Book 1

Prepare For Your
Emirates Upgrade
BOOK 1
THE PROCESS GUIDE
(AIRBUS - A330)
October 2008
By: Prepare for success Publications - A.B
First
Edition
Prepare for Success Publications 2008
This book has been written and published as a reference book to assist all
Emirates pilots who are going or being in their Upgrade command process.
All materials herein are gathered and collected from pilots with emirates airlines
during their upgrade process, recurrent or line training.
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained
within this book, however its the responsibility of all pilots to make sure that
the information in this book is up-to-date according to Emiratess latest updates
as per the Company CD, FCIs or any sort of updating venues.
COMPANY MANUALS CANT BE OVERIDDEN BY

ANY MEANS OF OTHER MATERIALS, ITS THE
MAIN SOURCE OF INFORMATION, AND ANY
OTHER MATERIALS
MUST BE USED FOR
GUIDANCE ONLY.
All pilots are highly appreciated to submit their feedback, suggestions, comments
or anything that might be helpful to our colleagues now or in future.
Please send all your correspondences to the following e-mail:
ekupgrade@gmail.com
FOREWAORD
I would like to say a big thank you for all the people who
provided me with this amount of useful information that led
to the publishing of this book, I hope their time, effort and
study will be reflected on all of us during our upgrade
process, I wish you a very successful upgrade.
A.B
October 2008
Index
Pre-Face CONGRATULATIONS
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION
SECTION 2 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS EXTRACS
SECTION 3 INTERVIEW PROCESS
SECTION 4 PRE-COURSE NOTES
SECTION 5 COURSE DETAILS
SECTION 6 FULL FLIGHT SIMULATOR
SECTION 7 LOS/LOFT SCENARIO
SECTION 8 FOM STUDY GUIDE
SECTION 9 QUESTIONS BANK
CONGRATULATIONS
Preparing For Your Emirates Upgrade
Congratulations
CONGRATULATIONS!
Congratulations! as you have been selected for a new role as a Commander of an
Emirates aircraft, this new role requires a lot of study and preparation, Im sure that all of
Emirates Pilots are having the skills and the experience required for the this new
responsibility, during service with Emirates all of us were waiting for this moment which
is a mile stone in our career.
During your service with Emirates you should have heard good stories, bad stories about
the upgrade process, so just put faith in your self and be confident you can do it, just do
your home work and make some effort to achieve your goal which you have always
dreamed off.
This book is intend to give you a hand during your preparation for your upgrade on the
A330 Aircraft, I gathered all available information that made sense to me that it might be
needed and combined them in TWO different books, (BOOK 1 and BOOK 2), Book one
is THE PROCESS GUIDE , which includes most of the official material provided by
the company, and Book 2 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, which include some
good information collected from Emirates Pilots and a trusted internet sites.
I have tried my best to gather as much information as I can from all my friends,
colleagues, instructors and experienced, knowledged, trusted pilots, and combined them
in this document for the benefit of all of us.
Although this document is updated to the best of my knowledge and up to date, it is
required by all pilots to update this document according to the new revisions/updates
from the company.
I wish all the best for all of us, and hope this document will give some help for all my
colleagues approaching their upgrade time, GOOD LUCK.
A.B
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Congratulations
Intentionally Left Blank
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
Section 1
Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
How you will be selected for your upgrade
As stipulated in the FOM the minimum experience for normal command are as follows:
1) A minimum of 6,000 hours Total Time.
2) A minimum of 4,000 hours HardTime.
3) Possession of a valid UAE ATPL.
4) A minimum of 3 years of service in Emirates prior to promotion to Captain.
5) A minimum of four PPCs successfully completed on any aircraft type in Emirates fleet.
6) A minimum of 12 months on type, from date of completion of initial line training.
7) Must maintain full Route and Aerodrome qualification recency, including CAT B & C airports.
If you are fulfilling the above requirements, then once your time comes the process is as follows:
1- Each month there is a Fleet Review Meeting which will review your file for an INITIAL
SUITABILITY ASSESMENT (details in Section 1 of this document).
2- Once you have been successfully selected by the Fleet Review Board, you will be notified in
Writing to conduct a DETAILED SUITABILTY ASSESMENT as follows:
-
Attend a psychometric test.

Attend a test on A330 technical, procedures and FOM knowledge.
To fly a series of command assessment sectors.
3- Upon the successful completion of the above requirements, candidate will be invited for
INTERVIEW with Fleet Management (details are listed in Section 2 of this document).
4- Successful candidates will be receive offers for their upgrade course dates.
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Section 1
Introduction
Upgrade Course Layout

The following is your upgrade footnotes, it will be detailed in the following sections of this document.
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SECTION 2
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
EXTRACTS
Upgrade requirements and process
(Extracts from FOM, OM-D, TM 334-Part 1)
Section 2
Company Manuals Extracts
2. Company Manuals Extracts

UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESS
This section will highlight the minimum requirement for upgrade in Emirates Airlines as well as
the different upgrade steps and process which laid down in our official documents (FOM, TM 334
Part 1, OM-D and any FCIs or FCNs).
The following documents will be extracted to cover all the requirements and different upgrade
process steps:
-FOM (OM-A)
-TM 334 Part 1
-OM-D
-FCIs and FCNs (If available)
FOM (OM-A) Extracts

The following are exact extracts from the FOMs latest version up to date as of October 2008.
Note: Please make sure to update any changes that might happen as per updates on
company CD, FCIs, FCNs.
Chapter 3: Training, Checking, Qualifications & Recency

3.5 Upgrade Training
3.5.3.1 Minimum experience for normal command
The experience requirements for upgrade to command are:
1) A minimum of 6,000 hours Total Time.
2) A minimum of 4,000 hours Hard Time.
3) Possession of a valid UAE ATPL.
4) A minimum of 3 years of service in Emirates prior to promotion to Captain.
5) A minimum of four PPCs successfully completed on any aircraft type in Emirates fleet.
6) A minimum of 12 months on type, from date of completion of initial line training.
7) Must maintain full Route and Aerodrome qualification recency, including CAT B & C airports.
3.5.4 Initial Suitability Assessment
Suitability means having the necessary licence and experience requirements as defined above and also
meeting the technical and performance standards expected for the new role.
The monthly Fleet Review Meeting will assess the initial suitability of pilot candidates for type transfer or
upgrade to command.
The findings of this review process will be considered the Initial Suitability Assessment.
The Fleet Review Meeting will be chaired by the Chief Pilot or Fleet Manager of the Fleet type. Minimum
attendees shall consist of the Chief Pilot or Fleet Manager, Fleet Standard Captain or his representative,
Manager Flight Training or his representative, Human Resource representative and Recruitment
representative.
The review meeting will perform the initial assessment of both the technical competence and all aspects
of personal performance of the pilot in relation to the required standard expected for the new role.
In determining the suitability of a First Officer, the review meeting will pay particular attention to
Training and Standard performance. The candidate will be expected to have a high level of competency
demonstrated through PPCs and ALCs.
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Section 2
The Fleet management shall advise unsuccessful candidates in writing and shall provide details of the
assessment on which the recommendations are based.
This written notification will also specify the conditions and/or performance criteria necessary for future
upgrade consideration.
The outcome of the Review Meeting will be deemed to be the Flight Operations managements final
decision in this respect.
An upgrade candidate who is successful in the Initial Suitability Assessment will be put forward for
Detailed Suitability Assessment.
3.5.5 Detailed Suitability Assessment
Subject to a satisfactory recommendation from the Initial Suitability Assessment, First officers will
undertake a Detailed Suitability Assessment. Upon completion of the Detailed Suitability Assessment, the
First Officer will be given a written notification of the outcome.
The Detailed Suitability Assessment will consist of the following:
1) Candidates will attend the Psychology Department for psychometric testing.
2) Candidates will be tested on their current technical, procedural and FOM knowledge.
3) Candidates may be required to fly a series of Command Assessment Sectors with a Pilot Standards
Captain where further demonstrations of technical, procedural, handling and FOM knowledge will be
assessed.
4) Upon completion of the above requirements, candidates will be invited for an interview with Fleet
Management where the results of the Assessment Process will be discussed and a decision will be made as
to the candidates suitability to commence the upgrade training program.
Successful candidates will receive offers of command training. Unsuccessful candidates will be notified by Fleet
Management in writing outlining areas of concern that require development Any future consideration for
command upgrade will be determined by Fleet Management upon the candidate meeting the suitability
requirements as outlined in this policy.
3.5.6 Upgrade Command Training
1) On the same type:
Pilots undergoing upgrade on the same aircraft type will undertake a suitable upgrade course as described
in OM-D.
Upgrade PPC with a grading of 3 must be reviewed by VPFT and CFI Airbus/Boeing to decide on the
continuation or termination of Upgrade Training.
2) On a different type (Transition Upgrade):
It is the policy of Emirates not to permit transition upgrades.
3.5.7 Course Failure
3) Upgrade Command Training Failures:
At the discretion of the Fleet Management, after a period of 12 months from an upgrade failure, a First
Officer may be considered for a second upgrade attempt subsequent to satisfactory completion of 2
recurrent PPCs. In determining the suitability of a First Officer for a second attempt, the Fleet Review
Meeting will pay particular attention to Training and Standard performance. The meeting expects to see a
high level of competency demonstrated through PPCs and ALCs.
Before being offered a second upgrade course, the First Officer will undergo an assessment process that
will include a technical quiz and Command Assessment Sectors as determined by the Fleet Standards Dept.
If any developmental training is required this will be identified and the First Officer sent to the Training
Dept to undergo the required training. If the First Officer is determined suitable for his second attempt at
upgrade then he will conduct a final assessment flight with either the Chief Pilot or his nominated deputy.
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Section 2
3.5.8 Freeze Periods

1) General:
For the purposes of this policy, the A330, A340 and A380 will be considered to be the same aircraft type.
The freeze period is the period of time a pilot is not permitted to change aircraft type.
Freeze periods are not cumulative.
Freeze periods commence from the date of FLC.
Upgrade on the current type may take place during the freeze period.
Freeze periods may be varied to meet company requirements. Any such variation must be authorised by
SVPFO or EVP-E & O.
2) Captains:
After completion of initial training (Upgrade/DEC), Captains will be frozen on type from FLC for a
minimum of six years.
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Section 2
TM 334 Part 1 Extracts

The following are exact extracts from the TM 334 Part 1 latest version up to date as of October 2008.
CH 2: Training Syllabi and Checking

General
Foreword
The A330 Upgrade course has been designed to cater for the needs of a rapidly expanding fleet.
This requirement has led to a course that will provide suitably qualified First Officers with the
adequate training required, to qualify them as competent Aircraft Commanders in Emirates.
Refer to OM-D for crew complement during upgrade training.
Objectives
The Command Upgrade Training is provided in order to achieve the following goals.
1. To ensure that the newly upgraded Captains have:
Acquired the flying skills and competency required to operate from the Left Hand Seat (LHS);
Acquired the leadership qualities and the technical and procedural knowledge required to command the
operation of the aircraft;
Meet the standards established in the FOM.
2. To ensure that newly qualified Captains will comply with Line Operation Standards through the
implementation of standardized training programmes.
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Section 2
2.1.3.1 Course Footprint
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Section 2
2.1.3.2 Ground School

Foreword
The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During
the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions
and practical application thereof.
Thorough preparation is required by the upgrade candidate. Candidates are required to log
on to the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires
must be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a
modular format. Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight
Training Administration for the exact dates and times.
Objective
At the end of the modular ground school candidates should:
1. Show enhanced knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of a Captain,
2. Understand company policy and procedures to be applied in normal and emergency
situations and
3. Demonstrate sound management skills, decision-making abilities and leadership traits
expected of a newly-upgraded Captain.
Course Modules and Subjects
Module 1 - Management Model (CRM)
Trainees will, through an extensive review of relevant CRM topics and case studies, decide
how effective management, decision making, leadership and communication can be achieved
in a flight deck environment. Topics will be covered with the emphasis place from a human
factors perspective.
Module 2 Performance
A review is conducted on certification, ICAO, JAR-OPS and LIDO performance requirements.
Demonstration of practical application of procedures is required during and as part of pre-course
study.
Module 3 Responsibilities, Expectations, Standards and LOS Scenario 1
A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains duties and
responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the
subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of
international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of
when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to
ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained.
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Section 2
Module 4 LOS Scenario 2-5

In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring,
through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 3. Candidates
will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight
operations. The topics will include:
Flight Planning LIDO requirements and practicalities.

Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures and awareness of
effective management of various major emergencies, i.e. fuel leek, bomb on board, flight
control failure.
All Weather Operations (AWOPS) - company and international legal requirements.
Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) - normal and abnormal operations when a failure
may effect the safe operation.
Diversion and Suitable Airport planning - Selection of diversion airports using resources
and guidance provided in aircraft manuals, Discussion on procedures when diverting to
EK and non-EK airports whether continuing or terminating a flight.
Fuel Management - The current fuel policy is reviewed and its practical application
discussed.
Aviation Law - The FOM will be reviewed with emphasis on an Emirates Captains duties
and responsibilities. Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon
an Aircraft Commander as derived from International and National Law will also be reviewed.
Module 5 - LOS Scenario 6 and 7

Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full
flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and
complete a safe and efficient flight in the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of
LOS training, all aspects of the airlines operation should be fully understood.
Module 6 Fleet
To enable better understanding of the airlines operation, briefings are conducted by
representatives from the flowing departments in Flight Operations, Fleet Planning, Network
Control and Flight Safety representatives.
2.1.3.3 Pre PPC Training
Foreword
This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the
PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS.
Objectives
1. To become proficient with operating the aircraft from the LHS.
2. To develop a sound decision-making process whilst re-familiarising the candidate with certain
abnormal and emergency failures.
3. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the Upgrade PPC and
4. AWOPS/ZFT Simulator sessions.
5. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the LOS/LOE phase.
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Section 2
Upgrade Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Training

The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS
conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase.
The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candidate must display a good
understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal and abnormal
operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made.
F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review
of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures.
F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures.
PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On
successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U.
F5U: All Weather Operations and Zero Flight Time. Refer to relevant chapters.
Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seats or with a Line
F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Line F/O in the RHS, Items that have been covered in the
1st half of the session need not be repeated.
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Section 2
2.1.3.4 CAT C Airport Familiarization

Foreword
All Upgrade candidates are required to complete a simulator exercise at SANAA and
SEYCHELLES airport.
The simulator exercise is designed to familiarise the candidate with that particular Cat C
aerodrome, with a large emphasis placed on training. During the session the Instructor will
highlight important aspects and considerations for safe operations into that airport.
Each familiarisation takes approximately 1 hour. The Sanaa familiarisation is conducted after
LOS1 and the Seychelles familiarisation is conducted after LOS2. As the training takes place
immediately after a LOS there is little time avail for a formal briefing. Therefore the student must
have complete a thorough review of the OM-C RAIG beforehand Refer to TM 5.23 Category C
Airfield training for details.
2.1.3.5 LOS
See section 5.19 of TM 334 Part1 (Below).
5.19 Line Orientated Simulation
Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first
3 sessions will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line
Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during
which time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors
have been inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall
training value, and to generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade
candidate. The allotted amount of sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE,
followed by the Final Line Check (FLC). Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster,
whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line sectors from the LHS, between each simulator
session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies
and abnormalities in real time, and realistic operational conditions.
To observe and develop the candidates knowledge in technical and procedural matters.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding
scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates
will have the tools to:
Successfully complete the upgrade training, and
Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company Policies upon
promotion to Captain.
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Section 2
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically
as possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as
required to assist in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator freeze
facility is acceptable for the TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase
the candidate must demonstrate a good standard, or show signs of improving towards this,
before being recommended for the LOE. Should the standard not be achieved within the
allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the discretion of VPFT and/or
CFI/CFE.
During the LOS and LOE sessions, the TC will act as engineer, purser, ATC and any other
character as may be required. The emphasis on training must be maintained during the LOS
phase.
The final LOS is conducted as a Progress Review without any instructor intervention. On
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The
LOE will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
All LOS and LOE forms consist of 2 pages, filling in and signing of these forms is as per standard
Emirates practice.
Use Of Video
It is recommended that the video equipment be used to record the entire Loft as this gives
increased value to the debriefing. It clearly highlights CRM aspects and in many cases will greatly
assist in getting across an important teaching point. The student should provide a blank 180
minute video tape for each session, if he wishes he can use the same tape and record over it.
The tape must be erased after each session and the student must not be allowed to take it home.
A video eraser is available in briefing room 4 for this purpose.
During the simulator session the instructor should note the times at which items of interest occur
and use this as a guide during replay. Debriefing in this manner may increase the debriefing time
however this method has been well received by the crews that have undergone upgrade training.
LOS Rules
LOS sessions are designed with the following rules:
Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further failures to affect
the outcome of the flight.
Only 1 failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
After takeoff, only 1 x recoverable failure, and 1 x unrecoverable failure may be given. These
failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure due to
engine shutdown.
Weather conditions are to be realistic with changes as indicated on the forecast The content
and failure scenarios of each LOS will be at the discretion of the TC in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines in OM-D.
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Section 2
LOS/LOE Guidelines
Furthermore, one prescribed scenario will be included in each LOS:
LS1U: the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario.
LS2U: will include a Cold weather Operation scenario.
LS3U: will include an ETOPS flight.
LOEU: is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the TRE
in keeping with the above rules.
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may be
introduced and conducted by the TC.
2.1.3.6 Initial Pilot Proficiency and ZFT

See Training Manual Volume A33/4 Part 2, Section 5.17 of TM 334 Part 1(Below).
5.17 Zero Flight Time Training
General:
The Zero Flight Time module is a training event. As a general rule, all the items in the syllabus
should be completed and repeated, if necessary, until proficiency is achieved. At the end of the
session the instructor shall certify the trainees proficiency by ticking the ZFTT box on the Synthetic
Training Report Form.
2.1.3.7 All Weather Ops Initial

See Training Manual Volume A33/4 Part 2, Section 5.5 of TM 334 Part 1 (Below).
5.5 Low Visibility Operations LVO Training
5.5.1 General:
The Low Visibility Operations module is a combination training / checking event. There is
significant preparation required for this module. The trainee should prepare by reviewing the
document references listed below.
Refer to Training Manual A33/4 Part 2 for the latest syllabus.
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Section 2
5.5.2 Document References:
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Section 2
2.1.3.8 LIFUS
See section 5.21 of TM 334 Part 1 (Below).
5.21 Line Flying Under Supervision

General
The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing
of Line Training subjects.
Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets,
with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our
route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network
environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of
the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available
to support the Companys flying operations.
Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the
simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS.
The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order
to deliver to the Fleet highly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their
Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and
operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit
resource managers.
The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.
Line Training Preparation

This guide is to help prepare you for the transition from Simulator Training (Aircraft Type
Rating) to Line Training (operating on the line according to Emirates procedures.)
Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and
Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts
and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC).
These charts will be out dated but are still useful for route study.
We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and
a geographical awareness is essential. When you get transferred to LVIV Control it would be
nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation.
A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP
and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but
it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time
management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in
flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the
CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.
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Section 2
Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOMs.
Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we
recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20.
Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various
Training Captains you must arrive for you flight well prepared. The Line Training Study Guide and
Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage.
Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on
location check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart
CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins
depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical.
Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.
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Section 2
OM-D Extracts
The following are exact extracts from the OM-D latest version up to date as of October 2008.
CHAPTER 2: TRAINING SYLLABI AND CHECKING

2.1.3.1 General
The Company may upgrade First Officers to command on their existing fleet or select first officers
for an upgrade on a different type. Direct Entry Captains (DEC) may also be employed. DECs
and Upgrade First Officers complete a course of training and checking, detailed in the applicable
type specific training manual, which incorporates the required elements of Initial, Conversion and
Upgrade Command training courses.
2.1.3.2 Authority
The CFE and CFI-A/B shall ensure that upgrade command training and checking programmes are
established in the Operations Manual and approved by the Authority.
2.1.3.3 Associated Training
Initial Training Course
Conversion Training Course
2.1.3.4 Minimum Qualifications / Experience Levels
Refer to OM-A. (FOM).
The candidate shall complete the training detailed and successfully complete the associated
proficiency and other tests to the standard detailed in Chapter One Specification of Training and
Checking Assessment.
2.1.3.5 Syllabus and Content
The command course shall include at least the following:
training in an approved flight simulator to include LOFT and/or flying training
a PPC operating as commander
commander's responsibilities
line training in command under supervision
completion of a commander's line check and route and aerodrome competence qualifications
(see Line Flying Under Supervision and Line Checking Appendix)
CRM training (see CRM Training Appendix)
The Upgrade Command course is conducted in accordance with a detailed course syllabus,
included in the applicable type specific training manual.
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Section 2
2.1.3.5.1 Ground School

- Pilots progressing from First Officer to Captain will undertake ground school training
emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of a Commander.
- Human factors topics in relation to Crew Resource Management (CRM) will be trained and
practiced. At the end of the course, candidates should have an understanding of how to
maintain safe and efficient operations.
- During this ground school, exercises will be undertaken to enhance sound and effective management,
decision making, leadership and communication skills.
The following topics are conducted in a modular format:
Aircraft Performance
Crew Recourse Management (CRM)
Airline Management and Flight Safety
Command Responsibilities, expectations and achievement standards.
Line Orientated Simulation exercises covering the following topics:
Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures
All Weather Operations (LVO)
Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS)
Diversion and Suitable Airport planning
Flight Planning
Fuel Management
Aviation Law for Aircraft Commanders
2.1.3.5.2 Simulator Training
Details of the upgrade simulator training modules can be found in the applicable type specific Training
Manual. The Upgrade FFS Modules are summarised as follows:
Module 1:
2 simulator sessions
Provides a familiarisation from the Left Seat, and a review of the flight characteristics of the aircraft.
Module 2:
1 simulator session
Provides a review of the principal Emergency and Abnormal Procedures, in preparation for the
Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC).
Module 3:
1 simulator session Initial Pilot Proficiency Check
Module 4:
1 simulator session
o LVOPS
o ZFT
o Cat C (if required).
Module 5:
3 LOS simulator and 1 LOE simulator session.
o LOS: a series of line oriented flight training simulator exercises.
o LOE: is a final line oriented simulator check.
o Simulator LOS and LOE sessions will be embedded throughout the Line Training flights. LOS
session 1 must be completed satisfactorily before commencing Line Training and LOE must be
completed before the FLC.
Note: For guidelines on the conduct of LOS/E, refer to the LOS and LOE Appendix.
2.1.3.5.3 Line Training
Refer to the Line Flying Under Supervision and Line Checking Appendix.
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SECTION 3
INTERVIEW PROCESS
Section 3
Interview Process
3. INTERVIEW PROCESS
Upon completion of the requirements stipulated in the FOM and previously stated in Section 1 of
this document, candidates will be invited for an interview with Fleet Management where the
results of the Assessment Process will be discussed and a decision will be made as to the
candidates suitability to commence the upgrade training program.
Successful candidates will receive offers of command training.
The interview panel may consist of:
-Fleet Management.
-Human Resources representative.
-Recruitment representative.
The interview will take about 15 min to 1 hour depending on the panel and your answers .
Questions will vary between personal, technical, operational or daily operation including a real
scenario for a flight with different problems on ground and before departure. Problems will be time
critical and sometimes to judge your awareness of the FOM, decision making process and
company operational policies.
In the following pages you will find a very good summary of some points you need to focus and it
really covers some of the interview questions as well as the experience of many pilots who have gone
through their interview process and would like to share their experience with their colleagues, I tried
to gather as much interview sessions as I can from both Airbus and Boeing pilots respectively so
please if you come across an interview with a Boeing pilot, please disregard the specific type
technical info and procedures.
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Section 3
Interview Process
GOOD POINTS TO PREPARE FOR YOUR COMMAND INTERVIEW

-
Limitations
Tech Log, Daily Validity, What must be signed
MEL, Concessions, verbal,
Captain performed items
Company Ops Spec, Where, what does it contain?
Aircraft Documentation Folder
Fuel Policy, extra, when
Reduced Reserve Fuel, conditions, actions
Continue without Alternate, conditions
Fuel uplift check
Tankering, how to maximize calculation
Fuel emergency
AWO Minima, Take-off / Landing
Take-Off Alternate requirements, when, distance
ETOPS, Suitable Alternate, weather deteriorates?
Alternate Airport weather requirements, 2 Alts when?
Circling Minima
Visual requirements
Stable approach criteria
Flight parameter callouts by PNF
Orbit
Autoland
Approach ban point
Company speed limits
Derated Take-off, when must you use TOGA
FO takeoff / landing restrictions, taxi
Minimum cabin crew
Captain Responsibilities, whose authority, when, where (ie)hotel?
ZFW LMC, 300, 700, +700, LMC Fuel? LMC bag weights
New CFP when?
Need to reduce TO weight, priorities
New Captain limits
ASRs, when, GCAA
Fire fighting / Rescue
Capt is PF mandatory when?
Departure / Arrival delays, time, Pax PA, Ops call info
Arming of doors
Autobrakes recommended
Land ASAP (RED) when
Mayday vs PAN
Flight Duty period, local night, max duty with positioning
Flight Duty Period extensions
Latest publication amendments numbers
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Section 3
Interview Process
Command Interview 1 (Airbus)

Quiz:
330 Severe Turbulence Penetration

Minimum battery voltages
Engine Master Fault light
Destination Alternate minima
Time limit on taking Viagara before a flight
Max number of INADS and DEPOS
Is Captain required to be informed if a wheel chair pax is on board
Can the Captain sign transit checks
Meaning of Check EWD on upper display
What is the minimum contingency fuel
Whose permission id is required for a crew member to stay away from hotel on layover
Maximum number of bags allowed for a crew member
Interpret the engine bleed page to determine what power setting the engine is at when
both the High and Low pressure bleeds are supplying air
ETOPS weather requirements when TEMPO condition exists on the ETOPS alternate
TAF
What happens when the thrust levers are moved forward of the climb detent below 100
Interview
Scenario involved a flight to BAH with considerations for fuel planning, F/O landing
restrictions, dispatch with no engineer, all with a difficult F/O and how I would handle him.
What would you do if the FO was running down the company while you were on duty.
Relate a complex situation you have been involved in.
Non-adherence to SOP's, when/why?
Relate a time you have had to assert yourself.
What do you think of EK command criteria?
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Section 3
Interview Process
30 Nov. 02
3 Panel members
Duration : 20 25 min
1.
If there has been a failed check ride in the past it will come up and be discussed. This may
include any abnormal write up you may have had, not necessarily a failed check ride.
2. What do you think a good Captain is (should be) ?
a. Include Leadership roles.
b. How to motivate crew.
c. Etc.
3. Have you had any difficult situations in the past (could be as Captain or F/O) ? Explain if full
detail.
4. Have you had any conflicting experiences ?
5. What is enroute reserve fuel ? This will lead into the next question.
6. You are in LHR after pushing off the gate and find out you must off load a bag. What are the
considerations ? You notice that you no longer have CFP fuel, what will you do ? Refueling
is not an option. After exhausting your great knowledge on flying at a more economical
speed, closer alternate, blah, blah, you are stuck with what you got and its not enough.
a. LMC
b. RRP
i. New CFP
ii. DP, etc
7. Following through with the above scenerio.you now end up with a medical emergency.
What are your considerations ? How are you going to handle it ? What is your role in this
case ?
8. You are approaching the Lamborne VOR for LHR. Weather is fluctuating above and below
Cat III limits. First of all what are the limits ? And second of all what are you going to do ?
9. Are both autopilots engaged in a autoland ?
10. What considerations must you take into effect for a NPA ? This questions is referring to the
QRH checklist. There is also a question regarding the EK policy that you must fly a NPA at
least once a month and then annotate in the VR.
11. Know EGT limits.
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Section 3
Interview Process

-Panel of 2 to 4 people
-They expect to see at least a tie and shirt worn, possibly a jacket depending on time of year.
-Approx 15-20 mins in duration
-Relatively informal format
-Possible discussion on anything Pysch may have de-briefed you on
Past Questions (A330)
-First officer limitations
-New Captain limitations
-List reasons you cant continue on an ETOPS flight
: FOM Chap 18
: FOM Chap 3
: AFM section 6
: FCOM VOL 2 Special Flight
-What is contained in the Ops Specs & Where are they located : (Docs Folder on board)
-When can the Captain utilise Flt and Duty discretion
: FOM Chap 27
-Outline the Company Circling minima
: FOM Chap 21
-Who can issue a CRS?
: FOM Chap 17
-What is a concession, how many sectors can you operate under one and who can authorize its use?
: FOM Chap 17 & MEL Section 0
-What is the recommended technique if an overspeed occurs in the descent? : SOPs & FCOM 3
Supplementary Procedures
-What would you do if you realize you will be arriving at dest with < CMR fuel : FOM Chap 11
-Incapacitation scenario
: FOM Chap 25 & FCOM 3
-Why do you want to be a Captain?
-What are the qualities you think a Captain should have?
-Tell us about a time you experienced conflict in the flight deck/at work/at home.how was it resolved
-What are the duties and responsibilites of a Captain?
: FOM Chap 1
-Tell us about the worst experience you have had in your aviation career
-Tell us what you were doing prior to joining EK
-What do you think of the EK fuel policyIf ZFW drops prior to departure what would you do re-fuel.,
When would you take extra fuel?
-ATC ask you to maintain 210 kts until 8nm finalwhat would you do?
-On the CFP, how is block time calculated?
-How do you view EK as a company?
-What do you think EK could be doing better?
-Destination Alternate is equipped with a CAT 2 Approach only, what are the weather limits required
at the planning stage
: FOM Chap 12
-Briefly summarise the changes in the latest FOM amendment
-Briefly summarise the changes in the latest SOP amendment
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Section 3
Interview Process

Stabilization Criteria
Capt Limitations
What is CPDLC
What is ADS
RVSM- 1000 FPM Climb-where do you find this criteria?
G/A calls
Duties & Responsibilities of Captain
Who can you call inflight for help?
Concessions
ETOPS-Currency requirements
Reason for ASR
Actions for Bomb onboard
Fuel Policy
Special ops (ETOPS,RVSM)
Circling minima
VFR Wx Req
180 min Etops-Ops specs (Doc Folder)
A330 -420 m
-Not approved NAT MNPS
-RNP 4 Approved
-RVSM approved
-CPDLC/ADS approved
Scenarios:
-Cabin Crew Pregnant Can she fly (NoLicense)
-Fat Lady thinks she is preg-can u off load her
-Fight with F/O-now to get talking-SOPs
Go Around calls and actions
MNPS/RNP/RVSM
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Section 3
Interview Process

Hi guys,
Just a few points about the interview this week
-
interview takes about 45 minutes

1st 10 minutes about how you and family are adapting to Dubai ?
o Any problems?
o How is school for the kids etc,
Have you had any conflicts at work?
If yes, how did you handle it?
If no, discussion about CRM at Emirates, read RM CRM section.
AAM, stay under the radar, conflict resolution, etc
How would you handle conflict with FO that refuses to follow your request/direction while
airborne?
What is your honest opinion about the new SOPs
If you could change any part, what would it be?
What do you think about the Gross Error procedure for performance
Give an example of a recent Category 1 change to the SOP
Why do we enter the CFP FINAL fuel into the FMGS? (ISA versus Actual temp)
What must you watch for if you order 40.0kg of fuel, pre-load, trim tank numbers, trim
sheet, etc
What do you do for a TCAS RA event?
What is the reject procedure?
What is meant by a single suitable ETOPS alternate? Is there a critical fuel point?
What is a DEPA? (Deportee accompanied) What form do you need?
Scenario
o 30 minutes from TOD and you have insufficient fuel, options?
o After you have given the solution (Alt Fuel at cruise) you then commence
descent, now there is holding at destination, what to do?
Scenario
o LHR, LVP, Slot times with LMC
o Offload bags, check total LMC, new load sheet?
o Start aircraft and released by engineer, youve dispatched
o During taxi, ground tells you to call ops, one LMC bag still on board
o Pull off to the side to off load the bag, shut down engine, bag removed by the
redcap and he gives you the thumbs up.
o Can you dispatch and continue
o Yes you can, still dispatched
o Fuel is now below minimum amount on the CFP, can you go?
o Yes use the enroute reserve, call SMNC, get Reduced reserve CFP figures via
ACARS, etc.
Thats about it
Good luck
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Section 3
Interview Process

1. CRM: Tell us a story of when you had to use it:
2. How do you handle a stressful situation or when you are stressed (RM: CRM section)
3. What do the latest FCI's contain
4. What is the Best ANGLE/RATE speed/mach
5. What is your max taxi speed and when would you configure for take off with snow covered
ramps and taxiways
6. While flying at V2, following an engine failure after rotate, what bank angle will the AFS limit
you to during a turn and when will the bank angle increase
7. What is the minimum altitude at which you may commence a turn after take off to comply with
an ATC assigned heading
8. RVSM: What is the recommended maximum rate of climb in RVSM airspace to avoid TCAS
Alerts.
9. What are the F/O Wx limits for T.O. And landing
10. If ATC or you require an "orbit" wile on approach, what is the minimum altitude and what are
the requirements that need to be met
11. How long before the STD are the FA's required to leave the CBC.
12. How long is the daily check valid
13. When and what does the Captain "sign for" in the Tech Log
14. If your duty period started at 15:10, what is your max duty period(before Captain's discretion)
15. How will an FA alert you to a hijacking
16. What are your actions in the event of a hi jacking
17. What are and where can the "Ops Specs" be found
18. When is a new load sheet required and what is the maximum LMC.
19. What is the minimum number of Cabin Crew required on the A 330 to be able to dispatch
20. What can be done if you are one short from the requirements of Q.19
21. ETOPS: What are the currency requirements
22. Where can you find the alternate Wx limits on the OFP, and where else
23. When do the slides have to be armed
24. How do you know all the passengers are seated
25. What is an MEL concession
26. You arrive late at the CBC, what is the minimum to brief in your flight plan briefing
27. What are the normal A 330 RFF requirements for Dest./Alt./ETOPS Alt and can they be
Reduced?
28. What is the range the glide path angle can be within to be suitable for an autoland
29. What are the published wind limits for the AFS to conduct a successful autoland
30. How do we conduct a circling approach on the A 330
31. What are the EK Company Wx minima for a circling approach
32. What are the criteria for a "stabilized approach"
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Section 3
Interview Process

Do you need a ceiling for T/O alternate at planning stage?
When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent?
What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the
numbers.
You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS?
How much can you extend an FDP by?
What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate.....they
gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were
operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is happening
here?
What initial actions for unreliable airspeed?
What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why?
How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable?
At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)?
When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure?
What's true about dest alternate, need one navaid if weather is CAVOK, weather below CAVOK
you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple indicator
drops to zero...is this normal?
Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on destination alternate weather
when assign at planning stage?
Max alts for gear and flap operation?
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Section 3
Interview Process
Command Interview 8 (Boeing)

Here is the rundown from whats left of my memory (Im trying really hard to wipe it out in Malta).
HR QUESTIONS
1. Tell us about your career up to joining EK
2. Tell us a time when you were really pushed time wise during a flight
3. Tell us about a time when you had a conflict with cabin crew, Captain, F/O- how did you resolve it?
4. Tell us a time when you were put into a difficult situation after all planning failed
5. How are you finding life in Dubai?
6. How has your experience at EK been?
Along those lines
FLT OPS QUESTIONS
KUL DAC DXB
WX KUL 10kt crosswind/ 3500 BKN CB/ 2000m VIS tempo TS RA+
Same basically for DAC
200ER emi
OFP's for both legs
Tankering sector KUL-DAC, reason (p) price
fuel out of KUL 62.2
Alternate leg 1 VTBD (15.1) second alternate VTCC (10ish)
Nothing special Enroute Wx wise
What are your thoughts?
I just did the normal flight planning routine and looked at EVERYTHING including the Wx timings on the OFP (new Wx
was coming out for our departure time and with temp it seemed to like that) and reason for tinkering (price not supply or
volume)
Consider
-Contaminated RTOW for KUL and DAC (DAC has a Max ZFW) remembering max payload for min cost.
-F/O limits.
-Alternate limits(met VIS for cat 1 not RVR).
-Fuel in center tank (below all limits for RTOW and fuel limitations but use the penalty of carrying 1.2 - .9 t in the center
tank min cost).
Then a purser handling ops question (PREGGO..."WASNT ME" or maybe a dg or weapons or Inad/Depo scenario)
Pushback status before or after start or MEL and engineer is a bit lax about procedures "just jiggle the switch" what to
do.. be firm about getting fixed and signed.
Nothing unusual about the flight to DAC.
DAC on ground, he drew a map of the taxi way and said the a/c is halfway to the RWY and an ACARS load sheet rev2
pops out what would you do. F/O is taxing (I just said keep taxiing to hold short of RWY, set brakes you have control,
advise ATC and review what the load final 2 is about) Mine was ZFW - 270 and 3 PAX less. Had to call company and
enquire about what type of people and if bags offloaded etc.
30 min delay due wx, push hold scenario
Fuel policy question - say landing assured as much as possible ... a/c failures, airport failures traffic and WX (Wx
specifically if you have CAT 1 Wx and a CAT 2 approach then its ok but if the Wx drops to cat 2 and thats the lowest
landing not assured. Stuff like that) maybe RWY lighting issues, anything that would prevent any easy landing.
Remember fuel to land at Dest, fuel at alternate and fuel to commit.
Alternate Wx limits, planning and enroute (jepps mins enroute only apply)
Basically he was very easy going and light toned, even joking a bit. He really wants to see your gut reaction and
legal reaction to all the scenarios.
No surprises really, just know the basics and he was glad to see if you had the key points but wanted to check the
FOM just to be sure.
Take your time, dont rush and just do what you have been doing all the time, everything we yapped about is
there.
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Section 3
Interview Process

Upgrade interview ( 20th of June 2007 )
1. Psychometric assessment
It takes from 2 to 3 hours to answer the 560 questions

Debriefing occurs on the same day or the next day.( Take notes of the results as it
can come back during the final interview.
2. Technical quiz
30 questions in 30 minutes
o These questions are mainly from the multiple choice B 777 questions
o 2 to 4 Dangerous Goods questions
3. Final interview
Interview was conducted by S.P and H.W ( HR)

The interview was done in a nice casual atmosphere. It was more a discussion than
an interrogation. S.P was helping in case of any doubts.
My feeling about the interview is that they already knows whether you will pass it or
not. It is just a matter of being 100 % sure, so, if you studied enough and had no
problems before, it should be a piece of cake. So, my advise would be: dont put
unnecessary pressure on your shoulder.
i. Interview with the H.W ( HR)
In 2 to 3 minutes, talk about your career before EK
What was the hardest thing when you joined EK?
Do you have any ambitions in EK ?
Have you had any problem with a captain ?
Did you have to take any Important decisions ( in aviation, of
course) ?
ii. Interview with S.P
The interview is a small scenario to see if you are able to react in
the grey areas of the FOM and FCOM. During the discussion,
S.P fills the white board, helps you if you need it and adds
questions to the initial scenario. Again, he is not there to kill you.
The scenario:
I have to operate a flight from DXB to IST and return
DXB 10:40 IST 14:30
IST 16:00 DXB 20:00
DXB: 5000 m BLSA 100/06 SKC ILS
IST : 2000 m RA 140/08 OVC 040 ILS
ALTN : 1800 m RA 160/10 OVC 040 VOR DME( 1600m) no circling
ANC : CAVOK
1) What are your considerations when you reach the CBC ?
In blowing sand, visibility might decrease and the fall below the
F/Os minimas .What are the F/Os minimas ?
The alternate weather is below the planning minimas
(1600m+1000m=2600 m) then ANC fuel.
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Section 3
Interview Process
2) You reach the airplane and you see that the techlog hasnt been
signed. Only missing the signature. What do you do ?
Call SMNC to know if the captain is still ther ? ( gone)
At the same time, the red cap asks if he can start the boarding
o I ask him to wait 5 minutes, the time to solve my
problem, he says he is going to put my responsibility for
the delay and I accept it .
Obviously, only the signature is missing as all the other boxes
were filled and we decide to go and raise a CSR.
3) APU auto shutdown due to APU controller. You are in the black.
What are your actions?
Check list
Stop boarding + PA
Engineer + MEL
Ground power
S P for engine start
Check if dest has the appropriate equipment
4) NOTOC
5 or 6 containers are loaded with radioactive products( TI = 12.4)
at last minute. What do you do ?
You accept after you checked the TI or
You refuse it because you dont know if it is loaded
on the bottom of the container
5) You have a MEL cat C dated of 10th of june at 17:40. What do you
do?
Dated on the 10th means active from the 11th at 00:00 until the
20th of june 23:59. Then, we can go.
6) And what if you have a split duty in IST and land in Dubai at 01:00
LT ?
As we takeoff before midnight, MEL is a pre dispatch document,
we can go.
7) During taxi, you have a comm message and a new load sheet, final
2
Stop and coordinate with ATC
Contact load control and discover that LMC, - 3 pax and 270
kg ( check that bags are not on board )
No perfo change We continue
8) You arrive at IST, gate 223 and it is really not your day, the ground
kart doesnt connect Neither the second one
The right engine is turning, so, I coordinate with everybody(
Engineer, ground staff, ATC) and connect the bridge on the
left( disembark PAX)
Then, I start the left and shutdown the right. Proceed for bags(
offload and load), cargo and fuel( + 2hrs of fuel( 2.5 tons) to
cover the rest of the ground ops
Start left and shutdown right to allow pax. Arm a second door.
9) The end
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Section 3
Interview Process

The interview started with question from the HR lady as:
What I have done to get prepared for the interview
What are the characteristic of a good captain
Story where you needed to use persuasion to reach a goal
A time you needed to act quickly for flight safety
What do you do to prepare for a flight
Then S.P stepped in asking the maximum duty period and what if you are now into the position for
the last leg or a single leg (2 hrs max)
Scenario:
MNL to DXB
Rain, wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind)
Dubai weather fine
Alternate OMAA with tempo 2000 meter
Who will fly the sector?
Although the weather is border limit I would fly
Then he added that RWY is contaminate with 3 mm rain.
In this case CA must takeoff
OMAA has a tempo wit 2000 meters , ILS is out, consideration?
Alternate weather is not adequate for a NPA need to get a new alternate (considering both ends
of RWY if ILS is available opposite end)
RAK is elected and since is within 100 nm is not required to have the extra fuel. The new alternate
need to be filed with ATC tough!!
During pushback ,prior to engine start FO push status page and you get a "Hydr Dem right", what you do?
Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it.
REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF
WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed>
Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it.
During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't have the intersection takeoff
point, considerations?
Ask for backtrack,
Push into position for full length
Set for a different RWY if wind gets within limits OR
Decrease RWY length by distance unusable entering the data in the Notams.
After takeoff bomb threat red, Step by Step:
STOP CLIMBING WITH ALT HOLD
MAYDAY to ATC
PURSER TO FLIGHT DECK (NITS)
GET IN THE HOLD ABOVE MSA
PLAN TO LOWER GEAR AND FLAPS IN CASE IT GOES OFF
LAND ON RWY, STAY THERE AND GET A PRECAUTIONARY DISEMBARKATION
(BOMB FOUND: FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION)
Well this is all I can remember..I hope it can help.
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Section 3
Interview Process

I was scheduled for this interview on a day when S.Ps roster was showing a cross day off. I was
a bit concerned and asked P.D. She confirmed that interview is still ON and I was impressed to
know that S.P works on his off days as well. Good management.
I reached there a bit early and after waiting for a while was received by S.P. In his office he was
accompanied by R.M from HR. They both introduced themselves. S.P briefed me about how the
interview will be conducted. During that he asked me what was my understanding about the
interview and how had I prepared for it. Off course I told him that I had ruined my one month
leave in Dubai studying for this interview.
Then R.M asked me about my past experience in aviation and all the typical questions about
occasions of:
Deviation from SOPs
Helping others
Team work
Any decision that I regret or that I could have done better
Questions regarding feed back from my psychometric analysis
Since I went through my log book thoroughly and recalled quite a lot of occasions regarding these
questions so I had answers to all most all the questions that she asked.
Than it was S.Ps turn. Scenario was from DXB-LGW. Low visibility ops in Dubai and LGW.
Alternate was LHR AND BHX. LHR also low vis and BHX was fine. I have reached late in the
CBC with my F/O and our cabin crew had already left. Basically he was looking at the
Min briefing requirements,
Who will do the take off and landing,
T/O alternate requirements,
2 alternate requirements for destination
What kind of weather do we need for alternate
Additional fuel and how much
Above discussion was in detail and took about 25 mins.
Then we go to the a/c and red cap wants to get boarding clearance. I told him we need to see the
techlog first and also I want to talk to the purser and than will be able to give the boarding
clearance.
Then we had a CAT C MEL and expiry was the same day midnight UTC so I accepted that.
Then purser came to me with a pregnant woman case whose medical certificate was one month
old. She was having twins and was in her 31st week. Not a problem.
Than we completed our boarding and push back. Eng start was normal and we taxi out. He
wanted to know my considerations during taxi and what taxi speed will I maintain.
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Section 3
Interview Process
During taxi we got an EICAS TCAS message. We checked the MEL and it says A/C SHOULD
not depart Dubai with a TCAS U/S. We talked to maintenance and there point of view was that we
have been dispatched and it is a SHOULD case and not a MUST case. I checked the
requirement for MNPS airspace and off course it was not required, but I still decided to get it
rectified considering busy airspace in Europe and expected holdings and stacking at LGW. So we
decided to return and that was it.
Stefan said I have no further questions. They told me to wait outside and than after a short while
called me and gave me the good news.
Over all it was a very comfortable environment. Stefans perspective is to see that you know your
stuff very well. The earlier you can make it happen the easier the interview is. So my advice is to
thoroughly understand and remember your books particularly FOM along with all the FCIs plus
all the supplementary procedures.
Best wishes.
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Section 3
Interview Process

I reached EOC an hour early ( just in case there was an accident) and then waited till I got called
in by May B.K. She introduced me to S.P and P.D that were waiting in the room. At that point S.P
started a mini brief on what to expect and made it clear that if at any stage I wasnt sure or didnt
feel comfortable about a question or a situation, to speak up and say so. I found it very very
professional and felt that they really wanted to put you in a situation you can feel free to answer
the questions with no pressure. P.D started asking questions regarding a brief history on my
career, what made me move to Emirates and an example on when I had to make a difficult
decision thinking outside the procedures. Then was S.Ps turn.
What would you do to prepare for the flight the day before?
Well, basically he wants to hear that you dont go clubbing the night before
You are picked up late and your F/O is in the car and you can see fog everywhere on the way to
CBC.
SCENARIO DXB to FCO
Weather in DXB Fog and Vis 200 m. B777-300ER EBA
What are your consideration? (F/O LVO qualified, T/O Alternate)
You get to CBC and spot your crew going thru security. What do you tell them?
You get to the briefing area now, what are your considerations?
Min time brief (as per FOM) and check the rest on the bus ride.
Youre ready to go but SMNC wants you now to Operate Moscow.
Weather in Moscow is CAOK.
Basically do the same as above (Min Time brief and go to the Aircraft since the crew already left).
You Arrive on Board and the Purser wants to start boarding.
What do you tell her? (Chk the Techlog ,Slot Check with the Dispatcher, refueling)
MEL: APU GEN U/S. CAT C, When does it expire?
10 days following the day of discoverywell you know all that stuff dont you?
The purser asks again to board, refueling still going ,so OK but 2 bridges required.
A pregnant pax having twins with a letter issued the 10th of OCT stating no complications and in
the 26th week. Today is NOV 12th so we are in the 31st. Therefore no problem we can accept her.
Ready to go now and we start the Engine at the gate and ask for the Pushback.
During the push and BEFORE the other engine start the F/O pushes the Status Key and there is
HYD DEM PUMP L displayed. Considerations?
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I said to my self: 1 engine has started already so I would disregard that and go.
He said he would do the same.
During taxi we Received Load sheet edition 2. What are your actions?
Stop, ATC evaluate the changes (3 PAX no bags minus 275 KG) Call SMNC to see if theyre part
of a group and continue.
Clear for T/O RVR 150/125/150
I said its below minima cause we need 150 for all the positions.
He said ok now RVR is within minima and you takeoff but you lose visibility at 75 Knots.
I said its below 80 so we Stop. He said ok, now you are airborne and around 2000 ft they tell you
to contact the company ASAP.
I said I would wait till above MSA then handover the control to the F/O and call the Company.
We Have a confirmed bomb on board so what are your actions?
Tell the F/O to stop the climb and reduce the speed, declare a Mayday etc.. etc..
He wanted to know step by step the FOM actions for a RED ALERT in FLIGHT
Also having elected to return to DXB I decided to land below the minima
(Remember ? The weather is still cat 3 but we only have CAT 2 avail in DXB)
And also to use the Autoland that is not certified for overweight landing.
After landing A/C stopped on the RWY, Precautionary Disembarkation.
I was then asked to wait outside for few minutes.
S.P called me back 5 minutes later and gave me the good news.
During the debrief He pointed out a few suggestions.
Instead of asking for radar vectors after declaring an Emergency with the ATC, it would have
been better to ask for a holding on the PPOS so you always know where you are.
Another point was that I assumed that the ATC would have provided the steps for the
precautionary disembarkation and I should have instead asked the Company.
Other than that I found the whole process very professional and relaxed.
They really want you to pass and Im sure they already know if you gonna have problems. So my
advise is, study hard before the Interview and when is your turn, relax, be yourself and its going
to be very easy!........Best Luck!
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I wasnt prepared for this part of the interview, I was asked all the usual questions:
How did you prepare for the interview?
What manuals had I read?
Did I know what to expect, Who had I spoken to regarding the interview?
Give me an example of when you had to be assertive with a Capt.
Give an example of when I had to reprimand a cabin crew member.
Give an example of a confrontation you have had with a cabin crew member, how did I resolve
the situation? ( she wouldnt let it go!!)
Then about 40 mins with Stephan
Weather :
MNL
Wind 160/22
3mm standing water on rwy
RA, vis 3500m
TEMPO 1218 2500m RA+
DXB
NSC, 200/4,3000m
TEMPO 9999
OOMA
NSC, 280/4, 3500m,

TEMPO 2000m HZ BR
Flight time 9hrs 30mins

Departure time 1600gmt
Arrival time 1.30 gmt
You arrive at the aircraft and you notice the left cowling open.what are your considerations?
I then went through everything like a normal line flight, went through the weather, I was asked
who would fly? What are the new F/Os restrictions? Do I need a take off alternate? When do you
need a t/off alternate?
Engineer comes in and says it will take 2 hours to fix problemyour considerations?
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Flight duty time, MEL? ETOPS sensitive item? Etc

Purser comes in to ask if they can board?.....No because of engine prob.
He then put some times up on the board, and worked out that we would be out of duty time. How
can we extend our duty time? How much discretion can you go in to?
How would you brief the cabin crew?
Two of the Philipino cabincrew then decide that they dont want to operate because of going into
discretionhow would you handle them?
Finally engineer says plane is ready. He has fixed it and there are no MELs relating to this
problem, however, there is one already in the book. It is a category C, due to expire at mid night
tonight, before you land, can you go? How long is cat C MEL valid for?
Purser again wants to board.ok this time
Pushing back and F/O pushes STATUS button. HYD PRESS DEM R.what do you do? Stop
push back / ATC/ tell engineer. He says cycle the switch, he has had this problem before. I asked
to be towed back to the gate and have him come and do it. This would add a further 20 min delay.
I stuck to my guns and asked to be pulled back in. Engineer comes in and sorts out prob. ( In the
debrief he told me I should have just done what the engineer asked and saved the 20min delay)
As we are taxiing out for dept, ATC says full length is not available..my considerations? Stop/
new figures from laptop etc
Depart, Abeam BKK, unable to get level requested, and FMC reserves are below what is required
( needed 6.1 tonnes and FMC showing 5.7 tonnes) Considerations?
When can you commit to destination? What are the criteria? ( he wanted to know exact wording
from the FOM)
That was it.
Hope this is of some use.
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Command interview - Aug 2007
Present were S.P and a lady from HR. HR began the proceedings with the usual touchy-feely
questions like: "Tell me when you had to be assertive; Tell me when you had a disagreement with
a captain or cabin crew; Tell me about a time in the airplane when you were pressed for time and
how you handled it."
After about a half hour of that, S.P took over with a flight scenario:
DXB-CMB-SIN
Due to traffic I'm arriving late at CBC so I was asked about the minimum requirement for PreFlight Briefing.
As opposed to other candidates, I was not given any "real" paperwork. Instead Stefan wrote out
all the details on a whiteboard in his office.
Weather in DXB and SIN was good but rain and 4000 m forecast for CMB. Our destination
alternate was TRV with TEMPO indicating only 2500 m with ILS U/S. Applying the required
minima I requested a new alternate since TRV would be tight and in coordination with dispatch
we nominated GOA as the new alternate.
He asked who would fly the sector and after looking at the wx and crosswind I stated that I'd let
the F/O choose.
During the cockpit preparations and while passengers are boarding the APU suddenly quits.
"What are your actions?" Call engineering for power and A/C cart, summon purser to stop
boarding e.t.c. The APU can't be fixed so we will dispatch without it. "Your concerns?" ETOPS
restrictions, ground/pwr cart availability in CMB and SIN.
We also had another MEL (Category C) which would exceed 10 days in a couple of hours before
landing in CMB so he asked it we could go with that, and the answer was YES since the MEL is a
Pre-Dispatch document and unlike the daily check, a MEL validity can expire during flight. But, of
course in this case, repair would have to be done in CMB or a concession would be required.
Stefan put me as PF and during taxi-out in DXB we receive a new loadsheet, Final 2, with a ZFW
drop of 275 kg and minus 3 pax. "Your actions." Hand controls and ATC to FO, while I call load
control on the other radio to ascertain that the passengers' bags were not on the plane. He
seemed to be happy with that and I didn't have to elaborate any further. Then shortly before
taking the runway for departure we get a TCAS EICAS. "Actions?" Call MCC, explain the
situation, ask for suggestions, switch transponders, and consult the MEL. Stefan says the MEL
says (in this case) do not depart DXB. I express my desire to MCC to have it fixed, due to dodgy
ATC on both upcoming sectors but with an estimated time of repair (according to MCC) of 2:45
hrs and considering implications of FDP, I elect to depart without TCAS. I was then asked about
when you could use max discretion of 3 hrs versus 2 hrs.
Then we find ourselves on the ramp in CMB and after parking none of the power- or air-carts are
working and I'm asked for step-by-step actions. Advise ATC, Purser, and the Station that we will
need to keep one engine running for the whole ground stop. First the right engine for deplaning
and expedited boarding then cross-bleed-starting the left before shutting down the right so
baggage and cargo can be offloaded and loaded and fueling take place. I elect to take some
extra fuel to allow for this procedure.
That was the end of the exercise as far as I can remember.
Good Luck when your time comes!!!
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The good news: I managed to convince him to give me the upgrade letter.
The bad news : The rumors about the interview being cancelled is ,well, still a rumor!
I prepared the way most guys did all the usual manuals, with particular emphasis on things like
fuel policy, flight planning, handling, safety and security, AWOPS, cold weather ops, Etops
(sounds like the entire FOM !). Memorise it if u can because if you can quote verbatim from
there in the first 5 mins, half the battle is won. FCOM Vol 1 ,the AFM, and the Document folder
on board are also good reading, especially the Supplementary procedures and limitations.
From my own experience, and from a few others who have gone before me, my 2 cents
worth.
The day itself; He was extremely pleasant and professional. He knows that its a big day for you
and tries to put you at ease. Establish a rapport with him early. He can be quite witty...end of
the day hes not there to kill you. He needs to see that you are confident with ease and able to
laugh and relax during what is a really stressful point in your career. However, do not get lulled
into a state of being too relaxed as well, he is very good at that. He knows that you have read
the books backwards so the earlier you can show him this in the interview, the easier it will be.
But the most important thing that he seems to look for is a logical management model/style.
Anybody can repeat the numbers, but how you apply it in out of the box ,grey situations is the
clincher.
My Scenario : DME- DXB,777-300ER,
DEP:1400utc
ARR:1900utc
DME : 170/16 G22 ,3500m,BLSN,OVC5000,-4/-11,1024,tempo 1200-1600 1500m +SHSN, Nil
Notams
DXB :280/8 5000m,HZ,NSC,28/16 1019 ,nil notams
Alternate OMAL : 260/4, 4000m, HZ,NSC, 28/16, 1019, tempo 3000m HZ, BR, VOR DME
approach only
I went through the weather thoroughly e.g, DME : crosswind not a problem and weight more
than 250 tons so no limitations on Xwind limits, vis 3500m with tempo 1500m so no problem for
takeoff and for immediate return with a Cat 1 ILS, well above FO limits, BLSN is the runway
contaminated? No, only blowing snow, Ok so no RTOW issues, BLSN visually deceptive so
possible threat(include in threat briefing later), cloud, Temp, QNH ok, tempo is applicable, vis
already discussed, +SHSN confirm its dry snow because heavy wet snow is no go.
Similar weather analysis for Dest and Alt. Volunteer information even if he does not specifically
ask you, he wants to see your thought process.I told him that during the actual preflight brief, I will
pull out the adverse weather supp procedure and the Boeing deice/anti ice worksheet from the
blank forms folder and brief from there. I also spoke about Cold Wx Ops ( kind of precipitation,
kind of fluid,1 or 2 trucks, EK spray pattern or otherwise, comms via headset, if lose comms,
exchange mobile numbers etc..)
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As you can see, DXB weather is not a factor, but OMAL is because we need circling or
NPA+200ft/1000m.I asked whether there is a circling approach and there was ,so need
1000(round up to nearest 100ft)+5km.Having gone through the Wx, I let the F/O fly if he wants
to. Was asked the criteria for takeoff alternate and FO minimums. If MEL restricts us to 120
Min ,are we still ETOPs? Yes we are. some questions on EETOPS, since I brought it up!
Q : there is a MEL Cat B Item reported on 4 days ago /1620Z.
A : applicable from 0000Z 3 days ago till today 2359Z,so no prob.
Q : what if we are delayed and land in DXB after 2359Z?
A : No problem, MEL is pre dispatch so can go, but defect needs to be addressed in DXB,I will
send MCC an ACARS Msg to remind them.
Q : How to apply for Concession to operate with expiring MEL?
A : Ans in the MEL.
Q : Tech log is all filled in with a defect from the last sector, but not signed.
A ; I said will contact SMNC first to try to contact the Captain or FO,then call MCC to inquire
about any significant downlinks from the aircraft over the past 5 days or so. Eng has done a
transit check, and I will ask him to have a look in the onboard maint(CMC) computer have
any active leg faults that might impact the flight. SMNC calls back that unable to contact the
flight crew .I said I am happy to accept the aircraft as I have verified that the aircraft is fit for
service and will release and accept the aircraft in the tech log.I will also make a note in the
voyage record about what I have done.
Q: Purser comes in to ask to board the pax
A : verify one door with steps and one aerobridge, ok to board
Q: snow blowing into door L5
A: I said close the door and have somebody man the door
Q: do you remove the steps
A: I said No, on the contrary, I will call the Eng and confirm with him that the steps be left in
place until refueling complete.
Q while boarding , APU quits..what are your actions?
A:
1) verify Apu has failed
2)
call for checklist from the QRH(no ECL, dark cockpit)
3)
hand the F/O my torch(if he doesnt have one)
4)
while he looking for chklist, call Purser to stop boarding
5)
make a quick PA to calm the pax
6)
do the chklist,no joy,so call eng to connect me to grnd elecs and gnd air cond and
then come upstairs
7)
Ask for Grnd Air Cond supp procedure before connecting to air con cart
8)
Eng in the cockpit to clear the pages in the Status, cannot fix the APU
9)
OK ,implication on my operationNo Apu on during the remote deicing, flight non
Etops so no problem, need grnd support at Dest. Can it be deferred, yes.
I said I will call ATC to ask for dispensation to deice at the gate. Not allowed. So I said I will
need to keep one Engine running on the side of the aircraft that is not being deiced, ATC
doesnt understand because of English problems : ( , I was on the verge of calling for our
stunning Russian cabin crew to translate : ), But I ask for the deicing chap to come upstairs and
explain my plan, he says no problem. (Ok, saved the stunning Russian for language lessons
later in the cruise!) So push to remote deice spot after 1 eng started at the gate with normal
de/anti ice one side at a time.
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During taxi ,due congestion HOT time expired. I explained HOT protocol and said that as long
as a PCI is done before takeoff and the fluid is still effective with the wings clean, we can
takeoff. was asked how I was gonna conduct the PCI as well as the engine runups ( FO does
the PCI ,make sure he knows what he is looking for and eng runup one at a time to 50%N1/60
min)
Finally ,we takeoff and during cruise, of course a passenger falls sick! Medlink contact and page
for doctor, nursestarted looking for possible diversion spots. Purser comes back and informs us
that pax is worsening fast. Medlink prefers we go to Tiblisi. for the purposes of the scenario,
Tiblisi is an approved 777 alternate, wx was ok with Cat 1 ILS. Ran through my diversion
considerations quickly and decided to go to Tiblisi with the intent of dispatching myself out of
there considering FTL, dump if required to get myself no overweight, refueling ,tech support,
parking position if no B777 tow bar etc.went through all the actions step by step with me taking
control for the landing. after landing, considerations for quick getaway e.g: FTL, Captains
authority for refueling, Transit check, new OFP, ATC FLT PLN.
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With Capt S.P.
At the beginning he explained the interview, how it will be conducted and that he will be asking
me some HR questions and later some operational ones, giving me a sort of scenario.>
HR:
1. My aviation career
2. A time where I had to take a quick decision
3. A time where I had to go outside the FOM
SCENARIO:
DME-DXB ETD 2200Z
On the bus to the airport snow starts to fall with temp of -1 C: what are your thoughts ... cold Wx
ops, Rwy, RTOW, de-icing, FO, engineer, purser, pax, planning: alternate AUH FCST with tempo
2000 BR: need to change it with RAK, same fuel on the OFP because 100nm, but new on ATC
flight plan.
RWY condition in DME: patches of ice 50% rwy: rwy is SSW because the contamination is more
than 25%.
MEL: CAT C expiring al 2359Z: we can go, in DXB the MEL needs to be fix. In cruise I will remind
DXB MC via acars.
De-icing is needed. In DME it is be done with Engs OFF and at a remote stand, not at the gate,
the OM and the engineer says.
While the last pax are boarding the APU ... quits, what are your actions:
1. EICAS + checklist
2. Talk to engineer to get an ext pwr
3. Talk to pax and advice them to be patient for a few minutes
Ext power arrives and APU in the MEL
... Now ... we still need to de-ice at a remote stand .... first I ask ground to de-ice at the stand but
they reply that for environmental reasons it's not possible.
I ask the F/O and the engineer if they have any suggestions ... we could start left engine, push
back to the de-icing remote stand, de-ice right side of the a/c.
Then stop the de-icing, x-bleed start right engine, shut down left one and de-ice left side of a/c.
Then x-bleed start left engine.
We need to get extra fuel, 1 ton. Fuel truck gone, 2hrs wait. We can continue using the
contingency fuel.
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HOT 2310-2330z. Time now is 2340z. what do you do? PCI and if the A/C is clean we can go.
At the hold short load sheet edition No.2: minus 270kgs and 3 pax missing.
I advice ground 3 minutes delay. I call ops and I find out that 2 of their bags are inside the A/C ....
I said that this is a security breach and that I need to off load them.
I request Ops to organize for refueling, deicing again and MC for a concession for the MEL
expiring at 2359z.
S.P. asked me: " Are you sure?"
I said YES again.
He then suggested that I could get in contact with FCDM and security in DXB.
They could have more info about these pax and their bags, like that they were in transit and the
bags travelled already on another flight ... or other details ...
He said that sometimes we need to go outside the FOM lines and be "creative" in order to bring
back an A/C.
He then congratulate me and he gave me a course date.
Good luck.
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The interview started with question from the HR lady as:
What I have done to get prepared for the interview
What are the characteristic of a good captain
Story where you needed to use persuasion to reach a goal
A time you needed to act quickly for flight safety
What do you do to prepare for a flight
Then S.P stepped in asking the maximum duty period and what if you are no into the position for
the last leg or a single leg (2 hrs max)
Scenario:
MNL to DXB
Rain/ wind 120/15-22 (Crosswind)
Dubai weather fine/ Alternate OMAA/with tempo 2000 meter
Who will fly the sector?
Although the weather is border limit I would fly
Then he added that Rwy is contaminate with 3 mm rain.
In this case CA must takeoff
OMAA has a tempo wit 2000 meters , ILS is out, consideration?
Alternate weather is not adequate for a NPA need to get a new alternate (considering both ends of
rwy if ILS is available opposite end)
RAK is elected and since is within 100 nm is not required to have the extra fuel. The new alternate
need to be filed with ATC tough!!
During pushback ,prior to engine start /O push status page and you get a "Hydr Dem right", what
you do?
Ask to be pulled in and get the engineer to fix it.
REFUELING WITH PAX ON BOARD AND PURSER IS NOT HAPPY L5 GETTING PADDLE OF
WATER . Want it closed but ask for another one to be armed>
Close and manned and since there is no other door she needs to accept it.
During taxi TWR advice full length is not available and OPT doesn't;t have the intersection takeoff
point, considerations?
Ask for backtrack,

Push into position for full length
Set for a different RWY if wind gets within limits OR
Decrease RWY length by distance unusable entering the data in the Notams.
After takeoff bomb threat red, Step by Step:
STOP CLIMBING WITH ALT HOLD

MAYDAY to ATC
PURSER TO FLIGHT DECK (NITS)
GET IN THE HOLD ABOVE MSA
PLAN TO LOWER GEAR AND FLAPS IN CASE IT GOES OFF
LAND ON RWY, STAY THERE AND GET A PRECAUTIONARY DISEMBARKATION
(BOMB FOUND: FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION)
Well this is all I can remember, I hope it can help.

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Hi guys, here is the summary of my interview on Sep 09th
1) Aprrox 30 min questions by HR representative:
- What have you done to prepare the interview?
- How is your family in Dubai?
- What was the biggest change when you have arrived in Dubai?
- Has EK been a good experience so far?
- Have you got any conflicting situation with a Cpt/FO during your career? And with EK?
- How do you deal with?
- Have you ever used your authority to solve crew or handling problems?
- Have you ever take over controls from your F/O or Cpt? Explain in details
- Etc...
2) Approx 45 min with S.Prugner
Scenario DXB - LGW - alternate LHR B772 A6-EMI
WX: DXB: 160/04 Rwy 12L RVR 200-200-200 ( CAT II app )
LGW: Calm RWY 26L RVR 250-250-250 BCMG 1113 2KM ( CAT II app )
LHR: Calm RWY 27 RVR 300-300-300 BCMG 1114 2800M ( CAT III app )
ETA LGW 1100Z
ETA LHR 1130Z
You arrive late at the CBC due to the poor wx:
What are your considerations? What do you do? What do you say to your F/O, purser...
Min flt prep then quick brief to CC to leave CBC asap, brief in bus if necessary
Check F/O LVO qualify, LVO in OPS, check 10 AWO for T/O mins
Special brief for LVO ( slow taxi, cat II holding points, mel, t/o alternate, lights,...)
Extra fuel for ground ops in DXB (he asked me how much and I said 1 extra ton)
Calculate req fuel asap to determine max payload with load control
What are the min items to cover?
OFP, WX+ notams dep, dest, alt, 1st hour enroute, relevant FCIs
What fuel do you want?
Dest is below minima so you need 2 alt with fuel for the furthest ( I said EGBB, EGCC)
LHR is CAT III arpt so you need CAT I WX at planning stage ( consider end of TAF period
for WX improvement )
Extra fuel for LGW (he asked me why bcs I already have fuel to go to EGCC and I
aswered that my intention is to land in LGW so I need fuel till 1300Z. Believe me, hard to
say that you look for an extra 12 tons...
T/O Alternate is at 620Nm, is it Ok?
Yes, ETOPS A/C can go up to 840 Nm ( 2H at 1 eng inop speed ISA )
What if MEL APU GEN U/S limiting ETOPS to 180 min?
I said 420 Nm 1 H at 1 eng inop speed ISA and I was wrong! He told me that if I can go
up to 180 min, I'm still ETOPS... keep that in mind
You arrive at the aircraft and you have a MEL CAT C item expiring today. Are you legal?
MEL is pre-dispatch doc so as long as you T/O before 2359 Z, you are ok
What about if you land after the expiry time?
Just don't care
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During taxi, new load sheet edition 2 from printer ZFW drop 285KG. What do you do?
Contact load control and ask what are the changes. He said 3 pax so you have to make
sure that they have no bags on board and if they are not part of a group
Red bomb warning just after T/O. What do you do in the correct sequence?
Push alt hold verify for obstacles (above MSA) transfer controls to F/O go to PINGO
Declare mayday std-by for intentions, NN check-list, purser to flight deck with NITS
Declare that you go back to DXB in emergency, ask for stairs at designated area
and fire brigade. Disregard overweight landing autoland and wx restrictions, you just want
to land asap. Update info with purser prior landing (precautionary/emergency evac).
That's all I can remember...
Good luck for the interview.
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SECTION 4
PRE-COURSE NOTES
(Company Provided Notes)
Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
4. Pre-Course Notes
1. Introduction
Congratulations on your award of a command assignment!
As you await the commencement of your training in excited anticipation you may well be feeling
somewhat daunted at the amount of work you will have to do in a relatively short time.
These notes are designed to help you focus on the key aspects of your new role and help make your
upgrade training as beneficial as possible.
We certainly do not underestimate the strong base of knowledge, expertise and experience that you have
gained as a First Officer. In many ways, Command Training will not teach you anything new. It will,
however, give you opportunities to develop and improve your leadership and management skills. This
process of improvement does not stop at your check to line. There will always be room for improvement
throughout your career as an Airline Captain.
You will find that your command training is consistent with the type of CRM training you have had in
recent years and it is consistent with the A.A.M. model, (discussed below). It is also useful to consider
how this training fits in with the flight operations mission statement to operate Emirates aircraft in
the safest and most efficient way, and in accordance with our strategic goals:
Safety record among the best in the industry
Respond to the business needs in a flexible and cost effective way
Provide superlative training and flight technical support
Encourage initiative, teamwork and business awareness
Demonstrate concern for the needs of the customers
The safety message is one that we are very well aware of but it is worth emphasising that the pilots are
often the last line of defense. All parts of the Company should be working towards this goal, but there
may be times when you feel that this is not the case. As a Captain you may well have a wider
understanding of, and exposure to, safety issues than others in the organisation. You also have the
authority, supported by company policy and legislative force, to say No!.
As pilots we are often sceptical about cost-saving measures, but the simple fact is that we have to run an
airline cost efficiently, over time, if we are to stay in business. There are a number of ways that you, as a
Captain, will be able to contribute to this efficiency. Our industry has always been a competitive one and
this fact is unlikely to change. As a company we need Captains who are up to the challenge of making
their contribution towards improvements in efficiency. How we attract and look after customers is also
an important part of the profit equation. Whilst we do not have a great deal of face-to-face contact with
customers we should not underestimate the effects (positive and negative) of our communications with
them in building customer value.
In any company, especially large ones, maintaining staff motivation is a challenge. You may well
recognise periods in your career when personal motivation has slumped but as you are about to take the
most significant step in an Airline Pilots career your motivation level is probably high. As a Captain it is
worth reflecting on how you motivate those around you. The way you go about your job has the potential
to significantly enhance the people you work alongside. It affects not only your First Officer and Cabin
Crew, but also Engineers, Ground Staff and others.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2. Human Factors
You bring a unique combination of knowledge, skills and attitude with you as you embark upon your
training. These are all equally important, but it is fair to say that with the correct attitude, the other
factors will, in all likelihood, fall into place. It is therefore appropriate to spend some time focussing on
some of the human factor aspects of Captaincy.
2.1. Leadership
Leadership is a concept that is easier to recognise than it is to define. Leadership is not a quality that
you either have or dont have. It is a complex set of skills that can be learnt and continually improved,
upon with reflection and application. The whole of your command training is about leadership but here
are a few preliminary points to think about:
Command leadership is much more than occupying the left-hand seat.
Leaders plan, organise and evaluate the work that is done.
A good leader needs to be competent at a task to inspire confidence.
Leaders help keep others motivated.
Leaders create the conditions in which others can excel at their job.
Leadership requires patience.
Leaders facilitate interpersonal interaction and positive working relations.
As a Captain you will hold an important leadership role by virtue of the authority vested upon you in that
position. It is important that you develop your own leadership style and have the confidence to back your
own judgement. You will have seen a variety of leadership styles and techniques throughout your career.
It is worthwhile thinking over some of the challenging situations that you have been involved in as a
crewmember. Were there particular techniques that the Captain used that were effective or ineffective?
Think of ways to incorporate the useful techniques in your own operation.
It is also important to recognise that different leadership styles are needed in different situations.
Normal operations may allow for a participative style that would not be appropriate in an emergency. As
a Captain you must be able to quickly adapt to the situation. A laissez-faire style in an emergency will
only exacerbate the problem, whilst an autocratic style in normal operations will cause resentment and
frustration. One particular challenge that some of you will face is to be a newly qualified Captain flying
with First Officers that have thousands of hours more than you on type.
It is important that you do not abdicate your leadership. You have the authority that goes with your
position. Remember also that the First Officer is a very useful resource available to you.
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Page 2 of 10
Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2.2. Team Building

Research and practical experience consistently point to team building as an important factor in team
performance. The key activity to facilitate team building is the pre- flight briefing. You have a lot to do
at Operations, but remember there will always be time constraints that make your job as a Captain more
difficult. When faced with these challenges it is often simply a matter of doing the best job in the time
available. A good briefing need not take up much time.
It is not necessary to labour the point regarding normal operations, but you should provide specific
information and guidance with respect to unusual or non-standard situations. The same applies to your
flight crew briefings, if necessary.
Team building is ongoing. It is not something that is restricted to the pre- flight stage. You can take
advantage of quieter periods in flight to communicate with your Purser and crew regarding any
operational needs. Team building with your First Officer is also something you should think about. This
may be a matter of discussing who flies which sector taking into account the weather, recency, alertness,
practice requirements, preferences and, of course, the destination.
Also a good team player does not shirk his or her share of the work.
2.3. Communication
The importance of effective communication will not be new to you but there are some points that are
worth emphasising as you focus on your new role. In Emirates we have a disciplined approach to using
standard terminology. This is vital as it is driven by the number of differing nationalities on the flight
deck. Miscommunication will occur, but being standard in your speech will keep these instances to a
minimum. The benefit of standard phraseology is that it defines a common vocabulary and provides
specific direction to deal with many operational situations. It is important, however, not to let our
communication be limited in situations where standard phraseology does not provide guidance. It is also
important to recognise that there is a wide variety of communications that occur on the flight deck.
Here are some examples:
Commands
Crew obligatory statement
Crew suggestions
Queries
Preferences
Hints
Self-directives
Permission-seeking questions
Turn 30 degrees right.

We need to deviate right/sink rate/speed etc.
Lets go around this one.
Which way do you want to turn?
I think a left turn is best.
That doesnt look good.
Ill get us a clearance to divert.
Do you want a clearance to divert?
Communication is not simply about passing information. There is also a social / relational aspect. You
are probably aware that as a First Officer you frequently used indirect communications to good effect.
As a Captain you need to be aware that much of the communication that you receive from subordinates
and other airline staff will be indirect. There may be times that you have to ask people to be more
specific with the information they provide if you think they are being too socially sensitive.
You, as the Captain, must establish a very open style of communication. You should share the plan
with your crew. This does not in any way undermine your authority. If fact it enhances it and promotes
the flow of information that will contribute to sound decision making.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2.4. Decision-making
As a Captain, you make the decisions, but the process of decision making involves other crewmembers
and resources. The aim is to minimise risk whilst maximising the effectiveness and efficiency of the
operation. The decisions you will have to make will vary greatly in complexity and importance.
Sometimes your decision will be the first acceptable option (e.g. land ASAP in an emergency). At other
times it may be to find the optimal decision after taking into account many variables (e.g. A diversion
due to weather or maintenance requirements).
In your decision-making, keep in mind the operating priorities of Safety, Economy, Comfort, and
Schedule. It is always important to approach decisions in a thorough and constructive manner. A useful
mnemonic may help. The one that is provided in Emirates is A.A.M.
Firstly, when a problem occurs concentrate on flying the aircraft, then ensure a safe trajectory/phase of
flight and finally communicate. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate are the golden rules.
A -Assess the problem. (ANC, Stay below the line, time management)
A -Action the problem. (ECAM / EICAS / Recalls / Checklist / Plan)
M -Manage the needs. (Prioritise - Individual / Task / Group-Communicate)
Further essential reading is contained in your CRM course notes and in the Route Manual chapter one.
Remember that you are now the leader / manager of the situation, something you may have not practised
for some time. As the situation develops do not forget to evaluate your actions at each significant point,
or decision, in the ongoing situation.
You may also find it helpful to think about decision- making in the following terms:
Risk
Information
Time
Perspective
- Consider potential as well as actual risk as you approach a problem.

- Do I have all the information I need? If not where do I get it?
- Can I create time for myself by holding or parking the brakes? But how before another
problem occurs from waiting too long to take action?
- Involve others in the process. They may have a different perspective on the problem,
which may be of assistance.
Remember that it is your job to analyse the situation and find the critical limiting factor. It may one of
many things such as; time, fuel, runway length or even the weather. Stay below the line, ask questions
and ensure that you have all the relevant information, prior to embarking on a course of action. Some
seconds spent gathering information; planning and directing the instigation of that plan will save many
minutes later in the operation.
An important point to emphasise with regard to evaluation is what happens after the situation has been
dealt with. Some events require you to de-brief the crew at an appropriate time and place. You may also
have reporting requirements. For you own benefit, you should also evaluate your decisions that do not
require a formal report. Ask yourself what you did well and what you could do have done better to
handle a similar situation in the future.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
Indeed as pert of your preparation you should study other Commanders decisions. You should analyse
their situations, with the benefit of hindsight, and without the stressor of time, to see if you agree with
the decisions made, and if not, decide what you would have done in similar circumstances. Indeed, if you
did not agree with their decisions you should also analyse why you did not agree and decide, perhaps at a
later date after further consideration, why you did not agree.
2.5. Error Management

Early CRM programmes endeavoured to improve air safety by eliminating error. The focus was on
interpersonal issues and promoting a team concept. More recently it has been recognized that we operate
in an environment where systemic threats contribute to errors. From the mid 1990s it became apparent
that eliminating error completely was an unrealistic goal. Researchers changed tack somewhat and
attempted to record and classify threats and errors as they actually occurred on the Flight Deck. This
differed from much of the previous research, which reconstructed and analysed accidents and incidents
after the event. The findings from observing crews on normal scheduled flights indicate an average of
two errors per flight. (It could well be higher but the observers probably do not pick up every error that
crews make.) Fortunately most of the errors we make do not end in disaster, because of effective error
management. This is the process of correcting an error before it becomes consequential. Most errors
occur in the Taxi/Take Off/Climb/Descent/Approach/Landing phase, which probably is no surprise.
Another point worth highlighting is that crews that make intentional violations are also more likely to
make unintentional errors. This underlines the importance of adherence to SOP's and of knowing the
Company requirements as laid down in the OM-A (FOM). Workload management and contingency
planning also reduce errors and help crews deal with the errors they make.
2.6. Cognition
Our brain is exceptionally powerful but typically limited to dealing consciously with one issue at a time.
It is easily overloaded and can also produce biased results. Restrictions in attention and filtering may
reduce the processing of sensory inputs therefore thought awareness and training we can implement
ways of overcoming these shortfalls. Some examples are: avoiding information overload, task sharing,
avoiding mindsets and practising psychomotor skills (motor-actions).
2.7. Stress
Recognising the effects of stress in yourself and others is important if you are to understand that the
effect stress has on team performance. Stress is caused by a combination of external factors, workplace
factors and personality. Some level of stress is inevitable and, in fact, desirable in our workplace.
However, beyond a certain point, the cumulative effects of stress will cause performance to decline
possibly in a very rapid manner. There are many symptoms of acute and chronic stress and individuals
will vary in how they react.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
The following list of symptoms may be helpful but is by no means comprehensive:

Tunnel vision/fixation
Increased error rate
Perspiration/high heart rate
Sleeplessness/fatigue/inability to relax
Irritability
Depression/loss of interest in work
Long term health effects.
As well as coping with stressful tasks as a Captain, the Command Training process itself can be a
stressful time. On the whole, pilots are not particularly good at recognising stress and seeking assistance.
Hopefully an organised approach to your training and maintaining a healthy lifestyle will help avoid and
alleviate stress. If you do feel that stress is having a negative effect on your ability to do your job, dont
ignore the assistance you can get. Often family and friends can be of great support and, perhaps, help
you keep things in perspective. Do not hesitate to discuss issues of concern with your Training Captains
and Fleet Training Manager. If it is necessary to take some time out or get expert assistance it is far
better to do this sooner rather than later.
Command training is hard work. There is a lot to cover and a high standard to achieve. It should not,
however, be an ordeal. Remember that the training system is designed to help you reach the standard, it
is not a hurdle designed to trip you up.
2.8. Conflict Resolution

Hopefully conflict will not feature regularly in your everyday work. Effective team building and
communication will reduce the likelihood of conflict but it will inevitably occur from time to time. There
is no point being too prescriptive about how to deal with such occurrences as personalities and situations
will vary greatly, but here are a few points that may be worth considering.
Focus on the facts: Often conflict arises because not everyone has the same information and
remember, you may be the one that is missing the critical piece. Clarifying exactly what the problem
is, and why it is a problem will make it easier to resolve.
Focus on the task: Sometimes conflicts have little to do with the task at hand and can be a dangerous
distraction. As a Captain, it is important that you control the situation. In some cases, discussion
should be deferred until the appropriate time and place.
Refer to the appropriate documents and people: Sometimes conflict can be resolved by referring the
other party to the appropriate company documentation or by seeking the opinion of another suitably
qualified person. There is no point making a discussion of policy or procedure a matter for personal
argument.
Do it better next time: We all have situations that we know could have been handled more effectively.
As an effective Captain it is important that you reflect on your handling of difficult situations and think
of ways that you could improve your handling of them.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
2.9. Learning Styles

We are all different and have different ways that we prefer to take on new information and learn new
skills. Some learn well by observation, others prefer a hands-on approach. Some are quick at applying
general principles whilst others may prefer to see concrete examples. You are probably aware of what
learning styles and techniques work best for you. If you havent thought about it much, now is a good
time to start.
Your instructors and Training Captains will give you a clear idea of what is required, but it is up to you
to work out how to go about it. It is important to set out a disciplined timetable to make sure you cover
all areas. Remember that prior planning prevents a poor performance. It is also important that you
discipline yourself to take regular breaks whilst studying, and dont attempt to work seven days a week
throughout your training and preparation.
2.10. Continuous Improvement

As all pilots recognise, there is no such thing as a perfect flight. This is something you should become
even more aware of as a Captain, because your role has the added dimension of leadership. There will
always be areas that need improvement and, as we are all different, we each have different strengths and
weaknesses. It is also important that Emirates is a learning organisation, thus to continue to improve
there must be effective and constructive feedback.
The feedback that Captains provide is vital. This can be done through formal channels such as Captains
Special Reports and the Voyage Report and informally through direct contact with the appropriate
management. You also have the opportunity as a Captain to help other people improve by sharing
knowledge and experience. It is often easy to become discouraged in seeking to help improve the
organisation. Results tend not to be immediately visible and, due to organisational constraints, feedback
mechanisms to Captains are sometimes imperfect. However it is important that we maintain a positive
approach in this matter. In a rapidly changing environment, if you are not striving to improve as an
organisation, you are probably in decline.
Unofficial Document
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
3. Commercial Environment
We are working in an industry that has become increasingly volatile. Companies come and go. Fleet
structure and schedules change very rapidly here at Emirates. Whether we like it or not, we are business
managers in a very challenging economic environment. It is important that we understand the
commercial environment to ensure that we can make decisions that are appropriate. It is also important
to understand the public relations/customer satisfaction impact of our decisions. We may not need to
know a great deal about the balance sheet or profit and loss statement, but we should all have a clear
understanding of how our decisions can affect Emirates profitability.
3.1. Cost side

On the cost side of the equation, fuel is the major variable expense for most airlines. You do not have to
justify the fuel uplift you decide on but the company would like to know, if just for statistical records,
why extra fuel was required.
Take the amount that you think is needed to do the job safely. However, where safety permits, we can
help reduce cost by carrying the flight planned amount. There are also a number of other ways we can
minimise our fuel burn, which you should consider. On a day-to-day basis, it is good to be aware of
actual fuel burn and sector time compared with planned figures. Also having an awareness of the
seasonal variations in delays in approach due to weather or traffic, i.e. WX in Male during the monsoon
and Traffic in Nice during the film awards or car race periods. Minimising delays within your power is
the other major cost contribution you can make. The cost of rolling delays is difficult to estimate but it is
certain to be quite significant when you consider the inefficiencies caused, not to mention the effect on
our customers satisfaction. Also the cost of an unnecessary diversion has to be judged in comparison to
carrying holding fuel.
3.2. Revenue Side

On the revenue side, your main contribution is in terms of customer satisfaction. Obviously the primary
concern of your passengers is that you do your job safely. You can also contribute to high levels of
customer satisfaction through the way you interact with your passengers.
3.2.1. Passenger Announcements

The main form of interaction you will have with customers is by way of the PA.
Timely supply of information is consistently reported as a key factor in customer satisfaction and this is
something that you can have a direct effect on. Guidance is given in the OM-A (FOM) on the use of the
Public Address System. Here are some further comments for you consideration:
Many pilots speak too fast. You will need to speak slower than normal conversation. About 100-125
words per minute is a reasonable guide.
It is useful to have a standard spiel but try to vary it to make sure it does not come across as clichd.
Try to sound (and be) sincere. Be honest, but you may have to be selective in the information you provide.
If you are trying to explain something complex or awkward, make notes before your PA to make
sure you communicate clearly.
Avoid using jargon or technical terminology.
Ask for feedback regarding clarity and volume from Pursers. This may not be offered unsolicited.
When travelling as a passenger, listen to PA's that are particularly effective or ineffective and
continue to improve your own technique.
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
4. Resource Base
As a Captain you have many resources available to you. These may be in the form of crewmembers;
ATC and manuals carried on the aircraft. There is also the resource of the Integrated Operations Centre
(IOC) available to you, SMNC, MCC and conference call facilities, and DNATA Movement Control
(MOCON). It is important that you have a good understanding of how the IOC and MOCON work and
what they can offer you.
It is anticipated that you will be given the opportunity to visit the IOC, MOCON and Engineering at
some stage in your training, (non-official personal visits are also allowed). In the meantime make sure
you are familiar with the various ways that you can contact them.
5. Knowledge Base
As an experienced airline pilot you already have a very solid knowledge base. A good understanding of
regulations, procedures and policies will help you to make consistently sound decisions. There are some
things that you should know from memory. Other areas require a working knowledge. There are also
things that you should not attempt to memorise, but should be able to be referenced efficiently when the
need arises. If it is not clear what sort of information fits into each category, your Training Captains will
help clear up any ambiguity.
Depending on your background and previous experience, your knowledge requirements will vary
slightly. You should however have a working knowledge of the OM-A (FOM), the LIDO and the
FCOMs. You should concentrate on revising the areas that will affect you specifically as a Captain.
The sections below provide some general guidance.
5.1. Civil Aviation Regulations.

On a day-to-day basis most of the requirements that affect our operation are covered comprehensively in
the OM-A (FOM). However it is important to have a good understanding of from where the
requirements are derived. It may also be necessary from time to time to refer to the primary document
for a greater understanding. The full CARs of the UAE and AIPs of the countries we operate to are
kept at Flight Operations.
5.2. LIDO.
A good knowledge with particular emphasis on these areas:
- Chart Legends, Definitions (especially MORA, MOCA, and MSA)
- Notam and Weather decodes
- Country Specific Normal and Emergency Procedures
- Aircraft Speeds
- Flight Planning
- Meteorology
- Rules of the Air
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Section 4
Pre-Course Notes
5.3. Flight Operations Manual.

As mentioned above, it is best to work through the whole manual to revise all areas. Particular attention
should be made to your duties and responsibilities as an Emirates Captain.
5.4. Flight Crew Operating Manuals.

You must be thoroughly conversant with Emirates SOPs, as previously discussed. You should also
have a working knowledge of the Supplementary Techniques, FCOM bulletins and the OEBs. You
should also revise Limitations and Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.
A general knowledge of all the FCOMs is a decided advantage, during your Command Training. Also
the management of various emergency situations, i.e. who should be the PF / PNF, knowing what the
ECAM/EICAS or Checklist procedure is trying to achieve and what will be available to Aviate,
Navigate, and Communicate.
5.5. Route Manual.

A working knowledge of the route manual is essential for you to properly prepare for your flight and
simulator training. You must be able to quickly extract information about diversion airports, DARD and
other less time critical information. Being familiar with the information in this manual will enable you to
prepare quickly and efficiently for both simulator and line training.
6. Skills
Manipulative skill is generally not a major point of difficulty in command training. You will have plenty
of opportunity for practice and, of course, a very good standard is expected. You may find however, that
as you settle in on the line your manipulative standard drops slightly as you are concentrating on the big
picture aspects of the operation. It is important that you maintain your standards for a number of
reasons. One of which is to inspire confidence from your First Officer and the rest of the crew. You may
have to pick which sectors you fly to make sure you keep in practice. You should also bear in mind
recency requirements when planning your flying for the day.
7. Conclusion
These notes do not provide you with a recipe for success in your command training. Rather they are
designed to get you thinking about the general principles involved, so that you can prepare these
principles prior to putting them into place during your training and after your check to line. You will find
flying as a Captain very satisfying and enjoyable, but command is not without its challenges and
frustrations. You will have to be thoroughly conversant with a Captain's duties and responsibilities, and
be developing a high level of knowledge and understanding of many topics. Through training you will be
able to develop you skills and show an attitude that meets the companys expectations.
We are all different and some people will pick up some aspects of the job quicker than others.
The important thing as a Captain is to put it all together. Do not hesitate to seek extra assistance if you
need it. Your Training Captains and your Fleet Training Manager are in a position to help, should you
call upon them. We also recognise that the Captains position is not an easy one. Not every decision that
you make will be perfect, but it is important not to let fear of making a mistake inhibit you from
exercising confident command leadership.
All the very best with your command training and enjoy the view from the left-hand seat!
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Page 10 of 10
Command Upgrade Official

Memorandums
(Crew Portal Extracts)
MEMORANDUM
Flight Operations Training
ATTN: FLIGHT DECK CREW

SUB: AIRBUS A330 NOMINATION AS COMMANDER COURSE
Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you via My Mint for the details of your course on a daily
basis. You may refer to the Crew Portal while on Sim Training. Crew Portal > Main Menu > Sim Roster
Please arrange to collect your training file from Flight Training Content Management team, Emirates Training College
(ETC), 2nd Floor. Please note that you are required to complete and submit a GCAA application form for your Licence to
the Flight Training Admin Assistants. This form will be available in your training file. Please complete Part 1; Part 2
(section 5) circle P2 deletion; Part 3; Part 8; signature and date. This is a mandatory requirement.
Kindly submit a clear paper copy of the following to Flight Training Admin, ETC, 2nd Floor, as it is a mandatory
requirement to process your Licence with GCAA:
1 copy - valid Passport copy - with passport holder's picture & details page.
1 copy - valid UAE visa page - The UAE visa endorsed page, please check if visa is not expired.
1 copy - valid & current UAE licence copy (ATPL) - showing both sides of the card on same page.
1 copy - valid & current UAE medical certificate or Temporary medical cert - showing both sides of the card on same
page.
1 colour passport size colour photograph on white background
On arrival at the College, please collect the visitors swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of your ID or any other
identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure you collect your ID card and return the
swipe card prior to leaving the College.
Required Documentation and Pre-reading
1.
A paper copy of the FOM will be available for use during the ground school. The FOM can be collected from the
Flight Training Content Management on day 1 of your ground school. Please ensure you return the FOM on the
last day of your ground school.
2.
Your FCOM 3 and QRH.
3.
The Crew Portal > Home Page > Training - Generic > Nomination as Commander, containing pre-reading
information on Command Preparation, Aviation Law and Rights of a Commander is to be reviewed before the
ground school.
4.
Please familiarise yourself with A330 Nomination as Commander Training Manual which may be viewed on
Crew Portal > Home Page > Training Manuals > A330 Training
The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training - Generic > Transport
Arrangements.
Note: In the event that a Flight Crew has to leave the Ground School Training session for any urgent reason/s, he/she must
inform either the FTSM or the relevant Training Chief before leaving the Training College.
As per the Companys regulations you are required to attend in your Uniform.
Flight Training Department
Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:30 Sunday to Wednesday
07:00 to 15:00 Thursday
Page 1 of 4
Sep-08
Type Memo
MEMORANDUM

SUB: CRM UPGRADE COURSE
Please refer to the Ground school roster that has been issued to you for the date and time of your
course.
You may view the Classroom details mentioned on the roster that has been issued to you. The
Classroom Utilisation sheet is also posted on the CBT Area Entrance Door and in the FCTIs Area at
the Emirates Training College (aircraft shaped building), Flight Training Department, 1st Floor. The
Classroom Utilization sheet can also be accessed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training
Generic > Class room Utilization Sheet
Most of the training courses are held at the Emirates Training College. However, if any of your
sessions are held at the Emirates Aviation College (EAC) Sim Building, the location can be viewed
from Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training Generic > EAC SIM Building Class room Location
On arrival at the College, please collect the visitors swipe card from the Security Desk in exchange of
your ID or any other identification card to gain access to Flight Operations Training. Please ensure
you collect your ID card and return the swipe card prior to leaving the College.
Please find attached the Pre-reading material for your CRM Upgrade Course. Kindly read it thoroughly
as it forms an integral part of the course. Your attention is drawn specifically to the following:
American Airlines
Swissair 111 Investigation Report Exec Summary
CRM Pre-reading
2005.pdf (333 ...
The transportation arrangements can be viewed from: Crew Portal > Main Menu > Training
Generic> Transport Arrangements
As per the Companys regulations you are required to come in your Uniform.
Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:00 - Thursday
Page 2 of 4
Sep-08
Type Memo
MEMORANDUM

SUB: IOC (NCC) / ENGINEERING VISIT
Please refer to your Ground School roster for the date and time of your IOC (NCC)/Engineering Visit.
You are required to carry your ID card for security verification purposes.
The details of the visit are as follows (timings are approximate). You may refer to the location map
from: Crew Portal > Main Menu >
Training Airbus > Upgrade > New EK II Engg gate Location Map
Training Boeing > Upgrade> New EK II Engg gate Location Map
IOC(NCC)/Engineering Visits:
Pick up from Training College at 1200hrs to arrive at the new EK Engineering Gate-EK II near
Hangar D for IOC (NCC)/Engg. visits at 1230hrs.
Contact: IOC (NCC) - SMNC on Tel: 04-2182201 or 04-2991011/6061 at the security gate for
prior notification.
Contact: Engineering Base Shift Manager on 050-6458762 or 04-208 5259 for prior
notification and approximate finishing time at NCC.
Contact: Mr. Francis T/ Mr. Sajith Thayath on Tel: 04-2181216/8, if you face any problems at
the Security. Mr. Ayman Murad El Hag (for gate passes) on Tel: 04-2181221.
Return from IOC (NCC) / Engineering visit to Training College at 1515 hrs (approximately,
coordinate with bus driver).
Return to residence from Training College at 1530 hrs (approx).
If you foresee any delay or if you finish prior to the scheduled time, you can call Central Services on
2184538/2184539/2184540.
As per the Companys regulations you are required to come in your Uniform.
Note to Flight Crew:
Visits should be strictly followed in the order as given below(timings are approximate):1st Visit - To IOC (NCC): 1230 - 1345
2nd Visit - To Engg. area: 1345 - 1500
Please call the contact numbers mentioned above of the respective areas for tour co-ordination.
Please contact the new Police EK II Gate Tel: 04-2151563 for the Gate passes, if delayed or if not
yet available at the Gate.

Office Hours:
07:00 to 15:00 Thursday
Page 3 of 4
Sep-08
Type Memo
MEMORANDUM
Page 4 of 4
Sep-08
Type Memo
Five day upgrade course details

(OLD COURSE)
Upgrade Ground
School Syllabus
FIVE DAY UPGRADE COURSE
DAY ONE
INTRODUCTION
Guidance will be given on how to be prepared and what expectations are to be anticipated,
however the Upgraders are to show that they are developing proficiency toward their new position. A
full description of the upgrade programme from Day 1 until the final line assessment is to be provided
by the Instructor.
COMPANY PROCEDURE
A FOM review; emphasis is placed on an Emirates Captains responsibilities and duties. Also
discussed are specific areas of the FOM where guidance is specified in how to conduct routine and
non-routine flight operations; the policies and procedures to be followed and circumstances where the
Captain, in the interest of safety, may take whatever course of action he deems necessary.
DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTS

The aim is to have a thorough knowledge of what manuals and documentation are required to be
onboard, those that are stored onboard and those that the crew should take on a flight.
Other documentation and reports for example, Captains special reports, Captains discretion report,
ASIRs etc, are to be thoroughly understood in relation to when and what should be recorded and how
the various reports are to be filed.
AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL LOG

The aim is to increase the trainees knowledge of the Aircraft Technical logbook, and the
practical aspects during line operations whereby the trainee should be able to state:
2. The Tech. Logs contents
3. The required pre-flight check of the log book
4. How to record deficiencies
5. Who is able to sign the CRS
C:\To be deleted\Upgrade Ground School Syllabus.doc
1.0
30/07/03
Author: D. Granter
Upgrade Syllabus
Page 1 of 5
Upgrade Ground
School Syllabus
Procedures to be followed if diverting to a non-EK airport.
MOVEMENT CONTROL BRIEFING

A tour of the Airport Operations and Movement Control (MOCON), and a briefing conducted by
the Duty Controller outlining the facilities and procedures used for scheduled and delayed departures
from Dubai Airport.
ENGINEERING
A visit to Network Control (IOC) and Engineering is conducted so that a wider understanding of
the whole operation is achieved and also provides the opportunity to ask operational and maintenance
related questions.
DAY TWO
FLIGHT SAFETY
The General Manager Flight Safety presents a summary of the departments functions. Procedures in
the case of an incident or accident, the requirements for reporting of air safety incidents are discussed
and a visual presentation of the FOQA programme. Specific areas and recent trends of ASIR are
highlighted; further discussion is invited from the participants.
LIDO FLIGHT PLANNING
The Flight Dispatch Manager provides the Flight Dispatch Department gives an informative briefing
on LIDO flight planning and EK dispatch principals with elaboration on the methods of application.
In-flight assistance, i.e. flight with landing gear down, re-routings, significant profile changes and the
principals of ETOPS planning are discussed to update overall LIDO understanding.
DANGEROUS GOODS
This is a review of dangerous goods procedures and an update of new information in the new
IATA Dangerous Goods Manual. A Captains responsibilities in relation to the carriage of these goods
and applicable operational considerations are to be understood.
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AIR LAW
Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon an Aircraft Commander
derived from International and Local Law are clarified with a review of the Chicago, Warsaw and
Tokyo conventions. The outcomes of recent legal cases in relation to notification of seatbelt usage are
discussed along with proposed changes to the UAE law, specifically in the handling of disruptive
passengers.
DAY THREE
CREW RESOURCE MAMAGEMENT (CRM)
This CRM day provides a review of Emirates CRM principals and tools which aid towards
maintaining a high level of safety and efficiency.
Emphasis is also given towards the development of leadership skills and the use of authority
dynamics. Demonstration is made in the application of the companys Threat Management Model
(AAM). Finally Live application of CRM techniques is practised during roll play in the F3D
trainer, which is videoed to provide effective feedback.
DAY FOUR
PERFORMANCE
This is a review of FAR/JAR, ICAO, and Jeppesen requirements together with FCOM and EK
performance criteria and its practical application.
The review is assisted through the aid of a questionnaire to be completed as part of home study before
the course. The questions refer to various performance sections within the FCOMs, which arent
usually employed in normal operations, however a detailed knowledge would be required in abnormal
situations.
Operational knowledge and the correct use of the laptop (BLT / LPC) in normal and abnormal
configurations is heightened through realistic examples.
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SUITABLE AIRPORTS
Instruction is given on guiding principals in the selection of adequate and suitable alternate
airports in cases of technical and non-technical related in-flight abnormal/emergency situations, i.e.
where to go, how to proceed, continue, return or divert.
DIVERSIONS
Once the decision has been made divert, the procedures for operations to EK and non-EK station
airports are considered, i.e. re-plan a continued flight or preparing for an unscheduled night stop.
Guidance is provided on how and what expected tasks must be completed by the crew in an
unscheduled night stop at a non EK airport.
FUEL MANAGEMENT
Details of fuel planning, normal and RRSV planning, plus in-flight considerations and
procedures when the flight is forecast to land with less than the Company Minimum Reserve (CMR)
requirement. Examples of various situations are given so that unnecessary diversions are avoided.
DAY FIVE
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Major emergency and abnormal procedures/checklists are clarified. For example:
1. Emergency Electrical configuration
2. Dual engine flame out
3. Smoke / Toxic fumes
4. Fuel leak
5. Volcanic ash
6. Unreliable airspeed
Current Operational Engineering and FCOM Bulletins are reviewed.
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MEL
A revision of the various sections in the MEL, specifically guidance is given in the practical
operational use of the MEL.
WHEN and HOW to use this reference tool.
If there isnt a reference in the MEL then how next do you proceed?
ALL WEATHER OPS

This is a review of Airbus and Emirates All Weather Operations Procedures, also aircraft
equipment, ground facilities requirements, and procedures to be followed in the case of malfunctions.
COLD WEATHER OPS

Overall considerations and the procedures to be applied during cold weather operations are
discussed in detail. The emphasis is on being organised and having an awareness of the procedures in
the FCOM, FOM, and RM
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An introduction to International
Aviation Law
A330 Training Department

International Aviation Law
International Aviation Law: An Introduction

It is great importance that Aircraft Commanders have a basic understanding of the major
instruments of "Public International Law", and "Private International Law" that apply to
International Airline Operations, and how these instruments relate to State Law.
For their own protection, and in the Company's interests, Aircraft Commanders are expected
to have:
an understanding of the international applicability of "The Rules Of The
Air", individual State variations, and the responsibility of the Aircraft
Commander in observing same.
an understanding of possible civil action that could be directed at an
Aircraft Commander in the event of an accident, incident or occurrence,
and the requirement to observe all published company procedures to
minimise personal liability.
an understanding of the rights of the Aircraft Commander in relation to
containing disturbances on board, and any resulting civil liability in
relation to acts taken against individuals.
an understanding of the implications of civil and or criminal action that
may be taken against an Aircraft Commander in the event of a ground
collision whilst taxying.
an understanding of the implications of disallowing a passenger to
disembark after a request has been made to disembark.
an understanding of the obligations of the Aircraft Commander to State
Immigration Authorities in the event of being required to carry
deportees.
an understanding of actions to be taken in the event of an accident or
incident.
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U.A.E. Aviation Law

1. The Civil Aviation Law (Federal Act No. 20 [1991])
This is the primary source of all UAE Aviation Law. This document contains the basic
provisions of UAE Aviation Law, and also specifically identifies acts which will lead to punitive
measures being taken against offenders.
Examples of Punitive Provisions Include:
A term of imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding fifty
thousand dirhams for piloting an aircraft when drunk to such an extent as to impair his
capacity to pilot the aircraft. Also the same penalties are legislated against a pilot-incommand who has failed to enter the required information in the documents or record
of the aircraft, or who has altered such information (Article 69)
A term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and a fine not exceeding one
hundred thousand dirhams, or either penalty, for carrying munitions or weapons of
war, or committing smuggling (or the intent to smuggle), (Article 70)
A term of life imprisonment, or a lesser term of imprisonment, for an act of violence

committed on board an aircraft against a crewmember, (Article 72)
2. The UAE Civil Aviation Regulations (July 2003)

This document contains the detailed administrative provisions required to implement the Civil
Aviation Law. This document is amended biannually. Copies of this document are kept in the
Emirates Operations Centre (E.O.C.)
International Air Law

The foundations of international and state aviation law are International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) Conventions, but how do these Conventions become State Law?
The Conventions are prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee, and are then agreed to and
signed by a number of States. After a pre-determined number of States become "signatories"
to the Convention, it is said to be in force.
After a State becomes a "signatory" to the Convention, it is expected that the State will enact
"enabling legislation" to enact the Convention under local law. Be aware that it is not
uncommon for a State to be a signatory to a Convention, but has failed to pass enabling
legislation.
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The Chicago Convention (1944)

The Chicago Convention was agreed to in 1944 by 50 States. It's objectives were to
establish the framework, and standards for the establishment of civil aviation after the
termination of hostilities post World War II.
The Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO),
which formally came into being on May 13, 1947.
Quoting from the Chicago Convention, the objectives of ICAO are:
The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and
development of international air transport so as to:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation
throughout the world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful
purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular,
efficient and economical air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable
competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully
respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to
operate international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all aspects of international
civil aeronautics. (The Chicago Convention, Article 44)
Annexed to the Chicago Convention are the following annexes that constitute the basis of air
law as the pilot knows it:
Annex 1 - Aircrew Licensing
Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
Annex 3 - Met. Services for International Aviation
Annex 4 - Aeronautical C harts
Annex 5 - Units of Measurement
Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9 - Facilitation
Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services
Annex 12 - Search and Rescue
Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident Investigation
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Annex 14 - Aerodromes
Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16 - Environmental Protection
Annex 17 - Security - Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference
Annex 18 - Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
Of particular relevance to the Airline Commander are Annex 2 Rules of The Air, and Annex
11 Air Traffic Services. Extracts from both of these Annexes are found in the Jeppesen
Manual, Air Traffic Control Section.
Jeppesen Manual - AirTraffic Control Section

JEPP. ATC FLIGHT PROCEDURES (200 SERIES)
Extracted from ICAO Document 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Ops.
[PANS-OPS].)
Outlines the parameters that instrument procedures are based on, to emphasise the
necessity of compliance with charted procedures.
JEPP. ATC ICAO RULES OF THE AIR - ANNEX 2 (300 SERIES)
Extracted from the Chicago Convention - Annex 2

Basic Rules of the Air
Responsibility for Compliance With The Rules of The Air
Chapter 2.3 : Responsibility of PIC/ 2.4: Authority of PIC
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JEPP. ATC ICAO RULES OF THE AIR - PANSRAC (400 SERIES)

Extracted from Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services
(PANSRAC - Doc. 4444)
Mainly directed at Air Traffic Services Personnel.
JEPP. ATC JAR-OPS (600 SERIES)
Contains excerpts from Joint Airworthiness Operations (JAR-OPS) legislation. The Joint
Airworthiness Authority (JAA) comprises a number of European States that have agreed to
harmonise aviation legislation across their jurisdictions. A State is said to be JAR Compliant if its
aviation legislation is in accordance with JAR-OPS requirements.
STATES PAGES RULES AND PROCEDURES - LISTED ALPHABETICALLY
State variations to ICAO Standards. It is necessary to review this section to verify if a State has
enacted non-ICAO procedures (e.g., holding speeds, communication procedures, emergency
procedures, classification of airspace, etc.). For example, Saudi Arabia SCATANA procedures and
TIBA procedures, China and C.I.S. states Emergency Descent requirements, U.K. TMA Holding
speeds and required call on initial contact with Radar Departure.
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Rules of The Air Over the High Seas

Signatory States to the Chicago Convention agree that over the High Seas, the Rules of The Air (with
no State differences) shall apply to all aircraft.
In Summary
The Aircraft Commander is legally responsible for the disposition and safe operation of the
aircraft (Annex 2 and Annex 6). It is his responsibility to ens ure that all legal requirements
have been met before accepting flight plans and accepting the aircraft from maintenance.
The Company has a legal obligation to the local regulatory authority to ensure that
appropriate protocols are in place to meet all legal requirements, however, the Aircraft
Commander must remember that in most areas, he bears final legal responsibility.
Failure to take all reasonable actions to ensure all legal requirements are met could be
considered as negligence, or breach of "duty of care". Deliberate failure to observe any rule
could be considered as reckless conduct or wilful misconduct.
The Montreal Convention (1999)

The Montreal Convention of 1999 lays out the liability of the carrier for damage caused to
passengers, goods and cargo, and also the liability of carriers from damages caused by
delays. This convention came into force on November 4 2003. This convention totally
replaces the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (and amending protocols).
The Montreal Convention primarily focuses on the rights of passengers and consignors to
claim for damages for death, injury, damage or loss of baggage or goods. The Convention
applies a principle of strict liability up to a nominal sum, (e.g., for the death of a passenger,
the carrier is strictly liable for a sum of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights [SDRs,
approximately US$135,000]).
For a plaintiff to be awarded sums in excess of the limit of strict liability, it is incumbent upon
the carrier to prove that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier, or
its servants and agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third
party. (Article 21)
The implications for the aircraft commander are that plantiffs will attempt to prove that the
actions of the Captain were a causal factor in the damages claimed against, and that these
actions were negligent, wrongful, or constituted an omission that the normal pilot should not
make. If the court accepts that this was the case, the carriers liability is unlimited. Under the
now defunct Warsaw Convention, it was necessary to prove that the Carrier or its agents
acted recklessly, or with wilful misconduct. It is probable that it is now easier to prove that the
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carrier or its agents acted negligently or did not perform an act that was contributory to the
damages claimed against.
The Warsaw Convention primarily provided protection for carriers, and specified limitations of
liability for carriers. The Montreal Convention howeve r primarily protects the rights of
passengers and consignors. The carrier is burdened with the requirement to prove that it or
its agents did not act in a negligent manner to preserve limits of liability.
For the Montreal Convention to apply, the following tests must be satisfied:
the carriage is international,
the plaintiffs injury or damages are directly related to the flight in question (for
passenger injury or death, the event must occur on the aircraft, or in the
process of embarkation or disembarkation [Article 17]).
Under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs had to prove that the Carrier or its agents acted
recklessly. Historically Courts have found Aircraft Commanders to have acted recklessly
under the following circumstances
For failing to utilise INS during a long overwater crossing, amongst

other acts, (KAL 007 shootdown, September [1983])
For failure to switch on the seat belt sign when entering an area of
forecast turbulence (Goldman v. Thai Airways International, [1983])
The Judge's finding in this case was predicated on the fact that the
Airline's Flight Operations Manual (which was presented as evidence
in Court) stated explicitly that the seat belt sign was to be switched
on before entering an area of forecast turbulence.
For failure to properly observe documented anti-icing procedures (Air

Florida crash, Potomac River, Washington, January 1982)
In all these cases, having proved wilful misconduct or reckless conduct (depending on
whether the Warsaw Convention or the amending Hague Protocol applied), the plaintiff was
then able to claim damages in excess of the Warsaw Convention limits of liability. In the U.S.,
particularly, the pecuniary damages awarded may be extraordinarily high, as the U.S. law
system allows the award of punitive damages to express societal disapproval.
The implications to the Aircraft Commander are obvious, be aware of the fact that your best
defence in the event of an accident or incident is to prove that you followed manufacturers,
and company procedures to the letter! Any procedural shortcut could be considered grounds
for negligence in a Court of Law.
The Tokyo Convention (1963)

Contains protocols relating to crimes on board aircraft. Provides that the State of Registration
of the aircraft has competence to exercise jurisdiction over acts committed on board. The
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protocol's intent is to ensure that such acts do not go unpunished. States party to this
Convention are obligated to take all measures to restore control of the aircraft to its
commander, or to preserve his control of it.
The Tokyo Convention defines the acts to which its provisions apply:
1. This Convention shall apply in respect of:
(a) offences against penal law;
(b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or
do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or
which jeopardize good order and discipline on board.
2. Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect of
offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered
in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the
high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State (The Tokyo
Convention, Article 1)
The Tokyo Convention makes specific reference to the powers of the Aircraft Commander.
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an
offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such
person reasonable measures including restraint which are
necessary:
(a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property
therein; or
(b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
(c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or
to disembark him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other
crew members and may request or authorize, but not require, the assistance
of passengers to restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain. Any crew
member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures without
such authorization when he has reasonable
grounds to believe that such action is immediately necessary to protect the
safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein. (The Tokyo
Convention, Article 6)
Additionally specific licence is granted to the Aircraft Commander to disembark any person,
suspected of committing any act as specified in Article 1:
1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose of
subparagraph (a) or (b) or paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the
territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has
reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board
the aircraft an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1(b).
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2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which
he disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of ,and the reasons
for, such disembarkation. (The Tokyo Convent ion, Article 8)
The powers of the Aircraft Commander take effect when the aircraft is in-flight, the exact
definition of when the aircraft is in-flight is found in Article 5:
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall
for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time from
the moment when all its external doors are closed (The Tokyo Convention,
Article 5)
For any action taken in accordance with this Convention, complete exemption from liability is
specified:
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft
commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or
operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was
performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the
treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken.
(The Tokyo Convention, Article 10)
The UAE
The UAE is a signatory to the Tokyo Convention (Effective date 15/7/81). The Tokyo
Convention is mentioned specifically in the introduction the UAE Civil Aviation Law
document where reference is made to Federal Decree No. 9 (1981), which recognises the
UAEs accession to the Tokyo Convention.
The Tokyo Convention is also specifically mentioned in the UAE Civil Aviation Regulations,
Part 7, the relevant section is reproduced below:
1.2.5
The UAE is a contracting party to the three principal conventions
concerning aviation security; these are:
(a) Tokyo Convention 1963: contracting states recognise offences committed on
board aircraft on international flights, acknowledge powers accorded to aircraft
commanders, and undertake to restore an aircraft subject to unlawful interference
to its lawful commander; they also accept a range of procedures for bringing
offenders to justice;
(b) Hague Convention 1970: contracting states agree to make the seizure of an
aircraft by force or intimidation - "hijacking" - an offence punishable by severe
penalties; and to make offenders subject to prosecution or extradition;
(c) Montreal Convention 1971: contracting states agree to make an increased
range of offences relative to the safety of aircraft (acts of violence against persons
on board, destruction or damage of an aircraft or navigational facility,
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communication of false information, etc.) punishable by severe penalties, with

offenders subject to prosecution or extradition.
The UAE, unlike other legal jurisdictions, does not elaborate in law in matters relating to the
Tokyo Convention. Most jurisdictions specifically legislate against certain acts mentioned in
the Tokyo Convention, and specifically mention punitive measures that may be taken against
offenders. The UAE Civil Law does make mention of certain criminal acts on board aircraft,
the relevant section is reproduced below:
Notice under paragraph one, that an act of violence is mentioned specifically in relation to
possible danger to the safety of the flight!
Aircraft Commanders should also be aware that in the event of a passenger suffering injury or
death whils t under restraint, civil action would probably be taken against the Aircraft
Commander for breach of his duty of care to the passenger. The implications of this are
obvious, should a passenger be restrained, ensure that he/she is placed under close
supervision for the remainder of the flight!
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In Summary
The Aircraft Commander has the power to restrain any passenger who he/she suspects
of committing, or being about to commit an offence, or any act that compromises good
order and discipline on board the aircraft.
Pursuant to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander has the right to have any person
disembarked in a signatory country. All signatory States agree to receive any passenger
offloaded in such circumstances.
According to this Convention, the Aircraft Commander's authority takes effect the moment
the external doors are closed.
In the event of action being taken against a passenger, make careful notes of the events,
preferably with a timeline, and take the names of passengers who could supply evidence
at any later enquiry.
Taxying Accidents/Incidents
Should the aircraft suffer an accident or incident during taxy, the local legislation of the State
I which the aircraft is located would apply. No International Conventions would be applicable
in this instance.
The UAE
In the UAE, an accident during taxy which resulted in death/injury or damage to property
would be treated in a similar manner to a road accident! The Local Police authorities would
take action based on the Statutes relating to road law.
Dubai Airport (November 99)
In conversation with the Dubai Airport Safety Officer, it was verified that agreement has been
reached between Dubai Police and the Airport Safety Officer, that the Safety Office will
exercise jurisdiction in any incident related to aircraft ground taxying
In Summary
In the event of a taxying accident, remain with the aircraft (quoting safety concerns), until
the Company has been notified of the circumstances, and appropriate legal assistance
has been obtained.
OTHER AREAS OF LEGAL INTEREST TO THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER

False Imprisonment
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If a passenger requests to disembark the aircraft, and this can be done without major
disruption or inconvenience, you must allow them to do so. Failing to allow a
passenger to disembark in these circumstances could conceivably result in a civil action
against the Aircraft Commander for "false imprisonment".
Diplomats
Diplomats enjoy a high level of immunity from legal process. The specific document of
International Law which documents this is the Vienna Convention on International
Relations and Optional Protocols (1961). This document, of course, does not relate
specifically to aviation, but deals with the way that diplomats, diplomatic mail, and
diplomats possessions are dealt with, and the immunities that they enjoy.
Diplomatic mail cannot be opened or x-rayed.
Be cautious in dealings with Diplomats
Carrying Deportees
In some jurisdictions (e.g., Australia and Singapore), the Aircraft Commander shares
responsibility with the Operator for landing an individual with unsatisfactory
documentation.
If you are required to carry a deportee, ask to see the notice of deportation. (Note: The
Flight Operations Manual [FOM] specifically states that the Captain must be informed
when Deportees [DEP] or Inadmissible [INAD] passengers are carried.)
The Immigration authorities can authorise the offload of a commercial passenger to allow
the carriage of a deportee.
Be courteous in dealings with Immigration authorities.
Overflight Clearances/ Right To Search
In Air Law there is no "right of innocent passage" as in Maritime Law. All transits of
another State's airspace must be pre-arranged in bilateral negotiations. Be able to quote
overflight clearances when queried.
Every State has the right to search any aircraft. In the event of being involved in such a
search, ensure the authorites are accompanied by aircraft crew, (quoting safety
concerns).
Any State has the right to demand that an aircraft in its airspace land and be searched.
Customs Authorities
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Customs Authorities have broad reaching powers to search and detain. Unlike the Police
they do not have to show reasonable cause to conduct a search. Co-operate at all times,
if they wish to search an aircraft, ensure that they are accompanied by aircraft crew.
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Actions In The Event of An Accident/Incident

The natural tendency after a traumatic event is to want to talk about it DO NOT! State that
you wish to consult a medical practitioner, eat and obtain rest. DO NOT ADMIT TO ANY
FORM OF LIABILITY! Ensure that the Company is notified, so that appropriate legal
resources can be marshalled.
In Summary
Do not interfere with cockpit settings after the event
Have yourself and crew transported to Hospital
Do not speak to the Press at all!
Ensure that the Company has been notified
If possible - alert your embassy in the country you are in
When interviewed - cooperate fully with the accident investigator and the Police.
Limit your statements to descriptions of events, do not speculate, or attempt to
apportion blame in any way.
If interviewed by the Police, have your legal representative present.
Disclaimer
The material presented in this document is presented as information to promote awareness of legal
matters. The above does not constitute legal advice per se. To obtain legal advice consult an
accredited Aviation Lawyer!
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Suggested Further Reading

For copies of all ICAO Conventions and Protocols, refer to the following Internet address:
http://icarus.iasl.mcgill.ca/
For information on ICAO, refer to the following Internet address:
http://www.icao.org/
Books
Diederiks-Verschoor, I.H.Ph. (1997), An introduction to air law (6th. Ed.). The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International
Gifis, S.H. (1996), Law dictionary (4th Ed.). New York: Barron's Educational Series
Goldhirsch, L.B. (2000). The Warsaw convention annotated: A legal handbook. The Hague,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International
Pengilley, W & McPhee, J. (1994), Law for aviators. Sydney, Australia: Legal Books
Unmack, T. (1999). Civil aviation: Standards and liabilities. London, U.K.: LLP Professional
Publishing
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Rights and responsibilities of an

Aircraft Commander
Rights and Responsibilities

of The Aircraft Commander
Rights and Responsibilities Of The Aircraft

Commander
UAE Civil Aviation Law
(Federal Act No. 20 1991)
Article 11
The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft, and
the safety of all persons on board during flight time. He may take necessary measures to
maintain order on board the aircraft and must comply with the applicable rules in this respect.
The following references are drawn from the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation
Regulations, issue 2003-2, issued 1/7/2003, valid until 1/1/04.
UAE CARS
(ISSUE 2003-2)
PART I: DEFINITION OF TERMS

Pilot-In-Command: The pilot designated by the operator or in the case of
general aviation, the owner, as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.
PART III: RULES OF THE AIR

1.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLIANCE
1.3.1 Responsibility of Pilot in Command
The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or
not, be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with these
regulations
1.3.2 Deviation from Regulations
The pilot in command may depart from a Civil Aviation Regulation in
circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in the interests of
safety. The pilot in command shall submit a written report to the GCAA within
24 hours.
1.3.3 Pre -flight Action
Before beginning a flight, the pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall become
familiar with all available information appropriate to the intended operation. Pre-flight
action for flights away from the vicinity of the aerodrome, and for all IFR
flights, shall include a careful study of available current weather reports and
forecasts, taking into consideration fuel requirements and an alternative course of
action if the flight cannot be completed as planned.
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1.4 AUTHORITY OF PILOT IN COMMAND

The pilot in command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition
of the aircraft while in command.
1.5 INTERFERENCE WITH CREW MEMBERS
No person shall assault, threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crew member in
the performance of the crew member's duties aboard an aircraft being operated.
1.6 USE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR, NARCOTICS OR DRUGS
1.6.1 General
No person whose function is critical to the safety of aviation shall undertake that
function while under the influence of any psychoactive substance, by reason of
which human performance is impaired. No such person shall engage in any kind
of problematic use of substances.
1.6.2 Flight Crew
No person shall act or attempt to act as a flight crew member of an aircraft:
(a) within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage; or
(b) while under the influence of alcohol; or
(c) while using any drug that effects the persons faculties in any way contrary
to safety; or
(d) while having 0.04 percent or more blood alcohol level.
1.6.3 Other Than Flight Crew
Except in an emergency, no pilot shall allow a person who appears to be
intoxicated or who demonstrates by manner or physical indications that person is
under the influence of drugs (except a person under proper medical care) to be
carried in that aircraft.
1.6.4 Testing For Psychoactive Substances
A crew member shall submit to a test to indicate the use of psychoactive
substances and/or alcohol in the blood when the GCAA has a reasonable basis to
believe that a person may have violated the provisions of paragraph 1.6.2 above,
or as part of a GCAA authorized screening programme. That person shall, upon
request by the GCAA, furnish the GCAA, or authorise any clinic, hospital,
doctor, or other person to release to the GCAA, the results of each test taken.
Refusal to submit to a drug or alcohol test is grounds for immediate suspension of
that persons licence.
1.6.5 Test Information
Any test information obtained by the GCAA under paragraph 1.6.2 above may be
evaluated in determining a persons qualifications for any pilot or flight engineer
licence or possible violations of this Chapter and may be used as the basis for
suspension or sanctions against that licence as well as evidence in any legal
proceeding.
1.7 CARRIAGE OF ILLEGAL SUBSTANCES
No person shall operate an aircraft within the United Arab Emirates with
knowledge that illegal substances, such as narcotic drugs, marijuana, depressant
or stimulant drugs or substances, are carried in the aircraft.
2.23.3 Inadvertent Changes [To Flight Plan]
2.23.3.1 In the event that a controlled flight inadvertently deviates from its current flight
plan, the following action shall be taken:
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(a) Deviation from track: if the aircraft is off track, action shall be ta ken
forthwith to adjust the heading of the aircraft to regain track as soon as
practical.
(b) Variation in true airspeed: if the average true airspeed at cruising level
between reporting points varies or is expected to vary by plus or minus 5
per cent of the true airspeed, from that given in the flight plan, the
appropriate ATC unit shall be so informed.
(c) Change in time estimate: if the estimate for the next applicable
reporting point, flight information region boundary or destination
aerodrome, whichever comes first, is found to be in error in excess of three
minutes from that notified to ATC, or such other period of time as
prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority or on the basis of air
navigation regional agreements, a revised estimated time shall be notified as
PART IV: AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

4.4 DUTIES OF PILOT IN COMMAND
4.4.1 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the safety of all crew members,
passengers and cargo on board the aircraft when the doors are closed. The pilot in
command shall also be responsible for the operation and safety of the applicable
aircraft from the moment:
(a) the aeroplane is ready to move for the purpose of taking off until the
moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s)
used as primary propulsion units are shut down, or
(b) the helicopter engine(s) are started until the helicopter finally comes to rest
at the end of the flight, with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades
stopped.
4.4.2 The pilot in command shall be responsible for reporting all known or suspected
defects in the aircraft to the operator, at the termination of the flight.
4.4.3 The pilot in command shall be responsible for notifying the nearest appropriate
authority by the quickest available means of any accident involving the aircraft,
resulting in injury or death of any person or substantial damage to the aircraft or
property.soon as possible to the appropriate ATS unit.
4.4.4 The pilot in command shall ensure that the checklists specified in this Subpart are
complied with in detail.
4.4.5 The pilot in command shall be responsible for the journey log book or the general
declaration containing the information listed in Subpart B.
4.4.6 The pilot in command shall not permit any activity during a critical phase of
flight, which could distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his or
her duties and interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties. For
the purposes of this paragraph, critical phases of flight includes all ground
operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing, and all other flight operations
conducted below 10000 feet, except cruise flight.
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PART 6: AVIATION SAFETY, CHAPTER 1: PASSENGER CABIN SAFETY

1.4 LEGAL POWERS OF THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND
The Pilot-in-Command is empowered to take reasonable and necessary measures, including restraint, as
may be necessary to prevent:
(a) any incident in an aircraft registered in the UAE which is an offence under
the laws of that State;
(b) anything which endangers, or may endanger, the safety of passengers and crew, the safety of
the aircraft or of property on board the aircraft, or the good order and discipline on board the
aircraft.
1.4.2 Delegation of Responsibility
While it is the clear responsibility of the Pilot-in-Command to maintain order and
discipline on board an aircraft, he may delegate such responsibility and authority.
However, there is no provision in law for transferring his responsibility and
authority for control of passengers on board an aircraft, to another crew member.
1.5.2 Authority
When immediate actions are necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft or of
persons or property on board the aircraft, any crew member and any other person
on board an aircraft may (without the authority of the Pilot-in-Command), take
such reasonable measures including restraint. As he has reasonable grounds to
believe, such situations would be deemed to have been so critical, from a safety
viewpoint that no time was available to obtain the authority of the Pilot-inCommand, for instance:
(a) to prevent a person from opening an aircraft door; or
(b) to prevent self -inflicted bodily harm to any person on board an aircraft.
Note: Criminal or civil proceedings could be brought against crew members for
assault or false imprisonment if restraining measures are applied other
than in good faith and in circumstances as described above. Crew
members finding it necessary to act without the authority of the Pilot-inCommand, can expect to be protected by law provided the action can be
proved to be reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. The
interpretation of what is "reasonable and necessary" may be difficult for
an individual CCM to determine. The use of immediate and direct
measures to restrain a person will be rare and only employed when the
safety of the aircraft or persons or property on board is at immediate risk.
1.5.3 Legal powers
Any action by a Cabin Crew Member to control a disruptive passenger on board
an aircraft can, in general, only be exercised under, and in pursuant to, the
authority and direction of the Pilot-in-Command. Cabin Crew Members have no
direct and independent authority themselves to initiate measures for the restraint
and control of passengers. Similarly, Cabin Crew Members cannot, on their own
authority, prevent undesirables from boarding the aircraft nor can they refuse
carriage or disembark any person. These powers can only be exercised by the
Pilot-in-Command directly or by delegation.
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1.7 RESTRAINT EQUIPMENT

When all other means of placating a violent passenger have been exhausted, the
Pilot-in-Command will give the order to effect restraint of that passenger, to be
accomplished as follows:
(a) the Pilot-in-Command must ensure that sufficient force is available to
effect the restraint and he has the authority to co-opt and direct the
assistance of anyone on the aircraft;
(b) on no occasion may the restraint equipment be used without the authority
of the Pilot-in-Command except as outlined in subparagraph 1.7.1,
above;
(c) if deemed prudent and practical, the Pilot-in-Command should arrange
for a Flight Crew member to be present as a witness, but he should not
become physically involved;
(d) passengers seated adjacent to the disturbance should be reseated, or
asked to vacate the area, to ensure that they are not harmed;
(e) when effecting the restraint, only sufficient force should be used as is
necessary to overpower the passenger; check the restraint at intervals to
ensure no injury is caused;
(f) at no time must the person who has been restrained be secured to any
part of the aircraft;
(g) the recommended method for effecting the restraint is as follows:
(1) handcuff or otherwise secure the hands : pinion arms with straps
also securing the passenger in the seat; strap legs, if required
(2) seat the passenger in a seat other than an aisle seat
(3) fasten the seat belt
(h) when restrained and seated a crew member must stay seated alongside
the passenger and be equipped with special shears to release the
passenger in event of an emergency;
(i) obtain witness reports and pass them, together with Voyage Reports from
crew members involved, to the pilot-in-command;
(j) on landing, all other passengers should depart the aircraft prior to the
removal of restraint and the turn-over of the restrained passenger to civil
police and/or medical authorities.
4.7.2 Air Turbulence
(a) If air turbulence is forecast, the Pilot-in-Command should brief the Senior
Cabin Crew Member prior to departure.
(b) When air turbulence is encountered, the Pilot-in-Command should direct
appropriate action via the Senior Cabin Crew Member.
(c) If in-flight service is to be discontinued, all trolleys, galleys and cabin
equipment are to be secured and checks undertaken to ensure that passengers
are seated with seat belts fastened.
(d) Cabin Crew Members should take their seats and fasten harnesses as soon as
reasonably practicable.
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CHAPTER 7: AVIATION SAFETY

SECTION 5.0 SEARCHING OF VIPS, DIPLOMATS AND COURIERS
5.1 VIPS AND DIPLOMATS
All intending passengers are considered as being subject to search. However, Article 36
of the Vienna Convention, 1961, specifically exempts the personal baggage of a diplomat
from security searches (in the country to which he/she is accredited only) unless there are
serious grounds for presuming it contains articles other than those for official use or for
the personal use of the diplomat or members of his family forming part of his household.
Any such searches however, shall only be conducted in the presence of the diplomat or
his authorized representative.
5.2 DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND POUCHES
Diplomatic bags/pouches are inviolable and shall not be opened or detained. They are
exempt from pre-board security screening by any means including X-ray and metal
detection equipment.
5.3 DIPLOMATIC AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE COURIERS
5.3.1 Diplomatic couriers convey diplomatic bags/pouches under conditions outlined in
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, 1961.
5.3.2 Diplomatic couriers are identified by:
(a) a document indicating their status, issued by the state which they serve; and
(b) a document (Way-Bill) indicating the number of packages which comprise the
consignment or diplomatic bag/pouch for which they are responsible. Each
package has a label bearing a serial number which identifies it with the Way-Bill.
5.3.3 Diplomatic couriers may be engaged wholly on the conveyance of diplomatic
bags/pouches or may be persons accredited on a one-time basis as "casual couriers". The
documents of accreditation differ from state-to-state, but the status of a courier and the
diplomatic bag/pouch are similar.
5.3.4 Ministry of Defence couriers may convey packages which merit the same immunity from screening
as diplomatic bags/pouches. Ministry of Defence couriers are identified by:
(a) a courier certificate; and
(b) a document (Way-Bill) issued by the Ministry of Defence.
5.4 SECURITY SCREENING OF COURIERS
The persons and personal baggage of diplomatic and/or military couriers are not exempt
from screening procedures.
5.6 REPORTING DIFFICULTIES
The Appropriate Authority of the relevant Emirate should be notified of any difficulties
in implementing the procedures outlined in this section. Specific difficulties should be
dealt with as follows:
(a) UAE couriers: to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
(b) Military couriers: to the Ministry of Defence;
(c) Foreign cour iers: to the appropriate Embassy/Consulate of the country to which
the courier is accredited; and
(d) Any person seeking exemption from screening on grounds of protocol or
diplomatic status to: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the
airline concerned.
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Induction CRM Course Pre-reading
Emirates
Induction CRM Course
Pre-reading
CRM Course Pre Reading
Page 0
Emirates CRM Course Pre-reading
Contents
Page 2-3
6 Generations of CRM
Page 5-6
Qantas 1, Bangkok
Page 7-8
Gulf Air 072, Bahrain
Page 9-12
American Airlines 1420, Little Rock
Page 13-15
American Airlines 965, Cali
Page 16-17
Air Inter Strasbourg A320 accident.
Page 18-19
Swiss Air 111, Nova Scotia
Page 20-21
Singapore SQ 006, Taipei
Note, wherever possible, all accident reports are taken from the official findings, edited for sake of brevity
For training purposes only
Page 1
First Generation CRM

1980-1986
zDerived from corporate management development training
zFocus on individual management style/interpersonal skills
zGoals to fix the Wrong Stuff captains
Make junior crewmembers more assertive
Second Generation CRM

1986 - present
zTeam building
zFocus on concepts
situational awareness
stress management
zModular
error chain
individual decision making
models
Third Generation CRM

1993 - present
zSystems approach
zFocus on specific skills/behaviors
zIntegration with technical performance
zEmphasis on evaluating human factors
zSpecial training for Check Airmen/Instructors
zBroadened perspective
Flight attendants, dispatchers, maintenance
Fourth Generation CRM

1994 - present
zIntegration of CRM into technical training
zProceduralization of CRM
Checklists include CRM issues
zSpecialized curriculum topics
automation, etc.
zEvaluation of human factors in full mission simulation (LOFT/LOE)
Page 2
Fifth Generation CRM :

Error Management 1996zFocus on managing human error
zTraining in limitations of human performance
Universal nature of human error
use of incident & accident data to illustrate
zContinuation of earlier generation training topics under error management
framework
Sixth Generation CRM:

Threat and Error Management 1999 zFifth generation was useful, but created resistance among pilots who did not
like the idea that their task was managing their own errors
zLOSA documents not only errors but also the nature and prevalence of threats
in the operating environment shows superior performance as well as
problems
Page 3
QANTAS 1 Summary
Overview
On 23 September l999, at about 2247 local time, a Qantas Boeing 747-438 aircraft registered VH-OJH (callsign
Qantas One) overran runway 21 Left (21L) while landing at Bangkok International Airport, Thailand. The overrun
occurred after the aircraft landed long and aquaplaned on a runway which was affected by water following very
heavy rain. The aircraft sustained substantial damage during the overrun. None of the three flight crew, 16 cabin
crew or 391 passengers reported any serious injuries.
The accident flight
The first officer was the handling pilot for the flight. The crew elected to use flaps 25 and idle reverse as the
configuration for the approach and landing. in accordance with normal company practice (since December 1996).
At various stages during the approach to runway 21L, the crew were informed by air traffic control that there was a
thunderstorm and heavy rain at the airport, and that visibility was 4 km (or greater). At 2240, a special weather
observation taken at Bangkok airport noted visibility as 1,500 m and the runway visual range (RVR) for runway 21
Right (21R) as 750 m. The Qantas One crew was not made aware of this information, or the fact that another
aircraft (callsign Qantas 15) had gone around from final approach at 2243:26. At 2244:53, the tower controller
advised that the runway was wet and that a preceding aircraft (which landed at approximately 2240) reported that
braking action was good.
The Qantas One crew noted no effect from the weather until visibility reduced when the aircraft entered very heavy
rain as it descended through 200 ft on late final approach. The aircraft then started to deviate above the 3.15 degree
glideslope, passing over the runway threshold at 169 kts at a height of 76 ft. Those parameters were within company
limits. (The target speed for the final approach was 154 kts, and the ideal threshold crossing height was 44 ft.)
When the aircraft was approximately 10 ft above the runway, the captain instructed the first officer to go around. As
the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircrafts mainwheels touched down (1,002 m along the 3,150
m runway, 636 m beyond the ideal touchdown point). The captain immediately cancelled the go-around by
retarding the thrust levers, without announcing his actions. Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other
pilots, and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll.
Due to a variety of factors associated with the cancellation of the go-around, the aircraft's speed did not decrease
below the touchdown speed (154 kts) until the aircraft was 1,625 m or halfway down the runway.
The investigation established that, during the landing roll, the aircraft tyres aquaplaned on the water-affected
runway. This limited the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes to about one third of that for a dry runway. In such
conditions and without reverse thrust, there was no prospect of the crew stopping the aircraft in the runway distance
remaining after touchdown. The aircraft overran the 100 m stopway (at the end of the runway) at a speed of 88 kts,
before stopping 220 m later with the nose resting on an airport perimeter road.
The depth of water on the runway when the aircraft landed could not be determined but it was sufficient to allow
dynamic aquaplaning to occur (i.e. at least 3 mm). The water buildup was the result of heavy rain on the runway in
the preceding minutes, and possibly because the runway was ungrooved.
During the examination of the performance of the aircraft on the runway, it became evident that the flaps 25/idle
reverse thrust landing procedure used by the crew (and which was the 'preferred' company procedure) was not
appropriate for operations on to water-affected runways. The appropriate approach/landing procedure was flaps
30/full reverse thrust. This had the characteristics of a lower approach speed, of being easier to fly in terms of speed
control and runway aim point (for most company pilots), and of providing maximum aerodynamic drag after
touchdown when the effectiveness of the wheelbrakes could be reduced because of aquaplaning Had this
configuration been used, the overrun would most probably have been avoided.
As with other company B747-900 pilots, the crew had not been provided with appropriate procedures and training
to properly evaluate the potential effect the Bangkok Airport weather conditions might have had on the stopping
Page 4
performance of the aircraft. In particular, they were not sufficiently aware of the potential for aquaplaning and of
the importance of reverse thrust as a stopping force on water-affected runways.
Post-accident events and cabin safety issues
The main areas of damage to the aircraft were the lower forward fuselage, the nose and right wing landing gear and
landing gear bays, and the engines. Numerous cabin fittings dislodged during the accident sequence. As a result of
the nose landing gear collapsing rearwards and upwards into the lower fuselage, the cabin passenger address system
and the interphone system for communications between the flight deck and the cabin became inoperable.
No evidence of fire was found during the post-accident examination of the aircraft.
After the aircraft came to a stop, the flight crew initiated a process of gathering information from the cabin
concerning the extent of the aircraft damage. The failure of the passenger address and cabin interphone systems was
a major hindrance to the crew s efforts to assess the situation in the cabin. Some important information regarding
the cabin environment and the external condition of the aircraft did not reach the flight crew. In addition, there were
gaps in the information available to the flight crew, the possible significance of which was not considered by them
in deciding whether or not to keep the passengers on the aircraft. The captain assessed that the appropriate response
was to wait for outside assistance and then conduct a precautionary disembarkation, rather than initiate an
immediate evacuation.
Normal radio communications between the aircraft and the control tower were lost for a few minutes after the
aircraft came to a stop. Additionally, the aircraft could not be seen from the tower because of the reduced visibility
and the emergency response vehicles were restricted to sealed surfaces by the wet conditions. These issues
contributed to the emergency response vehicles arriving at the aircraft about 10 minutes after the accident.
Approximately 20 minutes after the accident, the crew initiated a precautionary disembarkation from the right side
of the aircraft using the emergency escape slides. Although the disembarkation was achieved largely without
incident, there were arguably sufficient 'unknowns' concerning the condition of the aircraft, and possible related
hazards, for an earlier evacuation to have been conducted
Page 5
Gulf Air 72 Summary

On 23 Aug 2000, at 1930 local time, Gulf Air flight GF-072 from Cairo, an airbus A320, crashed at sea 3 miles
north-east of Bahrain Airport.
GF-072 was cleared for a VOR/DME approach for Runway 12 at Bahrain. 1 nm from touchdown at an altitude 600
feet, the crew requested a left hand orbit, which ATC approved. Having flown the orbit beyond the extended centreline on a south-westerly heading, the crew initiated a missed approach. Observing the manoeuvre, the ATC offered
a Radar Vector which the crew accepted. GF-072 crossed the runway on a north-easterly heading with a shallow
climb to 1000 feet. GF-072 entered into a descent until impact. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all
143 persons on board were killed.
The Flight
The airplane had been cleared to land on Rway 12 at BAH, but crashed at sea 3 miles NE of the airport soon after
initiating a go-around following the second landing attempt. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces, and all
143 persons on board were killed. Night, VMC existed at the time of the accident. According to the cockpit voice
recorder (CVR), the captain was performing the pilot-flying (PF) duties, and the first officer was performing the
PNF duties.
At 1921:48, as GF-072 was descending through approx 14,000 feet amsl and 30 nm north-west of Bahrain,
Dammam App gave the following instruction to GF-072:
Gulf Air 072, uh, self navigation for 12 is approved. Three point five (3,500 feet) as well approved and Bahrain
Approach (127.85 MHz) approved.
Several seconds later, the captain asked, Gulf Air 072, confirm we can go for 12? Dammam App responded,
Affirmative. Three approves (approvals) you have. Direct for one two (Runway 12). Three point five (3,500 feet)
approved. (127.85 MHz) approved.
The CVR then recorded the captain instructing the first officer to contact Bahrain Approach. After the first officer
made contact, Bahrain Approach stated, cleared (for) self position and, uh, as youre cleared by Dhahran.
Confirm 3,500 feet.
The CVR then recorded the captain telling the first officer, tell them we are cleared to 7,000 feet. The first officer
complied and Bahrain Approach responded again to flight GF-072 to continue descent to 3,500 feet.
After the flight-crew began executing the approach checklist, Bahrain Approach instructed GF-072 At 1923:21 to
continue descent to 1,500 feet and report when established on the VOR/DME for Runway 12.
At 1923:36, the CVR recorded the first officer asking, V bugs? and the captain responded, V bugs, 136, 206
knots, set.
At 1924:38, the CVR recorded the captain saying to the first officer, Now you see you have to be ready, for all this,
okay? If (it) change on you all of a sudden, you dont say Ill go. You have to know DME. If you can make it or
not. Okay? This was followed by another comment by the captain, Now, Ive just changed all the flight plan,
RADNAV, everything for you, before you even blink. Yeah? Okay Ammy?
At 1925:15, with the airplane 9 nm from Runway 12, 1873 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 313 knots, the captain
stated, final descent is seven DME.
At 1925:37, with the airplane 7.7 nm from Runway 12, 1715 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 272 knots, the captain
instructed the first officer to call established.
At 1925:45, 7 nm from the runway, Bahrain Approach cleared GF-072 for the VOR/DME approach to Runway 12
and instructed the flight to contact Bahrain Tower.
At 1926:00, the CVR recorded the captain saying, final green,
At 1926:04 the first officer contacted Bahrain Tower and stated that GF-072 was eight DME, established. Tower
controller then cleared GF-072 to land and reported wind from 090 degrees at eight knots. The first officer
acknowledged the transmission.
At 1926:13, with the airplane 5.2 nm from the runway, 1678 feet AGL, and an airspeed of 224 knots, the captain
called for flaps one. Seconds later, the captain called for gear down, and FDR data subsequently showed the
landing gear moving to the gear-down position.
At 1926:37, the CVR recorded the captain stating, Okay, visual with airfield. Seconds later, FDR data showed
the autopilot and flight director being disengaged.
At 1926:49 and 2.9 nm from the runway, the airplane descended through 1,000 feet AGL.
At 1926:51, with the airplane 2.8 nm from the runway, 976 feet AGL, and 207 knots, the captain stated, Have to
be established by five hundred feet. Flaps two were then selected. As the flight continued on its approach for
Runway 12, the captain stated at 1927:06 and again at 1927:13, .were not going to make it.
Page 6
At 1927:23, the captain instructed the first officer to Tell him to do a 360 left (orbit). The first officer complied
and the request was approved by Bahrain Tower. The left turn was initiated 0.9 nm from the runway, 584 feet AGL,
and an airspeed of 177 knots. During the airplanes left turn, FDR data showed the flap configuration going from
flaps two to flaps three and then to flaps full.
At 1928:17, the captain called for landing checklist.
At 1928:28, with the airplane approximately half-way through the left turn, the first officer stated, landing
checklist completed. After three-fourths of the 360 turn, the airplane rolled out to wings level. FDR data showed
that the airplanes altitude during the left turn ranged from 965 feet to 332 feet AGL, and that the airplanes bank
angle reached a maximum of 36 degrees.
At 1928:57, after being cleared again by Bahrain Tower to land on Runway 12, the captain stated, we overshot
it. FDR data then showed the airplane beginning to turn left again, followed by changes consistent with an increase
in engine thrust.
At 1929:07, the captain stated, tell him going around and FDR data indicated an increase to maximum TOGA
engine thrust. Bahrain Tower responded with, I can see that. 072 sir uh.would you like radar vectors.for final
again? The first officer accepted, and Bahrain Tower instructed the crew to, fly heading 300, climb (to) 2,500
feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. During this time, the flaps were moved to position three
and the gear was selected up. FDR data showed that the gear remained retracted until the end of the recording.
At 1929:41, with the airplane at 1054 feet AGL, at an airspeed of 191 knots, and having just crossed over the
runway, the CVR recorded the beginning of a 14-second interval of the aural Master Warning 11 (consistent with a
flap-overspeed condition), followed by the statement from the first officer, speed, overspeed limit
Approximately two seconds after the beginning of the Master Warning, FDR data indicated a forward movement of
the captains side stick. The captains side stick was held forward of the neutral position for approximately 11
seconds, with a maximum forward deflection of 9.7 degrees reached. During this time, the airplanes pitch attitude
decreased from 5 degrees nose-up to 15.5 degrees nose-down, the recorded vertical acceleration decreased from
+1.0 G to +0.5 Gs, and the airspeed increased from 193 knots to 234 knots.
At 1929:51, with the airplane descending through 1004 feet AGL at an airspeed of 221 knots, the CVR recorded a
single aural warning of sink rate from the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), followed by the repetitive
GPWS aural warning whoop whoop, pull up, which continued until the end of the recording.
At 1929:52, the captain requested, flaps up.
At 1929:54, the CVR indicated that the Master Warning ceased for about 1 second, but then began again and lasted
about 3 seconds. Approximately 2 seconds after the GPWS warnings began, FDR data indicated movement of the
captains side stick aft of the neutral position, with a maximum aft deflection of approximately 11.7 degrees
reached. However, the FDR data showed that this nose-up command was not maintained and that subsequent
movements never exceeded 50% of full-aft availability. FDR data indicated no movement from the first officers
side stick throughout the approach and accident sequence.
At 1929:59, the captain requests, flaps all the way and the first officer responded, zero. This was the last
comment from the crew recorded on the CVR, which stopped recording at 1930:02. The FDR data showed
continuous movement of the flap position toward the zero position after the captains flaps up command. The last
flap position recorded on the FDR was 2 degrees of extension. The last recorded pitch attitude was 6 degrees nosedown and last recorded airspeed was 282 knots. FDR data indicated that TOGA selection and corresponding
maximum engine thrust remained until the end of the recording. FDR data indicated that during the go-around after
selection of TOGA thrust, GF-072 was initially at a 9 degree nose-up pitch attitude. However, the pitch attitude
gradually decreased to 5 degrees nose-up over the next 25 seconds, where it remained until the captains forward
sidestick commands resulted in nose-down pitch changes.
Note: All information collated from, official accident investigation findings on the Bahrain Airport Official Website
Page 7
American Airlines Flight 1420 Little Rock

American Airlines Flight 1420 crashed after it overran the end of the runway at Little Rock, Arkansas, during a
breaking thunderstorm on the night of June 1999. Many of the 139 passengers and 6 crew on the flight where
injured and the Captain and 10 passengers died in the accident.
The weather conditions were appalling. The official investigations review of the meteorological data showed 46
lightning strikes occurred within five miles of the centre of the airport in the five-minute period leading up to the
crash.
Witnesses reported torrential rain, strong gusty winds and intermittent golf ball-sized hail.
Flight 1420s departure was more than two hours late from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in Texas,
because bad weather had delayed the arrival of the aircraft intended for the flight.
The first officer was concerned. He notified gate agents that the flight would need to depart by 2316 because of
duty time limitations. He then telephoned the flight dispatcher to suggest he get another aircraft for the flight, or
cancel it.
Another aircraft was substituted, and the flight departed at 2240.
Shortly after departure, the flight crew received a warning indicating that the weather around Little Rock might be a
factor during the arrival. The dispatcher suggested the flight crew expedite the arrival to beat the thunderstorms if
possible.
At 2304, another weather advisory (SIGMET) was issued for an area of severe thunderstorms that included the
Little Rock airport area.
The cockpit voice recorder indicated that the flight crew discussed the weather and the need to expedite the
approach.
About 2325 the captain (flying) said, we got to get over there quick. Five seconds later, the first officer said, I
dont like that lightning.
The flight crew had the city of Little Rock airport area in sight about 2327. When the crew contacted Little Rock air
traffic control seven minutes later, the controller advised that a thunderstorm northwest of the airport was moving
through the area and that the wind was gusting to 44kts.
About 2339 the controller notified flight 1420 of a windshear alert. The flight crew then asked for a change of
runway to ensure a headwind during landing.
After the crew advised the controller that they had lost visual contact with the airport, they were cleared for an
instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 04R.
At 2347:53, seconds after the captain called for landing gear down, the controller issued a second windshear alert.
The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission.
According to the cockpit voice recorder, at 2350 the first officer said, Were way off. One second later the captain
said, I cant see it. Three seconds afterward, the first officer asked, got it? to which the captain replied, Yeah, I
got it. Flight data indicated the aircraft touched down on the runway about 2350:20.
Four seconds after touchdown the first officer stated, Were sliding. Flight data indicates that over a seven-second
period after touchdown, both thrust reversers were deployed. The spoilers did not deploy symmetrically at
touchdown, but a momentary eight degree deflection of the left outboard flight spoiler concurrent with a left aileron
deflection was recorded.
At 2350:36, flight data indicated a full 60 degree deployment of the right inboard flight spoiler, concurrent with a
full aileron deflection.
The aircraft was swerving out of control as it careered down runway 4R. It crashed through a chain fence and a
metal ILS structure and pitched over an embankment, before coming to rest at the edge of the Arkansas River.
Tragedy: There on the rivers marshy banks, the smoking MD-82 lay broken in pieces, while passengers and crew,
many of them injured, scrambled to safety through exits and fissures in the hull.
From the wrecked cockpit of the aircraft, the co-pilot called American Airlines operations centre with his cell
phone. Flight 1420 had crashed. His captain lay dead next to him. Ten passengers had died in the crash and 110
people were injured. In the control tower the controller was making frantic efforts to contact the flight crew. In the
poor conditions, he could not see the aircraft and requested Flight 1420 report that it was clear of the runway. There
was no response. He tried five times over the next two minutes, before alerting rescue and fire fighting units that
Flight 1420 was down on runway 4R.
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All three fire trucks went to the approach end of runway 4R. Eight minutes later, fire truck two called the tower to
report the aircraft was not there. Should they sweep the runway? After a five second delay, the controller sent them
to the departure end of 4R where they located the aircraft.
The delayed emergency response was among several factors investigators examined during a 28-month inquiry into
the crash by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The NTSB found the delayed emergency response was a result of a communication failure between the tower
controller and the rescue response team. The team was directed by the tower controller to go to the end of runway
4R which they interpreted as going to the 4R painted on the runway. The misunderstanding took them away from
the crash site.
The Safety Board considered whether a shorter rescue response time could have prevented any fatalities, but
concluded passenger lives would not have been saved if emergency responders had arrived on the scene earlier.
The NTSB report recommended annual briefings between airport tower and fire and rescue personnel, to ensure
they had a common understanding of the local airport emergency plan.
Investigators found the immediate reason the aeroplane roared off the far end of runway 4R was the crews failure
to arm the spoilers prior to landing. In the 26 seconds between touchdown and flight data recorder shut-off, there is
no indication that the crew took belated action to manually deploy the spoilers.
Procedures: The investigation also found American Airlines procedures regarding spoiler operation at the time of
the accident, differed from other carriers operating DC-9/MD-80/MD-90 series aircraft.
At American, the practice was for the pilot not flying to arm the spoilers by moving the handle on the centre
console to the armed position, and then moving the appropriate switch on the carriers mechanical landing checklist
to indicate that the spoilers had been armed.
The process did not require a verbal call-out and read-back between both pilots, the practice at other carriers. Nor
was a positive call-out of spoiler deployment required at American, as it was at other carriers operating the same
type of aircraft.
NTSB investigators found a variance between practices taught during simulator training sessions, and actual
practice flying the line. In simulator training, the pilot not flying would arm the spoilers, but during actual flight
operations where the captain was the pilot flying, the captain would often arm the spoilers, as the handle is on the
left side of the console.
The pilot not flying might not notice, due to the absence of a requirement for positive verbal dual-confirmation that
the spoilers were armed. Flight crews should verbally confirm arming of the spoilers, and conduct a call-out of
spoiler deployment after touchdown.
Without spoilers, Flight 1420 was doomed to overrun. The aircraft touched down about 2,000ft from the threshold
of the 7,200ft runway. As the pilot flying, the captain had elected to use manual brakes, but delayed using them
until 11 seconds after touchdown. He made aggressive use of reverse thrust, exceeding the maximum 1.3 engine
pressure ratio (EPR) authorised for landing on wet runways.
Overrun: In a last minute effort to maintain control, as the aeroplane swerved down the runway, the right engine
recorded a maximum 1.9 EPR, and the left hit 1.7 EPR. Because the spoilers were not deployed, the aircraft could
not stop in time.
Computer simulations showed if the spoilers had been used, even with an 11 second delay in braking and the use of
reverse thrust as actually recorded during the incident, the aeroplane could have been stopped with about 700ft to
spare.
Investigators were also concerned that the landing was attempted at all in the face of the severe thunderstorms
moving across the airfield. Flight 1420 flew into a wall of thunderstorms on its final descent to runway 4R
Comments on the cockpit voice recorder indicate that the flight crew was aware of the weather and wanted to
expedite the arrival. However, the cockpit voice recorder did not contain any discussion about the possibility of
holding to allow the storm to pass or diverting to one of the alternative aerodromes.
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1. 10 people slipped out from the tail cone just

ahead of toxic smoke.
2. At least three people escaped through a partially
buckled gallery door.
3. Passenger In seat 27E died.
4. Flames made escape through the emergency
exit over the left wing treacherous but several
made it.
5. Many people escaped through the right over
wing emergency exit before flames engulfed the
area.
6. Four people crawled out after the aircraft broke
apart. Five others near them perished.
7. Passengers in seat 17A, seat 18A, seat l8B, seat
1YD and seat 19A perished.
8. Passenger in seat 19B died
9. Several people crawled through a fissure 18
inches wide, falling loft to the ground.
10. Passenger n seat 3A died
11.The pilot died when the left side of the cockpit
took a direct hit from a steel pole
12. The crash ripped out the left side of first class,
leaving an opening of mangled metal through
which more than 30 people escaped.
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of airline thunderstorm penetrations published just two days after
the crash at Little Rock, found pilots were more likely to penetrate convective weather when they were:
Near the destination airport rather than further away.
Following another aircraft.
More than 15 minutes behind where they ought to be, based on the nominal flying time scheduled for the
trip.
Flying after dark.
Factors: Three of these four factors were present in the case of Flight 1420. The flight was more than two hours late
departing, it was dark, and the convective weather blanketed the airport and its immediate surroundings.
Investigators believe the final approach to runway 4R should have been aborted. Among the many reasons they
cited, was the aircrafts unstabilised approach. Twenty seconds before touchdown the first officer (not flying)
remarked, Were way off.
The final flap setting to 40 degrees, which should have been completed as the aeroplane descended through 1,000ft
above ground level (AGL), was not completed until 900ft AGL. Nor was the aeroplane on a proper flight path for
imminent landing, as shown by the computerised reconstruction of the final descent, and by the first officers belief
that the aircraft was not stabilised for landing at 400ft AGL. Among its nearly 40 conclusions, the NTSB said, It is
imperative that air carriers have specific approach criteria
Fatigue: The crash occurred after the crew had been on duty for 13.5 hours, and awake for more than 16 hours.
Flight 1420 was the end of the first day of a three-day sequence for the flight crew.
As the aeroplane descended for landing at Little Rock, first on Runway 22L, then on Runway 4R, the crews
apprehensions about the situation mounted. They became task fixated as a result of fatigue and stress. Despite
having plenty of fuel to abort the landing, they painted themselves into a corner.
Evan Bryne, a human factors expert with the NTSB, cited three examples of fatigue at work in the events leading to
the accident:
Checklist improper execution of the pre-landing checklist, in which the spoilers were not armed, possibly due to
the forgetfulness, distraction and inattention to detail that are some of the effects of fatigue.
Recall the momentary confusion of the final flap setting before landing. Twelve seconds after the crew had
descended through 1,000 feet, the first officer said:
Want 40 flaps? when the flaps were set to 28 degrees. The captain replied: Oh yeah, I thought I called it.
Failure to confirm that the landing gear was down and locked is another indication of forgetfulness aggravated by
fatigue. The captain commanded gear down at 1147:44, but positive confirmation, as required by the carriers
procedures, was never given.
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Information processing Byrne pointed to a readback error regarding wind direction as a further suggestion that
fatigue was at work. Little Rock tower told the crew that the wind was ~three five zero, gusts four five i.e. 3Okt,
gusting to 45kt from a direction of 350 degrees.
The First Officer replied zero three zero at four five 330 rather than 350 degrees. It is possible the first officer
momentarily confused wind speed which was reported at 30kt, for wind direction. The tower controller should have
corrected the error in acknowledgement, but this was not done.
Perhaps an even greater indication of fatigue was the extensive discussion between the pilots about the crosswind
limits for landing.
At 1147:22, the runway visual range was reported as 3,000ft, with crosswinds of more than 30kt. The captain
declared, We cant land on that? He was correct the company crosswind limit was 20kt.
About 50 seconds later, the tower controller advised that the runway visual range was now just 1,600ft. Declaring,
Were established on final the captain continued the approach.
Conclusion:
The NTSB concluded that the probable causes of the accident were the flight crews failure to
discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms moved into the airport area, and the crews failure to ensure
that the spoilers had extended after touchdown.
Contributing to the accident where:
The flight crews impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the
intent to land under the circumstances.
Continuation of the approach to a landing when the companys maximum crosswind component was exceeded.
Use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ration after landing.
In the wake of the Little Rock disaster, American Airlines and Little Rock National Airport have started making
important safety changes to minimise the chances of another such accident. American now offers its pilots fatigue
countermeasure programs and pilots have the right to refuse a flight if they feel fatigue is stopping them from
performing to the best of their ability.
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AA965 Cali Accident Report

NEAR CALI, COLOMBIA, DECEMBER 20, 1995
History of Flight
At 2142 (est) on December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965 (AA965), a Boeing 757-223, on a
regularly scheduled passenger flight from Miami to Cali, Colombia, operating under instrument flight rules
(IFR), crashed into mountainous terrain during a descent from cruise altitude in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC). The accident site was near the town of Buga, 33 miles northeast of the Cali VOR
(CLO). The airplane impacted at about 8,900 feet mean sea level (msl), near the summit of El Deluvio
and approximately 10 miles east of Airway W3. Of the 155 passengers, 2 flightcrew members, and 6
cabincrew members on board, 4 passengers survived the accident.
Both the captain and first officer were in his office about 40 minutes before the required check-in time,
and appeared to be in good spirits.
According to the AA flight dispatcher at MIA, AA965 was delayed about 34 minutes, waiting for the arrival
of connecting passengers and baggage. The flight departed the gate at 1714, and then experienced
another ground delay of 1 hour 21 minutes that the flight dispatcher stated was related to gate
congestion due to airport traffic. AA965 departed MIA at 1835, with an estimated time enroute to Cali of 3
hour 12 minutes.
AA965 was cleared to climb to flight level (FL) 370 [3]. The route of flight was from MIA through Cuban
airspace, then through Jamaican airspace, and into Colombian airspace, where the flight was cleared to
fly direct from BUTAL to the Tulua VOR (ULQ)
At 2103, AA965 Bogota Center again cleared the flight from its present position to ULQ, and told the
flight to report when they were ready to descend. At 2110, AA965 communicated via ACARS with AA's
System Operations Control (SOC) center, asking for weather information at Cali. At 2111, Cali weather
was reported as clear, visibility greater than 10 kilometers, and scattered clouds. At 2126:16, AA965
requested descent clearance. The flight was initially cleared to FL 240 and then to FL 200. At 2134:04,
the flight was instructed to contact Cali Approach Control (Approach).
AA965 contacted Approach at 2134:40. The captain, making the radio transmissions said, "Cali
approach, American nine six five." The approach controller replied, "American niner six five, good
evening. go ahead." The captain stated, "ah, buenos noches senor, American nine six five leaving two
three zero, descending to two zero zero. go ahead sir." The controller asked, "the uh, distance DME from
Cali?" The captain replied, "the DME is six three." The controller then stated, "roger, is cleared to Cali
VOR, uh, descend and maintain one, fve thousand feet. altimeter three zero zero two.... no delay expect
for approach. report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "OK, understood. cleared direct to Cali VOR.
uh, report Tulua and altitude one five, that's fifteen thousand three zero.. zero.. two. is that all correct
sir?" The controller stated, "affirmative." The captain replied at 2135:27, "Thank you. At 2135:28, the
captain informed the first officer that he had "...put direct Cali for you in there."
At 2136:31, Approach asked AA965, "sir the wind is calm. are you able to [execute the] approach [to]
runway one niner? ( "VOR DME Rwy 19" and "ILS RWY 01") The captain responded, "uh yes sir, we'll
need a lower altitude right away though." The approach controller then stated, "roger. American nine six
five is cleared to VOR DME approach runway one niner. Rozo number one, arrival. report Tulua VOR."
The captain, replied, "cleared the VOR DME to one nine, Rozo one arrival. will report the VOR, thank
you sir." The controller stated, "report uh, Tulua VOR." The captain replied, "report Tulua."
At 2137:29, AA965 asked Approach, "can American airlines uh, nine six five go direct to Rozo and then
do the Rozo arrival sir?" The Cali approach controller replied, "affirmative. take the Rozo one and runway
one niner, the wind is calm." The captain responded, "alright Rozo, the Rozo one to one nine, thank you,
American nine six five." The controller stated, "(thank you very much) [8].... report Tulua and e'eh, twenty
one miles ah, five thousand feet." The captain responded, "OK, report Tulua twenty one miles and five
thousand feet, American nine uh, six five."
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At 2137, after passing ULQ , during the descent, the airplane began to turn to the left of the cleared
course and flew on an easterly heading for approximately one minute. Then the airplane turned to the
right, while still in the descent. At 2139:25, Morse code for the letters "VC" was recorded by navigation
radio onto the airplane's CVR. At 2139:29, Morse code similar to the letters "ULQ" was recorded. At
2140:01, the captain asked Approach, "and American uh,
thirty eight miles north of Cali, and you want us to go Tulua and then do the Rozo uh, to uh, the runway,
right to runway one nine?" The controller answered, "...you can [unintelligible word] landed, runway one
niner, you can use runway one niner. what is (you) altitude and (the) DME from Cali?" The flight
responded, "OK, we're thirty seven DME at ten thousand feet." The controller stated at 2140:25, "roger.
report (uh) five thousand and uh, final to one one, runway one niner."
The CVR recorded the flightcrew's conversations as well as radio transmissions. At 2140:40, the captain
stated, "it's that [expletive] Tulua I'm not getting for some reason. see I can't get. OK now, no. Tulua's
[expletive] up." At 2140:49 the captain said, "but I can put it in the box if you want it." The first officer
replied, "I don't want Tulua. let's just go to the extended centerline of uh...." The captain stated, "which is
Rozo." At 2140:56, the captain stated, "why don't you just go direct to Rozo then, alright?" The first
officer replied, "OK, let's...The captain said, "I'm goin' to put that over you." The first officer replied, "...get
some altimeters, we'er out of uh, ten now."
At 2141:02, Cali Approach requested the flight's altitude. The flight replied, "nine six five, nine thousand
feet." The controller then asked at 2141: 10, "roger, distance now?" The flightcrew did not respond to the
controller. At 2141:15, the CVR recorded from the cockpit area microphone the mechanical voice and
sounds of the airplane's ground proximity warning system (GPWS), "terrain, terrain, whoop, whoop." The
captain stated, "Oh [expletive]," and a sound similar to autopilot disconnect warning began. The captain
said, "...pull up baby." The mechanical voice and sound continued, "...pull up, whoop, whoop, pull up."
The FDR showed that the flightcrew added full power and raised the nose of the airplane, the spoilers
(speedbrakes) that had been extended during the descent were not retracted. The airplane entered into
the regime of stick shaker stall warning, nose up attitude was lowered slightly, the airplane came out of
stick shaker warning, nose up attitude then increased and stick shaker was re-entered. The CVR ended
at 2141 :28.
The wreckage path and FDR data evidenced that the airplane was on a magnetic heading of 223
degrees, nose up, and wings approximately level, as it struck trees at about 8,900 feet msl on the east
side of El Deluvio. The airplane continued over a ridge near the summit and impacted and burned on the
west side of the mountain.
When entering navaid information into the database, the navaid identifier is used as the key identifier.
This means that the letter R is the default value for the Romeo NDB and the Rozo NDB. Since the
Bogota city and airport is larger than Cali, the larger airports are entered sequentially at the beginning to
satisfy the greatest amount of users. The letter R was entered for the Romeo NDB as the "key" to the
navaid. Therefore, when using most FMSs, entering the letter R when in Colombia will call up the Romeo
NDB since it is the identifier for the Romeo NDB.
When the Rozo NDB was entered into the database, the letter R was attempted, but the computer
rejected the letter R since it had already been used for the Romeo NDB. According to the ARINC 424
standards, when a duplicate exists, the name of the NDB can be used as the identifier for entry into the
database. In the case of Rozo, since the name is four letters or less, the complete name of Rozo was
used as the identifier.
Simulations found that when R was entered into the CDU, a white dashed line pointed off the map
display towards the east-northeast. When R was "executed," the airplane turned towards R (in the City of
Bogota) and the white dashed line turned to a solid magenta colored line on the display.
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Page 14
Air Inter Strasbourg A320 accident.

Following an uneventful flight from Lyons the crew prepared for a descent and approach to Strasbourg. At first the
crew asked for an ILS approach to runway 26 followed by a visual circuit to land on runway 05. This was not
possible because of departing traffic from runway 26. The Strasbourg controllers then gave flight 148 radar
guidance to ANDLO at 11DME from the Strasbourg VORTAC. Altitude over ANDLO was 5000ft. After ANDLO the
VOR/DME approach profile calls for a 5.5% slope (3.3deg angle of descent) to the Strasbourg VORTAC. While
trying to program the angle of descent, "-3.3", into the Flight Control Unit (FCU) the crew did not notice that it was in
HDG/V/S (heading/vertical speed) mode. In vertical speed mode "-3.3" means a descent rate of 3300ft/min. In
TRK/FPA (track/flight path angle) mode this would have meant a (correct) -3.3deg descent angle. A -3.3deg
descent angle corresponds with an 800ft/min rate of descent. The Vosges mountains near Strasbourg were in
clouds above 2000ft, with tops of the layer reaching about 6400ft when flight 148 started descending from ANDLO.
At about 3nm from ANDLO the aircraft struck trees and impacted a 2710ft high ridge at the 2620ft level. Because
the aircraft was not GPWS-equipped, the crew were not warned.
CTRL = Strasbourg ATC

PF = Captain (Pilot Flying)
PNF = First Officer (Pilot Non-Flying)
Source Contents
PNF I don't understand why you do not try a zero-five VOR DME after all
PF Because the zero five VOR DME, we've got to arrive here, leave, go to God knows where, and come back
again (*)
PNF Ah, yes, OK
PF If not, it's necessary to go out to 11 STR, that makes eleven, 22 miles means another 10 minutes' flight (*) (*)
PNF Sierra Echo identified
PF I'v set you the return track to STR eh, ... zero-five-zero
PNF OK
PF We'll do the pre-descent procedure
PNF (*)
PF I doesn't matter
PNF I'm ready
PF Pre-descend checklist
PNF ECAM status checked. Speed bugs
PF They are set
PNF Standby altimeter
PF One thousand and twenty-three
PNF One thousand and twenty-three, altimeter (*) checked. Engine anti-ice
PF To OFF
PNF FMGS parameters inserted and the harnesses
PF (*)
PNF Checklist completed. We descend in one minute, it's OK?
PF In one-and-a-half minutes, two minutes, we've enough time
PNF Air Inter one four eight Delta Alpha we'd like to descend in one minute
CTRL Delta Alpha descend level one hundred thrity
PNF To one hundred thrity, we'll descend Delta Alpha
CTRL Delta Alpha heading to ANDLO
PNF Heading to ANDLO correct?
CTRL Affirmative
PF To?
PNF ANDLO
PF ANDLO, oh there, they are a nuisance (*)
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha what's your heading to ANDLO?
PNF Our heading is zero fifty three to ANDLO
CTRL Delta Alpha, maintain heading zero fifty-three until further advised
PNF We'll maintain until further advised. Ah, I say, Reims, their control there (*) that one goes to Epinal
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue descent to level seventy
PNF Continuing descent to seventy Delta Alpha
PF There we're of. Idle open
PNF Idle open descent
CA Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our descent. We ask you to please return to your seats. Thank you
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha the level on descent
Page 15
PNF (*) one fifty descending to seventy Delta Alpha

CTRL Delta Alpha received, no more restrictions on heading, contact Strasbourg one twenty dot seven. Goodbye
PNF No more restrictions on heading one twenty seven, Strasbourg approach, good day. Air inter one hundred
forty-eight Delta Alpha
CTRL One hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, good day. Proceed to ANDLO. Your distance?
PF (*)
PNF Yes ANDLO, and we are at twenty-two nautical DME from STR
CTRL Received, continue the descent to five thousand feet QNH one thousand twenty-three call ANDLO five
thousand feet
PNF Five thousand feet, thousand twenty-three, we'll call ANDLO five thousand
PNF There one thousand...
PF And sixty (*).
PF Safety height twenty-two. OK it's alright... five thousand two hundred feet ... twenty one ... OK it's good.
PNF (*)
PF One thousand and five ... we'll do the procedure at two thousand ... initial approach (*) eleven thousand
twohundred feet now.
PNF OK.
PF TOP
PNF No. Eleven thousand feet, one thousand five..one thousand five not one thousand eight
PF Yes it's one thousand eight
PNF One thousand twenty-three that makesone thousand five.
PF One thousand five?
PNF For Delta Alpha, you confirm Fox Echo one thousand five, zero five correct?
CTRL The Fox Echo is one thousand five, zero five and QNH one thousand twenty-three
PNF Thank you Sir. One thousand five. Ten thousand four hundred...
PF Ten thousand four hundred feet ready, now
PNF It's correct. it's OK. Checklist initial approach Baro ref altimeters set compared. Seatbelts ON.
PF It's set
PNF Engine anti-ice OFF for the moment (*)
PF No
PNF Marker selected to listen on righthand side. Engine mode selector set to normal. Checklist completed
PF We're passing ANDLO
PNF We're passing ANDLO, Air Inter Delta Alpha, level ... er! Sorry seven thousand five hundred feet, descending.
CTRL Received one hundred forty-eight Delta Alpha, you are number one for te VOR DME zero five, call passing
the VOR in final
PNF Number one for the VOR DME zero five
PNF We could ask him to confirm the cloud base now... how many miles?
PF Ten miles. It's not going to work, tell him, we'll make a ...
PNF Yes, 'maxi maxi'. Confirm cloud base Strasbourg?
CTRL We have three-eighths at elevenhundred feet and six-eighths at two thousand six hundred feet
PF That's good
PNF Yeah, we planned to proceed Sierra Echo, do an ILS, then an indirect for zero five.
PF [Chime] (*)
CTRL Received Delta Alpha
PF What's the temperature?
PNF The temperature...?
CTRL Delta Alpha, initially maintain five thousand, QNH, one thousand twenty three and as there will be three
takeoffs on zero five, you may have to hold in the stack at five thousand feet.
PF We'll have to go back to doing a VOR DME procedure ... then ...
PNF We'll go back to the VOR DME procedure at this time then
CTRL OK
PF We would not have made an India Mike descent like that of they had told us beforehand, but there we are, we're
arriving flat out
CTRL Delta Alpha ... Strasbourg
PNF I'm listening to you
CTRL If you want I can take you on the radar to bring ou to ANDLO at five thousand
PF Er! Yeah, that's good
PNF Yes
CTRL OK! Then six one zero zero, turn left heading two hundred thirty
PNF Sixty-one zero zero and heading two hundred thirty to the left
CTRL There you are, that will save you time
PF (*)
PNF Thank you
? I'll give you zero five (*)
Page 16
CTRL Maintain five thousand on reaching it and until ANDLO, the QNH is one thousand twenty three
PNF QNH one thousand twenty-three, maintaining five thousand.
PF The distances there ... er! ... Ah yes, there (*) overhead the 250 moving out to eleven STR, we repass ANDLO
on the track and we leave at eleven STR .. 4500 feet, nine STR, 3800, seven, three,two hundred. In case of go
around we climb on the centreline
CTRL Delta Alpha, six nautical radial two hundred ninety for Strasbourg
PNF Received Delta Alpha
PF The coud-break is made on zero fifty. It's a slope of 3 point five er! five point five ... That is three (*) three.
PF We'll select anti-ice (*).
PF And the lot, the wings as well.
PNF Yes
PF What's up?
PNF It's nice and new, but that's what's wrong
PF Yes, yes, there is ice on it.
PF It's crazy, eh? When you're not ready the time it takes to get to five thousand feet to ANDLO flat out. It doesn't
work eh? And also at ... what ... ten miles from final.
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha turn left (*) heading ninety, zero nine zero
PNF Heading ninety, zero nine zero to the left Delta Alpha
PF Flaps to one
PNF Flaps to one. (*) One
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha continue left turn to establish yourself on zero fifty one, you are four miles from ANDLO,
passing left of ANDLO
PF OK
PNF Received, we will call established on QDM zero fifty one
CTRL Affirmative sir
PNF We will (*) (*)
PNF Il aurait fallu qu'tu ouvres au zero sept zero
PF Yeah, yeah
PNF At least
CTRL Air Inter Delta Alpha passing right of ANDLO, authorized (*) final approach VOR DME zero five
PNF Delta Alpha
PF Flaps to two
PNF Flaps to two, (*) two
PF Gear down
PNF I'll prepare the lights without putting them on
CTRL Delta Alpha call the VOR on final
PF OK
PNF Call the VOR on final (*) pass eight hundred feet
PF (*)
PNF On centerline. (*) Half a dot from centerline. There is is, it had been at sixty, it's good, you see here
[Two hundred] - radio altimeter callout
End of Recording
Follow-up / safety actions:
As a result of this accident Airbus made some design improvements to the FCU giving the digital VS mode read-out
4 digits and the FPA read-out just 2. Furthermore, 34 safety recommendations were issued by the French
BEACockpit voice recorder transcript of the February 20, 1992 accident of Air Inter Flight 148, an Airbus A320 near
Strasbourg (France).
Page 17
Swissair 111 Investigation Report - Executive Summary

The following is an executive summary of the report by the Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSB) into the accident involving Swissair Flight 111 near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, on
the night of 2 September 1998. The aircraft, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 with 215 passengers
and 14 crew members on board, was on a scheduled flight from New York to Geneva
Summary of Occurrence
About 53 minutes after departure, while flying at Flight Level 330 (about 33,000 feet), the flight
crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. A small amount of smoke became visible in the
cockpit; then, it is likely that the smoke stopped entering the cockpit for an undetermined length of
time. The flight crew assessed that there was an anomaly associated with the air conditioning
system.
After conversing with air traffic services, the flight crew decided to divert to the Halifax
International Airport in Nova Scotia, Canada. While the flight crew was preparing for the landing
in Halifax, they were unaware that a fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the
aircraft.
About 13 minutes after the abnormal odour was first detected, the aircraft's flight data recorder
began to record a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. The flight crew declared
an emergency and indicated a need to land immediately. About one minute later, radio
communications and secondary radar contact with the aircraft were lost, and the flight recorders
stopped functioning. About five and one-half minutes later, at 10:31 p.m. Atlantic daylight saving
time (ADT), the aircraft crashed into the ocean about five nautical miles southwest of Peggy's
Cove, Nova Scotia, Canada. The aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors.
Summary of Findings and Board Recommendations
Approximately 98 per cent of the aircraft, measured by weight, was recovered. From the
examination of the pieces of wreckage, it was determined that a fire had occurred in the forward,
overhead area of the aircraft. Portions of the front section of the aircraft were reconstructed to
allow a thorough analysis of potential ignition sources, and to assess how the fire propagated.
It was determined that the fire most likely started from an electrical arcing event that occurred
above the ceiling on the right side of the cockpit near the cockpit rear wall. The arcing event
ignited the flammable cover material on nearby metallized polyethylene terephthalate (MPET)
covering on the thermal acoustic insulation blankets. As the fire spread across the surface of the
insulation blankets, other flammable materials became involved, including silicone elastomeric
end caps, hook-and-loop fasteners, foams, adhesives, thermal acoustic insulation splicing tapes,
and metallized polyvinyl fluoride (MPVF) insulation blanket cover material. The fire progression
was rapid, and involved a combination of these materials that together sustained and propagated
the fire.
Material Flammability
The Board concluded that aircraft certification standards for material flammability were
inadequate, in that they allowed the use of materials that could be ignited and sustain or
propagate fire
Initial Wire Arcing
Reconstruction of the wreckage indicated that a segment of arced electrical cable associated with
the in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) had been located in the area where the fire most likely
originated. The Board concluded that the arc on this electrical cable was likely associated with the
fire initiation event. The Board also concluded that it is likely that one or more additional wires
were involved in the lead arcing event, and that the additional wire or wires could have been
either IFEN or aircraft wires. Therefore, it could not be concluded that the known arcing event on
the IFEN cable located in the area where the fire most likely originated was by itself the lead
event.
During the course of the investigation, in efforts to find and eliminate potential ignition sources in
MD-11 aircraft, more than 70 Airworthiness Directives have been promulgated by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). These airworthiness directives required various measures to be
taken, such as one-time inspections of wires and electrical components, primarily in the front
ceiling area of the aircraft.
During the lead arcing event, the associated circuit breaker or breakers did not trip. The Board
concluded that, although the type of circuit breakers used in the aircraft, including those used for
the IFEN, were similar to those in general aircraft use, the circuit breakers were not capable of
protecting against all types of wire arcing events. The Board recommended that a certification test
regime be mandated that evaluates aircraft electrical wire failure characteristics under realistic
operating conditions, and against specified performance criteria, with the goal of mitigating
against the risk of igniting nearby flammable material.
There was no information available to indicate that the SR 111 crew reset circuit breakers.
However, during the course of the investigation, it became evident that the circuit breaker
Page 18
resetting philosophy and procedures varied considerably among manufacturers, operators, flight
crews, and maintenance personnel throughout the industry. While considerable standardization
has taken place during the course of the investigation, the Board is calling for clearer guidance
from regulators.
Fire Detection and Suppression
Airflow patterns in the aircraft and fire propagation scenarios were analyzed to assess cues that
may have been available to the pilots during the early stages of the fire. It was determined that
the small amount of odour and smoke first noticed by the pilots originated from a small creeping
fire propagating aft from the area of the initial ignition, toward the area above the forward
passenger cabin ceiling.
As the fire propagated aft, it is likely that the associated smoke temporarily stopped migrating
forward into the cockpit. As the aircraft was not required to be equipped with built-in fire detection
in the hidden area where the fire was located, the pilots were not alerted to the presence of the
fire. The Board concluded that the actions by the flight crew in preparing the aircraft for landing,
including their decisions to have the passenger cabin readied for landing and to dump fuel, were
consistent with them being unaware that an on-board fire was under way. A theoretical descent
profile calculation, conducted by the TSB during the investigation, confirmed that, because of the
rapid progression of the fire and its adverse effects on various aircraft systems and the cockpit
environment, they would not have been able to complete a safe landing in Halifax, even if they
had undertaken to do so at the time of the PAN PAN urgency radio communication at 10:14 p.m.
ADT.
The Board issued several recommendations to mitigate against potential fires in hidden areas of
aircraft, including a recommendation that appropriate regulatory authorities, together with the
aviation community, review the methodology for establishing designated fire zones within the
pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view to providing improved smoke and fire detection and
suppression capability.
Adequacy of In-Flight Firefighting
The available information indicates that, by the time the aircraft crew became aware that there
was an in-flight fire, the fire had developed to a condition where it is unlikely that available
firefighting equipment and methods would have been effective. The Board concluded that
industry-wide changes are necessary to provide aircraft crews with effective means to detect and
suppress fires in hidden areas, including the provision for ready access to hidden areas for the
purpose of firefighting.
There was no integrated in-flight firefighting plan in place for the accident aircraft, nor was such a
plan required by regulation. Therefore, the aircraft crew did not have procedures or training
directing them to aggressively attempt to locate and eliminate the source of the smoke, and to
expedite their preparations for a possible emergency landing. In the absence of such a firefighting
plan, the aircraft crew concentrated on preparing the aircraft for the diversion and landing.
Additional Safety Risks Identified
During the course of this investigation, some additional risks that have the potential to degrade
aviation safety were identified. Although these factors could not be shown to have played a direct
role in this occurrence, the associated deficiencies could potentially lead to other accidents if the
deficiencies are not rectified.
Areas of Concern
- checklists that do not adequately deal with smoke conditions;
- aircraft designs that do not facilitate the rapid de-powering of electrical systems;
- MD-11 map light design and installation;
- lack of clarity in guidance material and regulations regarding wire separation in confined areas;
and
- inadequacy of Supplemental Type Certificate standards to ensure that add-on equipment is
compatible with the aircraft's type certificate
Page 19
A330 Performance (General)
A330 PERFORMANCE
Performance Notes
VMCG
VMCG, assuming that the path of the AC accelerating with all engines
operating is along the centreline of the runway, its path from the point
at which the critical engine is made inoperative to the point at which
recovery to a direction parallel to the centreline is completed, may not
deviate more than 30 ft laterally from the centreline at any point.
Determination of VMCG:
Lateral deviation under 30 ft
VMCG must be established, with:
The AC in each take-off configuration or, at the option of the
applicant, in the most critical take-off configuration;
Maximum available take-off power or thrust on the
operating
engines;
The most unfavourable centre of gravity;
The AC trimmed for take-off; and
The most unfavourable weight in the range of take-off weights.
VMC[A]
VMC[A] is the calibrated airspeed, at which, when the critical engine is
suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to maintain control of the AC
with that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight flight with an
angle of bank of not more than 5 degrees.
VMC[A] may not exceed 1.2 VS with,
Maximum available take-off power or thrust on the engines;

The AC trimmed for take-off;
The maximum sea-level take-off weight
Upgrade Notes
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Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
The AC in the most critical take-off configuration existing along

the flight path after the AC becomes airborne, except with the
landing gear retracted; and
The AC airborne and the ground effect negligible
VMCL
VMCL, the minimum control speed during approach and landing with all
engines operating, is the calibrated airspeed at which, when the critical
engine is suddenly made inoperative, it is possible to maintain control of
the AC with that engine still inoperative, and maintain straight flight
with an angle of bank of not more than 5.
VMCL must be established with:
The AC in the most critical configuration (or, at the option of the
applicant, each configuration) for approach and landing with all
engines operating;
The AC trimmed for approach with all engines operating;
The most unfavourable weight, or, at the option of the applicant,
as a function of weight.
Go-around thrust setting on the operating engines
Maximum Brake Energy Speed: VMBE

When the takeoff is aborted, brakes must absorb & dissipate the
heat corresponding to the AC kinetic energy at the decision point.
Info: Demonstrated is conducted with no more than
10% of the allowable brake wear range remaining
on each of the AC wheel brakes.
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Maximum Tire Speed

Max Gnd Speed that can be reached, in order to limit the
centrifugal forces & heat elevation that may damage the tire structure
VTIRE = 204kts (EK GEN LIMITATIONS 3.01.20 p5)
Speed Definitions
V1 Max speed at which the crew can decide to reject the
takeoff & is ensured to stop the AC within the limits of the RWY
(Considered to be VEF + 1 second = V1)
VR Speed at which the pilot initiates the rotation at about 3

deg per second.
Not less than . * V1
105% of VMCA
Speed that allows reaching V2 before a
ht of 35 above Takeoff surface
A speed that, if AC is rotated at max
practicable rate, will result in a
satisfactory Vlof
V2 Min climb speed that must be reached at a ht of 35 above the

RWY surface in case of an engine failure
May not be less than
1.13 VS1G
Stall Speed
Vs1g: Identified stall speed for the Airbus fly by wire Aircraft (JAR
25) corresponds to the maximum lift drag (just before the lift starts
decreasing). The load factor is still equal to one.
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Aircraft Weight Definitions

(EK applicable and reference for Weight & Balance, Manual Loadsheet &
Manual Trim)
Dry Operating Weight: (Definition) Total wt of an aircraft ready for a

specific type of operation excluding all usable fuel & traffic load.
EK reference Route Manual Ch5 page 6 & 7
DOW = Basic Operating Wt + Crew Wt + Pantry Wt
Info - EK Basic Op wt & Configuration wt outlines
AC Rego / Weight / Index / Cabin Config / AC Wt Limits
Crew Weight & Index (RM Ch5 page 8)

Caution . 2 columns exist WITHOUT or WITH Crew Bags
Pantry Weight & Index (RM Ch 5 page 9)
Caution . Ensure correct valid AC rego before confirming
destination Pantry requirement (Wt & Index)
Additional Crew member occupying PAX Seat

Note . Cabin Area (OA, OB, OC, OD) as per Manual
Loadsheet & Manual Trimsheet. Confirm AC rego
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
LMCs (FOM Ch 16, page 18 & 19)

o Std Pax Wts (16.2.2.4) (Also Normal Load Sheet
Loadmessage & Captains Information before LMC)
Adult Male 85kg Adult Female 70kg
Children
38kg Infant
10kg
LMC LIMITS (FOM Ch16, page 19)

A332 .. Total LMC permitted 700kg
FUEL . NO LMC
Cargo +/- 700kg
Pax (incl bags) ... up to 6
DOW LMC up to 3 CREW
or +/- 300kg Pantry
Note: Up to +/- 300kg only LMC table amended,
301 to 700kg Complete LMC table &
Amend also the . AZFW, ATOW, & ALW
IF you exceed any of the above New Loadsheet Required
(supplemental - see FCI 2005-132 ACARS-PAX COUNT MSG .. for Purser

Use)
_________________________________________________
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Info & References of where to find

Manual Loadsheet & Manual Trimsheet Samples ref
Route Manual Ch 5 Page 21 & 22
A330 Fuel Index Table: Assuming STD fuel loading RM Ch 5

page 23 .. Caution uses RAMP fuel + density for required Index
(Additional : Reverse side of Manual Trimsheet)
RM Ch 5
A330 Fuel Index Table:
NON STD refueling
page 24 .. Uses INDIVIDUAL tanks & Index as applicable. (nb.
assumes fuel density 0.80 kg/ltr) (Additional ref , Blank
Documents folder on AC behind FO - Caution this is a photocopy
ref & may not be as up to date as Route Manual)
Diversion Flight Loadsheet: Explanation RM Ch5 page 25

Sample - RM Ch5 page 27
Followed by Manual Trimsheet required note only the lower
section of the sheet from the Fuel Index & Fuel Correction
line. Sample RM Ch5 page 28.
Diversion Flight Log: Multiple Flt Plans for use after a
Diversion & destination now DXB. ( Location - Blank Forms
Folder, Behind FO)
Based on .
ZERO WIND / MAX ZFW / Max
Structural TOW / FLT PLAN ALT is Departure AP
(user instructions are on front page of DFL
Computerised Load Sheets List of Approved Stations
RM Ch 5 page 13 . MANUAL Loadsheet currently only
stations Hyderabad, Jeddah & Khartoum
______________________________________________________
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Take Off
N1 Rating (FCOM 3.05.06 p9)
Must check for take off to maintain an awareness of the

required N1, to ensure the engine probe is not frozen or
blocked (737 Potamac River)
Take Off Run
Take Off Run (TOR) with Clearway

TOR
dry
= max of {TORN-1 dry, 1.15 TORN dry}
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
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Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
TOR
wet
= max of {TORN-1 wet, 1.15 TOR wet}
Wet screen height from Brake release to VLOF to 15 to
achieve TOR N1-wet ensuring V2 achieved before 35.
With wet RWY, TOR with 1 eng out is always equal to TOD
with 1 eng out (brakes release to 15). Therefore a Clearway

does not give any performance benefit on a wet RWY, as TOR
ia always more limiting. (TORA less than TODA)
______________________________________________________
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
Page 8 of 18
A330 PERFORMANCE
Accelerate-Stop Distance
ASDdry = max of {ASDN1 dry, ASDN dry}

ASDwet = max of {ASD dry, ASDN1 wet, ASDN wet}
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Line Up Corrections
LPC accounts for line up corrections for 90 deg & 180 deg &
shown depending on which is used
(Ref FCI 2005-130 AIRBUS LPC WT & RWY LINE UP
MODIFICATION INPUTS)
Take Off Segments & Climb Requirements

Take Off flight path begins 35 above the take off surface at
the end of the Take Off Distance
Take Off flight path can then be divided into several
segments (see below as reminder)
Take Off flight path ends at 1,500 above the take off
surface
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
Page 10 of 18
A330 PERFORMANCE
Net Gradient = Gross Gradient Gradient Penalty

For 2 eng AC 0.8% Penalty
INFO Net Take Off flight path clears all obstacles by
vertical distance of at least 35
This may sometimes require 2nd SEG Gradient to be greater
than 2.4%.
Note: if AC bank is greater than 15deg then the Net vertical
distance is increased to 50 obstacle clearance
(JAR OPS 1.495)
A330 THRUST SETTING / EGT LIMITS
(FCOM 3.01.70)
Take off GA 10 min / 900deg (1 eng out)

MCT
- Unlimited / 850 deg
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
Page 11 of 18
A330 PERFORMANCE
Take Off Funnel

(JAR OPS 1.495)
If intended Flight Path does not require TRK changes of more

than 15deg need not consider OBS which have lateral
distance greater than .
300m if able to maintain req nav accuracy through OBS
accountability area
600m for all other conditions
TRK changes of greater than 15deg need not consider OBS
which have a lateral distance greater than .
600m if able to maintain req nav accuracy through OBS
accountability area
900 m for all other conditions
TRK changes of less than 15deg
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
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Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
TRK changes of greater than 15deg

INFO: ICAO recommendations for departure sector are same as
for JAR OPS definitions
Runway Definitions
EK references: * FOM Ch18 p21 (Adverse & All Wx Ops)
Runway Surface Condition
* FOM Ch 18 p22
Perf Basis for a given RWY state
Operational Limitations
Captains Considerations
* FCOM 2.04.10 (Special Operations)
Fluid Contaminated Runway
(particular reference given to
TakeOff Performance & use of the
Equivalence Tables
* A330 max Xwind FCOM 2.04.10 p4
& QRH S 3
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
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Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
EK Definitions .... (FOM Ch 18 p21 Adv & All Wx Ops)
Runway Surface Condition: For Take Off & Ldg performance
purposes, runways surfaces are categorised as DRY, SLIPPERY or

CONTAMINATED
See FOM for expanded definitions
P22 states
Max TO thrust on CONTAMINATED RWYS

TO not allowed on ICY RWYs
TO & LDG not allowed on RWYs covered in MORE than

13mm standing water
13mm slush
100mm dry snow
13mm wet snow
TO not commenced if risk of icing during initial climb .. anti-
icing sys not able to cope with exp ice secretion
Avail cleared or treated RWY width less than 30m
Snow banks cleared RWY / Taxiways & edges of Aprons

limited in ht, protection against eng ingestion, damage to eng
pods, extended flaps or slats. With AC maneuvering Follow
taxi & Rwy center lines as closely as possible require
guidance if in doubt
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
JAR OPS Definitions ....
Dry runway: A dry runway is one which is neither wet nor
contaminated, and includes those paved runways which have been

specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and maintained to
retain effectively dry braking action even when moisture is present
Damp runway: A runway is considered damp when the surface is not
dry, but when the moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance.
Wet runway: A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is
covered with water or equivalent, [with a depth less than or equal to 3

mm], or when there is a sufficient moisture on the runway surface to
cause it to appear reflective, but without
significant areas of standing water.
In other words, a runway is considered to be wet, as soon as it has a shiny
appearance, but without risk of hydroplaning due to standing water on one
part of its surface. The water depth is assumed to be less than 3 mm.
Contaminated runway: A runway is considered to be contaminated
when more than 25% of the runway surface area within the required
length and width being used is covered by
Standing water
Slush
Wet snow
Dry Snow
Compacted snow
Ice (See also EK FCI 2006-003 Icy Rwy Definition)
Gross & Net TO Flt Paths on Wet & Contaminated Rwys

Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Take Off Calculations .
Preference is via LPC for Optimization
RTOW Charts available in AC (Normal AC configuration)

EK Dispatch (eg MEL, CDL) to optimize
DXBOVEK on ACARS provide relevant RWY, surface

conditions & known defects.
Unserviceablity Effects: LPC Module FCOM 2.02.15

RTOW A330-200 Destination AP
Vol 1 of 11 A-H (Removed fm
Contents pages on AC)
RTOW User Manual (Disk & Portal)
Take Off Thrust.
Flex Temperature Principle
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
Page 16 of 18
A330 PERFORMANCE
A330-200 EK AC
MCDU DATA PAGE ENG TRENT 772B-60
ie 7 series, 72 thousand lb thrust,

B = increased temp for Tref or ISA + 22deg (SL)
Tflex Max ISA + 48deg
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
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A330 PERFORMANCE
Upgrade Notes
[Version1.0]
March 2006
Author: R J Capps
Type- [Information]
Page 18 of 18
SECTION 5
COURSE DETAILS
Section 5
Course Layout
5. COURSE LAYOUT
Basically the course will consist of the following phases:
12345-
Ground School (Modules 1,2,3,4,5,6)

Full Flight Simulator Sessions (F1U, F2U, F3U, PPCI, F5U)
Line Orientation Simulation (LOS), combined with Line Training Phase.
Final Line Check (FLC)
Standard Progress Check (SPC)
Daily Program
After the successful completion of the above mentioned phases you will congratulated for being a
new Commander on Emirates Airbus Fleet .
Unofficial Document
Page 1 of 14
Section 5
Course Layout
Course Details
1. Ground School
Foreword
The Upgrade Ground School forms the initial part of the Upgrade training programme. During
the course a variety of topics will be addressed in the form of lectures, presentations, discussions
and practical application thereof.
Thorough preparation is required by the upgrade candidate. Candidates are required to log on to
the Crew Portal, Training / Generic / Upgrade, as required pre-reading and questionnaires must
be downloaded from the crew portal Topics, summarized below will be presented in a modular
format.
Please refer to the downloadable course footprint and timetable sent by Flight Training Administration
for the exact dates and times.
Objective
At the end of the modular ground school candidates should:
1. Show enhanced knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of a Captain,
2. Understand company policy and procedures to be applied in normal and emergency situations and
3. Demonstrate sound management skills, decision-making abilities and leadership traits expected of
a newly-upgraded Captain.
Unofficial Document
Page 2 of 14
Section 5
Course Layout
Ground Course Modules and Subjects

Module 1 - Management Model (CRM)
Trainees will, through an extensive review of relevant CRM topics and case studies, decide
how effective management, decision making, leadership and communication can be achieved
in a flight deck environment. Topics will be covered with the emphasis place from a human
factors perspective.
Module 2 Performance
A review is conducted on certification, ICAO, JAR-OPS and Jeppesen/LIDO performance
requirements. Demonstration of practical application of procedures is required during and as
part of pre-course study.
Module 3 Responsibilities, Expectations, Standards and LOS Scenario 1
A major component of upgrade training is being fully conversant with a Captains duties and
responsibilities. A pre-course questionnaire on policy and procedures and pre-reading on the
subject of aviation law will assist a candidate to gain extensive knowledge and awareness of
international, local (GCAA) and company legal requirements. A thorough understanding of
when and how to apply the procedures provided in company documentation is required to
ensure that both individual and company integrities are maintained.
Module 4 LOS Scenario 2-5
In-flight normal and abnormal scenarios will be proposed at various stages of flight, requiring,
through role play, practice of all the topics briefed and trained in Module 1 3. Candidates
will be required to provide input through review and discussion on various aspects of flight
operations. The topics will include:
Flight Planning LIDO requirements and practicalities.

Aircraft Systems Management - Normal and Emergency procedures and awareness of
effective management of various major emergencies, i.e. fuel leek, bomb on board, flight
control failure.
All Weather Operations (AWOPS) - company and international legal requirements.
Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) - normal and abnormal operations when a failure
may effect the safe operation.
Diversion and Suitable Airport planning - Selection of diversion airports using resources
and guidance provided in aircraft manuals, Discussion on procedures when diverting to
EK and non-EK airports whether continuing or terminating a flight.
Fuel Management - The current fuel policy is reviewed and its practical application discussed.
Aviation Law - The FOM will be reviewed with emphasis on an Emirates Captains duties
and responsibilities. Legal responsibilities, the boundaries and authority bestowed upon
an Aircraft Commander as derived from International and National Law will also be reviewed.
Module 5 - LOS Scenario 6 and 7

Module 4 dealt with small scenarios based on various stages of flight. In this module two full
flights are given as examples requiring the candidates, through group exercise, to plan and
complete a safe and efficient flight in the given circumstances. Through this classroom practice of
LOS training, all aspects of the airlines operation should be fully understood.
Unofficial Document
Page 3 of 14
Section 5
Course Layout
Module 6 Fleet
To enable better understanding of the airlines operation, briefings are conducted by representatives
from the flowing departments in Flight Operations, Fleet Planning, Network Control and Flight Safety
representatives.
Full Flight Simulator Sessions (Pre PPC Training)

Foreword
This phase will provide a training forum to prepare the candidate for successful completion of the
PPC and AWOPS/ZFT phases, whilst operating from the LHS.
Objectives
1. To become proficient with operating the aircraft from the LHS.
2. To develop a sound decision-making process whilst re-familiarising the candidate with certain
abnormal and emergency failures.
3. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the Upgrade PPC and
4. AWOPS/ZFT Simulator sessions.
5. To prepare the candidate for the successful completion of the LOS/LOE phase.
Upgrade Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Training
The FFS Training for type-rated First Officers is divided into two phases, i.e. RHS to LHS
conversion and preparation for the LOS/LOE phase.
The first 3 sessions encompass the pre-PPC training. The candidate must display a good
understanding of failure items and the handling of the aircraft during normal and abnormal
operations, before recommendation for the PPC can be made.
F1U: provides a familiarization from the LHS, a review of flight characteristics, and a review
of some Emergency and Abnormal Procedures.
F2U & F3U: provides a review of some additional Emergency and Abnormal procedures.
PPCI: is the Initial Pilot Proficiency Check as per OM-D - Training Manual Vol A33/4 Part 2. On
successful completion of the PPCI the student will proceed to F5U.
F5U: All Weather Operations, Zero Flight Time and CAT C Airport Familiarization (If Required).
Refer to relevant chapters.
Note: FIU / F2U / F3U may be conducted with 2 Upgrade Trainees swapping seats or with a Line
F/O in the R.H.S. In the case of a Line F/O in the RHS, Items that have been covered in
the 1st half of the session need not be repeated.
Unofficial Document
Page 4 of 14
Section 5
Course Layout
Full Flight Simulator Sessions Details

F1U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Manchester. The focus of the lesson is on left hand seat
familiarisation, using supplementary techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency
procedures.
The trainee is introduced to the left seat position, arm rest position, flight controls and general
aspects of the flight deck from a different perspective.
A transit cockpit preparation is carried out and engine 1 is started using the manual engine start
procedure during which there is a hot start After start the aircraft is taxied to the holding point for
runway 24R. Before take off a 180 turn is carried out on the runway.
A TCAS event occurs after takeoff and then IR 1+ 2 fault leads into a low altitude stall
warning and recovery. An emergency descent will be carried out from high altitude.
The final exercise involves a Flap fault after takeoff, the aircraft returns for a non-precision
approach, during which there is a Slat fault.
Training Objectives
To review normal cockpit procedures from the LHS in accordance with the latest FCOM
and FCTM amendments.
To review Manual Engine start procedure.
To review the correct recovery procedure for TCAS events.
To review the correct procedure for recovery from a stall warning.
To review the correct procedure for an Emergency Descent.
To review the correct procedure for Abnormal Slats/Flaps Configuration.
To review the correct procedure for conducting a 180 turn on the runway.
To revise the correct procedure for flying a non-precision Approach.
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Section 5
Course Layout
F2U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Zurich. The focus of the lesson is on engine starting supplementary
techniques, aircraft handling and abnormal/emergency procedures.
The APU is unserviceable so the engines are started using external pneumatic power and a cross
bleed start.
Reactive and predictive windshear events are encountered on takeoff and approach.
Selected and Managed non-precision approaches are flown to runways 16 and 28, a circling
approach is flown to RWY 28.
A generator 1 + 2 fault results in flight in electrical emergency configuration and a raw data
approach is flown to runway 16.
The final exercise involves smoke in the cabin/cockpit, a diversion to EDDM with approach and
landing in electrical emergency configuration.
Training Objectives
To review Engine Start with External Pneumatics and Cross-Bleed Start procedure.
To review the correct avoidance and recovery procedure for Windshear and Windshear Ahead.
To review the correct procedure for flying a Non Precision Approach.
To review the correct procedure for handling the Electrical Emergency Configuration.
To review the correct procedure for Smoke/Fumes/Avionics Smoke and Smoke Removal.
To revise the correct procedure for flying a ILS approach Raw Data.
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Section 5
Course Layout
F3U
Lesson Summary
This session is conducted in Johannesburg. The focus of the lesson is on aircraft handling
(heavy weight with high density altitude), engine failure and abnormal/emergency procedures.
Engine failure after V1 results in a return to JNB with fuel jettison due to approach climb limitation.
A VOR/DME approach is flown to runway 21R (single engine) followed by a go- around. After
cleanup from the go-around, the engine and all effected systems are restored.
A Green hydraulic reservoir low level followed by Blue system low pressure (Yellow system for
2nd trainee) leads to a non-precision approach to runway 21R (No Auto pilot).
The aircraft is repositioned to runway 03L and during takeoff suffers unreliable airspeed, resulting
in return to JNB and an ILS approach to runway 03L.
Training Objectives
To review and practice engine inoperative handling and procedures, including non- precision
approach and go-around.
To review the correct procedure for fuel jettison.
To review the correct procedure Single and dual hydraulic Failures.
To review the correct procedure for handling of unreliable airspeed.
To review and perform a rejected takeoff and emergency evacuation.
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Section 5
Course Layout
4. LOS (Line Orientated Simulation)/LOFTs

The following are extracts from Training Manual-Volume A33/4-Part1 Training (TM 334 Part1), Chapter
5.19, It high lights how LOS is being practiced and structured.
Line Orientated Simulation (LOS)

Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions
will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which
time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been
inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to
generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of
sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC).
Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line
sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities
in (real time), and realistic operational conditions.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have
the tools to:
Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company
Policies upon promotion to Captain.
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as
possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist
in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the
TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good
standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the
standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the
discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.
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Section 5
Course Layout
phase.
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE
will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
Emirates practise.
Use Of Video
LOS Rules
Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
failures to affect the outcome of the flight.
Only 1 Failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverable Failure, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given.
These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure
due to engine shutdown.
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Section 5
Course Layout
LOS/LOE Guidelines
LS1U:
LS2U:
LS3U:
the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario.

will include a Cold weather Operation scenario.
will include an ETOPS flight.
LOEU:
is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the
TRE in keeping with the above rules.
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may
be introduced and conducted by the TC.
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Section 5
Course Layout
Category C Airfield Training (If Required)

Category C Airfield training will include Sanaa and/or Sychelles Familiarization.
Sanaa Familiarisation
Overview
This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training.
As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing.
The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route
manual briefing for the destination.
During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and
considerations required to operate at Sanaa.
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Section 5
Course Layout
Seychelles Familiarisation
Overview
This is an airport familiarisation of a category C airfield, with a great deal of emphasis on training.
As this training takes place after a LOS session there is little time available for a formal briefing.
The instructor is required to ensure that the student has had a complete review of the route
manual briefing for the destination.
During the simulator session the instructor is to highlight important aspects and considerations
required to operate at Seychelles.
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Section 5
Course Layout
Line Flying Under Supervision (LIFUS)/Line Training

General
The Line Training Syllabus presented has been developed from the Airbus recommended listing
of Line Training subjects.
Line Training is intended to familiarise new entry, upgraded pilots, and pilots who are transferring fleets,
with the operation of their new aircraft type, their respective crew duties, and the characteristics of our
route network environment. It must highlight the duties, and the characteristics of our route network
environment. It must highlight the difficulties and traps that could affect the safety and the efficiency of
the flight, and provide comprehensive guidance regarding the use of all the resources that are available
to support the Companys flying operations.
Line Training will also include the technical items on the syllabus, which can not be taught in the
simulator. These may include: weather radar, ETOPS and comprehensive use of the FMS.
The main objective of Line Training is to consolidate the training received on the ground in order
to deliver to the Fleet highly competent, safe and standardised pilots. At the completion of their
Line Training, these pilots must have demonstrated that they have reached a high level of technical and
operational knowledge, as well as good flying skills, and that they are capable and efficient cockpit
resource managers.
The Briefings are listed in flight phase order until parking. The topics are then listed in procedural order.
Line Training Preparation

This guide is to help prepare you for the transition from Simulator Training (Aircraft Type
Rating) to Line Training (operating on the line according to Emirates procedures.)
Preparation is key: Before each flight thorough route study is essential. OM-C RAIG (Route and
Aerodrome Information Guide) is a good starting point. You can obtain old LIDO en-route charts
and Aerodrome charts from Nav Services, located in the Emirates Operations Centre (EOC).
These charts will be out dated but are still useful for route study.
We recommend you buy an ATLAS. You are bound to be flying over unfamiliar territory and
a geographical awareness is essential. When you get transferred to LVIV Control it would be
nice to know which country you are over, not to mention the pronunciation.
A day or two before your flight you can ask the operations clerks at the CBC to print off a CFP
and NOTAMS for that particular sector. It will not be exactly as per the flight you will be doing but
it will be a great aid in preparation, especially when covering NOTAMS. It will also help with time
management, as you will know which items are need-to-know and which can be covered later, in
flight. A good time to get these is immediately following a duty when signing off, obtain the
CFP/NOTAMS for your next flight, so you can study at home.
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Section 5
Course Layout
Study: Line Training will require an in-depth knowledge of the FOM and the FCOMs.
Thorough knowledge of all chapters is expected and required. For study purposes we
recommend you give particular emphasis to FOM chapters 11-15 and chapter 20.
Your Training File contains a Line Training Syllabus. Each subject will be covered by your various
Training Captains you must arrive for you flight well prepared. The Line Training Study Guide and
Completion standard is designed to help you study, please use this document to your advantage.
Time Management: Your pick-up will be approximately 2hrs15mins prior to flight (depending on
location check FOM). Arrival time at CBC will vary, however, cabin crew are instructed to depart
CBC for the aircraft at STD -75 mins. The bus ride from CBC to the aircraft can take 15- 20mins
depending on the parking bay. Time Management at the briefing stage is critical.
Prioritisation is essential, make sure you know the minimum requirements FOM 12.2.
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SECTION 6
FFS Details
(F1U, F2U, F3U, Skill Test,
CAT C Aerodrome Training)
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
FFS Instructor Notes

(An Extract from the EK A330
Nomination as Commander Training Manual)
Emirates Airlines Cockpit Management Guide

& Decision Making Model
Abnormal Situation or One Requiring a Decision
AVIATE
(FLY THE AIRCRAFT)
Stabilise Flight Path

Consider Use of Automation
NAVIGATE
(WHERE ARE WE GOING?)
Think BIG PICTURE
COMMUNICATE
Assign Duties
Any immediate notification required (ATC, CC)
If Appropriate
Complete immediate Checklist Action
Verify Failure/Malfunction
Apply Checklists if Applicable
When Situation Stabilised

Mini Brief Update Crew on Situation
Available Information
Sources**
Radio/ACARS/Phone
Manuals
ATC
SMNC
Flight Tech
Fleet
Engineering
Medical
Factors/Considerations**
TASK Needs
Aircraft
Time
Fuel
Performance
Configuration
En-Route
Wx
Terrain
Decision Making Model

Assess
Make Time-Set a Decision Deadline
Understand the Problem
Gather information from all available sources**
Identify factors & considerations**

Test several options and select a solution
Action
Communicate decision
Action Decision
Continually test decision for correctness

Re-assess if required
Manage
Manage the effects of your decision
Organise resources
Consider Task, Group and individual Needs**
Re-assess your decision for correctness
FOM
MEL
AFM
FCOMs
Route Manual
Jeppesen/LIDO
Laptop
AIRSPACE
ETOPS
RVSM
Landing
NAV Aids
Runway
Lighting
ATC
RFF
Go Around
GROUP Needs
Pax-(Pax Handling)
Crew
Company
Hotel
Transport
Food
INDIVIDUAL Needs
Control stress
Medical assistance
** Information Sources, Factors and considerations are not limited to those listed
Emirates Airlines Cockpit Management Guide

& Decision Making Model
SECTION 7
LOS/LOFT SCENARIOS
- LOS Guide Lines
- LOS Instructor Notes, Common Errors
- LOS Candidates Notes
LOS Guide Lines
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
7. LOS (Line Orientated Simulation)/LOFTs

The following are extracts from Training Manual-Volume A33/4-Part1 Training (TM A334 Part 1),
Chapter 5.19, It high lights how LOS is being practiced and structured.
Line Orientated Simulation (LOS)

Foreword
This phase consists of 4 FFS sessions, with the emphasis being again on training. The first 3 sessions
will be Line Orientated Simulation (LOS), with the last one being the Line Orientated Evaluation (LOE).
The 4 simulator sessions will be interspersed with normal upgrade line training sectors, during which
time the line training syllabus will be completed to a satisfactory standard. These sectors have been
inserted between the 3 LOS and the 1 LOE session to further enhance the overall training value, and to
generally assist in building the confidence and ability of the upgrade candidate. The allotted amount of
sectors, as per FTPM, will be completed before the LOE, followed by the Final Line Check (FLC).
Training rostering will endeavor to produce a roster, whereby the candidate will fly between 4 to 8 line
sectors from the LHS, between each simulator session.
Objectives
To observe and develop the ability of the candidate to handle various emergencies and abnormalities
in (real time), and realistic operational conditions.
To observe CRM behaviours and task management when subjected to potentially demanding scenarios.
To develop the skills, knowledge and the application of knowledge so that upgrade candidates will have
the tools to:
Use sound judgment and make sensible decisions in accordance with Company
Policies upon promotion to Captain.
Training Guidelines
During the LOS phase, the emphasis is on training. The scenarios will be run as realistically as
possible, however the TC is encouraged to intervene and discuss pertinent issues as required to assist
in developing the candidate. If necessary the use of the simulator (freeze) facility is acceptable for the
TC to stress an important point of instruction. During this phase the candidate must demonstrate a good
standard, or show signs of improving towards this, before being recommended for the LOE. Should the
standard not be achieved within the allocated sessions, then extra training may be scheduled at the
discretion of VPFT and/or CFI/CFE.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
phase.
successful completion of this exercise, the candidate will be recommended for the LOE. The LOE
will be run as a normal flight in all aspects.
Emirates practise.
Use Of Video
LOS Rules
Only 1 MEL prior to pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
Only 1 Failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
After takeoff, only 1 x Recoverable Failure, and 1 x Unrecoverable Failure may be given.
These failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure, eg. Hydraulic system failure
due to engine shutdown.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
1. LOS/LOE Guidelines
LS1U:
LS2U:
LS3U:
the first LOS will include a Monsoon Weather scenario.

will include a Cold weather Operation scenario.
will include an ETOPS flight.
LOEU:
is the Line Orientated Evaluation. The content will be at the discretion of the
TRE in keeping with the above rules.
If a particular LOFT does not take up the entire simulator session, then a second mini-loft may
be introduced and conducted by the TC.
FURTHER INFORMATION FROM PEOPLE WHO ALREADY DONE LOS IN THEIR

TRAINING:
LOFT FORMAT:
All of the LOFTs followed a similar format:
1 MEL requirement. If not already in the tech log would get a problem on taxi / start
requiring you to check MEL (especially if ETOPS).
Usually a start problem or an abnormal start (on bat / ground cart etc)
1 Failure resetable (watch for this one).
1 Failure major safety related.
1 Failure minor non-safety.
Either, Passenger problems / Boarding problems, ATC slot or VIP movements to put
pressure on you. Remember not to try and fix everything yourself. Make it the station
managers problem.
No sudden changes in weather or any bullshit like the old days. If the forecast was good it would
be good.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
MORE LOS GUIDE LINES

Line Oriented Simulation (LOS) Training
Introduction
Upgrade Trainees and Direct Entry Captains will be rostered for three LOS sessions and one
LOE session.
After LOS1 the line training will commence. Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning
to the Simulator for LOS2.
Approximately 2 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for LOS3.
Approximately 4 sectors will be flown before returning to the Simulator for the LOE.
Instructors and students should make contact approximately one day prior to the event and
discuss the upcoming session. This will allow the trainee sufficient time to prepare for the
session.
Trainee Preparation
Emirates expects trainees to be prepared for their training sessions. It is assumed that the trainee
must be familiar with Emirates procedures and policies, basic technical knowledge as well as the
network structure. Instructor input is encouraged to assist trainees in the development of the various
skills required for the successful completion of LOS exercises. Instructors, however, will not
compensate for a lack of preparation by the trainee. The instructor will assess areas of weakness
and focus training where required.
Focused Training
The elements of focused training include:
SOPs and Company Policy
Flight Deck Management
Task Prioritization and Planning
System Knowledge
Situation Awareness Decision Making
Non-Normal Management
Communication Skills and CRM
Environment
The LOS will take place in a line operational environment with a complete crew. A complete crew
will always be scheduled and every effort will be made to maintain crew integrity. During a LOS,
each crewmember performs both as an individual and as a member of a team, as is normal
during line operations.
LOS scenarios are to be conducted in real time and in real-world line operational situations.
The Instructor will endeavour to check the progress of the trainee to date with regards to:
Environmental (wet, dry, contaminated, heavy, ETOPS day or night).
Technical (Failure scenarios, MEL, Eng start problems, other distractions), and routes flown.
Trainee Progress and problem areas (if any). This is normally done by consultation with the
instructor who conducted the trainees last LOS and/or reference to the trainees training file held
at the ETC.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Using the above information, a LOS scenario can be constructed based on the Emirates rules. A
trainee is normally required to cover Monsoon, Cold Weather and ETOPS conditions during
upgrade training. This is usually achieved by assigning a different topic for each LOS session.
Constructing Scenarios Using Emirates Rules
Instructors will assign specific training objectives to each scenario. These training objectives will be
based on the particular needs relevant to Emirates operations and the trainees progress. A variety
of scenarios can be constructed by choosing different combinations of elements and manipulating
conditions (i.e. failures) however, these manipulations will be carried out while adhering to Emirates
rules.
The following are Emirates LOS training/evaluation rules (Ref: OM-D 5.19), which
instructors are to follow when creating and conducting any LOS/LOE session:
Only one MEL item active before pushback. This may or may not be combined with further
A start malfunction or alternative start procedure.
Only one failure allowed during taxi. This can be in addition to the MEL above.
After takeoff, only one recoverable failure and one unrecoverable failure may be given. These
failures may be the secondary result of a primary failure e.g. hydraulic system failure due to an
engine shutdown.
Some performances commonly observed from trainees are:
A high level of knowledge leading to instant solutions, or failing to involve the other crewmember
in effective communication.
A high stress level leading to poor flight deck management, either through poor communication
or poor resource management.
Poor preparation demonstrated by an observed lack of technical knowledge, operational
resource management or prioritisation.
Some common trainee errors are listed below:
Poor task prioritisation and planning.
Not delegating tasks during high workload.
No structure in flight management.
Under confident / over confident.
Not prepared and poor knowledge of systems and procedures.
Additional Guidelines
Realism
Scenarios will contain realistic circumstances e.g. messages from ATC, cabin crew or operations.
Just as crewmembers cannot anticipate all flight operational situations, instructors will try to
prevent crewmembers from anticipating the entire content of the scenarios.
ATC
Air traffic control actions will be reasonable. If radar vectors would normally be available, and the
local system is not affected by NOTAM, then radar vectors will be available. If the crew requests
help from ATC, and help would normally be available at a chosen destination, then that help will
be available.
Weather
All weather parameters will be realistic. The actual weather experienced in the simulator will
reflect the weather in the forecast. Airfield conditions will reflect the NOTAM.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Time Management
The instructor will not use Speedx2 or Speedx4 and will allow the flight to proceed in real time.
The instructor will not use, position freeze to give the crew extra time to get through an exercise.
The trainee must learn to create time for himself, perhaps by slowing down, or holding. In the
same sense, fuel freeze will not be used to give the crew extra time. Fuel management is an
essential part of normal operations.
Distractions
These may be used to good effect. This could be an unruly passenger, a failure that requires
ECAM action but does not affect the overall flight e.g. loss of a fuel pump or generator or ATC
instructions to report abeam, or track DIR to a specific WPT, etc.
Weather avoidance or TCAS TA events are other suitable examples of distractions.
Role Playing
Instructors will brief First Officers to act normally. They are not to play a role. If the trainee is
losing situational awareness because of overload, or perhaps poor cooperation from his First
Officer, the instructor may wish to allow the trainee to regroup to better assess the problem and to
provide necessary guidance without distraction.
When this situation occurs, and instructor guidance is required, it is acceptable to freeze the flight
or the position. This is not the same as freezing the position just to complete preparation for an
approach, or something similar. Freezing in these situations is counter-productive. Time
management is part of the training, and the trainee has to learn to manage the time normally
available to him.
Pre-flight Planning Documents and Activities
Pre-flight planning documents such as weather reports, flight plans, NOTAMs and load sheets will
be prepared by instructors in advance with the particular training objectives in mind.
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LOS
Instructor Notes, Common Errors
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
2. LOS INSTRUCTOR NOTES

UPGRADE LOS & LOE SUMMARIES
SCENARIO
LOS 1
WX: 6km OVC 1500 (Or at TCs discretion)
MEL - PRIM 1 INOP
Non-standard Fuel distribution (if short route used, use Normal Distribution)
Low Oil pressure ENG #2, or high oil temp S/E diversion & landing. NPA app
Other possibilities, Eng Stall, Eng high Vibration.
LOS 2
Wx: 6km BKN 1000 (Or at TCs discretion)
MEL: APU U/S
TR 1 FAIL
AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF
LOS 3
WX Fair
R.OUTER INLET VALVE stuck closed during refuelling R.OUTER TANK
empty - Non-standard Fuel Distribution
During taxi PRIM 2 Fault RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist
IR ROLL DRIFT on takeoff
Birds reported on final Approach
Possible ENG SEVERE DAMAGE + loss of Green Hyd fluid (RAT Level)
Unofficial Document
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
MXP-DXB
MAN-DXB
LGW-DXB
BOM-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
LGW-DXB
ZRH-DXB
MXP-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
Any short sector,
or
(Choose from
available CFPs)
Page 7 of 84
LOS 4
Wx Rain and cross winds
Red BOMB warning, EIU Fault (Man Thrust) Flaps Jam
LOS 5
Wx Fair
MEL EPR indication fault N1 Rated Mode
Avionics Smoke (AC BUS 2) Emerg Descent, High Altitude airport
LOS 6
Wx: Winter Ops
TCAS
GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL
PAX heart attach
BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS recoverable at low level
LOS 7
WX: Fair
MEL APU BLEED INOP
After Start STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL)
FUEL LEAK decision making
LOS 8
WX: Fair
MEL Nil
ETOPS Procedures
ENG STALL ON START
ENG VIBRATION
ENG OIL LEAK
ENG SHUTDOWN
NPA,
LOS 9
WX; Fair
TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL)
TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL
Return to land management, APP CLB, jettison
LOS 10
WX: Monsoon
On takeoff FLAPS JAM
Runway closed due crashed aircraft
Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM
Diversion AD requires a NPA approach
Unofficial Document
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
DAR-NBO
SAH-DXB
ZRH-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
SAH-DXB
JNB-DXB
NBO-DXB
THR-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
MXP-DXB
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
FCO-DXB
KHI-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
CMB-DXB
JNB-DXB
MRU-DXB
(ETOPS)
If Non ETOPS
(Choose from
available CFPs)
SAH-DXB
JNB-DXB
NBO-DXB
ZRH-DXB
SAH-DXB
NBO-DXB
NBO-DAR
(Choose from
available CFPs)
Page 8 of 84
SCENARIO
LOS 11
WX: Rain and low cloud
MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP
R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT
Diversion and landing
LOS 12
WX: Good with HZ
Pre-Departure Pax wanting to carry gun on board
TCAS
TOD ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY
F/O becomes sick incapacitation
Runway lighting failure missed approach
Return for landing
LOS 13
Wx Low Cloud
MEL SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN)
After T/O SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position
Sick PAX
Return for Ldg unable due wx
LOS 14
Wx above circling minima.
MEL - APU u/s
GPU failure, requiring a START ON BATTERY POWER
TAXI - FMGS 1 FAIL, RESET OF COMPUTERS checklist & reset OK
CRUISE Gen 1 Over Voltage (single gen ops) Considerations. (Possibly
Lightning strike causing EMERG ELEC CONFIG. OR
ENG 2 HIGH VIBRATION (Within limits at Idle Thrust)
single GEN ops
Diversion airports require circling or have high crosswinds.
LOS 15
WX: CBs
MEL: SATCOM U/S
Enroute LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of
comms
Approach NBO, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate(fuel
state)
LOS 16
Wx: Monsoon OR Winter Ops.
MEL: APU INOP
GEN 1 FAULT
DC ESS BUS FAULT
Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle
Unofficial Document
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
MXP-DXB
FCO-DXB
ZRH-DXB
LGW-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
DAR-NBO
NBO-DAR
(Choose from
available CFPs)
DXB-MCT
DXB-KWI
FCO-MXP
(Choose from
available CFPs)
ETOPS?
MRU-DXB
CMB-DXB
NBO-DXB
JNB-DXB
Non ETOPS
(Choose from
available CFPs)
DAR-NBO
Any short route
(Choose from
available CFPs)
SAH-DXB
KHI-DXB
BOM-DXBq
Or can use this as
a Winter Ops
scenario using:
LGW-DXB
ZRH-DXB
MAN-DXB
Page 9 of 84
SCENARIO
LOS 17
WX: CBs
MEL APU INOP
LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT single GEN operations
If no diversion (no Galleys/PES etc), then IDG OVHT ADVISORY
Return, jettison, and landing (Refer to Los. #15)
If Non ETOPS, considerations, Part Galley, PES, Length of flight, Routing, etc
LOS 18
WX: TCs Discretion.
MEL Nil
Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL
ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown DUAL HYD LO PR
If used on a short route (due time) consider ENG 2 HIGH VIB or ENG STALL
Eng Ops OK at Idle Thrust
LOS 19
WX: Good for return.
LH MLG STUCK DOWN
Diversion considerations, depending on Airfield. Landing, NPA App.
Unofficial Document
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
(ETOPS)
MRU-DXB
NBO-DXB
JNB-DXB
CMB-DXB
(NON-ETOPS)
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
MXP-DXB
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
JNB-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
JNB-DXB
NBO-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
SAH-DXB
Page 10 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
FAILURE TYPE SUMMARY:
DISPATCH/MEL
PRIM 1 INOP
NON-STANDARD FUEL DISTRIBUTION
APU U/S
EPR FAIL RATED N1 MODE
APU BLD
RAD ALT FAIL
ENG BLD INOP
FLIGHT FAILURE
LOW OIL PRESSURE
TR 1 FAIL
AVIONICS SMOKE - 2
IR ROLL/ATTITUDE DRIFT
BOMB OB BOARD - 2
TCAS - 2
GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL
BLUE HYD LOW PRESS
STANDBY HORIZON FAIL
FUEL LEAK - 2
FADEC FAIL
RH MLG ABNORMAL
FLAPS OR SLATS JAM - 3
INCAPACITATION
EIU FAULT
SICK PAX
ENG 2 HIGH OIL TEMP
AC BUS FAULT = 2
NO COMMS
ENG GEN INOP
DUAL HYD LO PR
ROUTES:
AIRPORTS:
FCO-DXB
MAN-DXB
DXB-MAN
NBO-DXB
ZRH-DXB
DXB-KWI
BOM-DXB
DXB-MCT
NBO-DAR
DAR-NBO
KHI-DXB
JNB-DXB
SAH-DXB
MRU-DXB (new route)
THR-DXB
FCO-MXP
MXP-DXB
CMB-DXB
LGW-DXB
FCO
MAN
DXB
NBO
ZRH
LGW
KHI
JNB
SAH
MRU (new AD)
DAR
BOM
ETOPS CONSIDERATIONS:
ETOPS scenarios:
Smoke - Cargo smoke caused by Dangerous Goods?
EMERG ELEC
Engine Fail with full driftdown and diversions considerations
Depressurisation
Unofficial Document
Page 11 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ETOPS routes:
CMB-DXB
JNB-DXB
MRU-DXB
WINTER OPERATIONS:
Routes:
ZRH-DXB
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
THR-DXB
A330 UPGRADE LOS SCENARIO DETAILS:

All the scenarios below are designed as basic guides to allow TCEs to develop the general chronology and
flow of the LOS. It should be stressed that the TCE is permitted to deviate from the planned scenario if he
considers circumstances warrant. TCEs should also be mindful that trainees may become aware of the
planned scenario at an early stage and may begin to use a planned response. Under these circumstances
changes to the planned scenario may be appropriate.
Any changes to the planned scenario should try to keep the general objectives of the LOS in mind, and in
any case must conform to the LOS requirements contained in the ETPM 13-2.
Unofficial Document
Page 12 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
FCO-DXB
MXP-DXB
MAN-DXB
LGW-DXB
BOM-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
LOS 1
WX: At TCs discretion, depending if a diversion or return to departure airfield is required,
MEL PRIM 1 INOP (Check MEL as a recent Mod allows certain of our aircraft, dispatch)
Non-standard Fuel distribution
Low Oil pressure ENG #2, S/E diversion & landing
OBJECTIVES:
1. To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL and correctly carryout the necessary
actions.
2. To Observe the trainee use the non-standard fuel distribution chart and work out a new trim
sheet.
3. To Observe the trainee manage an ENG Low oil pressure, correctly diagnosing the problem.
4. To Observe the trainee conduct a single engine diversion and landing.
If using a short
route, ignore NON
STD FUEL
Distribution
DETAILS:
1. MEL PRIM 1 INOP. Consider MEL dispatch requirements. MEL is quite involved with an
extensive flight control check required prior to start.
2.
Ensure that after refuelling, no fuel is present in the Trim tank (or approx 600Kgs) by
manually inserting each tank quantity. Engineers advise they have been unable to sort out
the problem. This should cause the TOMAC to be outside the 2% limit. This will require a
non-standard Fuel distribution calculation and a new Trim sheet. Ensure CG inserted in IOS
3.
Approaching TOC or in cruise reduce ENG 2 OIL QTY and increase ENG 2 OIL TEMP.
Reduce OIL QTY until 4 qts, at which time the ECAM advisory will activate. ECAM OIL
TEMP HI warning occurs at 190C. Observe troubleshooting and decisions. Reduce OIL
QTY to zero, or reduce Oil Press to 0.
4.
ENG 2 will need to be shutdown. Diversion required for an overweight landing. Jettison
may not be necessary. Arrange for an NPA to be required at diversion airport.
COMMON ERRORS
Failing to carry out the correct procedure in the MEL.

Not noticing the fuel was incorrectly distributed, or TOMAC outside limits.
Poor handling of the emergency, poor prioritisation and management.
Mismanagement of the diversion.
Poorly executed NPA.
Unofficial Document
Page 13 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
MAN-DXB
LGW-DXB
ZRH-DXB
MXP-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
LOS 2
Wx: 6km BKN 1000 or at TCs discretion.
MEL: APU U/S
TR 1 FAIL
AVIONICS SMOKE with Loss of CM1 probe icing. CM2 as PF.
OBJECTIVES:
1. To observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL.
2. To observe the trainee deal with TR1 Failure.
3. To observe the trainee manage the avionics Smoke and Removal procedure.
DETAILS:
To be truly effective this LOS should be conducted in WINTER enroute weather conditions that contain
icing. It is not necessary for full winter weather operations to be present at departure airport. If using a short
route, have Rain and CBs
1.
MEL APU INOP. GPU and External Pneumatics required for departure.
2.
Provide Slot time to give pushback requirement of 1 hour after entering simulator.
3.
FCOM procedure of ENG START WITH EXTERNAL PNUEMATICS required. If one engine is
started on stand and the GPU disconnected, the PES is lost and cannot be rebooted until after 2nd engine
start. This reboot may take up to 20 mins. This means that Safety video cannot be used after the 1st
engine is started. Purser to advise Captain by Interphone of this problem if it occurs. Options:
Start both engines on stand using GPU.
Ask Purser for crew to conduct a Manual Safety demonstration for Pax.
4.
5.
6.
Insert turbulence during climb. Crew comms

Approaching TOC, insert TR 1 FAIL. This is the first sign of a problem in AC BUS 1.
Advise Sim engineers prior to session that you wish to use smoke, as they need to isolate the smoke
warning for the building. Remember to PRIME smoke 10 mins before you need to use it.
7.
In cruise, insert AVIONIC SMOKE with cockpit smoke until AC BUS 1 is isolated. Regulate the
amount of smoke in the cockpit by selecting the failure on and off. This will allow the crews to go for
bus isolation as opposed to directly jumping into Emerg Elec Config. Crews to divert and conduct and
Emergency Descent.
8.
A lot of systems are affected, including the anti-icing of CM1 and STANDBY probes. On descent
introduce a blockage of these probes due to icing. CM2 should become PF.
9.
If diverting to an airport in the JEPP Other Airports Manual, there is only one set of approach plates,
so good crew co-ordination required.
10. All checklists, including Overweight Landing is to be conducted. Normal landing.

11. No APU on ground means:
GPU is required for Electrics note that BUS TIE should be OPEN to isolate AC BUS 1 before
using GPU as this caused the smoke
External Pneumatics should be used if readily available to ensure air is available in case of a
problem during shutdown of the second engine
Common Errors
Poor prioritising of the external pneumatic start

Incorrect donning of oxygen mask with Avionics smoke.
Emergency Descent poorly flown.
Failure to carryout overweight landing checklist.
Rushing into Isolation of all busses by going in Emerg Elec Config.
Unofficial Document
Page 14 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
Any short sector.
LOS 3
Wx: At TCs discretion
R.OUTER INLET VALVE stuck closed during refuelling
Non-standard Fuel Distribution
PRIM 2 Fault
IR ROLL DRIFT
Birds reported on final of one of the runways
Possible ENG SEVERE DAMAGE on final app.
Choose from
available CFPs
OBJECTIVES:
To Observe the trainee make use of the non standard fuel distribution table and Trim Sheet.
To Observe the trainee use the reset computers checklist.
To Observe the trainee correctly deal with a CHECK ATT problem.
To Observe the trainee deal with a multiple bird strike, leading to a Dual Hyd Failure
DETAILS:
1. During refuelling R. OUTER INLET VALVE reported stuck closed by engineer. No reset
possible. Not possible to get fuel into R.OUTER TANK. There is 1.0T of fuel in L.OUTER
TANK at that stage. Engineer asks Captain what to do?
Check limitations do not allow more than 1.7T in L.OUTER TANK.
Obtain T/O CG and STAB using Non-Standard Fuel distribution table.
MEL (28-25-04d) states Flt Ops performance section to calculate new CG, but Captain is
to be asked to do this manually using the A330 Fuel Index Table for Individual tanks, the
manual Loadsheet, and the CFP computer loadsheet for LIZFW.
2.
During taxi after the checklist has been completed, insert PRIM 2 FAULT. After a RESET
OF COMPUTERS checklist, the fault clears, but a new FLT CTL check is required. If the
QRH is not referenced, a flight control check may not be done as required.
3.
ATC to give revised T/O clearance immediate left turn after takeoff to intercept a radial or
Hdg. Pre-set failure IR ROLL DRIFT variable of 60 deg/sec at 120 kts for PF IRS.
Revert initially to STBY HORIZON, determining which IR is at fault, and then handing
over control when flight path is safe.
ATT HDG switching will resolve problem.
4.
At destination, ATC advise large flock of birds on approach to runway.

Crew to consider alternative runways, conditions permitting.
During approach, when passing 1000 Bird Strike leading to ENG SEVERE DAMAGE
with loss of GREEN HYDRAULICS Fluid, down to RAT level.
No Auto RAT deployment as no 2 systems low levels.
Considerations, Go Around, Fuel requirements for return, Ldg Gear stuck down,
Slat/Flap position.
If continue to Land, Braking on Accumulator pressure, no Nose wheel steering.
Common Errors
Misinterpreting non-standard fuel table.
Not following the correct reset of computer QRH procedure.
Too slow to use standby horizon on CHECK ATT problem and Transfer of controls.
Not positively taking control of the aircraft after the bird strike.
Unofficial Document
Page 15 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 4
Wx Heavy rain and crosswinds at the departure airport.
EIU FAULT A/THR LOST
RED BOMB warning
FLAPS JAMMED
OBJECTIVES:
To Observe trainee deal with complicated procedures while flying with MAN THR
To Observe handling of SLATS/FLAPS JAM procedures while under time pressure
To Observe task management and CRM during high workload and time pressure
To Observe communication and handling of Cabin Crew and Pax with regard to sensitive information
and panic control.
To Observe leadership and decision making capability

DETAILS:
CM1 to be PF.
High terrain considerations. On certain routes.
No MEL items.
1.
Contaminated runway operations due to heavy rain 5mm standing water.
RTOW & crosswind performance considerations
Braking action MED crosswind limits.
2.
Normal takeoff. During climb passing approx. FL200 ENG EIU FAULT leading to loss of A/THR.
Operational considerations, and flight should continue.
3.
Just before TOC or in cruise (depending if diversion to another airfield) ACARS message from
company advising RED BOMB WARNING.
No specific information on type of bomb or location.
BOM-DXB
DAR-NBO
ZRH-DXB
THR-DXB
KHI-DXB
(Choose from
available CFPs)
If a bomb search is conducted, a suspicious article is found in the forward toilet behind the waste bin.
4.
Diversion considerations:
Contaminated runway at departure airport
Emergency facilities available in case bomb explodes
Time/distance considerations in case bomb explodes
Performance requirements at high altitude airports
High speed or CONF 1 diversion considerations
5.
Descent and or diversion in accordance with BOMB ON BOARD checklist.
Flight using manual Cabin Pressure control and manual thrust requires close attention.
6.
About 20 mins from landing further information provided by ACARS that device is probably a timeactivated device and is due to explode at his ETA + 10 mins.
7.
After CONFIG 1 has been set, insert FLAPS JAM.(use more criteria on IOS) This will become
apparent when CONF 2 is selected for landing.
Landing performance considerations, which may involve Fuel Jettison.
Use of the SLATS/FLAPS JAM checklist and procedures
Prioritisation considerations due to time pressures.
8.
After landing consider Pax evacuation using slides or waiting for steps. Slides are the preferred
alternative, due time constraints.
Common Errors:
Trainee not familiar with Bomb on Board Checklist/ FOM policy
Incorrect handling of cabin pressure controls
Incorrect speed management due to MAN THR
Insufficient considerations of contaminated runway operations
Ineffective leadership style and lack of prioritisation
Ineffective communication with cabin crew and passengers.

Unofficial Document
Page 16 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
NBO-DXB
SAH-DXB
JNB-DXB
THR-DXB
LOS 5
Wx TCs discretion
MEL EPR indication fault N1 Rated Mode (control mode MEL 2.73.3)
AVIONICS SMOKE (AC BUS 2)
OBJECTIVES:
1. To Observe the trainee deal with the operational and performance considerations with thrust
control in N1 mode.
2. To Observe the handling of the Smoke drill and subsequent emergency descent.
3. To Observe the considerations of high terrain and high altitude operations.
4. To Observe task management and CRM in a high workload situation.
(Choose from
available CFPs)
DETAILS:
1. During cockpit preparation insert ENG EPR INDICATION FAULT.
This requires a takeoff procedure with A/THR re-engaged at LVR CLB in N1 rated
Mode.
Performance penalties for takeoff, and approach climb performance penalties for a
possible return, need to be considered prior to takeoff, especially due to the high altitude
of the airport.
2.
Depending on choice of diversion airports, insert AVIONICS VENT SMOKE with small
amounts of visible smoke in the cockpit.(control this by modulating the failure on the IOS
panel)
Arrange with sim technicians prior to the session to ensure smoke is available and that
they isolate the smoke warning for the building.
Do not insert too much Smoke as crew may be tempted to revert directly to EMER ELEC
CONF. The intent is to isolate only AC BUS 2.
3.
When AC BUS 2 is isolated the smoke disappears. PF must be CM1.

Ensure diversion is initiated promptly in accordance with FOM requirements to the
nearest suitable airport.
4.
A descent is required at some stage when approaching diversion airport, however an

Emergency Descent may not always required. If an Emergency Descent was initiated, ensure
correct procedures are used.
5.
High altitude, overweight landing, and performance requirements will need to be considered.
Go Around weight penalty due to N1 Rated mode.
6.
Evacuation requirements and options to be considered after landing. If normal landing has
occurred an evacuation should not be required.
Common Errors:
Trainee not familiar with N1 Thrust tables
Incorrect handling of Smoke Drill refer to FCTM.
Not commencing a diversion when smoke drill presented on ECAM.
If initiated, not conducting Emergency Descent correctly
Not appreciating the performance aspects of high altitude operations and its affect on aircraft
speeds
Unofficial Document
Page 17 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
ZRH-DXB
MXP-DXB
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
LOS 6
Wx: Winter Ops
TCAS
GREEN HYD LOW LEVEL
PAX heart attack
BLUE HYD LOW AIR PRESS
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVES:
To Observe the trainee prepare the aircraft in cold weather following the correct procedures.
To Observe decision making process and task management with the single hydraulic failure.
To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation, and
communication.
To Observe how the trainee copes with a deteriorating situation after the second hydraulic system Low
Air Press.
DETAILS:
This flight involves cold weather operations with low cloud, snow, and low visibility at the departure airport..
1.
Full cold weather operations are required for departure, with instructor adding pressures regarding deicing, hold over times, and slot times.
2.
After takeoff, introduce some FMGS exercises followed by a TCAS RA ( Aircraft must be in level
flight). Approaching TOC insert a SLOW GREEN HYD SYSTEM LEAK ( approx 3 lts/min)leading to
a complete loss of green hydraulic fluid (no RAT available).
Operation considerations include whether a diversion is required.
Dubai Engineering should be consulted as part of decision making process for information and
recommendations.
Best option is to continue flights as remaining two systems are operational.
3.
After a further 10-15 min of cruise, Purser advises of a sick passenger (suspected heart attack).
MEDILINK and any on-board doctor should be consulted. They recommend a diversion ASAP.
4.
Diversion to be executed to a suitable airport.
Operational considerations of loss of Green Hydraulics to be considered.
5.
Once diversion has been initiated a BLUE HYD LO AIR PR leads to a loss of Blue Hydraulics
Blue Hydraulic system is recoverable at low altitude.
If trainee does NOT recover Blue Hydraulics then landing with GREEN + BLUE HYD LO PR will
occur.
If Blue Hydraulics are recovered, then landing with GREEN HYD inop. will occur
Operational and performance considerations of DUAL HYD or loss of Green Hydraulics to be

considered.
6.
Diversion and landing.
Common Errors:
Trainee unfamiliar with cold weather operations and fails to delegate.
Trainee diverting with the single hydraulic failure rather than obtaining more information and
continuing.
Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options.
Poor workload management when handling the diversion.
Failing to restore the Blue Hydraulic system at low altitude.
Incorrect TCAS manuever.
Unofficial Document
Page 18 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
DXB-KWI
FCO-DXB
KHI-DXB
SAA-DXB
LOS 7
WX: TCs discretion
MEL APU BLEED INOP
After Start STANDBY ATTITUDE FAIL (MEL)
FUEL LEAK decision making
(Choose from
available CFPs)
A short sector
works well.
OBJECTIVES:
To Observe the management of engine start with external pneumatic power.
To Observe the trainees correct use of the fuel leak procedure.
To Observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly planning, delegation and
communication.
DETAIL
Non tanking sector.
ADD APU bleed fault leading to an external pneumatic & cross bleed start.
After engines have been started, standby Attitude indicator fails ( acceptable MEL 34 22 01 )
ATC requires deviation 10nm miles north of track. Passenger reports seeing vapour from wing
area. Crew investigate and a fuel leak. Is confirmed.
Leak not from engine or leak not located
Diversion and Landing at a Suitable airfield.
COMMON ERRORS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Poor sequencing of check lists during external pneumatic start

Failing to notice standby attitude failure.
Incorrect use of the fuel leak checklist.
Poor diversion choice and management.
Unofficial Document
Page 19 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
(ETOPS)
CMB-DXB
JNB-DXB
MRU-DXB
LOS 8
WX Tcs Discretion (NPA)
NOTAMS ILS at most likely diversion airport is u/s
ETOPS procedures
ENG STALL ON ENG START
ENG VIBRATION
ENG OIL LEAK
ENG SHUTDOWN
NPA
OBJECTIVES:
To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures
and considerations.
To Observe the trainees handling of an engine vibration and oil leak communication,
contingency planning.
To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a
single-engine diversion.
To observe the correct execution of a non-precision approach.
DETAILS:
The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS procedures during flight planning and aircraft
preparation.
1.
During pre-flight preparation, introduce a distraction of an FOM related item (pregnant Pax,
firearms etc.)
2.
During engine start introduce an ENG 1 STALL that clears during the subsequent engine auto
start. Normal taxi and takeoff
3.
In cruise after 20-30 mins (consider using SPEED x 2 and FUEL FLOW x 2), introduce a
VIBRATION ADVISORY for ENG 1. This in turn results in a SLOW LEAK of ENG 1 OIL
QUANTITY.
Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM,
whilst making contingency plans for a possible diversion
Engine should not be shutdown while sufficient oil remains.(this needs to be set through
the IOS panel)
Eventually ENG 1 OIL QTY reduces sufficiently to require an ENG SHUTDOWN and a
diversion.
Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling diversion.
4.
NOTAMs indicate a NPA is required at the diversion airport. If another airport is selected for
diversion, ATC advice ILS is temporarily unserviceable.
5.
Single-engine NPA approach and landing required.
Common Errors:
Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations.
Poor flight management techniques and workload management when implementing the
diversion.
NPA approach procedures conducted incorrectly.
Shutting down of engine on advisory condition only.
Unofficial Document
Page 20 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LGW-DXB
SAH-DXB
JNB-DXB
NBO-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
LOS 9
WX; TCs discretion
TAXI: RAD ALT 1 FAULT (MEL)
TAKEOFF: RH MLG ABNORMAL
Return to land management, APP CLB, jettison
OBJECTIVES
To observe the trainee deal with all the precautions required for an emergency landing and
evacuation.
To allow the trainee to deal with the problem in real time and complete the full drill.
To observe the trainees knowledge of approach climb limits.
Observe handling of the fuel jettison system.
(Choose from
available CFPs)
DETAIL
On taxi out, RAD ALT 1 fault for MEL discussion. GPWS, High terrain Airfields.
On gear retraction, RH main landing gear shows abnormal indication, does not recycle and shows
unsafe. Crew must prepare for landing with abnormal gear, however in this instance it is a false
warning and gear locks on touchdown.
COMMON ERRORS
Failure to hand over control of the aircraft and effectively manage the situation.
Incorrect calculation of the approach climb limits.
Not using all available resources, under the circumstances.
Unofficial Document
Page 21 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
BOM-DXB
SAH-DXB
NBO-DXB
NBO-DAR
LOS 10
WX: Monsoon.
On takeoff FLAPS JAM.
Runway closed due crashed aircraft.
Divert to another AD with FLAPS JAM.
Diversion AD requires a NPA approach.
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVE
To observe the trainee deal with the Flap locked problem during the acceleration phases
and manage for another approach.
To observe the decision making process and task management when the runway closes and
diversion implemented.
To check trainees knowledge of limitations and performance restrictions in this configuration.
To observe the trainee demonstrate use of QRH tables and FCOM references as above to
deduce new burn off and alternate decision.
To observe FMGS reprogramming and execution of diversion.
To observe a NPA approach with uneventful landing.
DETAIL
This exercise is a flight during the monsoon season. The weather is typical with heavy rain, storms
in the area and associated turbulence. Normal pre-flight, engine start, taxi and takeoff. Flap2 or 3
config for takeoff. On flap retraction, flap stuck between 3 and 1. Slats are still operative.
Whilst aircraft is manoeuvring for holding or an approach, a B747 has a runway excursion on
landing and closes airport for an indefinite period.
Diversion to available alternates. NPA approach to be flown. ILS is notamed inop.The weather is
around NPA minima. Fuel is critical due to cruise now at FL200 (flap limit) and increased fuel
burn. The CM 1 needs to analyse all the information before arriving at an alternate decision.
QRH 4.13 burn off
FCOM 3.02.27 p4 x 2.2
COMMON ERRORS
Trainee failing to fly the aircraft accurately and getting a VFE exceedence
Not flying a selected speed as soon as the problem occurs
Incorrect task management when implementing diversion. Someone must always fly the
aircraft
Incorrect use of FCOM and QRH to solve performance considerations.
Poor alternate chosen, as being fuel critical.
Incorrect programming of FMGS for diversion.
Unofficial Document
Page 22 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
MXP-DXB
FCO-DXB
ZRH-DXB
LGW-DXB
LOS 11
WX: Rain and low cloud, cross winds
MEL - ENG 2 BLD INOP
R INR TK FUEL LEAK finally causing ENG 2 FLAMEOUT
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVES
To Observe use of MEL and considerations.

To Considerations for wet Runway with cross winds, and limits
To Observe the use of the weather Radar.
To Observe task management of FUEL LEAK, Eng Fail and diversion
To Observe Single Eng Ops, Approach and Landing, on WET Rwy with 15 kt Xwind.
DETAILS
Rain and low clouds with crosswinds of 15kts. Rwy wet. Braking action MED
MEL- ENG Bleed 2 Inop.
During climb, Fuel Leak from Right Inner tank.
1.
MEL Bleed Inop. 36-11 Requires APU to be left running for the entire flight. Fuel
considerations!
2.
Wet runway with cross winds considerations. (2.04.10)
3.
Normal takeoff with climb to cruising Altitude.
4.
Thunderstorms and weather avoidance, use of weather radar, during climb.
5.
During climb or in cruise, depending on diversion airfields available. Fuel Leak form right
inner tank. Crew may notice this, if not, then during ECAM advisory, or Pax report of white
vapour from Rt. wing. This should draw the crews attention to the fuel leak procedure.
Leak not located C/L to be actioned.

Gravity fuel feeding C/L to be actioned. If less than 30 mins FL 150
6.
The engine should flame out during the procedure.
7.
A diversion to a suitable airfield is required.
8.
Fuel imbalance considerations and limitations.
9.
An approach in rain, low cloud.
10. Landing on a wet Rwy, with a crosswind of 15 kts. Reverses not usable as per fuel leak C/L
Common Errors
Not allowing enough fuel for APU use due Bleed Inop.
Not using the weather radar correctly.
Trainee not familiar with the fuel leak proc.
Trainee not descending to correct altitude for fuel gravity feeding.
Insufficient considerations given to fuel imbalance and limitations.
Using reverse after touch down
Ineffective communication with crew and Pax
Unofficial Document
Page 23 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
DXB-MCT
DAR-NBO
NBO-DAR
LOS 12
WX: Good with HZ
Pre-Departure Pax wanting to carry gun on board
TCAS
TOD ATTITUDE DISCREPANCY
F/O becomes sick incapacitation
Runway lighting failure missed approach
Return for landing
Use a short sector

flight.
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVE
To observe the trainee handle the attitude discrepancy and deal with it accordingly without
losing control of the aircraft.
To conduct a lightweight, low level missed approach.
To successfully fly and land aircraft safely as single pilot with incapacitated F/O
DETAIL
This exercise is based on a short flight at night. In this exercise the trainee actually completes the
flight without diverting.
Prior to departure FOM related problem ( body guard carrying gun etc )
All ops normal with FMGS or TCAS exercises at instructors discretion. At top of descent, when
the A/C pitches down for descent, insert attitude discrepancy on IRS flying autopilot.
Recovery is possible with proper analysis, crosschecking and switching.
Descending through 7000ft F/O complains of severe abdominal pains ( appendix ) and dashes to
the toilet immediately. Does not come back !
Approach to minima where the runway lights fail ( wayward driver smashes into relay station )
resulting in a missed approach.
Trainee to conduct another approach as single pilot IFR with slight improvement in the weather
and lights back on standby generator . Runway lights strength 3 to allow landing.
COMMON ERRORS:
Clear determination of who is flying the aircraft during abnormals.

Hand flying when autopilot is available
Incorrect prioritisation during single pilot operation.
Diverting when not really necessary.
Incorrect TCAS manouvering.
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Page 24 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
NBO-DAR
DXB-MCT
DXB-KWI
FCO-MXP
LOS 13
WX: Low cloud and visibility at minimum for NPA
MEL SLAT SYS 2 INOP (GREEN) 27-81
After T/O SLAT SYS 1 FAULT, Slats stuck in extended position
Sick PAX
ILS U/S at Departure and Destination Airfield
Return to Departure,G/A - due wx
Diversion and landing, NPA
A short route will highlight the fuel problems.
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVES:
To observe the trainee use the MEL

To observe the trainee handle the Slat jam procedure.
To observe the decision making process and task management with the failure and sick Pax.
To observe how the trainee manages the diversion, particularly the fuel requirements,
delegation and communication.
To observe an NPA being flown.
DETAILS
The flight involves Weather at NPA minimum at Departure and Destination.
A MEL with Slat sys 2 INOP.
After takeoff and at Flap retraction,Slat Sys 1 fault, causing the Slats to be stuck.(insert this fault
using the more criteria on IOS)
Initially speed management is important. This fault will manifest itself with the flap lever in
the 0 position, with the slats actually stuck at position 1. Thus having a speed limit.
After ECAM and reference to QRH with C/L completed, Purser advises of a passenger
suffering from severe stomach pains.
Normally a decision to return would be made and a NPA flown. The Visibility being on the
low side will necessitate a Go Around.
A diversion to a suitable airfield is to be made, before fuel becomes a problem.
Considerations, Max Altitude with Slats out (200000 Ft.). Fuel burns (3.02.27 pg 4. 1.5
times) Sick passenger?
ILS inop at diversion, requiring a NPA (At the instructors discretion. If the first one went
well, then continue for an ILS, or a selected if the first was managed)
Common Errors
The trainee is not familiar with the S/F jam procedure and as per ECAM Status reads it from
Go Around.
NPA procedures not being followed correctly.
Overspeed with Slats stuck out.
Not observing the 20000-ft altitude limit with Slats stuck out.
Poor fuel management.
Poor workload management when handling the sick passenger options.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LOS 14
WX - above EK circling minimas at departure airport
ETOPS diversion airports have high crosswinds that approach the 80% limit for ETOPS planning purposes.
ETOPS procedures
MEL APU GEN INOP
GPU failure, START ON BATTERY POWER
GEN 1 OVERVOLTAGE
EMERG ELEC CONFIG considerations, Or Eng 2 high Vibration (OK at idle thrust)
Diversion & landing
OBJECTIVES:
To observe the trainees understanding of ETOPS planning, pre-flight, & enroute procedures and
considerations.
To observe the trainee handle the associated ground problems on a battery start and running one engine
on the ground during boarding etc..
To observe the crew demonstrate FMGS knowledge during exercises on climb.
To observe the trainees workload and task management and prioritisation with regard to a diversion to a
non-ETOPS routing..
To observe the correct execution of a circling approach.
ETOPS
MRU-DXB
CMB-DXB
NBO-DXB
JNB-DXB
DETAILS:
The flight involves full use of all normal ETOPS procedures during flight planning and aircraft preparation.
1.
During pre-flight planning the ETOPS diversion airport should have crosswinds approaching the 80%
limit for planning pruposes. The crew should detect this and note that the airports are still available.
2.
During engine start the GPU fails requiring a Battery Start.
The management, planning, considerations, communications with ground crew, cabin crew and
passengers result in a busy time.
One engine needs to be running while checks are completed. Possibly IRS align and resetting of
CIDS for Cabin crew to use video equipment.
During climb introduce some FMGS exercises.
In cruise after 20-30 mins (consider using SPEED x 2 and FUEL FLOW x 2), but before entering the
ETOPS sector, Company ACARS message advises that crosswinds at ETOPS airport are approaching
32 kts.
Crew to consider what other ETOPS airports are available.
Is 180 mins ETOPS a consideration?
Are they in the ETOPS sector? If so then no route changes are required, but if not then a re-routing
to a non-ETOPS route may be required.(fuel requirements)
3.
4.
5.
Introduce a GEN 2 OVERVOLTAGE causing a loss of GEN 2 before entering the ETOPS sector.
Crew should consider operational options and also contact Engineering on SATCOM, whilst
making contingency plans for a re-routing or diversion.(1 Gen. means no PES and part Galley)
Observe workload management and communication techniques in handling re-routing or diversion.
Does crew have enough fuel for non-ETOPS routing? If not, then a diversion is required.
6.
During the diversion, Lightning strike takes away Gen. 1 leaving the Aircraft with EMERG
ELEC CONFIG. OR Eng. 1 High Vibration or Eng Stall (Both OK at Idle Thrust)
7.
If diversion does occur the crew arrange for a circle-to-land to be required at the diversion airport.
Common Errors:
Trainee not being familiar with ETOPS procedures and planning considerations.
Poor flight management techniques and workload management when considering and implementing rerouting or diversion.
Circling approach procedures conducted incorrectly.
Not ascertaining that the electrical status of the aircraft is getting critical single generator ops.
Not considering best diversion options in case EMERG ELEC CONFIG becomes required.
Poor communication and resource management during failures.

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Page 26 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
DAR-NBO
FCO-MXP
LOS 15
WX: CBs
MEL: SATCOM U/S
Enroute LIGHTNING STRIKE causing AC BUS 2 FAIL and total loss of comms
Approach Destination, heavy rain causes go-around and diversion to Alternate
(Choose from
available CFPs)
OBJECTIVES
To observe the trainee take the necessary precautions with regard turbulence and
thunderstorm avoidance.
To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions associated with an AC BUS 2 fault.
To observe the trainee conduct the promulgated ICAO loss comms procedure
To observe the trainee correctly manage a low fuel state.
To observe the trainee execute a safe go around and diversion to an alternate.
DETAIL
The flight is short sector, The aircraft has a Tech log MEL SATCOM u/s.
The weather is typical rainy season, with thunderstorms (with associated problems of heavy rain
and low vis). There are CBs to avoid en route and the weather at alternates fair, but reducing to
2000m in rain.
After reaching top of climb CB avoidance. During this phase the aircraft experiences a lightning
strike causing an AC BUS 2 fault. The flight continues but now they have lost comms completely.
No responses from any radio call.
The LOS continues to develop with the crew having to carry out the proper procedure for total
loss of comms. The correct course of action is continuing the flight.
On arrival at Dest heavy rain is experienced and a PWS is activated, resulting in a go around and
subsequent diversion due marginal WX and fuel state.
They should execute a diversion without delay otherwise a low fuel situation will develop.
COMMON ERRORS
Incorrect procedures followed for flight in turbulence and weather avoidance.

Failing to carry out the correct loss comms procedure.
Allowing the loss of comms to distract them from the low fuel state.
Poor execution of the go around and diversion to alternate.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
BOM-DXB
SAH-DXB
KHI-DXB
LOS 16
Wx: Monsoon
MEL: APU INOP
GEN 1 FAULT
DC ESS BUS FAULT
Engine shutdown required via Fire Handle.
Or can use this as

a Winter Ops
scenario using:
LGW-DXB
ZRH-DXB
MAN-DXB
OBJECTIVES
To Observe the trainee correctly interpret the MEL.

To Observe the trainee correctly manage the aircraft with a severely degraded electrical
system.
To Observe the trainee manage a diversion
DETAIL
The A/C has an MEL item APU u/s. This necessitates an external pneumatic start with all relevant
Precautions being taken.
In climb there can be FMGS exercises or weather avoidance as required.
Once in the cruise introduce GEN 1 fail. Observe comms and decision to continue or divert. Pax
comfort, Part galley and no PES.
Some time later when well established en route introduce DC Ess Bus Fail. AP 2 is still available
The A/c has a severely degraded electrical system and a decision must be made on whether a
diversion should be made.
ACP 1 & 2 are u/s and the a/c has no wing A/I no L WINDOW heat so a winter scenario can
prove interesting.
The A/C is CAT 1 only due to loss of standby horizon.
Captain has lost his flight instruments.
Common Errors
Poor prioritising of external start.

Operating in icing conditions with a degraded anti icing system. (Winter option only).
Poor decisions to continue or divert with one gen (Pax concerns, part galley. PES)
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
(ETOPS)
JNB-DXB
MRU-DXB
CMB-DXB
LOS 17
WX: CBs
MEL APU INOP
LIGHTNING STRIKE causing GEN 1 FAULT single GEN operations
If no diversion back to JNB (no Galleys/PES etc) then IDG OVHT ADVISORY
Return to JNB, jettison, landing
OBJECTIVES
To observe the trainee carry out the correct procedures associated for an ETOPS flight
To observe the trainee accomplish an external pneumatic start.
To observe the trainee manage a departure in thunderstorms and rain.
To observe the trainee handle a GEN problem and manage a diversion with all the necessary
procedures being followed.
(NON-ETOPS)
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
MXP-DXB
DETAIL
If used on an ETOPS sector the trainee should carry out the extra pre flight duties. (Refer to LOS
14)
APU is inop, so a start with external sources is required.
Numerous CBs are encountered on departure and all the relevant precautions with regard weather
avoidance and turbulence must be undertaken.
Once established in the cruise the aircraft experiences a lightning strike which results in a GEN 1
FAULT. The trainee must decide whether to continue or return to departure airfield. The purser
will complain about lack of galley power and the fact that a number of passengers are angry
because their IFE is not working.
Once a decision has been reached, as to whether to continue or return
An IDG OVHT ADVISORY on GEN 2 could also be introduced leading to Emerg Elec
Config
Or an Eng problem eg. High Vib, Eng Stall, that requires no Eng shutdown and the thrust to
remain at Idle.
The trainee must now return to departure airport with all the considerations of performance,
weather, runway state, fuel jettison etc.
COMMON ERRORS
Failing to carry out the necessary precautions for an ETOPS flight.

Poor prioritising with the external start
Poorly managed departure in thunderstorms
Failing to take into account all the considerations with a diversion.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
LGW-DXB
MAN-DXB
ZRH-DXB
FCO-DXB
JNB-DXB
LOS 18
WX: TCs Discretion
MEL Nil
Tire burst on T/O causing BLUE HYD LO LEVEL
ENG 2 LO OIL PRESS causing ENG 2 shutdown DUAL HYD LO PR
OBJECTIVES
(Choose from
available CFPs)
To observe the trainee prioritise his actions in the event of a tire burst.
To observe the trainee manage a Blue Hydraulic low level.
To observe the trainee carry out the correct actions for an ENG LOW OIL PRESS.
To observe the trainee manage a DUAL HYD LO PR
DETAILS
On the T/O run (20kts below V1) a tire burst on the LH MLG. The decision should be GO.
Possible consideration is leaving the MLG down (FOM ch 25-13) performance permitting.
As the tyre burst is very subtle most trainees will probably retract the MLG.
The damaged tyre causes a leak in the blue hydraulic system and during the climb out the A/C
experiences a BLUE HYD LOW LEVEL.
If the MLG is down the trainee will have to decide whether to return to point of departure or
divert, but continuing en route would probably not be a good option. All issues should be
considered, fuel, landing weight, performance, unsafe gear, etc.
If the MLG has been retracted the trainee should gather as much information as possible as to
whether he should divert or continue. It is a single failure so continuing is a consideration but as
much information about possible further damage caused by the tyre should be sought i.e. ATC
should be asked about Tyre deposits on the runway. Engineering asked about likely further
damage engineering response should be that if there is no vibration and that if all other system
parameters are normal, then the a/c should continue.
Only when a decision on whether to divert or continue has been made ENG 2 LO OIL PR should
be introduced. This will result in Engine being shut down with the ensuing loss of the yellow
hydraulic system
DUAL HYD LO PR Despite this being LAND ASAP the trainee must consider ,landing weight,
Performance, fuel jettison, etc before deciding where to go. The procedure for DUAL HYD LOW
PR must be methodically run through handing over control where necessary.
As this is a very demanding situation, radar vectors to an ILS should be made available.
If the LOS is used as a short exercise, the Low Oil Press can be replaced by Eng High Vib or Eng
Stall, leaving the aircraft with one Eng in Idle Thr. and a single HYD Sys Lo Press.
Common Errors
Rejecting for a tyre burst.

Failing to gather sufficient information about the single hydraulic failure.
Failing to complete all the actions for a DUAL HYD LOW PR and rushing the approach.
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Page 30 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
SCENARIO
ALTERNATIVE
ROUTES
SAA-DXB
ZRH-DXB
JNB-DXB
LOS19
Wx : Variable
MEL Nil
LH MLG Stuck Down
Diversion consideration and landing, NPA approach
OBJECTIVES
To observe the trainee initially concentrate on flying the a/c during climb out and not be
distracted by MLG problem.
To observe the trainee gather information prior to either Landing or diverting
To observe a NPA being flown.
DETAIL
On T/O LH MLG will not retract. Trainee should fly the a/c making sure all altitude constraints
for the SID are met.
Once at a safe height ECAM actions can be completed the outcome being the MLG is stuck down.
With the excessive vibration a quick PA to the Pax should be made to reassure them.
This scenario is not time critical and the trainee should stay below the line whilst making a
decision on where to divert.
This scenario works best at airfield with large performance penalties: Go around & landing
distance.(SAH RWY 18)
The trainee will have to calculate whether he can achieve go around climb gradient with the gear
down, whether he should use higher minima, circling app, divert with gear down etc.
Good comms with SMNC/Engineering are required
Approach should be via NPA.
Common Errors
Failing to fly the A/c and getting too preoccupied with the gear problem.
Failing to establish all the facts (particularly) performance, before committing to a diversion
or return.
NPA approach procedures not being adhered to.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Unofficial Document
Page 32 of 84
LOS
Candidates Notes
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
3. CANDIDATES LOS NOTES

BOM DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Thunderstorm activity whilst boarding.
Start Fault. Manual start Valve

BMC 1 + 2 Fault
Failure 3
BMC Fault
Failure 4
Drunk passenger, over assertive SFS wanting to Man handle pax
RAK is the alternate on the flight plan, there are no charts for RAK in the sim so change alternate to
OOMS, gives excuse for extra fuel.
Route manual company NOTAMs cannot use Ahmedabad as an alternate on A330. Remember, in an
abnormal situation can disregard. If airborne and want to divert there, then call the company and find out
why cant use it. Maybe just no handling agreement.
Start Fault. Manual start Valve operation.
Thunderstorm activity whilst boarding. Briefed for windshear and checked to see if rwy contaminated.
Passenger trouble. Ask CSD if wants to off load passenger or not? Involve station Manager. Make it
someone elses problem.
BMC Fault at holding point. Drunk passenger, over assertive SFS wanting to Man handle pax. Get purser
involved.
Lots of very bad weather around. Divert L and R. Keep ridiculously clear or get severe turbulence! Dont
get flight level, start running tight on Fuel. Review fuel policy.
BMC 1 + 2 Fault. Now have no bleed monitoring so wont know if have an overheat until the pack auto
shuts down! Sent ACARS to engineering to warn them, decided to continue to DXB.
Sick passenger, establish if genuine or Indian sick. If genuine call Medlink on Sat phone before calling for
doctor on board. Prepare secondary incase divert to KHI or MCT.
Lightning strike and lose radome. Resulting in unreliable airspeed. Establish flight path hand over to F/O,
so can run QRH (obscure location 5.05) and monitor. Elect to divert to KHI. Fully configure in level flight
on a very long final.
Check GS on ND. Or from Radar. +/- wind component to get IAS.
Can only use FPV if altitude info is ok. Get block Altitude clearance.
Check Altitude on GPS monitor page (Data / GPS monitor). Or with Radar.
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Page 33 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1

14/32 closed for works
ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode)
Failure 3
Failure 4
Dispatch in N1 rated mode, lots of consids in the MEL

A few pax probs, ENG STALL on start, auto restart OK
Had another computer reset on taxi, cant remember what it was but straight forward from the QRH.
T/O into the wx and FLAPS fault on retraction somewhere between 2 and 1. Return for landing BOM but
another jet runs off the runway and 09/27 blocked.
Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam
effecting ILS).
BOM - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Thunderstorms
Pack 1 u/s Restricted to Fl310, took extra gas
GPS 1 and 2
Failure 3
FMGEC independent operation
Failure 4
Eng flame out

HYD G&B
Got F/O to fly the sector

GPS 1 and 2 fault on push back
On T/O FMGEC independent operation
Thunderstorms in the area weather avoidance
Eng flame out descend to relight the engine on relight it blow up engine damage shutdown checklist
Divert to Muscat as wind was 20 across and slight tailwind at KHI so did not want to fly visual to 07
On descent the HYD G&B ( was suppose to be Blue with Rat on Green ie will lose it at 140 kts
Difficult to fly and consider A/thr off as the eng where hunting lots of power changes
Took up hold to get check list done and 25 mile final for configuring
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Slats or Flaps dont retract on T/O. Run ECAM, do checklist, return. Traffic ahead blows tyres on runway.
ATC says 1 hr to clear. Dont trust them. Check status of cross runway. Immediately start heading towards
KHI, (AMD is basically on the way). On the way calculate divert fuel (KHI 455nm away, AMD is 240nm)
with slats or flaps out. Refer 2.05.50. Corrections from FCOM3.02.10 p8., QRH 4.13 gives the same.
455nm = 6,800 kg + (19 * 40) = 7,560 kg = 7,600kg.
Slats Extn
7,600 kg * 1.5 = 11,400 kg
Flaps Extn
7,600 kg * 2.2 = 16,720 kg
Slats & Flaps
7,600 kg * 2.5 = 19,000 kg
+Final fuel
240nm = 4,169 kg + (19 * 40) = 4,929 kg = 5,000 kg.
Slats Extn
5,000 kg * 1.5 = 7,500 kg
Flaps Extn
5,000 kg * 2.2 = 11,000 kg
Slats & Flaps
5,000 kg * 2.5 = 12,500 kg
+Final fuel.
BOM DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Double IRS failure on take off. Return, runway blocked, Go-around divert to KHI.
Unofficial Document
Page 35 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM DXB ALT OOMS

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
THUNDERSTORMS IN VICINITY, HEAVY RAIN.

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT
NIL.
Failure 3
Failure 4
TOOK 1T EXTRA WEATHER. (TAKE MORE!!!)
LOTS OF DISTRACTIONS AS WE WERE DOING SET-UP.

CONFIG 2 FOR RWY 27.
NO START VALVE OPENING ON #2. CONFIRMED NO N1 WITH GROUND. MANUAL
VALVE OPENING PROCEDURE.
ON TAXI, CALL FROM THE SFS WHO HAD A DRUNKEN PAX, SFS WAS AGGRESSIVE;
ASK ME TO RESTRAIN THE PAX. TOLD HIM TO STAND BY, HAD THE PURSER TAKE
CONTROL AND HAD THE PAX ISOLATED IN BUSINESS WHERE HE WAS HAPPY AND
WOULD NOT BOTHER ANYONE.
ATC TRIED TO RUSH US INTO AN IMMEDIATE WITH 747 TRAFFIC 8 NM FINAL. SAID
WED WAIT AS WE WANTED TO HAVE A GOOD RADAR LOOK PRIOR TO THE ROLL.
HAD THE FO SCAN THE RADAR, CLEAR SO ROLLING. (WET X-LIMIT APPROX 20KTS.)
IN POSITION. BMC 1 FAULT.TOLD FO WED LOOK AT IT IN THE AIR.
AFTER TO VISUAL WITH A MASSIVE LINE OF CBS PERPENDICULAR TO OUR TRACK
ABOUT 100NM LONG........NOTHING ON RADAR, AND AS IT TURNS OUT WE HAD THE
RADAR INCORRECTLY SET UP?? ANYWAY HUGE DIVERSION LEFT AND RIGHT
..BURNT LOTS OF FUELBMC 1 + 2 FAULTDISCUSSION FCOM 3.
FL280 ONLY IN LOTS OF WEATHER..LIGHTNING STRIKE (WE THOUGHT IT WAS
SEVERE ICING ONLYSIM DOESNT DO A VERY GOOD LIGHTNING STRIKEJUST A
LOUD BANG AND SHAKING???).LEADING TO UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED DRILL AFTER A
VERY SLOW SUBTLE LOSS OF SPEED TAPEDECLARED PAN AND ASKED FOR SLOW
DESCENT AND LOST SOME ALTITUDE TRYING TO MAINTAIN SPEED
(ICING???)..MEANWHILE..15000 IN DESCENT..BOTH PACKS
OVERHEATINGSEVERAL RESETSCONFUSING DUE TO LOSS OF BMCS..STARTED
APU..
MAYDAYDIVERSION TO MUSCAT (KARACHI ONLY 50 NM CLOSER...) FOR ILS 25
VECTORS LANDED WITH 1TON FUEL ONLY..
TOTAL TIME 3 HRS (SIM NEEDED A RESET AND ANOTHER TAKE OFF DUE TO SEVERE
TURB)
SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO..LIGHTNING STRIKE AND RADOME DESTRUCTION FED IN.
Unofficial Document
Page 36 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Good Weather BOM and DXB, no weather enroute

APU GEN U/S
Planned on Start at the gate after all passengers were onboard
Just prior to start, Ground Power unit fails, no replacement available
Battery Start procedure
Normal taxi
Departed RWY 27 SLATS LOCKED during the acceleration phase
Continued enroute, requested FL200 while we addressed the problem
Decided to return to BOM
Approaching BBB, Aeroflot departs runway, airport is closed
Divert to Ahmedadab
At FL200, using ALT Planning charts QRH X 1.5, 45 minutes enroute
LOC ONLY RWY 23 VAAH
Landed
De-Brief
-
During Battery start procedures, consider turning OFF the IRSs

o Saves battery life and they have to be restarted anyway
o Full align takes about 10 minutes
when engine starts,
o restart the IRSs
o check the MCDU, database may have changed
o Gives you time to reset the CIDs , if necessary, and
o Reset the N1 EPR mode (N1 mode ON then OFF)
Refer to the QRH CRM stuff more often, especially if diverting

Use the CORS method of problem solving
Be careful when talking to the Purser about Evacuations. It might be the only word she
hears even if you say it is not needed!
OK to let the PNF do the flying and the approach
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
-
Failure 3
Failure 4
ON GROUND DURING COCKPIT PREP "APU BLEED LEAK" (ECAM, THEN FCOM 3)
MAN ENG START WITH EXTERNAL BLEED (DUE PRESSURE <25PSI ), START
MALFUNCTION WITH HIGH EGT, MANUAL SHUT DOWN (REMEMBER, ONCE ABOVE
700C, MAINT. REQ)
DURING TAXI, PRIM 1 FAULT, USE QRH RESET OF COMPUTERS
ATIS STATED RVR OF 550M IN MOD RA (T/O MINIMA FOR F/O 2 KM, ALSO CHECK MIN
T/O VIS IN BOM ON JEPP PLATES)
LOTS OF WX ON DEPT SECTOR (MONSOON COND), ND SETTING FOR WX CHECK MIN 40
NM
CONF 3 T/O, AFTER COMMAND "FLAPS 1", ECAM "F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED"
ENTERED THE HOLD OVERHEAD BBB, ASKED FOR WX, RVR WAS LESS THAN REQ FOR
CAT 1 LANDING, NO IMPROVEMENT, WX KHI AND AMD NOT BRILLIANT, BUT OK
USED SEC FLIGHT PLAN TO FIGURE OUT DISTANCE ALONG AWY'S TO OPKC (~465NM),
VAAH(~230NM), I WAS WESTBOUND MINDED, FORGOT TO CONSIDER VOHY(~334NM),
(TURNED OUT THAT HYD RWY LENGTH SIGN. LESS THAN AMD AND WX WAS WORSE)
USED THE TABLE FCOM 3.02.27 P4 AND THE ALTN FLIGHT PLANNING TABLES
INITIALLY, KHI WAS TO TIGHT, DECIDED TO PROCEED TO AHMEDABAD
CLIMB TO FL 200, THEN AGAIN COMPUTATION OF FUEL REQ ACCORDING ACTUAL FF
INFORMED PUR, PAX AND COMPANY
UNEVENTFUL LANDING IN AMD
TOTAL TIME CA 3 HRS, THEREAFTER TWO MINI LOFTS (1. UNRELIABLE SPEED DURING
ROTATION AND 2. ELEC EMER CONFIG DURING INITIAL CLIMB)
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
BOM-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Wx: TS and rain over the field although Vis > Cat 1
Notams 14/32 closed for works
MEL: ENG 1 EPR Mode fault (rated mode)
Dispatch in N1 rated mode, lots of consids in the MEL
A few pax probs, ENG STALL on start, auto restart OK
Had another computer reset on taxi, cant remember what it was but straight forward from the QRH.
T/O into the wx and FLAPS fault on retraction somewhere between 2 and 1. Return for landing BOM but
another jet runs off the runway and 09/27 blocked.
Diverted to VAAH with slats flaps out as not the gas for anywhere else, landed via NPA to 23 (notam
effecting ILS).
BOM DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
SLATS / FLAPS JAM ON

RETRACTION
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
SLATS / FLAPS JAM ON RETRACTION.

RETURN TO BOM, UNABLE TO LAND DUE DISABLED A/C ON THE RWY.
DIVERT TO AHMEDABAD.
Unofficial Document
Page 39 of 84
JNB to DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Bomb Threat
Failure 3
Failure 4
Bomb Threat must descend aircraft immediately as per the checklist to get the cabin within 1
PSI of the outside air pressure. Minimizes explosive damage.
- do not jettison fuel, explosion could ignite fuel that is being dumped
Bomb Threat (or avionics smoke) go direct to nearest suitable airport, immediately and
declare an emergency, then follow the checklist.
Rudder Jam use FCOM 3 as there is a reset procedure that should fix the problem
EMERG ELEC CONFIG this scenario occurred right after take-off.
- fly the aircraft (Capt) and remember to get the autopilot back on, use the FMA to help
- landing gear lever was stuck down, both LGCIUs are off line Land Recovery gives back
LGCIU # 1.
- If this is the only problem, use the summary page in the QRH
- In the event of a go-around, turn off the Land Recovery P/B to regain use of autopilot
Unreliable airspeed scenario was that we flew through a locust swarm
- all 3 ADRs became blocked, thus, as you climb, the indicated airspeed increases
- this then results in the aircraft pitching up to combat the apparent overspeed, even if you
push forward on the stick. If you climb higher the problem gets worse.
- The only way out of this scenario (aircraft continuously pitches up) is to turn off all 3
PRIMs. This results in Alternate Law and the Overspeed protection is disabled
Climb Performance Charts
- FCOM 3 provides S\E Climb Gradient charts
- QRH has Approach climb gradient charts for overweight approach and landing
- AFM contains 2 engine climb gradient performance charts
Dual Engine Failure the AFM states that relight is not possible until aircraft is below FL300,
but continue to follow the procedure on ECAM or the QRH if necessary.
- if you get one of the engines back (ie) #2 , even though you have green hydraulics, still
use the Gravity extension for the gear.
- Reason is that the green system could be overloaded by the excess demand and the
Emergency generator (in the green system) is still powering the essential buses at this
stage. An over demand on the green system could stall the emergency generator.
African airspace use the 1NM offset to the right in African airspace
- utilize the blind broadcast procedures ( 126.7)
- have all approach plates ready for Harare, Dar and JNB
- need both HFs so test them both
Unofficial Document
Page 40 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
review use of the Satellite Comms
High Altitude Airport calculate your return weight for emergency landing
- calculate runway distance needed for emergency (remember Press Alt correction)
- S/E Climb Gradient for Go-Around
- Maximum true airspeed for tires Vr + 2KTS per 1000 ASL ?????????
- Max tire speed is 195 knots
These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I
have just included the main items. (Thats all I can remember anyway!)
Unofficial Document
Page 41 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
JNB - DXB (Etops)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
T/S Nil significant

Nil
APU
Smoke
Failure 3
FCU
Failure 4
The Sheikh wanted to carry his hunting rifle on board
A/C had an APU Gen Fault, which had been fixed???
APU dropped off line just before Start check the FMGEC again use the Hat
Cabin in dark, make PA to Pax
Had to get ground Elec cart start one on stand then push
Pax problem new the Sheikh wanted to carry his hunting rifle on board no way in the cabin
Normal T/O after airborne lost FCU Red Alt and Spd on PFD A/P and A/thr gone you get the Bird
so fly this set manual thrust say 85% N1 10 deg pitch up
Get clearance from ATC for heading and block clearance cancel Sid
Restore using QRH reset Computers
Thunderstorms avoidance
In cruise smoke, Descend and carry out drill mask on etc
Smoke would not go away so you get to the Smoke removal checklist we did not want to slow
down so elected not to do the checklist till near JNB but you can get Ram air to help so do the
checklist to Ram air ie packs off and carry out to Ram air on
Remember that you also have Harare as and airport use ETP page to keep aware of Alternates
Keep O2 cover area clear
Call a May Day
Unofficial Document
Page 42 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
JNB - DXB - ETOPS

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Had APU Gen U/S in brfg>> no effect on ETOPS capability. Given max ZFW of 168 T for
departure. Wx in DXB was not good. Elected to take reduced reserve to carry the load as Muscat
wx was good.
After takeoff & following gear retraction, had low tire press. Got tower to check out runway and
indeed had left shredded rubber on runway>>> burst tire. No problem. kept on going to DXB &
consulted with MCC on SATCOM. MCC suggested review low tire press limits in FCOM 3.01good info.
Through FL 200, had blue hyd fail. Kept going to DXB & called MCC again to advise/consult.
Around 250 mi N of JNB had severe eng vibrations & eng shutdown leading to dual hyd failure
& Land ASAP in amber. Driftdown proc. Although I was closer to Harare (by about 75mi) and
the wx was good in both places I elected to turn back to JNB rather than go to Harare. Was good
decision as I needed lots of time to dump fuel anyway. Advised Purs, Pax, Company etc.
Continued to JNB dumping fuel. Use ETOPS diversion procedure from FCOM 2. Yes, I said FCOM 2 !
Could not dump below 180T because of hvy ZFW so elected to land slightly O/W (183 T)
Vectors back for ILS 03L (better than 03R)
Landed & stopped on Runway due to burst tire. Engineers inspected & shutdown on rwy due lack
of NWS (gravity gear ext).
Unofficial Document
Page 43 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
JNB to DXB ETOPS sector
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
MEL R/H Landing Light U/S (Etops restriction) concession granted by MCC
Pregnant passenger FOM
During Taxi, Spoiler Fault, OEB, reset procedure PRIM 1
Tire Burst at rotation
Blue Hydraulic Loss
Oil Leak #2 Engine TOC
Returned to JNB using high speed strategy
S/E ILS 21L (one engine at idle thrust)
De-Brief
-
read the MEL carefully, the R/H Landing light issue could possibly apply to either light
tire blown after takeoff, discussed possible damage to aircraftgood
at TOC check, FO missed the low oil quantity and I missed it 5 minutes later. MCC
advised that they could see the problem and advised us to retard the thrust lever in an
attempt to save the engine, it did.
Utilized high speed profile single engine back to JNB. Harare and Lilongwe were closed
at night and Biera was too short to help us.
CAREFUL, if Biera were unuseable, then the first leg out of JNB would have to be
considered an ETOPS sector. More than 420 nm from a suitable airport.
Continue to use the diversion checklist in the QRH, helped a lot.
Fuel dumped enroute down to 180 tonnes. Enough for alternate and a few circuits at JNB
and under max landing weight.
Considered the possibility of losing the low oil engine, effects on approach, further
diversion to Gabarone, Dual Hydraulics failure, etc.
Discussions about landing and the sister tire blows, land on the right side of the runway,
idle reverse on good engine.
Taxi with blown tire procedures 7 knots for 1 tire blown, 3 knots for 2 tires blown
Unofficial Document
Page 44 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
JNB-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
TYPICAL JOHANNESBURG AFTERNOON, SOME CU, POSSIBILITY OF SHOWERS

AND 90* X-WIND, RWY 03L IN USE FOR T/O. EN-ROUTE WEATHER OK, DUBAI
FORECASTING 100M IN FOG.
NO TRAPS, VARIOUS EN-ROUTE AIRPORTS WITH UNSERVICEABILITIES AS PER
NORMAL.
APU U/S.
SCENARIO:
Failure 3
Failure 4
ESTIMATED ZFW 168T, FUEL LOAD REQD WITH 2800 ALL-WX ADDITION
WAS VERY HIGH---60T. UNABLE TO LIFT THAT WT AT 20*C, TOLD LOAD TO
STANDBY, REQUESTED REDUCED RESERVE FLT PLAN. NO COMMS WITH
DUBAI---NEW FLIGHT PLAN NOT FORTHCOMING. DECIDE TO REDUCE FUEL
BY 3T, TO TAKE AS MUCH LOAD AS POSSIBLE. (STILL LEFT 1 CONTAINER
BEHIND).
PNEUMATIC GND AIR AND ELECTRICS USED FOR STARTING 1, THEN XBLEED START ON 2 DURING PUSHBACK. DURING THE PUSHBACK, ECAM
PRIM 2 AND SEC 2 FAULT. RESET OK.
TOGA TAKE-OFF UNEVENTFUL, DURING CLIMB OUT THE YELLOW
HYDRAULIC LEVEL SLOWLY REDUCED UNTIL ECAM HYD YELLOW LO
PRESS.
APPROACHING OVANA, HEAVY VIBRATION---ENGINE 2, N3 WELL ABOVE 4
UNITS. THROTTLE REDUCED, EVENTUALLY TO IDLE THRUST. RETURN TO
JNB, DUMPING ALL THE WAY IN. LANDS VIA ILS 03L.
MINI-LOFTS
1.
ENGINE FAILIURE ON TAKE-OFF, CANNOT LAND BACK DUE WX, DIVERT TO CLOSE
ALTERNATE, LOC APPROACH AND LANDING.
2.
DURING CLIMB-OUT, PASSING FL 280, INTERMITTENT SMOKE WARNING, THEN

AVIONICS SMOKE WARNING. RUN QRH TO EVENTUAL ELEC EMER CONFIG.
VECTORS BACK TO CLOSEST RUNWAY, EMERGENCY DESCENT TO FINAL,
EVACUATION ON RUNWAY.
3.
ON TAKE-OFF, ENGINE FIRE. WILL NOT EXTINGUISH. REQUEST VECTORS BACK TO

TAKE-OFF RUNWAY. ON DOWNWIND ENGINE BURNS OFF AND FALLS FREE OF THE
WING, RESULTING IN DIFFICULT CONTROL AND DUAL HYDRAULIC EMERGENCY.
LAND BACK, NO EVACUATION REQUIRED, NO FIRE.
Unofficial Document
Page 45 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
JNB DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
MAX WEIGHT T/O.

RWY CHANGE RESULTING IN SEVERE PAYLOAD RESTRICTION. OPT TO TAKE REDUCED
RESERVE CFP TO MAXIMIZE PAYLOAD.
AT TOC, #2 ENG LO OIL PR INTERMITTENT WARNING, FOLLOWED BY #2 ENG FAIL.
RETURN TO JNB.
FUEL JETTISON DURING DESCENT.
DURING DESCENT, BLUE HYD LO PR WARNING, RESULTING IN #1 ENGINE AND GREEN
HYD SYS ONLY.
REGAIN YELLOW HYD SYS THRU AUTOMATIC ELECTRIC PUMP OPERATION, ON FLAP
SELECTION, RESULTING IN #1 ENGINE WITH GREEN & YELLOW HYD SYS.
JNB-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
JNB- WIND ACROSS THE RUNWAY WITH POSSIBLE RAIN SHOWERS.

DXB- AWO FORECAST, ALTERNATE MCT.
APU U/S.
Failure 3
Failure 4
DISPATCH: MAX ZFW, MAX TOW AND MAX LDGW.

AFTER START FMS 2 FAULT, THE COMPUTER WAS RESET FOLLOWING QRH, SUCCESSFUL.
TAKE OFF ON 21R.
WHEN IN MAPUTO AIR SPACE GEN 1 IDG OIL LOW PRESS, AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM GEN 1
U/S.
DECIDED TO CONTINUE USING A NON ETOPS ROUTE. ABOUT 15 MINUTES LATER GEN 2
WENT OFF LINE. EMERG ELEC CONFIG. AFTER FOLLOWING ECAM, GEN 2 WAS
RECOVERED.
DECIDED TO RETURN TO JNB, WE JETTISON FUEL DOWN TO 180 T AND LANDED IN JNB.
Unofficial Document
Page 46 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
KHI DXB.
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
APU power cart failure

FM1
Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault
Failure 3
Failure 4
Eng 2 Low oil pressure
APU power cart failure. Start on Batteries. Hand signals only available for start. Cant see the bottom
ECAM screen. Can check it by switching. Pressing ALL key. Would have been better to call the bridge
back and ask the engineer how long to get another cart. Company preference is to take the delay rather than
start on batteries. No Communications with engineer so use hand signals. PA to PAX about the lights
flickering on / off etc.
On taxi out FM1 failed, carried out switching. Forgot to try reset procedure as per QRH. Would have got it
back if had!
Depart KHI from rwy 07L. Weather avoidance / direct to Enroute etc.
Eng 1 Thrust lever Fault. The MN note in the FCOM is mach number. Effectively when the slats are
extended the engine will be commanded to idle (like a simulated engine failure except cannot get the thrust
back when cleaned up) inform ATC purser and company.
Eng 2 Low oil pressure. Unable to shut down engine as would become a glider at slats extend. Diagnosed
the fault as being a faulty oil press transmitter so elected not to go to Muscat. Which had a NPA and
Xwind. Continued to DXB.
Failed to keep ATC adequately in the loop so they blocked the runway to force a go-around. Went around
stayed in the circuit kept Flap 1 1500 and landed.
Unofficial Document
Page 47 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
KHI DXB (Final Loft check)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
KHI 070/15-20 kts vis 5000m, DXB Cavok, MCT 350/20 gusting 25 kts Cavok
KHI Rwy 25R/07L closed.Taxiways F+B closed
MCT G/S rwy 26 u/s
AUH
Aerodrome closed until 1400hrs due VIP movements (ie still
closed at the time we would need it if we had to divert there from Dubai)
APU Gen u/s
Failure 3
Failure 4
Took Extra 3 tons
At planning stage Cfp had OMRK as primary alternate. No charts in sim for OMRK. Second alternate was
OMAA but closed at expected time of arrival due VIP movements. No other alternates listed on Cfp. Had
wx and Notams for OOMS, fuel difference was roughly 3 tons between OMRK as an alternate and OOMS.
Told KHI Atc to change our filed alternate to OOMS and briefed F.O that our first option would be to
check with ATC to see if OMAA had re-opened should we need it. Ordered CFP fuel plus 3 tons.
On board, confirmed GPU available and that DXB had been advised we would need a GPU on arrival.
Normal set up. Problem with a family who had not been seated together, Purser asked me what she should
do, I asked her and the F.O what they thought was the best idea, between them they came up with the
solution.(Which was to move our engineer from Business into First and then bring the 2 kids seated down
the back to join their folks in business)
On start, eng #1 start pressure initially good (30psi) but rapidly decayed to around 8psi.Confirmed no N1
Rotation with engineer.
Apu air had given up the ghost. Refer to Mel and dispatch without APU.
Request ground air.
Start eng #1 on gate with GPU and Gnd pneumatic air, push back and x-bleed start the other engine.
Normal taxi.
On line up IRS#3 fault.
Request to hold position. Run ecam. Not really enough info. Refer to Vol3 3.02.34 pg4a. Attempt the reset
procedure mentioned in the note on the page but no success. Refer to MEL and off we go.
Advise Ek engineering via ACARS of IRS fault.
Airborne and wx radar picks up large cell on track at about 60nm.Ask ATC about it and they report new
met info indicates a tropical storm enroute. (Not on wx briefing)
Divert Left of track by approx 50nm to clear wx by approx 40nm.Talk to purser and advise her that will
release the crew (light turb only at this point) but keep pax seat belts on. Passing approx FL150, moderate
turbulence. Sit the crew down. PA to pax advising I have instructed the crew to take their seats and may be
a while before the service starts.
FMS!/FMS2 position mis match picked up by F.O on MCDU screen.
Ran accuracy check on KHI VORboth FMGCs check o.k.
Held down to FL310 due traffic. (Requested level 390).Fuel still o.k at 310 but only just for OOMS by
approx 200kg.
Another FMS!/FMS2 pos mis match. Confirmed GPS still primary, ran another accuracy check on MCT
Vor and asked Muscat to confirm our radial and distanceall checked o.k.
Pushing for higher level but no go by ATC
AC Bus 2 fault. All goes blank on F.Os side. Shortly after, #2 eng gen u/s.
Down to one eng gen and emer gen only with AC bus 2 lost.
Approx 100nm from OOMS and 220nm from OMDB
Sort out failure which basically is just a very long list of minor inop systems and nothing left on the F.Os
side (no screens or FM),overhead switch internal light failures but the switches are still working, reverse 2
U/S and in manual thrust due N1 mode reversion.
Unofficial Document
Page 48 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Quick discussion with F.O, get OOMS weather and OMDB weather. Same conds as when left KHI. Decide
to continue to OMDB but if we lose another gen source will divert to either OOMS or OMDB whichever is
the closest.
Cant handover of course so instruct F.O to advise Purser of situation and that she has lost partial galley
systems and continuing to DXB etc. Get F.O to do P.A and advise Dubai. Discussion on what to say to
ATC. We decide to tell them we have a technical difficulty but not to declare an emergency or raise a Pan.
Ask F.O to review Vol3 for both AC2 Bus fault and also EPR mode fault to obtain N1 values for Toga and
MCT in the event we are reverted back to N1 unrated mode for any eason.
Rest of cruise is just setting up for arrival etc.
Passing through 4000 feet and cleared to intercept LLZ 30R (for the ILS) and lose IRS#2.
Altn Law, no AP, no F.D, no A.thrust.
Got F.O to stop ecam and ask ATC for hold in current position at 3000. Confirmed that Atc had us under
radar and clear of terrain.
Ran the Ecam. Very quick procedure and only change was now for a config 3 landing. Fuel had just gone
under CMR for OOMS so got F.O to check if OMAA had re-opened and it had so re-nominated OMAA,
got F.O to change alternate in MCDU 3 .
Radar heading from ATC to manually flown ILS and Landing 30 R.
No reverse 2 , selected idle reverse only on 1 and low auto brake.
Multiple glasses of bubbly later
Debrief points:
Nil
(CHECK) KHI - DXB

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
FINE.
APU GEN INOP.
FUEL LEAK
Failure 3
Failure 4
ALL WENT SMOOTHLY THEN JUST AFTER DOORS CLOSED WE HAD GPU FAILURE. NO
OTHER GPUS HANDY SO HAD TO DO BATTERY START. FOLLOW BATTERY START
CHECKLIST AND MANUAL START CHECKLIST.
NO PROBLEMS ON THE TAXI AND TAKE-OFF.
ON THE CLIMB OUT GOT AN ENGINE BLEED LEAK. ECAM DONE, DECIDED TO STOP CLIMB
AT 350.
APPROACHING ALPOR CSD REPORTS VAPOUR COMING OFF THE LEFT WING. CHECKED
FUEL AND SURE ENOUGH FUEL FROM THE LEFT SIDE DIMINISHING RAPIDLY. GOT THE
CHECKLIST OUT. UNABLE TO CONFIRM ENGINE LEAK SO DESCENDED TO GRAVITY FUEL
FEEDING CEILING. (YOU HAVE TO GO TO GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING PROCEDURE QRH 2:08).
IN THE MEANTIME STARTED DIVERSION TO OOMS, AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY.
WHEN GRAVITY FUEL FEEDING CEILING WAS REACHED SWITCHED OFF ALL LEFT FUEL
PUMPS. QRH THEN STATES THAT IF ENGINE FLAMES OUT WHEN THERE IS STILL FUEL IN
THE TANK, GO BACK TO THE LEAK FROM ENGINE PROCEDURE. ENGINE CARRIED ON SO
ASSUMED WING DAMAGE AND CONTINUED THE DIVERSION. ACCORDING TO THE
INSTRUCTOR, IT WAS ACTUALLY AN ENGINE LEAK AND IT DOESNT ALWAYS FLAME
OUT? WHILST BUSY WITH THE CHECKLIST GOT AN ECAM WARNING, WING TANK LO LVL.
BE CAREFUL AS THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE ECAM LEADS YOU UP THE GARDEN PATH. IT
Unofficial Document
Page 49 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
TELLS YOU TO SWITCH ON FUEL X-FEED WHICH IS THE LAST THING YOU WANT WITH
FUEL POURING OUT OF THE WING.
ABOUT 5MINS OUT OF MUSCAT, LEFT ENGINE FLAMED OUT, NO MORE FUEL IN LEFT
WING TANKS. SORTED IT OUT, WENT IN AND LANDED ON 08, 3.5 TONS OF FUEL LEFT IN
THE RIGHT SIDE. STOPPED ON THE RUNWAY SO THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE CHECKED
OUT BY FIRECREW.
MY MISTAKES.
CONSIDER SWITCHING IRSS OFF BEFORE BATTERY START AS THEY USE A LOT OF BATT
POWER.
COULD HAVE TROUBLESHOOTED MORE WITH REGARDS TO ESTABLISHING WHETHER IT
WAS AN ENGINE OR WING LEAK.
Unofficial Document
Page 50 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
KHI DXB ALT OMRK

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
GOOD WEATHER ALL ROUND

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT
APU GEN INOP.
Failure 3
Failure 4
TOOK 1T EXTRA AS NEW CAPTAIN.
LOTS OF DISTRACTIONS AS WE WERE DOING SET-UP. MISSED 500 KG FUEL IN TAIL.

BRIEFED START #1 AT GATE DUE TO MEL. AS WE STARTED, GPU KICKED OFF, DID NOT
DISCONTINUE START UNTIL GROUND CONFIRMED NO N1 ROTATION. STOPPED THE
START. ASK FOR NEW GROUND CART, TOLD WOULD TAKE A WHILE. MEANWHILE
TOWER ADVISES A/P WILL BE CLOSED IN 13 MINS DUE TO VIP MOVEMENT. DECIDED
ON BATTERY START, STILL NO N1 ROTATION, COULD NOT MONITOR START VALVE
DUE TO LOSS OF SD (BATTERY ONLY). OKAY NO PROBLEM ASK IF GRND WAS
PREPARED FOR MANUAL START VALVE OPERATION, THEN REALISED WE HAD
FORGOT TO TURN ON APU BLEED AIR!!
FO MISSED IT IN HIS SET UP, AND I DIDNT CHECK
OK SO BACK TO BATTERY START ON 1, ALL OK EXCEPT NO FM1 OR FM2 AFTER POWER
TRANSFER, TOLD THE FO WE WOULD CONTINUE WITH PUSH AND START ON 2 AND
THEN IF STILL NO FMS WOULD TRY RESET.TWO GOOD STARTS, PARK BRAKE
SET.QRH RESET OF FMGEC 1 AND 2 FAILEDFO WANTED TO REALIGN IRS BUT I
BELIEVED THIS WAS NOT THE PROBLEM.TRIED FMGEC RESET AGAIN..NO
JOY..QUICK REALIGN NO JOYFULL REALIGN..NO JOY..ASKED INSTUCTOR
FOR ENGINEER INPUT, HE ASSISTED AND SUGGESTED ONLY OTHER OPTION TO CHECK
MEL..NOGO..BACK TO THE GATE. (ACTUAL SIM SNAG)
BURNED THE 1T EXTRA ALREADY! WENT WITH CFP FUEL.
ON TAXI MCDU #2 FAIL, SWITCHED IT OFF, FO USED #3, BRIEFED WE WOULD RESET IN
THE AIR, AS WE WERE NOW LATE.
TAKE OFF CLIMB UNEVENTFUL.
NOTICED FUEL FWD XFR IN CLIMB, HAD A LOOK AT FUEL PAGE, THOUGHT THATS
STRANGE..IT WAS THE 500KG WE HAD MISSED AT THE GATE
THRU 12000 MC AND L + R WING TANK LO LVL DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WHY WE WOULD
GET THIS SO EARLY IN THE FLIGHT, FUEL BURNT PLUS FUEL IN TANKS LOOKED OK,
ECAM ACTIONS OKFO HAD NEVER SEEN THIS IN HIS 2 YEARS ON THE LINE..FO
THEN ADDED UP ALL THE FUEL AND BRIEFED THAT WE HAD LOST 1.2 T, STILL FUEL
PAGE LOOKED OK TO ME, HAD THE PURSER LOOK AT THE WINGS OK, ASK FO TO
RECALCULATE, YUP, WE HAD LOST 1.3 NOW..I THOUGHT OK THIS WAS IN ADDITION
TO THE FUEL WE HAD BURNT ON THE GROUNDMEANWHILE FMS SHOWED ARRIVAL
AT DXB 2T BELOW MIN FUELSO WE TURNED AROUND AND AS A PRECAUTION
RAN THE FUEL LEAK CHECKLIST..
RESET MCDU #2IN DESCENT
THR LEVER FAULT #2 ECAM ..DISCUSSIONILS 25R.
A/C ON RWY GO-AROUND..
VECTORS NOW WITH #2 STUCK AT IDLE..ILS STOP 25 R..
ENG#1 FLAMED OUT ON TAXI INECAM..
COULDNT TAXI WITH #2 AT IDLE SO WAITED FOR TOW BAR THEN SHUT DOWN #2
ON BATTERY PWR AND TOWED IN .LOTS OF PAS TO PAX!!
SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEONO ACTUAL FUEL LEAK..
Unofficial Document
Page 51 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
KHI-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
090/15kts 5k 1000
Nil Sig at KHI, no glides slope ILS 26 OOMS
APU Gen INOP
Failure 3
Failure 4
GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start.
FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH
T/O normal.
ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to
OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for
land.
KHI - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
-
Failure 3
Failure 4
DURING COCKPIT PREP, PUR CAME AND SAID, FIVE MEN ARE CARRYING 10 FALCONS
IN FIRST CLASS, ARE WE ALLOWED? (GAVE F/O FOM TO LOOK FOR APPROP. PAGE AND
CLARIFIED)
CHECK ATT MESSAGE CAME ONTO PFD'S, AFTER EVAL RESETTED IRS 1, PROBLEM
CURED
AFTER T/O: HYD Y RSVR LO LVL, AFTER HYD ECAM, ANOTHER ECAM WARNING
STATED WHEEL TIRE LO PR (ON THE WHEEL PAGE TWO TIRES HAD LO PR)
ATC CONFIRMED TIRE DEBRIS ON THE RWY, WE DIDN'T NOTICE ANYTHING LEADING
US TO TIRE BURSTS (SIM ), SO GEAR WAS ALREADY UP, CONTINUED TO DXB
A MINUTE LATER HYD G RSVR LO LYL CAME UP
STOPPED CLIMB AT 8000FT, DECLARED EMERGENCY, RETURNED TO KHI.
IT IS A TRICKY THING TO DETERMINE THE LDG DISTANCE, G+Y HYD = X 1.7, NO TIRE
PROBLEMS INDICATED IN CHART QRH 2.26
CHOSE BRK RELEASE FAULT, WHICH IS X 1.4, SO TOTAL LDG DIST REQ IS FOR 2 FLAT
TIRES: 1,4X1,4X 1,7=3,332
ZWF WAS 168TO AND EVEN WITH E.G. 170TO LW THE REQ LDG DISTANCE WITH THIS
FACTOR WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE THAN THE AVAILABLE 25R 3200M(25L CLOSED)
SO DIDN'T JETT FUEL, LW CA 180TO, BRIEFED F/O THAT I WILL FLY BELOW THE GS
WHEN VISUAL AND ALMOST ON TOP OF THE RWY IN ORDER TO LAND ON THRESHOLD
TO GAIN MORE DISTANCE
LANDING AND BREAKING WITH ACCUMULATOR WAS NO PROBLEM, STOPPED AFTER
2/3RD OF THE RWY, ACC TCE SIM DOESN'T REFLECT THE LDG DIST PROBLEM
PROPERLY
ONE ENG FAILURE AFTER T/O MINI LOFT
Unofficial Document
Page 52 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
KHI DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
APU GEN INOP

FM2
Failure 3
Failure 4
GPU FAILS
PRIOR TO START, GPU FAILS. BATTERY START.

ON TAXI, FM2 FAILS. RESET.
ENROUTE, GEN 2 FAILS, TWICE, RESET, THEN FAILS AGAIN. LEAVE OFF.
IDG 1 LO OIL PR, RESULTING IN EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION.
DIVERT TO MCT.
KHI-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
090/15kts 5k 1000
Nil Sig at KHI, no glides slope ILS 26 OOMS
APU Gen INOP
Failure 3
Failure 4
GPU Tripped off line at engine start, no others available so battery start.
FM 2 failed on taxi, reset OK via QRH
T/O normal.
ENG 2 vibes in cruise, reduced at idle. LO OIL PRESS 2 a few minutes later so shut down, diverted to
OOMS LOC 26. SIM placed the R/W in the wrong place so stayed vis at 1000 and circled back onto 26 for
land.
Unofficial Document
Page 53 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
LGW DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
PRIM 3 Fault at the gate

Trim Tank empty after fuelling, Manual Trim sheet
Weather avoidance
ENG High Oil Temp in cruise
Icing conditions
Diversion to EDDF
LOC Approach to 25R
-
when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at
this time. You may catch a trim tank problem at that time
some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final
altitude FL 60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected.
Further investigation in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this
procedure. Peter agreed with our selection.
RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and
the charts can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong
altitude for direction of flight. You have to correct it.
Stick to the engine failure in cruise procedure

o MCT, A/THR disconnect, ATC
o Start descent by checking the FMA
o Consider engine anti-ice for descent
anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!
STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide
where to divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the
higher airspeed and resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of
pressure fluctuations in the descent.
Landing Distance Procedure apply

o QRH 2.43, when multiple factors for landing must be calculated, always multiply
the factors together unless both failures HAVE an asterisk!
if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload
point, (ie) crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000 AGL.
Unofficial Document
Page 54 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
LGW-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
LGW OVERCAST AT 400, RAIN, TEMP 4*. MOST OF LONDON AIRPORTS ARE
FORECASTING MUCH THE SAME.
NORMAL LOADS OF INFO, BUT NOTHING TO DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE
FLIGHT.
NIL
Failure 3
Failure 4
SCENARIO:
SLOW BOARDING, DIFFICULT PAX, SLOT TIME. CHECK FOR ICE, WORK WET
FIGURES. ON TAXI, RA 1 FAILS---NOT RECOVERED.
DURING CLIMB, LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT. RECYCLED, NOW
WOULD NOT EXTEND. (RIGHT MAIN JAMMED IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION).
REQUESTED HOLD AT MAYFIELD VOR, ASSESSED THAT WOULD NEED TO
DUMP ABOUT 40 TONS OF FUEL AND ALSO REDUCE FUEL LOAD IN RIGHT
WING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. REQUESTED VECTORS TO JETTISON AREA,
HELD FOR ABOUT 45 MINS, DUMPING FUEL. USED TIME FOR COMMS WITH
EK AND TO BRIEF PURSER ON REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDING WITH
ABNORMAL GEAR. GATWICK ADVISED WE COULD LAND ON 26 R, AFTER
APPROACH ON LEFT. BURNT AS MUCH FUEL AS POSSIBLE FROM RIGHT
WING, THEN BRIEFED FOR AND FLEW APPROACH, WITH LAST MINUTE SIDE
STEP. EVACUATED ON SIDE OF RUNWAY, (WE HAD GROUND LOOPED OFF
THE RUNWAY).
RMK:
BEWARE OF RUNNING TWO FUEL CHECKLISTS AT THE SAME TIME.

RATHER DUMP FIRST, AND THEN CHANGE FUEL FEED CONFIG.
LGW DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
PRIM 3 Fault at the gate

Trim Tank empty after fuelling, Manual Trim sheet
Weather avoidance
ENG High Oil Temp in cruise
Icing conditions
Diversion to EDDF
LOC Approach to 25R
-
when you decide on final fuel be sure to advise mechanic downstairs, check fuel page at this time.
You may catch a trim tank problem at that time
Unofficial Document
Page 55 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
some discussion about what altitude to set in the FCU for the SID. I briefed the final altitude FL
60 and using the managed climb, the enroute constraints would be respected. Further investigation
in the FCOM , SOPs and FCTM does not give guidance about this procedure. Peter agreed with
our selection.
RVSM discussion enroute. Are we at the right altitude? Usually, the CFP Is correct and the charts
can confirm the altitude. Be careful in Africa, instructor may give wrong altitude for direction of
flight. You have to correct it.
Stick to the engine failure in cruise procedure

o MCT, A/THR disconnect, ATC
o Start descent by checking the FMA
o Consider engine anti-ice for descent
anytime you have a problem at altitude, consider, Belts ON and Eng A/I ON!
STATUS page, give it a quick review even though it is flashing. It may help you decide where to
divert. The status page may be interrupted during the descent because of the higher airspeed and
resulting windmilling. The hydraulics page will cycle because of pressure fluctuations in the
descent.
Landing Distance Procedure apply

o QRH 2.43, when multiple factors for landing must be calculated, always multiply the
factors together unless both failures HAVE an asterisk!
if PNF has control, plan to take control back at a better time. Not at a high workload point, (ie)
crossing the FAF. As long as it is done by 1000 AGL.
These are my LOFTS, there were a number of minor things along the way in each of them but I have
just included the main items. (Thats all I can remember anyway!)
Unofficial Document
Page 56 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
LGW DXB:
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Ice
Unreliable Airspeed/Alt
Failure 3
Failure 4
Take Off, company calls and asks you to divert to LHR to pick up passengers because of a broken B777.
Get authorisation from them to dump fuel as we are way over weight. Co-ordinate with ATC and go and
dump to Max ldg weight. Go to LHR, have to hold due traffic. Ice starts to build rapidly. In close
succession lose airspeed and altitude info. Run the unreliable airspeed QRH.
Cant control pitch when visual due to ice. Try other stick i.e. F/O. Conduct a very gentle go-around incase
cant control pitch. Inc speed to get more control. (VLS +15kts FCOM 3.04.91).
Conduct a high speed approach and land.
LGW- DXB (Pre check)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
LGW: 270/06 4 degrees in rain, Bkn 600 forecast to improve.

Most of the U.K the same or worse.
Nil
Nil
Failure 3
Failure 4
As per Cfp
Confirmed with engineer that the aircraft had no ice on arrival so therefore no deice required.
Eng a.ice on for T.Off.
Slot time given, asked F.O to load FMGS to speed things up.
Normal start up, after start Blue electric hyd pump u/s
Checked MEL and continued.
During taxi, Rad Alt #1 fault. Stopped on taxiway to sort out. MEL checked and o.k to go but also
implicates to GPWS. Checked MEL for this also and it states that you should not leave either DXB or any
place that the GPWS can be repaired at. We had already dispatched so MEL did not apply. Quick chat with
the F.O and we checked with engineering in LGW to ensure they were happy for us to continue or would
they prefer to repair it. We continued.
On departure Land gear retraction fault (Right main L.Gear), briefed to continue on track hoping we
could sort it out initially. Limited speed to 230 kts (250 max) and altitude to FL210.
F.O ran ecam and after recycling still no good so ecam says put gear down.
Now we end up with Land gear not downlocked fault. Ecam says to recycle for this fault also, ran the
recycle and still not locked down. Stopped the ecam procedure at this point,handed over control to F.O,
discussion with F.Oobviously not going to be able to continue to DXB stacks of fuel on board so no
hurry to do anything, got weather for LHR,MAN and LGW. Only one with good wx was LGW (improved
to 1000 base) Requested vectors to a suitable hold and asked ATC to liase with other control centers to
establish who would be most likely to accept an aircraft with the possibility of an abnormal landing gear
problem.They cleared us to LYD holding position and said they would get back to us.
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Chat to Purser to tell not sure of nature gear status yet but definitely not continuing to Dxb, released her and
the crew but said dont start service yet. PA to pax telling them of technical difficulty and to reamin seated.
Advised LGW station manager of problem and asked him to contact Dubai and to liase with our engineers
there and we would keep a listening watch on the frequency.
Returned to ecam procedure.
Lower ecam screen now fails (S.D).Switched Ecam N.D to Capt postn and it did not recover S.D on my
N.D. Reset the switch. Located QRH and ran QRH2.10 (which said to do exactly what I had just done) and
this time it did recover the screen on my N.D.
Quite confusing and difficult to monitor the F.Os flying and run the ecam via screen switching. Decided to
wait until safely established in hold before continuing ecam actions. Atc advise that LGW would be in a
position to accept us if we end up with a gear problem. Entering hold ( had stopped climb at FL150) realize
that we are above the freezing level and with gear hanging out thats not a good thing so ask for descent to
6000 as are probably going to have to burn a lot of fuel off anyway. Started descent to FL60 in hold.
Finally return to ecam and after the second manual gear extension procedure (ecam says to do twice) gear
is still not locked down.
Dragged out Vol3 and find a note saying that if second attempt unsuccessful refer to Landing with
abnormal gear procedure
Located this in Vol3 and briefed that although it is also in the QRH Vol3 has more notes and so will read it
from Vol 3 and then do the actions when required from the QRH for the approach.
Now that we knew we for sure had a gear that we couldnt get down we declared an emergency and
requested emergency services. Asked which runway to expect, ATC advise 26R , quick talk to F.O and
refuse as dont want to side step to smaller rwy near buildings etc. Cleared to use 26L.
Returned to Vol3.Worked out we needed to dump around 30tons of fuel. Asked ATC for vectors to an area
to dump fuel, held at FL60 in 5 min race pattern dumping fuel. Used time to brief Purser and Pax and
company etc programme FMGS and finish Vol3.
Reset the fuel dump at 8 tons, opened up X-feed and started fuel imbalance procedure as per Vol3.
When finished, took control again, transferred S.D to F.Os side got clearance for radar vectored ILS and
got F.O to run the QRH 2.13 from where it says Approach. Attention crew at stations at 2000 and
Brace Brace at 1000.
Landed on 26L stopped ,completed the QRH procedure and evacuated on the rwy.
Debrief points:
Have a very good look after landing at the state the aircraft may be in.
In my case I followed the QRH all the way which automatically lead to an evacuation being announced.
I must admit that I was surprised we had remained on the runway as I was expecting quite a vicious ground
loop. In actual fact the gear didnt collapse and when the right hand Mlgear finally came down (as I had
been holding up the right wing on touchdown) I thought that the thump was the engine pod touching the
runway. It was just because I had finally run out of airspeed holding the wing up and the MLGear came
down harder than normal.
Therefore an evacuation was probably not necessary.(I am sure you would notice this if it happened for
real)
Miniloft
Ex 26L LGW for DXB.
Airborne and #1 eng fire, Pan Call.
Fire didnt go out ,Mayday.
Mid down wind , engine seperates and lose B+G hyds.
Fire light still on, quick check with Purser confirms engine gone, so reasoned at least no more engine fire.
Downgraded to Pan call but still wanted emer services obviously. Asked F.O to go straight to status page to
tell me what config I needed for landing and quickly what we had left.
Config 2 for app and land.
Gear collapses on touchdown and I get to see what a ground loop really does!
Evacuate on the grass.
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Debrief point:
Discussion on downgrade to Pan Call. Probably a fair comment, should have left it at a Mayday.
CHECK LGW DXB ALT OMAA

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
WINTER 3000 RASN OVC 005 3/-5 ALL OVER EUROPE

DEST/ENROUTE: GOOD
NIL.
#2 BLEED AIR (MAX FL370..APU RUNNING..XBLEED OPEN)
Failure 3
Failure 4
CFP + 1T (APU) +2T (FL370)
RWY: 26L WET FLEX
NO DE-ICE.
SLOT TIME.15 MINS TO DO SET-UP..GOT FO TO DO PANEL WHILE I DID FMS.
NORMAL START AND PUSH THEN CONFIG FOR MEL.
NOISE ABATEMENT CLIMB 3000 AND S SPEED FOR TURN.
TOC ADV FUEL IMBALANCE.
CALCULATIONS INDICATE LOSS OF 6T FUEL. RECHECKED, PURSER TO INVESTIGATE.
FUEL LEAK CHECKLIST.RETURN TO LGW.
COULDNT PINPOINT ENG/WING LEAK LEFT SIDE SO KEPT ENGINE SO AS NOT TO
DEPRESSURIZE DUE MEL.
OVERWEIGHT LANDING @187T
HAD TO CONVINCE FO NOT TO RUN FUEL IMBALANCE CHECKLIST AND NOT TO SHUT
DOWN THE ENGINE.
VECTORS ILS 26L FULL STOP.
SHUTDOWN #1 ON RWY..CLEARED ON TAXIWAY.SHUTDOWN STAIRS FOR PAX.
TOTAL TIME 2 HRS.DEBRIEF IN SIM
Unofficial Document
Page 59 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
LHR - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
NIL
Failure 3
Failure 4
WX, AS ABOVE.
A MINI-LOFT WITH AN UNEVENTFUL TAKE-OFF. ON DEPARTURE, PASSING
THROUGH 5000 (IMC) MASTER WARNING, NO1 ENGINE ON FIRE. CARRIED OUT
ECAM ACTIONS, FIRE BECAME UNCONTROLLABLE, SO ASKED FOR VECTORS
BACK FOR THE ILS. APP AND LANDING UNEVENTFUL AND CARRIED OUT
EMERGENCY EVAC ON THE RUNWAY.
Unofficial Document
Page 60 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
MAN DXB (Cold Weather ops)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Sigmet Turbulence and Icing
ENG2 EPR Mode fault

Smoke
deicing
Failure 3
Failure 4
Sigmet Turbulence and Icing. Briefed Crew.

Cold Weather ops out of MAN. Weather not that bad. De-iced on stand. Co-ordinate with Station manager /
engineer / purser / ATC / loaders / deicers. Dont rush and dont multi-task, do one checklist at a time.
Dont start deicing one wing thinking the door will be closed by the time they get there etc No, no, no.
Set S speed on the climb page for the departure to make aircraft fly the noise abatement SID out of MAN.
Otherwise accelerates at 1,000 and the turning circle is too big.
Just prior to V1, ENG2 EPR Mode fault. RH EPR goes blank and left goes automatically into N1 mode.
Looked across and saw it was rated. So delayed ECAM actions until after the after T/O checklist. Could
have perhaps done them earlier, as the ECAM didnt inhibit the warning until 1,500 therefore it must be
reasonably serious.
Remember to powered back to set 1.10 EPR before selecting N1 Mode so as not to over boost.
Check QRH, Check FCOM, confirmed that the N1 was rated and looked at the charts to do manual
calculations should the rated function fail. Advised Ops via Speed bird Manchester and continued. FADEC
restored the system later on.
Weather avoidance. Turbulence. QRH 5.01 Man Thrust.
At FL370 got ECAM cold fuel which calls to increase TAT. Fuel Temp was exactly the same as TAT.
Figured if the TAT didnt get any lower then nor would the fuel temp. Decided that we would stay at
FL370 and monitor the Temp. Should have checked QRH and FCOM 3 and limitations to confirm this
decision.
Turbulence got bad sat down crew and descended to FL 330. Turbulence better but got Smoke. Masks on,
ECAM actions down to Avionics smoke procedure. Called for QRH, signs on sat down crew, MAYDAY
and high dive into FRA. Isolated the Smoke to AC bus 2. Determined that the cockpit window did not need
opening so stopped the checklist. Note Vol3, the RAM AIR does nothing to remove smoke from the
aircraft but it allows you to turn the Packs off so can open cockpit window. Kept high speed and flew a
short circuit into FRA. Very brief approach brief, quick review of the overweight landing checklist. Didnt
dump fuel with fire. CSD said sick passenger when on finals. Landed in FRA stopped on runway.
Confirmed no fire from cabin or external, continue to gate, didnt switch on APU or take ground power as
wanted to keep AC BUS 2 isolated. Shut down, told paxs to remain seated as ambulance people coming on
board, as was engineer to check Fire status. Spoke to station manager and sent pax to terminal area.
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
MAN-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
RAIN SHOWERS WITH SNOW, TEMP +2C, 220/10 OVC 500.

L4 DOOR, DEVICE FOR KEEPING IT OPEN U/S. DOOR CANT BE USED
FOR PAX, EMERGENCY LIGHTING MUST BE MASKED, RED NO EXIT
SIGN POSTED BY THE DOOR, CABIN CREW BRIEFED, PAX BRIEFED.
Failure 3
Failure 4
AT AIRCRAFT, TIGHT SLOT, TRY AND GET A NEW SLOT AT LEAST 20MIN BEFORE OLD
SLOT EXPIRES. DE-ICING NOT REQUIRED. ON AUTO START, NO LIGHT UP ON NO2, FADEC
SORTED IT OUT AND SECOND START SUCCESSFUL. TAXIED WITH EAI DUE TO ICING
CONDITIONS, BE CAREFUL AS SPEED PICKS UP VERY QUICKLY.
TAKE-OFF UNEVENTFUL, ON FLAPS RETRACTION GOT A FLAPS LOCKED WARNING.
ACCORDING TO THE INDICATOR FLAPS WERE ALL THE WAY UP, SO DECIDED TO
CONTINUE TO DXB AND CARRY OUT A NO FLAP LANDING THERE. JUST TO BE SURE,
ASKED F/O TO GO BACK AND CHECK VISUALLY. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE A SIM FAULT AS
THE INDICATOR WAS SUPPOSED TO SHOW SOME FLAP STILL DOWN. ROD DULY GAVE F/O
THIS MESSAGE. STOPPED CLIMB AT FL200, INFORMED ATC AND ASKED FOR WX. MAN
RUNWAY HAD BECOME BLOCKED; LHR, LGW AND LSS WERE ALL OVC WITH RAIN AND
HOWLING X-WINDS. ORIGINAL FORECAST FOR AMSTERDAM WAS FINE, BUT ON REQUEST
ATC NOW INFORMED US THAT IT WAS CLOSED, FREEZING RAIN ETC!!! STANSTEAD WAS
THE BEST OF A BAD BUNCH, SO DIVERTED THERE AND ENTERED THE HOLD AT LOGAN.
GAVEF/O CONTROL AND RAN THROUGH THE CHECKLISTS AND SET UP THE APP. DECIDED
NOT TO JETTISON FUEL AND RATHER TAKE THE OVERWEIGHT LANDING, AS I DIDNT
WANT TO END UP DIVERTING FROM SS WITH LESS FUEL AND FLAPS STUCK DOWN. TOOK
OVER AND CARRIED OUT APP AT SS.
MY MISTAKES.
TERMINOLOGY, STANDARD LEFT/RIGHT SEAT TAKE-OFF IS NOT RECOGNIZED ON A330
FLEET.
CHECK X-WIND LIMITS FOR WET RUNWAY TAKE-OFF.
ENTERED THE HOLD AT LOGAN AT 230KTS, F/O FLYING BUT I SHOULD HAVE PICKED IT
UP. TAKE SLATS TO SLOW DOWN AS O SPEED AT THAT WEIGHT WAS 230.
ADDED SPEED INCREMENT FOR FLAPS PROCEDURE TO VAPP INSTEAD OF VLS.
LEFT IT TOO LATE TO ASK FOR REVISED SLOT.
Unofficial Document
Page 62 of 84
LOFT Check
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
MAN DXB
Most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west.
NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH
AP 2 u/s (Cat III single)
Failure 3
Failure 4
Pax probs with school football team (UMs)
EPR MODE FAULT in climb out (rated)

Held low for ages, re-routing required to get higher level.
Double Eng flame out (unknown reason), only one restarted when APU available. Diverted to
LSZH for VOR r/w 28. (Wind was from the west with 15kts down wind on 14, could go either
way but no app climb probs off 28).
MAN DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
NORMAL TAKE OFF.

FROM TOC, LOTS OF WEATHER AVOIDANCE. IN THE VICINITY OF CB, DUAL ENGINE
FLAMEOUT.
RESTARTED #2 ENGINE, APU ASSISTED BELOW FL 200. UNABLE TO START #1.
DIVERTED TO ZRH.
FUEL JETTISON AND LAND VIA RWY 28 NPA.
LOFT Check
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
MAN DXB
most of UK was just hazy , Western EUR was below cat 1 clearing to the west.
NPA only at LGW, one r/w at LHR, 16/34 closed at LSZH
AP 2 u/s (Cat III single)
Failure 3
Failure 4
Pax probs with school football team (UMs)
Fuel
EPR MODE FAULT in climb out (rated)
Held low for ages, re-routing required to get higher level.
Double Eng flame out (unknown reason), only one restarted when APU available. Diverted to
LSZH for VOR r/w 28. (Wind was from the west with 15kts down wind on 14, could go either
way but no app climb probs off 28)
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
MAN DXB ALT OMRK

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
OVC SNOW +2, MIST/LOW CEILING AT DEST SIGMET:

LONDON FIR SEVERE TURB 50-200, TRW.
NOTHING SIGNIFICANT
NIL.
Failure 3
Failure 4
TOOK 3.6T EXTRA FOR ENROUTE/DEST WX. RWY: WET CHARTS ONLY,
FLEX TO.
A FEW MINOR DISTRACTIONS AS WE WERE DOING SET-UP.

CONFIG 1 + F WET CHARTS FOR RWY 24, NO WEIGHT LIMITATIONS/PENALTY.
DE-ICE FCOM 3, ONE STEP, 75/25, TYPE II, LIGHT SNOW, HOLDOVER 30MINS.
DELAYED FLAPS AND FLIGHT CONTROL CHECK UNTIL HOLDING SHORT/EAI AFTER
START. CONSULT FCOM 2 FOR PROCEDURES.
50% N1 RUNUP PRIOR TO BRAKE RELEASE.
EPR MODE FAULT PRIOR TO V1..CONTINUE.
MANUAL THRUST FOR CLIMBOUT. ECAM ACTION N1 MODE EPR BACK TO 1.1-1.2 FOR
CLIMB.N1 RATED MODE, MANUAL THRUSTFCOM 3 FOR SETTINGS.
WX AND SEVERE ICING IN CLIMB. WAI ON. TOC WX AVOIDANCE. TCAS TA.
ATC REROUTE DUE TRAFFIC. FCOM 3 TO SORT OUT EPR MODE FAULT.
FADEC RECOVERED EPR MODE.FCOM 3/ECAM (N1 MODE.OFF).
CRUISE 10 MINS.
AVIONICS SMOKE..ECAM ACTIONS.SMOKE FROM AVIONICS IN COCKPIT..EDDF
RAPID DESCENT VECTORS FOR ILS 25R MAYDAY..ISOLATED AC1 THEN
AC2.SMOKE DISSIPATEDOVERWEIGHT LANDING CHECKLIST WITH FUEL IN
TT.
PAX HEART CONDITION ON APPROACH.
STOP ON RWY TO ASSESS WITH FIRE TRUCKSCONTINUE WITH PROGRESSIVE TO
GATE QUICKLY WITH SICK PAX.
DID NOT START APU AT RISK OF REACTIVATING SMOKE.
UNABLE TO CONNECT GPU DUE TO ISOLATION PROCEDURESHUT DOWN ON
BATTERY ONLY AS SICK PAX NEEDED IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.DID NOT WANT TO
MESS WITH THE ELECTRICS.
SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO..
Unofficial Document
Page 64 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
APU shut down on start

ACP 2 fails
Blue HYD overheat
Failure 3
Failure 4
Gen 2 fault
DC ESS BUS
APU shut down on start. Start on Ground cart. Check MEL. Depart MEL inop.
Just before line up. ACP 2 fails (F/O cant transmit and no lights). Switching carried out. Again forgot to
check QRH reset procedure. Would have got it back! Check MEL as not allowed ETOPS?
Blue HYD overheat on departure. Pumps switched off. ECAM doesnt call for Blue elec pump off, whereas
VOL 3 does. This is because the ECAM knows that the Blue elec pump is not on, Vol 3 does not!
Gen 2 fault. Tried reset no joy so now single Gen ops. Could have tried one more reset, certainly no more
though. Decided not to continue all the way to DXB on one Gen and over Africa. Returned to NBO. Forgot
to check Vol 3 Gen Fault.
On return. Lost DC ESS BUS. Loads of important stuff in Vol 3, such as no gear indications, no brake
indications (stop on taxi way, apply power to check brakes ok), no shut down with MSW so use Fire
handles, plus no interphone to speak to engineer / purser this combined with losing VHF1 and ACP 1 and
ACP 2, made life difficult. Had to call engineer via radio to organise ground cart so could shut down (no
APU MEL, and no APU because of DC problem).
PAN call as had a serious electrical problem. Got F/O to fly so could monitor and do checklist. Didnt
adequately explain to the F/O why I wanted him to fly, causing confusion.
Restored Blue HYD. So got the Slats back for landing. Non standard switched Blue pumps off again so
would not get an overheat in the go around which would mean divert to Mombassa with Slats extended.
Ended out going around because of confusion over whether the gear was extended. (Lack of system
knowledge again). Pulled out Vol 1 to check whilst downwind. Gear was safe returned to land.
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
OVC WITH CBS, NOTAM, NO GLIDE-SLOPE IN NBO.

MMR1 U/S AND APU GEN INOP. MULTI-MODE RECEIVER NOT FOUND IN
THE MEL (SUSPECTED A PAGE MISSING) SO SENT A MESSAGE TO
DUBAI ENGINEERING. THEY SAID WE COULD GO AS IT ONLY
AFFECTED ILS1. CHECKED ILS1 IN MEL- ALL OK.
Failure 3
Failure 4
ONLY PROBLEM ON THE STAND WAS AN IRATE FEMALE PAX, CAUSED LOTS OF
PROBLEMS AND EVENTUALLY THREW A TANTRUM. (VERY REALISTICALLY DONE BY
ROD!!!). TOLD GROUNDSTAFF TO SORT IT OUT AND EVENTUALLY OFF-LOADED HER WITH
HER BAGGAGE.
START AND TAXI OUT ALL NORMAL.
AFTER T/O AT LVR CLIMB, GOT A MASTER CAUTION WITH A THRUST LOCK WARNING.
EPR INDICATION FAULT (NO2). FAILED IN N1 RATED MODE. ECAM TELLS YOU TO PUT N1
MODE 1 AND 2 ON BUT DOES NOT TELL YOU TO BRING THE POWER BACK TO 1.1 EPR TO
AVOID AN OVERBOOST. QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD, EXCEPT THAT YOU HAVE TO GO
INTO THE IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE TABLES TO GET YOUR N1 THRUST SETTINGS. ALSO
YOU DONT GET AUTO-THRUST BACK, SO MONITOR SPEED.
TOC, MASTER WARNING AVIONICS VENT SMOKE. STRAIGHT FORWARD PROCEDURE
EXCEPT REMEMBER TO PUT THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE FOR THE EMER DESCENT, AS YOU
HAVE NO AUTO-THRUST DUE TO THE EPR PROBLEM. TURNED BACK TOWARDS NBO,
ONCE FINISHED WITH THE CHECK-LISTS, DECIDED THAT WX THERE WAS BELOW LIMITS
FOR A NPA, SO GOT MOMBASA AND DAR WX. MOMBASA OK BUT HAD A GUSTY X-WIND,
DAR MUCH BETTER SO ELECTED TO GO THERE FOR THE COMPANY SUPPORT. FUEL WAS
NO PROBLEM AS WE HAD FUEL FOR DXB, PLUS I HAD TAKEN EXTRA FOR FORECAST FOG
AT DEST. GOT THE F/O TO PROGRAMME FMS AS I COULD NOT GIVE HIM CONTROL DUE TO
THE FACT THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUMENTS. (AC BUS 2 WAS OFF DUE TO THE SMOKE
PROCEDURE). THIS PROVED QUITE TRICKY WITH HANDS ACROSS THE COCKPIT WHILST I
WAS CONTROLLING THRUST.
SELECTED VOR APP INTO DAR. COULD HAVE DONE MANAGED BUT WE HAD LOST GPS
PRIMARY AND WERE GETTING A HIGH DRIFT RATE ON THE IRSS.
MY MISTAKES.
EVEN THO NOT ACTUALLY REFUELING, L4 SHOULD STILL BE ARMED WHEN THE BOWSER
IS CONNECTED.
LOADSHEET WASNT SIGNED.
LOOKOUT FOR WINDCHANGES BEFORE TAKE-OFF MAY NEED TO GO BACK INTO RTOW
CHARTS.
ENSURE BRIGHTNESS ON ND TO SEE THE CBS BETTER.
MAYDAY GIVE CALLSIGN, POSITION AND INTENTIONS. MORE INFO TO ATC.
RATHER NOT INTERRUPT ECAM ON THE SMOKE PROCEDURE. NEED TO GET TO THE
SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM ASAP.
DOWNGRADE THE EMERGENCY TO PAN.
CALL COMPANY REGARDING THE DIVERSION. ASK ATC IF NECESSARY.
MUST DO ACCURACY CHECK WHENEVER GPS PRIMARY IS LOST.
Unofficial Document
Page 66 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO DXB ALT OMRK

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
GOOD EVERYWHERE, ENROUTE.

NOTHING SIGNIFICANT
NIL.
ACP #2
Failure 3
Y SYS OVERHEAT
Failure 4
ESS DC BUS FAIL

GEN #1
TOOK 1.3T EXTRA FOR POSSIBLE LOWER ALT.
A FEW MINOR DISTRACTIONS AS WE WERE DOING SET-UP.

CONFIG 1 + F FOR RWY 06.
APU GEN FAIL, THEN APU AUTO SHUTDOWN AFTER DOORS CLOSED.MEL FOR
RELIEF.RE-OPEN DOORS TO GET ENG TO SIGN OFF..EXT AIR START THEN
XBLEED START ON PUSH.
NORMAL TAXI AND TAKEOFF.
ACP #2 FAIL ON DEPARTURE. RESET AT TOC.
Y SYS OVERHEATECAM ACTIONS.LEFT PUMPS OFF UNTIL TOD.
ESS DC BUS FAIL IN CRUISEQUICKLY FOLLOWED BY GEN #1 FAULTECAM
ACTIONS SHORT DISCUSSION AND DECISION TO RETURN TO NAI WITH PAN AS FLIGHT
WITH ONLY ONE GEN ..QRH..FCOM 3TO DISCOVER ENGINES NEED TO BE SHUT
DOWN WITH FIRE SWITCH ON GND AND TT FUEL UNUSEABLE (5T IN TT AT THIS POINT,
ANOTHER GOOD REASON TO RETURN!)
CONTROL TO F/O FOR THE RETURN AS I WAS MISSING ENOUGH ON MY SIDE
INCLUDING WINDOW HEAT, ND, MCDU, and FMGS1.ETC. RETURN TO NAI FOR
VOR/DME 06 .A LOT OF HF COORDINATION WITH ADDIS AND
NAIROBI..INCORRECT PROCEDURE TURN IN DATABASE SO SELECTED UNTIL FINAL
THEN MANAGEDSETUP AND BRIEFED BY FO WHILE I ADVISED ALL REQUIRED
AND HAD A GOOD LOOK AT REQUIRED REFERENCES.
LARGE FUEL IMBALANCE DUE TO LOSS OF FUEL PUMP ON LEFT SIDE WHILE RUNNING
VARIOUS CHECKLISTS... THEN RAN THE QRH FUEL IMBALANCE
CHECKLIST.CHECKED LIMITATIONS AND ALLOWED 1T IMBALANCE TO SAVE TIME.
REMEMBER NO GEAR DOWN INDICATION EXCEPT ON SD (LGCIU2).
REQUIRED GND PWR AND REQUESTED AIR FOR SHUT DOWN WITH FIRE
SWITCHES..DIDNT WAIT FOR THE AIR, BUT REQUESTED ANYWAY IN CASE OF
TAILPIPE FIRE ON SHUTDOWN..
SELF DEBRIEF/VIDEO..
Unofficial Document
Page 67 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06.
Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I
made a list which helped.
MMR 1 and 2 U/S
Failure 3
Failure 4
DEPO pax problem B4 start (FOM for guidance)
Start was normal for a change

T/O normal although heavy, TCAS on climb out.
AVIONICS VENT SMOKE ECAM, nothing in the cabin, returned to NBO, smoke cleared with
AC Bus 2 isolation.
Managed VOR 06 then NAV ACC Down grade so continued selected.
NBO to DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
HDAM weather not suitable, no other available or useable, ETOPS, new Flt Pln
TRW +, contaminated runway
MEL Inner Fuel Tank Unreliable indications
APU failed during pushback, halfway through #1 Start
Return to gate for Ground Air Start
Weather avoidance after takeoff
At Cruise, intermittent high vibrations N3
Vibration worsened, engine back to Idle
Returned to NBO, weather improving
45 minute transit, planned on Mombassa as alternate (9000MEA)
ILS 06 via NV
CB to the west of approach course causing large wind variations
Autopilot could not hold the LOC, Go-Around
Second attempt, same problem
Asked for radar vectors, did a hand flown ILS and landed
Rolled to a stop , check ride done
De-Brief
-
Read the MEL operational requirements carefully, Trim Tank forward switch was not
selected Forward before departure
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
If APU fails during engine start, cockpit goes black and the first priority is the Eng
Master selected to OFF, then save the battery, IRS off, etc. Good.
- Take time to ensure everyone is aware of how the start on pneumatics will be done, good
brief, have the Engine Start faults FCOM ready, elected to do a Manual start, NBO, high
altitude, low pressure cart etc.
- No refuel needed because I took lots to start with due to TRW, +1500KG
- Normal departure, weather avoidance, try to tell ATC but no answer, did a few avoidance
vectors anyway but did a blind broadcast
- After AVITU, IFBP for African airspace, 1nm right of track
- Some high vibrations, called MCC on SAT, got worse during the conversation and told
MCC to stay on the line, used QRH to retard thrust lever, in cruise shutdown procedures
but engine was running at idle
- Mayday declared routing direct NV
- Asked MCC if they see any more damage to engine, should we shut it down, NO was the
reply.
- 3 approaches to get in to NBO, remember to mention FOM limit of 2 approaches
talk to passengers
(EVAL) NBO - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
-
APU AUTO SHUTDOWN
Failure 3
Failure 4
NO GROUND PROBLEMS
ELECTR GND POWER CONNECTED ON STAND

DURING PUSH BACK, APU AUTO SHUTDOWN AND THEREAFTER INOP
FINISHED PUSH BACK, ASKED ATC IF WE CAN STAY AT PRESENT POSITION WITH A
DELAYED ENG START, "YES"
ASKED GROUND MECH TO MOVE GROUND ELECT CARTS TO A/C AND ORGANISE
GROUND PNEUMATIC POWER
AFTER PNEUM CONNECTION PRESSURE WAS 28 PSI, ALTHOUGH 25 IS ENOUGH,
ELECTED TO DO A MAN START
3 CHECKLISTS IN FCOM 3 SUPPL TECHN. ARE NECESSARY TO START THE ENG, AT A
CERTAIN TIME TWO PARALLEL (ENG START WITH EXT PNEUM PWR, MAN ENG START
PROC AND CROSSBLEED START PROC)
IT IS IMPORTENT NOT TO FORGET TO FINISH ENG START WITH EXT PNEUM PWR
AFTER MAN ENG START PROC
THEREAFTER DURING LINE-UP, FM 1 FAULT, DID ECAM BUT DELAYED RESET OF
COMPUTERS TO AFTER TAKE-OFF DUE TRAFFIC ON 15 NM FINAL
DURING CLIMB, AT A PITCH OF ALMOST 15 UP, THE VERTICAL SPEED DECREASED TO
MINUS 900FT/MIN, QUICK PFD X-CHECK WITH F/O AND STBY INSTR. HORIZON, ALL
THE SAME
DISCONNECTED AP AND A/THR, UNRELIABLE SPEED CHECKLIST, CLIMB WITH GPS
ALT AND ND TAS AND GS TO 22000FT (MORA IN THE NORTH IS 19600 FT (MOUNT
KENIA)
RETURN TO NBO, PROCEDURAL ILS OUT OF NV VOR STAYED AT ~ 11000FT
GPS ALTITUDE (FINAL APPR. ALT IS 8300FT) AND GOT A "PULL UP TERRAIN" WARNING
DURING THE PROC TURN
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
GPWS RECOVERY, BUT CLIMBED ONLY 1000FT, KEPT (WITH TERR BUTTON ON) THE
TERRAIN IN THE GREEN, LINE-UP ONTO THE LOC AND INTERCEPTED THE GS,
LANDING
I SUSPECTED THE GPWS WAS A FALSE WARNING AS I DON'T THINK THE GPS ALT IN
GPS PRIMARY IS 3500FT WRONG, SWITCHED OFF THE GPWS ONCE EST. ON ILS AND
VISUAL
ACC TCE IT WASN'T HIS SELECTED FAILURE, THE SIM SOFTWARE MADE A 70C
TEMPERATURE JUMP AND CORRUPTED ALL STATIC PRESSURE INSTR.
BREAK, I THOUGHT, NICE THAT'S IT, BUT TCE SAID NOW WE WILL DO HIS LOFT
SCENARIO, SO BACK INTO THE TUBE
SAME DEPARTURE, HYD B OVHT, ECAM, INTENTION WAS TO LEAVE THE PUMP
OFF UNTIL LDG IN DXB ALTHOUGH OVHT DISAPPEARED
THEN IDG OIL LO PR, DID ECAM , NOW IN SINGLE GEN CONDITION, DECIDED NOT TO
CONTINUE TO DXB DURING NIGHT OVER AFRICA
CONTACTED SMNC AND ENGINEERING AND STATED INTENTIONS, THEY TRIED TO
CONVINCE ME THAT THEY NEED THE A/C URGENTLY IN DXB, DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS
PUR, PA BLA BLA BLA
ILS NBO IN THE MEANTIME ON MAINTANANCE, BRIEFED FOR A VOR DME APPR 06, 100
NM OUT NO DME INDICATION, QUERIED ATC, ANSWER: VOR+DME OK, THE LOC WILL
BE AVAILABLE SOON
DIDN'T CHANGE PLANS (NO FAITH IN LOC), TOLD F/O THAT WE PLAN FOR VOR/DME
AND IF THE DME IS NOT AVAIL AT 50 NM, SWAP TO LOC APPR (LOC SERV IN THE
MEANTIME)
EXACTLY THAT HAPPENED, PROCEDURAL LOC OUT OF NV (NO DME AGAIN SIM
PROBLEM)
5 NM BEFORE VOR ECAM ELEC DC ESS BUS FAULT, (NASTY FAILURE)
LOST ND ON MY SIDE, BUT DDRMI STILL AVAIL, F/O STILL HAD HIS ND, BUT I
CHOSE NOT TO HANDOVER CTRL + MADE THE F/O TO SELECT NV ON STBY NAV,
THEN F/O STARTED ECAM AND I ENTERED A RAW DATA HOLD WITH F/O ND BACK UP
AT NV
AP AND A/THR GREEN LIGHT ARE NOT WORKING ON FCU, STATUS OF BOTH ONLY
AVAIL ON PFD
COMMS IS A BIG PROBLEM, ECAM SAYS "USE VHF 2 OR 3", RMP 1 +2 AND ACP 1+2 U/S,
NBO TRIED TO CALL US SEVERAL TIMES, TOOK SOME TIME TO FIGURE OUT THAT
ONLY RMP/ACP 3 ARE WORKING
AFTER ECAM COMPLETED, HANDED OVER TO F/O TO FLY THE APPR BECAUSE HE HAD
THE ND AVAIL AND TOOK HIS HAND-MIKE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC
AFTER WE BECAME VISUAL, TOOK OVER CONTROL AND LANDED
TAXIED ONTO STAND, CONNECTED GROUND POWER AND SHUT THE ENG DOWN W/O
CHECKING THE SPOOLING DOWN
PUR TO COCKPIT:"CLEARED TO OPEN DOORS?" INITIALLY SAID "YES", BUT CALLED
HER IMMEDIATLY BACK TO STOP OPENING THE DOORS (SOMETHING STROKE MY
MIND JUST IN TIME),
BIG MISTAKE NOT TO READ THE FCOM 3 DC ESS BUS FAULT, A LITTLE NOTE SYAS
:"TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG ON GROUND YOU HAVE TO USE THE FIRE PB"
Unofficial Document
Page 70 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Wx: All the usual diverts were hovering around NPA minimas, NBO was at minimas for VOR 06.
Notams: Heaps, check all the available aids at NBO and ALTS and how they effect approaches, I made a
list which helped.
MEL: MMR 1 and 2 U/S
DEPO pax problem B4 start (FOM for guidance)
Start was normal for a change
T/O normal although heavy, TCAS on climb out.
AVIONICS VENT SMOKE ECAM, nothing in the cabin, returned to NBO, smoke cleared with AC Bus 2
isolation.
Managed VOR 06 then NAV ACC Down grade so continued selected.
NBO - EBB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Good everywhere (Nbo, Ebb, Dar, Mba) 06 in use Nbo

Nbo: TV & TH u/s (missed app aids for 06), Ebb: Fir notam to maintain FL250 until
100nm from the Vor
Nil
Failure 3
Failure 4
Took as per CFP as good wx and tankering sector for return flight to Nbo.
During refueling the engineer advised that the right outer tank refuel valve had failed closed and he is
unable to place any fuel in the rt outer.(Tank showing zero fuel) Checked Vol 3 limits for Max allowable
fuel imbalance on takeoff in outer tanks and asked for left left outer to be filled to 1500kg.Suspected that
might mean that the load sheet would be incorrect with non std fuel distribution. Referred to Mel and Mel
tells you to do a manual trim sheet with non std fuel distribution anyway. Obtained the trim sheet and fuel
index tables from the blank forms folder and waited for the load sheet.
Load sheet arrives, sure enough >2% discrepancy so re did a manual trim sheet to find new ZFWMAC and
TOWMAC and trim position, entered all in MCDU and back within limits. Got engineer to complete tech
log with Mel.
On push back ATC advise a new departure clearance. Re-entered and re-briefed.
After second start PRIM fault, reset and continued.
On line up left Outboard aileron (Yellow) fault. Aircraft at 10nm final. Asked to hold position. Reset fault
via QRH5.03 Flt Ctl Architecture diagram and Prim 3 and then QRH 2.29 Prim reset procedure and
subsequent Flt ctl and pitch trim check.
On rotate my PFD Check Att. Used Standby A.H until rotate complete and then handed over to F.O and I
took the radios. Yet another departure clearance change onto a radial for an intercept, set that up. Ensured
well away from the ground and ran Ecam actions ending up with Att and Hdg switch Capt on 3.
After T.Off chks.
Couldnt find any reason for the fault, all IRs indicating O.K, left switch where it was and continued. Re
took control.
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Normal climb.
Changeover to Ebb in cruise wind favouring VOR for 35 (rwy 35 in use) but less than 10 kt tailwind if we
needed the ILS onto 17 for any reason. Briefed for full Managed VOR from overhead for 35. Cleared for
the descent earlyqueried them re the 100nm notam and remained at cruise level until normal descent
point. Ebb advise bird activity reported around 35 approach area, asked if the ILS17 was available and it
was, so reset up and briefed for ILS17, tailwind less than 10kts still. At TOD wind swings and increases to
20 kt northerlies, reset up for VOR35 and rebrief again. Crossing overhead the VOR at 7000 we broke
visual with excellent visibility, elected to fly the full procedure as I had never been to Ebb even though
could have asked for a vis app.
Managed Vor app to 35 (codes accurately) visual with the runway from 10 nm out and wind now less than
5 kts.
Approx 700 feet and multiple heavy bird strikes, lose engine #1 and Blue and Green hyd systems
instantaneously.(No NWS and max1000psi brakes)
Hand fly, selected man thrust for good control, kept it straight and decided to land as unsure as to how
badly damaged the remaining engine#2 may have been in the event of going round and aircraft nicely
stable and handling well.
Landed on 35.
Debrief points:
Might have considered the option of going round to fully ascertain all services lost.
NBO-DAR (ALT HKMO)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
NOTAMS NBO ILS 06 U/S

WX MARGINAL FOR VOR-DME 06 VIS 1500M
NO TANKERING.
AIRCRAFT ARRIVED FROM PREVIOUS SECTOR WITH SLATS SYSTEM 1 FAULT, DISPATCH
UNDER MEL.
AFTER TAKE OFF SLATS FAULT, UNABLE TO RETRACT SLATS, ECAM FOLLOWED,
DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DAR. LATER ON SICK PASSENGERS, DECIDED TO RETURN TO
NBO FOR A NPA, UNABLE TO SEE RUNWAY, MISSED APPROACH. AFTER CHECKING FUEL
DECIDED TO DIVERT TO MOMBASSA.
Unofficial Document
Page 72 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NBO-DAR
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
NAIROBI OVERCAST AT 1300, FORECAST TO DROP TO 800. SCATTERED

CBS, RAIN IN THE AREA. DAR OVERCAST AT 1800, EN-ROUTE WX OK.
OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE---NBO ILS U/S., MOST NDBS OUT OF SERVICE,
INCLUDING THE VOR MISSED APPROACH-HOLDING FIX.
SLAT SYS#2 FAILED.
Failure 3
Failure 4
SCENARIO: START NORMAL, TAXI NORMAL. IN THE CLIMB, DURING CLEAN-UP, SLAT#1
FAULT, SLATS STUCK. ENTERED HOLD, TRIED TO RECONFIGURE, SET UP
FOR VOR APPROACH ONTO 06 AND BRIEFED. SHOT SELECTED APPROACH--DUE CODING ABNORMALITY, NOT VISUAL AT MINIMA, GO AROUND TO
NON-STANDARD VOR HOLD. ELECT TO DIVERT TO MOMBASSA (CLOSER
THAN DAR AND MORA ACCEPTABLE, UNLIKE DAR ROUTE). LEVEL
RESTRICTED TO FL 200, SPEED TO 205 KTS. CHECKED FUEL CONSUMPTION
IN QRH 4.13. SICK PAX, REQUIRING IMMEDIATE OPERATION ACCORDING
TO MEDLINK.
MOMBASSA ILS U/S, BRIEFED FOR AND LANDED VIA MANAGED VOR APP. (+2800KGS FUEL REMAINING).
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Final Loft / DAR-NBO

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Filed alternate Entebbe however no sim pubs for Entebbe fuel for Mombasa on flight plan so
advised station staff to changed alternate to Mombasa with DAR ATC
MEL SATCOM u/s
Weather package indicated tempo 800m +R in Nairobi, NOTAMs indicated possible ATC
disruptions due to labor unrest
Kenya has special Jepp procedures for lost comm following a missed approach
Took additional 1500kg fuel for weather
On taxi FM 1 fault QRH reset successful
After departure FM1 fault QRH reset unsuccessful Re enter Weight/CG message on scratch
pad the weight/CG will be displayed on the FUEL PRED page in small font just overwrite
with the same data
Minor deviations for weather
Advised to contact Nairobi at GABSO no contact
Moments later DC Bus 2 fault resulting in FM1+2 Fault no AP, A/THR, FD use B/U NAV
Once ECAM all sorted out still no contact with Nairobi contacted another EK 761 enroute to
JNB and they had no contact with Nairobi either decided that with possibly no ATC, weather
forecast, minimal automation and potentially insufficient fuel to reach alternate considering the
lost comm procedure that an immediate diversion to Mombasa was prudent
Broadcast intentions on 121.5 and 126.9
Used back up nav only to proceed direct Mombasa VOR and climbed 1000 feet for appropriate
direction could have climbed much higher but considered it unnecessary as fuel state excellent,
had fuel state been a problem or enroute weather been an issue would have climbed higher
Able to contact Mombasa once in range and received descent clearance for full procedure
VOR/DME approach flew a selected approach using the NPA 10 to eyeball the descent profile
broke out at 1000 and followed VASIS to uneventful landing
ECAM required us to manually set cabin altitude for Nairobi dont forget to change it to
Mombasa we almost did
Unofficial Document
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
NCE DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Wind shear, CBs

16L closed
RH bleed inop
FM failure
Fuel Leak
Passengers drunk. ATC Slot.
Failure 3
Failure 4
RH bleed inop. Photocopy procedure from MEL. Quite a lengthy procedure make a list of the items that
will require you to close the x-feed valve.(list in Abnormal bleed config). Restrict FL to 370, as per the
MEL, take extra fuel for APU use (FCOM 2). Raining, check contamination. Went Contaminated. TOGA.
Check if ZFW limited.
Passengers drunk. ATC Slot. Make it the station managers problem. Not your aircraft until the doors are
closed.
Weather bad. Briefed Windshear recovery.
Had RMP preset with the VOR freq and course incase of FM failure. Got exactly that on departure. Just
select Rose VOR and continue no probs. Did switching after the checklists. At safe alt ran the reset
procedure from the QRH and got FM 1 back.
Flashing fuel advisory in cruise. Fuel imbalance, added fuel up and confirmed leak from left hand side. Ran
the checklist started descent towards Rome. At gravity feed alt, pumps off. Left hand engine flamed out
(know no bleed), APU bleed on. Finished checks. Called Aeroma advised were on our way, told pax,
purser etc.
16L closed, 16R LOC approach. Did 2 laps of CMP hold then approach. Elected to land overweight as
didnt want to dump fuel with a leak. Plus there were CBs around. Landed ok. Forgot to stop on rwy to get
Fire services over to check if was large fuel leak / fire hazard.
NCE - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Nice Wet and windy (not contaminated) 04R in use. Rome O.K South easterly
winds. TS and Turb forecast in Nice and Rome Firs
Nice 04L/22R closed.
Eng #2 bleed valve u/s
Failure 3
Failure 4
Extra 2 tons (1200kg for Mel and 800kg one level below)
Refer to Mel 36-11-02 Bleed valve.

Can go with only one bleed valve providing the failed one is secured closed and a maintenance procedure is
completed. Confirmed with the engineer that the procedure had been carried out. It then refers you to Mel
36-11-01 which states that the APU should be running for the entire flight and In case of depressurisation
above 37400 ft the O2 masks may drop during the descent and refers you to a complex operational
procedure to follow.(Basically what to do if you lose the other bleed at altitude in terms of air switching
and APU use)
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Photocopied the operational procedure and took that with us into the sim so that if we had a problem we
werent diving around trying to remember what to do.
The operational procedure also refers you to FCOM Vol 3.02.36 page 2 once you are on board and the
upshot of that is that from the Fcom you also have to set the Pack flow to low for the flight.
In a nutshell, some non standard air switching on the overhead panel, the APU running for the whole flight
and a procedure to follow should you lose the other bleed.
We were flight planned at FL370 and with the potential for a mask drop problem I elected to fly at FL330
hence the fuel for one level below and the fuel for the Apu running.(Conservative 6 hours @ 200kg /hr)
On board, given a slot time (approx 45 mins )
Set up for flex take off, wet rwy, x-wind (checked limits were o.k), removed the de-rate for the TS activity.
Elected for flex t.off but discussed windshear recovery if encountered and the option to use TOGA.
During refueling the engineer advised that the refuel truck had broken down and cant pump any more fuel.
Asked for another refuel truck , none available. Checked the fuel quantity and 1500 kg less than what we
asked for on board at the time of the truck failure. Discussion with F.O. Decided to go with fuel as it was
after rebriefing that APU burn at altitude is really only about 60kg/hr (Vol 2.05.10 pg3) which allowed
approx 800kg less and the rest could be covered by the route reserve. Briefed to still use FL330 with the
option of the climb to FL370 if we needed to for fuel.
Normal start and taxi and met the slot time in the last minute.
Weather avoidance in the climb.
At TOC ran the Ecam scan. Checked the fuel on arrival at Dxb and at FL330 still had CMR. Just as I was
advising that to the F.O the fuel on arrival dropped from 6.7 tons to 5.9 tons. Asked for him to check the
fuel page and discovered a fuel imbalance with approx 1 ton less in the right inner tank. Retained control
and asked him to check the fuel used vs on board etc, then to add each tank individually and re-check.
Handed over control and I also did the same to ensure our figures agreed.2 ton difference by now. Let F.O
keep control and I checked QRH 2.08 fuel imbalance which leads to Fuel leak procedure.
Contacted Purser and asked her to observe both wings/engines and be very particular about describing what
she saw in terms of possible spray/ smell etc.
While she was off doing this got weather from Rome and Nice, Rome o.k with ILS16R and Nice crappy.
Slightly closer to Nice but elected to go to Rome.
Quick discussion with F.O and diversion to Nice let him continue flying, declared a Pan as still had plenty
of fuel. Purser returns with news that spray observed from RHS but unsure from where. Brief her while she
is there re the diversion. Run the leak not located fuel procedure.
Descend to gravity feed ceiling of 15000 feet (had been airborne for 26 mins) and turn pumps off.
Finish procedure, brief for Config 3 landing in case engine flames out ,that way already set up, plenty of
runway length, brief no reverse on landing and selected med a.brake.
PA to pax.
Over wt landing checklist and all other checks etc. Advise Rome to contact our ground handling agents in
Rome and advise Dub of our situation.
F.O flies to a landing onto ILS16R. Engine never flames out.
On ground, Attn crew at stations. Brake fans on.
Stop on rwy, talk to Fire officer, confirms that a large leak from RHS and fuel flowing onto rwy.
Elect to shut down engines on rwy while fire services spray away the fuel.
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Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
Talk to purser about possible steps disembarkation of pax on rwy.Cabin crew revert to normal operations.
P.A to pax to remain seated.
Fire services advise fuel leak stopped.
Request tug to tow us off rwy to a taxi way, Fire service advise leak totally stopped now and are happy to
tow us to gate.
Towed to gate. Almost forgot to dis- arm doors!caught just in time.
Debrief points:
Could have used just Low a.brake rather than medium as lots of runway and rescue fire probably down at
the other end anyway and with Low a.brake the brake temps would have been lower (they got to around
250 degrees) in case of fuel leaking around hot brake areas on rwy.
MiniLoft
Ex Rome Rwy25 for DXB, Cavok conditions.Rome ILS16 R for arrivals.
Passing 14000 Avionics Smokestarted ecam and almost immediately extremely dense smoke. Turned
back , Mayday etc etc. Ran dense smoke procedure, set Emer Elec config , vectors downwind , Rwy 25
visually in sight.
Disconnected AP and requested priority for visual onto 25
So much smoke that I couldnt see F.O, when it came for Land Recovery on he couldnt see the switch due
to the smoke so I set it on. Had to ask him to confirm gear was down as I couldnt see the ecam or
indicator lights and he needed a torch to do the manual gear extension. Masks fogged up, PFD and N.D
covered in condensation due to the smoke.
Landed on 25 and evacuated.
NCE-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
THUNDERSTORMS OVERHEAD, RUNWAY VERY WET, VARIABLE BUT STRONG

CROSSWIND. BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM. (MAX X-WIND 20 KTS.)
WHOLE OF FRANCE AND MUCH OF ITALY EXPERIENCING SIMILAR WX. ROME
AND BRINDISI OK.
NO TRAPS, 04L/22R CLOSED DUE WIP. HEAPS OF OTHER INFO, NONE
RESTRICTIVE TO THE FLIGHT.
#1 BLEED U/S, WIRE LOCKED. (CHECK MEL CAREFULLY---WIRE LOCKED)
RESTRICTED MAX FL TO 370.
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
SCENARIO:
PRE-START, REPORT OF DAMAGED CARGO CONTAINER, CHANGE OF ZFW,

CHANGE OF FIGURES. REFUELLER REPORTS DAMAGED NOZZLE, UNABLE
TO TAKE FULL FUEL LOAD. ACCEPTED LOWER FUEL FIGURE. ALSO MINOR
DAMAGE TO REFUELLING POINT ON WING----INSPECTED BY ENGINEER--SATIS FOR DISPATCH, ADD RAISED.
WEATHER DODGING AND MODERATE TURBULENCE ON CLIMB OUT, ENG
ANTI ICE ON, EVENTUALLY CLEAR OF CLOUD THROUGH ABOUT FL250.
DURING CLIMB, FUEL LEAK NOTICED FROM RIGHT TANKS, ADVISORY ON
ECAM.
DIVERSION TO ROME AFTER FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE. #2 ENGINE FLAME OUT ON
DESCENT, APU RUNNING, NO PRESSURIZATION PROBLEMS. BRIEF FOR AND CONDUCT ILS
ONTO 34 R. (FUEL LEAK FROM DAMAGED REFUELLING PORT).
Unofficial Document
Page 77 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
THR - DXB
Weather
WINTER CONDITIONS IN THR, -1C, LIGHT TO MED SNOW, DE-ICING

REQ, RWY DRY, ONE DE-ICE TRUCK, TYPE II HOLDOVER ONLY 15-30
MIN, CHOSE 20 MIN AS A TARGET.
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
ATC TRIED TO KEEP ME LOW AFTER T/O DUE INB TRAFFIC, BEWARE OF TERRAIN (MSA)
HAD TO LEVEL-OFF LATER AT FL 260 (AGAIN TRAFFIC), INB TRAFFIC WAS ACC TCAS
ONLY 600 FT ABOVE AND MASKED BY ANOTHER TRAFFIC 6000FT ABOVE , DIV IMMED
TO THE RIGHT AND AVOIDED TCAS RA
- EST IN FL 370, PASSED IFN (AIRFIELD CLOSED), THEN DISCOVERED THAT ARR FUEL
DROPPED FROM 5,5 TO 4.2TO (CMR 4.5TO), STARTED FUEL LEAK PROC
- LEFT INNER TANK HAD ALREADY 2TO LESS, UNABLE TO RECTIFY WHERE THE LEAK
IS (LEAK NOT LOCATED PROC)
- STARTED TO DO A HIGH SPEED DESCEND TO GRAVITY CEILING (FLIGHT TIME >30MIN)
AND DIVERTED TO SHIRAZ, NO WAY TO MAKE DXB OR KWI
- DURING DESC INFORMED PUR AND PAX, COMPANY
- ENG 1 FLAMED OUT DURING SHORT HOLDING OVERHEAD SYZ
ALTHOUGH SYZ MISSED APPR CLIMB GRADIENT IS 6%, LACK OF FUEL COMMITTED US TO
LAND, SELECTED ILS WITH THE VOR DME MINIMUM (VOR APPR CL GRAD 5%), CEILING
WAS 800FT IN SNOW, FUEL WAS ONLY AVAIL FOR A SECOND SHORT APPROACH, WOULD
HAVE CONTINUED DOWN TO 50FT BUT GOT VISUAL AT 700FT, LANDING TOTAL TIME
AGAIN ~3HRS, THEREAFTER 1 MINI LOFT (I ASKED FOR ANOTHER UNRELIABLE SPEED)
Unofficial Document
Page 78 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ZURICH TO DUBAI.
Weather
BAD ALL OVER EUROPE. ZRH WAS DRIFTING SNOW AND FOG
PATCHES, TEMP 1C, LOTS OF ICE ON THE AIRCRAFT.
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
RUNWAY IN USE 28. HAD TO GO INTO THE CONTAMINATED RUNWAY CHARTS AND
DECIDED TO TAKE A TAILWIND OF 5KTS FOR RWY16 AS WE WERE LESS LIMITED FOR
MTOW STILL HAD TO OFFLOAD 5 TONS OF FREIGHT IN ORDER TO GO. HAD A 28 MIN
HOLDOVER TIMEFOR THE ANTI-ICE AND WITH A TAXI SPEED OF 10KTS, MADE IT BY
2MINS.
DID ICE-SHEDDING ON THE RUNWAY, FOLLOWED BY UNEVENTFUL DEPARTURE. ON
CLIMB OUT GOT A GREEN HYD LEAK FOLLOWED BY LO LEVEL. DID ECAM ACTIONS AND
DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO DXB. STILL ON CLIMB OUT, CSD INFORMED ME OF A VERY
SICK PAX, GIVING HIM OXYGEN BUT HE WASNT LOOKING GOOD. OBTAINED WX WITH
MUNICH BEING THE ONLY PLACE WE COULD POSSIBLY GO TO. TOLD THE CSD TO USE
THE CABIN PHONE TO MEDILINK AND OBTAIN ADVICE, ALSO CHECK FOR ANY QUALIFIED
MEDICAL PERSONEL ON BOARD. MEDILINK ADVISED US TO DIVERT. CARRIED OUT
DIVERSION TO MUNICH TO HOLD AT MIQ. STARTED TO PROGRAMME FMS AND THEN GOT
A BLUE HYDRAULIC OVHT.
SWITCHED OFF BLUE PUMPS AND DID ECAM ACTIONS FOR DUAL HYD FAILURE. BRIEFED
THE APP FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO, LANDING WITH DUAL HYD FAILURE. AT THE
SAME TIME, A LOT OF PRESSURE PUT ON ME BY CSD REGARDING THE URGENCY OF THE
CONDITION OF THE SICK PAX. MUCH OF THIS INVOLVED FOM KNOWLEDGE. THE IDEA IS
NOT TO LET THEM RUSH YOU AND THEREFORE JEOPARDIZE THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT FOR
ONE PAX.
COMMENCED THE APP FROM MIQ, GOT BLUE HYD BACK, DOWNGRADED EMERGENCY TO
PAN, AND CONTINUED FOR ILS 08L. DUMB FIRE ENGINE DRIVER GOT STUCK ON THE
RUNWAY, SO HAD TO GO AROUND AT MINIMA, GEAR STUCK DOWN BECAUSE OF
GRAVITY EXTENSION, SO GOT VECTORS FOR ANOTHER GO AND THIS TIME LANDED
SUCCESSFULLY. PARKED ON THE RUNWAY, ADVISED PAX TO REMAIN SEATED WHILST
THE MEDICS BOARDED AND REMOVED THE SICK CASE, THEN ASKED FOR THE TOW TO
THE STAND.
ALL DECISIONS WERE MARKED DOWN AS CORRECT, BUT COULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE
FOLLOWING:
ASK DUBAI TO REROUTE US FOR A REFUELING STOP IN ISTANBUL SO THAT WE CAN TAKE
THE ENTIRE LOAD OUT OF ZRH.
WITH NO GREEN HYDRAULICS YOU HAVE NO EMER GEN. A POINT TO CONSIDER FOR
ETOPS.
THERE ARE NO FUEL TABLES FOR A DIVERSION WITH GEAR DOWN AFTER A GRAVITY
EXTENSION.
Unofficial Document
Page 79 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ZRH - DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Failure 3
Failure 4
Had APU U/S during briefing. RTOW calculation with slush.

Started up with external AC & External air. Elected not to de-ice on stand, rather do it out by
runway at the de-icing pad. Had slot time. I was not too concerned about slot, rather doing
everything correctly & not rushing. If could not get revised slot, elected to wait for new one &
stop enroute if I had to. Took a hit for that in the de-brief - thats OK though.
FMGC 2 fault during taxi. QRH 2.35 procedure. Departure uneventful.
At around 30,000 ft had ESS DC Bus fail with AC Ess Bus shed. Lots of systems U/S, including
ACP 1&2 & FCU plus numerous display losses. This means you have to use ACP 3 and the
microphone from the Jumpseat. PA system U/S as well as cabin call. If you want to talk to Purser,
got to get out of seat to grab him. With this malf, tell Purser to come back every 10 mins so you
dont have to get out of your seat!
Fuel in trim tank is unusable unless it will gravity feed & it would not for me. You are now time
limited as your CG will keep moving aft the more fuel you burn. Watch your lateral fuel imbalance
limits & follow ECAM to transfer outer tanks to inners. This helps move CG fwd.
Diverted to MUN for O/W ldg. Watch rate of descent at touchdown. Ask F/O to read out V/S at
100 ft & 50 ft, it helps.
Unofficial Document
Page 80 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ZRH DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
200/15 1700m SNSH +0/-4 1022, runway recently cleared and reported DRY?
HYD Green system fluid loss

Failure 3
AVIONICS SMOKE
Failure 4
Carriage of Pregnant passenger problem at the gate, Remote de-icing bays closed,
de-ice on the gate, Tight slot time given, airborne 40 minutes after arrival at aircraft
Fuel
- Briefed during de-icing at the gate

- Elected to use RWY 16 with TOGA and WET numbers (Rwy 28 was reported 2 mm slush)
- Discussed Thrust Rating Target for TOGA of 84% N1 (instructor liked that one)
- Plan on 15 minute taxi from concourse B (gate 31?)
- Normal start , well past minimum Holdover time, PCI check at the runway
- Climbing through FL150, HYD Green system fluid loss
Elected to continue on to DXB, MCC concurs
- At TOC, AVIONICS SMOKE
No reported smoke in the cabin and nothing detected in the cockpit
Diverted to EDDM (100nm)
Decided to jump to the SMOKE source not determined and smoke light went out after AC
BUS 2 was isolated. FO displays blank, AP OK, no A/THR
Elected to start APU, with APU GEN OFF, did not want to repower any faulty circuits, bleed
available for overweight check
Overweight landing EDDM
- Session finished while taxiing to the gate
De-Brief points
-
Departing ZRH, 10,000 checks on climb out are AGL. Should have done it at 11,400.
Consider RWY 28 for shorter taxi time
Remember to ask for NOTAMS affecting landing runway when deciding to divert or review
NOTAM from briefing folder
LOFT stuff, have all possible diversion plates in the mini folder ready (cheating!)
Briefed all the approach climb gradient items including gear down penalty and then realized after
that we were 2 engines. Aircraft is never limited on 2 engines.
Consider fuel dumping enroute to EDDM
Be sure to use the new de-icing form every time you de-ice
Remember the big ones
o Delay flaps until runway
o Consider Wing Anti-ice airborne
o Take-off within 5 minutes of the PCI
o Run up engine to 50% N1 for 10 seconds then idle before takeoff
Unofficial Document
Page 81 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
ZUH-DXB
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Weather cold ops with snow weather in Europe

NIL
FMGEC exercises
Flap lock
In cruise BOMB threat
Failure 3
Failure 4
Weather cold ops with snow weather in Europe pretty shitty only Munich not to bad.
Remember to liaise with engineers etc re procedures for deicing

Keep pax informed if delayed
Normal start after cold weather procedure completed
If speed control in the turn stay configured till you complete the turn
T/O off some FMGEC exercises remember if sent on radial if you want to get predictions then you
need to use place bearing /dist so it has something to work on
In cruise we had BOMB threat sat phone from company
Remember that the FOM has general procedure 14-8/9 with PA etc
Also the QRH has specific detail for the A330 the important thing is if Climbing stop and if in
Cruise then descent toward cabin Alt you must go Manuel to reduce the Diff get it to 1psi which
you want to maintain as this will help the blast effect to exit the aero plane and less damage. The
first line in the QRH says If possible land and evacuate the A/C
When the cabin is under control then you could consider use of speed brake to get down
Once you have the 1 psi diff press then you can set the cabin rate to descend the same as
the A/C ie set V/S for A/C then set the cabin descent the same this should maintain the
diff at 1psi.
Remember that the priority may change ie get down quickly then you can quickly review what
need to be done
Elected to divert to Munich as about the best weather around on finals got Flap lock.
Remember that the F&S speed is only on handle position so you need to maintain the speed near
the red over speed line and set 5 kts below this, the only things that are correct are over speed and
VLS once you are on finals then bring the speed back to VLS but maneuver at the higher speeds.
If time is critical then just a quick check of the landing dist in non normal flap ie check conf and
dist factor but MUN is 4000m so x1.3 is nothing.
Remember that you can not get G/s capture till you have LOC* remember you can V/S to recapture the G/S
or even descend a little early to get the G/S.
Unofficial Document
Page 82 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
DXB/LHR EK5
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
Enroute TURB forecast weather in UK becoming misty, Windshear reported on T/O

LH eng bleed U/S
FMGEC exercises
Flame out on the RH engine
Failure 3
Failure 4
Route over IRAN
Remember to liaise with the CSD re turb and the service consult F/O for opinion
Normal start and push back had AIR Abnormal Bleed which had us selecting low flow on the
packs concern re long flight and lots of Pax the AIR abnormal bleed check list could be reviewed
prior to push back and get confirmation that this is OK
+ Windshear reported on T/O elected to go TOGA remember + is an increase of speed
Some FMGEC exercises remember that you can get the expected height from the FPLAN page as
long as the track is correct so use DIR to and keep it on heading if you need to climb then selected
spd 260kts and the FMGEC will work out the expected height remember that wind play a part as
you have probable not put in the winds yet
Remember to set the weather radar T/S around normal around 10,000ft
We then had flame out on the RH engine so no bleed except APU so rather then green dot speed
should desend as quick as possible to get down to stop cabin climbing,
( NB: keep aware that with only one bleed it will always be a quick desent and get the
APU bleed on below FL230.).
Always chech the PFD as to what is going on and read the ECAM AUTO FLT A/thr
Is not the autopilot only the A/thr has dropped out.( Sim fault) BE sure to FLY the Aircraft and
that you are flying what you want delay the ECAM actions get the F/O to help to confirm the you
our flying safely
With this problem it happened just short of Shriaz so desend quickly and once a/c is safely flying
turn back to Shiraz do not fly away as in be a little more postive with you intial plan (important in
cruise to keep a plan in your mind of what airport you our going to go to so you can intiate this
early in the case of an emergency)
Once you are safely on the way consider manual control of cabin as some pax medical situation
could be improved by a lower cabin Alt the diff is very low but cabin at about 5000ft
Tried eng relight but no fuel flow do not leave the master on too long as it use the bleed air not
enough for the cabin. So it will start climbing
CBs and poor weather in Shriaz opted to go to DXB as no engine anti icing and no ILS in Shiraz
weather on NPA Min
Overweight landing into DXB use full length once the stopping is assured so as to help brake
temps
If on one eng then configure a little later so as to not have high power settings.
Unofficial Document
Page 83 of 84
Section 7
LOS/LOFTs
DXB-MAN (ROUTE OVER IRAN AIRSPACE.)

Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
NIL
Failure 3
Failure 4
NO MEL
MAX TAKE OFF WEIGHT.
OVER IRAN TCAS RA AND WX AVOIDANCE.
NEAR ZAJ OIL LOW QTY ENG 2.
DIVERTED TO THR, DURING DESCEND ENG 2 SHUT DOWN.
NO JETTISON DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS IN THE AREA.
LANDING IN THR MARGINAL WX, WET RUNWAY IN LIGHT SNOW.
ONLY TABRIZ AND TEHERAN AVAILABLE AS ENROUTE ALTERNATES.
DXB-MCT
Weather
Notams
MEL
Failure 1
Failure 2
Problems
Fuel
NIL
Failure 3
Failure 4
Standard MEL, PAX problems.

Minor problem after T/O, run ECAM, advise Ops. Enroute to MCT. F/O goes back to toilet, doesnt return.
Get Purser to find him, he says he cant return as has crook guts. Do the descent and approach by yourself.
Have ambulance if necessary. Check for other crew etc. Easy loft.
Unofficial Document
Page 84 of 84
SECTION 8
FOM STUDY GUIDE
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
8. FOM Study Guides

This section includes the FOM study notes done by some colleagues during their upgrade
time, although its very brief but it highlights the important operational stuff that you
might need in your day to day operation, Having said so, these note are out dated as it
returns to the year 2005, So please, Its your responsibility to review and update your
self with any changes that have happened on the FOM including any applicable and valid
FCIs, FCNs through the preceding years and up till now (October 2008).
I hope you will find this section a good help to refresh your FOM knowledge.
Note:
COMPANY FOM IS THE OFFICIAL
DOCUMENT AT ALL TIMES.
THESE STUDY GUIDES CAN NOT
REPLACE THE FOM AND ARE MEANT
TO BE FOR GUIDANCE ONLY.
Unofficial Document
Page 1 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL (FOM)

STUDY GUIDE (as of 2005)
Chapter 1 - Duties and responsibilities
Chairman of Emirates Group;
Vice Chairman & Group President;
President Emirates Airline;
Executive VP Engineering and Ops
Senior Vice President Flight Ops;
H.H. Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum

Maurice Flanagan
Tim Clark
Adel Al Redha
Alan Stealy
It outlines duties & responsibilities of all posts like:

Senior Vice President Flight Operations (SVP-FO)
Vice President Flight Training (VP-FT)
Training Captains (TC)
Type Rated Instructors (TRI)
Type Rated Examiner (TRE)
etc....... It also gives all the abbreviations
The Pilot in Command is under the authority of SVP-FO, all other Flight & Cabin Crew are
under the PIC
Authority of the PIC:
- delegated from SVP-FO
- has authority to fulfill all his legal and company responsibilities for operation and safety
of A/C, persons and material on board during the period of his command
- Nothing in the Operations Manual shall be limiting or detracting from his authority
- for the Flight & Cabin crew, the PICs authority starts at check-in at base until reporting
back at base
- PIC is responsible for safe, economic and efficient operations
- The PIC may delegate his authority in Augmented Flight Crew Operations
Duties and Responsibilities of the PIC
- Legal representative of Emirates in contact with non-Company personnel as far as his
authority is specified
- authority over crew on/off duty when away from base and passengers during flight i.e.
CLOSING DOORS to OPENING DOORS
- Responsible for maintaining discipline amongst crew and passengers
- shall ensure compliance with the laws, regulations and procedures of the UAE and of
states visited/overflown
- must ensure all docs e.g. licenses, visas etc and for cabin crew a report from Purser suffices,
are in order
- ensure that SOPs and checklists are followed
- Responsible for telling the Ground Engineer all known or suspected defects of the
aircraft
- The PIC has the authority to declare an emergency and must inform appropriate ATC of
intentions
- The PIC must inform nearest authority and SMNC if accident, death or injury of/on A/C
- If under an emergency a violation of local regulations has been made, a report to the
UAE GCAA and SMNC must be made without delay, as well as to the local authorities
Unofficial Document
Page 2 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
General Responsibilities of the PIC

- Proper servicing and maintenance of airworthiness of the aircraft
- To maintain safety and good order, the PIC may temporarily remove a crew member
from his/her duty or off the aircraft.
- The PIC may refuse passengers for onward transportation if, after several requests, they
are still offensive or refuse to follow orders.
Persons obviously intoxicated with alcohol or drugs/narcotics shall be refused boarding!
Supervision and Co-ordination of Flight Duty
- co-ordinate and assign crew members various duties according to their licences
- delegate his responsibilities, when required, to authorize ground staff and crew
members
- notify superiors when a crew members behavior/performance is unacceptable
- supervise/judge the FO and be able to complete a flight alone (incapacitation)
- may delegate to other members within company limits (FOM and FCOM)
Unofficial Document
Page 3 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 2 - Company Regulations

Company Publications
Document Priorities in case of a conflict:
0. AFM - 1. FCI - 2. FOM - 3. FCOM. Electronic document takes precedence over a paper
copy in ER
- Compliance with the AFM is achieved by operating in accordance with FOM, FCOM,
QRH, RTOW and l/sheet
- As part of type specific FCOM, each fleet publishes supp info of A/C type 777 uses
Bulletins
- RM receives quarterly amendments; immediate requirements will be in the form of a
COMPANY NOTAM
- FCIs are issued by Flight Ops (changes to OPS manual) and FCIs will be incorporated in
the relevant manual within 6 month of issue. They are issued in two categories; GENERAL
FCI and TYPE SPECIFIC FCI
- FCIs become effective 7 days after issue
- FCNs are issues not amending the Ops Manual and have 3 month validity.
- Information/amendments needing urgent publication will be: FCI / Memo / Bulletin /
TRs
Documents that must be carried onboard (FCI 2005-086)
- Certificate of Registration (original)
- Certificate of Airworthiness (original)
- Noise certificate (original)
- Air operators certificate (copy)
- Aircraft Radio License (original)
- Third Party liability insurance Certificate(s) (original or copy)
- Flight crew licence with ratings
In case of loss / theft of above docs, flight may continue to Dubai or replacement station
- Certificates of Insurance listed in Sec A of docs file (Germany - must be onboard if
operating to Germany)
- AVN / EK / GERMANY
- AVN / EK / GERMANY (injury to pax and loss/damage to baggage)
- AVN / EK / GERMANY (certain insurance policies)
- Third party liability insurance certificate
Unofficial Document
Page 4 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Documents or Certificates included in A/C Docs file

SECTION A
SECTION B
- Certificate of Registration
- Fuel Carnets
- Certificate of Airworthiness
- Air Operators Certificate
- A/C radio licence
- DG Operators Certificate
- Noise Certificate
- Certificate of Competency
- Certificate Approval of Radio Installation
- Ops Specs
- Certificate of insurance (worldwide and A/C specific)
- Approval for RNP 5 and BRNAV ops
- Transit check
- Approval for RVSM
- Pre-Flight check
- Approval for MNPS
- Daily check
- GCAA waivers not included in FOM
- ETOPS Supp. Check
- Emergency Equip. checklist and Captains Authorisation
- Tool bag Contents
- NO EXIT sign
- On Board loadable software list
In Addition
- Ops Flight Plan
- Load and Trim Sheet
- AFM
- FOM, FCOM Vol 1 / 2A / 2B, QRH, Cabin Crew Emergency Manual, Ops FCIs and RTOW
charts
- Jepps and RM
- MEL
- ERG and DG Regs, Document
- 4 Security Checklists: Pre-flight, Aircraft search on ground, In flight and LRBL (least risk
bomb location)
Above documents will be updated within 10 days of effective date of revision except
FCIs
Bold docs. Are required departing Dubai, not outstations. Any other missing doc does not
restrict Ops
Medical Regulations
Medicine is not to be consumed 24 hours before duty unless authorized by Emirates
doctor
Viagra must not be consumed within 6 hours of flight duty.
Alcohol must not be consumed within 12 hours of flight duty (=1 hour before off-blocks).
Diving must not be done within 24 (recreation 40m) or 48 (below 40m) hours of flight duty.
Blood donation of max 1 unit must not be done within 48 hours of duty, and 3 months
between donations.
If pax /crew show signs of infectious disease, Captain must inform port authorities before
disembarking
No stores may be taken from the A/C. In exceptional circumstances it may be necessary
to offload / dispose of stores, the Captain must then give written or verbal instructions to
the Purser to do so
Unofficial Document
Page 5 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
All Flight Crew members must carry:

- Valid passport
- Company ID
- Crew License
- Medical Certificate
- copy of most recent PPC/IR or Certificate of Test signed by TRE (FCI 2005-071)
- Certificate of Vaccination
- Flight and Cabin Crew members may train or do Supp flights with temp validation
certificates but once released to the line they must have a valid UAE GCAA licence
- Loss of FOB/Captains Company Credit Card must be reported to fleet office (CBC) + email FAS Airbus
- Loss of Captains Company Mobile Phone must be reported to fleet office (CBC), if after
hours contact ETISILAT to cancel sim card
- Loss of Company ID requires a police report
Consecutive sickness/absence longer than 20 days, notify GCAA. More than 30 days,
licence suspended
If a crew member reports sick less than four hours before starting duty will explain reason
to fleet Chief Pilot.
Sickness in excess of 48 hours must be approved by a Company Doctor.
If sickness is self-certified, it is assumed the pilot is fit after 48 hours subject to min report
time of 3 hrs.
If sickness is declared by a Company Doctor, the Doctor must notify Scheduling when he
deems the pilot fit.
Overseas the following, in order, is who to consult: Company Doctor, hotel Doc, Foreign
airline doc then any other doctor
Layovers
While at layovers the crew should be contactable at all times (e.g. by the hotel).
Captain must give permission for ALL crew wishing to stay away overnight (should be in
same city as hotel).
Crewmembers shall be back at the hotel FROM TRIPS OUTSIDE THE TOWN at least 12 hrs
before takeoff.
During the 12 hrs the hotel should not be left for extended periods without leaving a
telephone nr with hotel.
Moves: Flight Crew shall advise the secretary of the concerned Fleet Manager of new
home-details.
Crew baggage: the Captain must be informed when an additional piece of checked-in
or hand baggage is carried by a crewmember. The Captain will then notify Load
Control.
Unofficial Document
Page 6 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 3 - Training, Checking, Qualifications & Recency

Renewals - all pilots are required to complete recurrent checks:
PPC (Pilot Proficiency Check) within each 6-month period
ALC (Annual Line Check) within each 12-month period
Instrument rating within each 12-month period
SEP (Safety equipment and Emergency Procedures) within each 12-month period. CRM
will also be trained
Any check completed within the month prior to the due month are valid, except the
ALC
Upgrade training:
Newly promoted captains will for the first 20 sectors as PIC be limited to: (FCI 2005-029)
Always be the PF
At the Planning stage:
Add 200m & 100 to the more limiting Company, Jeppesen or State minima
(takeoff and approach)
Only CAT A airfields can be used (CAT B/C for diversion)
Recency: PIC Qualifications (FCI 2005-041)
Within the preceding 35 days; 1 takeoff & landing or 1 route sector
Within the preceding 90 days; 3 takeoffs & landings
Within 6 months, 6 hours of IFR time (3 actual in flight) & 6 instrument approaches
ETOPS On licence or signed certificate
Valid licence and Type rating
Valid Instrument rating
Night requirements waived
Yearly PPC
CAT A Airports - unrestricted
CAT B Airports - 13 month validity period; Self Brief, Audio/Visual presentation or Simulator
exercise to reval.
CAT C Airports - 13 month validity period; Physical Entry or Simulator exercise to revalidate
Captains Route Qualification Requirements:
Taken care of by an ALC & PPCs
FOs Route Qualification Requirements:
Taken care of by an ALC
Captains Aerodrome qualification:
CAT A Self briefing or close to another qualified A/Port
CAT B/C Every 12 months a Physical entry (Sim, audio visual, airfield briefing or actual)
FO Restrictions:
A Line Captain may allow a FO to carry out a take-off or landing provided:
- Runway not contaminated
- Crosswind max 20 kts
- 2.000 m vis for takeoff
- Cloud-base 500 for ILS
- Cloud-base 1.000 for non-ILS
Unofficial Document
Page 7 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Command requirements:
- 6000 Total time
- 4000 Hard time
- Valid UAE ATPL
- 3 years in Emirates
- 4 PPCs
- 12 months on type
- Full Route and Aerodrome recency
Unofficial Document
Page 8 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 4 - Flight Crew Rostering

Mobile phones: Must be kept well charged & Emirates Operational Numbers
updated
EVITA is required to call 30 minutes before pickup & 24-48 hours before duty after
leave/extended days off & after 17:00 prior to Available Days
Permission to leave Dubai on Days OFF from Chief Pilot Boeing
Monthly crew schedules to be delivered no less than 7 clear days before the end of
preceding month.
If your flight is delayed by 2 hrs or more, Crew Scheduling will contact family between
0600 2200LT, after this you must call them if later than 2 hrs
If due to sickness in roster month you lose credit, company can get it back on days
off
Access to Scheduling Department by phone/visits to be done between 11:00 - 14:00
daily.
One roster swap pr. month is permitted, using Mutual Roster Change Request.
Recently trained Capt will not be rostered to fly with recently trained FOs, month of
FLC + 1 month
Standby duty ready in 30 mins and always contactable
42 days leave per year, min 4 days and 14 to 21(in peak). Above 28 in off-peak with
authorization.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 5 - Administrative Instructions & Forms

Retention of records:
- Operational and Personnel Records; 12 months
- Load Manifest; 24 months
- Fuel and oil records; 3 months
- Flight documents (from the trip folder); 3 months
- FCOM revisions from Manufacturer must be incorporated within 3 months
- The only document required to be filled in on each flight is the VR (This meets
requirements of GCAA journey Log)
CSR (Captains Special Report) must be written in BLOCK CAPITALS and filed for:
- Any deviations from SOPs
- Details of an event not falling within the scope of an ASR
- Irregularities which could adversely affect the Companys operation or reputation
- Any other matter the Captain feels warrants a formal report
- Comments to improve companies reputation or operation
VR (Voyage Report)
- Missing documents; AFM, QRH, FCOM and other various documents (FOM 2.9)
- Any significant event occurring during a flight
- Autolands
- Amount and reasons for delay (if a delay exceeds 3 minutes, the reason for delay shall
be reported)
- If a CSR has been raised.
Captains Discretion Report must be filed for:
- Extension of Flight Duty or Reduction of Rest
Missing Passengers Report must be filed:
- If a passenger with or without baggage is offloaded or fails to board after checking in;
The form consists of two pages (pink & yellow). Pink copy to be retained and put in the
trip folder
Carriage of Gendec (FCI 2005-067)
- It is the Captains responsibility to ensure a flight departs with a GD, including all crew
names, GCAA inspectors and Security personal (permission needed).
- If a GD will cause undue delay, fill out a blank one from A/C folder and Capt must sign.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 10 - Safety & Security

- Penalty-Free Reporting (but willful violations of SOP is not tolerated)
- An aircraft accident and all listed incidents require immediate notification to the
GCAA within 24 hrs.
- Captain will ensure all affected members write a report and he must notify SMNC
ASAP
- Flight control system malfunction or failure
- Inability of any required Flight Crew member to perform his normal flight duties as
a result of injury or illness,
- Turbine engine rotor failures, excluding compressor and turbine blades,
- In-flight fire,
- Aircraft collision in flight,
- In-flight major failure of electrical systems, which requires the sustained use of an
emergency bus powered by a back-up source such as a battery, APU, or RAT, to
retain flight control, or essential instruments,
- In-flight failure of hydraulic systems, that results in sustained reliance on the sole
remaining hydraulic or mechanical system for movement of the flight control
surfaces,
- Sustained loss of thrust or power produced by two or more engines,
- Evacuation of an aircraft in which an emergency egress system is used,
Significant incidents involving:
- The transport of dangerous goods,
- Breaches of security,
- The carriage of important persons,
- Maintenance events or failures,
- Aircraft departure from taxiways or runways,
- Taxiing accidents or collisions,
- Flight crew incapacitation,
- Decompression resulting in emergency descent,
- ATC incidents involving near collisions,
- Serious windshear encounter,
- Passenger offences affecting safety,
- Any other factor affecting or compromising safety.
- An aircraft is overdue and is believed to have been involved in an accident.
Preservation of evidence:
- If a Captain deems in necessary to preserve info he can do the following
o FDR and DFDR(25 hrs), tech log entry Remove FDR for investigation
o CVR (30 120 min), Remove CVR for investigation. If the CVR circuit breaker
is accessible from the flight deck, it may be pulled as a last resort
- An ASR can be filed by any crew member but must be filed by the Capt for the
following reasons in an expeditious manner, FOM 10-6
- (FCI 2005-092) ASR requirement for low fuel status
- A CHFR (Confidential Human Factors Report) is the means by which an individual
may report sensitive human factors that have influenced an incident or may have
been a near miss in almost causing an incident.
- Must be delivered to Flight Safety by the most expeditious means possible
-
Ops / Capt may restrict or suspend operations to an A/Field they/he feels is unsafe.
Capt may not continue to that airport unless he feels that the problems will be
corrected before arrival or in an emergency
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Crew Incidents & Accidents

- A PAAR (Passenger/Aircrew Accident Report) must be filed by the Purser + an ASR by
the Captain.
- Classified as URGENT or NON-URGENT
URGENT are death or serious injury that requires medical attention/hospitalization
Must fill out a PAAR immediately (if URGENT) or within 2-7 days (if NON-URGENT).
Crime on board.
- Between doors closed and doors open, the Captain is responsible for protecting
lives, aircraft & cargo +
safeguarding of necessary evidence.
- He may order a search of belongings (with owners consent) to preserve evidence
- The Captain must notify the next landing place, and a CSR or ASR be filed if a crime
was committed on board or pax was detained. He/she must be handed over to the
law enforcement at the destination.
On turnaround stops and during transit stops one flight deck crewmember must remain
on board.
At some outstations, local authorities might try to gain access to the aircraft WITHOUT valid
IDs. Be alert!
The following have access to the flight deck (subject to the Captains discretion, but
never in UK airspace):
- His Highness the Chairman
- Vice Chairman
- Group President
- President Emirates Airline
- Executive Vice President Engineering & Operations
- Senior Vice President Flight Operations
If a request to open ANY aircraft door is received outside the parking area, the aircraft
shall return to the parking position and the door only be opened in the presence of
Emirates/Handling Agent staff.
Sabotage/Bomb Threats
- RED at gate:
PA: Purser to flight deck immediately
Notify ATC & ramp agent
Shut down engines, if running, but maintain electrical power (APU)
Brief Purser (who will brief Cabin Crew)
Make Captains PA
Offload pax with hand baggage
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
- RED while taxiing: (Read FCI 2005-073) Precautionary Disembarkation

Proceed as cleared by ATC
Follow the QRH/FCOM procedures (QRH not really applicable on the ground)
Use mobile steps if readily available, if not; use slides
Notify ATC of intentions & to keep vehicles clear of slides
Notify ramp agent
Brief purser on nature & disembarkation procedure
Maintain electrical power if possible (APU)
Shut down engines
Make Captains PA (different for Steps Available & Slides to be used)
IF DEVICE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED, CARRY OUT FULL EMERGENCY EVACUATION
- RED in flight:
Brief purser on NITS
Make Captains PA
Follow QRH/FCOM procedure
If time permits carry out FD and Cabin search
Keep ATC fully informed; keep away from heavily populated areas if possible
Prepare for use of Oxygen masks
Request details on remote parking, steps and busses available
If time allows, make PA regarding B.D. or E.O.D experienced passengers
Land as soon as possible
- SUSPICIOUS article discovered in flight:
Follow QRH/FCOM Bomb threat in Flight
Keep ATC fully informed; keep away from heavily populated areas if possible
Brief Cabin Crew
Prepare for use of Oxygen masks
Request details on remote parking, steps and busses available
If time allows, make PA regarding B.D. or E.O.D experienced passengers
Land as soon as possible
LRBL least risk bomb location, AFT RIGHT DOOR
Hijacking.
- Crew will use the word DEMAND
- At no time shall a hijacker be allowed access to the flight deck.
- Squawk 7500
- Advice ATC
- Plan to land as soon as possible, at a suitable airport of choice
- Advice SMNC, preferably use SATCOM
- When on ground, unless Captain decides it is better, do not leave crew and pax
behind.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 11 - Fuel Policy (FCI 2005-033)

Company policy; Minimum total cost & maximum payload.
Extra fuel may be required to cater for possible deviations.
The following mandatory fuel MUST be carried:
- TAXI FUEL (statistical taxi-fuel + 30 min. APU burn + engine start)
- TRIP FUEL (from start of takeoff to touchdown at destination including SID and STAR for
latest WX)
- CONTINGENCY FUEL (used after bowser disconnect)
Must be greater of 1) or 2)
1) - a full 5% of planned trip fuel
- 3% of planned trip fuel with Enroute Alternate (placed within a circle having a radius
equal to 20% of total flight plan distance AND a centre on planned route at a
distance from destination greater of 25% of total flight plan distance or 20% of total
distance + 50nm.
- 20 minutes flying at planned trip fuel consumption
2) An amount to fly for 5 minutes at holding speed 1500 above destination airport in ISA
conditions
- ALTERNATE FUEL (from go-around at destination to touchdown at alternate (LRC)
assuming contingency has been used, +5%, never planned < 100 nm)
- FINAL RESERVE FUEL (hold for 30 min. at 1500 over alternate at ISA at estimated weight)
Supplementary fuel shall be carried as and when appropriate:
- ADDN (to max 1% below MLW or ETOPS critical fuel)
- EXTRA (decided by the Commander. If Other is specified as reason, explain briefly on
the OFP)
Company Minimum Reserve (CMR) for Destination; ALTERNATE FUEL + FINAL RESERVE FUEL
Company Minimum Reserve (CMR) for Alternate; FINAL RESERVE FUEL (= 30 min. @ 1.500
@ est. weight)
Isolated Destination
TAXI, TRIP, CONTINGENCY + 2 Hrs HOLDING AT CRUISE SPEED OVERHEAD DESTINATION.
For in-flight planning The last possible en-route alternate point will be determined and
at that point the 2 hrs holding fuel and trip fuel to destination must be in tact. At this point
you can continue if 2 runways are available and the wx complies with, FC ETA to ETA + 2
hrs, Circling (1200/5000m) + 300/1km = 15006000m. If not met, proceed to en-route
alternate
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Decision Point Procedure

A flight that is NOT planned with Contingency Fuel may be dispatched using a Decision
Point Procedure.
The amount of fuel required must be greater of:
a) Sum of:
- Taxi Fuel
- Trip Fuel to Destination via the Decision Point
- Contingency Fuel of not less than 5% of the estimated fuel used from the DP to
Destination
- Alternate fuel + Final Reserve Fuel + Additional (if required) + Extra
(Commanders discretion)
b) Sum of:
- Taxi Fuel
- Trip Fuel to Enroute Alternate via the Decision Point
- Contingency Fuel of not less than 3% of the estimated trip fuel from Departure
airport to Enroute Alt.
- Final Reserve Fuel + Additional (if required) + Extra (Commanders discretion)
Refueling:
Load Control will pass final ZFW at ETD - :25
Final ramp fuel should be communicated to the engineer at ETD - :25
If final ZFW is communicated late AND refueling not complete by ETD - :10, delay is caused
by late ZFW.
A new load sheet may be requested with a change at or above 3.0 tons.
Refueling has to be supervised by a responsible person OR one of the Pilots.
Fuel uplift check. Actual Fuel Uplift versus Calculated Fuel Uplift must be within;
Actual Uplift > Calculated Uplift - max 5% of Calculated Uplift up to 2 tonnes
Actual Uplift < Calculated Uplift - max 5% of Calculated Uplift up to 1 ton
(FCI 2005-095) - Read
Refueling with pax onboard is only allowed with at least one Pilot present on the Flight
Deck and;
Two Way comm. between pilot and ground crew supervising the refueling.
Captain is required to inform the Purser when refueling starts & finishes, who will in turn inform
crew & pax.
A minimum of two normal exits must be available for opening in case of evacuation. At
least one exit must be provided with loading bridge or steps. A second exit might be a
closed & ARMED door with a CC at the exit, preferably behind the wing.
The NO SMOKING signs must be ON and FASTEN SEATBELTS must be OFF
No De-Fuelling with Pax Boarding, on board or Disembarking
Fuel tankering:
Up to 1% below MLW
Not to be performed if runway for takeoff is contaminated or expected to be so.
For a non-tankering sector, the landing weight is to be planned to 1% below MLW
If uplift to MLW, planning to this weight should only be in coordination with Commander /
Load Control.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
In-Flight Fuel Management:

Fuel checks enroute should be carried out at waypoints not exceeding 60 minutes.
Be aware that OFP minimum required fuel does NOT include Contingency Fuel or
Additional Fuel
If insufficient fuel is remaining, reduce consumption by:
- Fly at a more economical speed (Cost Index Zero) & flight level
- Fly a more direct routing
- Select an alternate closer to the destination, or re-calculate actual distance to alternate
(ex LHR-LGW).
The Commander SHALL declare an emergency when the actual usable fuel on board is
less than Final Reserve Fuel (as stated on the OFP).
Commitment to Destination (Alternate Airport discarded)
The following conditions must be met:
1) If a delay is known or an EAT is received from controller, AND a landing at destination is
assured AND touchdown with at least Final Reserve Fuel is possible; The flight may
continue to destination regardless of the
number of runways.
A landing is assured if it can be completed in the event of any forecast weather
deterioration AND plausible single failures of ground and airborne facilities (ex: ILS failure
on ground or NO LAND 3 on board).
Forecasted weather is used when more than 2 hours from relevant airport.
Actual weather reports and trend information is used when closer than 2 hours from
relevant airport.
2) If a delay is NOT known, the flight must be able to reach at least two airports
(Destination & Alternate) and landing assured with at least Final Reserve Fuel remaining
at touchdown.
Exception: Within 2 hours of destination and destination having at least two separate &
independent runways,
the second runway can be nominated as alternate.
A landing is assured if it can be completed in the event of any forecast weather
deterioration AND plausible single failures of ground and airborne facilities (ex: ILS failure
on ground or NO LAND 3 on board).
Forecast weather is used when more than 2 hours from relevant airport.
Actual weather reports and trend information is used when closer than 2 hours from
relevant airport.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 12 - Flight Preparation & Planning

- Within the constraint of route requirements, the flight routing selected shall result in
minimum cost operation consistent with ATC restrictions, weather conditions and
passenger comfort.
- The pilot arriving first at the CBC shall initiate the flight prep and planning process.
- Only one FP marked Master Copy must be submitted, Capts responsibility, legal
requirement
Changes to departure times:
- Change for one flight at least 48 hours before - STD is changed. Delays recorded from
this new time.
- Short notice changes - STD is not changed. Delays recorded from original STD/STA
- In either case, Ops Control will enter the new ETD on the OFP, since it is the basis for
wind and route calculations. Therefore, these times should NOT be copied onto the VR,
but use the scheduled STD/STA that should be remarked under the Remarks heading.
Flight crew should make a quick scan of relevant info, then brief the Cabin Crew, then
conduct the remainder of the briefing.
The minimum requirements for Pre-flight Planning and Briefing are:
- Check OFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route)
- NOTAMS and WX for departure, destination and alternates
- Enroute NOTAMS for the first hour of flight
Cabin Crew briefing:
- The Captain is required to brief the Cabin Crew before every duty or change of Cabin
Crew.
- First Officers should only conduct this briefing when it is certain that the Captain is
delayed.
- The briefing will establish the role of the Captain as a team leader and team manager,
and should encourage interaction and feedback between cabin and flight crew.
- Items to be covered:
Introduction of Pilots
Verbal confirmation from the Purser that all personal documents have been verified
Details of the flight and any aspects affecting service or pax comfort
Access to the flight deck
Only the Purser/SFS should contact the Flight Deck from Cabin Crew prepare for Take Off
to gear is up.
Only the Purser/SFS should contact the Flight Deck from Cabin Crew prep. for Landing
to runway vacated.
At all other times an abnormality is noted the Cabin Crew should contact the Flight
Deck directly.
- The importance of strict adherence to all security procedures
- Any details from the Purser regarding special pax, VIPs, deportees etc.
- For augmented ops: brief on delegation of command, rest periods and meal
arrangements
Company Briefing
- Flight Doc folders contents
- Check CFP for accuracy and validity (date, aircraft to be used and route)
- Fuel (gross error check x7 for the -200 and x8 for the -300)
- RM, company NOTAMS, fuel requirements, tankering and degradation value
- FCIs
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
- Check NOTAMS for the flight

- Check WX for the flight
- Check terrain critical sectors for single engine performance (RM ch 5)
- Check Safety & Security file
- Route briefing should include checking ATC FP
- Availability of airports for Depress or Drift down should be assessed in the same manner
as adequate airports for NON-ETOPS flights; importantly f/cast wx should not influence
the dispatch of the flight. It does however influence dispatch of ETOPS or Reduced
Reserve Flights.
- If a flight folder is not provided, FD shall obtain relevant info from the local Flight
Planning office.
Dubai Diversion (FCI 2005-077)
- Use Master Flight Log in Docs folder (from specific airports). Capt must ensure FP is filed
(handling agent)
- They are based on zero wind (negligible), Max TOW (land weight limited) + 30 min fuel.
Be careful not to use them if MEL has higher fuel consumption
- If no load sheet provided, use diversion load sheet in docs folder
Selection of Destination and Alternate
- Forecast WX must be at applicable PLANNING minima +/- 1 hour ETA or improving to
the requirement for supplementary fuel carried
- Destination planning minima is Jepp approach minima taking A/Field facilities into
account. The only exception is circling minima (higher of Company +1100/5000m or
Jepp). If weather at destination +/- 1 hour is below applicable Jeppesen minima - 2
alternates
- Emirates normally plans one alternate, if no diversion is foreseen they plan the closest
alternate, if diversion is a possibility, they plan the best operational alternate.
- One nav-aid is enough if WX is CAVOK, otherwise 2 nav-aids required to be considered
an Alternate
- Alternate weather minima applies:
CAT III CAT I
CAT II CAT I + 100/300m
CAT I Non Prec
Non Prec Circling minima (if no circling then NPA + 200/1000m)
Circling Approach higher of 1200/5000m or Jeppesen minima if higher
REMARK; once airborne, only Jeppesen chart minima needs to be considered.
(FCI 2005-093)
- A Takeoff Alternate must be designated within 420 nm (840 nm for ETOPS a/c) if
departure aerodrome is below CAT I. The TO alternate must have weather above
applicable minima from 1 hour before to 1 hour after estimated arrival time. Ceiling
required for NPA and circling
- If No Weather Forecast is available, the airport must be considered below minima.
- Emirates policy is to plan for anticipated runway conditions, e.g. wet, hot, snow etc.
Regarding pavement strength for destinations and enroute alternates, if it is in the RM, it
CAN be used.
- If an enroute stop is to an airport not in the RM, the Jeppesen Airport Directory shall be applied.
- RFF; VPTFO may nominate 1 below (annotated in RM). GCAA can authorize 2 below
(annotated in RM).
Departure & Destination: RFF 9
Destination Alternate: RFF 8
ETOPS alternate: RFF 6
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 13 - General Flight Rules

- Emirates policy is the more restrictive of FOM or State Law
- No cancellation of an IFR flight plan is authorized.
MAPS AND CHARTS
- Jeppesen takes precedence over the RM when a conflict exists.
- Manuscript alterations to any manuals are not permitted (e.g. writing on Jeppesen
charts)
- Old plates/charts that are superceded by a newer one will be returned to Flight Ops with the
ships papers.
- ATC will not guarantee terrain clearance, this rests with the Captain. However; if positive
radar identified, a clearance to descend below MOCA/MORA is acceptable, as terrain
clearance is the responsibility of the radar controller.
- ICAO defines the ILS Glide Path to be usable up to at least 10 nm. Do not capture the GS
outside this.
COLD TEMP CORRECTIONS
- If Temp is warmer than ISA, True alt is higher than indicated, Pressure Alt under reads.
This puts you higher on the GP for NPAs and is safe. The opposite is therefore a concern.
(Hot to Cold, dont be bold) If FMC NPAs require altitude corrections, VNAV cannot be
used
- If OAT is ISA -15 or colder, corrections to en-route MSAs must be applied
- DA or MDA when ISA -30
- IF, MAA etc when ISA -45 with ATC approval
- No paperwork should be done below 10.000
- Only essential items should be done below 20.000
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 14 - General Crew Procedures

- When on duty and a uniform is worn, the Captain is responsible for the correct appearance
of all crew.
- Summer uniform: on turnaround flights from 15 April - 31 October. During summer and
on a layover flight, the jacket may be carried on the arm, at the Captains discretion.
- Winter uniform: all year for all layover duties & on turnaround flights from 01 November 14 April. Jacket must be worn when in public.
- Decrease of fitness under mental stress can occur and the crew member is responsible
to decide whether he is fit for duty or not
- If a crewmember needs to be removed (doubt about fitness to operate), the problem
will be discussed mutually by the Captain, First Officer and Purser. SMNC should be
contacted if a crewmember is to be removed.
- The Captain/FO/Purser should brief the remaining crew that the crewmember has stood
down from the flight.
- Crew transport in Dubai. Contact Central Services if car has not arrived 10 minutes after
expected time.
- After 20 minutes, make your own way to the CBC. Flight Ops Department will reimburse
this expense.
- On positioning flights with EK crew must wear uniform and be on GD, report ETD -0130 at
briefing, where positioning was decided within 72 hours, a Captain may be downgraded
to Y class.
- An FO traveling with a Captain travels in the same class.
- Minimum Cabin Crew for service: -200 = 8 crew (one for each door) and on a -300 = 10
crew
- One cabin crew less is acceptable if that door is considered inoperable and therefore
the max number of pax is limited, 1 cabin crew per 50 pax.
- A cabin crew may operate one grade higher or lower than their normal position
Crew Position and Duty
- The A/P must be engaged during seat changes and non permissible below 10 000.
- Capt and TC flying during training, TC is commander. If not training L seat Capt is
commander
- In the following cases the Capt must assume PF
RTO
Certain emergency / abnormal situations
Any time he considers it necessary for safe conduct
- When the First Officer is acting as PF, the Captain shall not countermand the First
Officers decisions, unless he considers that flight safety, regulations or Emirates standards
are being compromised.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Augmented Crew:
Where Crew Scheduling has not nominated a particular pilot as Augmenting, this will be
done by the PIC.
The Second in Command must hold a valid UAE ATPL.
Augmenting FOs will be trained in - Rapid Decompression & rapid descent
- Engine Failure with drift down
- TCAS RAs
When the Captain is resting with a 2 FO crew, the FO in the right seat (qualified operating
seat) will be PF.
The PIC should contact his operating crew the day before the flight to draft an in-flight
rest plan.
T/O crew must be in their seat prior to Pre-flight Checklist
Before changing seats the incoming crew must be fully briefed on A/C, Destination, Alt,
ATC, WX status
When changing seats, A/P engaged, speaker on and docs ready
PIC must brief crew on severity of situation for his disturbance before retiring
Admission to Flightdeck
- The following people are allowed to the F/D
Sheik Ahmed
Flanagan
Clark
Al Redha
Stealy
They are however not allowed while in UK airspace
- The Capt decides on who gets vacant crew seats
- Only 1 flight deck jumpseat may be occupied by a non-crewmember
- Vacant crew jump seats are not to be used for T/O and landing
- Flight crew resting should be no more than 40 min, then 10 min to regather
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 15 - Normal Operations

- A checklist may never be recited from memory
- Scan actions may be out of sequence but response must be according to checklist
- Any paper checklist which is interrupted should be started again from the beginning.
- At any time PF is off the primary ATC frequency, control of the aircraft is transferred to
the other pilot.
- When the First Officer is PF, the Captain shall only handle the CFP from TOC to TOD.
- The altimeter of the PF shall be the governing instrument for ALT / Height checks
- Whenever an aircraft commences a climb or descent, the PF shall call Leaving...
Climbing/Descending...
(FCI 2005-99)
- Speeds
Between 10 and 5000 AAL, 250 KIAS unless requested by ATC
Below 5000it is mandatory to be below 250 KIAS
- Minimum width of runways for EK operations is 45 m. Otherwise an approval from VPFOT
is needed.
- When Seatbelt Sign is ON for turbulence, the Purser must be briefed by the Captain.
- The Purser must be informed when 20 minutes remains before TOD.
- Briefings should always include the airfield CAT
- Any non-standard procedure or deviation from the SOPs is to be reported on CSR
- Ground staff must keep Capt aware of any delay longer than 5 min.
(FCI 2005-076)
Captains welcome aboard PA:
- Introduce yourself & crew (Capt, FO, Pur, and SFSs)
- Flight plan routing, mention map display on screens
- Enroute weather
- Destination weather
- Expected flight time
- Use of seat belts whilst seated (legally important)
If time permits if boarding was delayed get announcements made in terminal to pax. If
not pushing back by ETD, give pax reason. Use professional and calm voice, simple facts
and known places, do not mention safety videos, avoid technical terms, do not use
bad wx, turb, going down or final approach and use Arabian Gulf.
- Flight delays of more than 20 min, crew may request connection info for pax from
Company
Captain to Ground Engineer:
- Ground to Flight Deck
- Go ahead
- All ground checks are complete and engineering standing by
- Roger
- Cleared for pushback, facing....
- Pushback facing...., please release brakes
- Brakes released, off chocks ...., delay due to......
- Pushback complete, please set brakes
- Brakes set
- Two good starts, cleared to disconnect, hand signals on the .. side
Ground crew thumbs and by-pass pin held up means all is clear around A/C
During pushback if you need to attract the engineer or tug drivers attention, flash A/C
wing lights
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
CRS (Certificate of Release to Service)

When a defect is entered in the Tech Log, the Certificate of Airworthiness is no longer
valid
The CRS revalidates the CoA
A CRS will be issued by a UAE GCAA licensed engineer
A Captain can issue a CRS at outstations if
- No faults have been detected
- A fault can be deferred to the MEL without a maintenance procedure
The aircraft is considered dispatched when the engineer has been released, prior to taxi
(EK).
The aircraft is considered dispatched when take-off power is set (Boeing MEL).
After dispatch the MEL should only be used for reference if:
an ECAM/EICAS message appears after dispatch and before T/O
- Accomplish non-normal/normal procedure
- Communicate with maintenance (LM or MCC) with reference to MEL, FCI, Bulletins
etc and decide on course of action. After comms return to stand if, unsafe to
continue flight, MEL maintenance procedure needs to be completed before flight or
continuing with the problem, even if allowed under MEL, is not appropriate
- If you cannot establish comms with maintenance, FC must establish if flight can
continue using all the available sources taking the above into account. If they
determine maintenance action is required then return to stand.
If a fault occurs with no EICAS message, the MEL need not be referenced.
Concessions:
- For handling of defects not specifically covered in the MEL, a Concession to Operate is
needed
- The concession must be in written form only, unless special authorization from GCAA
received
- Capt must receive a copy for the Tech log as well as entries for nature of problem,
concession been received and WX for certain conditions if required
Technical fault reporting in the Tech Log: (Both pilots must review Tech log together)
Y for a new defect
N for no defect (& Nil Defects written), or if the defect is a known defect already in
the ADD. Brief description
AUTOLAND in Tech log only if unsatisfactory, downgraded or requested by technical
section
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Before Take-off
Cannot dispatch if maintenance check expires before the planned time of arrival at next
station
Daily Check, valid 48 hours (cannot expire during flight)
Transit checks, can be performed by a Captain on a contingency basis
Flight Crew should be aboard no later that STD-35
Cabin Crew should be aboard no later that STD-55
Emergency briefing: on a multiple-sector day, the Reject briefing need only be briefed
for first take off.
Cabin Crew will ARM doors as soon as the A/C moves or on ODD occasions at Capts
discretion
A delay is Off Chocks Time later than STD+3 minutes
(FCI 2005-98) Runway data validation check
Taxi
- Max 30 KIAS, Max 10 KIAS on slippery surfaces
- When A/C is brought to a complete stop, Park Brake must be set
- CM1 must taxi A/C when
Final turn onto stand until parked
180 deg turn required
No published Taxi guidance available
Take-off and Climb
GCAA Ops Specifications states minima for take off as
Ceiling = Zero and minimum RVR as follows:
Facilities
RVR/Visibility (Note 3)
Nil (day only)
500M
Runway Edge Lighting and/or Runway Centre Line Marking
250/300M (Notes 1&2)
Runway Edge Lighting and Runway Centre Line Lighting
200/250M
(Note 1)
REL and Runway Centre Line lighting RVR Information
150/200M
(Note 1&4)
Notes:
1. The higher values apply to Category D aircraft.
2. For night operations at least runway edge and stop end lights are required.
3. The required RVR/visibility value representative of the initial part of the takeoff run can
be replaced by pilot assessment when no reported RVR or visibility is available. The
takeoff run shall not be commenced unless it can be determined that the actual
conditions satisfy the applicable minima.
4. The required RVR value must be achieved for all relevant RVR reporting points with the
exception in note 3
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FOM Study Notes
- AWO are below the values above, down to the values on the 10-AWO chart (typically
RVR 125/150m)
- When no RVR or visibility is reported, a Captains assessment based on 60m runway
edge lights is OK.
- Turns shall normally not be initiated below 500 AGL unless mandated by a SID or noise
abatement.
- Max bank for all phases of flight is 30 deg
- Comms with the company if not AUTO by ACARS should be done above 20 000at
Capts discretion
Cruise
A 1-mile offset is not approved:
In European B-RNAV or in RNP5 or better airspace

Below MSA
On SIDs or STARS
If Nav accuracy is not assured
Unless approved by ATC if appropriate
- A 1-mile offset should be considered in areas with In-Flight Broadcast Procedures
(Africa, Yangon) and while climbing and descending in areas with known bi-directional
traffic exists.
- If ETA changes by more than 30 min, advise MCC via ACARS
- Any A/C unservicebility that might affect dispatch at next station must be sent to EK Eng
by ACARS ASAP
Descent and Hold
- ROD not to exceed the following
o 5000 fpm down to 5000
o 1000 fpm below 1000
In the decent, ROD should be reduced to below 1000 fpm within 500 of level off.
(Old FCI 2005-063)
Approach
- Target for decent is 25 track miles at 250 KIAS at 5000 AAL
An approach should be stabilised by 1000 ATE, (or at the latest 500 ATE if rwy lights visible
above 1000)
1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path.
2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path.
3. The aircraft speed is not more than V REF + 20 knots indicated airspeed and not less
than V REF; or as adjusted by minimum ground speed techniques.
4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration.
5. Rate of descent is no greater than 1,000 feet per minute; if an approach requires a
rate of descent greater than 1,000 feet per minute, a special briefing should be
conducted.
6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the
minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual.
7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted.
8. Specific types of approaches are stabilised if they also fulfil the following: Instrument
Landing System (ILS) approaches must be flown within one dot of the glideslope and
localiser. During a circling approach, wings shall be level on finals by 300 feet above
airfield elevation; and,
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the

above elements of a stabilised approach require a special briefing.
Note: An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1,000 feet above airport elevation
in IMC, or below 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC, requires an immediate goaround.
Approach minimas are as published on the Jepp charts + the following:
- Circling: Ceiling of 1000 rounded up to the nearest 100 or Jepp minima and Visibility
5000m or Jepp minima
- Radar vectors to visual approach: 5000m (reported by twr before leaving Vectoring
Altitude OR rwy in sight).
- Visual Circuit Approach: company VMC (5000m vis, 1,5nm from cloud and 1000 below
cloud)
CAT 1 approaches must have specific minima of 200 DA and 800m met vis or 550 RVR
Airfield with vis less than 800m vis must have RVR information to be used
Requirements and Applicability of Ceiling, RVR and MET VIS
- A circling approach may only be commenced if the ground reported ceiling and vis
are equal to or better than company or Jepp minima
- An instrument approach in IMC may be commenced / continued to minima
irrespective of reported ceiling
- Approach may commence if reported VIS / RVR is at least approach minima
- If the reported VIS / RVR is below the minima, the approach may commence provided
the Capt considers these to be at / above the approach minima before reaching the
ABP
- For NPA or CAT 1 ILS, only VIS or touchdown RVR need be considered
Circling approach is the only one that requires reported ceiling
- When an approach chart minima is labeled JAR OPS and ONLY reported VIS is given
(no RVR), the FACTORED VIS table can be used.
- This conversion cannot be used for T/O, AWOPS or where RVR is available and RVR
reported for a runway does not qualify it for an alternate runway
Approach ban point:
CAT II/III - .000 (or as stated on the 10-AWO chart)
CAT I & Non-prec - Outer Marker or equivalent point (unless otherwise stated). If no point
exists it will be 1000
Circling approaches - Initial Approach Fix (IAF), effectively you cannot commence the
approach
Required visual reference:
CAT I requires at least one of the following:
- Elements of the approach light system
- Runway threshold
- Runway threshold markings / lights / identification lights
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Non-Precision Approach requires at least one of the following:

- A minimum of seven consecutive approach lights if available
- Runway threshold
- Runway threshold markings/lights/ identification lights
- VASI
- Touchdown zone, or touchdown zone markings/lights
- Runway edge lights
- PF must take control at latest leaving FAF, turning base leg with radar vectors or 1000
AGL
- On a coupled approach with manual landing, AP must be disengaged by 80 AGL
- AUTOLAND can only be performed on runways approved for CAT II / III approaches
- Manual approaches may only be flown down to minima with WX above CAT I
- Each crew member will try and do 1 NPA approach to MDA, once a month, note it on
VR
- If a visual circuit (3 legs at / above 1500) is to be flown, brief the following
MA procedure in conjunction with ATC
Possible GPWS GS warning
Terrain clearance and airport characteristics
- Orbits/360 turns are only authorised with Autopilot engaged and are not authorised
below 1500AGL
- Pilots can only request orbits in daylight VMC and it must be reported on the VR
- If a missed approach is conducted, it is Emirates policy to limit the number of
approaches to 2, unless
there is a good possibility to land off a third approach.
Diversion
- If a diversion is required, the Captain should lease with SMNC & Ops Control, and inform
the passengers on the PA (PA may be delegated to the Purser)
- Alternate Weather If alternate WX deteriorates it may continue to be used if the latest
forecasts, including TRENDS, indicate it will be above JEPP minima at applicable landing
time
- Ensure that the diversion A/Field has the required equipment for pushback before
accepting a parked in bay
- The availability of equipment has no bearing on adequacy of airport.
Landing
- AUTOBRAKES should be used for CAT II / III landings
- Recommended for
o Wet or Contaminated RWYS
o One engine inop landings
o Crosswind above 15 kts
- If the A/C has a Tech fault, the Engineer or mechanic should be briefed, if NIL DEFECTS,
there is no need to handover to the engineer / mechanic
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FOM Study Notes
Chapter 16 - Handling Operations

- Disruptive passenger is one who imperils the safety of the aircraft, passengers or crew or
causes discomfort or make him/her objectionable to other passengers or who fails to
observe the instructions of Emirates staff.
- A PIC has the right to refuse to accept an invalid or incapacitated passenger if he
believes the passenger is likely to be placed at risk by the journey or constitutes a flight
safety hazard or cause discomfort to others.
- The PIC is ultimately responsible for the decision to exclude a passenger from carriage,
and the final decision must rest with him. Once dispatched, if PAX must be offloaded,
police must be present
- A CSR must then be filed (2 independent witnesses names must be included, willing to
give evidence)
- One Flight Deck Crew and all Cabin Crew must be on board while passengers
embark/disembark.
Autoboarding in DXB shall commence at STD-45 (remote stand) and STD-35 at an
aerobidge. PIC consent is not required. If auto-boarding is delayed due late arrival of
Flight Crew, this must be noted in the VR.
If 14 or more UMs are traveling, IFS will provide a Supy to look after them.
UMs are the responsibility of the Purser, even in the case of a flight disruption.
PIL (Passengers Information List) will include all Wheel Chair requests. If additional WCs
are needed, the Flight Deck Crew will request this, stating the passengers name.
WCHR - for pax that can walk to cabin seat, can ascend steps.
WCHS - for pax that can walk to cabin seats, can not ascend steps.
WCHC - pax completely immobile. Must have escort. (But p 10 states a Non-ambulatory
passenger can travel unescorted except if he/she can not manage own bodily functions
in the toilet!)
If during a transit stop where passengers disembarked, if upon re-boarding a discrepancy
between the Transit Passenger Manifest & passengers occurs, this must be reported to
the PIC & he must order a baggage identification check.
If a checked in passengers fails to show up at the gate at STD-10, offloading of baggage
shall commence.
If a passenger appears before baggage is found, he may me accepted for the flight.
If a passenger appears AFTER the baggage has been located, he will be denied.
If a checked in passenger in a pooled group (family or group) fails to show up at the
gate:
- All bags checked in by the group must be off-loaded
- The remaining passengers of the group must physically identify their own bags by
touching them
- In DXB, re-screening of identified, pooled baggage is not a requirement.
There is no requirement for the Flight Crew to sight the offloaded baggage.
The PIC will then sign the missing passenger report.
If the Seat Belt Sign is ON, hot liquids shall not be served to passengers.
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FOM Study Notes
- If smoking in the cabin is noted, an instruction to stop will be issued by a Cabin Crew
member.
- If the instruction is not followed, the Purser & PIC must be informed, and the Purser must
raise a VR.
- If a passenger is caught smoking in the toilet the PIC must be informed, and the Purser
must raise a VR.
- If a passenger has tampered with the Smoke Detector in the toilet, the PIC must be
notified. The PIC will then call SMNC to request Police meet the aircraft on arrival.
- Life vest DEMO must be done if flight over water, 50 nm from off-shore and over water
beyond gliding dist.
- 2 Therapeutic O2 bottles can be carried but NO xtra portable O2 bottles may be
carried
- Diplomatic bags (max 75 kg) will not be screened and must be placed on the seat
cushion & fully secured.
- INAD passengers - no threat, no limit on number.
- DEPO passenger - no more than 1 unescorted on any one flight (except for families).
- More than 1 DEPO requires prior approval from Chief of Group Security.
- No more than 8 DEPO requiring escort on any one flight. More than 8 requires prior
approval from CGS.
- PRISONER passengers - escorted at all times, usually in some form of physical constraint.
- C15 form must be completed and distributed to Purser & PIC for all 3 of the above and
the station should ensure that the Purser has all of their travel documents.
- It is the PICs responsibility to ensure that a DEPO does not disembark within the country
of refusal. DEPO and INAD pax may however disembark at other countries with approval
from the concerned authorities
Pregnancy: (FCI 2005-88)
- Uncomplicated pregnancy until the end of 27 weeks - no medical certificate required
- From the start of the 28th week a Medical certificate (written within 7 days of travelling
and stating delivery date) is required from a doctor or mid-wife.
- The limitations on these are:
Uncomplicated single pregnancies accepted up to the end of the 36th week
Multiple (twin etc) pregnancies accepted up to the end of the 32nd week
Travel beyond these dates requires special authorization and they must use MEDIF system
Medical assistance on Arrival in Dubai:
DNATA Ramp on 131.6 must be advised with all pertinent details.
OPS Control on 132.6 must be advised that DNATA Ramp has been contacted.
Medical Emergency Diversion:
Cabin Crew should provide First Aid. Medlink should be contacted if needed.
Only if Medlink is not contactable should a Passenger PA for medical personnel be done.
The PIC will normally not give assurance of responsibility of Emirates to accept cost of
medical care.
Medlink will advise the PIC of suitable enroute diversion airport. The PIC will advise
Medlink of ETA, and
Medlink will arrange all medical services to meet the aircraft and follow-up treatment.
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Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Passenger misconduct.
Can be of many types, abusive/suggestive language, refusal to comply with instructions,
indecent exposure, drunkenness, drugs, threatening with physical violence, etc.
Cabin Crew will warn passenger, ending in a Formal Warning from the Captain.
PIC is responsible that appropriate written reports from the crew are submitted.
The authority to use Passenger Restraining Devices rests solely with the PIC.
Illness, Birth or Death
- Someone aiding must produce a valid qualification
- Cabin crew may not give a pax an injection
- Cabin crew may open EMK without Capts permission
- For an in-flight birth a doctor or nurse must be requested and if non available, help from
female cabin attendants. The PIC shall make a lengthy report with his signature and 2
other crew members. This report shall be copied & attached to the VR.
- Suspected death:
A passenger is never declared dead, but considered Very seriously ill. After landing a
lengthy report must be filed by the PIC in conjunction with the Purser and Station
Manager and handed over to the police. A copy of this report must be filed with the
ships papers.
Loadsheet: (FCI 2005-100) New ACARS loadsheet at all MACS stations
- It is the PICs responsibility to check that the certificate number & signature is written on
the loadsheet, and also periodically inspect such certificates for validity (valid 2 years).
- Exception is in Dubai where a gate-printed loadsheet will only bear a name & licence
number.
- The PICs signature is his confirmation that he is satisfied with the loadsheet.
LMC:
<= 300 kg; no change to loadsheet
>300 to 1000 kg; amend ZFW, TOW and LW on loadsheet
> 1000 kg; new computer loadsheet.
If manual loadsheet is used, amend it & make a new trim sheet.
It is acceptable to use 20 kg. as standard passenger baggage.
Special loads:
- List of animals and compartments in the table provided
- Falcons; up to 15 can be carried, must be hooded & chained to handler.
In Economy or Business class, only 1 falcon pr. handler. If a further seat is paid for, an
additional 2 falcons.
In First class, only 2 falcons pr. handler. If a further seat is paid for, an additional 3 falcons
can be carried.
DFO may grant exceptions for VIP passengers.
All weapons and ammunition, incl. replica & knives must be carried in the cargo hold.
If a NOTOC was received and crew changed at a transit stop, the departing crew will
leave a message to new
crew regarding the NOTOC.
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FOM Study Notes
Aircraft Technical Support at Outstation:

STATIONS WITH EK OR AUTHORISED ENGINEER
- They sign the CRS and the Capts signs his acceptance
STATIONS WITHOUT AN AUTHORISED ENGINEER
- Capt is responsible to ensure A/C is serviceable, correctly fuelled and fluid levels
sufficient
- If there is no assistance the Capt has authorization for:
- Refueling (FCOM)
- Transit Check (Docs folder)
- Transfer of Defects to ADD section of Tech log provided they are acceptable to
PIC for the next leg and in accordance with the MEL
- If the A/C is unserviceable and requires maintenance action the PIC will contact SMNC.
It is the PICs responsibility to determine using MEL / CDL whether the A/C can continue
to fly in the current condition. If rectification of a defect is required, with authorization
from Dubai, a local maintenance agency can supply spare parts and a local engineer
can issue a CRS. A FAX with this authority is required, copy in ships papers.
Requirements for CRS
NO DEFECT
- No requirement to issue CRS
DEFECT RAISED
- If a competent (non authorized) engineer or crew is able to rectify the defect and the
PIC is satisfied the A/C is airworthy, he may accept the A/C without CRS being raised but
must report it to UAE GCAA within 10 days.
- The CRS should contain the following
Type of defect and its circumstances
Action taken to rectify defect including people / organization and parts names
Comms with EK Engineering
DEFECT RAISED AND MEL APPLIES
- If the defect is allowable under the MEL:
PIC must make appropriate entry in the Action Taken column
Item transferred to ADD section
PIC has authorization to issue CRS, no GCAA notification required
- Captains credit card is for use at off-route unscheduled airports where Credit facilities are
not in place
- If it is needed however SMNC must be contacted to increase the limit
- Use the Fuel Carnet for Fuel, handling etc and only the credit card if Credit cannot be
arranged
- Be aware of what document copies need to be left behind if you diverted and are now
returning.
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FOM Study Notes
Chapter 17 - Use of Equipment

- Do not place any magnetic or metallic object closer than 75 cm to the compass. (FCI
2005-078)
- If the Forward Facing Camera was switched off due turbulence/crosswind, a note in the
VR is needed.
- Throughout an NDB approach, the PNF is to continuously monitor the identification of
the beacon.
A navaid shall not be used for primary navigation purposes if it is:
- On maintenance
- Unreliable
- On test
- The proper identification has not been received
If a navaid is reported Ground checked only it can ONLY be used for enroute
navigation, NOT for approach.
- For night operations, at least runway edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights
must be on.
- If both high & low intensity approach lights are unserviceable, minimum visibility must be
increased by 900 m to a minimum of at least 1500 m visibility.
Oxygen:
- Emirates O2 is:
o Supply all pax for 10 mins or entire time above 15000cabin alt
o 30% of the pax for time between 14 and 15000cabin alt
o 10% of the pax after 30 mins between 10 and 14000cabin alt
- Passengers must use oxygen when cabin altitude is above 15000 (not at or below
15000)
- Flight Crew must use oxygen above 10000 (FCI)
- If the crew O2 becomes inop in flight, you can descend to FL250 with portable O2
bottles for each flight crew on duty. Above FL250, quick donning masks must be
serviceable
All flight crewmembers must be secured during moderate or heavy turbulence.
Radio two, set on 121.5 can be switch to a Volmet frequency when needed.
ACARS should only be used for weather information when it is not readily available from
Volmet/Atis.
- Satvoice is expensive and should only be used when it is the most appropriate means of
communication.
- Flight deck loudspeakers may be used during cruise, but only for VHF communication.
- When a headset/boom mike is used, the corresponding loudspeaker will be turned OFF.
- Headset must be used when radio other than primary VHF is used and when below
10000
- The PNF should not use the PTT-switch on the control wheel when the PF is flying
manually.
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FOM Study Notes
Chapter 18 - Adverse and AWO

- Ground icing condition company policy: Make it Clean & keep it Clean.
- A light coating of frost is permissible on the top of the fuselage.
- Frost up to 3 mm is permissible on the under surface of the wing due fuel cold soaking.
- There is no such thing as a little frost on critical surfaces.
- No A/C may knowingly dispatch with an INOP APU to an airport where de-icing may be
required unless ground start facilities are available
- Take-off is permissible in light freezing rain (but perhaps not advisable).
- Take-off is not permissible in moderate & heavy freezing rain and falling heavy wet
snow.
- Emirates requires cabin crew during pre-flight to briefed and pax before de-icing takes
place
- If such a report is made, a Pre take-off Contamination Inspection (PCI) from the Cabin is
mandatory.
- A PCI is MANDATORY if precipitation has occurred since the final de/anti-ice fluid was
applied and MINIMUM holdover time has expired.
- It is mandatory for the PIC to inform Cabin Crew of de-icing during preflight briefing,
and passengers prior to engine start.
- Once a decision to de-ice has been made (either by PIC or Qualified Person), it can not
be over-ridden by the other party.
- It is imperative to ensure all personal and equipment is clear after De/Anti-icing before
you taxi
- Ice can form in temps as high as 15 deg
- Engine-on de-icing is allowed at specified stations, found in the Route Manual.
- At no time may an A/C that has been anti-iced get another treatment unless it is first
de-iced
- A Tech-Log entry with the following is required by the PIC or Engineer; Type of fluid used
& ratio + UTC time of starting final application + if 1 car was used, which wing was
treated first.
- Time spent spraying parts of the fuselage before representative surface is not
considered for holdover time
A runway is Dry, Slippery or Contaminated
Dry - runway is not shiny in appearance
Slippery: < 2 mm slush / < 3 mm water / < 4 mm wet snow / < 15 mm dry/loose snow / ice
/compact snow
Contaminated:
=> 2 mm slush / => 3 mm water / => 4 mm wet snow / => 15 mm
dry snow
- Max T/O thrust for contaminated runways
- T/O on icy runways is not allowed
- T/O or landing on runways covered with more than the following is not allowed:
13 mm standing water
13 mm of slush
13 mm of wet snow
100 mm of dry snow
- The available cleared or treated runway width must not be less than 30 m (45 m)
- If icing is present, increase approach speed, use anti-icing before slat operation and
delay extension
- For landing on slippery runways, consider use of idle reverse until directional control is
assured.
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- If surface mean winds are => 60 kts, the airport must be considered closed.
- On approach, 4 nautical miles between heavy aircrafts are acceptable.
- Avoid cells by more than 10 miles above 20 000
AWOPS
- AWOPS refers to T/O below T/O minima 150/200 and Landing below CAT I minima
- LVPs come into force when RVR falls below 550 m and ceiling below 200
- AWO pilot qualifications remain valid between PPCs.
- CAT II / III new Capt limits are 50 hrs or 20 sectors, add 100m to RVR minima
TAKE-OFF:
AWO qualified crews may reduce take-off minima to 125m (C) / 150 (D) provided:
- LVP in force
- Rwy Centre Line Lights spaced 15m or less and High Intensity Edge Lights spaced 60m or
less.
- 90m visual segment available from the flight deck at the take-off point
- Required RVR for all reporting points as shown on the 10-AWO chart
Abandon take-off if visual reference is lost below 100 KIAS.
Reduced thrust take-off is permissible.
APPROACH:
- For an AWO approach, the 10-AWO must be used.
- Aircraft must be stabilised at the latest by 1500 AGL during an AWO approach.
- RVR for the Stop end (Roll Out RVR) is at Captains discretion, but never below 75m
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Chapter 19 - Special Operations

ETOPS:
Emirates ETOPS single-engine cruise speed (still air & ISA) is 420 kts.
Fuel planning is NOT in still air/ISA, but considers winds, ISA deviation, icing etc.
Fuel must include cruise at selected diversion speed, descent to 1500 above diversion
airport, hold for 15 minutes, one IFR approach with a missed approach and a VFR
approach to landing.
Fuel must be planned at the actual weight at ETP with 5% contingency fuel, individual
aircraft performance degradation, APU fuel (all done automatically by OFP), icing &
MEL/CDL items (applied by dispatcher).
Recency is ETOPS on licence or signed ETOPS authorization certificate. (FCI 2005-091)
Critical fuel scenario:
1) Standard fuel from departure to Critical Equitime Point & 2) fuel from Critical ETP to
the diversion airport.
The highest of the two must be used, and if the diversion fuel required is higher than
standard fuel at ETP to
destination, it will be included at ETOPS Extra Fuel.
Critical Fuel is based on 3 scenarios:
1) Engine Failure - descent at selected speed and cruise to diversion airport (never
limiting)
2) Depressurisation - rapid descent at Mmo/Vmo to FL 100, cruise at LRC
3) Depressurisation with Engine failure - rapid descent to FL 100, cruise at selected speed
(worst case)
ETOPS alternates weather requirements:
Planning stage: An adequate airport is Suitable if the weather is above minima from 1 hr
before earliest use to 1 hr after latest use, including forecasted crosswinds being within
limits (within 80% of company limits).
Typically for an airport with a CAT I approach is Circling Approach minima (5000m &
1100 ceiling).
After dispatch: Once the aircraft is dispatched, the weather needs only to be above
landing minima (no planning penalties).
If WX minima deteriorates below landing minima before or while inside the ETOPS
segment, another alternate must be nominated with required WX
If not possible, do not enter ETOPS area, if already in, Capt must decide whether to
continue or fly non-ETOPS routing
Before an ETOPS flight, an ETOPS SUPPL check must be signed in the Tech Log.
If an ETOPS verification flight is needed after maintenance, a 90 minutes segment before
entering ETOPS is needed without the failure of an ETOPS critical item. This must be noted
in the Tech Log as ETOPS Verification Flight satisfactory. The ADD raised will be cleared
at the next station.
Consider carrying extra fuel to continue the flight non-ETOPS if the verification flight
should fail.
ETOPS Flight Watch will notify EK flight crew if an enroute alternate goes below minima,
and will re-plan.
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Special Airfield Authorisation:

Cat A - Unrestricted
Cat B - Physical entry or Self Brief or Audio/visual presentation or Simulator exercise.
Validity is 12 months.
Cat C - PE and Airfield Briefing or Audio/visual or Sim. Validity 12 months. Revalidation by
either PE or Sim.
Physical Entry (PE) is an operation to the airport as First Officer or flight deck duty travel or
Captain under observation of a Training Captain.
For new EK destination, flight deck duty travel with another local airline is acceptable.
A ZFT simulator is considered at PE for revalidation purposes, but NOT as PE for initial Cat
C qualification.
Remote Destinations:
A geographically isolated airport with no suitable alternates.
Must be authorised by DFO, and listed in the Route Manual.
Weather forecast must indicate at least Circling Minima from ETA-1 to ETA+2 hrs.
Additional fuel will be not less than 2 hrs. flying at cruise level using LRC at the calc.
weight and ISA at arrival.
An ETP (Equitime Point) will be calculated between destination and last suitable
alternate, and fuel at ETP must indicate at least Holding Reserve at destination OR unless
two separate rwys are available at the isolated airport AND expected weather
conditions comply with Remote Dest planning minima. 1400/6000m vis.
B-RNAV - R on ICAO flightplan. GCAA approves RNP4/BRNAV for EK. RNP1 for terminal.
(FCI 2005-096)
MNPS (Minimum Navigation Performance Specification) - X and S on an ICAO flightplan.
North Atlantic and Polar regions and is RVSM and possible ETOPS; special training and
equipment needed.
RVSM - W on the ICAO flightplan. When approaching a cleared level, vs should be 5001000 fpm, max 1500.
FANS - Pilots should complete FANS 1/A Problem Report form (spare forms folder) if
unable to log on etc.
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FOM Study Notes
Chapter 20 - Abnormal Procedures

In the following cases, a landing must be affected at the nearest Suitable Airfield:
- if the Non-Normal Checklist include the words Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport
- Any fire on board (incl. engines) if fire fighting is not possible or not effective (QRH states
Plan to land...)
- Persistent smoke of unknown origin (QRH states Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport)
- Failure of an engine (QRH states Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport)
- Dual hydraulic failure (QRH states Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport)
- Red Bomb Threat (QRH states Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport)
- One power source remaining (both backup generators are considered ONE power source)
- Structural damage
If two or more Suitable Airports exist, consider;
- Glide path assistance
- At least Circling Minima (5 km & 1.000 ceiling)
- Flight time
In extreme emergencies Captains are authorised to land when reported weather is
below minima.
Crewmembers shall not enter the avionics compartment, except in an extreme
emergency.
There should be no reluctance to declare an emergency, it can always be cancelled later on.
Aviate - Navigate - Communicate. If Captain is PF, consider handing over control to the
First Officer.
On ground management of Cargo Fire/Smoke warnings:
- Carry our required procedures from EICAS, door must not be opened until all
pax are off and fire services are present.
- If it is believed to be non fire related (spraying), and there is no evidence of fire
in consultation with the ground crew, the door may be opened with pax on
board with aerobridges connected or the doors armed.
Rejected Take-off
During a Rejected Take-off, by calling STOP the Captain automatically takes control,
and FO becomes PNF.
Prior to 80 KIAS, reject for:
- Activation of the Master Caution System & Take-off Config Warning
- System Failures
- Unusual noise or vibration
- Tire Failure
- Abnormally slow acceleration (max 20 seconds from start of roll to 80 KIAS as a rule-of-thumb)
- Fire or Fire Warning
- Engine Failure
- Predictive Windshear Warning
- Airplane unsafe or unable to fly
Unofficial Document
Page 37 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Above 80 KIAS, reject for:

- Fire or Fire Warning
- Engine Failure
- Predictive Windshear Warning
- Airplane unsafe or unable to fly
- Engine failure during cruise on terrain critical routes, the crew MUST select the alternates
and driftdown strategies listed in the Route Manual, and flight must proceed at or above
the MOCA/MORA.
- A hard landing is 600 fpm or higher in technical terms, if this occurs: ASR, Tech log,
advise MCC or local engineer and ensure follow up before leaving A/C
- If damage to U/C like a blown tire is suspected on T/O, leave the U/C down
- Emergency landing/ditching; Advise Cabin Crew at Stations 2 minutes before, &
Brace, brace 30 sec before and then Capt initiates evacuation when appropriate
- If ditching, assign 2 adult males at each exit and try ditch close to a surface vessel
Evacuation:
Read the latest (FCI 2005-073)
Incapacitation:
- 2 verbal comms above 1000, 1 verbal comm. Below 1000, any verbal comm.
Associated with significant deviation from flight path or a system malfunction.
- Declare an emergency, land ASAP, preferable WX above CAT I and get towed in,
cannot park.
Unofficial Document
Page 38 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Chapter 21 - Flight Time Limitations

Absolute limits on Flying Hours:
- 100 hrs in 28 consecutive days (expiring at the end of the day on which the flight begins
- means on the 28th day you may depart on a single sector flight, even though at the end
of the flight the total is more than 100 hrs).
- 900 hrs in 12 months (expiring at the end of the previous month).
Acclimatised;
Crew member has spent 3 consecutive local nights within a timezone +/- 2 hours wide
Local Night; a period of 8 hours falling between 22:00 and 08:00 local time
Flying Duty Period (FDP); 60 min before ETOB (Estimated Time Off Blocks) until On Chocks
at destination Duty period; any period the crew member is required to carry out any task
associated with company business
Early Start Duty; if a duty commences from 05:00 - 06:59
Late Finish Duty; if a duty commences before 00:59 and finishes in the period 01:00 - 01:59
Night Duty; if any part of the duty falls within the period 02:00 - 04:59
A crew can have max 3 consecutive LATE FINISH, EARLY START or NIGHT DUTY (01:00 06:59), 34 hours of rest interrupts this sequence.
Positioning; transferring of crew in surface or air transport, is considered a Duty, but not
considered a Sector.
Sector; chocks-off to chocks-on WITH a take-off
Day Off; a single day off shall include two local nights
Delayed reporting time:
If a delay of less than 4 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, the
maximum FDP shall be based on the original reporting time, and the actual FDP shall start
at the actual reporting time.
If a delay of more than 4 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest, the
maximum FDP shall be based on the more limiting of the planned & actual reporting
time, and the actual FDP shall start 4 hours after the original report time.
If a delay of more than 10 hours is informed the crew before leaving the place of rest,
and the crew is not further disturbed by the company, then the elapsed time is classified
as rest.
Standby:
If a crew member is called out from standby before completing 6 hours of standby duty,
then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the FDP
from Table A or B (page 25).
If a crew member is called out from standby after completing 6 hours or more of standby
duty, then the total duty period allowed is the SUM of the time spent on Standby + the
FDP from Table A or B minus amount of Standby in excess of 6 hours.
If crew are at home on Standby duty between 22:00 - 08:00 and called out within 2 hours
of reporting time, the allowable FDP will start at the reporting time.
Unofficial Document
Page 39 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Maximum FDP:
Standard reporting times for Flight Deck Crew in Dubai & outstations is STD -1:00
Standard reporting times for Cabin Crew in Dubai is STD -1:30, and at outstations STD -0:45
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 1 sector, Max FDP is 11-13 hrs, depending on starttime.
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 10:15 -12:15 hrs, depending on
start-time.
For Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 9:30 -11:15 hrs, depending on
start-time.
Cabin Crew has Max FDP 1 hour more.
For Non-Acclimatised Flight Deck Crew on 1 sector, Max FDP is 11:30-13 hrs, depending on
preceding rest.
For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 2 sectors, Max FDP is 11:00 -12:15 hrs, depending on
preceding rest.
For Non-Acclimat. Flight Deck Crew on 3 sectors, Max FDP is 10:30 -11:15 hrs, depending
on preceding rest.
Cabin Crew has Max FDP 1 hour more.
For 2 Flight Deck Crew on a sector scheduled for more than 7:00 hours, it is considered a
multi-sector flight.
A table on p. 27 then defines how many sectors this flight will be considered as, generally
2-4 sectors.
Variations Dubai (page 49) deals with reducing additional sectors for flights over 7:30
hours leaving Dubai, and is a bit confusing. It makes a DXB - MNL flight of FDP 10:05 legal,
since it reduces the 4-sector limit to a 3-sector limit.
Minimum rest for Flight Deck:
At least as long as preceding Duty Period or 12 hours, whichever is greater.
Exceptionally at Home Base, the Company may ask a crewmember to reduce rest up to
1 hr (min 12 hrs).
Away from Home Base, the rest may be reduced by 1 hr if total travel time is less than 60
minutes.
Extension of Duty:
Commanders discretion can be used if he is satisfied that the flight can be made safely,
and up to max 3 hrs.
If a Flying Duty Period involving 2 or more sectors, a max of 2 hrs discretion can be used
prior to first sector.
Immediately prior to the last sector (or first sector on a 1 sector flight), full 3 hrs. discretion
may be used.
Unofficial Document
Page 40 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
A Commander may only exceptionally extend a FDP after a reduced rest period, and
then GCAA will be informed as well as the Company.
If the Commander extended a FDP up to 2:00 hours, he must inform the Company via a
Discretion Report.
If the Commander extended a FDP from 2:01 - 3:00 hrs, he must inform the Company via
a Discretion Report, and the Company will inform the GCAA within 14 days of the aircraft
returning to base.
A Commander may reduce rest to a minimum of 10 hours IN ROOM.
A Discretion Report must be filed, and if the rest was reduced by more than 1 hr, the
Company informs GCAA.
Extension of Duty by In-Flight Relief (Flight Deck & Cabin Crew):
If rest is taken in a seat: 1/3 of the rest time (min. 3:00 hrs) extension up to a max FDP of 15
hrs (16 C/C).
If rest is taken in a bunk: 1/2 of the rest time (min. 3:00 hrs) extension up to a max FDP of
18 hrs (19 C/C).
Extension of Duty by Split Duty (Flight Deck & Cabin Crew):
Time for post-flight duties (normally 30 minutes) can not be included in the below.
Rest less than 3:00 hrs - no extension
Rest 3:00 - 6:00 hrs - extension of half of rest taken, and rest in a quiet place is adequate.
Rest 6:01 - 10:00 hrs - extension of half of rest taken, and rest in suitable accommodation
is required.
Extension of FDP by Variations (ex: DXB - DAC - KUL):
FDP +30 minutes. When a planned sector does not exceed 7:30 hrs, operators may plan
30 minutes extra on the allowable FDP obtained from Table A - Acclimatised (page 25).
Flight Crew members must be acclimatised and off-duty by 22:00 hrs local on the day
prior.
Commanders normal Discretion to extend a FDP is reduced to 2:30 with no more than
1:30 being exercised prior to departure.
A maximum of 4 extended FDP flights may be undertaken in any consecutive 28 day
period.
Unofficial Document
Page 41 of 42
Section 8
FOM Study Notes
Unofficial Document
Page 42 of 42
SECTION 9
QUESTIONS BANK
Company FOM TEST 1 and 2,

Technical Questions
Section 9
Questions Bank
COMPANY FOM TEST 1

1. What are the duties of SMNC?
a.
keep the operation running smoothly and minimize delays.
b.
liaise with other stations
c.
point of contact with difficulties
d
all of the above
(answ d)
2. What statement is incorrect re lighting ?
a.
>50% of lights U/S and airfield is to be considered unavailable.
b.
50% of the lights unavailable in the first half of the runway and runway is unusable
c.
>25% of the lights unavailable and the runway is to be considered unusable
(answ c)
3.What is the company circling minima ?
a.
the greater of 1000AAL rounded up to the nearest 100 or Jepp minima, vis the greater
of 5000m or Jepp minima
b.
the greater of 1000AAL rounded up to the nearest 100 or Jepp minima, vis the greater
of 7000m or Jepp minima
c.
higher of 1100ft, vis greater of 5000m or Jepp minima.
d.
higher of 1200ft, vis 1000m or Jepp minima
(answ a) (answers c and d are pretty close to the exact wording)
4. When can factoring not be used ?
a.
JAR ops chart
b.
when RVR available or for take off
c.
for ILS approaches
(answ b)
5. With auto brake med, when does it become active ?
a
weight on main ldg gear
b.
ground spoiler deployment
c.
thrust reverse unlock
d.
weight on nose wheel
(answ b)
6. When may the pic be replaced by the relief pilot ?
a.
5000ft
b.
10000ft
c.
20000ft
d.
15000ft
(answ c)
7. What is not an F/O restriction ?
a.
slippery runway
b.
x wind in excess of 20 kts
c.
visibility less than 2km
d
A and C
(answ c) (yep thats what their answer sheet said)
Unofficial Document
Page 1 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
8. Who is responsible for the timely renewal of medical and keeping caccinations up to date ?
a.
medical
b.
flight ops
c.
the individual
d.
HR
(answ c)
9. What is correct ref factor vis ?
a.
HIAL available 1.5 by day 2.0 by night
b.
ALS available 1.5 by day 2.0 by night
c.
HIAL available 2.0 by day 2.5 by night
d.
ALS available 2.0 by day 2.5 by night
(answ a) ( I looked it up it is correct)
10. What is not correct ref destination alt minima ?
a.
CAT III app use Cat I minima
b.
Cat II app use Cat I plus 100ft / 300m
c.
NPA use comp circling min or if not avail NPA plus 200ft/ 1000m
d.
CAT II app use CAT I plus 300ft 100m
(answ d)
11. What is the min legal number of cabin crew on an aircraft that has 434 seats with
401 passengers and 10 emergency exits ?
a.
8
b.
9
c.
10
d.
11
(answ c)
12. Diagram of pfd with speed just below Vls at the orange = but above alpha prot, high
roc. What is acft doing ?
a.
alpha floor
b.
hi aoa prot
c.
nothing
d.
load ctl
(answ c)
13. What is true about the IDG push button ?
a.
hold in till the light goes out but less than 10 secs
b.
hold in till the light goes out but less than 3 secs
c.
hold in till the light goes out but more than 10 secs
d.
hold in till the light goes out but more than 3 secs
(answ b)
14. How may you legally extend FDP ?
a.
split duty
b.
captains discretion
c.
relief crew
d.
all of the above
(answ d)
Unofficial Document
Page 2 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
15. What is the definition of acclimatised ?

a.
3 nights sleep on the ground
b.
2 nights sleep on the ground
c.
48 hours sleep on the ground
d.
some other answer
(I got this one wrong, I went for 3 night sleep)
16. What is the max aob in normal law ?
a.
33
b.
no limit
c.
67
d.
80
(answ c)
17. What doc does not need to be left on ground ?
a.
official flight plan
b.
load sheet
c.
sig weather as amended by emirates
d.
NOTAM as amended by EK
(answ c) (I think they meant NOTOC for d)
18.Diagram showing batt voltage at 24 on the over head panel ?
a.
this above the minimum of 23 v
b.
this is below the minimum of 25.5v
c.
this is normal
d.
you cant check the batt voltage
(answ b) (argue that one, I put A according to vol 3)
19. What happens when you momentarily push the thrust levers forward of the cl
detent below 100ft
a
you go to toga
b
the a/thr drops out
c.
you get cl thrust
d.
nothing
(answ b)
20 What is contingency fuel for
a.
unexpected weather
b.
deviations en route
c.
burn higher that dat burn
d.
all of the above
(answ d)
21. What are the critical surfaces
a.
all the correct shit but including fuselage
b.
the correct shit
c.
some more shit thats correct but mentions the fuselage again
(answ b)
Unofficial Document
Page 3 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
22. What are the altitudes for flap and gear

a.
22,000 and 22,000
b.
20,000 and 21,000
c.
21,000 and 20,000
d.
21,000 and 21,000
(answ b)
23. A captain can carry out a pre transit check ?
a.
true
b.
false
(answ a true)
24. What are the wind limits for auto land ?
a.
30 head 20 x and 15 tail
b
c.
d.
35head 20 x and 15 tail
(answ c)
25. When must you disengage the autopilot if carrying out a vis landing off an approach ?
a.
400ft
b.
80ft
c.
100ft
d.
200ft
(answ b)
26. Windshear no SRS what pitch attitude ?
a.
up to 15
b
up to 12.5
c.
15
d.
up to 10
(answ b)
27. What are the A330 turb penetration speeds ?
a.
250 to 20,000, the 280 into .8
b
240 up to 20,000 ft then 260 into .8
c.
240 up to 25,000 ft then 260 into .8
d.
240 up to 20,000 ft then 260 inot .82
(answ b)
28.What is the definition of cold weather operations ?
a.
when static OAT is less that ISA -15
b.
oat less than 10 degrees with visible moisture
c.
oat less that 3 degrees
d.
OAT less that 10
(answ a)
Unofficial Document
Page 4 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
29.What is not stable app criteria ?

a.
landing chex complete
b.
brief complete and chex concluded
c.
app speed less than Vref +20 and higher than Vref -5
d.
sink rate 1000ft/min
(answ c)
30. Above what terrain altitude is used in determining drift down start ?
a.
10,000ft
b.
8000ft
c.
15,000ft
d.
some other one
(answ b)
I looked at it this way, I could afford to get 9 wrong which is a lot and I was pretty happy I could Jag 21.
Unofficial Document
Page 5 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
COMPANY FOM TEST 2

1. Do you need a ceiling for t/o alternate at planning stage?
2. When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent?
3. What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just know the numbers.
4. You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS?
5. How much can you extend an FDP by?
6. What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and alternate
.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
7. They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law we were
operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
8. Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is
happening here?
9. What initial actions for unreliable airspeed?
10. What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
11. ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank transfer"....why?
12. How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable?
13. At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)?
14. When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision point procedure?
15. What's true about destination alternate, need one navaid if weather is CAVOK, weather below
CAVOK you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
16. For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The triple
indicator drops to zero...is this normal?
17. Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on destination alternate
weather when assessing at planning stage?
18. Max alts for gear and flap operation?
Unofficial Document
Page 6 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS
1- Do you need a ceiling for t/o alternate at planning stage?
2- When can you use factoring to arrive at an RVR equivalent?
3- What are the factoring figures to be used....they give you different options so just
know the numbers.
4- You have no engineer and no defect so do you need a CRS?
5- How much can you extend an FDP by?
6 -What is min fuel for landing with commitment to destination, destination and
alternate.....they gave me two of these options, can't remember which.
7- They gave me 3 different questions with pictures of a PFD and asked me what law
we were operating under.....didn't like those at all, just couldn't remember that stuff.
8- Picture of ECAM fuel page with jettison showing on left wing and in Amber....what is
happening here?
9- What initial actions for unreliable airspeed?
10- What is initial attitude for double engine flameout and is it weight dependant?
11- ECAM fuel page with aft transfer occurring and upper ECAM showing "trim tank
transfer"....why?
12- How do you check if battery voltage is acceptable?
13- At what temp do you correct DH/DA (cold weather)?
14- When can you dispatch without contingency fuel, never or when using decision
point procedure?
15- What's true about dest alternate, need one navaid if weather is Cavok, weather
below Cavok you need 2 navaids or both of the above?
16- For taxi you have toe brake pressure applied and you release the park brake. The
triple indicator drops to zero...is this normal?
17- Do tempo or prob30/40 of a transient nature have influence on dest alternate
weather when assessing at planning stage?
18- Max alts for gear and flap operation?
Unofficial Document
Page 7 of 8
Section 9
Questions Bank
Unofficial Document
Page 8 of 8
EK Upgrade A330 Performance

Questionnaire
Upgrade
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
Whilst answering the following questions, you will explore various performance
sections contained in Company and Aircraft documentation and manuals.
1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabilizer Trim Setting for
the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration):
a)
ZFW
ZFW Index
Fuel SG
160 000kg
110
.80 kg/l
F.O.B
39 000 kg
Answer
b)
ZFW
ZFW Index
Fuel SG
Standard Fuelling
160 000kg
110
.80 kg/l
Non Standard Fuel distribution as follows:

Each Outer Tank
Inner Tank
Trim Tank
Answer
2,400 kg
17,100 kg
Nil
2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what
are those decrements?
Answer
3.
a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes?
Answer
b} What is the fuel burn at this altitude ?
Answer
..
D:\Crew Portal\Portal pre reading\Questionnaires\A330 Performance Questionnaire v3.doc
[1.1]
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Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 1 of 4
Upgrade
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
c}
What is the fuel burn at the above weight at FL 050 ?
Answer
..
d} Above what Altitude will the all engine holding efficiency generally decrease? Why is
this?
Answer
4. Calculate the MTOW and speeds for the following conditions;
ZRH runway 28. Runway wet.
Wind calm. 1500m in drizzle. Temperature 5C, QNH 1005.
One thrust reverser inoperative.
Answer .

a) ZRH runway 16.
25mm of dry snow, braking action medium.
Temperature - 5C. QNH 1005. 5kts of headwind.
Answer
b) What would be the maximum X-wind ?

Answer
6. At low weights what is the relationship between V2 and Vmca ?

Answer ..
7. What would be the Density Altitude, in DXB, in summer with a QNH of 998 and a
temp. of 45C?
Answer ..
[1.1]
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A330 Upg Crs

Page 2 of 4
Upgrade
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine?
Answer ..
9. On a 50C day using reduced thrust, the assumed temperature is 62C.
Approximately, what is the effective derate, in percentage terms, compared to an
ISA day ?
Answer
10.
a) What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15C at
MLW ?
Answer
b) What is the minimum Jeppersen missed approach gradient if not specified on the
chart?
Answer
c) Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a
3.9% climb gradient.
Answer
11. What would the Flap Setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following
situation. Technical Fault, MEL Eng 1 REV U/S, locked out.
VABB RWY 27 Int H
TOW 195,000Kgs
Calm OVC 020 +RA +28 C / +23 C 995
RWY Contaminated 6mm Water.
Answer
[1.1]
02/10/07
Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 3 of 4
Upgrade
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
Decode the following SNOTAM.

SWUU0041 UUEE 1031 1435
SNOWTAM 0041
A) UUEE
B) 0010311435 - 0011011435
C) 25R F) 5/5/6 H) 3/3/2
T) RWY CONTAMINATION - 100 PER CENT.
TWY, MAIN TWY, ACFT STANDS AND APRON - SLUSH.
Answer:
12. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)?
a) 75490394
b) 25590592
Answer:
[1.1]
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Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 4 of 4
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
1. Calculate the percentage TOMAC and the corresponding Stabiliser Trim Setting for
the following two situations using A6- EKS (three class configuration):
a)
ZFW
ZFW Index
Fuel SG
160 000kg
110
.80 kg/l
F.O.B
39 000 kg
Answer
b)
ZFW
ZFW Index
Fuel SG
Standard Fuelling
160 000kg
110
.80 kg/l
Non Standard Fuel distribution as follows:

Each Outer Tank
Inner Tank
Trim Tank
Answer
2,400 kg
17,100 kg
Nil
2. Where can the performance decrements if a winglet is missing be found, and what
are those decrements?
Answer
3.
a) What is the optimum all engine holding altitude for an A330 at 180 tonnes?
Answer
b} What is the fuel burn at this altitude ?
Answer
c}
..
What is the fuel burn at the above weight at FL 050 ?
Answer
..
C:\To be deleted\A330 Performance Questionnaire.doc
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A330 Upg Crs

Page 1 of 4
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
d} Above what Altitude will the all engine holding efficiency generally decrease? Why is
this?
Answer
ZRH runway 28. Runway wet.
Wind calm. 1500m in drizzle. Temperature 5C, QNH 1005.
One thrust reverser inoperative.
Answer .
5. At low weights what is the relationship between V2 and Vmca ?
Answer ..
a) ZRH runway 16.
25mm of dry snow, braking action medium.
Temperature 2C. QNH 1005. 5kts of headwind.
Answer
b) What would be the maximum X-wind ?

Answer
..
7. What would be the Density Altitude in DXB in summer with a QNH of 998 and a temp.
of 45C?
Answer ..
8. At 200 tonnes over Iran, ISA +20, What is the Net ceiling of the A330 on one engine?
Answer ..
9. On a 50C day using reduced thrust, the assumed temperature is 62C.
Approximately, what is the effective derate, in percentage terms, compared to an
ISA day ?
Answer
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Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 2 of 4
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
10.
a) What is the approach climb capability at 5000ft Pressure altitude, ISA + 15C at
MLW ?
Answer
b) What is the minimum Jepp missed approach gradient if not specified on the
chart?
Answer
c) Why is the SAH Missed Approach Climb Gradient limiting weight calculated on a
3.9% climb gradient.
Answer
11. What would the Flap setting, Flex Temp and Take Off speeds be in the following
situation.
Mumbai { VABB } RWY 27H
TOW 195,000Kgs
Calm OVC 020 RA 28 / 23 995 Rwy WET
Answer
12. In the following situation what is the flap setting, associated speeds and Flex Temp.
Manila (RPMM) RWY 24
TOW 230T
240/10 SCT 030 RA 30/27 996 WET
Answer
13. Decode the following SNOTAM.
SWUU0041 UUEE 1031 1435
SNOWTAM 0041
A) UUEE
[1.0]
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Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 3 of 4
A330 Performance
Questionnaire
B) 0010311435 - 0011011435
C) 25R F) 5/5/6 H) 3/3/2
T) RWY CONTAMINATION - 100 PER CENT.
TWY, MAIN TWY, ACFT STANDS AND APRON - SLUSH.
Answer:
14. What is the decode of the following codes at the end of a METAR (SA)?
a) 75490394
b) 25590592
Answer:
[1.0]
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Author: D. Granter
A330 Upg Crs

Page 4 of 4
EK Policy and Procedures

Questionnaire
Policy and
Procedures
Questionnaire
While answering the following questions, you will need to explore various
sections of the Company Documentation and manuals pertaining to Policy and
Procedures.
General
1.
What are the objectives of the Flight Operations Mission Statement?
2.
When do the Captains Duties and responsibilities begin and end in

relation to a flight, the crew and passengers?
3.
What is stated in the FOM / OM-A relating to compliance with

regulations and orders?
4.
What is stated in FOM Chap 2 with regard to what the OM constitutes?
5.
What does the Flight Operating Manual section of the FOM / OM-A state
in regard to more conservative operations?
6.
Where is the Emergency Authority of the Captain stated in the FOM /

OM-A?
Destinations
7.
How do you know if a particular destination is authorized for EK

operations?
8.
What are the forecast requirements for a destination?
9.
Is a cloud ceiling required to be considered for landing minima?
10. For what type of approach does the company require higher landing
minima than that charted?
11. What are the flight planning fuel requirements, if the destination
forecast is below minima?
Alternates
12. What are the different types of alternate airports?
13. When do you require a takeoff alternate?
14. Within what distance must it be situated?
15. For what period must the takeoff alternate be available?
D:\Crew Portal\Portal pre reading\Questionnaires\Policy and Procedures Questionnaire v3.doc
1.1]
02/10/07
Author: D. Granter
A330 UP GS
Page 1 of 3
Policy and
Procedures
Questionnaire
16. What must the minimum forecast weather be for the T/O alternate?
17. What are the forecast weather requirements for a Destination Alternate?
18. What are the forecast weather requirements for an ETOPS Alternate?
19. Is ETOPS Alternate minima required if the departure or destination are
used as ETOPS Alternates?
20. What minima are required for these airfields in question 19?
21. When does TEMPO and PROB apply?
22. Do TEMPO and PROB apply to ETOPS Alternates?
Take Off
23. Where are takeoff minima specified?
24. Could you still take off if there is no reported meteorological visibility or
RVR is available?
25. What will you use to assess the RVR?
Approach
26. Is an approach allowed to be commenced if the weather is less than
approach minima?
27. Is the cloud ceiling required to be considered for an approach?
28. If intending to carry out the landing manually when must the autopilot
be disconnected?
29. There are three targets for stabilization, when do they apply?
30. What are the stabilization requirements?
31. What is the minimum visibility for radar assisted visual contact
approaches?
32. When can a visual approach be conducted?
33. What are the requirements for a visual approach?
34. Is an orbit during a visual approach or instrument approach allowed?
35. If an orbit is required, what criteria must be met?
1.1]
02/10/07
Author: D. Granter
A330 UP GS
Page 2 of 3
Policy and
Procedures
Questionnaire
36. When and how can factoring of visibility be used?

37. When is an Approach Ban Point Applicable (ABP)?
38. Where is the ABP situated on European and USA charts?
39. What are the requirements at the minima for an approach to be
continued?
40. What is Adequate Visual Reference for the various approaches allowed?
All Weather Operations

41. When can a LVP approach be carried out?
42. Can an Autoland be carried out on any ILS equipped runway?
43. With reference to RWY lighting, when will you be aware that you are
nearing the end of the RWY after landing?
44. Where, in company documentation, is it stated If there are extra radio
calls required, i.e. On Runway?
Go Around
45. How many approaches may be attempted?
46. Are there any exceptions?
Taxiing
47. What is the maximum speed on a high speed taxi way after landing?
48. What is the maximum Company permitted taxing speed.
Restrictions
49. What are the F/O restrictions?
50. What restrictions are applicable to a new Commander in Emirates?
1.1]
02/10/07
Author: D. Granter
A330 UP GS
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Attend a psychometric test.

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Upgrade Course Layout

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Chapter 3: Training, Checking, Qualifications & Recency

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