Scribd Logo
Cargar

¡Te damos la bienvenida a Scribd!

  • Izard 1994

    Cargado por

    Dariana Romero
    12 vistas12 páginas
    las emociones desde la neurología

    Título original

    Izard1994

    Derechos de autor

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Formatos disponibles

    PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd

    ¿Le pareció útil este documento?

    ¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

    Denunciar este documento
    las emociones desde la neurología

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd
    Marcar por contenido inapropiado
    12 vistas12 páginas

    Izard 1994

    Cargado por

    Dariana Romero
    las emociones desde la neurología

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd
    Marcar por contenido inapropiado
    de 12
    Prcepalnaece, BEC TSERSIRSS!-a00 Innate and Universal Facial Expressions: Evidence From Developmental and Cross-Cultural Research Carroll E. Izard ‘The idea of innate and universal facial expressions that have links with human emotions was _ziven the status of scientific hypothesis by Darwin (1872/1965). Substantial evidence, old and ‘ew, supports his hypothesis. Much ofthe evidence is independent of language, but Russell's (1994) criticisms of the hypothesis focus on language dependentdata, Inthisartile itis argued that Russell's critique was off target in that his arguments relate only to a hypothesis of the universality of semantic atibutions and overstated in that he used questionable logic in designing studies tosupporthis claims. tisalsoargued that Russell misinterpreted the relation between the universality hypothesis and differential emotions theory. Finally, newevidenceis resented thatsupportsthe Darwinian hypothesis of the innateness and universality ofthe facial, expressions ofa limited setof emotions and the efficacy ofthe mostcommonly used method of testingit ‘The purpose of this article isto present new evidence and argu- ‘ments for the innateness and universality ofa limited set of facial expressions of emotions. | attempt to demonstrate that Russell (1994) overstated hiscriticismsof the data supporting the universal- ity hypothesis and did not accurately assess the relevance of the universality data or his criticisms for differential emotions theory. [Newevidence from studies of emotion recognition shows the robust- ness of the forced-choice format for assessing the accuracy of subjects’ classification of facial expressions intoemotioncategorie. Although the language-dependent data that Russell (1994) cit ized may never convince everyone, asubstantial body oflanguage- independentevidence supporsthehypothesisoftheinnateness and universality ofat least some of the patternsof facial movements that signal emotion states in human and nonhuman primates and other species (Chevalier-Skolnikoft, 1973; Darwin, 1872/1965; Harlow, 1962; Mason, 1985; Sackett, 1966, vanHooff, 1962). Thisevidence and that from the language-lependent methods are consistent with the separate and much older popular notion that specificexpressions ‘may be either signs or symbols of specific feelings and intentions Inthe framework of folk psychology, aparticular expression ike asmile isa sign when theres sufficient converging information to indicate that theexpresserishappy orexperiencingjoy.A smile may bbeonly asymbol, withouta simultaneous underlyingjoy experience, whenitisasetofcortcally mediated facial movernents used merely Editor's Note land's rebttal andthe ove by Eksvan that procedes it were prepared in response to an invitation from the Bulletin to write replies that ‘would appear in the same issue withthe target article by James Ruse. The Rossel atc inadvertently appeared alone inthe January issue. “This work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BND, s706146 ‘Correspondence concerning his article shouldbe addressed to Caroll E. 1uard, Department of Psychology, 220 Wolf Hall, University of Delaware, Newaik, Delaware 19716-2577 288 as a social grecting or to deceive the observer. However, even the status of the cortical smile as a symbol is due to the frequent association ofthe genuine smile with concomitant feelings of joy. I refer to the popular belief in an association between a specific ‘emotion expression and aspecific corresponding conscious experi- ence emotion feeling, feltaction tendency, or motivational state) as the expression-feeling link. Russell’s (1994) review focused on the question as to whether “emotions are universally recognized from facial expressions” (p. 103). This use of the term emotion apparently identifies it withthe ‘experiential or conscious component of emotion. I thisis the case, Russell's question might be more precisely phrased in terms of the cexpression-feeling link or in terms ofthe question as to whether specificemotionexpressions are associated with specificconscious experiences. And this question clearly has two facets. First i there sufficientregularityin the correspondence between particularemo- tion expressions and particular conscious experiences or feeling sates to justify classifying the expressions in terms of the verbal ‘categories that describe the conscious states? In the pages that follow, I presenta case for an affirmative answer to this question. ‘The second part of the issue of an expression-feeling link is that if one assumes substantial regularity in correspondence of specific expressions and specific feelings or genetically influenced connec: tions amongthem, thencanexpression-feclingrelationsbemodified through experience, even othe point at which emotion expressions and emotion feeling states become dissociated? Common observa tion overeons, as wellas modern empirical research, indicates that ‘sometimes the message ina voluntarily controlled facial expression ‘may be unrelated to the corresponding feeling, ambiguous, or deliberately deceptive (ef. Ekman, 1994) There appears to be an evolutionary-biologically based connec: tion between particular expressive behavior anda particular feeling Cor motivational state, but this connection can be uncoupled or ‘modified by virtue of thecapacity ofhumanand nonhuman primates toexercite voluntary contol over innate emotion expressions (lurgens &Ploog, 1970, 1981). That voluntary control of expressive behavior isapparentlyafaily recent developmentin phylogeny (P!oog. 1986) INNATE AND UNIVERSAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 289 suggests thatthe modifiability of connections between feeling or ‘motivational states and expressions might be indicative of the ‘complexity ofthe species" social life andthe capacity fordeveloping social-cognitive skills. To have the very sizable repertoire of self- revealing signals of higher primates without thecapacity oregulate them would seem a highly maladaptive, if not fatal, tum of nature. Undoubtedly, natural selection saved us from this awkward fate Ancient Origins of the Expression—Feeling Link Despite the imperfectrcliability and modifiability ofexpression— feeling relations, the need for veridicality of expressions as an indicator of feelings and intentions in situations critical to social relationships, adaptive behavior, and survival Andrew, 1963) sug- ‘gests that the idea ofan expression-feeling link was a precursor of the formal hypothesis of the innateness and universality of certain facial expressions. There is, as Russell (1994) observed, a widely beldandapparently pancultual beliefin the expression-fecling link: the power of the face to reveal feelings, intentions, and even character or personality. Russel (1994) traced the idea of an expression-feeling link to ‘Aristotle, bt itis much older than that. There are clear indications ‘ofageneral acceptance of theideain Homer and in the Bible Perhaps itisabiosocial givenoraffordance(. Gibson, 1966;Neisser, 1976). (One ofthe prophets quoted God as saying that “My fury shall come vp in my face” (Ezekiel 39:18). And Homer depicted belief in the expression-feeling link poignantly in an episode in which two of ‘Agamemnon’ ides had t confrontthe mighty warrior, Akhilleus: “Shamefaced, pale with fear of him, they stood without a word; but the knew what they felt" (Homer, Iliad Book One, p. 22). Nooneknows who made thefirstattribution aboutthe meaning of ‘facial expression. Chances are good thatthe atribution was made ‘automaticaly, silently, and without benefitoflanguageby one of our primate ancestorsinanefforttoadaptand survive cf. Andrew, 1963, 1965), Ethologists and primatologists generally agree that at least some of these simian signals were emotion specific and not just positively or negatively valenced (Chevalier Skolnikoff, 1973; Hauser, 1993; Mason, 1985), ‘The Vicissitudes of Human Facial Expressions Despite the testimony of venerable observers andtheevidence and arguments of ethologists and evolutionists, doubt and controversy have probably always challenged the reliability of the expression— feeling link. Inmustering hismen forbatle, Shakespeare's Henry V said, “Disguise fair nature with hard favout'drage.... then end the eyeaterribleaspect... let the browo'erwhelmit“ (Henry V, Act! Scene IV). But Shakespeare's Duncan, afte learning thatthe Thane ‘of Cawdor, a longtime friend, had treasonously deceived him, said, “Thereisno arttofind the mind'sconstructionin theface” (Macbeth, ‘Act I, Scene IV), Few doubt that people observe facial expressions and habitually make inferences about the expresser’s feelings and intentions, but thedebate aboutthe veridicality of messagesin the face and concem ‘with the noise or unreliability inemotion communication arequite likely aboutasoldas the practice of makinginferences.'Therecanbe litle doubt that there is degree of inaccuracy in interpreting facial expressions in daily life and in the laboratory. As already noted, evolution and adaptation required that human beings be genetically endowed with the capacity w selfregulate, manipulate, and alter expression-feelin relations in keeping with the perceived contin- sgencies of veridcal expression in socal interactions. Ths may be ttuc of nonhuman primates as well, forithas been shown tha they have somecortical eontroloverinnate vocal expressions ofemotons (lrgens & Ploog, 1970; loog, 1986). Inaddition, muchof thenoiseinemotion communication through facial expression can reasonably beattributedtocivilizationandits constrains, Socialization processes and social learning aimed at controlling and modifying emotion expressions and expression feelingselations begininearly infancy and have measurable effects by 4 to 6 months of age (Camras, Oster, Campos, Miyake, & Bradshaw, 1992;Malatesta& Haviland, 1982). Yet, despitethe fact thatexpresions can be voluntarily managed to conceal subjective feeling states or simply for purposes of communicating with or influencing conspecifics, theideaof anexpression-Feeling ink lives on. Though not held in blind faith, it remains a common belief becauseitis generally consistent with what actually happensinmany socialexchanges. Darwin and the Idea of an Expression—Feeling Link Russelland Ihave different perspectives on thehistory of theidea of an expression-feeling link and the universality hypothesis. T disagree with his implication that Darwin was justanother believer. ‘The idea ofan expression—feeling link was for many millennia just that, an idea or folk belief abstracted from common observation or zeligious doctrine, Pre-Darwin scientists, whom evolutionists now describe as creationists, studied facial expressions in awe of what God had wrought (ef. Russell, 1994) Darwin brought anentirely different perspective. Hisideasabout knowledge through experience and observation, hypothesis formu Jation, and hypothesis testing area lot like what we hearin modern ‘courses on scientific method. Whereas evidence against an expres- sion-feeling link might have been seen by Bell (1806/1966) and Duchenne de Boulogne (1876/1990) as heresy, it would have been seen by Darwin as data calling for a change in postion "have steadily endeavored to keep my mind fee, 808 give up any hypothesis, however beloved (and I cannot resist forming one onevery subject). assoonasfactsareshowntobe opposed tot. Indeed Thave had ‘0 choice but to acti this manner, for with the exception ofthe Coral Reefs, cannot remember a singe fist formed hypothesis that had nat after sine tobe given up or greatly modified. (Darwin, 1887/1958, p 141) ‘The central thesis ofthis artcleis that the expression-feelingidea of Homer, Ezekiel, Aristotle, and Shakespeare has become more tan a robust folk belief. I was given the status of a scientific hypothesis by Darwin, both by virtue of his attitude (willingness to ‘modify it in the face of contrary evidence) and by his observations that placed human facial expressions in evolutionary-biological perspective. Darwin's (M Notebook, 1838/1974; 1872/1965) ex- planation ofthe origin of discrete emotions and ther expressionsis ‘consistent withthe contemporary conceptof modularity (the decom- posability of the apparent wholeness of complex systems into relatively independent and dissociable units or modules). Gould (1993) defended Darwin's use of the principle of modularity as an ‘explanatory concept for discrete emotions and argued forts appli- ‘ability tothe domains of human talent and cognition. 290 ‘CARROLL B. IZARD Darwin's treatise on emotions, The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animal (1872/1965), 33 yearsin the making, inspired not only the research on facial expressions now being debated, bt work fon the neuroanatomy and the biological and social functions of ‘emotions (e.., Izard, 1989; Kling, 1986; LeDoux, 1987; Lorenz, 1965; Panksepp, 1986). So the culture-common idea that specific ‘expressionsareassociated with specificemotionstates took the form of the scientific hypothesis of the innateness and universality of ‘emotion expressions inthe hands of Darwin, He was keenly aware ‘ofthe work ofhis predecessors ike Bell (1806/1966) and Duchenne de Boulogne (1876/1990), and in his early years he was an avid reader of Shakespeare. Yet he was able to add the perspective and insight that changed a folk belief into a testable hypothesis. Russell's (1994) critique did not directly address the innateness— hypothesis (TUH). He focused on an aspect ofthe folk belief about expression-feeling relations or subjects’ ability 10 associate verbal representations of subjective emotion states with ‘posed facial expressions as measured by emotion-recognition and ‘emotion-labeling techniques. Both of these techniques of assessing emotion knowledge are language dependent, the former depending ‘on recognition memory and the latter on recall memory. Russell's (1994) critique is about the universality of semantic attributions to facial expressions, or the semantic attribution hypothesis. Although ‘much of the data that relate in any way to the IUH came from ‘emotion-recognition and emotion-labeling studies, there are, as already noted, other mportanttypesof supporting data (see Ekman, 1994) Russell's (1994) critique of thecross-culturalemotion recognition and emotion- labeling research and some new data of his own seems tosuggestthatitis time for us staunch supporters of theTUHto show ‘our Darwinian colors and modify the hypothesis (See Ekman, 1994, forcommentsregarding the accuracy of Russll’streatmentof other scholars who have studied facial expression.) That may be the case, but believe that what Russell's review requires us tomodify ae the impressions and inferences that have heen drawn fromthe research relating to the IU. Note that data supporting the semantic attribu- tion hypothesis are only one of the kinds of evidence that can be ‘marshalled in support ofthe TUH. Universality Hypotheses and Emotion Theory Before developing the empirically based arguments, I present a, few comments in response to Russell's (1994) statements about the relation of the universality hypotheses to my differential emotions theory (DET). The universality ofcertainexpression-feelinglinks— ‘or, more pertinent to Russell's review. the equivalence of emation labels across cultures asindexed inadultsubjecs through language- dependent techniques-—may have litte to do with DET's central thesis. The overarching principle of DET is that emotions (which consist of neural, expressive, and experiential components) are inherently adaptive and that each discrete emotion has unique ‘organizational and motivational properties (Izard, 1989, 1991, 1992) Clearly, however, evidence for natural connections between specific expressions and specific motivational-feeling states and evidence for the IUH strengthen the biosocial-developmental emphasis in DET. Russell (1994) quoted the following statement: “Emotion at one Jevelisneuromuscularactivity inthe face” (izard,1971,p.188).One ceaninger from this statementthatemotionexperience (motivational feeling state) is dependent on facial expression or, atleast, that expression is alwaysan integral part of emotion, 'm not sure that | ever meant for that inference to be made without qualification. At any rate, DET has been modified a numberof times since its frst formulation, and ater versionsallow for thecomplete independence ofexpression and feling (Izard, 1977). Current DET views expres- sive-behavior feedback as only one of four different systems for ‘emotion activation (Lard, 1993), Idonotmean to denigrate the signficanceof theidea of universal facial expressionsin the original formalationof DET orinitscurrent hypotheses relating to expressive-behavior development and the ‘development of interpersonal relationsin the prelingvalinfant. Yet, ‘evenin these cases, the idea of innateness and universality of facial cexpressionsininfancy (asa function of ourevolutionary-biological heritage) is more important to DET than is confirmation of the semantic attribution hypothesis with adult subjects who have had ‘many yearstolearnto inhibitand modify facial behaviorstosuittheir individual personalities and their culture. PPechaps these thoughts help explain why my cross-cultural re- search focused on demonstrating the human capacity to recognize facial expressions of emotions and not on the veridicality and "universality of spontaneous expressions in daly fe. Ibelieve there is veridicality in spontaneous expressions when they are free of personal and cultural bias regarding thei display. Inthe following ppages, I argue that there is universality in recognition of facial expressions when the expressions meet certain criteria, These crite riaare difficultto state in purely theoretical terms, butthey relate to the communicative functions of expressions inevolution and adap- tation. However, even ifthe criteria were absolutely clear and all ‘expression stimuli metthem exactly, thereare several reasons notto ‘expect perfect correspondence among emotion words and emotion expressions (Izard, 1971), ‘The Ecological Validity of Facial Expressions Russell (1994) stated that ultimately the question ofthe universal- ity of emotion expressions is about what happens in natural situa- tions. One could put this the other way around. What happened in natural situations (Darwinian selection processes) brought about the innateness and universality of facial expressions. Ifexpressions are anything, they area functional communication system that preceded language in evolution and that precedes language in ontogeny. Arguably, twasthe relatively specific messages ofdiscreteemotion expressions that facilitated the evolution of primate social life. Hamburg (1963) maintained that emotions were critical in the evolutionary process, serving many important functions, some of which scem tobe dependent on emotion-specific communications ‘Andrew (1963) argued that primate facial expressions evolved because they were effectivein social communication, Mason(1985) concluded thatin rhesus monkeys, species-fypical motoric patterns of facial expressions are innate relatively impervious to environ- ‘mental influences, elictedby certain stimulus situations onthe same predictable schedule in all individuals (despite preat variations in rearing conditions), and stable overtime in signal value, The signal value holdsevenafterthe monkeyshaveleamed to simulate expres- sions to manipulate social events. Inhumanevolution, effective communication situations where adaptive response or even survival was at stake would seem tohave called foremotion-specific communication and not merely expres INNATE AND UNIVERSAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 291 sive behavior consistent with broad dimensions of experience such as valence and arousal. To see the point more clearly, imagine an adult and juvenile trampling through the savannah when the leading. foot of the adult lands adjacent toa stimulus thatshould be avoided: afoul-smelling, deteriorating carcass. Thishappens again, buton the second occasion the stimulus is a deadly viper. A display on both ‘occasions that was consistent only with undifferentiated negative arousal would provide the railing juvenile with itl information for Tearningto discriminateadisgusting encounter fromaterrifyingand deadly encounter. Surely, the speed and repertoire of behavioral responses in the two situations need tobe different tobe adaptive ‘Although all developmental psychologists do not agree on the time of emergence of discrete facial expressions, few doubt their significance in socioemotional development. Ithasbeen well docu- mented that discrete facial expressions of human mothers have predictable and differential effects inregulatingtheiinfants’ behav jor in happy circumstances and in what can be perceived as @ ‘dangerous situation (Malatesta & Haviland, 1982; Sorce, Emde, ‘ampos, & Klinnert, 1985). Nevertheless, Russell (1994)is correct innoting the scarcity ofthe ecological validity of spontaneous adult expressions Conceptual Components of the IUH. ‘The IUH has two distinct components: inateness and universa- ity. tis conceivable that a facial expression could be innate but not displayed in adults ofall cultures. This could be explained in terms of cultural differences in socialization and in genetically based individual differences inthe neural substrates that serve expression encoding. Conversely, an expression mightbeuniversalnot because itisinnate,butbecause of culture-constantlearing. Furthermore, an expression might be inaate and universal but show individual and coltral variability inthe semantic meaning attributed tot. Russell (1994) cite data on facial exprssionsin the bom bind, the ontog- eny of expressions inearly infancy, and comparisonsof expressions in different cultures and granted that some patterns of facial move- tment are universal, I guess that he might also agree that these universal expressions arealso innate Treview additonal evidence forthe innateness of facil expros- sions because, ike Darwin, believe thatthe universality ofexpres- sionsisrootedintheirinnateness. However, Russell (194) demon- strated thatitis possible wo disregard the inatenessissue and grant that there are some universal expressions and still raise critical «questions about the semantic atsibution hypathesis—theuniversal- ityofcorrectoreross-culturally reliable atributionsofthesemantc ‘meaning of expressions. The thrust of Russell's (1994) argumeatis that we have not established the hypothesis of universal semantic anuibutionsasitrlatestodisereteemotion expressions particularly certainnegativeemotion expressions. Heddnotaddress the UH ot the supporting data from prelingual infants derived through such language-independent methodsas the anatomically based objective coding ystems (eg .Ekiman & Fiesen, 1978 Izard, 1979; Oster & Rosenstein, in press) {think that methods dependent on language and semanticattribu- tion are not the best way to establish the IUH. Objective coding systems to establish onfogenies of facial expressions inthe born blind, cross-cultural comparisons of the ontogeny of expressions through naturalistic observation, anderost-culturaleomparisons of expressive responses to standardized eliciting events are examples of stronger methods. However, Russell's (1994) review focused on the research based on the language-dependent methods relevant to the semantic attribution hypothesis, because it was largely the impact of this research that put the idea ofthe universality of facial expressions intocontemporary psychology textbooks. Overview of Arguments for the 1UH. Despite the foregoing distinction between the semanticatribution hypothesis and the IUH, my first argument bears onthe innateness ccomponentof the IUH, because Ithink iti of importance inits own ‘ight independentof the semanticissues relating toemotion-tecog- nition and emotion-labeling techniques and the semantic attribution hypothesis, For example, firm knowledge of the innateness and universality of a set of facia expressions has far-reaching implica tions for cross-cultural research on socialization and its effects on normal and abnormal development (Izard & Harris, in press; ard & Malatesta, 1987). Thesupporting data for this argumentareindepen- dentoflanguage-dependent methods. The gistof theargumentisthat evidence on the ontogeny of facial expressionsineatly development supportsthe notion that certain facial expressionsareinnateand that their innateness links them to the human evolutionary-biological heritage and hence to universality My second argument is that there is not much weong with what Russell (1994) identified as the forced-choice format that 1 and others use for assessing subjects" ability to classify facial expres- sions into emotion categories. Given thatithas some ofthe inherent ‘weaknesses of any language-dependent method, the results were rather robust support for the IUH (ef. Ekman, 1994). My third argumentisthat fixing the forced-choice formatby adoptingsomeot ‘Russell's (1994) suggestions doesnot change profoundly the kindof results reported in my early eross-cultural research (Izard, 1971), Facial Expressions in Early Infancy Because no one denies that some discrete emotion expressions existin adulthood, evidence ofthe existence of these same expres- sions in early infancy would be consistent with the IUH. Evidence that young infants can discriminate discrete emotion expressions ‘would also support the IUH. In presenting data relating to discrete ‘emotion expressions in early (preverbal) infancy, Tam aware that such evidence can support the IUH without having a direct bearing (on the semantic attribution hypothesis. The encoding, and even aspects of the decoding, of expressions is quite different from the ‘business of matching words with expressionsorthe taskof verbally labeling expressions. The Ontogeny of Facial Expression Encoding ‘Weexamined the ontogeny offacialexpressions inapproximately 100 infants, who were observed during mother-infantinteractionsat ages2.5,3.0,4.5,6,9.0,and9.5 months (Izard, Haynes, Fantauzz0, Slomine, & Castle, 1993). There weretwotypesofconditions. Inthe positive conditions, mothers playfully expressed interest and joy facially and vocally. In the negative conditions, mother assumed a still and silent face or expressed sadness or anger facially and vocally, High reliability was obtainedin coding theinfants’expres- sions with Max Izard, 1979) and Affex (ard, Hembree, Dougherty, & Spizzirsi, 1983), 292 By 2.5 months, infants encoded full-face and partial expressions, of interest, joy, sadness, and anger with sufficient frequency of statistical analysis. The basic morphology of these expressions (pattems of muscle movements and appearance changes) remained stable through the first 9 months. Furthermore, the same Max- ‘dentiiedpatternsof fecal movements presentedin theadultexpres- sions used in my original cross-cultural research (Izard, 1971). Although these movements were too infrequent for formal analysis, the infants also displayed surprise, disgust, and fear with the same facial movements that characterize these expressions in adults. We also demonstrated that these infant emotion expressions were reli- ably recognized by adults (see also Emde, Gaensbauer, & Harmon, 1976; Ieard, Hucbner, Risser, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980; and see Oster, Hegley, & Nagel, 1992, foradifferent point of view), ‘As Russell (1994) noted, some researchers have challenged the notion that Max-specified expressionsin very young infants younger than 2 or 3 months) are accompanied by corresponding emotion- specifiemental (feeling-motivational state (Camras,1992;Matias & Cohn, 1993; Osteretal., 1992). However, the expression-feeling congruence hypothesis (Izard & Malatesta, 1987), as it relates 10 carly infancy, isa separate issue from either the IUH or the idea of an expression-feeting link in older children and adults Even investigators who disagree with the idea that thereisexpres- sion-feeling congruence in very young infants have obtained evi- ‘dence of the identity of emotion expressions in infants of widely ifferent cultures. During an experimental procedure that included armrestraint, American and Japanese 5-mmonth-old infants produced ‘anatomically identical Max-specified expressions of anger most frequently, but also enjoyment, fear. and sad-anger and sad—fear blends (Camras etal, 1992). Camrasetal. interpreted the observed infant expressions as variants of distress or ery faces, yet they concluded thattheir cross-cultural evidence of young infantsencod. ing identical expressionsin response to the same event was support for tho TUK. The Ontogeny of Emotion Expression Decoding ‘Sackett (1966) reared rhesus monkeys in complete socal iso tion, and from ther Ist weeks oflife, he exposed them to photographs (rear-projected slides) of juvenile and adult monkeys. The photo- graphs included facial expressions ranging from the play face (comparableto the humaninterestexpression) to the threat and fear faces (which have components similar to the human anger and fear expressions). Primatologists agree on the meaning of these expres- sions in monkeys (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973; vanHiooff, 1967). ‘Theisolate-eared monkeys responded differentially and appropri ately to other monkeys’ expressions. They did not make their first appropriate response to friendly and threatening expressions at the same age, butona schedule similar to thatof the maturation of what Harlow (1971) called the affectional, aggressive and fear systems. They responded to friendly expressions with play faces well before they responded with ear faces and avoidant behaviors tothe threat expression, ‘Human infants are characterized by an innate preference for looking atthe face whenitis in competition withotherstimuli (Fante, 1963, 1965, 1966; Stechler, 1964). Infants 2 months of ageshowed ‘more interest expressions and attention (looking time) to a live hhuman face than to the face of a mannequin or an inanimate object wih scrambled facial features(Langsdorf, ard, Rayias, &Hembree, ‘CARROLL E, IZARD 1983), Reviews of the literature on the development of emotion ‘recognition inhuman infants agree that infants iscriminatebetween positive and negative expressions by about 3 months and among ‘negative expressionsby 6or7 months e.g.Nelson, 1987),Ludemann and Nelson (1988) demonstrated that infants of 7 months could represent oy and surpriseexpressions categorically, but Ludemann and Nelson failed to show thatthe infants could discriminate these expressions from the fear expression. However, Serrano, Iglesias, and Locches (1992) used a habituation-recovery procedure and ‘concluded thatinfantsof4to 6 months discriminated andrecognized anger, fear, and surprise expressions. Each type of expression was portrayed by several different models, and discrimination general- ined across models. The foregoing evidenceisstronger support for the IUH than forthe semanticattribution hypothesis, Infants’ bility todiscriminate and categorize facial expressions does nottellus when orhow they come {oderiveinformation fromanexpression that could motivate behav jor appropriate to that expression. Such discrimination and catego- ‘ization certainly tel us nothing about the derivation of semantic information fromexpressions. Eventhe categorization andrepresen- tation of some types of expressions may require some amount of visual experience with those expressions (cf. Ludemann & Nelson, 1988),and surely the derivationofsemanticinformationrequiresthe acquisition of receptive vocabulary and perhaps extensive social learning as well Monkey and human infants of only a few months of age can tell ‘usalotaboutthe recognition and categorical representation of facial expressions, but they cannot tell usanything about matching expres- sions with names of emotion categories (emotion recognition) orthe free-response labeling of expressions (emotion labeling). Ipropose that individual and cultural differences inthe basic processes that lead to emotion-recognition and emotion-labeling abilities help explain why emotion labeling scoresare always ower than recogni- tion scores by a substantial margin and why recognition scores can vary with the manipulation of the sort of variables identified by Russell (1994), There are anumber of important questions here that require more researc, How Bad Is the Forced-Choice Format? Russell's (1994) review was critical of the method most fre- ‘quently usedin the early cross-culturalemotion-recognition studies. ‘The principal features ofthe procedure consist of expression photo- ‘graphs and emotion categories selected by a priori criteria and a ‘multiple-choice response format in which the number of response options is determined by the number of hypothesized emotion categories. Russel called this the forced-choice format and argued that it had several characteristics, which, taken together, might influence responses.n favor ofthe semantic attsibution hypothesis, and, indirectly, the TUHL However, the forced-choice format did notnecessarily lead toan overestimation of emotion-recognition accuracy, depending on the 4efinitionof recognition accuracy. As Russell (1994) observed, the goal of my cross-cultural research was to tet the hypothesis that people of different cultures had the capacity to identify aparticular set of facial expressions in terms of a particular set of a priori categories. intended this research to provide evidence for the UH, Dut the evidence is actually more directly related to the semantic. attribution hypothesis, because the methods were dependent on INNATE AND UNIVERSAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 293 language and meaning attribution. Itwas because lsoughtevidence (of people's capacity to identify a limited set of expressions that 1 ‘selected emotion categories and expression exemplars by certain criteria. This is quite different from the very important question of theaccuracy with which people attribute meaningto thespontaneous expressions of daily life. “The selection of expressions and emotion categories (emotion- recognitionresponse options) was guidedby existingempirical data ‘as wel as the theories of Darwin (1872/1965) and Tomkins (1962, 1963) and DET. The idea was that an evolutionary-biosocial ap- proach to understanding emotions suggested that limited number of facial expressions could be given corresponding categorical rubrics and that subjects in different cultures could match expres- sions and categories. Tthink the forced-choice format, perhaps with some modification, is an acceptable method for estimating adult subjects” capacity 10 classify facial expressions intoemotioncategories. Thisisespecially soifthereissome theory to guide the selection of emotion categories orlabels and the expressions that exemplify them. Darwin's (1872/ 1965) theory provides the general principle that in evolution the expressions served communicative functions and motivated adap- tive behavior in observing conspecifics (cf. Andrew, 1963). “The forced-choice format, in keeping withthe Darwinian tradi- tion, assumes thatemotionscanbeadequatcly described or classified interms of categories. Inthe domainofexpressions,asctofemotion categories is tantamount tothe idea ofa limited set of discrete and

    También podría gustarte