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tookpressureofftheUSSRinEasternEurope
Alliesagreedtothisinprinciplebutdidnotopenthesecondfrontuntilthetimewasdeemed
right
ThisinturncausedStalintobesuspiciousthattheAlliesweredeliberatelydelayingthe
openingoftheSecondFrontinhopetoseetheSovietstobepermanentlyweakenedby
Germanattacks
TheWarsawUprising
August1944
RedArmyapproachedWarsawandGermanoccupyingforcespreparedtoretreat
PolishresistancehomearmyroseuptoliberatePolandthemselves
encouragedbySovietsandbelievedtheywouldbeassistedbyRedArmy
StalinorderedhisarmytorestonothersideofVistulariver
Germansslaughteredpoles
15,000membersofthePolishresistancearmywerekilled
TensionsatYalta
GermanyonthevergeofbeingdefeatedwiththeSecondFrontfinallyopenedduring
Normandylandingsof1944
AlliesdecidedthatGermanywouldbedisarmed,demilitarized,denazified,anddivided
postwarGermanytobedividedintofourzonesamongstAlliesAlliedControlCouncilset
uptogovernGermany
StalindemandedalargepercentageofthereparationsfromGermanytobegiventoRussians
borderbetweenPolandandtheUSSRtobedrawnatCurzonLine
frontierbacktowhereithadbeenbeforetheRussoPolishWarof1921
SovietswantedCommunistdominatedLublinCommitteeinPoland
SovietsintentionregardingPolandevidentlyseenwithKatynForestMassacreaswellas
failureofSovietforcestoassistPolishundergroundinWarsawUprising
ClearDivisionsatPotsdam
TrumanchallengedthenewwesternfrontierbetweenPolandandGermany(OderNeisseline)
insistedforthereorganizationofPolishgovernment
StalinsendorsementoftheLublinPolesdidnotappeasetheUSA
USAunhappyaboutPercentagesAgreementmadebilaterallybyStalinandChurchill
spheresofinfluencesdiscussedintermsofpercentages
Trumanrevealedthesuccessofthefirstatomicbombtestinginthisconference
firstABdroppedonHiroshimaAugust1945
secondAbdroppedonNagasaki
AmericansdidnotencourageSovietstojoinPacificwarinthefirsttimeever
Hiroshima
FirstatomicbombdroppedinHiroshimaonAugust1945
TheRedArmyinEasternEurope
SovietUnioncontrolinEEbecameknownassatelliteempire
countrieskepttheirseparatelegalidentities(theonlythingthatseparatedthemselvesfrom
Moscow)
Tiedintomoscowslinesduetothefollowing:
sovietmilitarypower,salamitactics,statepoliceandsecurity,COMECON
bytheendof1948,satellitestateswereeconomicalyandmilitarilyunderthecontrolofthe
USSR
SalamiTactics
SovietssupervisedtheorganizationofgovernmentsinEE
eachofthepartieswasslicedoff,oneaftertheother
communistcorewasleftandultimatelythelocalCommunistswerereplacedwithMoscow
trainedpeople
BaggageTrainleadersreturnedtoEasternEuropeensuredthatthepostwargovernment
oftheirrespectivecountries
Germany
Potsdam:
stateofwar:GermanysurrenderedunconditionallyandUSinvadingJapanesemainland
Germany:economyofGermanywouldrunasawholebutwaslimitedtodomesticindustry
andagriculture
Sovietsreceive24%oftheirreparationbillfromWesternzonesmoreagricultural
Easternzonewastogivefoodinexchange
Iran
TehranConference1943
criticalturningpointvictoriesin1942forAllies
UKandUSAstillhaventlaunchedtheSecondFrontthattheSovietshavebeendemanding
for
StalincontinuedtopressurehisAlliestoinvadenorthwesternEuropeinordertotake
someburdenoffUSSRsshoulders
WhattodowithGermany
differentviewsaboutthefutureofGermany
lessonsfromthefailureofTreatyofVersailles
agreedupontheideathattheunconditionalsurrenderofGermanywastheir
objective
RooseveltsupportedOperationoverlord
StalinsconcernswithsecurityanddemandedtohaveasayinhowPolandspostwar
borderswouldbeshaped
arguedthatPolandhadbeenthetraditionallaunchingpadforinvasionsofRussia
USSRgottokeeptheterritorythatwasseizedin1939
PolandwouldbegiventerritoryonitswesternborderwithGermany
createdanotrulyindependentPolandensuredfuturehostilitybetweenGermanyand
Poland
PuppetRegimePolandwouldhavetolooktoUSSRforfuturesecurity
Sovietsdemandedtherighttokeepterritorytheyhadseizedbetween193940whichwould
givethemcontrolofBalticStates,partsofFinlandandRomania
UKandUSAagreedtotheSovietannexationoftheseterritories
wentagainst1941AtlanticChartervalues
settleinternationaldisputesthroughcollectivesecurityorganization,UnitedNations
mainpositiveoutcomes:UnitedNations,agreementontheneedforweakpostwarGermany
Kennan'sLongTelegram
keyidea:Sovietsystemwasbuoyedbythethreatofahostileworldoutsideitsborders
KennanarguedthatUSSRsviewoftheworldwasatraditionaloneofinsecuritywantedto
advanceStalinistideology
Sovietregimewascruelandrepressive
HostilerelationshipbetweenrussiaandtheUSA
Churchill'sFultonSpeech
IronCurtainSpeech
Sovietreaction:withdrewfromIMF,steppedupantiWesternpropaganda
initiatedanewfiveyeareconomiclife
InstabilityinGreeceandTurkey
postWW2:antiimperialist,nationalistandtoacertainextent,ProCommunistrebellions
inGreeceandTurkey
rebellionssupportedanddirectedbySoviets?
CommunistPartysuccessinItalyandFrance
grewstrongerinpostwarEurope
membershipincreasingduetoeconomicdeprivationsandhardshipsexperiencedattheendof
thewar
TheTrumanDoctrine
radicalchangeinUSforeignpolicywhichhastraditionallybeenisolationist
inresponsetounstable
TrumansdecisionasaffectednotonlybyChurchillsperception
TheMarshallPlan
MarshallbelievedthattheeconomiesofWesternEuropeneededimmediatehelpfromthe
USA
followedquitenaturallyontheTrumanDoctrineeconomicextensionoftheideasoutlined
bythepresident
aims:reviveEuropeaneconomiespoliticalstabilityandsocialcouldbeensuedinthefuture
SovietsbelievedthatUSAwasestablishingaEuropeanempireandthatitsmethodwas
economicdominationanddependence
COMECON(January1949)
acentralizedagencythatlinkedEasternbloccountriestoMoscowdesignedtostimulate
andcontroltheireconomicdevelopment,supportcollectivisationofagriculturaland
developmentofheavyindustry
responsetoMarshallPlanMolotovPlanseriesofbilateraltradeagreements
COMINFORM
createdasaninstrumenttoincreaseStalinscontrolovertheCommunistpartiesofother
countries
WestwasconcernedthatthisorganizationwouldactivelyspreadCommunismintheWests
ownsphereofinfluenceWesternEurope
Mr'X'Article
KennanarguedthattheUnitedStatespolicytowardstheSovietUnionhadtobeoneofthe
longtermcontainmentofSovietexpansionism
USshouldregardtheUSSRpoliticallyasrivalratherthanpartner
KenanhadstronginfluenceonPresidentTruman
hadinfluenceoverAmericanpublicopinionduetohisexpertiseonSovietpolicy
CzechoslovakianCoup
1948SovietscontinuedtoattempttoconsolidatetheircontroloverEasternEurope
CzechwishedtoleanmoretowardsWesternsidessphereofinfluence
WorriedStalinbecauseCzechexpressedinterestinreceivingaidfromtheMarshallPlan
certainamountofsentimentalfeelingintheWestforCzechsafterabandonmentin
theMunichAgreementsof1938
StalinorganizedforpressuretobeputontheCzechcoalitiongovernment
CzechCommunistPartyleaderdemandedtheformationofacommunistledgovernment
ImpactoftheBerlinBlockadeontheestablishmentoftheCIA:
1.WhywastheBerlinBlockadeatestforUSintelligence?
BerlinCrisisbeganMarch1948
importanttestfortheAmericanintelligenceestablishment
StalintriedtopushtheAlliesoutofWesternBerlin,intelligenceofficersjudgedwhetherhis
pressurewasapreludetowaroracalculatedbluff
2.Whatweretheconclusionsdrawnatthetime?
March1948:AmericanMilitaryGovernorinBerlindescribedsubtlechangeinSoviet
attitudewhichconvincedhimthatwarmightsooncomewithdramaticsuddenness
theybelievedthattheUSSRwouldnotresorttomilitaryactionwithinthenext60days
followedbyseriesofescalatingSovietprovocations:blockadeofBerlinandAlliedairlift
3.WhatwastheimpactofthecrisisonUSintelligence?
nonationalintelligenceunittoproduceassessmentsatthattime
DCIHillenkoetterestablishedanadhoc,interagencycommitteetoprepareanestimateof
Sovietintentions
adhoccommitteeestimatesprovedtohaveimmediateandlongtermrelevancefor
policymakersinWashington
4.WhatarethevalueandlimitationsofusingthisasasourceforfindingoutabouttheBerlinCrisisof
1949?
TheBerlinCrisiswasanationalintelligenceproblemthatittranscendedthebureaucraticlines
thathaddividedtheintelligencefortheprevioustwoyears
Theotheralternativewasquitesimplyparalysis
CaseStudy
Causes
Impact
Significance
BerlinBlockade
19481949
Germanyskeystrategic
position
Differingaimsofthemain
powers
increasinglackoftrustbetween
bothparties
disputesbetweenpostwar
powerswithinGermany
divisionofGermany
thecontinuationoffourpower
controlinBerlin
theformationoftheNATO
PostwarGermany:
BerlinwasagreedtobedividedtemporarilyintofourzonesadministeredbytheACCwith
BerlinsgovernancebeingtheresponsibilityofAlliedKommandantur
temporaryarrangement
Germanywastreatedasoneeconomicunit
by1949,Germanyhadpermanentlydividedintotwoseparatestates
WhydidpostwarpowersfailtounifyGermany?
Germanyskeystrategicpositionanddifferingaimsofthemainpowers
geographicalproximitiesandpotentialeconomicstrengthconcernforallcountries
USSRdidnotwishfortheresurgenceofGermanyposeassecuritythreat
wantedtogetasmuchoutofGermanyatthesametimereparations
FrancefearedaunitedGermany
USwishedforGermanytogothroughrapideconomicrecovery