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    The Misplaced Legacy of Gregory Bateson: Toward a Cultural Dialectic of Knowledge and Desire Charles W. Nuckolls Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), 367-394. Stable URL hitp://links jstor-org/siisici=0886-7356% 28 199508% 29 10%3A3%3C367%3ATMLOGB%3E2.0,CO%3B2-V Cultural Anuhropology is currently published by American Anthropological Association. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use ofthis work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www jstor.org/jounals/anthro. html Each copy of any part of @ JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission. STOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org, hupslwww jstor.org/ ‘Thu Aug 12,09:18:53 2004 The Misplaced Legacy of Gregory Bateson: Toward a Cultural Dialectic of Knowledge and Desire Charles W. Nuckolls Deparment of Anthropology Emory University Introduction “The dualism constituted by the opposition of cognition and emotion is all the more intractable given the failure on the par of those who seck a synthesis (see Holland 1992; Hutchins 1987) to consider the history of past attempts. This is particularly striking in the case of attempts that might have been considered eatremely promising, especially in light of current interests (Horowitz 1988; Westen 1991, 1992). Of particular importance inthis regard i the early work of Gregory Bateson, whose writing on the dialectics of ethos and cidos offered a possible solution, although not one Bateson himself fully formulate. This art cle isan attempt to recover the insight of Bateson’s early work, witha view to developing itas anew approach tothe problem of cognition and emotion in cul- ture thos includes among its many possible meanings reference toa constella: tion of concepts that infuses culture with affective tone or emotional identity. For Bateson, it refers tothe standardization of a culture's affective and emo- tional aspects in contrast to what he called eidos, the standardization of a cul: ture’s informational and cognitive aspects, its logical structures and systems of inference. “The sum,” wrote Bateson, “of ethos and eidos, plus such general characteristics of a culture as may be due to other types of standardization, 10- gether make up the configuration” (1958:33). In using “configuration,” of course, Bateson had in mind the concept formulated by Benedict in Patterns of Culture (1934), which Bateson readin manuscript form while he was still camp: ing on the Sepik River, Bateson took the concept of ethos not from Benedict, however, but from Radcliffe-Brown, who never used ithimself but suggested itto Bateson ata time ‘when the later was struggling to develop a new approach tothe study of culture. Clara Ameopoogy 103387-396, Copyigh © 1985, Ameren AmhopopclAsscaton, 1 366 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY Bateson was bored, he later wrote, with the conventional study of “formal de- tails” and was more interested in studying the “feel” of culture (1972:81), While still inNew Guinea, he read Doughty's Travels in Arabia Deserta (1923), aclas- sic two-volume work of cultural description, and was struck by the author's su ccess in capturing the affective tone of the people. But Doughty had achieved only a literary or artistic representation of the “feel” of the culture. “I was more interested,” wrote Bateson, “in a scientific analysis of it” (1972:82). So he ap- propriated the term ethos to refer to standardized emotional configurations, in contrast to eidos, the standardization of cognitive configurations. Culture, the combination of both, was best captured through analogy: “The river molds the banks and the banks guide the river. Similarly, the ethos models the cultural structure and is guided by it” (1972:83).. ‘The meanings of ethos and eidos depend on the term standardization, which in Bateson’s work generally refers to the recurrent patterns that organize and represent feelings and thoughts. Standardized emotions are deep and strongly motivating emotional orientations. They constitute a cultural ethos. Standardized thoughts are habitually associated ideas, located in memory and. available to recall, which organize and direct thinking. They constitute a cul- ‘ural eidos. Standardized emotions and standardized thoughts are general, hence ‘common to everyone, and impose a conformitory pressure, such that differences tend to be assimilated to a central exemplar or, as Bateson put it, “preferred type.” The hypothesis is circular, of course, like the system it describes: “It is ‘Supposed that the pervading characteristics of the culture not only express, but also promote, the standardization of the individuals” (1972:83). Ethos: The Standardization of Emotional Aspects ‘Taken together, standardized emotions constitute an ethos, but what are ssuch emotions in themselves? If they are no different from the terms that repre- sent them, then, by standardization Bateson must have meant the organization ‘of emotion terms in cultural scenarios. But that would be a cognitive interpreta- tion, and since the whole point of introducing erhos was to distinguish it from ei- dos, its cognitive counterpart, the conflation of emotion with emotion terms ‘must be ruled out. The other possibility is that the emotions that make up an ‘ethos are deeply embedded motivational orientations, which people share by virtue of their common socialization and early childhood experiences. In this in- terpretation, the emphasis is decidedly developmental and there are vague Freud- jan resonances. Did Bateson intend that? In his 1958 epilogue to the second edition of the book, Bateson boldly as- serted that “Naven was written almost without benefit of Freud” (1958:282).. ‘There is no reason to doubt this, but his remark on what would have followed if, ‘Naven had been written with benefit of Freud is surely exaggerated: “I would have indulged in an orgy of interpreting symbols, and this would have distracted me from the more important problems of interpersonal and intergroup process” (1958:282). One suspects that Bateson wished to put his readers at ease, many ‘of whom, as social anthropologists, would have had only the greatest distaste for ‘THE MISPLACED LEGACY OF GREGORY BATESON 369 Freud, Official psychoanalysis was synonymous (then and now) with the sexual decipherment of symbols and with the psychological dynamics of “needs” and “wants.” This was a narrow and necessarily reductionist enterprise, one that was ‘opposed by anthropologists early on.' We are left with a puzzle, and perhaps a little doubt, as to what Bateson meant by “almost without benefit of Freud.” How much is “almost”? We shall return to this question later. For the present let us consider the analysis Bateson presents in his classic ethnography, Naven, since itis here that the dialectical theory of cultural cognition and deep motivation is developed. Several conceptual problems arose immediately, beginning with ethos. Shortly after introducing the observation that ethos is not one, but two, and differs be- tween men and women, Bateson introduces in a footnote the following explana- tion of what he means by his use of the term: In my description of ethos, Ihave not hesitated to invoke the concepts of emotion and to use terms which strictly should only be used by observers about their own introspections. Ihave been driven to this loose phrasing through lack of any proper technique for recording and of any language for describing human gesture and behavior. But I wish it to be understood that statements of this kind are an attempt—crude and unscientific peshaps—to convey to the reader some impres- sion of the behavior of latmul natives. [1958:124; emphasis in original] Bateson clearly wished to avoid attributing emotions to people when in fact the only attribution he could make was to himself tohis wa impression oftheir behavior. The emotions he describes, therefore, are his and not theirs; they refer to Tatmul emotions, but they do not actually represent them. In the epilogue to the 1958 edition of the book, Bateson tried (once again) to convey what he meant: “When I stated that the “tone” ofthe men's behavior inthe initiation cere monies was expressive of harshness and iresponsbility rather than asceticism, Tmeant thatthe actions performed by them, the washing ofthe novice,etc., were ‘accompanied by other details of behavior so that the whole picture was one of harshness” (1958:276; emphasis in original). In other words, the emotions Bateson describes correspond to the observer's own, experienced in the pres- ‘ence of Iatmul behavior, thus indexing Iatmul emotions without representing them. If this is what Bateson meant, the method behind it does not receive sys- tematic development as a theory of description. For that, it would have been nec- essary for Bateson to describe his own emotion categories and to explain how observation of Iatmul behavior triggered them. (An interesting project, to be sure, but not the one he undertook.) How then does Bateson justify the transla tion of emotion experiences and the comprehension of ethos? ‘We know that Bateson read Benedict's Patterns of Culture in manuscript form while he was still in the field. Its imprint is clearly evident. Benedict had developed the notion of a universal “are” of cultural variations, which all people share, but which particular cultures chose among to elaborate particular vari- ations. According to Benedict, human beings are born with the potential to be Zuni or Pueblo or anything else. But once we are socialized, and thus equipped 310 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY to experience only a segment of the arc as real, we find it difficult to understand people of another culture for whom a different part of the arc has been elabo- rated. Bateson, presumably, believed that he was studying that segment of the universal emotional continuum which Iatmul culture had selected for special elaboration. Consider this statement, drawn almost word for word (although Bateson does not say so) from Patterns of Culture: ‘A human being is born into the world with potentialities and tendencies which may be developed in very various directions, and it may well be that different individuals have different potentialities, The culture into which an individual is bom stresses certain of his potentialities and suppresses others, and it acts selectively, favoring the individuals who are best endowed with the potentialities preferred inthe culture and discriminating against those with alien tendencies, this way the culture standardises the organisation of the emotions of individuals. [Bateson 1958:115] ‘When Bateson discussed Iatmul pride, “an attribute of human nature” (1958:116), he believed he had special access to it by virtue of the human nature ‘that both he and the Iatmul shared. Pride among the Tatmul was elaborated differently, of course, and had different social implications, but it was still in some sense pride as Bateson, as well as every other human being, knows it or can know it given appropriate exposure, conditioning, and acculturation. Thave tried to extract a definition of emotion from Bateson, first, because | think that one is implicit in his early work, and second, because so few anthro- pologists who write on the subject (then or now) provide one of their own. One can comb the pages of Unnatural Emotions, for example, and find nothing more definitive than the comment that emotions are “intensely meaningful” (Lutz 1988:5), One would think that this might make emotion difficult to talk about. Bateson, to his credit, devoted a considerable space to the definition of terms in ‘Naven. In the end, however, itis the explanatory approach he developed that is important. I is to that approach that we now turn. Bateson developed an interpersonal theory of emotion that might seem t0 anticipate the work of several later anthropologists, especially the ethnopsy- chologists, since the emphasis is on the social construction of emotion catego- es. Looking back on his Tatmul work, more than 30 years later, Bateson himself confirmed that such a theory was his goal: “The New Guinea material and much that has come later taught me that I will get nowhere by explaining prideful behavior, for example, by referring to an individ- ual's “pride.” Nor can you explain aggression by refering to instinctive (or even learned) “aggressiveness.” Such an explanation, which shifts attention from the interpersonal field to Factitious inner tendency, principal instinct, or whatnot, is, suggest, very great nonsense which only hides the eal questions. (1958:147] Although this statement, with its implicit disavowal of drive psychology, might seem to constitute an excellent charter for ethnopsychology and the construc tivist project, there is more to it than that. In fact, as I shall show, the THE MISPLACED LEGACY OF GREGORY BATESON 371 interpersonal world Bateson constructs looks a lot like the intrapsychic world of psychoanalytic theory, with the same reliance on dialectical conflict and its dynamic principles. ‘The Dynamics of Ethos: Opposition, Conffict, and Dialectic Jatmul ethos is a binary relationship in which the emotional orientations of ‘men and women are opposed as well as complementary to each other, It is closely associated with place, The male ethos is best exemplified by male be- havior in and around the ceremonial house, a place of ritual and debate from which women are excluded, There, Iatmul men vie with each other in displays of harsh vituperation and buffoonery. There is a constant emphasis on making oneself the center of attention, and thus in lessening or eliminating, through in- sult or mockery, the posturings of other men. The term Bateson repeatedly uses to characterize this ethos is pride: pride in oneself as a master orator and pride in one’s clan: ‘The emotions which are so dramatically paraded in debate have their centre in pride, and especially in individualistic pride, But hand in hand with this, there is ‘developed a prodigious pride in the totemic ancestors ofthe lan; and most of the debates are concerned with the details ofthe totemic system, The totemic system hhas an obvious affective function—a very important one in this culture—of providing the members of every clan with matter for self-congratulation, 11988:127] ‘One might almost take Bateson to mean that the totemic system exists for the purpose of providing satisfactory expression to the pride Iatmul men feel in such overwhelming abundance. As we shall see, this was not Bateson's intent, but it does hint at something more complex—a way of seeing knowledge and ‘motivation as necessarily related and conjoint, ‘The female ethos of the Iatmul, centered in the domestic sphere and con- cerned with daily occupation, contrasts with its male counterpart. Where the ‘male is spectacular, the female is unostentatious; where the male is ceremonial, the female is domestic; where the male is individualistic, the female is coopera tive, There are exceptions, as Bateson notes, since when women ate by them- selves they manifest some of the same intemperate boisterousness as the men, But, for the most part, the female ethos is consistent in its emphasis on “quiet and cooperative attitudes” (1958: 148). Bateson’s approach to cultural ethos is premised on the existence of emo- tional orientations that the observer observes, then names, using the terms he takes to be their nearest equivalents in English. This was the approach favored by others, such as Benedict and Mead, and it has been extensively critiqued. ‘Where Bateson differed was in his description of an ethos as a binary emotive phenomenon, both parts mutually configuring and neither intelligible by itself. ‘This, as we shall see, is central to the synthesis of cognition and emotion impli inhis work, Moreover, Bateson asserted, ethos is nota static phenomenon, Ithas direction and force. Each aspect defines itself in opposition to the other, and in 372 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY their conflict each side compels the other to accentuate the emotional values that define it. The process is necessarily dialectical and progressive, a mutually re- inforcing system of opposites in which each moment represents movement to- ‘ward greater differentiation of values. This is schismogenesis. Schismogenesis is either complementary or symmetrical. The first case arises, as above, whenever opposites accentuate their different values and thereby increase mutual differentiation. The second differs only in that the val- ues that are accentuated are the same and not opposed (1958:176). Does comple- ‘mentary schismogenesis provide an adequate conceptual framework for under- standing the workings of the latmul ethos? Bateson had to consider the fact that the schismogenic process is progressive and unending. What happens to prevent the schismogenic entity (a person or a group) from destroying itself through ex- cessive differentiation? A kind of distortion or discomfort might develop that ‘would render normal psychological or social functioning increasingly difficult. ‘Something must exist, in short, to arrest the progression before it reaches this state. Bateson’s answer to the question, in 1936, was that the two forms of schis- ‘mogenesis—complementary and symmetrical —constrain each other and thus preserve the balance of the system. Here is how it works: Actors in a comple- ‘mentary relationship experience increasing mutual hostility, inability to under- stand the emotional reactions of the other, and mutual jealousy (1958:188-189). ‘One of Bateson's favorite examples was feudalism. The serf is submissive, the lord aggressive, and each responds to the behavior of the other with exaggera- tion of their assigned role attributes. But if this continued, it would not be long before the relationship deteriorated in mutual hostility. Consequently, some- thing must take place to retard or reverse the schismogenic spiral ‘There are four possibilities. First, symmetrical schismogenic moments ‘may temporarily interrupt complementarity: “The Squire is in a predominantly complementary and not always comfortable relationship with his villagers, but if he participates in village cricket (symmetrical rivalry) but once a year, this, ‘may have a curiously disproportionate effect in easing the schismogenic strain in the relationship” (1958:193). Second, the meaning of the complementary op- position may change, becoming no less complementary, but possessing a difer- tent symbolic significance that may make it more endurable. Here Bateson re- sorted to his other favorite example, marriage: “In a marriage in which there is a complementary schismogenesis based upon assertion-submission, illness or accident may shift the contrast to one based on fostering and feebleness” (1958:194). Third, an individual's consciousness of strain may prompt him to adopt behavior deliberately at odds with the behavior that sustains the schismo- genic relationship. [atmul men, for example, suddenly shift from harshness to buffoonery—apparently, as we would say, o provide comic relief and thus de- fuse tension. Finally, persons or groups opposed to each other in a progressive ‘complementary relationship may overcome their opposition by uniting in com- bined opposition toa third party or group. Bateson speculated that head-hunting ‘warfare in Iatmul culture constituted just such a mechanism, uniting the parties, ‘THE MISPLACED LEGACY OF GREGORY BATESON 373 usually opposed to each other, and thus controlling the schismogenesis between the sexes and the initiatory moieties. ‘Solutions to the problem of schismogenesis were not united within a theory ‘of psychosocial function that could explain the self-correcting processes just de- scribed. Bateson was aware of the problem, but in 1936 he had nothing to offer. ‘Twenty years later, in the second edition of Naven, he did have something to of- fer—cybernetics/systems theory. Cybernetics has not achieved the status of a master paradigm as Bateson, writing in the 1950s, hoped or expected that it ‘would. The reason might be that function, which cybernetic theory was intended to rescue, did not survive the advent of new problematics, at least not as the pri- ‘mary architectonic of anthropological discourse. If anything, it has become a term of opprobrium. The problem with most forms of functionalism was the im- plicit teleology—that the end or purpose of a process could be invoked as an ex- planation of the process itself. This made functional accounts weak and vulner- able to logical critique. Bateson considered cybernetic theory a solution to the teleological dilemma and thus the savior of functionalism, because it substitutes the notion of self-correction for the idea of purpose. The schismogenic system could now be seen as a circuitlike system consisting of multiple feedback loops. To merely state, as Bateson had done in 1936, that various countervailing forces might exist to arrest the progression of a schismogenic process is not suf- ficient. Cybernetically, one must be able to specify and relate the specific path- ‘ways through which self-correcting messages are transmitted. In reviewing the Iatmul materials in 1958, Bateson discovered what he thought must be the pri- ‘mary pathway. It was the naven ceremonial itself. ‘The naven ceremonial, which is an exaggerated caricature of a complementary sexual relationship between wau [mother's brother} and laua {sister's child] is fact set off by overweening symmetrical behavior. When laua boasts in the presence of wau, the later has recourse to naven behavior. Peshaps in the initial ‘description of the contexts for naven it would have been better to describe this as, the primary context, and to see aua’s achievements in head-hunting, fishing, etc, as particular exampies of an achieved ambition or vertical mobility in laua Which place him in some sor of symmetrical relationship with wau. (1958:290] ‘This is an ingenious solution to the problem, but it does not constitute proof, since it still lacks a demonstration that symmetrical or complementary behavior does in fact call forth its opposite at certain moments to restore balance and harmony. As Bateson himself remarked, “The questions at issue are whether excessive symmetrical rivalry between clans will in fact increase the frequency ‘with which lauas act symmetrically vis-a-vis their waus, and whether the resulting increase in frequency of naven tend to stabilize the society” (1958:290). Bateson calls for “statistical study” and “appropriate measurement” to test this hypothesis, but he does not present them. ‘The importance of Bateson’s ethological method is that it attributes to the emotions a motivational force not present exclusively in the emotions them- selves, as we are accustomed to think of them, but in the dynamic in which they 374 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY participate. Pride is motivating in that it prompts Iatmul men to ceremonial dis- play, but pride itself is nothing. It receives motivational strength from the com- plementary relationship it participates in: Men are prideful and women are co- ‘operative, and as they conflict, they construct both each other and the emotions they are expected to display. Pride is therefore impossible without its structural ‘obverse. It is so with all the emotions which differently construct the ethos of both Iatmul men and women. Emotions do not stand alone, but instead partici- pate in a relationship of contrast and mutual self-definition, much as signs within a semiotic system. ‘Complementarity is the principle of semiotogical contrast Bateson consid- ered primary. Symmetry, the other principle, is also important, but since itrefers to the one-upmanship among men or among women, it does not possess the gen- erative power of a dynamic conflict. Ths is because symmetry measures the in- tensity of expression between like sign-values. But the meaning of such values ‘depends on their differentiation from others with which they are paired in com- plementary opposition. The third semiological principle is reversal, as when Tat- ‘mul men suddenly shift from prideful display to comic buffoonery, or when ‘women, who are otherwise quiet and cooperative, suddenly become loud and demonstrative. These three principles—complementarity, symmetry, and rever- sal—are the principles that govern the working of an ethos. Freud and Bateson: ‘The Psychoanalytic Resonances of the Concept of Ethos If schismogenic ethology were merely a semiological theory, it would not possess the power to motivate behavior. What isthe source, for example, of the “balance” that the system tries to achieve? Why do responses to tension take the forms they do? This takes us back to the issue of psychoanalysis and its influ- ence on Bateson. We have already considered Bateson’s response: The influ- ence of psychoanalysis on the development of his approach was thought by the author himself to have been minimal. The similarities go much deeper than that, however, and they are all the more interesting if, as Bateson maintained, his de- pendence on the Freudian theory of development was nearly nonexistent. ‘The schismogenic theory of the emotions does not depend on an under- standing of infant behavior or child socialization. Bateson did not study these phenomena, atleast not among the latmul, so there can be no question of his hav- ing based his theory on a developmental psychology. A psychogenic theory of the emotions, like Freud’s, which might have traced schismogenic processes to early experiences of separation and loss, or pleasure and pain, is not introduced. Nor is there any indication that Bateson thought that sexual development might bbe involved, despite the fact that progressive sexual differentiation is fundamen- tal to ethological contrast and thus to the construction of Iatmul emotions. Per- haps the concept of progression itself, so vital to schismogenesis as a theory of change, might provide the link to psychological development. But there is no dication that Bateson ever considered progression in this sense. Ontology can- ‘THE MISPLACED LEGACY OF GREGORY BATESON 375 not constitute a dimension of comparability between Freud and Bateson. Yet the similarity of their approaches to the emotions is too strong to overlook ‘What they most clearly have in common is an emphasis on homeostatic bal- ance. Bateson, of course, shared with all functionalists the view that society is an organism-like entity that seeks balance as its natural state. Where he differed ‘was in trying to escape the teleology inherent in most functionalist explanations. ‘That is why he turned to systems theory and cybernetics. The other major dffer- ence that set Bateson apart from most of his functionalist colleagues, and that ‘made him comparable to Freud, was his emphasis on the emotions and the ethos. they constitute as the principle locus for expressing and determining homeo- static balance. He wanted to come up with a cybernetic theory of emotional dy- namics as a mechanism for explaining social integration and progress through time. ‘This i the most obvious link to Freud. In one of his earliest statements on the emotions, The Neuropsychoses of Defense, Freud stated that “in mental functions something isto be distinguished—a quota of affect or sum of excita- tion—which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity... which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of the body” (1894:60). Thus, even at this early point, Freud believed that the “mental apparatus” functioned as a complex reflex arc. Stimuli im- pinged on one end, either from within the organism or from the environment, and this accumulated excitation was discarded a the other end as motor activity or affect. This is a systems theory of a sort, even though Freud does not cal it that. But the importance of psychoanalytic theory was in attempting to specify ‘what happened within this system. Freud retained the notion of the mind as a complex reflex are in his later ‘work but enhanced the importance of the apparatus that protects it from exces- sive unbound stimulation, or anxiety. Powered by the twin drives of libido and aggression, the forces of the id motivate the organism to gratify instinctual ‘wishes. The ego cannot hold such wishes in abeyance and is overwhelmed by an influx of stimuli. Psychic energy, unable to achieve its purpose but incapable of restraint by the ego, courses through the system and is experienced by the ego as the affect of anxiety. The experience of emotion is dependent on the ego, for itis within the ego that energy is converted into affect. To make it possible for the organism to avoid anxiety, and to satisfy its drives even in the absence of a direct outlet, the ego uses various defensive mechanisms. Inhis account of self-correcting functions, Bateson described the loss and recovery of systemic balance in similar terms—terms that seem more like Freud's, not less so, with the accretion of cybemetic terminology in the second edition of Naven. Freud, of course, located the circuit in the mind and the fune- tions of self-correction in the unconscious part of the ego. Bateson located the circuit in cultural ethos and the functions of self-correction in ceremonial social interaction. The inner workings of each, however, are astonishingly alike. The 316 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY “mind” of psychoanalysis and the “ethos” of Batesonian anthropology are both ‘dynamic systems in constant internal conflict. Let us consider the psychoanalytic account. The mind is divided between its acquisitive and appetitive functions, located in the id, and its own ideal of it- self, located in the superego. The needs of the id demand satisfaction, but since reality and social convention prevent this, the ego, as the entity that mediates in- ternal wants and external constraints, represses needs and provides alternative, ‘or compromise, satisfactions. Solutions thus arrived at both represent the con- flict that is internal to their generation and partially resolve it, by providing sub- limated satisfaction, But because the conflict is permanent, and its compromise solutions never more than partial, a continuous effort or expenditure of energy must be made to keep the system intact and functioning. Over time, and under conditions of acute stress, the system may weaken, with the result that the old compromises must be reinvigorated or new ones devised. Certain conflicts are basic tothe system and cannot be eliminated, since the system itself and the repertoire of compromises it generates depend on theircon- tinued dynamic existence. Such conflicts are not resolved even in the enlight- ‘ened age Freud imagines at the end of Future ofan Illusion (1928). Unconscious wishes, deep in the id, cannot achieve satisfaction through direct expression since they cannot comprehend or control the environment. They must find ac- ceptable direction and form. The superego, as the vehicle of moral constraints, demands compliance, but it cannot provide satisfaction for unconscious wishes, Its demands must be reworked through appropriate compromises. Only the eg0, as the mediator of these two, can do both. It is formed in the clash of opposites, taking form according to the pressures imposed by both and providing partial solutions to the competing demands that help to constitute it. Culture, like the ego, is the result of a similar process in social, instead of intrapsychic, terms. Wishes and prohibitions conflict with each other, as they do in the primal scene imagined by Freud in Totem and Taboo (1950), and once the need arises, people invent social structures and symbol systems to represent and resolve the conflict. Freud thought that rituals, like the infamous “totem meal” ‘that followed the primal crime, are particularly effective means to this end. In ‘consuming the animal that represents their father, the primal brothers reexper- jence fulfillment of their wish to supplant him, but in conforming to the rules ‘that govern the ritual, they subject themselves to the authority that once their fa- ther, but now culture as a whole, represents, The ritual is repeated at regular in- tervals, thus ensuring that the functions it performs will continue. ‘Thenature of the agencies Freud proposed, as well asthe ontogenesis of the processes that connect them, are less important than the fact that their relation- ship is a dynamic one, built out of conflict and compromise. Now compare this to the Iatmul society that Bateson described. Male and female are structural op- posites. They define themselves in relation to each other, and for both there is a

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