5 sassemesonnries Big, Slow-Moving, and... Invisible MACROSOCIAL PROCESSES IN ‘THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS RE IEE SSP RTEM Paul Pierson sprured, but the postulate on which this work must stand is chat they mater more, ~ Bdward Carmines and James Stimson (1989) [Rjesearchis 2 game against nature in which narure counters with strat- of concealment... Obviously, the effectiveness ofa given strategy ‘of discovery will depend on nature’ strategy of concealment, and con- sey, the effectiveness ofthe laws of natureasa strategy of concealmentPherson Politics sa strong and slow boring of hard boards ~ Max Weber (1946 1921) thas become the central vintage point for framing questions ly in economies and political sciene, the cime singly restricted. In choosing st we kc apna in ching fr alana, ow the immediate; we look for causes and ovtcomes cha are bath conguous and rid unflaing ache proce, emis lot (Golstone 1998; Kitschelt 1999). There are important things that we do not see 2 all and what we do see we aften Temay help to start out ura sciences, Consider first a tomado. Typical suggest that they develop relatively rapidly of these storms ‘An examination of earthquakes would ordinarily look different. Like the tornado, the outcome of incerest ~ the earchquake itself takes place in @ very short petiod, a matter of seconds. The explanation or causal account ldap Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible "Tle 5.1, The Tne Horisoms 9D Shor Lows “Toorado — Meecoive/Extinction Long w Esctquike Global Warming increases ceased tomorrow, we would nonetheless see a substen temperatures during the nest century. Much of the increase, ic seems, i stantial diversity, s summarized in Table $.1. The causal processes claimed to generate outcomes ofinterest mey or may not unfold overa shor< period. ‘ith some tan ‘only over a very extended period. In each case, we may r horizon” ofa variable or cluster of variables -the period of time over whichPierson er period. Typically, analysts tackling particular kinds of processes diversi is thot go much of contemporary 1 Typiealy «short period of time. This sort of framework will often be eppropris The a i, however, a0 resson to think that most political process most interesting ones, are necessarily best understood by invoking secounts with this kindof temporal structure, In many situstions, we will ‘want to extend our temporal field of vision to consider social dyna vadrants 2-4. In Part T of, cssay I discuss causal processes that oceur gradually over extended periods of time ~ reviewing some reasons why certain causes are slow-moy and offering some examples from comparative research. In Pare I, I caplare the same sec of issues for long-term outcomes. Part IT moves the discussion beyond the simple fmework introduced in Table 5. focuses on two types af processes where there may be significant time ween the onset ofa central cause and the initiation of the outcome of "Throughout his discussion, my emphasisison distinguishing and out ing differen types of processes that might opertte overextended periods of ‘ime, Such distinctions can help provide the foundation fr future efforts to inegrate long-term processes into theoretical accounts. That isto say they provide orientations ~ sources ofboth questions and potential hypocheses — for empirical research. They aso help to clarify specific methodologi challenges facing invesdigations of long-term cially, the idensfication of diferent rypes of long-term processes can serve tate toward Quadrant I, nd preaecupatio. Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible 1. Slows-Moving Ceusal Processes of these pos Cumulative Cores “Themoststraightforward ype change ina variableis continuous but jal change provide good examples. ft as key causes of important political changes - a theme re~ cently incorporated inta significant work in comparztive political economy Robert impact of| became a more pervasive aspect of American halé-cenzury (Putnam 2000). This change processes the gradval spread of tele Pornam’ recent analysis television, which gradu: popular culture over the tnd appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the votecontemporary political sc selegute these types of processes to the background, esents the potential impact of cumulative causes Toresold Effects generated slermessis even more impor In incremental or curnulative frees may not generate incre- ment in outcomes of interest. Instead, these processes have a modes impact until they reach some critical level gers major changes. The earthquake extmple presented in lear instanceof this kind of process. Another favorit eis very nature seems eo eal for a Big, Slow-Moving and Invisible ‘There is, however, no reason t0 exclude roving variables may be eemencous old prominent features in theoretical work on call sage communities ( 1998). More generally, threshold dynamics are likely co be prevalent in 8 where actors fice binary choices and where the choices favor depend in pare on their perception of what others are likely todo. Granoverert clastic article atualy invokes a more restricted argument particular at heterogeneity ofindivideal thresholds, is ps 1 thresholds of even a single actor can generate lective behavior. By contrast, am interested in collec- tive thresholds, where once a social variable reaches a particular level, it triggers a big effect. The key point is th points in many socal processes that lead to nonlinearities (Sch ‘These processes could, bur need not, involve the interpley of heterogeneous 1 Granovercer has in mind,Prerson am places great weight on the ng the preconditions fr successful cart of McAdam’ analysis is the decline ofthe cotton economy io the quarter-century ater 1925. This decline both decreased the strength of forces opposed to black insurgency and generated patterns of migration that boosted the organizational capacities expansion of black churches, colleges, and Southern chapters of the National Asocietion for the Advancement of Colored People (NACI long-oppressed mi- nority. Ix was these gradval interconnected socal processes that created ns ripe for a set of triggering events Although threshold-sryle arguments have been particulary prominent in thestady of collective ation, there are good reasons to expect thistype of Aynaric to be prevalent when Socal variables ofthe slow-moving sort op- crate in established institational or organizational settings. Social scientists of vatiou sized the strongly inertial qualities ‘These tendencies toward persistence ‘up for sometime without generating immediate effets. When some likely setions, leading co relatively rapid change. Change in one furthermore, may quickly undermine others. The dynamic at and Invisible ‘outcomes in advanced ind Stephens 2001). In outlining the roots of Socal hegemony in Sea for instance, they sess chat 2 single election res ¥ 2 big effect on previonsly wel instivotionalized arrangements. On the other hand, electoral suce dam extended porad of time leads to significant changes i fs in the ‘expectations of social actors. At some point, these actors adjust their pal- iy preferences to accommodate the new environment. By doing s0, they |help co propel coordination sround these expectations, reinforcing the new regime. Similar eeguments about threshold effects are centeal to che ertical re- ligament cheories that have played such a prominent role in the study fof American electoral polities (Burnham 1970; Brady 1988). This line of argument has been summarized by David Mayhew (che quotations in the following passage ae from Bormharn 1970) imi, even dslctieplaizaton Benween longterm ines 2nd an instetins tend toward i quite critical ofthis account of American clectoral politics, Indeed, he maintains that short-run processes are often of greater causal significance than realignment theor to Mayhew, the “gente model of stres buildup. clongate political roubles backwards in time without warrant” (Mayhew highlig tal buildup of eres, rm processes ocesses. References to # boiling mi shootsPierson Figure $1 Aasic threshold model point or threshold can suggest, as McAdam notes, that “[mJovemen ‘cular Suctuations sbove she tend line become ‘riggers. An analyst could treat the scurces ofthese fluc tilly andor (Macy 1990). Alternatively, she could eeek to explain these flucretions as well. What threshold model of this kind, it does not analyze the sources of fuctuations wi the kind of argument presented in ‘Meddamb ans of black insungeny articular claims abo established with care. Even a ential analy that such arguments sometimes present 186, recentesample. Inasessing se retrenchment, he crit grams. The standard interpretation holds tris socal policy change by increasing ‘to defenders ofthe status quo. Swank goes. He notes, however, chat che causal erm indizec effec of institutional fragmentation ras in cer direction, Not only does institutional fragmentation limit the intial ‘expansion of the welfare sate, bu Sr inhibits the growth of encompassing interest groups, and weakens cultural ‘commitments to universalism. All f these long-term effects strengthen the welfare state$ opponents and weaken its advocates. In short, Swank argues, many of important effects of institutional fragmentation work ed pind of ine. Seng jiectly and oversequence of developments overtime, 1 tricky issues. A key challenge isto (tightly coupled,” as ‘quickly if there are many sages or stage are not very high Fe only three links, nd the probability 80 percent, there is les than a fify-fifty chance that the entire ges cannot bee The third and pechape most instructive response for curre the ends of the catsal chain on the bas an analysts research such processes are re strong theoretical grounds for believing Jbtantial range of social phenom the consideration of out- Processes I, Slox-Moving Outcomes Slow-moving outcomes are ones with long time horizons—thatis, processes where meaningful change in the dependent variable occurs only over the long run, The main category of uch processesin the socialsciences mirrors‘ually hive their most powerful effects on new voters, Partisan realignment therefore often works through the exte replacement of poli >; Purnem 2000). Slow-moving out- comes result from the changing distribution of these generations in the poptlation over time ‘This mechanism of replacement is applicable in a variety of contexts, suggesting central reason why many poliial outcomes have a very slow: ‘moving quality. Consider the case of political elites. If occupants of elite challenges, major changes in elite composition will often operate through slow-moving processes of replacement. Inthe U.S. Congress, fo cout of offee. The main mechani replioement: wien particular politicians retire or die, uhey ae succeeded by politicians who better match the new social environment. Thus even 4 major change in the fortunes of particular categories of pal declining prospects for moderate Repe in the Northes Democrass ofl stripesin the South aftr 1960) may take decades to work self out As this language suggests, one good class of such arguments are those grounded in theories of evolutionary processes, which mechanism operating overextended periods of time (Spruye 1994; Nelson hose pursuing pardiculargosls and employing parccolar strategies are 4 development of public bic expenditure on income wansfes, rly unfolding outcome of earlier pol- iy choices (Steverle and Kawai 19 highly relevant for many al economy, because 2 great deal of the growth in public expendivare sine 1975 reflects these lagged policy-com= rents rather than the introduction of new, more generous policies. (Pierson 2000e; Huber and Stephens 2001), Public pensions account fr roughly 40 pereent of expendizures on social protection and th the current budgetary stress affecring advanced welfare sa iy area there are often very long time lags berween the enactment ofa policy and the realization ofits major public expenditure implications. In the case of concibutory pensions, it may be secenty years ~ the time it takes for the bulk of the pensioner population tobe composed of those who had 2 full working ca- reer under new rules - before policy choices are fully reflect they may attribute pol- developments ‘changes tookPierson Dafne Sui See. “Tine Horinn of Oneome Shore Long Shoe Fi m of Caste Carat ects Long ‘Trshol Cou Chine _Cumulare Caer ‘emphasizes that Drd vo by ory hat analysis on the famework presented in Table 5. casein the physical sciences, no ll processes fins ar ily t fit comfortably in Quadrant L Many causes and outcomes have pendent variables with long time horizons. Arguments about cumulative effec, by definition, refer to dependent varia IIL, Moving Beyond the Focus on Time Horizons So far, I have sessed that social scientists may need to look at extended periods of time because they wish to consider the rale of factors that change only very gradually In essence, this argument suggests the need for al analyses: stracroral explanations and Structural Determination Structoral accounts constitute a prominent clas of arguments abo, termouteomes. Key cause the cone exvsal processes at work In. rey resemble the threshold arguments discussed previously. They that structural arguments need not rely onthe gradual buildup of over time. In other words, neither eauses nor outcomes need be loving. Outcomes, however, may occur at 2 considerable temporal distance from the appearance ofthe central cause. ‘The difference can be seen by contrasting Figure 5.2 wi summary of threshold arguments. In Figure 5.2, struct eaters ceaocis ie eeeaal ot Sac) introduced in Period 3. This moves the pressure on the status quo to ane such higher level ~ very close to the threshold change, From here itis only « mater of time (inthis before some triggering event precipitates the outcome of interest, ta oe) eae Figure 5:2 A threshold model with srueraral emsthat particular ences (Xs) Elster 1 ‘viously. In many eases they invalve a ), These processes dit with superglue. We do not know when the frog will come toa halt on the superglae pad, 2 take quite along sime, bu the eventual ly dete do svch argumeats require the strong claim chat Ys never turn into X5. IF the probability of x > y transformations is considerably higher than the probability of y —> 2 transformations, we wi population made up almost encrly of Vs, ‘While thismay seem like a fairly artifical construct the kinds of arguments about cause! proces 3 instance, make an argues ir analysis of de jon. Once countries reach a certin level of economic develop ignifcanc probability tht authortaren governments tum into democracies but very litle chance of transformations inthe oppo- sive direction, Over time, we see fewer and fewer author ‘Thiskind of process suggest che poss bbecween the key causal process and the eventuel outcome, The" 194 Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible Path Dependent or Positive Feedback Processes A frequentclaim in comparative historical ‘cal juneture induce path-dependent processes. Overtime, these proces lead to strikingly divergent outcomes, even from initially similar conditions (Gee, eg, Shefeer 1977; Collier and Collier 1991; Hacker 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001). Much ofthis literatre impli refers to the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes ina politcal system ~ what economists cal “increasing returns" processes Pierson 20004; cf. Mahoney 2000) A facly modest change induces 2 feedback loop, which reinforces the initial direction of change. Collective action, for instance, may lead to shifts in expectations and resources that facilitate more collective action; similar, insttutionalization may ease problems of coordination, fostering ‘more than insittionslization? 'A pash-dependent causal account employs a particular temporal highlights the role of what Arthur Stinchcembe has termed *his- torical causation,” in which dynamics triggered by an event or pro ‘one point in time reproduce and reinforce themselves even inthe a of the recurrence of the original event or procass (Stinchcombe 1968), ‘Ths the fll outcome of interest may require substantial time for these rocessts to play out, emerging ata considerable distance in time from the eritieal juceare or “historical cause." One could ctexample, under- 1: the impact of initial patterns of party ‘orth’ analysis of the instnaional foundations for economic growth (North 1990), and Robert Wuthnow cexplenation se of modern ideologies (Wthnow 1989), tration of 2 path-dependent account is Thomas sing repercessions of the financing methods adopted in those European states that feced military compesiion before cies (Eruman 1996). Following predecessors in The Birth of Leviathan that the ed a erticaljonerure for emerging powerful effect on patterns ‘on the prospects for de- ronting the pivotal problem of fof European state development and, veloping parliamentary democracies. Big, Slow-Maving, and Invisible argues, because the bureaucrat wging war and more conch insitstions. As noted previous now widespread in comparsie hi ‘Carmines and Stimson’ study of "issue evolution” investigates a very differ ing, bu the a rn oftheir argument is ‘Stimson 1989). Carmines and ‘are seeking to explain a momen elections (especially partisan differences reinforce that ni ‘eed in develops over the long term: complete the process but only begins it by setting x motion grows overtime” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. be slow-moving; they may also re- sion between igificane temporal separa ate interest. As the scholarlyPierson amply off che radar ser shown such desided preference for clea ate of throwing ‘The discipline jeisoned an undesirable ‘Quantitative analyses are By no long-term, slow-moving features hresh- priority on gener~ proximate butaften ‘Stephens, andPrerson ing a long-term exnporal structure, quantitative schol choice theorists) riposte loses much of seoretial imageries these analysts employ rarely lead them to ident tie outcomes or hypotheses in question (Jepperson n.d). Indeed, ruch in contemporary social science leads precisely to this re- sale Jon they reduce the time lag between explanans and explanandum. A mecha~ nism provides a continuous and contiguous chain of eausdl or intentional links..." Elster 1983, p. 24). Yer this reasonable desire to creates contigu- thould be only ane priority, and the price of pushing important social processes out 3 argument the increasing prevalence of rational choice c= parts to cas accounts democracy looks almost Game- (Collie sed th antaneous: put the pact in gear end go theoretic approaches do not easly sre 200 Big, Slow-Moviog, and Invisible Jong time periods without rendering key assumptions ble? oice theory, or even game theory, ior of cot ny not ete mos promising way opener i pe of ‘Biking atonal ehice theory may con many of the strongest candidates accounts are likely 1 be sociological. Even Jd be incorporated into rational choice explanations, they are not the kinds of lypothests that these analysts ‘ypically go looking fo ‘The pull of Quadrant tal choice investigations. Qu: evident not only in quantitative and ratio-Big, low-Moving, and Invisible period of ime foreach ofthase cases. As noted previo pears to mar many recent investigations of transitions to democracy. Even those not grounded ingame theory have often advanced highly voluntarisic those outcomes unfold. Ia tur, sation, As Swank’ research shows Claims about short-term eausdl effects when the long-term causal processes twreen small-N and quantitative methods for examining such slow-moving run exacty counter to them. All of these possibilities processes are likely o be considerable. Consider Carmines and Stimson’ reflections on their efforts to intro ace long-term perspective ino the stay of American publi opinion and. 2 of Chicago Press into Pinder Sct. New York: Basic Books. tims and Conrail Pal Maken. Stanford, 203Big, Slow-Moving, and Invisible eal They New Tr Go te ae a Combe Ms Harvard aie Stephens 2001, Development and Cris of the Wife we Clael Market. 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