Title 2

CRIMINAL
LAW 1 REVIEWER

TITLE II: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR

FELONIES

Article 16. Who are criminally liable.
The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
3. Accessories
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices

POINTS

I. Treble Of Division Of Persons Criminally Liable
The treble division of persons criminally liable for an offense
rests upon the very nature of their participation in the
commission of the crime.
When a crime is committed by many, without being equally
shared by all, a different degree of responsibility is imposed
upon each and every one of them. In that case, they are
criminally liable either as principals, accomplices or accessories.

II. Accessories Are Not Liable For Light Felonies
Reason: in the commission of light felonies, the social wrong as
well as the individual prejudice is so small that penal sanction is
deemed not necessary for accessories.

III. Rules Relative To Light Felonies:
1. Light felonies are punishable only hen they have been
consummated (Article 7).
2. But when the light felonies are committed against persons or
property, they are punishable even if they are only in the
attempted or frustrated stage of execution. Only principals and

accomplices are liable for light felonies (Article 7).
3. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies
(Article 16).
4. Accessories are not liable for light felonies even if they are
committed against persons or property (Article 16).

IV. Active Subject And Passive Subject Of Crime
A. Active Subject (Criminal)
Only natural persons can be the active subject of crime because
of the highly personal nature of the criminal responsibility.
o Only natural persons because he along by his act can
set in motion a cause of by his inaction make possible
the completion of a modification of the external world.
o Only natural persons can act with malice.
o Juridical persons cannot commit crimes with willful
purpose or malicious intent.
o Penalties consisting in imprisonment or deprivation of
liberty can only be executed on natural persons
Juridical persons, however, are criminally liable under certain
special laws.
o Officers, not the corporation, are criminally liable.
General Rule: a director or other officer of a
corporation is criminally liable for his acts
though in his official capacity, if he participated
in the unlawful act either directly or as an
aider, abettor or accessory, but is not liable
criminally for the corporate acts performed by
other officers or agents thereof.
It is a settled rule that since a corporation can
only act through its officers and agents, the
president or manager can be held criminally
liable for the violation of a law by the entity.

Original Material from TABLE TURNERS (2012-2013). Edited by Rachelle Anne Gutierrez (2015-2016)
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CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

However, if the law provides a penalty for the
corporation, it may be punished even though the crime
was perpetrated through its agents.

B. Passive Subject (Injured Party)
The passive subject of a crime is the holder of the injured right:
the man, the juristic person, and the state.
General Rule: Corpse or animal cannot be passive subject. As
such, the dead and animals have no rights that may be injured.
o Exception: Article 353, the crime of defamation may be
committed if the imputation tends to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

V. Anti-Hazing Law (Republic Act No. 8094)
A. Principals
Those who actually participated in the hazing.
Parent of a frat/sorority member who owned the place where
the hazing occurred, knew of it but still did not do anything to
stop it.
Officers, former officers, alumni who planned it, even if they
werent there.
Fraternity or sorority advisor who was present but didnt stop
it.
Anyone present who did not prevent it.

B. Accomplices
Owner of the place where the hazing occurred and who knew
of the hazing and did not stop it.
School authorities who actually knew and consented to it.

VI. Command Responsibility
A. Philippine Context
General Rule: There is not command responsibility in Philippine
law.
Exception: Under Republic Act No. 9851 (Genocide

Law), the superiors are liable for the acts of their
subordinates.
Exception: The Anti-Torture Act contains a similar
provision. Under it, senior officers who give order to
their minions to torture people are liable as principals.

Article 17. Principals.
The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.

POINTS

I. Two Or More Persons Participating In The Crime
Single individual committing a crime is always a principal by
direct participation (take direct part in the execution of the
act).
(Par 1.) Principal by direct participation
(Par 2.) Principal by induction
(Par 3.) Principal by indispensible cooperation

II. Difference Between A Principal Under Any Of The Three Categories
Enumerated In Article 17 And A Co-Conspirator
Principal in Article 17: criminal liability is limited to his own acts
Co-conspirator: (His) responsibility includes the acts of his
fellow conspirators (People v. Peralta)

PAR 1: THOSE WHO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE
ACT. (PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION.)

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I. Take A Direct Part In The Execution Of The Act.
Principal by direct participation personally takes part in the
execution of the act constituting the crime.
o Example: One who shoots at and kills another
(homicide) or one who burns the house of another
(arson) personally executes the act of killing another or
the act of burning the house of another.
The one who orders or induces another to commit a crime is a
principal by induction while the other who follows the order
and executes the act constituting the crime is a principal by
direct participation. (People v. Lao)
Two or more offenders as principals by direct participation.
Two or more persons may take direct part in the execution of
the acts constituting crime principals by direct participation.

II. Elements For Two Or More Persons To Be Considered As Principals
By Direct Participation: (co-principals)
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution;
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its
execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.

III. FIRST ELEMENT: Participation In The Criminal Resolution.
Usually, this points to a conspiracy. BUT it is also possible that
there is no conspiracy between the actors.
o They will only be liable for their own/individual actions.
Two ore more persons are said to have participated in the
criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of
the commission of the crime.
o When there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose
and intention in the commission of the crime a
person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another.

A. Conspiracy.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it (Article 8, Paragraph 2).
The conspiracy in this first requisite is not a felony but only a
manner of incurring criminal liability.
To be a party to a conspiracy, one must have the intention to
participate in the transaction with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose.
o To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy: it must be established that he performed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy either by
actively participating in the actual commission of the
crime or by lending moral assistance to his coconspirators by his presence at the scene of the crime
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators to move them into executing the
conspiracy. (People v. Cortez)
o Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate not
enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy there
must be intentional participation in the transaction
with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. (People v. Izon)
Silence does not make one a conspirator.
o Silence is not a circumstance indicating participation in
the same criminal design. (People v. Gensola)
Conspiracy transcends companionship.
o The fact that the two accused may have happened to
leave together, and one of them left a closing warning
to the victim, cannot instantly prove a finding of
conspiracy. (People v. Padrones)
Participation in the criminal resolution essential.
o It is not enough that a person participated in the
assault made by another in order to consider him a co-

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principal in the crime committed. He must also

participate in the criminal resolution of the other.
Cooperation which the law punishes: assistance which
is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not
possible without previous knowledge of the criminal
purpose (People v. Cruz)
People v. Ortiz and Zausa
Facts: Bancoyo (deceased) and Ortiz
have known each other for a long time
because their wives were sisters. After
gathering corn from the fields, Bancoyo
asked Ortiz from outside his house for
some water but Ortiz said that they
couldnt give him water because they
had none. Bancoyo asked again to
which Ortiz replied that they had no
water so he cannot compel them to
give him some water and immediately
descended from his house carrying a
shotgun and pointed it at Bancoyo.
Bancoyo, seeing the aggressive attitude
of Ortiz, flung himself over Ortiz and
they struggled for the weapon. Zausa,
when she saw this, was inside the
house and grabbed her spear and
rushed outside and attacked Bancoyo
by stabbing him on the left side of his
abdomen and his intestines protruded.
Bancoyo died of peritonitis that night.
Held: Ortiz should be acquitted
because he did not take part in the
attack of Zausa because it appears that
there was no plan or agreement
between them to carry out the attach
that caused Bancoyos death. Also,

barely a few seconds elapsed which
interval in insufficient to give rise to
the criminal agreement.
In the absence of a previous plan or agreement to commit a
crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts
directed against the same person is individual and not
collective each of the participants is liable only for the acts he
committed.
o United States v. Reyes and Javier There was no
concerted action between Javier and Reyes even
though Javier was holding the offended party and
Reyes suddenly and unexpectedly inflicted mortal
wounds on said offended party. It was held that Javier
was neither a principal nor an accomplice of the crime
of homicide convicted of Reyes because he had no
reason to believe that Reyes would do a homicidal
attack and that in holding the off. Party he was
voluntarily cooperating therein
o In cases above: no anterior conspiracy = no unity of
purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime; their criminal responsibility is
individual
In the absence of concerted action pursuant to a common
criminal design, each of the accused responsible only for the
consequences of his own acts.
o Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals The accused who
inflicted the mortal wound was held guilty of murder
while the other assailants are only guilty of slight
physical injuries/less serious physical injuries.

B. Existence Of Conspiracy
Existence of conspiracy does not require an agreement for an
appreciable length of time prior to the execution of its purpose.

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From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if at the
time of the commission of tzhe offense the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution
(People v. Binasing).
Conspiracy arises on the very instant that the plotters agree
expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to pursue it. each and everyone of the conspirators is
made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by
anyone of them (People v. Monroy).
o

C. Proof Of Conspiracy
Direct evidence of conspiracy: interlocking judicial confessions
of several accused and the testimony of one accused who is
discharged and made a witness against his co-accused who did
not make any confession.
o In the absence of any collusion among the declarants,
their confessions may form a complete picture of the
whole situation and may be considered collectively as
corroborative and/or confirmatory of the evidence
independent therefrom (People v. Castelo)
o Two or more extrajudicial confessions given separately,
untainted by collusion, and which tally with one
another in all material respects, are admissible as
evidence of the conspiracy of the declarants. (People v.
bernardo)
o To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
proofs to the previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime it is sufficient that the malefactors
shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. (People v. San Luis)
Formal agreement or previous acquaintance among several
persons not necessary in conspiracy.
o In conspiracy, no formal agreement among the
conspirators is necessary, not even previous
acquaintance among themselves sufficient that their

minds meet understandingly to bring about an
intelligent and deliberate agreement to commit the
offense charged.
Sufficient that at the time of the aggression all accused
manifested in their acts a common intent or desire to
attack to so that the act of one becomes the act of all
(People v. Gupo).
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
(need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design) can be inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances when taken together
indicate they are parts of a complete whole
Examples:
Two or more persons aimed at the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their acts even
though apparently independent were
connected and cooperative, showing a
closeness of personal assoc. and concurrence
of sentiment a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them is
proved (People v. Mateo)
People v. Garduque All the accused were
already armed when they met, they went
together in a jeep to the house where they
robbed the offended party and raped his maids
their conspiracy is implied even though some
of the accused were only there to show the
location of the house
People v. Catubig Offenders were all present
at the scene of the crime, acted in concert in
attacking, assaulting, beating, chasing, and

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stabbing the victims and robbing them then

fleeing going to their separate ways they
showed through their concerted actions that
they acted in unison and cooperated with each
other to accomplish a common felonious
purpose (to rob victims)
Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive
evidence.
o While conspiracy may be implied from circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, it is
nevertheless a rule that conspiracy must be established
by positive and conclusive evidence (People v. Ancheta)
o Proof beyond reasonable doubt = degree of proof to
prove conspiracy (same as degree of proof to establish
the crime); it must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence; conspiracy cannot be appreciated
when facts are consistent with the non-participation of
the accused in the fancied cabal (People v. Furugganan)
o Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission is not by itself sufficient to establish
conspiracy (People v. Tacca)
No conspiracy, as shown by the acts of the defendant.
o People v. Quiosay Appellant stabbed the deceased
once on the arm and ran away and his brother was the
one who cut off the deceaseds head. Appellant is
answerable only for his individual act there was no
conspiracy because he didnt stay to liquidate the
deceased with his brother.
o People v. Lacao Spontaneity of respective reactions
of several accused, resulting in an attack where they all
participated, rules out the existence of conspiracy.
Respective liabilities shall be determined by the nature
of their individual participations in the felonious act.
(Two of which are only liable as accomplices.)
People v. Madera Two appellants not co-principals

nor accomplices they were not armed, did nothing to
help co-appellant, mere passive presence at scene of
the crime (they were just standing behind co-appellant
when he shot victim)
Conspiracy shown by circumstances.
o People v. Vinas Brothers Nelson and Norman Vinas
conspired to carry out the killing even though it was
only Norman who had a grudge against the deceased
because Nelson assaulted the deceased and they both
told Sumpay their plan to kill Varela.
o People v. Manzano A community of design to kill:
three brothers and nephew avenged their father (or
grandfather) showing concerted actions in committing
the crime
o People v. Saliling The four appellants were linked to
each other by friendship or some sort of relationship =
conspiracy (They all had a specific role in the
commission of the crime)
o People v. Umbrero Conspiracy may be shown by the
appellants actuations immediately prior to, during, and
right after the shooting of the victim
o People v. Timbol Three accused arrived together at
the Pasudeco offices. They menacingly demanded
approval of their 60-40 share of the mill denied by the
Board of Directors of Pasudeco. They shot Pres. De Leo,
Gonzales (of Pasudeco) and Capt. Olivas (peace officer)
and fled the scene together. The Supreme Court held
that circumstances demonstrate conspiracy when the
accused have all met together days before the crime.
Conspiracy is implied when the accused had a common
purpose and were united in its execution.
o People v. Damaso Facts: The deceased slapped the
face of one of the three appellants in front of a
o

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carinderia. The appellants boarded a taxi and borrowed
a gun of a security guard at Greenhills and came back
to the carinderia where the deceased was shot by one
of the appellants from inside the taxi. Afterwards, the
three returned the weapon and proceeded to the
headquarters of the Rizal Security and Protective
Agency. Held: There is unity of purpose and unity of
execution establishing conspiracy.
People v. Delgado Community of purpose on part of
three accused inferable from the circumstances: they
came together to the scene of the occurrence and they
each acted against the victim then left together to the
house of another person, leaving the victim
unconscious on the ground.

D. Unity Of Purpose And Intention In The Commission Of The Crime Is
Shown In The Following Cases: (Evidences Of Joint Responsibility)
1. Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of
the crime sufficient to create joint responsibility.
o Example: Acceptance of two accused of the challenge
posted by the deceased and their concert attack on the
same clearly showed a community of purpose and
design. (People v. Ibanez)
2. Active cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of
the crime.
o Example: A struck deceased, B whipped lips of
deceased, C seized deceaseds left hand while D held
the right, E stabbed deceased with knife.
Held: No proof of anterior conspiracy but the manner
in which accused cooperated in the perpetration of the
homicide shows they were moved by a common motive
and their intention was to kill deceased
Dissenting: Only individual responsibility in this case for
only E gave the fatal blow
No participation in the criminal design when the act of

one came so close upon the heels of that of the other.
Reason: He had no time to see that the other
intended to case the deceased the wound he
did (People v. Manalo)
Simultaneity per se is not a badge of conspiracy
if the requisite concurrence of wills is absent. It
is not sufficient that the attack is joint and
simultaneous; it is necessary that the assailants
are animated by one and the same purpose.
in situations where assaults are not
simultaneous but instead successive, greater
proof is needed to establish concert of criminal
design (People v. Tividad)
Examples:
People v. Macabuhay Facts: A, B, C, D, and E
were in Fs house. Someone threw a stone at
that house. All 5 went to Gs house 40 yards
away to avenge the stone-throwing. They
suspected the deceased who was in Gs house
to be the stone-thrower and they seized him
and E stabbed him. Held: A, B, C, D, E all liable
as principals by direct participation for death of
deceased same motive: avenge stonethrowing.
People v. Cruz, Jr. Conspiracy was wellestablished: one of the appellants companions
announced the holdup while the appellant and
his other companions proceeded to rob the
victims.
People v. Carpio Conspiracy manifested in
the coordinated acts of the assailants: one held
hand of victim, another stabbed him, third gave

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fist blows and the first one finally shoots
deceased
3. Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common
criminal intent.
o People v. Agbuya Facts: Family feud between Palisoc
(family of C = deceased) and Agbuya (family of A and D
= accused)
Held: Homicide was committed by the act of the one of
the two accused in shooting the deceased with a gun
which was given by the co-accused, his father, and
where it also appeared that the latter contributed to
the commission of the homicide by various other
significant acts both father and son were properly
convicted as principals in the crime. There was
common criminal intent in the case because father and
son took common cause (family feud)
o People v. Mancao Wounds which caused deceaseds
death were not inflicted by Mancao himself but by coaccused Aguilar but Mancao having been the instigator
and aggressor by calling his harvesters to his aid (one of
which was Aguilar) and wanting them to carry out the
criminal act started by him Mancao is not only liable
for his own acts but also for the acts of those who
aided him. Mancao contributed the following positive
acts: Being the instigator, the aggressor and calling his
harvesters.
4. Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and
lending moral support thereto, also create joint responsibility
with the material executors.
o U.S. v. Ancheta There were 7 defendants in this
case. Held: All of them previously concerted action,
met together and witnessed the capture and later, the
violent killing of the deceased. Some took a direct part
in the actual commission of the crime, others were
determined instigators who induced the former to

commit it, while the remainder cooperated in the same
by their presence and lending their moral support. all
are thus directly responsible for the consequences and
incidents of the same
U.S. v. Santos Facts: A band of 25 men captured
American soldiers and detained them somewhere. The
soldiers were killed by some of the members of the
band in front of the accused.
Held: It is if no importance that the accused did not
himself strike the blow or blows by which the prisoners
were killed. It is sufficient that he was present at the
place of the commission of the act, augmenting with his
arms and presence the power of the band, thus aiding
the common act of all he was considered as a
principal by direct participation in the crime
prosecuted.
Conspiracy is presumed when the crime is committed
by a band. A band raises the presumption of a previous
understanding between one offender and the others
who formed the band; accused lent his thought and
action for the realization of the criminal object
increasing the offensive strength of said band.
U.S. v. Asilo Accused was a member of a
band that went to the house of the deceased to
kill him. Even if there was no evidence that the
accused fired a shot at the deceased, he is still
liable for homicide.
People v. Bazar Robbery was committed by
a band: all the members of the band are
presumed to be conspirators or co-principals
also in the assaults committed by the band in
the absence of a showing that appellants
attempted to prevent the killing of the victim

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they are equally guilty of his death at the hands
of their companions.
o Exception: U.S. v. Fresnido When at the start of the
encounter the accused fled from the scene of the fight
between the constabulary and the insurgent band he
is not criminally liable
5. Where one of the accused knew of the plan of the others to
kill the two victims and he accepted the role assigned to him,
which was to shoot one of the victims, and he actually
performed that role, he is a co-principal by direct participation
in the double murder (People v. De La Cruz).

E. There May Be Conspiracy Even If There Is No Evident Premeditation
On The Part Of The Accused
Even if appellants were unarmed, which may indicate lack of
evident premeditation, this does not necessarily negate the
existence of conspiracy because conspiracy does not
necessarily require an agreement for an appreciable time prior
to the occurrence.
o See People v. Binasing.

F. When There Is No Conspiracy, Each Of The Offenders Is Liable Only
For The Act Performed By Him
People v. Castillo
o Facts: Guarino was quarreling with Terencia and
policeman Machica tried to stop them. Guarino
stabbed Machica instead. Then Policeman Campos was
able to bring Guarino to the municipal building where
another Policeman Boco hit Guarino. Chief of Police
Castillo came and shot to death Guarino in front of the
three policemen Machica, Campos, and Boco (who all
had inflicted serious physical injuries to Guarino)
o Held: Only Chief Castillo was guilty of murder qualified
by treachery. Machica, Campos, and Boco were liable
for serious physical injuries only because there was no

competent proof that the three policemen intended to
kill Guarino no conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention among them plus Chief Castillo. The three did
not participate in the shooting by Castillo and could not
have stopped it even if they wanted to because Chief
Castillo just drew out his gun and fired.
In homicide, immediate participation in the criminal design
entertained by the slayer, is essential to the responsibility of
one who is alleged to have taken a direct part in the killing even
if he has not himself inflicted an injury materially contributing
to the death (People v. Tamayo)

G. Liability Of Participants Where There Is Conspiracy
When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Collective criminal responsibility
U.S. v. Bundal Defendants after conspiring together to kill
deceased, went to his house for purposes of carrying out their
intent and prepared to cooperate to that end (even though
having different roles in the commission) all will be held equally
guilty as principals irrespective of the individual participation of
each in the material act of the murder
Conspiracy adequately proven = all conspirators liable as coprincipals. The degree of actual participation by each of the
conspirators is immaterial. As conspirators, each is equally
responsible for the acts of their co-conspirators. (People v. De
la Cruz)
Where there is conspiracy to commit a felony, all the
conspirators are liable for its consequences.
o People v. Villamora There was no conspiracy to kill
deceased and Barauel only hit him with an iron bar.
Held: Since there was conspiracy to punish Acuna, with
resulted to his death, ALL the conspirators are
responsible for the consequences that arose from the

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punishment. Note: The ruling is in accordance with the

provision of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the RPC.
Conspiracy may cover persons previously undetermined.
o If it appears that there was a general plan to kill anyone
who might put up violent resistance, then the accused
are liable for all the natural and inherent consequences
of such plan (People v. Timbol)

H. Liability Of A Conspirator For Another Conspirators Acts Which
Differ Radically And Substantially From That Which They Intended To
Commit.
Conspirator should necessarily be liable for the acts of another
conspirator even though such acts differ radically or
substantially from that which they intended to commit. (People
v. Enriquez)
Boyd v. U.S. Wound made with the knife on leg of person
assaulted was the primary cause of death and the author of this
injury has not been identified (the attorneys of the accused
defended that the infliction of injury by means of a cutting
instrument was not within the scope of the agreement and that
the one who should be held liable is the one who inflicted the
wound). Held: The Court did not agree. Accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do so grave personal injury to the
deceased which have resulted in death, the accused cannot
escape from the legal effects of their acts that a wound was
inflicted in a different way from that which they intended.
As has been said by the U.S. Supreme Court: If a number of
persons agree to commit, and enter upon the commission of a
crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery,
all of them are responsible for the death of a person that
ensues as a consequence
o U.S. v. Patten Conspirators who join in a criminal
attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons
victim knocked down tries to escape pursues him
with increased numbers continue the assault are

liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a
knife wound inflicted by one of them during the
beating, although in the beginning they did not
contemplate the use of a knife
o People v. Espiritu Four assailants acted in
conspiracy, pretended to look for a lost carabao in
Bernardos house and then killed him. As conspirators,
they are each liable for the attack on Bernardo,
regardless of who actually pulled the trigger or wielded
the club that killed him
Liability of offenders in robbery if committed by a band: any
member of a band (at least four armed men) is liable for any
assault committed by the other member of the band, unless it
be shown that he attempted to prevent the same. (Article 296
of Revised Penal Code)
A conspirator is not liable for anothers crime which is not an object of
the conspiracy or which is not a necessary and logical consequence
thereof.
People v. Umali Only the Huks (allies of defendant Umali)
committed robbery which was NOT an object of the conspiracy.
Held: Defendant Umali not liable for robbery BUT liable for
sedition, arson, and murder the objects of the conspiracy
Other defendants not held liable for the killings of persons not covered
by the conspiracy.
People v. De la Cerna Appellant cannot be held liable for the
killing od the deceased (Cabizares) even though there was a
conspiracy between him and his co-conspirator because the
conspiracy was to kill Rafael only and no one else.
The rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only
for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy.
For other acts done outside the contemplation of the coconspirators or which are not necessary and logical

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consequences of the intended crime, only the actual
perpetrators are liable.
When the conspirators selected a particular victim and another
person was killed by one of them, only that conspirator who
killed another person is liable.
Versus People v. Enriquez & People v. Rosario Conspirators
are liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such
acts differ radically and substantially from that which they
intend to commit (in accordance to provision of Article 4
paragraph 1 of RPC)
A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the crime
was committed by the others, is not criminally liable.
People v. Timbol Appellant was a member of the conspiracy
but desisted before the crimes were committed (left the
Pasudeco offices long before killings took place)
Held: Appellant Dalmacio Timbol is not criminally liable.
Conspiracy alone without the execution of its purpose is not a
crime punishable by law except in special instances (Article 8)
People v. Mappala An act of a conspirator who ran away as
soon as the aggression was started by his co-conspirators, and
called for help of other people who responded is an act of
desistance which removes the case from the established rule
that the act of one is the act of all.
When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the specific
act of each conspirator.
It is not necessary to ascertain the specific acts of aggression
committed by each of the culprits since having participated in
the criminal resolution the act of one is the act of all. (People v.
Mendoza)
Conspiracy having been established: it is immaterial who of the
conspirators fired the fatal shot (People v. Canoy)
All persons taking part in the crime shall be held guilty as
principals. (Even though not all accused took part in actual
commission of every act constituting the crime each is
responsible for all the acts of others done in furtherance of the

conspiracy) The degree of actual participation is immaterial.
(People v. Maranion)
When there is conspiracy, the fact that an element of the offense is
not present as regards one of the conspirators is immaterial.
U.S v. Hernandez Complex crime of seduction by means of
usurpation of official functions; One of the accused pretended
to be a minister and fake-married the other accused with a girl
in order for the girl to have marital relations with the other
accused
Held: Element of performance of official functions was present
with accused only. But the other accused was sentenced to the
penalty for and the same crime complexed with seduction
which he actually committed.

All are liable for the crime of abduction, even if only one acted with
lewd designs.
Essential element of the crime of abduction: lewd designs on
the part of the offender (Article 342 forcible abduction;
Article 343 consented abduction)
People v. Loyola Canaria conspired with Loyola to forcibly
abduct Caridad and Canaria made positive over acts necessary
to the realization of the abduction
Held: Even though Loyola alone acted with lewd designs,
Canaria was still liable for abduction because in a conspiracy
the act of one is the act of all
In multiple rape, each rapist is equally liable for the other rapes.
Each defendant is responsible not only for rape personally
committed by him but also for the rape committed by the
others because they cooperated in the commission of rape
perpetration by the others, by acts without which would not
have been accomplished

I. Exceptions: (from equal liability)

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1. Crime of parricide element of relationship must be present as
regards all the offenders
Ex. Wife and son of deceased conspired and did kill latter
both are guilty of parricide BUT if wife and a stranger conspired
and killed deceased, only the wife is guilty of parricide and the
stranger will be guilty of homicide or murder
Reason for exception: Article 62 paragraph 3 provides that
aggravating circumstances which arise from private relations of
offender with offended party shall serve to aggravate only
liability of principals, accomplices, and accessories to whom
such circumstances are attendant. Provision applies when
element of felony arises from private relation of offender with
offended party.
2. Crime of murder where treachery is an element of the crime
all offenders must at least have knowledge of the employment
of treachery at time of execution of act or their cooperation
therein
o Ex. A and B conspired to kill C but carried out their plan
without previously considering the means, methods, or
forms, in killing C; only A employed treachery but since
B was present when A employed treachery both are
liable for murder BUT if B remained outside so that he
did not know that A employed treachery only A is
liable for murder and B is liable for homicide
o Reason for exception: Article 62 par 4. Provides that
circumstances which consist in the material execution
of the ac, or in the means employed to accomplish it,
shall serve to aggravate the liability of only those
persons who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act or their cooperation therein

I. Participation in anothers criminal resolution must either precede or
be coetaneous with the criminal act. (Coetaneous: of the same age or
duration) People v. Tan Diong
Facts: Diong in order to avoid an execution of judgment against

him in a civil case transferred his properties by conveyance to
Baranda who only participated by falsely testifying in court that
he acquired said properties with sufficient consideration
Held: Barandas alleged participation in the fraud only consists
of his assertion of ownership in the properties conveyed which
does not justify his conviction as a participant in the fraud. His
resolution to accept the benefit of the fraudulent conveyances
may have been formed only after the act of Diong. His guilt as
co-conspirator in the fraud is, therefore not proved.
Note: Baranda would be liable as co-principal if he concurred
with Diong at the time or before the execution of the deeds of
conveyance.

There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through
negligence.
Conspiracy presupposes an agreement and a decision to
commit a felony, when it appears that the injuries inflicted on
the offended party were due to the reckless imprudence of two
or more persons, it is not proper to consider conspiracy
between or among them.
In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by special law,
allowing or failing to prevent an act to be performed by another,
makes one a co-principal.
People v. Santos professional driver of passenger truck let
his conductor drive the truck and they had an accident with a
jeepney which resulted to the death of one its passengers
Held: Both the driver and the conductor were held liable as coprincipals of homicide and damage to property through
reckless imprudence under Act. No 3992 and Article 365 of
RPC.
U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong a storeowners employee
sold adulterated coffee and the storeowner did not know that
the coffee was sold by his employee

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Held: Both the storeowner and the employee were held liable
as principals (criminally liable under the Pure Food and Drugs
Act)

IV. SECOND ELEMENT: That The Culprits Carried Out Their Plan And
Personally Took Part In Its Execution By Acts Which Directly Tended
To The Same End.

A. The Principals By Direct Participation Must Be At The Scene Of The
Crime, Personally Taking Part In Its Execution.
General Rule: Principal by direct participation must personally
take part in executing the criminal plan to be carried out. This
means that he must be at the scene of the commission of the
crime, personally taking part in its execution.
o People v. Ong Chiat Lay Held that one of the accused
not a principal by direct participation because he was
absent from the scene of the fire when the crime of
arson was committed by other accused
Exception: For as long as the conspirators perform specific acts
that were coordinated pursuant to the conspiracy, they are all
principals. Even if their acts are performed in different places.
o People v. Santos There was conspiracy to kidnap
and kill the victim and only one of the conspirators
kidnapped the victim and after turning him over to his
co-conspirators for execution, left the spot where the
victim was killed. Held: The one who kidnapped the
victim was liable for murder committed by the others
because he already performed his part and the killing
was done by his co-conspirators in pursuance of the
conspiracy.

B. The Acts Of Each Offender Must Directly Tend To The Same End.
While principals by direct participation personally take part in
the execution of their common purpose, it is not necessary that
each of them should perform a positive act directly

contributing to the accomplishment of their common purpose.
o People v. Mandagay Murder case where offenders
previously agreed to commit said crime, not only the
one who inflicts the fatal wound is considered a
principal but also the others to held the victim or stood
guard outside. The acts of each and every one of the
offenders are all directed to the same end, which is the
killing of the victim. Criminal responsibility in such a
case is collective.
Only serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal
by direct participation.
o People v. Canumay Appellants were part of plan to
rob victim. At time of robbery they stood guard outside
the house. Held: They are equally liable as the others.
o U.S. v. Reogilon One who stands guard outside the
house to keep others away or warning fellow
conspirators while the latter are murdering the
occupant takes direct part in commission of crime of
murder and is guilty as a principal by direct
participation. He is in fact present, aiding, and abetting
in the commission of the crime.
Exception: People v. Samano
o Facts: Accused jointly tried for murder of three
persons. They were members of a guerilla unit and
were being charged of taking the deceased to their
headquarters and beating him to death while
investigating him on charges of espionage. Accused
Samano and Alcantara acted as guards at place of crime
but did so in obedience to superior orders and without
knowledge that the deceased under investigation
would be killed. There was no evidence that there was
conspiracy between those who pleaded guilty and the
present appellants.

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Held: When there is no conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention indicating participation in the
criminal resolution, mere passive presence at the scene
of anothers crime does not constitute complicity.
BUT SEE People v. Masagnay The Supreme Court held that a
person could be held liable as a conspirator even though he
does not know every single detail of the crime, for as long as he
knows his role.
o

C. When The Second Requisite Is Lacking, There Is Only Conspiracy To
Commit A Crime
IF this 2nd requisite is lacking: there is, at most, only conspiracy
among several defendants who participated in criminal
resolution; if the crime they agreed and decided to commit is
not treason, rebellion or sedition, they are not criminally liable.
Example:
o People v. Asaad Four accused merely attended
conferences and assented out of respect and fear and
after commission of murders they joined other accused
in celebrating with a fiesta, by way of custom, they
were neither co-principals nor accomplices
o People v. Timbol Dalmacio Timbol was acquitted of
the charge of murder because he merely conspired
with his co-accused to kill deceased but left the place
before they began shooting him.
o People v. Pelagio Gs participation in the first
meeting involved him in the conspiracy because he told
the other the location of the house to be robbed, this
however is inadequate to make him criminally liable as
a conspirator. This because conspiracy alone without
execution of its purpose is not a crime punishable by
law except in special instances which does not include
robbery. (Article 8)

PAR 2: THOSE WHO DIRECTLY FORCE OR INDUCE OTHERS TO

COMMIT IT. (Principals By Induction)

I. Those Who Directly Force Or Induce Others To Commit [The Act].
Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called
principals by inducement or principals by induction from
the Spanish autores por induccion.
Inducement comprises price, promise of reward, command
and pacto (opinion of Viada and SC of Spain).

II. The Principal By Induction Becomes Liable Only When The Principal
By Direct Participation Committed The Act Induced.
People v. Ong Chiat Lay One cannot be held guilty of having
instigated the commission of the crime without first being
shown that the crime was actually committed by another.
The qualifying circumstance of price, reward or promise in
Article 14 is considered for both the principal by inducement
and principal by direct participation.

III. Two Ways Of Becoming Principal By Induction
Under Article 17, paragraph 2:
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime, and
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime.

A. By Directly Forcing Another To Commit A Crime
Two ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime:
1. By using irresistible force.
2. By causing uncontrollable fear.
In these cases (using force or causing fear), there is no
conspiracy, not even a unity of criminal purpose and intention.
Only the one using force or causing fear is criminally liable. The
material executor is not criminally liable because of Article 12,
paragraph 5 and 6.

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B. By Directly Inducing Another To Commit A Crime
Two ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime:
1. By giving price, or offering reward or promise.
o Both the one giving the price or offering reward or
promise and the one committing the crime in
consideration thereof are principals (former by
inducement and latter by direct participation). There is
collective criminal responsibility.
o This applies even if the inducer does not pay the
principal by direct participation after the commission of
the crime.
2. By using words of command.
o Both the person who used the words of command and
the persons who commits the crime (because of the
words of command) are equally liable. There is also
collective responsibility.

C. The Inducement May Be By Acts Of Command, Advice, Or Through
Influence, Or Agreement For Consideration
Inducement and the commission of the crime wherein the
inducer becomes the principal (with same extent and effect as
if he had physically committed the crime) may exist in acts of
command, of advice, agreement for a consideration, or through
an influence so effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime
1. The promise of love can be sufficient inducement.
o Example: A has a paramour B, who loved C. A told D to
kill B with the promise that he does, he will possess her
entirely. D killed B. A is a principal by inducement
(People v. Ramos).
2. The words of advice or the influence must have actually
moved the hands of the principal by direct participation.
An inexperienced boy of tender age was persuaded by

a person to steal the jewels of his grandmother; the
person was found guilty of theft by inducement
o Minors under 15 are easily susceptible to suggestions
of inducer because they have no discernment or
judgment of their own so when they are induced to
commit a crime, the influence of the inducer is the
determining cause of the commission of the crime
o Words of command of a father may induce his son to
commit a crime. Moral influence of the words of a
father (his words of command) may determine the
course of conduct of a son (because of the obedience
due to him). Compare With: same words coming from
a stranger which would make no impression
People v. Bautista The accused (exercising
dominance and ascendancy) compelled his 3year old son to throw a stone at another boy
which caused injury to the latters eye was a
principal by inducement.
3. By using words of command.
o People v. Gensola The command given must be the
moving cause of the offense. The evidence showed that
the accused would have acted on his own volition even
without the words of command (Rufino, strike him!)
o People v. Agapinay An utterer will not be liable as
principal by inducement if the imprudent utterance
was said in the excitement of the hour or in heat of
anger (and not in a nature of a command that had to be
obeyed)
o It must appear that the inducement was of such nature
and was made in such a way as to become the
determining cause of the crime and that such
inducement was uttered with the intention of
producing the result. (People v. Castillo)
o

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o
The inciting words must have great dominance and

influence over the person who act; they ought to be
direct and as efficacious or powerful as physical or
moral coercion or violence itself. (People v. Canial)

D. Elements To Hold Person Liable As Principal By Inducement
Through The Use Of Commands
All five requisites must be present in order that a person using
words of command be held liable as principal by inducement:
1. That the one uttering the words of command must have the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime.
2. That the one who made the command must have an
ascendancy or influence over the person who acted.
o U.S. v. Ganao When B (a very influential figure in
their community) selected A (his nephew who was poor
and depended on him) to commit the crime the
influence exercised by B over A was so great and
powerful that the latter could not resist it.
3. That the words used must be so direct, so efficacious, so
powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion.
o Efficacious a person who makes accused believe that
the person to be killed was the one who stole the
accuseds property = guilty as principal by inducement;
even though the accused seem to have a personal
reason, it was the inductor who made him believe so.
o Powerful U.S. v. Ganao.
4. The words of command must be uttered prior to the
o This requisite is lacking when the commission of the
crime has already been commenced when the words of
inducement are uttered.
o A son who was already in combat with another was
told by the father Hit him the father was not
responsible for the injuries inflicted after advice given
5. The material executor of the crime has no personal reason to

commit the crime.
o If the principal by direct participation has a personal
reason to commit the crime, the supposed words of
inducement cannot be the determining cause.
o People v. Kiichi Omine Facts: Omine shouted
pegale y matale to Autor and he struck the deceased
on the breast but before the utterance he had already
struck the deceased with a fist blow on the right eye
Held: Omine was not a principal by induction because
Autor had already struck beforehand and the utterance
was not sufficient because it doesnt show that Omine
has any particular influence over Autor. Autor = guilty
of serious physical injuries and Omine was acwuitted.

IV. Elements To Be Considered A Principal By Inducement
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime; and
2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime by the material executor.
U.S. v. Idanan To constitute inducement, there must be on
the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the
most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime
together with the presentation to the person induced of the
very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.

A. Examples
People v. Otadora
o (First requisite) It was clear that she had the intention
of procuring the commission of the crime when she
furnished her co-accused the gun to kill the deceased
o (Second requisite) The accused promised her coaccused pecuniary gain which was the determining
cause of the commission of the crime

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People v. Alcontin
o (First requisite) A married woman suggested to her
paramour that he kill her husband; Held: the
proposition of the woman constituted something more
than mere counsel or advice that her co-defendant was
entirely free to accept or not.
o (Second requisite) The married womans promise of
being able to freely live together with the paramour
was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime
People v. Caimbre
o Facts: Appellant was being prosecuted for uttering you
had better kill him when his co-accused was attacking
the victim.
o Held: Appellant was acquitted because he lacked the
first requisite because there was nothing to show that
appellant had any reason to have Olipmo killed; lacked
second requisite because he had no sufficient moral
influence over co-accused to make him obey blindly;
and fourth requisite was lacking because his co-accused
had already boloed the victim before he uttered the
words

VI. FIRST ELEMENT: That The Inducement Be Made Directly With The
Intention Of Procuring The Commission Of The Crime
The principal by inducement should be obeyed.

A. A Thoughtless Expression Without Intention To Produce The Result
Is Not An Inducement To Commit A Crime
A chance word spoken without reflection/ a wrong
appreciation of a situation/ an ironical phrase/ a thoughtless
act may give birth to a thought or resolution to commit a crime
in the mind of one without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion
would be followed or any real intention that it produce the

result. In such a case, the one who spoke the word or
performed the act would not be guilty of the crime committed
by the other. (U.S. v. Idanan)
Example:
o A decision of the Supreme Court of Spain (cited in U.S.
v. Idanan) held that a woman who robbed her husband
because a person told her that thats the only thing to
do to him because he was stingy and treated her badly
the person was not guilty of the crime committed of
the crime of robbery by inducement because an
imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient; the
person did not have the intention of procuring the

VIII. SECOND ELEMENT: That Such Inducement Be The Determining
Cause Of The Commission Of The Crime By The Material Executor
The inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the
act would not have been performed.
o It is necessary that the inducement be the determining
cause of the commission of the crime by the principal
by direct participation that, without such inducement
the crime would not have been committed (Decision of
SC of Spain).
o Inducement exists if the nature of the command or
advice is that without its concurrence the crime
would not have materialized (People v. Cruz).
Price given to the principal by direct participation after the
commission of the crime, without prior promise to give a price
or reward, could not be an inducement.

150

A. The one charged of inducing the commission of the crime is not
liable if the person who actually committed a crime had a reason of
his own to commit the crime.
People v. Castillo
o Facts: Marincho Castillo (son) was slapped on the face
by the deceased Vargas. After 2 months, appellant
Castillo (father) was talking to Vargas while holding a
revolver (but not pointed to him). Suddenly, Marincho
came from behind and hacked the head of Vargas.
When he was about to hack him the second time, his
father told him You kill him and then they
surrendered to the authorities.
o Held: Castillo is not guilty of being a co-principal by
inducement because Marincho has already given
Vargas a fatal blow on the head before Castillo
allegedly said You kill him because the utterances
must be sufficient enough to be the determining cause
of committing the crime
Can a person who is present during a homicide but has no
direct part in the act can be held criminally liable for inciting
and encouraging another with expressions like go ahead, hit
him, there you have him, now is the time?
o It depends upon whether these words were spoken
under conditions that give them a direct and
determinative influence upon the mind of the principal
actor. (People v. Tamayo)

B. Ascendancy Or Influence As To Amount To Moral Coercion Is Not
Necessary When There Is Conspiracy
To consider as principal by induction one who advises or incites
another to perpetrate an offense, it is essential to show that
the advisor had so great an ascendancy or influence that his
words were so efficacious and powerful as to amount to moral
coercion.
Proof of such extremes is usually required to justify such

conclusion.
Proof in unnecessary where the principal actor admits being
impelled and that he acted pursuant to a previous plan or
conspiracy to kill and promise to condone his indebtedness
(People v. Ulip)
There is collective criminal responsibility when words of
inducement were used.

C. One Who Planned The Crime Committed By Another Is A Principal
By Inducement
Persons who planned the crime committed by other persons
are guilty as authors by inducement.
If The Crime Committed Is Not Contemplated In The Order
Given, The Inducement Is Not Material And Not The
Determining Cause Thereof. People v. Lawas
o Facts: Accused Lawas was head of the home guards in a
barrio in Lanao and he orderd his men to shoot at
Moros suspected of having killed 11 Christian residents.
Some of the home guards fired at women and children
at the second floor of the house.
o Held: Lawas is not guilty of murder for the killing of the
women and children as principal by induction because
his order was to fire at Moros on the ground and
clearly did not intend for women and children to be
fired at.

IX. Principal By Induction In Falsification
People v. Po Giok To The employee did the overt act of
entering false facts on the residence certificate of the accused
because the accused induced him to do so by supplying him
those facts. Held: Accused was a principal by inducement. The
employee was a mere innocent agent of performing the act
constituting the crime hence employee was not criminally liable

151

because he had no knowledge of the falsity of the facts
supplied by the accused.

X. Principal By Inducement v. Offender Who Made Proposal To
Commit A Felony

Principal By Inducement
Offender Who Proposed To
Commit A Felony
There is inducement to commit a There is inducement to commit a
crime
crime
Liable only when crime is Mere proposal to commit a felony
committed by principal by direct is punishable in treason or
participation
rebellion; person to whom
proposal is made should NOT
commit the crime
Inducement involves ANY crime
Must involve ONLY treason and
rebellion to be punishable

XI. Effects Of Acquittal Of Principal By Direct Participation Upon The
Liability Of Principal By Inducement
1. Conspiracy is negative by acquittal of co-defendant.
2. It must be shown that another has actually committed the
crime; otherwise one cannot be guilty of instigating the crime.
o If the one charged as principal by direct participation
was acquitted because he acted without criminal intent
or malice his acquittal is not ground for acquitting the
principal by inducement.
o Reason for rule: In exempting circumstances, when the
act is not voluntary because of lack of intent there is a
crime committed but no criminal; in intentional
felonies, act of a person does not make him criminal
unless his mind be criminal.
Mistake of identity of the victim committed by the principal by
direct participation. The principal by inducement is not liable.
The crime committed by the principal by direct

participation must be that commanded by the principal
by inducement.
A principal by inducement may still be held liable even if the
principal by direct participation is exempt (Article 332).
o Example: falsification of documents, when the criminal
induces an 8-year-old to commit the crime.
Where the principal by inducement instructs the principal by
direct participation to do something without necessarily
thinking of the possible consequences both will be liable for
the proximate result. In short, Article 4 applies.
o Example: A told B to punch C in the back. C dies. Both
are liable for the resulting death of C.
o

XII. Possessor Of Recently Stolen Property Is A Principal
Possessor of a recently stolen article is considered a principal,
not an accessory or accomplice, unless he proves otherwise
satisfactorily and that another person who gave him the article
was the one who stole it (Section 5(j), Rule 131, Rules of Court)

PAR. 3: THOSE WHO COOPERATE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE BY ANOTHER ACT WITHOUT WHICH IT WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. (Principals By Indispensible Cooperation)

I. Meaning Of The Term Cooperate
To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. The
common will or purpose does not necessarily mean pervious
understanding because it can be explained or inferred from the
circumstances of each case (People v. Apelgido).

II. Elements To Be Liable As Principal By Indispensable Cooperation:
1. Participation in the criminal resolution.

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2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act, without which it would not have been
accomplished.

III. FIRST ELEMENT: Participation In The Criminal Resolution
The participation of a principal by indispensable cooperation is
different from the overt act committed by a principal by direct
participation.

A. Being A Co-Conspirator Is Not Necessary
A principal by indispensable cooperation need not be a party in
the planning stage of the conspiracy for he may become a
principal at the moment of the execution of the crime with the
other principals, if his act was indispensable to the crime.
o Hence, even if he was absent at the meeting where the
planning occurred, if his act showed that it was
indispensable to the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he will be liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation.

B. May There Be Cooperation By Acts Of Negligence?
A person becomes a co-principal through acts of negligence
cooperates in the commission of estafa through falsification or
malversation through falsification (without which the
commission of the crime could not have been accomplished).
The one who cooperated in the commission of the crime was
held guilty of the same crime through reckless imprudence
(Samson v. Court of Appeals).

C. The Principal By Indispensable Cooperation Need Not Be In The
Scene Of The Crime
Example: A, who lives in the U.S., gives B poison to kill C. B used
the poison to kill C here in the Philippines. A is Principal by
Indispensable Cooperation. B is Principal by Direct

Participation.

IV. SECOND REQUISITE: Cooperation must be indispensible without
which the commission of the crime would not have been
accomplished.
If the cooperation is not indispensible, the offender is only an
accomplice.

A. Cooperate X X X By Another Act
Act of the principal by indispensible cooperation should be
different from the act of the principal by direct participation.
Law says by another act which means it should not be the act
of one who would be classified as principal by direct
participation.
Examples:
o U.S. v. Javier Facts: C was the one who forced and
dragged the girl to the back of the house where J was
waiting to perpetrate the crime. C had a previous
agreement with J. After delivering the girl, C left so that
J can consummate the prearranged rape. Held: C
cooperated in the perpetration of the crime by acts
without which its commission would not have been
accomplished.
Act of cooperation: forcible taking of the girl to
the place of commission of rape by other
accused.
Act of execution: sexual intercourse with the
woman against her will.
o U.S. v. Lim Buanco Facts: R, employee of a bank,
indorsed upon a check drawn by B so that B, even
without sufficient funds in the bank, may still draw the
amount of the check when he presents it to the cashier
of the bank. The endorsement of R was in connivance

153

with B knowing he didnt have funds but indorsed it

still. Held: R was a principal by indispensible
cooperation.
Act of cooperation: Certification that the check
was entitled to payment
Act of execution: Crime of estafa by B
committed as principal by direct participation
the fraudulent cashing of the cash that
damaged the bank
o In the 2 cases, the cooperation of the other accused
was the performance of an act different from the act of
execution of the crime committed by the other
accused.
If cooperation of one accused consists in doing an act necessary
in the execution of the crime, he is a principal by direct
participation.
o Example: In a homicide case one of the offenders held
the victim while the other was stabbing him. The one
who held victim was principal by direct participation,
BUT there are cases where the Supreme Court
considered such accused as a principal by indispensible
cooperation

B. Liability Of Conspirators Who Took Turns In Raping A Girl.
People v. Villa Four persons took turns in raping a girl; others
held her while one had intercourse with her.
Held: Each of them is responsible for his own act of rape and
also for the acts of the others. Four sentences were imposed on
each accused.

V. A Principal By Indispensable Cooperation May Commit A Crime
Different From A Principal By Direct Participation
Example:
Malversation through falsification of public documents

committed by a public officer in conspiracy with a
private individual. Private individual may be liable for
malversation (People v. Sandaydiego).
Husband gives poison to friend to kill wife. Friend is
liable for homicide, and husband for parricide.

OTHER MATTERS
To be liable as principals, the offender must fall under any of the
three concepts defined in Article 17.
A person who assists one who commits the crime of arson and
who knows the latters purpose (but whose participation in the
arson is not known) may not be considered as a principal
because his acts were neither direct nor absolutely necessary
for the commission of the offense nor did it induce the said
commission (SC of Spain decision)

Collective criminal responsibility.
Present when offenders are criminally liable in the same
manner and to same extent; penalty imposed must be same for
all.
Who has collective criminal responsibility?
o Principals by direct participation.
o Principal by induction with the principal by direct
participation (EXCEPT the principal by induction who
directly forced another to commit a crime).
o Principal by indispensible cooperation with the
principal by direct participation.

Individual Criminal responsibility.
If there is no previous conspiracy/ unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before commission of crime/ community
of criminal design = criminal responsibility arising from different

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acts directed against one and the same person is individual and
not collective.
Each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by
him.
Example of individual responsibility. cited in People v. Martinez
Facts: Deceased assaulted a group of three individuals, in their
(incomplete) self-defense, two of them caused less serious
physical injuries on the assailant deceased while one inflicted a
fatal wound.
Held: Only the one who gave the fatal wound would be
principally liable for homicide and the others liable only for less
serious physical injuries.

Article 18. Accomplices.
Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.

POINTS

I. Quasi-Collective Criminal Responsibility
Between collective and individual criminal responsibility
quasi-collective criminal responsibility.
In quasi-collective responsibility, some are principals and others
are accomplices.

A. Liability Of Accomplice Based On Principal
May one be charged and convicted as accomplice/accessory
even before the principal is charged or convicted? Should the
PDP first be convicted before the accomplice/accessory be
charged or convicted?
o As long as the commission of the crime is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, determination of criminal
responsibility of accessory/accomplice may be
determined independently of and separately from

liability of principal by direct participation (People v.
Rafael).
Dismissal of case against principal: If the case is dismissed
against the principal by direct participation, the case against
the accessory/accomplice must also be dismissed because the
liability of the accomplice/accessory is subordinate to that of
the principal by direct participation. The accomplice/accessory
is like a shadow that follows the principal by direct participation
and not the other way around (PCGG v. Desierto).
o Principal by direct participation acquitted because
crime was not committed at all. What happens to
accomplice/accessory? They cant be charged. Crime
was not committed.
o Dismissal of the case against the accomplice/accessory
does not result to the dismissal of the case against the
Exemption of principal from criminal liability: BUT if the
principal by direct participation is exempted from the crime, it
does not follow that the accomplice/accessory is exempted, or
that the case against the accomplice/accessory should be
dismissed as well.
Principal by direct participation is dead. Can accomplice/
accessory still be charged? Yes, they can still be prosecuted.

II. The Participation Of An Accomplice Presupposes The Commission
Of The Crime By The Principal By Direct Participation
Principal element of complicity: concurrence of will of
accomplice with the will of the author of the crime (principal).
o He is not a principal (so he must not be part of the
conspiracy), but he supplies material or moral aid to
the principal in an efficacious way.
The accomplice cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts in
the execution of the offense by the principal.

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o
o
He intends to, and does, take part in the crime.

BUT, his cooperation is not indispensable to the crime.

III. Not being included in Article 17.
An accomplice does not fall under any of the three concepts
defined in Article 17.
Those who cooperated by previous or simultaneous acts cannot
be held liable as principals but as accomplices.

A. In Case Of Doubt As To Whether Principal Or Accomplice
In case of DOUBT participation of offender is considered as
accomplice rather than principal.
o Quantum of proof lacking = milder form of criminal
liability: as accomplice.
o People v. Celemente eyewitness unable to assert if
appellants hit the fallen man (uncertain participation in
homicide) and there was no conspiracy shown. Held:
appellants declared accomplices only.
Mere presence at scene, knowledge of plan, and acquiescence
is insufficient ground to hold a person as conspirator therefore
will be held liable only as accomplice.

B. When The Participation Of An Accused Is Not Disclosed, He Is Only
As Accomplice
In criminal cases, the participation of accused must be proved
by positive and competent evidence (beyond reasonable
doubt) BY the prosecution. It can't be presumed.
People v. Ubina: If a person assists in arson because he knows
the purpose of the principal, but his participation is
undisclosed. Held: His actions are neither direct nor absolutely
necessary for the commission of the offense nor induce the
crime.

IV. An Accomplice Does Not Have Previous Agreement Of

Understanding Or Is Not In Conspiracy With The Principal By Direct
Participation.
Accomplice does not enter into conspiracy with principal by
direct participation nor does he have a previous agreement or
understanding with him to commit a crime BUT he participates
to a certain point in the common criminal design.
Accomplices come to know of the criminal resolution of the
principals after the latter have reached a decision to commit a
crime. The accomplice does not decide the commission of a
crime. The accomplice just agrees after the criminal resolution
is accomplished, he does not conspire. But if the accomplice
commits an act of execution, he becomes a PDP.
NOTE: An accomplice gets a penalty one degree lower than that
provided for the principal in a consummated felony (Article 52).

A. Accomplice v Conspirator

Conspirator
Accomplice
Knowing and agreeing with criminal design
Knowledge of the criminal Gets knowledge of the criminal intent
intention is because they after principals have reached the
decided the specific course of decision and then they agree to
action
cooperate in its execution
Decide that a crime should be Merely concurs to do the crime;
committed
merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment
Authors of a crime
Instruments who perform acts not
essential to perpetration of offense

B. May A Co-Conspirator Be Held Liable As An Accomplice Only?
If technically the accused are co-conspirators BUT their
participation was not absolutely indispensible to the

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consummation of the murder court should favor milder form

of liability = accomplice.
Example:
o People v. Anin Even with knowledge of criminal
intent but the overt acts of co-accused was still not
indispensible to the crime of homicide = accomplice.
o People v. Nierra Even with community of design but
role in homicide or murder was of a minor character =
accomplice.
o BUT SEE People v. Manzano and People v. Mendoza
Once proved that accused had conspired with others
accused, liability only as accomplice is untenable; the
act of one is the act of all

Community of Design
Participation in the Criminal

Resolution
Does not necessarily mean that Implies conspiracy
there is conspiracy but it may
develop into one
Mere concurrence with criminal Entering into an agreement and
purpose
deciding to commit a felony

V. Elements To Be Liable As Accomplices:
1. There be community of design: knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation and concurs with him/her in
that purpose.
2. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts by supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
3. There be a relation between the acts by the principal and the
accomplice.

VI. FIRST ELEMENT: Community Of Design
There must be a principal by direct participation before there

could be an accomplice.
o The principal originates the design and the accomplice
merely concurs with it.
Cooperation which the law punishes: assistance knowingly or
intentionally given and which is not possible without previous
knowledge of the criminal purpose.
o People v. Lingad Taxi driver knowing that co-accused
were going to make a hold-up lets them use his cab to
where the crime will be staged and waited for them
after. Held: taxi driver is an accomplice
o U.S. v. Bello Sentry permitted some convicts to go
out of jail accompanies by guard then the convicts
committed robbery. Held: Sentry not liable as
accomplice because he had no knowledge of their
intention to commit robbery when he let them out

A. Community of design.
The accomplice intends by his acts, to commit or take part in
the execution of the crime Carino v. People
o Facts: Appellant was the close friend of Dr. Lava (the
accused in crime of rebellion). Lava has been helping
appellants family in terms of health services and in
return when accused Dr. Lava asked for shelter and
food from appellant, he provided the same for Lava not
knowing that he was helping a rebel. Lava was part of
the Huks and appellant helped Lava open bank
accounts and assisted them with money matters.
Held: Appellant was not considered an accomplice to
rebellion because his acts of helping did not fall under
the definition of rebellion in RPC nor does he fall under
Art 18s definition of accomplice because his intent to
rebel against the government was not proven and his

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assistance was not efficacious enough to make

insurrection or rebellion successful.
o People v. Maliao Accused facilitated commission of
crime by providing his house as the venue of the crime.
Even though he had no direct participation in the
crimes execution, he was present throughout it, and
he did not do anything to stop the malefactors nor help
the victim therefore he is guilty as accomplice in crime
of rape with homicide
The community of design need not be to commit the crime
actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common
purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime
actually committed was a natural or probable consequences
of the intended crime.
o People v. Largo Verzo caused Salazar and Largo to
load a time bomb in a plane which killed the deceased
and others. Held: Salazar and Largo were accomplices
in the crime of Verzo who was the principal
o U.S. v. De Jesus Three men entered Osetes house to
abduct his daughter but instead they ended up killing
Osete. Two other men were stationed outside by the
carriage, which brought them there to be lookouts.
Held: The two are accomplices because even if the
homicide was not part of the original plan, it was a
possibility to carry out the abduction.

B. How An Accomplice Acquires Knowledge Of The Criminal Design Of
The Principal.
1. Principal informs or tells the accomplice of the formers
criminal purpose.
o U.S. v. Sotto Master told his servant that he would
abduct the a girl under 18 years and he prompted said
servant to induce the girl to leave her home and the
servant did.
Held: Servant was an accomplice and master was a

2. When the accomplice saw the criminal acts of the principal.
o People v. Tamayo Ramon was choking the deceased
then Jose delivered a blow on the head of the deceased
which Ramon saw but he still continued with choking
the deceased.
Held: Ramon is an accomplice; showed that Ramon
approved/participated with the criminal design of Jose
because he continued choking deceased after the blow.
o People v. Cagalingan A. Cagalingan stabbed the
deceased first then J. Cagalingan and Romina Jr.
stabbed the deceased after.
Held: Even if there shows a community of design with
the principal, the stabbing of J Cagalingan and Romina
Jr. were not indispensible to the commission of the
crime because A Cagalingans stabbing was fatal
already, therefore the two are only accomplices.
o People v. Manansala: Even after the first knife thrust
delivered to the deceased, the accused did not try to
stop the other accused either by word or overt act
Held: Accused is an accomplice because even if his
initial intent was free from guilt, it became tainted after
he saw the first knife thrust delivered.
In case there is no conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose/intention among accused, what should be considered
is the criminal design/intent entertained by the accused that
inflicted the more or most serious wound on the victim. This
can be inferred from the nature of the weapon or the body part
injured.
No knowledge of the criminal design of the principal not an
accomplice.
o People v. Ibanez Even if the act of the accused
(holding deceaseds neck from behind) coincided with

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the other accuseds act of stabbing, simultaneousness

does not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor
the unity of action and purpose which are the bases of
the responsibility of two or more individuals
U.S. v. Flores Limbo was employee of the Bureau of
Printing and stole bank certificates for cattle
registration and sold to co-defendant Flores. Flores
used these to sell horses, which they got through theft.
Limbo had no part nor knowledge nor share in the sale
of the stolen horses.
Held: Limbo liable only for theft of bank certificates but
was neither a principal nor an accomplice nor an
accessory of the theft committed by the other
defendants

C. Concurrence With The Criminal Purpose Of Another May Make One
A Co-Principal
Even if only one of the accused originated the criminal design
and the other merely concurred BUT BEFORE the actual
commission of the crime BOTH of them agreed and decided to
commit it, then the other will now be held a principal and not
an accomplice because he has become a co-conspirator.
o BASICALLY, you are an accomplice if the original person
will commit the crime with or without your help. You
are dispensable! Replaceable!

VII. SECOND ELEMENT: Cooperates In The Execution Of The Offense
The accomplice cooperates with the principal by direct
participation BUT his cooperation is only necessary and not
indispensable.
However if there is conspiracy: the nature of the cooperation
becomes immaterial.

A. Examples Of Cooperation By Accomplice
1. By previous acts.
o Lending of a dagger or pistol to murderer knowing his
criminal purpose.
o U.S. v. Flores Pharmacist (knowing the criminal
purpose) furnishes the accused with the drug which he
used in order to help him rape the victim.
o When the owner of the gun knew that it would be
used to kill a particular person, and the principal used
it to kill another person, the owner of the gun is not
an accomplice as to the killing of the victim.
People v. De la Cerna Serapio borrowed the
rifle of Sulpicio in order to kill Rafael (as per
their agreement) but then Serapio used it to kill
Casiano. There was no evidence that Sulipicio
was aware that Serapio would do so. Held:
Sulpicio acquitted for the killing of Casiano
2. By simultaneous acts.
o People v. Escarro No previous agreement or
understanding with co-defendant but defendant held
hand of victim and tried to take away his revolver while
co-defendant attacked victim.
o People v. Crisostomo No conspiracy among the 6
persons three detained offended woman were
principals in crime of illegal detention and three others
held victims companion to prevent latter from helping
victim were accomplices.

A. The Cooperation Of An Accomplice Is Not Due To A Conspiracy
People v. Francisco Facts: Francisco (then Mayor in Isabela)
was accompanied by Berganio, Badua, Dasalla, and Tagasa
when he brought Corpus from the municipal building to the
constabulary and wanted the Corporal to detain him there. But
Corporal refused because they didnt have a detention cell and

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so they brought Corpus to another Barrio and Corpus
disappeared and was not seen anymore.
Held: Companions of Francisco were held as accomplices
because even if there was no conspiracy, they helped Francisco
being Corpus around in a jeep. Their acts constitute
cooperation by simultaneous or previous acts.

B. When The Acts Of The Accused Are Not Indispensable In The Killing,
They Are Merely Accomplices
People v. Villegas Nature of the killing was an offshoot of a
spontaneous turn of events not a previously conceived
ambush as seen by the use of stones of the accused. Held as
accomplices because they cooperated by simultaneous acts
which were not indispensable.
People v. Resayaga Acts of blocking the people who tried to
help victim is one of help and cooperation to assailants but not
indispensable to stabbing of victim. Held as accomplice
People v. Parcon No conspiracy but one acted as look-out or
guard in crime of robbery with homicide held as accomplice

C. The Accomplice Merely Supplies The Principal With Material Or
Moral Aid Without Conspiracy With The Latter
Being present and giving moral support when a crime is being
committed will make a person responsible only as accomplice
in the crime committed.
o If knowledge of criminal purpose of principal is absent =
giving aid or encouragement either morally or
materially in commission of crime or mere presence at
scene of crime does not make one an accomplice
(People v. Toling).
The moral aid may be through advice, encouragement, or
agreement.
o Material aid: external acts.
Moral aid: through advice, encouragement, or

agreement.
But the advice, encouragement, or agreement
should not be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime by the principal by
direct participation or else the one who gave it
would be a principal by inducement.
Example:
o People v. Ubina Ubina conspired with five persons to
kill Carag because he lost in an election to him and he
was also insulted by Carag. The five persons brought 3
others where Carag was killed but they did not
participate in the act of killing itself. Held: The 3 others
presence and company was not indispensable and
essential to the perpetration of the murder but they
were present and they gave moral support =
accomplices.
o People v. Balili No proof appellant conspired with
malefactors but he went with them, knew of criminal
intent, and stayed outside of house while other robbed
and killed victim. Held: Appellant is an accomplice
because he supplied material and moral aid
o People v. Vicente Inflicting stab wounds to victim
only after victim fell on ground and only because he
wanted to show a feeling of camaraderie with other
accused or a show-off or an expression of sympathy
guilty only as accomplice because his act was not
necessary and indispensable for the criminal assault
o

D. Wounds Inflicted By An Accomplice In Crimes Against Persons
Should Not Have Caused The Death Of The Victim
Accomplice should not have inflicted a mortal wound (or else
liable as principal).

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U.S. v. Zalsos Both were liable as co-principals because both
inflicted a mortal wound on the neck of the victim even if R
originated the intention to assault deceased and Z just assisted
action of initiator of the crime
Following cases other accused were held as accomplices
only wound inflicted by them were not the cause of death:
o People v. Azcona wounds inflicted did not materially
contribute to death of deceased.
o People v. Tamayo wound inflicted not of a character
that would result to death of deceased.
o People v. Cortes accused armed with clubs struck
victim, AS he fell by fatal blow made by principal, and
he did not cause serious injuries on deceased.
o People v. Antonio stoning victim already mortally
wounded by other accused.
In These Cases, The Following Rules Are Indicated:
1. One who had the original criminal design is the person who
committed resulting crime.
2. The accomplice, after concurring in criminal purpose of
principal, cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts.
If by simultaneous act accomplice acts while crime is being
committed by principal by direct participation or immediately
thereafter (ex. Principal already attacked the victim).
3. Accomplice in crimes against persons does not inflict the more
or most serious wounds.
o Example: C stabbed B first, and as B was in dying
condition, A gave a fist blow on Bs face A is an
accomplice.
o Reason: When A gave a fist blow after C gave a mortal
wound, it shows that A concurred in the criminal
purpose of C.

VIII. THIRD ELEMENT: Relation Between The Acts
There must be a relation between the criminal act of the

principal and the act of the one charged as accomplice.
o Not enough that a person entertains an identical
criminal design as that of the principal there must be
a relation between the criminal act of principal by
direct participation and of person charged as
accomplice.
o People v. De la Cruz Reyes attacked and passed his
hand over his girlfriends body and their families
decided that the father of Reyes would punish him.
Brother of the girl planned to avenge the honor of his
sister armed himself with a pistol. When he was about
to attack Reyes, Reyes was stabbed by his sister and
died. Brother was accused as accomplice. Held: No
liability by reason of participation if there is no relation
between criminal act of principal by direct participation
(girl) and of the person charged as accomplice
(brother).

A. An Accomplice May Be Liable For A Crime Different From That
Which The Principal Committed
People v. Babiera It was not shown that C and D knew of the
manner A attacked B but they knew that A had unlawfully
attacked B. Held: C and D were guilty as accomplices in crime of
homicide (A was guilty of murder qualified by treachery)
People v. Valdellon NARIC guard A asked C to help him (A)
get some sacks of rice from the NARIC warehouse then A sold
them to D. Held: C is only guilty as accomplice in commission of
simple theft. A guilty of qualified theft because of the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence (this did not apply
to C because he wasnt affiliated with NARIC).
People v. Doble Appellants joined in plan to rob by providing
banca for the robbery but there was killing committed in the
course of the robbery by the principals (others). Held:

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Appellants only accomplices because they couldnt have
prevented the killing because they were left at the banca

IX. Accomplice v. Principal
A. In General, An Accomplice:
Does not take direct part in commission of act.
Does not force nor induce others to commit it.
Does not cooperate in the commission of the crime by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous actions.

As to
Principals
Accomplices
Inducement
Without
such Inducement or utterance is
inducement, crime not indispensable with or
would
not
be without such, the crime would
committed
still be committed (since
principal already determined
to commit the crime)
Cooperation
Indispensable
Minor
When acts are Act before or during the commission of the crime
committed
Conspiracy
Decide the crimes Merely concurs with the plan
commission
already decided
Authors of the crime Mere
instruments
who
perform acts not essential to
the perpetration

Mere knowledge and participation therefore do not suffice to
make one a conspirator, for such are elements also of an
accomplice, especially if even without his participation (like a
look-out), the crime could have been accomplished.
o However, where the acts of the accused show that he
shared in the community of purpose with the principals
and their acts collectively demonstrate the existence of

a common design, conspiracy becomes evident and all
will be liable as principals.
Principals and accomplices both know and agree with the
criminal design. They have that in common. Difference lies in
the fact that conspirators know the criminal intention because
they themselves have decided to commit the crime;
accomplices just come to know about it after.

B. Accomplice v. Principal by Indispensable Cooperation

Accomplice
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation
Participation of offender in a Case of a co-principal by cooperation
case of complicity indispensible.
necessary only.

Examples: One lends dagger or pistol knowing borrower is
going to commit murder cooperation with a previous act but
not indispensable cause offender could have borrowed or
gotten weapon from someone/somewhere else
People v. Templonuevo Accused (with knowledge of
intention of other accused to kill the deceased) struck deceased
on forehead with piece of wood facilitating subsequent slaying
of deceased because it made him unconscious. Held: Accused is
guilty as accomplice
People v. Geronimo Romeo held the victim while the others
boloed him (without conspiracy among them) Held: Romeo is
only an accomplice because others could have hacked
deceased even without him holding

C. Accomplice v. Principal By Direct Participation

Accomplice
Principal By Direct Participation
Person entertained owner of a If the person was in the same

162

house (some distance away from place talking to the owner of the
the said place) while robbers were house (distracting him and serving
assaulting it so that owner will as guard to warn companions
not return until after robbery has robbing the place) he is a
been consummated an principal by direct participation.
accomplice in the crime because
he cooperated by a simultaneous
act but not indispensable (U.S. v.
Diris).
No conspiracy with principals
In conspiracy with other principals

X. Liability Of Accomplices Under Special Laws
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law (Presidential
Decree 532) anyone who aids or abets piracy or robbery in
the highway is considered an accomplice, not an accessory.
Human Securities Act (Republic Act No. 9372) an
accomplice basically follows the same definition of the Revised
Penal Code.
Genocide Law (Republic Act No. 9851) an accomplice is one
who facilitates the commission of the crime.
Anti-Torture Act (Republic Act No. 9745) there is no
definition of an accomplice. (So I guess follow the Revised Penal
Code for having suppletory effect?)
Are there accomplices in bigamy? A, a married man, marries B
who knew of As subsisting marriage.
o One case (Cant find the citation which J-Call
mentioned") said A is a PDP, while B is an accomplice.
o Another case (People v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No. L40624, June 27, 1975) said A is a PDP, while B is a PIC.

Article 19. Accessories.
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of
the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in
any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the
crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.

POINTS

I. Definition
An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor
cooperate in the commission of the felony, but with knowledge
of the commission of the crime he subsequently takes part in
three ways mentioned in the article.

II. Important Words And Phrases In Article 19
A. Having Knowledge
An accessory must have knowledge of the crime, and with that
knowledge took part in subsequent to its commission.
o In the absence of the purchasers knowledge at the
time of transaction that such goods were of illegal
origin, the customer who purchases such goods cannot
be held criminally responsible as accessory (People v.
Labrador).
Mere possession of stolen property does not make the accused
an accessory where the thief was already convicted.
o Rational: It is within the real of possibilities that the
individual received the stolen property honestly, in the

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legal course of transaction without knowing that it was

stolen (People v. Racimo).
Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been committed is not
enough.
o Knowledge and suspicion are not synonymous terms:
Suspicion being the imagination of the
existence of something without proof, or upon
very slight evidence or upon no evidence at all.
Knowledge known actual facts.
Knowledge of the commission of a crime may be acquired
subsequence to the acquisition of stolen property.
o U.S. v. Montano
Facts: Robbers took and carried away a
carabao. These were found in the possession of
A who acquired them without knowing they
had been illegally taken. Owners informed A
that they were stolen and agreed to pay half of
what A had paid for them. When the owners
returned with the payment, A said the
carabaos were returned to the seller.
Issue: Is A liable as an accessory?
Held: Yes. To declare the accused guilty as
accessory, it is not necessary that he should
have acquired the property knowing at that
time that it had been stolen. It is sufficient that
after acquiring that knowledge, he concealed
or disposed of the property, thereby depriving
the owner thereof.
Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be established
by circumstantial evidence.
o People v. Dalena When a person knew his coaccused had no legitimate business and there was no
rational reason for the accused to believe that his coaccuseds possession of said goods were legitimate, the
conclusion is that he had knowledge of their illegal

source.

B. Commission Of The Crime
The crime committed by the principal must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
People v. Pardito where there is doubt as to whether the
woman committed the crime of parricide or not (i.e. not
conclusively proven), the fact that the servant helped bury the
body does not make him an accessory in parricide.

C. Without Having Participated Therein Either As Principals Or
Accomplices
Facts: A attacked B, and B fell. C and D then each hit B with a
piece of wood. B died and was buried by all three.
Issue: Can anyone be held as an accessory?
Held: No. A is principal by direct participation. C and D are
accomplices.

D. Take part subsequent to its commission
The accessory takes part after the crime has been committed.

PAR 1: BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO
PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME.

I. Note:
The crime committed by the principal in this paragraph may be
any crime, but it must not be a light felony.

II. Important Words And Phrases
A. By Profiting Themselves By The Effects Of The Crime
Intent to gain is not enough, there must have been actual gain
or material benefit.
Examples:

164

One who received a property knowing it was stolen,
and used it (People v. Tanchoco).
o One who shared the reward for the commission of the
crime profited through it (U.S. v. Empainado).
The accessory should not take the property without the
consent of the principal otherwise it would be theft.
When is profiting by the effects of the crime punished as the
act of principal and not the act of accessory?
o When a person knowingly acquired or received
property taken by the brigands (Article 307).
o Anti-Fencing Law (Presidential Decree No. 1612) a
person is liable as principal if he buys, sells, possesses
or profits from the commission of robbery or theft.
BUT they may also be charted as accessories to
the crime of robbery or theft. Its up to the
prosecution what the charge will be.
o

B. Assisting The Offender To Profit By The Effects Of The Crime
Examples:
o A person knowing the item was stolen, sells it for the
thief (U.S. v. Galanco).
o Those who acted as runner or couriers in kidnapping
for ransom (People v. Magsino).
An accessory should not be in conspiracy with the principal
(otherwise he would also be punished as principal).
o U.S. v. Tan Tiap Co
o Facts: A conspired with others to steal goods, and
agreed to pay upon delivery of goods.
o Held: A is guilty of the crime of theft as principal, not
just accessory.

PAR. 2: BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY OF THE CRIME TO
PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY

I. Note:
The crime committed by the principal in this paragraph may be
any crime, but it must not be a light felony.

II. Important Words And Phrases
A. Body Of The Crime
Corpus Delicti the body/substance of the offense or crime.
o This is proof that a specific offense was in fact
committed by someone.
o Made up of 2 things: (1) Existence of a certain act or
result forming the basis of the criminal charge (criminal
event), and (2) Existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this actor result (criminal responsibility).
There must be an attempt to hide the body of the crime.
o People v. De la Cruz Facts: Accused was ordered to
board the jeep not knowing or even suspecting the
reason for it. He did not take part in the killing, nor
profit, nor try to help conceal it as the bodies were
merely thrown in the ditch. Held: Accused must be
acquitted.
Concealing or destroying the effects or instruments of the
crime to prevent its discovery.
o Accused is an accessory has he helped hide the weapon
used to kill. The pistol or knife is the instrument of the
crime.
Examples:
o Assisting in the burial of the victim (U.S. v. Leal).
o Making it appear that the victim had to be killed
because he resisted by placing a gun in his hand when
already dead (U.S. v. Cuison).
o The mere act of carrying the cadaver of one unlawfully
killed when it was buried to prevent the discovery of
the crime, is sufficient to make him responsible as an
accessory (People v. Galleto)

165

B. To Prevent Its Discovery
Its refers to the crime.
What is being concealed is the body of the crime, the effects or
instruments NOT the principal who committed the crime. There
must be an effort to prevent the discovery of the crime.

PAR. 3: BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE
OF THE PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME

I. Two Classes Of Accessories Contemplated In Paragraph 3
A. Public Officers
1. The accessory is a public officer.
2. He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal.
3. The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions.
4. The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it
is not a light felony.

B. Private Persons
1. That the accessory is a private person
2. That he harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author
of the crime.
3. That the crime committed by the principal is either:
a. Treason
b. Parricide
c. Murder
d. Attempt on the life of the President
e. That the principal is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime.

II. Habitually guilty of some other crime
Example: A person who previously punished for less physical
injuries three times, and then commits estafa is a habitually
guilty, and whoever helps in his escape becomes an accessory.
REQUISITE: The accessory must have knowledge of the

principal being habitually guilty of some other crime.
A mayor who refused to prosecute the offender is an accessory.
U.S. v. Yacat Mayor of the town of Cabiao refused to
prosecute the crime of homicide thus making it possible for the
offender to escape.
Accused policemen witnessed the killing of the victim by coaccused. Policeman failed to arrest culprit and even told coaccused not to tell the other policeman. Was policeman an
accessory? Damn right he was, under 3rd paragraph. It was his
duty to arrest culprit and not to conceal commission of crime
by silence or misleading authorities that accused was really
culprit. By his acts, he abused his public position (People v.
Antonio).
One who kept silent with regard to the crime he witnessed is
not an accessory.
o U.S. v. Caballeros Person who saw the commission
of murder and kept silent and does not report to
authorities, is not liable for anything.
o U.S. v. Romulo Person who volunteers false
information tended to deceive the prosecution and
assist in concealing the guilty party is liable.
A policeman who aids a murderer escape prison is liable for
infidelity, while the latter is liable for evasion of sentence.
o May the policeman be held liable as accessory for
evasion of sentence of the murderer?
Justice Callejo: YES.
But isnt the policeman a PDP or PIC?
Leviste couldnt have escaped were it
not for the actions of the policeman.
(ewan.)
Boado: Those who assist the principal to escape
maybe prosecuted under Presidential Decree
No. 1829 for obstruction of justice not as
o

166

accessory but as a principal, provided that a
separate information shall be prepared for the
crime of obstruction.

III. Accessories Liability Is Subordinate And Subsequent
Reason: The accessorys participation therein is subsequent to
the crimes commission, and his guilt is directly related to that
of the principal.
o If the facts alleged are not proven in the prosecution
instituted or do not constitute a crime, no legal
grounds exist for convicting a defendant as an
accessory since no crime has been perpetrated (U.S. v.
Mendoza).
Is conviction of accessory possible even if principal is acquitted?
o YES, if the crime was in fact committed, but the
principal was acquitted because of Article 12.
o See p. 590 591 for examples.
Apprehension and conviction of the principal is not necessary
for the accessory to be held criminally liable.
o So long as the requisites for the existence of the crime
are present and that someone committed them, the
accessory may be held criminally liable.
o In the same way, the trial of the accessory may be
resolved prior to that of the principal so long as the
above is satisfied.
o The accessory may be prosecuted and convicted even if
the principal is not yet apprehended, so long as the
crime has been proved to exist.
The accused cannot be held liable as accessory if the principal
charged with murder died before trial because had he been
alive, he might have been found guilty of only homicide.

IV. Accessory Distinguished From Principal And From Accomplice.

Principal
Accomplice
Takes direct part or cooperate or
induce in the commission of the
crime
Cooperates in the commission of
the offense prior, during or after.
Accessory
Does not take direct part or
cooperate in or induce the
commission of the crime
Does not cooperate in the
commission of the offense by
acts either prior thereto or
simultaneous therewith.
Participation takes place prior, Participation always takes place
during and after
AFTER the commission of the
crime.
Knows the criminal design of the Knows the commission of the
principal
offense
No exemption
Exempted under Article 20 and
for light felonies under Article 16
Provides direct or Provides
Acts in the 3 ways enumerated
indispensable
material
or under Article 19
participation, or moral aid in an
was liable for efficacious way
inducement.
but not in a
manner
indispensable
to the offense
Full penalty
1 degree lower 2 degrees lower than principal

Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.
The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon
those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article.

POINTS

167

I. Basis For Exemption
Based on ties of blood, and preservation of the cleanliness of
ones name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed
by relatives so near as those mentioned in this article.

II. Principals Related To Accessories Exempt From Criminal Liability
When principal is his:
o Spouse
o Descendant
o Ascendant
o Legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or
relative by affinity within the same degree.

III. Extent Of Coverage
Exemption applies even if the accessory is related to only two
of found principals guilty of murder (U.S. v. Abanzado).
Relationship by affinity between surviving spouse and blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives even after the death
of the deceased spouse.
Nephew or niece is not included among such relatives.

IV. Accessory Is Not Exempt From Criminal Liability Even If The
Principal Is Related To Him If Such Accessory (1) Profited By The
Effects Of The Crime, Or (2) Assisted The Offender To Profit By The
Effects Of The Crime
If the accessory performs the two acts mentioned, he is liable
even if the principal falls within the listed relatives because
such acts are prompted not by affection but be detestable
greed.
o Does concealing of the effects of the crime, not to
prevent its discovery, but to obtain gain, fall under
Article 19(2)?
Facts: Husband conceals the property stolen by

his wife to profit from it later.
Held: Husband is liable as an accessory since he
is driven not by affection for his wife, but
profit.
Only accessories under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 are
exempt from criminal liability if they are related to the
principals.
o Examples of exemptions:
A son who helps his father bury the body of the
murdered victim.
Grandson who having knowledge of the
robbery by his grandfather destroys the body
of the crime.
Person who helps his brother escape after the
latter committed treason.
Liability of a public officer when related to the principal
o Facts: Public officer abused his office in order to assist
the escape of his brother who had committed murder.
o Issue: Is he liable as an accessory?
o Held: He is an accessory BUT does not have criminal
liability. Ties of blood or relationship constitutes a more
powerful incentive than the call of duty.

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CRIMINAL

TITLE II: PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR

attempted or frustrated stage of execution. Only principals and

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

Exception: Under Republic Act No. 9851 (Genocide

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

principal in the crime committed. He must also

that caused Bancoyos death. Also,

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acquaintance among themselves sufficient that their

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

stabbing the victims and robbing them then

People v. Madera Two appellants not co-principals

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

No participation in the criminal design when the act of

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

determined instigators who induced the former to

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for serious physical injuries only because there was no

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

punishment. Note: The ruling is in accordance with the

with increased numbers continue the assault are

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

responsible for all the acts of others done in furtherance of the

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

Facts: Diong in order to avoid an execution of judgment against

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each of them should perform a positive act directly

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

PAR 2: THOSE WHO DIRECTLY FORCE OR INDUCE OTHERS TO

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

An inexperienced boy of tender age was persuaded by

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

The inciting words must have great dominance and

5. The material executor of the crime has no personal reason to

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would be followed or any real intention that it produce the

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

Proof of such extremes is usually required to justify such

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The crime committed by the principal by direct

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Indispensable Cooperation. B is Principal by Direct

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with B knowing he didnt have funds but indorsed it

Malversation through falsification of public documents

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determined independently of and separately from

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He intends to, and does, take part in the crime.

IV. An Accomplice Does Not Have Previous Agreement Of

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consummation of the murder court should favor milder form

Participation in the Criminal

There must be a principal by direct participation before there

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assistance was not efficacious enough to make

Held: Servant was an accomplice and master was a

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the other accuseds act of stabbing, simultaneousness

CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIEWER