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Who was to blame for the

breakdown of the Grand


Alliance?
Role of ideology
The breakdown of the Grand Alliance can be seen as a result of the conflict between two
competing ideologies.
- Communism VS. Capitalism incompatible; both sides felt threatened, believing that their way
of life was in danger of attack from an opposing ideology
- Bolshevik Revolution (1917); Red Scare (1950s) indicates how distrust and fear of
Communism was entrenched in domestic US polities by 1945
- Western attempts to destroy Communism (1918-22)
- US: Salami tactics used in Eastern Europe; Czech Coup - motivated by a desire to spread
Communism in Eastern Europe
- US: Comintern (international organisation designed to promote world Communism - from
1919dissolved by Stalin in 1943) COMINFORM - designed to promote worldwide revolution
- US: Post war rise of Communist parties - Greece, France, Italy - seen as being encouraged and
funded by the Soviets
- US: Soviet activity in Iran - reinforced belief that Stalin wanted influence outside of Eastern
Europe
- USSR: Marshall Plan; dollar imperialism, an attempt to extend influence over Europe and lure
Eastern European states away from the USSR
- USSR: US calls for free trade and democracy American imperialism? - indicated the
possibility of US global economic domination
- USSR: US actions in Germany; introduction of a new currency - attempt to spread US influence
- Iron Curtain speech, Stalins speeches and ideology
- Western liberal democracy VS. Soviet totalitarianism
- Stalinism: paranoid and hostile to the outside world? (Gaddis)

The role of fear and suspicion in causing the


breakdown of the Grand Alliance
USA

Ideology was the driver for the Cold War; USA was responding to its fear of Communism thus
interpreting Stalins actions as aggressive
- Although it could be argued that Stalins actions were designed to ensure Soviet security, the US
was afraid that the USSR would go on expanding if not resisted by containment
- Kennans Long Telegram and subsequent articles presented an analysis of Soviet foreign
policy; dictated by the pursuit of world revolution on a global scale
- Developing Red Scare further increased American fear of Soviet actions
- 1948: Czech Coup final straw for Congress - then passed the Marshall Plan as a way of
stopping the further spread o Communism
- Berlin Blockade: further evidence of the Soviets intention to expand aggressively
- Establishment of Comintern as evidence of its desire to spread revolution
- Detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb (1949) only increased the fear of the USA
nuclear arms race, establishment of NATO
- 1949: China became Communist, 1950: North Korea invades South Korea Americans were
afraid that hat the Soviets were expanding their power into Asia

USSR

USSR saw the USAs actions as aggressive and was afraid that he USA was trying to pursue dollar
imperialism to win over the East European states with its economic aid
- USSR weakened economically after WWII - USA had experienced an economic boom
- USs pursuit of open trade policies, setting up of the Marshall Plan, the introduction of the new
currency in the Western zones of Germany, establishment of NATO all seen by the USSR as
aggressive actions
- Soviets fear: USA deliberately undermining the USSR; using its nuclear superman and
economic strength to stake out its primacy
- Paranoia and fear and Stalins suspicious nature dictated Stalins actions

Role of economic rivalry


Both sides had set up opposing economic systems in Europe by 1949 indicates that economic
interests were important in the breakdown of the Grand Alliance
- Economic destruction of Europe following the war gave both sides the opportunity to impose
their economic systems on Europe
- US economic policy: establish open markets and free trade
- Bretton Woods Agreement - included the International Monetary Fund, World Bank; to
prevent a return to the economic problems of the inter-war years
- USSR involved in setting up these institutions; but tough conditions for the application of
loans caused disputes between the USA and the USSR
- Emphasis on free market Capitalism USSR withdrew from the Bretton Woods system
- Stalin: USAs pursuit of the worlds markets dollar imperialism
- US setting up economic spheres of influence that were based on its own Capitalist
aims; promoted American interests in general
- Marshall Plan further reinforced this perception
- Soviets set up COMECON
- System established by COME-ON tended to work to the advantage of the USSR and
helped the regimes of Eastern Europe to impose Stalinist economic systems on their
countries
- Like the US, the Soviets used economic measures to secure their ideological aims

- German problem - superpowers had different views of Germany


- Stalin feared economically powerful Germany: wanted to keep Germany economically weak
so that it could not again threaten the Soviet Union

- Dismantled much of East Germanys industrial plant; shipped it back to the USSR

- US saw the economic recovery of Germany as key for a general European recovery - wanted
to export to Germany to create an important market for American goods help generate
prosperity
- Introduced new currency in the Wests zones: highlighted the recovery of economic
confidence in West Berlin, led to the Berlin Blockade permanent division (1949)
- Iran Crisis (1946)
- Stalin/West wanted control of Iranian oil

Role of great power rivalry

- Breakdown was a result of traditional great power rivalry


- A balance of power always emerges, especially in the power vacuum of post-war Europe
- Superpowers
- US and Russia seemed destined to control half the world (Alexis de Tocqueville (1835))
- Expansionist power
- Both needed to feed their countries with raw materials, new markets, and make the world
safe for their countries
Prophetic writings of Alexis de Tocqueville (1835):

- There are at the present time two great nations in the world I allude to the Russians and the
Americans Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each other
them seems to have marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.
- Written before Karl Marxs idea of communism conflict between the USA and USSR was not
really about ideology at all?
- Walter LaFeber + Louis Halle: see the USSR and USA as expansionist powers; therefore the
hostility that followed after WWII was a continuation of politics they had respectively pursued
since the 19th century:
- The two powers did not initially come into conflict because one was Communist and the
other Capitalist. Rather, they first confronted one another on the plains of Asia in the late
nineteenth century meeting climaxed a century in which Americans had expanded
westward over half the globe and Russians had moved eastward across Asia. - LaFeber
- End of WWII heightened the possibility of conflict due to the fact that both the USA and the
USSR had emerged as superpowers
- Power vacuums, created by the decline of smaller states, meant that they actually attempted to
expand their influence consequently came into conflict
- Soviet motives were not based on ideology, but was a continuum of the long history of Tsarist
empire building; US policy is similar (Former US Secretary of State: Kissinger (1980s))
However, by viewing the Cold War as the result of ideological, economic, or great power conflict,
we risk the danger of assuming that the Cold War was inevitable. Was it?
Some historians argue that war wasnt inevitable but it was the actions of the government and
individual leaders on both sides that increased tension.

How far did the actions of the USA and USSR cause the
breakdown of the Grand Alliance?

USSR?
Argument: USA did not want to stay in Europe: only the actions of the USSR made it reverse its
decisions to extricate itself from European affairs
- Roosevelt said at Yalta that he wanted US troops gone from Germany within 2 years.
- US expected USSR to be part of new global system UN, IMF, Bretton Woods, ACC in
Germany
- US believed: the mutual benefit to be had from an increase in international commerce and
financial stability would eventually overcome national traditions and political mistrust - Tony
Judt
- Americans were taken by surprise by the USSR withdrawal from Bretton Woods
institutions, believing that the continuation of the alliance was possible until mid-1946
Stalins actions made continuing the alliance increasingly unlikely:
- Stalin disregarded promises at Yalta regarding Eastern Europe Poland
- No free elections in the Eastern European countries that the USSR had liberated
- Salami tactics led to all of these countries being under Communist control by the end of
1948 Stalinist style one party state with no individual freedoms
- Thus Stalins actions were seen as aggressive and expansionist
- Exploited wartime agreements to remain and pertain a military presence in Northern Iran despite
promises to withdraw
- Berlin Blockade was aggressive, ill-conceived and seen by the West as a prelude to a possible
attack on Germany
- COMINFORM: attempt to control Communist parties across Europe evidence of Stalins
expansionism
- Stalin promoted hostility to the West within the USSR
- Suspicious approach: interpreted all actions as deliberate attempt to weaken the USSR
- Policies in the USSR indicate that he was not a leader who would support compromise and
conciliation

- Churchills Fulton speech and the Kennan telegram which highlighted the implications of Stalins
actions made Truman act to contain Communism

USA?
Argument: Stalin had goo reason for his actions after the war: overreaction of the US to these
actions along with the pursuit of economic interests that caused the breakdown of the Grand
Alliance
- USSR had legitimate security concerns
- Faced a hostile West since 1917,
- Post WWII: lost 20 million in war, weak economy needed a buffer zone in Eastern Europe to
prevent future attacks, thus the establishment of the Soviet-style governments in the Eastern
states and Poland
- USSRs actions stemmed from USAs actions
- Stalin established broad-based coalitions in these countries, as agreed at Yalta; also did not
supply weapons to the Greek Communists, but abided by the Percentages Agreement recognised Greece as an area of British influence
- Stalins actions in 1947-8 can be seen as effects, rather than causes of the Cold War
- Dropping of the atomic bomb: designed to make clear to Stalin the military superiority of the
US
- USs determination to impose its own ideas for a new world order after WWII- open
markets, self-determination, democracy, collective security
- Dollar diplomacy - the US imposing its own values and advancing its own interests
- US failed to address Soviet anxiety and insecurity, stemming from the USSRs previous
encounters with the West and immense losses occurring during the war
- US failed to see that Stalins speeches were not about spreading Communism but were
about defending the Soviet Union
- Truman exaggerated the Communist threat to Congress in order to defend its position in Europe
and in order for him to get Congress to support aid for Greece and Turkey
- US viewed all Soviet actions as ideological didnt understand USSRs need for security, but
saw as aggression
- Made Americans ignore evidence to the contrary: e.g. China becoming Communist Soviets
were blamed when it was clear that Maos victory had little to do with Stalin
- USs actions with regard to the Marshall Plan: seen by the USSR as Capitalist interference
- Introduction of new currency into Berlin was provocative: indicated thatUS wanted an anti-Soviet
state
- Establishment of NATO was an aggressive action against the security of the Soviet Union
Soviet foreign policy was mainly carried out in response to US actions; attempt to defend itself from
what it saw as aggressive anti-Soviet actions. The problem was every action Stalin took in
response to the West in order to defend the USSR, the West saw it as further evidence of Soviet
aggression.

Both sides?

- The West and USA feared communism as a threat to its existence its presence in the world
-

would also be a threat


USSRs actions were suspicious and expansionist went against spirit of Yalta
Kennans Long Telegram presented a very fearful view of the USSR needed to be stopped.
Developing Red Scare in USA increased paranoia! China, Korea, USSR atomic bomb in 1949
confirmed fears?
USSR scared due to weak position after war USA had strong economy, nuclear monopoly
US imperialism?
Stalin was a paranoid leader: totalitarian state meant his fear prevailed lack of dialogue within
USSR unable to view US actions logically?

Historians
The Orthodox view
The Orthodox, or Traditional view, holds that the Soviet Union as responsible of the Cold War

- Position held by historians in the 1950s and early 60s.


- States that the Soviets were inevitably expansionist due to their suspicion of the West; in

accordance with their Marxist theory: advocated the need to spread revolution throughout the
world
- Thus Stalin violated the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, occupied and imposed Soviet control
in Eastern Europe, and plotted to spread Communism throughout the world Moscow at its
centre
- US had to act defensively: from the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, establishment of NATO
- Marxism-Leninism gave the Russian leaders a view of the world in which the existence of any
non-Communist state was by definition a threat to the Soviet Union An analysis of the origins
of the Cold War which leaves out these factors the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the
sinister dynamics of a totalitarian society and the madness of Stalin is obviously incomplete.
- Arthur M Schlesinger
- Other historians: WH McNeill, H Feis
- Winston Churchill and George Kennan could also be considered shapers of the Orthodox
perspective

Revisionist view
The alternative perspective held the USA responsible for the Cold War

- Position flourished when the consensus over foreign policy in the United States was crumbling
during the Vietnam War

- Revisionists explain the onset of the Cold War in terms of dollar diplomacy - William Appleman
Williams; see the motives behind US foreign policy as inherently linked to the needs of
Capitalism
- Hence containment of Communism was driven by the requirement to secure markets and free
trade penetrate Eastern Europe
- Followed on from the USs traditional open-door policy of the late 19th century
- View taken even further by Gabriel and Joyce Kolko: viewed Soviet action as even less
relevant to US foreign policy
- American policy as determined by the nature of its Capitalist system and by fears of
recession
- Coercion characterised United States reconstruction diplomacy - Thomas Patterson similar
said
- Many Revisionists believe that Stalin himself was a pragmatic leader
- Had the US been more willing to understand the Soviets need for security and offer some
compromises, Stalin would have also made concessions
- Most radical thesis: Cambridge political economist Gar Alperovitz
- Follows on an idea put forward by British physicist PMS Blackett - dropping of the nuclear
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not important as the last military campaign of WWII,
but rather as the first diplomatic move by the US in the Cold War
- Japan was already defeated; new weapon of power used to warn and intimidate the Soviets

Post-revisionist view
This school of thought does not exactly combine the Orthodox and the Revisionist views, but Postrevionists do stress that neither the USA nor the USSR can be held solely responsible for the
origins of the Cold War
- John Lewis Gaddis: declared that there was a growing consensus of opinion that followed the
Post-Revisionist line of argument

- The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments in
both the United States and the Soviet Union. The external situation circumstances beyond
control of either power left Americans and Russians facing one another across prostrated
Europe at the end of World War Two. Internal influences in the Soviet Union the search for
security, the role of ideology, massive post-war reconstruction needs, the personality of Stalin,
together with those in the United States the need for self-determination, fear of
Communism, the illusion of omnipotence fostered by American economic strength and the
atomic bomb made the resulting confrontation a hostile one. Leaders of both superpowers
sought peace, but doing so yielded to considerations, which, while they did not precipitate
war, made resolutions of differences impossible.
- Post-revisionist historians, e.g. Gaddis, Walter LaFeber, agree that misconceptions played an
important part at the beginning of the Cold War
- Both superpowers overestimated the strength and threat of the other; much of the growing
tension of the 40s was a result of a action and reaction pattern
- Both sides were improvising rather than following a well-defined plan of action
- Stalins search for security was not deterred ini ally by strong lines being drawn, while at the
same time the West did not fully recognise the Soviets motives

Views of the post-Cold War historians


After 1991, Soviet sources were now available, due to the fall of the Soviet Union

- Gaddis refined his Post-revisionist view, putting even more of a focus on Stalin
- Suggests it was Stalins policies, coupled with the Soviet totalitarian/authoritarian government,
that drew the West into an escalation of hostility and the protracted arms race
- Concluded that if Stalin was removed from the equation, the Cold war would have been
unlikely to develop
Individuals and their actions, rather than the policies of whole governments, are of vital importance
in explaining key events in the Cold War particularly obvious in the origins of the Korean War
and in the Berlin Crisis (1961)

European and Soviet Perspectives

Role of the Europeans


Historians brought Europe and its role into clearer focus in the 1980s after the 30-year rule period
that secured the confidentiality of government records
- Many European governments had been economically devastated by war; harboured deep
anxieties about Soviet expansionism important impact on US foreign policy
- Some historians argue that European elites partly engineered the Cold War to lock the USA
into military and economic support
- British: did much to heighten US awareness/perception of the Soviet threat - Churchills
Iron Curtain speech
- European contributions suggest that both the Revisionist and Post-revisionist historians had not
satisfactorily considered the complexity of US foreign policy
- Geir Lenestad asserted that the Cold War can only be properly understood by taking into
account the influence of external factors - European fears and opinions

Soviet perspective
Historians on both sides of the war have reconsidered the role of ideology and the search for
security in Soviet foreign policy.
Initial stages of the Cold War: Soviet line held that Americans were pursuing a policy of dollar
imperialism dictated by the needs of Capitalism
- Soviet Foreign Minister Sergei Molotov accused the United States of trying to take over Europe
economically and put it under control of strong and enriched foreign firms, banks and industrial
companies

- In response, Molotov said that he Soviets were only attempting to find security to rebuild after
the Great Patriotic War (WWII), and where and when possible, to aid in the liberation of the
exploited working classes of the world
Many historians believe that the furthering of socialist objectives became tied to the search for
security following WWII
- Crucial initial stages of the Cold War: USSR should aid Communist groups around the world to
fulfil this aim
Other historians using Soviet archives see the greatest motive for USSRs foreign policy as being
the renewed German and Japanese aggression, and of aggression from the Capitalist world.
Some East European historians, e,g. Vojtech Mastny, focus on Stalins role in the origins of the
Cold War
- Perspective called Soviet Revisionism
- Mastny sees Stalins role as pivotal; believes that Soviet foreign policy during this period can
be explained in terms of Stalinism;
- Joseph Stalins own specific modus operandi of paranoia and suspicion

Revisionist historians
A new perspective emerged during the 1960s when many Americans began to question the actions
of their own government over the controversial war in Vietnam.
They believed that the USA was responsible for the Cold War. They argue that US policy was
linked to the needs of capitalism.
Containment was all about securing access to markets. US was aggressive and wanted to
dominate the post-war world.
The most famous revisionist writer is William Appleman Williams whos book The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (1962) argued that US policy was a form of dollar diplomacy.
Other famous revisionists include Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, Gar Alperowitz and Walter LeFeber.
Gar Alperowitz has argued that the primary reason the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan was to
scare the USSR.

Post-revisionist historians
A third perspective emerged in the 1970s and 1980s that questioned both the orthodox and
revisionists.
US historian John Lewis Gaddis was a key proponent of this school and he argued that war grew
out of complex misconceptions on both sides.
Both sides failed to recognise the needs of each other and both overestimated the strength of each
side. Long-term factors made peace between them difficult.

Post-Cold War - New


Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, many Soviet archives have been opened which have
allowed historians to see events from the Soviet perspective.
This has led to a growing consensus that both sides were to blame, but that Stalin really was a
crazy leader and his actions encouraged war.
The New historians, using new evidence, focus more on the role of individuals and their ideologies.
John Lewis Gaddis, Daniel Yergin and Constantine Pleshakov.

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