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Nel Noddings is well known for her work around the ethics of caring, however, she has
also added significantly to theory and practice more broadly in education. Here we
explore her contribution.
Extracts from:
Smith, M. K. (2004) Nel Noddings, the ethics of care and education', the encyclopaedia of informal
education, www.infed.org/thinkers/noddings.htm.
Caring
Nel Noddings is closely identified with the promotion of the ethics of care, - the argument that
caring should be a foundation for ethical decision-making. Her first major work Caring (1984)
explored what she described as a 'feminine approach to ethics and moral education'. Her argument
starts from the position that care is basic in human life - that all people want to be cared for
(Noddings 2002: 11). She also starts from the position that while men and women are guided by an
ethic of care, 'natural' caring - 'a form of caring that does not require an ethical effort to motivate it
(although it may require considerable physical and mental effort in responding to needs)' can have a
significant basis in women's experience (ibid.: 2). 'Natural caring', thus, is a moral attitude - 'a longing
for goodness that arises out of the experience or memory of being cared for' (Flinders 2001: 211).
On this basis Nel Noddings explores the notion of ethical caring - 'a state of being in relation,
characterized by receptivity, relatedness and engrossment' (op. cit.).
Sympathy
What caring actually means and entails is not that easy to establish. Nel Noddings' approach is to
examine how caring is actually experienced (what we might describe as a phenomenological
analysis). She asks "what are we like" when we engage in caring encounters? 'Perhaps the first thing
we discover about ourselves', she continues, 'is that we are receptive; we are attentive in a special
way' (Noddings 2002: 13). This attention shares some similarities with what Carl Rogers describes as
'empathy' (see Carl Rogers. core conditions and education). However, Noddings is cautious as
'empathy' is 'peculiarly western and masculine' in its Western usage (op. cit.). Instead she prefers to
talk about 'sympathy' - feeling with - as more nearly capturing 'the affective state of attention in
caring' (ibid.: 14).
Receptive attention is an essential characteristic of a caring encounter. The carer is open to what the
cared-for is saying and might be experiencing and is able to reflect upon it. However, there is also
something else here - motivational displacement. In other words, the carer's 'motive energy' flows
towards the 'cared-for'. The carer thus responds to the cared-for in ways that are, hopefully, helpful.
For this to be called 'caring' a further step is required - there must also be some recognition on the
part of the cared-for that an act of caring has occurred. Caring involves connection between the
carer and the cared-for and a degree of reciprocity; that is to say that both gain from the encounter
in different ways and both give.
A caring encounter, thus, has three elements according to Nel Noddings:
ensure that there are something like adequate material resources in homes where there are
children, there is little evidence of policymakers seriously grappling with how attentive love might be
fostered. Similarly, the question of education for home life is not normally addressed in anything like
an adequate form. Indeed, the whole orientation of schooling systems in most 'advanced capitalist'
countries is toward skilling for the needs of business and the economy. Some attention is paid to
personal, social and life education - but it generally remains woefully inadequate when set against
the demands of care theory. A further significant element here is the direction of a great deal of
educational philosophy and theory. For example, John Dewey talks about education in terms of
preparation for 'public life'. While it is possible to see what place education for home life might have
in this (and the extent to which caring-for is linked to the cultivation of caring-about) the way in
which education is often discussed in terms of public life can be seen as not taking full account of
what might be needed for personal flourishing.
A third element can also be seen as following from viewing the home as the primary educator, that
'schools should, as far as possible, use the sort of methods found in best homes to educate'
(Noddings 2002: 289). This has far reaching consequences and takes us into the arena of informal
education - and the appreciation and facility to move beyond understandings of education that are
centred around notions such as curriculum into more conversational and incidental forms.
Modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation
Nel Noddings has argued that education from the care perspective has four key components:
modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation.
Modelling. Within a care perspective, not unexpectedly, educators are concerned with the growth
of people as carers and cared-fors. Unlike cognitive developmentalists, for example, they are not
primarily interested in moral reasoning (although there is a recognition that reasoning is important.
Educators have to show in their behaviour what it means to care. We do not merely tell them to
care and give them texts to read on the subject, we demonstrate our caring in our relations with
them (Noddings 1998: 190)
Dialogue. The intent is to engage people in dialogue about caring. As Nel Noddings has pointed out,
dialogue is such an essential part of caring that we could not model caring without engaging in it
(op. cit.). In addition, it is also important to talk directly about, and explore, our caring as it can be
manifested in very different ways. It can, thus help people to critique and better understand their
own relationships and practice. In other words, it allows us to evaluate our attempts to care: As we
try to care, we are helped in our efforts by the feedback we get from the recipients of our care
(ibid.: 191). Furthermore, and crucially, dialogue contributes to the growth of cared-fors.
Practice. Nel Noddings (1998: 191) argues that the experiences in which we immerse ourselves tend
to produce a mentality. If we want to produce people who will care for another, then it makes
sense to give students practice in caring and reflection on that practice.
Confirmation. This particular component, it is suggested, sets caring apart from other approaches to
moral education. In making her case Nel Noddings draws particularly on the work of Martin Buber.
He describes confirmation as an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others (see Between
Man and Man).
When we confirm someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development. To do this we
must know the other reasonably well. Otherwise we cannot see what the other is really striving for,
what ideal he or she may long to make real. Formulas and slogans have no place in confirmation. We
do not posit a single ideal for everyone and then announce high expectations for all. Rather we
recognize something admirable, or at least acceptable, struggling to emerge in each person we
encounter. The goal or attribute must be seen as worthy both by the person trying to achieve it and
by us. We do not confirm people in ways we judge to be wrong. (Noddings 1998: 192)
Significantly, such confirmation involves trust and continuity. The latter is needed as we need
knowledge of the other (op. cit.) and the former as the career needs to be credible and to be capable
of handling explorations and what emerges sensitively.
Caring and ethical theory
Nel Noddings suggests that neither utilitarianism (making decisions on the basis of anticipated
consequences) nor deontology (principled reasoning) can provide a proper understanding of the way
women approached ethical questions and concerns. 'The approach through law and principle is not',
she suggested, 'the approach of the mother. It is the approach of the detached one, of the father'
(1984: 2). She does not argue that there are distinctively different approaches empirically typical of
men and women but rather looks to a 'feminine view' in 'the deep classical sense - rooted in
receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness' (op. cit.). Natural caring, such as that of a mother for a
child, according to Nel Noddings, comes before ethical caring and is preferable to it.
Ethical caring, the relation in which we do meet the other morally... [arises]... out of natural caring that relation in which we respond as one-caring out of love or natural inclination. The relation of
natural caring... [is] ... the human condition that we, consciously or unconsciously, perceive as
'good'. It is that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is our longing for caring - to be in
that special relationship - that provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be moral in
order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring. (Noddings
1984: 4-5)
She argues that the ethics of care reveals the old distinction between is and ought as a pseudo
problem.
We do not have to construct elaborate rationales to explain why human beings ought to treat one
another as positively as our situation permits. Ethical life is not separate from and alien to the
physical world. Because we human beings are in the world, not mere spectators watching from
outside it, our social instincts and the reflective elaboration of them are also in the world.
Pragmatists and care theorists agree on this. The ought better, the I ought arises directly in
lived experience. Oughtness, one might say, is part of our isness. .
In contrast ethical caring does have to be summoned. The I ought arises but encounters conflict:
An inner voice grumbles, I ought but I dont want to, or Why should I respond? or This guy
deserves to suffer, so why should I help? On these occasions we need not turn to a principle; more
effectively we turn to our memories of caring and being cared for and a picture or ideal of ourselves
as carers Ethical carings great contribution is to guide action long enough for natural caring to be
restored and for people once again to interact with mutual and spontaneous regard. (Noddings
1998: 187)
Care theory is seen as reversing Kantian priorities. Nel Noddings, by putting 'natural' caring above
ethical caring, takes the view that latter is instrumental in 'establishing or restoring' the former
(Noddings 2002: 30).
Some issues
One of the refreshing aspects of Nel Noddings' approach is that she attends to, and recognizes,
opposing views. This means that some of the key questions and issues about her approach are
signposted by her. Here we want to highlight three particular areas of debate around caring and
reciprocity; 'natural' caring and maternal experience; and the relationship of care theory to moral
truth.
Caring and reciprocity. Some might view the emphasis on caring (especially in the context of formal
education) as both presenting a range of potential conflicts with professional frames of reference
and as possibly patronizing. In the case of the former, there has been a general movement away
from more affective and expressive language to describe the tasks that teachers and other welfare
professionals undertake. A parallel example here has been the retreat from the language of
friendship in education. In significant part such issues come down to the context in which the frame
of reference is formed. What is 'professional' in one context may not be viewed as such in another and this is rather more a matter of political and philosophical orientation than of anything
intrinsically problematic about the notion of care. As to the latter - the charge of 'caring' being
potentially patronizing or one-sided in its experience - Nel Noddings answers this by placing a strong
emphasis, as we have seen, on reciprocity. This means that caring is a relation involving dialogue and
exchange. Both can learn and gain from the experience; both can appeal to principle. However, this
focus on reciprocity is far from simple. As David J. Finders (2001: 211) has pointed out, in unequal
relationships (such as student-teacher) things can become complex. 'Issues of time, intensity and
situational variations also have to be worked out, as do questions of what it means to care for nonhuman entities such as plants, animals, ideas and organizations'.
'Natural' caring and maternal experience. Nel Noddings makes significant use of a range of feminist
theories to develop her argument and, as such, she has is potentially open to a range of criticisms
concerning her approach around notions such as 'natural caring' and the importance of maternal
experience. She is able to sidestep a number of these (especially around 'essentialism') by insisting
that men too, can take caring as the basis for moral action. At the same time she is able to
differentiate between men and women both in terms of women's physical and emotional experience
around carrying and bringing children into the world, and the sociological and anthropological
evidence concerning their role in bringing up, and caring for, them. This said, some problems of
interpretation do remain. Notions such as 'natural' are not that straightforward - what is 'natural' in
one culture may not be in another, for example. However, Nel Noddings does take some care when
discussing 'natural caring' (see above).
The relationship of care theory to moral truth. Nel Noddings argues that she takes
phenomenological approach and the purpose of ethical phenomenology is not to prove some moral
truth. 'We may present a coherent and enlightening picture without proving anything and, indeed,
without claiming to present or to seek moral knowledge or moral truth (Noddings 1984: 3 - emphasis
as in original). As she reports in Starting at Home, some critics have suggested that care theory is
actually based on a principle despite what she has argued. She responds:
One might suggest as a basic principle: always act so as to establish, maintain or enhance caring
relations. A carer, however, does not refer to this principle when she responds to a person who
addresses her. The "principle" is descriptive, not prescriptive. The behaviour of carers is well
described by this principle, but their motivation arises either spontaneously (in natural caring) or
through deliberate reflection on an ideal of caring that has become part of their character.
(Noddings 2002: 30-1. Emphases as in the original)
This position overlaps in some significant respects with virtue ethics but Noddings' emphasis upon
the relational meaning of care does bring out some contrasts (to gain a flavour of these see the
debate between Michael Slote and Nel Noddings).
In summary
Overall, it must be judged that Nel Noddings has made a substantial contribution to deepening our
appreciation of what education entails - both in terms of the direction it takes (education for public
and home life), and around the significance of caring. She shows us that caring is a moral attitude
'informed by the complex skills of interpersonal reasoning, that it is neither without its own forms of
rigour nor somehow less professional than the calculated skills of formal logic' (Finders 2001: 214).
In this respect she provides us with a further illumination of the ways in which 'good' practitioners
think (see, also Donald Schn and reflective practice).
Noddings, Nel. Educating for intelligent belief or unbelief The John Dewey lecture. New York:
Teachers College Press, 1993.
Noddings, Nel. Philosophy of education Dimensions of philosophy series. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1995.
Noddings, Nel, and Paul J. Shore. Awakening the inner eye : intuition in education. New York:
Teachers College Columbia University, 1984.
Witherell, Carol, and Nel Noddings. Stories lives tell : narrative and dialogue in education. New York:
Teachers College Press, 1991.
O'Toole, K. (1998) 'Noddings: To know what matters to you, observe your actions', fxStanford Online
Report, February 4, 1998. http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/1998/february4/noddings.html
Slote, M. (1999) 'Caring versus the philosophers', Philosophy of Education,
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/1999/slote.asp. Accessed December 6, 2004.