Political Law

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW)
POLITICAL LAW
HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the
purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and
of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international
relations."
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine
whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some
writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons
the Holy See and Vatican City.
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and
the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from
that in which it is applied to other states. In a community of national states,
the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object,
the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope,
who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of
State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are
such as to make it in a sense an "international state".
HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July
9, 2014
We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency
without any separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity
from suit. The then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, now DPWH, was
created under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO 710
abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public Highways
and transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works
of Highways.
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.
et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the U.S.
7th Fleet et.al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in

Political Law

his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. However, a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum
for local legislation and national statutes, without providing for initiative for
the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the
constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the
constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution
(Article XVII 2) required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735
lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack could not
be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its
legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate
rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so under law.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples
initiative. However, his petition did not include the full text of the proposed
amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the requirements
of the Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be
deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there
should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their
signature to the petition.
TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and
state policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called

Political Law

the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus
a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993
Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being
issued. The Supreme Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the
petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the Constitution.
While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not
Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and
self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind.
Thus, those provisions are self-executing.
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the
intent to adopt the historical background, nature, extent and limitations of
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the
1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major Philippine
cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining
the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny
of these cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion
clauses flows into two main streams of interpretation - separation and

Political Law

benevolent neutrality - the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence

on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which
gives room for accommodation.
IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of
individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to
provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of
the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State
Prosecutor,
National
Prosecution
Service,
and
PANEL
OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP
PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial
review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel
respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but
it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to
be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991

Political Law

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for
the post of ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making
known his desire to continue as Representative, was not able to return to
that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as
Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may
serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official
actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing
the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no
violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his
post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the
officer.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan
de Oro was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not reapportionment legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of
an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, section 5(4).
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual
occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in
the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible
number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the threeseat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast
guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat
allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. In the
second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote
requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down
the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that
"those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no
longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the
total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list
organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the

Political Law

second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes

is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number
of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the
number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties
of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
"marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized
and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
and will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have
the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that
fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral
wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or
youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Political Law

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
"sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"
of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction over the said contests.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI 15 (1935
Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship,
interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary
session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the
same either in or out of Congressional premises while in the official discharge
of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not
connected with the discharge of their office.
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility,
being appointed to other government posts, does not automatically forfeit
his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On
the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the
appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid
in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be
confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the
sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after
they have been appointed to another government office, while other
incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be
appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not
being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not
directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different
where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall
be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the
incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex
rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal,
130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or appointment to the
latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p

Political Law

388, 40 ALR 941)." Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons
holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another
office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to
incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any
attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).
AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including
Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not
mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the
House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the
House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than
the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained
OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in
any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which
petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's
power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September
1, 2005
Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a
law, only the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The
criteria for valid delegation are that:(1) Law is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and

Political Law

determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his

functions.
GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R.
No. 170338, December 23, 2008
It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he
did not get notice of. It consists of publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2)
and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication
via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state that the
rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA 8792,
an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. The rules must also be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it
is a continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules
state that they expire after every Senate.
BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914,
November 20, 1991
Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published
rules of procedure and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or
affected by the inquiries. Senator Enriles privilege speech that prompted the
committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation, only a call to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the
courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the
Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.
SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of
legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory
question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress right
to executive information in the performance of its legislative function. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department heads can only exempt
themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the
President on whom the executive power is vested and members of the
Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a collegial body as
co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question

Political Law

hour but not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege
is made by the President or Executive Secretary.
Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive
privilege, there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby
exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive
privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173,
December 27, 2007
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of
the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure

Political Law

of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role

in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate
under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be
couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the
import of the single title. Complying with the second directive is imperative
since the Constitution does not require Congress to read a bills entire text
during deliberations.
BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v.
PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No.
209251, November 19, 2013
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are
given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly
point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire
P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and
(b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.

Political Law

TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of
the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this
would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it stated that
savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for
legislative, instead of judicial determination.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section
39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as
otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for
programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the
regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or
increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings
except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever
authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another
within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts

Political Law

appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without,

however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department,
office or agency concerned.
On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to
approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in
the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to
cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such,
Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter
expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA
to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his
own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a
valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations
under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are
complied with.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation
were present, namely: 1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap
election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening to Pimentel's
advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power,
declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the
presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar
to prosecution. Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he
resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he would be
perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the
new President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text

Political Law

of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored. A preamble is really not an integral
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was
intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text
of the pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643,
September 4, 2008
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the
Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a
particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and
his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at
decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the
Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial
deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the
deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be
readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of
diplomatic
negotiations,
deliberative
process,
and
presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of
Sarmiento III vs. Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga,

Political Law

Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale; under

Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first
group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent
character.
The
Constitution
itself
makes
an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover adinterim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Political Law

DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA,

et al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013
The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to
the nature of the appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed
as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November
25, 2014
The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various
powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created.
While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation
and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the
concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman
sits as a member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his
position as CSC Chairman. Such being the case, the designation of Duque
was unconstitutional.
MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015
The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then
President Estrada of the grant of additional allowances and benefits. MIA
failed to prove its existence. The alleged approval of the President was
contained in a mere photocopy of the memorandum... The original was not
presented during the proceedings. A copy of the document is not in the
Malacaang Records Office.
Further, the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double
compensation proscribed by Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.
DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the
second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or

Political Law

May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8,
the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May
14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition
is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the
difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109
days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the
outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In
fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither
discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day
period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended
Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any
of the lower courts.
GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16,
2015
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those
appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010
even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the
country indirectly after the end of his term.
IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the
Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.
SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required
for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a
state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commanderin-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not the same as a
declaration of martial law.
DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take

Political Law

over privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented
by Pres. Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines
as an exercise of the Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent
in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending
to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging
the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power.
Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999
A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those
questions which under the constitution were 1) to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to which full discretionary authority
had been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of government.
Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality
of a particular measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by

Political Law

which its legality or constitutionality could be determined. A purely

justiciable issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242,
April 16, 2013
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were
indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very
clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of
its primary function to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers
arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three
(3) representatives from the major branches of government. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in
the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major
branch of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent
a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus,
misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the
entire Congress.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19,
2014
a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all
the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration
of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a
higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the
voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
becomes unanimous instead of the majority vote required in the
preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term integrity as
an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all
the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that integrity

Political Law

as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10

of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is
challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into
operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants
moral uprightness.
ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires
a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING
AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena
A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution.
It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials, save only for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee
who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any act or omission of a public
officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990
Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for
being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no
case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The SC agreed. The
appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the
independence of ConCom from the executive department.
DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

Political Law

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a

political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation
in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by
Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of
the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization
was not permanent and stable.
The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include
the Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any
political organization in a democracy. The test that the party must survive a
general congressional election was never laid down in jurisprudence. The
Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its
representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and
not merely temporary alliances or factional divisions without severance of
loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political alignments of
its members.
AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356,
December 3, 2013
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In
the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the
use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public
welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of
just compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are
property condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes
(e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety,
or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals) as well
as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to
the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a citys territory
into residential and industrial areas).

Political Law

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846,

January 20, 2009
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as
the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas
stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974
The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not
possess the property with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were
just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprive the
owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in
1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained
possession with a permanent character when the lower court granted them
such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50
4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The
proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April
24, 2012
Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just
compensation, the law on stock distribution option acknowledges that
landowners can require payment for the shares of stock corresponding to the
value of the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital stock of
the corporation.
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA,
WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA

Political Law

CAUSING vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY

ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA
AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due
process, the petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of
Cadet Cudia from the PMA. In order to be proper and immune from
constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated
from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific
charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or
her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and
other evidence. In the case at bar, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias
Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing
practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang.
He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that the case would
undergo. Thus, the petitioners could not argue that Cadet Cudia was not
afforded due process.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to
be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of
the PTCs investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that
violates equal protection. The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate
criminal prosecution and enjoys clear presumption of regularity and good
faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to overcome that

Political Law

presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a
preliminary step to selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a
discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has
sorely failed in discharging that burden.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5,
1973
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression,
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over
property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet
as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and
entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress
of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some
form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether
the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with
the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the

Political Law

utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which
the challenged act is assayed with.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the
cathedral which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who
supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered the latter to
dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a size
limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELECs breach of the
petitioners fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election.
Thus, the COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins
were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidates
therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the
petitioners advocacy against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit
to free speech of candidates during elections but do not limit the rights of
broadcasters to comment on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners,
as the petitioners are private individuals who have lost their right to give
commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin
removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the
tarpaulins is fundamentally part of protected speech, as it is important to
convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the electorate.
More importantly, every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party or partylist group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it
lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the
tarpaulins and their messages are not religious speech, as they do not
convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to
the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995

Political Law

Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and

derogatory of the courts and individual judges, is what is involved in the
proceeding at bar than which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more
appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it relates
to public comment about the courts and their workings within a
constitutional order.
SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec.
5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election
surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7 days before
the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys
covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates
their right to free speech and expression. The SC held that the resolution is
invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than suppression of freedom of expression.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA,
vs. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND
JOHN DOES,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common
Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR.
and ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where
he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase
"prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private,
including a business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras
are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover

Political Law

places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent

of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
Simply put, a person have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his
property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that
the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or
covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation
of their right to privacy.
AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997
Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him
from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner
alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of
public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied
the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which
appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new
designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The
governments goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious
goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government
and not to any church.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April
30, 1957
American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary
corporation distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines.
ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a
mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the
period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in
protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to seek a refund.
Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely
requires a mayors permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made
to apply to ABS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free
exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that
there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil, which the State has
the right to prevent.
EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1,
1993

Political Law

Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary

students from Cebu who were expelled for not participating in the flag
ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. As
Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to
their religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony
is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents
counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona
v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in
the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of
the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a
curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to
free education.
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)
The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such
program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and
constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is
protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any
imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the
show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of,
other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to
prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs power to
regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v
Ruiz regarding the Director of Posts power to check as to whether or not
publications are of a libelous character.
RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March
7, 1919
The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police
power.
CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be

Political Law

determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR
ALIAS NOY, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused
during custodial investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its
definition to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the
same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also
being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother
who accompanied him to the police station.
MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context
in which the Miranda doctrine applies when the official proceeding is
conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There
are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. The rights are
invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation
and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement
officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair analogy, Marieta may not be said
to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by
any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free
to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say
anything.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

Political Law

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful

arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is therefore a reasonable
exercise of the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested;
and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure
the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under
the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context
and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of
the law. Hence, a drug test can only be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To make
the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime
not listed under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase a person
apprehended or arrested in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. Moreover, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and
frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental
to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful
arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done
to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe whether
an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police

Political Law

officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones person
and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded
by this exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine reason
requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.
MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself.
GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014
Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to
libel; likewise with RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double
jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775.
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under
R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the time
of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to
have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease
Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed not

Political Law

to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase

under the conditions of this Act. It provides that those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002
A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a
U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a
requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The person may only be said to
have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he repatriates or by an act
of Congress, but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in
the residency requirement for elected officials. His status during that period
is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant visa and has waived his
status as a non-resident.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS,
G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from
judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is
a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a
Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine
citizen based on requirements required under CA 473.
ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928
Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was
registered to vote. After completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned
to Meycauayan and ran for office though his cancellation of voters
registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the
mails on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the Court explained that the
registration of a voter does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition
precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a
qualification.
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R.
No. 193314, February 26, 2013

Political Law

A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and

one cannot have two legal residences at the same time, otherwise the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649,
April 16, 2013
Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the
time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position. By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
205136, December 2, 2014
The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs.
The Court emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the
COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into
matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility
of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC. The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the
position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus, in simply
relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberlys
COC and denying the latters substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition
to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC
once more gravely abused its discretion.
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R.
No. 206698, February 25, 2014
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation
in the contents of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material
matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. Material

Political Law

misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to Qualifications

for elective office (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal
qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the
Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to
deceive the electorate.
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011
We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6646, contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any
way amend the period for filing "Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the
said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of
cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates
(retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino
v. Commission on Elections explains that "the procedure hereinabove
provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification
cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said
Act on nuisance candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that
the 25-day period for filing "sec. 78" petitions under the oec is changed to 5
days counted from the last day for the filing of COCs. The clear language of
Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference
in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for
another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that
repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court
unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy
that Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions,
was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we
therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23,
Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy."
SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March
19, 2013
The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua
non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is
thereby cancelled or denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly
substituted.
RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22,
2013

Political Law

When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest
number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398,
November 25, 2014
San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate
Ejercito. The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the
disqualification petition. In the said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito
was distributing an Orange Card with the intent to entice voters to vote for
him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable amount for campaign funds.
Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have been conducted
prior to the decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled
that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a
complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired
into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a
finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's
disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election,
the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the
said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.
PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009
Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election
campaigning before the campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A
candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable for an election offense for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period, when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan
political acts are lawful.
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Settled is the rule that

Political Law

the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The

COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition
of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting
the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as
achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an
ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It
involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the
people truly chose as their rightful leader.
ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B.
JULIA
G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014
It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second
District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of
the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District
as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District.
Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are
elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected
him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office
in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is disqualified to serve another term a
Sangguniang Member.
Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule,
does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he
labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by
another eligible person.
JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due
process for being considered a nuisance candidate even before a clarificatory
was even conducted. The SC ruled that nuisance candidates are persons who
file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus

Political Law

prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate." To

minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their
certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by
respondent. This denial or cancellation may be motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, subject to an opportunity to be
heard. Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for
office. Respondent had already declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
even before the clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity to
be heard.
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and
statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its
powers without limitations or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt
measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in
so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is
something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law.
The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has
consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If
ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with
sufficient basis. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal
mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the
law it is supposed to implement.
FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative
body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is
elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and
mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And
even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still
invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the
merits.
REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No.
147096, January 15, 2002
The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of
general circulation, thus, they did not take effect. Even though the 1993
Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in accordance with Section 3,

Political Law

Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative
act that gives rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules
by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies
specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of
general circulation is required before laws can take effect.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February
2, 2011
The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS
personnel, thus, there was no need to comply with the publication or filing
requirements. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines, interpretative
regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be filed
with the center.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No.
170599, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the
adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA
Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although
the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its
area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.

Political Law

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16,
2006
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can
enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.
Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)
Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its
own rates in order to compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses.
Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to the PSC the power of
fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to
Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new
rates will be just and reasonable.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)
Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with
the valuation of the land so it filed a petition for a determination of just
compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition
on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision
of the Adjudicator on the land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall
be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans petition in the RTC was
filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY
OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON.
SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R.
December 10, 2014

AS ACTING
ROGELIO L.
WORKS AND
No. 206661,

Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave

Political Law

offense. It amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave

offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense,
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act
of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible
deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is also an act
of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability
and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official
document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed
in one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of public accountability
shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven into the fabric
of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which
embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our
society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that they may be
demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to
apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our
public service.
SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007
All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant
positions and such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or
administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places.
The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they
have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this
case, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions
involved actually became vacant.
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES
UNION (CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE
PHILIPPINE, et al.,
G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014
Apropos then is the Courts ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy
Regulatory Board v. Barin, to wit: however, abolition of an office and its
related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office.
Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal
standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no
occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition
of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related
positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their
positions. Based on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in
the absence of any bad faith, we rule that the ATO employees right to
security of tenure was not violated.

Political Law

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1)
appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or
office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of
Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is
the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The defense of respondent Cortes that
her appointment was made by the Commission En Banc and that his father,
a member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his appointment did
not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought
to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the
deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence
and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.
VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014
The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city into a highly urbanized citys should be participated by the
qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija not of
Cabanatuan City only. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided
in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the
conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries"
involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration
of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should
not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of
the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs
exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a
qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of
the constitutional provision.
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE
MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014

Political Law

Designing and implementing a local government units own "organizational

structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and
reorganize. Without such power, local governments will lose the ability to
adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental
services especially at the local government level require rational and
deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to time.
However, the assailed decision by respondent Commission on Audit was
anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4968, which proscribes all supplementary retirement or
pension plans for government employees.
NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the
minimum land area requirement when the Local Government Unit to be
created consists of one or more islands is expressly stated in the Local
Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for the
creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of
the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR).
The omission of the exemption in the case of provinces was intended to be
corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true legislative intent. This
will also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy by construing
liberally the contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units in order to achieve the desired results.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27,
2000
The MMDAs power is limited to administration and implementation of metrowide services in Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a
public corporation endowed with legislative power nor police power to enact
ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down policies
and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011
The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the
deliberations showed that Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the
conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th
Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong
to a class of their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to
become component cities of their respective provinces (by being tourism
spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of

Political Law

transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural

resources).
AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
representative, but not for a province. Records of
Commission show that the population was not the sole
creation of a legislative district.

of the Constitution
to be entitled to a
the Constitutional
determinant of the

SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities.
Regional legislative bodies may be delegated the power to create
municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution
but only Congress may create provinces and cities.
ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The
Constitution is clear that the autonomous regions must consist of more than
one province, as the term region used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act
of the CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can
constitute an autonomous region; otherwise, the province will be composed
of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government Unit and another
set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive
and legislative powers over the same area.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702,
December 6, 1994
The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that
of a de facto municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the
case, such as the existence of governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying
the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality) that point to the
states recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code,
which states that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the
Code shall be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the
status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the legality of
EO 353 only thirty years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding

Political Law

assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision should be timely

raised.
SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009
The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA
under Sec. 286 is a mandate to the national government through the
Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the
said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units, free from
any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this
automatic realease of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent
the proper court from deferring or suspending its release to particular local
officials when there is a legal question presented in court as to the rights of
the parties to receive the IRA.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012
There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the National
Government under the General Appropriations Act, even if the said program
is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services involved in
the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National
Government, which it may designate to implementing agencies such as the
DSWD. The concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment of local
government units into mini-states, as what is involved in local autonomy is
decentralization of administration and not of power.
GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power
by virtue of the Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of
the construction of buildings. Property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police power, but the methods
and means used in exercising such power to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The
ordinance in question is valid as the citys primary goal in enacting it was to
increase health and safety of the city since these arcardes were intended to
provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for
pedestrians.
SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to reclassify land
within the jurisdiction of the city116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the

Political Law

Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by

another ordinance.
The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have
been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this
Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no
longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance
No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.
PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006
The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance
which served as its basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100
meters from any school, church or hospital, and not gasoline filling stations.
The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations and
gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there
was no due process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged
nuisance (Paraynos gasoline filling station) without proper judicial
proceedings.
CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L14355, October 31, 1919
Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public
purposes, the right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation in that where the statute does not designate the property to be
taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a particular property
is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on
expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land sought to be
expropriated is private but the second condition (public purpose) was not
met as it was not shown that the extension of the street was necessary and
its extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as
other lots have been offered to the city free of charge.
JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No.
152230, August 9, 2005
The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer.
Before a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain,
there must first be a) an ordinance enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property; b) The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required under

Political Law

Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There
was no offer because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to
the engineers office only proved its intent to acquire the property for a right
of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.
ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are
charges, making the municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there
was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local
Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes,
fees or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.
QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015,
March 6, 2006
Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually,
directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may
grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact
that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies the
power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and
limitations as Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily
vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local Government Code which
provides that a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan
Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property...not
hereinafter specifically exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to
thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government
units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this franchise in
Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayantes exemption from realty
taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power all of the franchisees
properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise.
MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt
from real estate tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers. An instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not

Political Law

extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation
imposed by Congress on the local governments exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities is construed strictly against local governments and the rule
is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be clear language in the
law imposing the tax.
QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008
While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec.
5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a
general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue and
they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other
taxes provision does not expressly provide in clear and unambiguous
language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of
tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown,
ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon Citys franchise tax.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16,
2008
Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise
did not expressly provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The
in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts legislative franchise did not expressly
and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national
taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national
internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.
SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open
a city street for public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents,
more important than this is the duty of a local executive to take care of the
needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs
liability due to defective streets, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of
his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers
merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object

Political Law

thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective streets in

particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is not liable because
the street where Teotico was injured was a national highway, the Court ruled
that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which
responsibility is placed. It is enough that the said province, city or
municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road.
TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978
The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly
fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta
even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the
town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the
state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of
income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service.
KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003
Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes
involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly
referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has
no application in this case since one party is an independent component city.
Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component
city, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used and as the
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to
hear and resolve the dispute in the case at bar.
SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in
the recall election as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition on serving for more than 3 consecutive
terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008

Political Law

Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity
of service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the
three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and he must have fully served
three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an interruption in
Potenciosos second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired
Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by
operation of law and does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office.
Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of
office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could
not be said to have fully served his second term and as such, he is entitled to
run for another term as municipal councilor.
MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003
The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently
unseated local elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity
of his re-assumption into his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and duly
sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and
exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to stop him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When
the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the
MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was occupying the
office of Barangay Captain was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath
was a mere formality, because through the stay of the MTCs decision, it was
as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.
VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the
term dual citizenship as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For
candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case,
Lopez should not be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez

Political Law

was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing
her Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the
loss of citizenship.
MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Manzano should not be disqualified because the dual citizenship meant in
Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification,
refers to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual
allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing
of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship. Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, shows his election of Philippine citizenship.
MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial
supervision over municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he
may submit written charges before the Provincial Board and suspend the
official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated under
Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be
considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial
Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner, there must
first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.
TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same
was null and void. The false representation here must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race, one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the
person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to deny due course
to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which
is the cancellation or denial of due course of the persons certificate, with the
said person not treated as a candidate at all as if she never filed a COC). A

Political Law

person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and
therefore cannot be substituted by another person.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of
those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public
order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so
bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept,
its full potential remains to be realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus
cogens. In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling
law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory
in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.
As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic,
and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps
are appropriate or necessary.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not

Political Law

reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken
any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant
to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and
enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."
Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)

Political Law

Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of
Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included
intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the civilian
population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court
convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are expected to result,
the attack should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a
reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or
her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the
attack.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts
Statute charging Pena-Irala, then the Inspector-General of the police in
Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The Court held that
deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary
international law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.