically specific group came to share over the better part of a century. SOCIAL VARIABILITY AND THE PRIMACY OF CULTURE (Ono distinctive aspect of the interprotve framework, in contrast to the causal and rational choice approaches considered in previous chapters, is 5 inclination to incat that social inguiry must be culturally epecife, There Js no antecedent framework whether instrumental rationality; materialism, or anything else—that will provide an explanatory Key to a glven sodety. Example 44 The English working class Classical Marism maintains that classes tend to become class-conscious: They identify themselves asa clas, identify tho material interests they have in ‘common, and crystallize as 2 collective agent. EP. Thompson argues that the process of class formation is not mechanical or inevitable in the ways suggested by this account. Instead classes come to a sate of conscious cess identity only ‘through extended historical experiences in particular social circumstances, “By lass | understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected ovents, both in the "aw material of experience and in consciousness” (Thompson 1963.9. In The Making of the English Working Clas, he explores in deta the historical route through which workers and attsans in England came to regard themselves as a class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. "The cass experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are bor—or enter involuntary. Class-consciousness is the Wey in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms. embodied in traditions, value-ysters, ideas, and insttutional forms” (Thompson 1963:$-10) He considers in deal both the changig technological circumstances and the political and cultural experiences that shaped the English working class—the Incusirial Revelution, pooular political movements, wotkingrven’s sel- improvement associations, uniarianism, the extinction of some traces end the Creation of new categories of work, and so on. “The making of the working class 'S¢ fact of poical and cultura, 28 much as of economic, history. t was not the Spontaneous generation of the factory-system, Nor should we think of an extemal force—the “ndustial revolution’—worklng upon some nondescript undiferentated raw material of humanity... The factory hand or stockinger was also the Inhesiicr of Bunyan, of remembered vilage rights, of notions of equality before the law, of craft tradtions” (Thompson 1963:188) Data: historical data concerning the eitcumstances of Iabor in elghtoenth- and Tineteenth-century England Explanatory model: to explain the emergence of politcal identity and class- Consciousness, is necessary to examine the particular cultural, social, and feconomie circumstances in which a given cass was fo Source: EF. Thompson, The Making of th énglish Working Class (1963) Rather the values, meanings, practices, and the like that make up the given culture must be explored without presupposition about the sorts of processes ‘hat will be found. This preference for cultural specificity is connected with ‘the primary emphasis on social meanings for this reason: If socal phenomena are constituted by the workings of human consciousness and if human ‘creativity is diverse, then thore i no reason to suppose that different caltares ‘will produce similar social processes and structures ‘Thus the interpretive paradigm insists on the fundamental cultural varl- ability of human meanings, with the result that fameworks that abstract ‘rom the cultural particulars will unavoidably disregard the essential. Geertz ‘maintains that a systematic unpacking of local meanings is mandatory for social inquiry becaiise there are few, if any, tranccultural univorsals in eitherod™ oh a oes of tplantion ¥ Sande ls society or individual. Even the conception of the person is dulturally specific. So itis impossible to make generalizations about even the most basic features fof human aspiration and self-conception. Geertz vrrites, “The Wester nation—must be rejected, In later chapters we will consider this issue more closely; Chapter 6 will present the case for materialist explanation, and Chapter 7 will examine the grounds for the application of the concept of rationality o non-Western culkuzes. But it is possible to anticipate the conclusions of those chapters briely now. Examples provided here establish that the interpretive framework is a legitimate approach to some problems fn social science. However the suggestion that all social inquiry should be conducted in this manner is not persuasive. There are substantial areas of secial science and explanation within ichich problems of significance and Interpretation do not arise and in which objective factors —materal interests, fecial structures, coercive institutions—play the central explanatory roles. ‘And there are many research topics in the socal sclences for which her- meneutic analysis is neither mandatory ner insightful, In particular, arguments will be offered in Chapter 7 to show that itis legitimate to apply the concept of rational selfintarest croes-calturally and86 Models of Explaration that it i reasonable for social sclentsts to postulate that a great deal of socal history may be understood asthe aggregate consequence of individuals fcring out of 2. prudent regard for solt- or famly-welfae. This rational choice framework is not suited for every topic of socal inquiry, to be sure, ‘but for many. problems in socal research—echnological change, rebellion, socal cooperation, and economic decsionmaking—the rational choice fame. ‘work ise defensible one. If this is conceded, it follows that these constitute Important areas of socal scence where the central problem isnot t discover culturally specie meanings and values. Rather it sto discover the specie social arrangements and institutions that constrain individual activity into certain channels and have the result in the aggregate of producing a piven patter of socal life. It might also be noted that it is unclear what social science would look like ona parely inerpretive approach, Would it offer explanations, gen= cralizaions, and modes? Or would it be simply collection of concrete hrermeneusial readings of different societies? Would any novion of law or regularity emerge? Snould causation have a place in such a science? Strict ee er be wel tone lt Ga ia toed analysis that is highly descriptive and not at all explanatory “Thus the interpretation theory assault fis in its general goal of discrediting rational choi theory and materialist socal science. There are substantial areas of social science that are premised on a sophisticated set of assumptions about rationality and material cicumstances of life that ere theoretically legtimate and empirically full. And these frameworks are compatible with the basic trth of interpretation theory—the meaningfal character of Jnuman action. They shate the assumption, iplicly or explicly, that socal science must fow through an understanding of human agency——cholce, belief, reasoning, ection, What distinguishes these programe is rot agency but rather at what level tf possible to characterize agency, The interpretive program implicitly assumes that there is no cultucally newial and nontrivial level at which to describe agency and personhood; the materialist program Genies this. I malnfalns that there is significant core of human agency that is species oposite but not culturally specif and that the content of this desctiption f sulfcient, in many socal creumstances, to generale good social explanations of socal patterns ‘Does this mean thatthe interpretive approach i itself misconceives? Are, bemenenc soda scence, nt Social inquiry, and cultural inves- ‘gation of meanings lagtinateprogams fo ssa dane? They corny ae, andits clear that they provide ansier to questions that other approaches Cannot, These points saggost essentially that ralonal choice theory, mate- Falism, and culture science are competing research programe, exch fouinded {on @ valid insight into one aspect of human behavior and society. Both Gettheatve ceaxon and ciltarel meanings influence behavior, socal practice, fand history, The question 1s: Ta what extent and in what ccumstances is the influence of goal-directed rationality sufficiently strong to let uo explain and predkt oulcomes without extensive interpretation of cultural factors? Irvercetaion Theory 87 And the premise of rational choice theory arid materialism Is that there are such areas, particularly involving the social arrangements of production, the political behavior of persons when political outcomes substantilly affect seretsdeirived In the core, and the economic structures that repute ‘material life. NOTES 1A seh sey ofthe srtion method may be fund in Othe (975) 2 Otter nsarcon of thi sat of npument cuss Chas Tors sada tarp Tp Ihost 6) aa Cec dicen of th niyo enable of Earopear: polite conspsate, poe atop happen to Bali (Geertz 1980:121-22). ee eae SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING Derger Peter L., and Thomas Lackmann. 1966, The Social Consructon of Realty. Bourdieu, Piers. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice Davidson, Doraid. 1953/80, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” Geertz, Clifford. 1971. Tae Interpretation of Culture, Outhwaite, William, 1975, Understanding Social Life: The Method! Called Verstehen. Saline, Marshall. 1976. Cute and Pracicel Reson Tayler, Chares, 1965. Philosophy and she Humax Sctences: Phlasophica! Papore 2, ‘Turner, Vitor 1974. Drars, ius, and Metephors: Symbelic Action in Human Society, ‘en Wright, Georg Henrie. 1971. Explonoion and Undersonsing. Wieber, Max, 1949. The Methodology of the Seciel Science. Trane, and oat by E, Shils ‘and HA. Finch