Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Classical Quarterly, 61
(2). pp. 553-573. ISSN 0009-8388
Copyright 2011 Cambridge University Press
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or
study, without prior permission or charge
The content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s)
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/72050/
Huius oratio ut semper gravis et grata in contionibus fuit his speech was serious and
1
pleasing, as it always is in such assemblies ... Ciceros praise of Pompeys eloquence in the
contio as generally impressive should be read as part of his glorification of his most
prominent supporter in the attempts to recall Cicero from exile. Yet, it points to an aspect of
Pompeys political profile which is often overlooked, namely his oratorical performances and
their effect on his audience and his political career. His speeches delivered in the senate, the
courts, and in the popular assemblies (the contiones) are often mentioned in passing only.
However, they provide an important means to understanding Pompeys political strategy and
career as a top politician. His speeches delivered in the contio, in particular, provide a
coherent picture of a man consciously nurturing a relationship with the popular audience in
order to build and maintain a political career for himself. In this paper, I aim to analyse
Pompeys oratorical performances in the contio with a view to establish the effect of his
oratory on his audience and its implications for his political career.
Cic. Sest. 107 with transl. by R.A. Kaster, Cicero. Speech on behalf of Publius Sestius
For the role of the contio in Roman politics, see, among others F.G.B. Millar, The Crowd in
Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor, 1998); H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late
Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2001); R. Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power
in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004); K.-J. Hlkeskamp, Oratoris maxima scaena:
Reden vor dem Volk in der politischen Kultur der Republik, in M. Jehne (ed.), Demokratie
in Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes in der Politik der rmischen Republik, Historia Einzelschrift 96
(Stuttgart, 1995), 11-49 = K.-J. Hlkeskamp, Senatus Populusque Romanus. Die politische
2
Pompeys oratorical skills are only rarely discussed in the ancient sources and modern
3
scholarship, partly as a result of the meagre and scattered nature of the evidence. Indeed, we
have no secure verbatim quotations from Pompeys speeches. Yet, a close reading of
passages mentioning his eloquence or descriptions of specific performances in the contio in
particular can help us judge the effect of his oratory and thereby form an opinion on the role
of oratory in his political career. In the following discussion, general testimonia to Pompeys
oratory and evidence of specific occasions in which he spoke in the contio will be analysed in
order to build up a picture of his oratorical abilities and their possible impact on his
audience.
I shall not discuss all of Pompeys public speeches (which are listed in the
Appendix) but focus on the performances which help to form a picture of his oratory and its
reception in the popular assemblies.
Kultur der RepublikDimensionen und Deutungen (Stuttgart, 2004), 219-56 with addenda;
K.-J. Hlkeskamp, The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the
People?, SCI 19 (2000), 203-23; J. Tan, Contiones in the Age of Cicero, Classical
Antiquity 27 (2008), 163-201.
3
The topic is discussed briefly by G. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World
(Princeton, 1972), 282 who is unenthusiastic about Pompeys oratorical skills and E.S.
Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1974), 62 who
is more positive.
4
(Torino, 1976 ), 359-67 of testimonia and fragments (in her sense of the word) provides most
of the evidence, supplemented by other sources when relevant.
I intend to show that Pompeys contional performances were characterised by his skill in selfpraise, his exploitation of popular sentiments and his knowledge of his dependence on the
peoples favour in the contio. When speaking, his expressions were often politically vague,
from choice rather than lack of ability, and his whole career illustrates his preference for and
mastering of a non-committal tactic. Only when it was expedient, or he was provoked, did he
express himself directly sometimes even harshly. Pompey advanced his career less through
purely oratorical skills, and more through his popularity with the people (whom he nurtured
in the contio), stemming from his military achievements, and through his shrewd political
talent for knowing when to speak and what to say and, in particular, when not to speak and
what not to say.
Meus autem aequalis Cn. Pompeius vir ad omnia summa natus maiorem dicendi gloriam
habuisset, nisi eum maioris gloriae cupiditas ad bellicas laudes abstraxisset. Erat oratione
satis amplus, rem prudenter videbat; actio vero eius habebat et in voce magnum splendorem
et in motu summam dignitatem.
My contemporary, Gnaeus Pompeius, a man destined to excellence in all fields, would have
reached a greater reputation for eloquence if ambition for even greater glory had not diverted
him towards the prizes of a military career. His manner of speaking was sufficiently ample
and he had a good judgement in perceiving the question at hand; but his delivery was mainly
impressive through his fine voice and the great dignity of his bearing.
Ciceros evaluation covers the main elements incorporated in most descriptions of Pompey,
firstly, Pompeys insatiable ambition for power and glory, which made him pursue a military
career and try to outshine any possible rival, and, secondly, the perception that Pompeys
oratory was built mainly on his understanding of the political game and his natural and
towering dignitas rather than on brilliant oratorical skills. Ciceros description is not overly
positive in terms of Pompeys speaking powers when compared to the description of other
orators in the Brutus.
Ciceros conclusions are often repeated in the other ancient sources. Authors such as Caesar,
Sallust, Lucan, Seneca, Plutarch and Dio describe Pompeys ambition as overpowering all
6
other considerations, and some detail how Pompey exuded a natural auctoritas and dignitas,
8
but Seneca also explains how shyness made Pompey blush when speaking in public. This
5
6
(Oxford, 1992) ad loc.; Luc. 1.125-6; Sen. Marc. 14.3; Ep. 94.65; Plut. Caes. 28.1; Pomp.
53.7; Dio 36.24.6, 41.54.1.
7
8
Sall. Hist. 2.17; Vel. Pat. 2.29.2; Val. Max. 6.2.4; Plut. Pomp. 2.1; Crass. 7.4.
Sen. Ep. 11.4. McGushin (n. 6), 193 makes the comparison between Senecas
characterisation of Pompey and that of Sallust (Hist. 2.17), partly derived from Varro and
timidity, combined with Pompeys tendency never to relay openly his thoughts and wishes
9
and not to commit to any particular viewpoint, may have detracted from his natural dignitas
and given the impression of a less accomplished speaker. Valerius Maximus certainly argues
that Pompeys tactic of keeping a straight face in spite of the accusations hurled at him
10
allowed him to become an object of ridicule, despite his great auctoritas. Valerius presents
this observation as a general trait of Pompeys public appearance, and exemplifies it with
Pompeys (possible) defence of Manilius Crispus in 69 or 68 B.C., where, apparently, the
prosecutor Cn. Piso countered Pompeys towering auctoritas with the accusation that
11
Pompey intended to start a civil war. How far we can rely on the dating of the court case or
the precise exchanges between Piso and Pompey is uncertain. Yet, this example illustrates
Valerius general point about Pompey as the object of public ridicule in spite of, or exactly as
transmitted by Pliny (HN 7.53, 37.14 with R. Syme, Sallust (Oxford, 1964), 206 and n. 118).
But any clear evidence of Senecas source for Pompeys shyness escapes us. For a
consideration of Senecas portrayal of Pompey throughout his works, see M.T. Griffin,
Seneca. A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976), 182-94, esp. 189-90.
9
Cic. Att. 4.1.7, 4.9.1; Fam.1.1.3, 1.2.3, 1.5b.2, 8.1.3, 8.4.4; Q Fr. 2.2.3, 3.6.4; Val. Max.
Val. Max. 6.2.4. See also Val. Max. 1.6.12 with the comment of D. Wardle, Valerius
Maximus. Memorable Deeds and Sayings. Book I (Oxford, 1998), 207: No human being is
credited with influence (auctoritas) more than Pompey.
11
For the question of Pompeys possible defence and the identity of Cn. Piso, see E.S. Gruen,
Pompey and the Pisones, (Californian Studies in) Classical Antiquity 1 (1968), 155-70, at
160-62. See also Helvius Mancias attack on Pompey in 55 B.C. (Val. Max. 6.2.8) with the
discussion of this incident in C.E.W. Steel, Cicero, Rhetoric, and Empire, (Oxford, 2001),
146-7.
a means to counter, his great auctoritas and therefore serves to highlight the possibility that
Pompeys non-committal tactic could have negative repercussions.
presentation of Pompey,
character except his unwillingness to see anybody his equal in dignitas. Velleius evaluation
of Pompeys oratorical skills as only moderate stick out as a not very positive feature in his
otherwise extremely flattering portrait. The source for Velleius portrait of Pompey is
unknown, but it has been suggested that the information derives from one or more
panegyrists or biographers of Pompey whose works are now lost. We know that various
authors wrote praising accounts of Pompeys military achievements, and they may also have
included the element of oratory, which Velleius could then have picked up.
12
14
Social War: Cic. Flacc. 28; Suet. Rhet. 3 with R.A. Kaster, C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De
Grammaticis et Rhetoribus (Oxford, 1995), comm. ad loc. Posidonius wrote about Pompeys
exploits: Strab. 11.1.6. Theophanes even received Roman citizenship, as did his hometown
Mytilene, from Pompey as a thank you for his panegyric of Pompey: Cic. Arch. 24; Val.
Max. 8.14.3; Vel. Pat. 2.18.1; Plut. Pomp. 42; cf. Strabo 11.5.1, 13.2.3. Later authors of the
imperial age often used Pompey as a historical example; we have already seen the evaluation
of Pompeys ambition presented by Lucan, Seneca, Plutarch and Dio. We may detect a shift
15
He
illustrates this view with a few examples of Republican orators, including Pompey. It is
noteworthy how positively Maternus regards Pompeys oratory, in contrast with Ciceros and
Velleius judgements:
nescio an venerint in manus vestras haec vetera, quae et in antiquariorum bibliothecis adhuc
manent et cum maxime a Muciano contrahuntur, ac iam undecim ut opinor, Actorum libris et
tribus Epistularum composita et edita sunt. ex his intellegi potest Cn. Pompeium et M.
Crassum non viribus modo et armis, sed ingenio quoque et oratione valuisse; Lentulos et
Metellos et Lucullos et Curiones et ceteram procerum manum multum in his studiis operae
curaeque posuisse, nec quemquam illis temporibus magnam potentiam sine aliqua eloquentia
consecutum.
Perhaps you have had in your hands those ancient records, which are still kept in the
libraries of collections and which are just now being compiled by Mucianus; and they have
already been arranged and edited in eleven volumes, I believe, of Records and three volumes
in the presentation of Pompey before and after his death, possibly inspired by Ciceros brief
obituary note (Cic. Att. 11.6.5) which sets up a dichotomy between Pompeys destructive
political ambition and his admirable personal morality. See also Griffin (n. 8), 189-90 on
Senecas presentation.
15
For discussion of Tacitus view of oratory in this work, see W. Dominik, Tacitus and
of Letters. From these it can be understood that Cn. Pompeius and M. Crassus were powerful
not only through manly virtues and military means, but also through their talented oratory;
that the Lentuli and the Metelli and the Luculli and the Curios and the great group of all other
leading men devoted effort and care to these studies, and that in their day no one achieved
16
Here, we see the traditional pairing of Pompey and Crassus, which seems to have been a
feature already in their own day and later underlined further by Plutarch.
17
This passage
follows immediately upon a passage about the necessity of oratory for political success in the
republic, and it is particularly curious that Tacitus, or, strictly speaking, Maternus, has chosen
Pompey and Crassus to exemplify this idea when, for example, Cicero or Caesar would have
been much more obvious choices. Did Tacitus simply want to insert a reference to Mucianus
collections of ancient records to add credibility to his view point?
18
Pompey and Crassus the best examples of oratorical skill by contrast to Cicero? Or was it
because Pompey and Crassus were more known for their military achievements and
therefore, in Tacitus view, better illustrated the notion that oratorical talent must have played
a part too in their political success? The latter possibility seems more likely: if even Pompey
and Crassus could be presented as good orators, then Tacitus (or, strictly, Maternus)
argument about the centrality of oratory becomes inescapable. If so, their prominence here is
not surprising, but perhaps, for the same reason, gives us little indication about their real
levels of oratorical skill. Also Plutarch, in his comparison between the two politicians,
16
17
Cic. Fin. 2.57; Tusc. 1.12; Plut. Pomp. 22.1, 23.3; Crass. 7.3, 7.4.
18
Mucianus himself was a very accomplished orator: Tac. Hist. 2.5.1, 2.76-8 with R. Ash,
emphasises how they were considered similarly gifted in terms of dignity, persuasiveness of
speech and winning grace of appearance.
19
have been considered accomplished speakers, at least by posterity, but much more certainly
that the long-term rivals were endowed with the same level of eloquence, which again made
them useful exempla for Tacitus in his Dialogus.
suarum narrator). Rather than praising Pompeys eloquence in general, this passage seems
to suggest that he was never more articulate than when praising his own victories. Indeed,
other sources attest to Pompeys boasts of his military achievements as a substantial part of
21
20
Quint. 11.1.36.
21
Plin. NH 7.99; Oros. 6.6.4; Plut. Pomp. 54.1; the speech put in Pompeys mouth by Dio
36.25-6 reflects this self-praise too. Cf. Val. Max. 8.14.3 on Pompeys citizenship to
Theophanes who had chronicled his military successes. On the difficulties inherent in
praising oneself, see R.K. Gibson, Pliny and the Art of (In)offensive Self-Praise, Arethusa
36 (2003), 235-54, whose conclusion could be said to fit Pompeys case too, even if the
context was different: Praise of the self is a key mechanism for exercising control in advance
over the reception of your deeds by society. (254)
We know very little of Pompeys rhetorical education or training, apart from the name of
22
Pompeys teacher in rhetoric, Manius Otacilius Pitholaus. Quintilian and Suetonius allow us
glimpses into Pompeys attempts to strengthen his performances through the help of ghostwriters and rhetorical exercises. In his treatment of deliberative oratory, Quintilian has a
curious note on Ampius Balbus, whom Pompey defended in 55 B.C. Under the topic of
impersonation (prosopopoeia), Quintilian explains the difficulty of the task: the speaker has
to be able to on one occasion to impersonate Caesar, while at other occasions act as Cicero or
Cato. Yet, it is a truly essential skill for an orator because many Greek and Latin orators have
composed speeches to be delivered by others, adapting the words to suit the position and
character of the speaker. To exemplify his point, Quintilian argues that Cicero cannot have
thought in the same way or assumed the same character when writing speeches for Pompey,
Titus Ampius or others:
An eodem modo cogitauit aut eandem personam induit Cicero cum scriberet Cn. Pompeio et
cum T. Ampio ceterisue, ac non unius cuiusque eorum fortunam, dignitatem, res gestas
intuitus omnium quibus uocem dabat etiam imaginem expressit, ut melius quidem sed tamen
ipsi dicere uiderentur?
Do you think that Cicero thought in the same way or assumed the same character when he
wrote for Gnaeus Pompeius and when he wrote for Titus Ampius or the rest? Taking into
consideration the fortune, dignity and achievements of each individual did he not rather
reproduce the character of all those whom he gave a voice so that even if they spoke better
than usual they nevertheless seemed to speak as themselves?
22
23
Quint. 3.8.49-50.
23
The writing of speeches for others to deliver was common in Greece, where such ghostwriters or logographers often made a living from this service. As far as we know, the
phenomenon was much less common in Rome, but Suetonius records that L. Aelius Stilo
wrote speeches for all the nobiles in the 90s B.C., including Q. Servilius Caepio, C. Aurelius
24
Cotta, Q. Caecilius Metellus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus. The fact that allegations of delivering
a speech written by somebody else could be used to criticise an orator, suggests that the
Romans looked down upon such activity.
25
conceal Aelius ghost-writing on their behalf. Kennedy suggests that the Romans distrusted
such activity because it was commercial, lacking in ethos or simply because it was Greek.
27
In any case, Ciceros speech-writing on behalf of Pompey and Ampius Balbus was not
unique, as we know of other such instances.
24
28
Suet. Gram. 3 with Cic. Brut. 169, 205-7 providing the names of Stilos customers. See
Kaster (n. 14), 75-7 for comment on this passage. For the whole question of speech-writing
on behalf of others, see G. Kennedy, The Rhetoric of Advocacy in Greece and Rome, AJP
89 (1968), 419-36, at 427-8, n. 12 and, shorter, Kennedy (n. 3), 12-13 with n. 14.
25
Cic. Brut. 99-100; Suet. Rhet. 2 = 26 in Kaster (n. 14) with commentary at 295-6.
26
27
28
Cicero wrote a funeral speech to be delivered by the father of Serranus (Cic. Q Fr. 3.6.5,
November 54 B.C.), and one for Catos sister Porcia to be delivered by her son Domitius or
by Brutus (Cic. Att. 13.48.2; 13.37.3, August 45 B.C.). D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero:
Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum (Cambridge, 1980) commentary ad loc. argues
that Serranus, the son of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was adopted by an Atilius Serranus,
probably the adoptive father of Sex. Atilius Serranus Gavianus, the tribune of 57 B.C.
by somebody else and the resulting attempts to hide such instances is likely to have led to the
29
scarcity of evidence. Quintilians report is, however, evidence of Cicero acting as Pompeys
and Ampius Balbus speech-writer. This passage does not prove that Cicero wrote a speech
for Ampius to be delivered at his trial in 55 B.C., it could just as well have been for another
occasion. But the link between Pompey and Pompeys loyal supporter as two named
recipients of Ciceros oratorical help is noteworthy and probably not accidental. It is, in fact,
most likely that such acts of speech-writing took place during the latter half of the 50s B.C.,
when Cicero had to subordinate himself to Pompeys wishes. Furthermore, this passage
suggests that Pompey wanted to strengthen his own oratorical performances with Ciceros
well-known brilliance; was he perhaps less confident in his own abilities or did he simply
want to make his own speeches as powerful as possible?
Shackleton Bailey thinks that the father speaking was Domitius, and not Serranus who may
have been dead already. When Atticus encouraged Cicero to compose a speech for Brutus
shortly after the murder of Caesar, Cicero declined on the grounds that Brutus, as most poets
or orators, would prefer his own version (Cic. Att. 14.20.3). As F. Pina Polo, Contra Arma
Verbis. Der Redner vor dem Volk in der spten rmischen Republik (Stuttgart, 1996), 27
notes, Ciceros reason for not writing a speech for Brutus was not ethical, which supports the
impression that writing speeches for others was not an uncommon activity.
29
See Tac. Ann. 13.3 for an example of such dishonour in imperial times: Nero delivering the
30
active politician to take up rhetorical exercises: Cicero taught the future consuls Hirtius and
Pansa after Caesars murder, Marcus Antonius received help with his speeches in the autumn
of 44 B.C., and Cicero himself continually kept up his practicing.
31
declamation were common for young men under education, rhetorical exercises by adult
32
orators were unusual, hence Suetonius need to comment on this. Pompey may have felt an
extra need to polish his oratory in this crucial political situation. As with Ciceros speechwriting for Pompey, the declamation exercises could be taken as Pompeys recognition of the
need for expert help at critical moments precisely because his own oratorical talents were
lacking the necessary edge, but also simply as a sign of Pompey wanting to strengthen his
oratory as much as possible.
So far, we have considered general testimonies to Pompeys oratorical skills which give a
picture of a politician at home when describing his own military victories. These victories,
and his continued advertisement of them, secured him the dignitas and auctoritas which
again made his speeches more persuasive and weighty, even if they were not following the
rhetorical handbooks or did not stand out for oratorical brilliance. Shyness and reluctance to
commit to specific political causes may have worked against him, but could equally well
30
Suet. Rhet. 1 (= 25 in Kaster (n. 14)). See Suet. Rhet. 3 (= 27 Kaster (n. 14)) with Kaster (n.
Hirtius and Pansa: Cic. Att. 14.12.2. Antonius: Cic. Phil. 2.8, 2.42-3 (with J.T. Ramsey,
Cicero. Philippics III (Cambridge, 2003), 223-5), 2.101, 3.22 (with G. Manuwald, Cicero,
Philippics 3-9 (Berlin & New York, 2007), 2.406); Suet. Rhet. 5 (= 29 Kaster (n. 14)).
Cicero: Suet. Rhet. 1 (= 25 Kaster (n. 14)).
32
have helped him retain a persona of military grandeur without contamination from mundane
political issues and quarrels. When speaking, he at times boosted his performance with
Ciceros ghost-writing or declamation practices. This suggests a lack of self-confidence, if
not necessarily a lack of actual skill, in his oratorical talents.
The first public speech by Pompey recorded in our sources is his speech delivered to the
people in 71 B.C. when he was consul-elect. This instance illustrates Pompeys ability to
perform well in front of a supportive audience. His election to the consulship was a testament
to his great military victories and political acumen in exploiting these victories to gain the
33
consulship before the normal age and without any previous political magistracy. Discontent
with Sullas curtailing of the tribunes powers and the corruption of the all-senatorial court
juries were burning political issues, which Pompey knew how to exploit. Cicero reports that
Pompey raised the issue of the tribunes power in the senate, followed by a contio where he
33
Hence his request that Varro compose a handbook on senatorial procedure for his use: Gell.
NA. 14.7.
declared that he would restore the powers of the tribunes. This was generally well received by
the people, but when he declared that he would tackle the problem of the corruption of the
34
speech in the popular assembly was a great success, and Sallust says that Pompeys intention
with this speech was to ingratiate himself with the people, so that he could use it as a political
instrument in the future.
35
oratorical skills as such or rather the fact that he was a successful general promoting a
popular political view. Persuasion consists, of course, partly in addressing the concerns of the
audience and as far as possible making it appear that one is sympathetic and willing to help.
On the other hand, it was by now generally recognised, also in the senate (cf. Catulus reply
to Pompey as reported by Cicero), that something had to be done regarding the tribunician
powers and the courts.
36
politically safe. It would not have needed a very skilled orator to put this message across in a
successful way, and Cicero does not report anything on Pompeys performance to suggest
that it stood out for its oratorical qualities.
Similarly popular was Pompeys public announcement of his discharge of military imperium
just before commencing his consulship on the first of January 70 B.C. This leads Plutarch to
34
Cic. Verr. 1.44-5; Sall. Hist. 4.39-40 with P. McGushin, Sallust: the Histories 2 (Oxford,
1994) comment ad loc.; Pseudoasconius ad Cic. Verr. 1.45 (T. Stangl, Ciceronis orationum
scholiastiae (Hildesheim, 1964), 220); Plut. Pomp. 21.4; App. BC 1.121. See Morstein-Marx
(n. 2), 121 for the rhetorical argument of the contio expressing the will of the populus, as
used by Cicero.
35
36
conclude that Pompeys consular colleague, Crassus, had more influence in the senate, while
Pompey was the darling of the people, his popularity reaching a climax at his laying down his
37
military imperium as a kind of spectacle offered to the people. Pompey certainly knew how
to bank on his fame, and, as Quintilian remarked, Pompey was no more eloquent than when
boasting of his own accomplishments.
Pompey is likely to have continued to sing his own praises at public assemblies in the
following years. His command against the pirates in 67 B.C. may also have been secured
partly through an address in the contio and certainly through Pompeys popularity with the
people. The violent opposition to the bill in the senate was countered by Caesar alone,
Plutarch tells us, because he wanted to boost his own credentials with the people by backing a
popular cause.
37
38
Sallust and Dio furthermore inform us that Pompey himself, Gabinius and
Plut. Pomp. 21.4, 22.3. It is unclear from Plutarchs account whether this announcement
was made at the same time as the promise of tribunician reform or in a separate speech. F.
Pina Polo, Las Contiones Civiles y Militares en Roma (Zaragoza, 1989) does not list
Pompeys announcement in his Appendices, thereby suggesting that it was made together
with the promise of tribunician reform.
38
Plut. Pomp. 25.3. Plutarch may have transposed Caesars backing of the Manilian proposal
the following year to the Gabinian proposal: Gruen (n. 3), 80, n. 142; R. Seager, Pompey. A
Political Biography (Oxford, 1979), 33, n. 49; O.D. Watkins, Caesar solus? Senatorial
Support for the Lex Gabinia, Historia 36 (1987), 120-1. Furthermore, Plutarchs wording
suggests that the opposition to the bill was only among high-ranking senators, opening up the
possibility that Caesars support was joined by other low-ranking senators. Senators speaking
against were, amongst others, the consul C. Calpurnius Piso and the consular Q. Hortensius
Hortalus (Plut. Pomp. 25; Cic. Leg. Man. 52) but we know nothing of the content of their
39
Lutatius Catulus (cos. 78 B.C.) spoke, the second in favour, the third against the bill.
That
both Sallust and Dio revised and sometimes even invented speeches to fit their stylistic and
narrative aims is generally accepted,
40
reflect to some degree main points of the speeches, their effect, or the character of the
speaker. Indeed, the speech put into Pompeys mouth by Dio echoes Pompeys well-known
tendency to feign reluctance of further tasks while clearly wishing this command. He is said
to have argued that he had already fought a number of wars successfully on behalf of the
Roman people and that there were many other good candidates for the job. His summary of
his victories can be seen as is yet another articulate self-advertisement of the kind we know
he was so good at producing. If Pompey spoke on this occasion, the argumentation and style
proposed by Dio is in character, and the ploy in feigning reluctance implies a speech of some
care and effectiveness. The bill was passed in the end. Whether or not Pompey spoke at this
event, his previous cultivation of popular support in past contiones helped him secure this
command.
speeches. Tan (n. 2), 183 argues that Gabinius took his bill to the senate rather than the contio
in order to preempt claims of popularis demagoguery or exploitation of Pompeys
popularity. But it was exactly Pompeys popularity with the people which made the bill an
attractive one to support for Caesar and other junior senators.
39
Sall. Hist. 5.16-20 (with McGushin (n. 6) comm. ad loc.); Dio 36.25-36a. See Gruen (n. 3),
65-6 for a discussion of the individuals behind the opposition to Pompeys command and the
command against Mithridates the following year.
40
Bchner, Sallust (Heidelberg, 1982), 161. Dio: F. Millar, Some speeches in Cassius Dio,
MH 18 (1961), 11-22; F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 1964), 78-83; A.M.
Gowing, The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio (Ann Arbor, 1992), 225-45.
Pompey famously managed to subdue the pirates and, afterwards, defeat Mithridates, and his
remarkable military successes were praised in literature and oratory.
41
In return for
immortalising his deeds, Pompey bestowed the citizenship on the historian Theophanes and
his hometown of Mytilene, and made sure to publicise his gift and therefore his military
42
exploits in a speech given in a military assembly in 62 B.C. Speaking of his own successes
was, as we now know, one of Pompeys specialities.
But Pompeys eloquence was to be tested for the first time at his first public speech upon his
return from the East. Cicero reports from the contio in circus Flaminius in early 61 B.C.,
giving us further indications of Pompeys evasive tactic:
Prima contio Pompei qualis fuisset scripsi ad te antea: non iucunda miseris, inanis improbis,
beatis non grata, bonis non gravis. itaque frigebat. tum Pisonis consulis impulsu levissimus
tribunus pl. Fufius in contionem producit Pompeium. res agebantur in circo Flaminio, et erat
in eo ipso loco illo die nundinarum . quaesivit ex eo placeretne ei iudices a
praetore legi, quo consilio idem praetor uteretur. id autem erat de Clodiana religione ab
senatu constitutum. (2) tum Pompeius locutus est senatusque
auctoritatem sibi omnibus in rebus maximi videri semperque visam esse respondit, et id
multis verbis.
41
Cic. Flacc. 28; Suet. Rhet. 3 (Manius Otacilius Pitholaus on the Social War) with Kasters
Cic. Arch. 24; Val. Max. 8.14.3; Theophanes: Vel. Pat. 2.18.1; Plut. Pomp. 42; cf. Strabo
11.5.1, 13.2.3.
I have already given you a description of Pompeys first public speech of no comfort to the
poor or interest to the rascals; on the other hand the rich were not pleased and the honest men
were not impressed. So a frost. Then an irresponsible Tribune, Fufius, egged on by Consul
Piso, called Pompey out to address the Assembly. This took place in the Flaminian Circus, on
market day just where the holiday crowds was gathered. Fufius asked him whether he thought
it right for a jury to be selected by a Praetor to serve under the same Praetors presidency, that
being the procedure determined by the Senate in the Clodius sacrilege case. (2) Pompey then
replied, very much en bon aristocrate, that in all matters he held and had always held the
Senates authority in the highest respect at considerable length too.
43
After 6 years away from the political game at Rome, Pompey may have been somewhat out
of touch with the current issues, yet Ciceros judgement is damning and suggests that
Pompeys first performance suffered from a lack of political awareness and insight and
perhaps also from an eloquence gone rusty after years away from the political scene. Pompey
was still highly popular with the people, but his fellow senators were less ready to
acknowledge his successes and grant him inclusion in the influential senatorial circles. When
asked for an opinion on the technicalities of the trial against Clodius, Pompeys answer
signals a reluctance to speak on a controversial matter in which he would only risk alienating
potential political allies. Ciceros letter continues with a description of a subsequent meeting
in the senate, where Pompey is again asked about his views on the Clodius case and again
provides a vague answer, just to be surpassed by Crassus articulate and well-received praise
44
Cic. Att. 1.14.1-2 (13 Febr. 61 B.C.). Transl. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero. Letters to
unsuccessful in conveying a returning general in touch with urgent political matters and the
concerns of the interested parties. Cicero was, however, not an objective witness.
45
His
46
This mixture of personal unease about Pompeys stance towards himself and a
more general anxiety about Pompeys willingness to work with people not considered boni
by Cicero makes Cicero a dangerous witness. However, Cicero cannot have distorted the
picture of Pompey in his first public performances altogether: the ambiguity in Pompeys
answers is in character with his tendency to hide his true intentions, and his lack of
commitment to either side of the question did nothing to further a decision. Cicero may have
been alone in this judgement. Indeed, Pompeys tactic of avoiding a firm stance on the issue
may have been the right stand to take in order not to offend anybody, except Cicero. That
Pompey spoke multis verbis yet still managed not to say much in favour of either side again
45
For a recent discussion of the subjectivity of Ciceros letters, see A. Lintott, Cicero as
Cic. Fam. 5.7. See T.N. Mitchell, Cicero. The Senior Statesman (New Haven & London,
1991), 74-7 for discussion and J. Hall, Politeness and Politics in Ciceros Letters (Oxford,
2009), 48-9, 128 on the style and expectations of these letters.
47
The question
In contrast with Pompeys lack of commitment regarding current political issues, he was
characteristically outspoken about his exploits in the East. When he was finally allowed a
triumph for his Eastern victories in September 61 B.C., it surpassed all previous triumphs in
its lavish display of spoils and placards advertising the extraordinary number of peoples and
areas subdued.
48
Pliny alerts us to the fact that Pompey also spoke at this occasion, when he
declared in a contio, speaking of his achievements, that he had found Asia the remotest of the
provinces but made it into a central dominion of his country.
49
with gravity and fluency when describing his own accomplishments. Two other snippets from
speeches held at contiones of uncertain dates underlines this trait further. Plutarch reports that
Pompey had told the people, in a contio we must assume, that he had received every office
earlier than he had expected, and laid it down more quickly than others had expected, adding
that his disbanding of the armies was a continuous testimony to the truth of his words.
50
In a
similar vein, Orosius explains that Pompeius himself told the contio about the war in the East
47
Tan (n. 2), 167, 183 and Lintott (n. 45), 155-7 both argue, from different angles, that
Pompeys answer was a signal of his support of the senate and of his unwillingness to go
down the popularis route.
48
Plin. HN. 7.98-9, 33.151, 37.11-14; Livy Per. 103; Plut. Pomp. 45; Dio 37.21.2-3; App.
Mith. 116-17; Strabo 12.3.31. For discussion of Pompeys two supplicationes of 63 BC and
62 BC, see F. Hickson-Hahn, Pompeys Supplicatio Duplicata: A Novel Form of
Thanksgiving, Phoenix 54 (2000), 244-54.
49
Plin. HN 7.99.
50
51
from the speech held in connection with his triumph, but they could also belong to earlier
speeches delivered shortly after Pompeys return to Rome.
52
among some senatorial quarters had created a sense of trepidation as to Pompeys actions
upon return. Especially Crassus and Cato had somewhat provocatively warned against
Pompey coming back as a new Sulla, but Pompey instead announced the dismissal of his
army upon his return to Italy, signalling his willingness to step down from his high position
and exert his influence through the traditional channels.
53
Plutarch could be argued to stem from such an announcement, and it would again have
required some oratorical ability to counter the claims of Crassus, Cato and their sympathisers.
The snippets from Plutarch and Orosius underline, in any case, the trend of Pompeys
oratorical skill at times of self-aggrandisement, but also the trend of our sources to record
such catching sound bites rather than full speeches. The triumph of 61 B.C. was an
important moment in Pompeys career as it was his chance to boost his general popularity
among the people and a moment to forget the mundane worries of political life and, in
particular, his problems of getting a strong footing within the political elite. Like previous
occasions, it was not through an oratorical performance in the senate or the courts that he
bolstered his claim to influence and recognition, but rather in a speech to the adoring people
in the contio, speaking of his main asset of military victories.
51
Oros. 6.6.4.
52
Pina Polo (n. 37), 295 no. 277 takes Plinys and Orosius evidence to stem from the same
Vel. Pat. 2.40; Plut. Pomp. 43-44, 46; Plut. Cato. 26.4; Dio 37.43-4, 37.49-50. See Gruen
Further possible sound bites from Pompeys mouth may have survived, which suggests that
Pompey could speak clearly, even brusquely, when expedient or necessary. Later sources
such as Plutarch, Appian and Dio detail how Caesar as consul in 59 B.C. called upon Pompey
and Crassus in a contio to speak in favour of his agrarian bill.
54
Caesar asked their opinion and that Pompey and Crassus said they approved.
55
Plutarch is
slightly more elaborate, apparently quoting Pompeys reply to Caesars question of whether
he would protect the law against any opposition: , ,
,
. (Yes, indeed, said Pompey, I will come, bringing, against those who
threaten swords, both swords and shields.)
56
quoting and paraphrasing a whole speech of Pompeys ending with a declaration similar to
that quoted in Plutarch: ,
. (If
57
any one dares to raise a sword, I also will snatch up my shield.) How far we can trust the
54
Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 264 seems in no doubt that Caesar did produce Pompey and Crassus
App. BC 2.10.
Plut. Pomp. 47.4-5. Transl. B. Perrin, Plutarchs Lives 5 (Cambridge (Mass.), 1917)
(adapted).
57
Dio 38.5.4. Transl. E. Cary, Dios Roman History 3 (Cambridge (Mass.), 1914). Rhiannon
Ash suggests the possibility of a literary joke (by Pompey or the historians) in the reversal of
Archilochus poem about throwing away his shield, a theme picked up later by Alcaeus,
Anacreon and Horace. For discussion of this theme, see D.N. Levin, War and Peace in Early
Roman Elegy, in W. Haase (ed.) ANRW II.30.1 (Berlin & New York, 1982), 418-538, at
429-34.
details of these accounts is uncertain, as both Plutarch and Dio could have made up Pompeys
words. Yet, the similarity of message and tone in Pompeys words suggests that either Dio
drew on Plutarch or both authors drew on a common source, directly or indirectly, which may
have reported Pompeys words. Indeed, the catchiness of the saying could have secured its
safe transmission in the sources, even if adapted in the translation from Latin to Greek. A
similar view may be taken about Pompeys memorable saying in the senate in the lead up to
the civil war, reported in Plutarch: , ,
, . (For, said he,
in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of foot
and
horse.)
58
man who was an expert in shielding his opinion from the public. Yet, Caelius Rufus, in a
letter to Cicero, quotes a probably genuine remark of Pompey in one of the senatorial debates
on Caesars Gallic command, which suggests that Pompey was perfectly capable of making
such belligerent public statements: quid si filius meus fustem mihi impingere volet? (And
supposing my son chooses to take his stick to me?)
59
his auctoritas against that of Caesar. It caused quite a stir in the senate and beyond for its
indication of Pompeys limited patience with Caesar and thus potential for civil war, but
probably also for its curt style; two reasons for Caelius not only to report it to Cicero in
Cilicia, but even to quote it. In light of this citation, it seems not impossible that Pompey
58
59
Cic. Fam. 8.8.9 (early October 51 BC). Transl. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero. Letters to
Friends 1-3 (Cambridge (Mass.), 2001). Lintott (n. 45), 269-70 discusses Pompeys remark
could have spoken in a similarly forceful way in the contio on Caesars agrarian bill. When it
was expedient, Pompey could speak in a direct and unambiguous way.
Pompeys belligerent statements should perhaps be seen against the peoples negative attitude
to Pompey, that is, if we are to trust Cicero. Cicero reports how Pompeys contional and
oratorical authority was dealt a blow in 59 B.C. when his coalition with Caesar and Crassus
had become unpopular:
Itaque ille noster amicus, insolens infamiae, semper in laude versatus, circumfluens gloria,
deformatus corpore, fractus animo quo se conferat nescit. progressum praecipitem,
inconstantem reditum videt. bonos inimicos habet, improbos ipsos non amicos. ac vide
mollitiem animi: non tenui lacrimas cum illum a.d. VIII Kal. Sext. vidi de edictis Bibuli
contionantem. qui antea solitus esset iactare se magnificentissime illo in loco summo cum
amore populi, cunctis faventibus, ut ille tum humilis, ut demissus erat, ut ipse etiam sibi, non
iis solum qui aderant, displicebat! o spectaculum uni Crasso iucundum, ceteris non item!
So there is our poor friend [Pompey], unused to disrepute, his whole career disfigured in a
blaze of admiration and glory, now physically disfigured and broken in spirit, at his wits end
for what to do. He sees the precipice if he goes on and the stigma of a turncoat if he turns
back. The honest men are his enemies, the rascals themselves are not his friends. See how
soft-hearted I am. I could not keep back my tears when I saw him addressing a public
meeting on 25 July about Bibulus edicts. How magnificently he used to posture on that
platform in other days, surrounded by an adoring people, every man wishing him well! How
humble and abject he was then, what a sorry figure he cut in his own eyes, to say nothing of
his audience! What a sight! Only Crassus could enjoy it, not so others.
60
Gone were Pompeys natural dignitas and gravitas when speaking, if we are to believe
Cicero, and he may not have been very winning or persuasive in his addresses. The coalition
between himself, Caesar and Crassus had not helped increase his popularity, as it was seen to
be against tradition and fair play. The fact that Caesar now took most legislative bills directly
to the contio without prior senatorial consultation was seen by Cicero as an affront to the
senates authority. We must therefore take Ciceros judgement of the overall unpopularity of
the coalition, and Pompeys unpopularity in particular, with a grain of salt. Nevertheless,
Pompeys problems of penetrating the senatorial elite after his return from the East were a
low point in his career, and Cicero may be right in his view that Pompey was not used to
unpopularity and was less effective in his oratorical addresses when speaking in adverse
situations. It had certainly been easier to capture an adoring audience with tales of his own
successes. His brusque expressions in support of Caesars agrarian bill may be read as those
of a politician frustrated with the delay in securing his veterans their promised land, with the
unpopularity of his coalition with Caesar and Crassus, with their opposition, and, in
particular, with his own unpopularity.
Ciceros negative description of Pompey in the contio in 59 B.C. is contrasted with a more
positive evaluation of Pompeys speech in a contio in the summer of 57 B.C.: Huius oratio ut
60
Cic. Att. 2.21.3 (Rome, after 25 July 59 B.C.). Transl. Shackleton Bailey (n. 43). For the
unpopularity, in Ciceros mind, of the coalition of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus, see also Cic.
Att. 2.18.1, 2.19.2-3, 2.20.3-4 with Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 147, n. 147 and Lintott (n. 45), 1701.
semper gravis et grata in contionibus fuit his speech was serious and pleasing, as it always
61
is in such assemblies ... The change in Ciceros judgement of Pompeys contional speaking
powers is related to the change in Pompeys political stance and, especially, his support of
Ciceros recall from exile. Yet, it may also suggest a fluctuation in Pompeys popularity with
the people and, as a result, his ability to perform persuasively in the contio. Pompey himself
was keenly aware of his dependence on the good will of the people. In February 56 B.C.,
Cicero tells Quintus that Pompey worries that the contional audience is alienated, the nobility
hostile to him, the senate ill-disposed, and the young men critical of him.
62
We know
moreover that the consul of 56 B.C., Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus, and Clodius on several
occasions tried to incite the contio against Pompey.
63
were exploited for political purposes which illustrates, first, how important was Pompeys
relationship with the people for his political influence (real and perceived) and, second, how
others knew this too and took it into account in their political activities. We have evidence of
a public meeting during Milos trial de vi in 56 B.C. where Clodius gangs tried to shout
down Pompeys speech, so as to make him unable to deliver his defence and connect with the
people. However, Pompey refused to be shouted down and spoke through the clamour and
61
Cic. Sest. 107 with transl. by Kaster (n. 1). See also Cic. Red. pop. 16; Pis. 80 for praise of
Pompeys performance.
62
63
Lentulus Marcellinus: Val. Max. 6.2.6; Plut. Pomp. 51.5-6. (Dio 39.30.1-2 places this
discussion in the senate). Clodius: Cic. Q.Fr. 2.3.2; Plut. Pomp. 48.7; Dio 39.19.1. See
Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 122, 134, and Tan (n. 2), 167-8 for further discussion and context.
64
even acquired silence at times owing to his auctoritas. Pompey was, in other words, capable
of speaking to a hostile audience intent on quelling him, and that at a time when he worried
about the people being alienated, as we saw above. He could perhaps have found strength in
the view that Clodius gangs did not represent the real populus or else he was simply made of
tougher material than what is suggested by Ciceros judgements of a faint-hearted Pompey in
front of an antagonistic audience.
Further insights into Pompeys ability in exploiting vague expressions as a tactical move may
be found in Ciceros paraphrase of Pompeys speech in the senate on the first of January 57
B.C. where Ciceros exile was, again, debated. Cicero relates:
Hunc nemo erat quin verissime sentire diceret. Sed post eum rogatus Cn. Pompeius,
adprobata laudataque Cottae sententia, dixit sese oti mei causa, ut omni populari concitatione
defungerer, censere ut ad senatus auctoritatem populi quoque Romani beneficium erga me
adiungeretur. Cum omnes certatim aliusque alio gravius atque ornatius de mea salute dixisset
fieretque sine ulla varietate discessio, ...
Everyone thought that this was the plainest truth; but when Gnaeus Pompeius was called
upon for his opinion after Cotta, he said that though he could approve and praise Cottas
view, he himself judged that for the sake of my tranquillity, to be certain that I would be rid
of harassment from popular quarters, the Roman peoples beneficence toward me ought to
be joined to the senates authority. When all had spoken for my restoration, with each speaker
64
Cic. Q Fr. 2.3.2. Morstein-Marx (n. 2), 169 n. 40 argues that the setting was either one of
the three required contiones (anquisitiones) before the vote in a trial before the People
(iudicium populi) or a public meeting preceding a trial in the quaestio de vi ...
trying to outbid the last in terms of solemn honor, and unanimous support had been expressed
in a vote,
65
To this, Kaster remarks that Pompeys speech is full of euphemisms. For example, the phrase
that Cicero needs tranquillity (otium) and not that he actually needed protection from being
killed, or his talk of the peoples beneficium towards Cicero to be joined to senatorial
authority rather than saying directly that the senatorial decree recalling Cicero ought to be
accompanied by a law ratified by the people. Kaster concludes: Whether the brief turn owes
66
more to Pompeys idiom or to C.[icero]s, it is plump, grave, and complacent. If these are
indeed words chosen by Pompey, Ciceros praise of his eloquence may be thought to reflect
Ciceros need to publicise his gratitude to Pompey post eventum rather than an objective
evaluation of Pompeys oratory. And if so, Pompeys choice of words may again be regarded
as unaccomplished in terms of style and vague in terms of meaning, intended to blur rather
than clarify his stance on the past events and his own position within them. Yet, this may
have been precisely Pompeys intention.
Another convenient way of avoiding taking sides in public was to let others sound opinion in
the senate before coming out in the open, as when Pompey had one of the tribunes of 56 B.C.,
P. Rutilius Lupus, raise the question of the Campanian land in the senate in December 57.
This tactic proved self-defeating, however, in that the senators refused to discuss the matter
65
Cic. Sest. 74. Transl. Kaster (n. 1). See also Cic. Red. sen. 5; Dom. 69; Pis. 34 for
Pompeys speech.
66
67
unless Pompey was personally present. Yet, this may have been exactly the aim of Pompey,
because this decision of the senate reinforced Pompeys importance and standing, again
proving his tactic of disengagement an effective way of directing attention towards himself.
Yet, as with his belligerent remarks and open confrontation of Clodius gangs, Pompey could
speak lucidly when expedient. His previous support of Milo ended abruptly with Milos
68
murder of Clodius on via Appia in early 52 B.C. Milo was no longer needed to keep a check
on Clodius and could be dispensed with. The three tribunes Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. Sallustius
Crispus, and T. Munatius Plancus brought Pompey to a contio and asked him there whether
he had heard anything about Milo plotting to murder Pompey. On this occasion, Pompey
answered clearly that he had indeed heard of such plans and had made inquiries of Milo
regarding this matter.
69
seems to have understood that the unstable situation could lead to a strengthening of his own
position. As he had been called upon to tackle the pirates and Mithridates in the 60s B.C., so
he could be seen as the most capable senator to lead the way out of the turmoil created by the
political violence of Clodius and Milo. Indeed, Pompey was made sole consul for 52 B.C.
and Milo was unsurprisingly convicted of Clodius murder in the subsequent trial. This train
of events indicates that Pompeys political acumen was sharper than ever before, that he
67
Cic. Q Fr. 2.1.1 (shortly before 15 December 57 B.C.). Another example of this tactic was
Pompeys movements in the issue of the reinstatement of Ptolemy XII Auletes to the throne
in Egypt: Cic. Rab. post. 6; Fam. 1.1 (13 January 56 B.C.), 1.2 (15 Jan. 56 B.C.), 1.5b
(shortly after 9 Feb. 56 B.C.), 1.7.3 (June-July 56 B.C.); Q Fr. 2.2.3 (17 January 56 B.C.).
68
69
could give a straightforward answer if useful, and that he knew how to exploit opportunities
to address the people.
CONCLUSION
This examination of instances of Pompeys oratorical performances in the contio leaves an
impression of a man who built his career on his military successes and made sure to remind
his audience of them, especially in his early political career. He cannot have been without
talent, because he spoke at many occasions in the senate, at contiones and in the courts (see
Appendix for details). For political purposes, he seems to have preferred a non-oratorical
route, if possible, by having other people speak on his behalf as, for example, did Cicero,
Caesar and many junior magistrates. Obviously, he could not address a Roman audience
when away on commands or other public service abroad. Indeed, the shyness reported by
Seneca may have played a part too. This, in combination with his tactic of shielding his
personal opinion from the public eye when politically expedient, may have been aimed at
protecting his reputation as a successful general untainted by tedious political quarrels and
direct confrontations. But it also enabled him to test the waters without risking any later
consequences, and it ensured maximum attention when he actually spoke. This may explain
the strong effect his more open and belligerent expressions had on his immediate audience
and subsequent tradition, and hence their transmission in our sources.
Pompeys conscious attention to self-presentation opens up the wider question of how far the
image we get of Pompey is one dictated by the sources or one dictated by himself. In the end,
we cannot know for certain, but it seems likely that he himself did what he could to display a
persona which he deemed effective for achieving his political aims and securing his longterm reputation. His promotion of an image of himself as a victorious general loved by the
people was prominent in his early political career especially. He played on his general
popularity with the people in addressing them relatively often; of his known public oratorical
70
could be understood to aim at preserving this particular image. We may also consider the
possibility that Pompey nurtured the image of a victorious general instead of an accomplished
speaker in an attempt to fit into the traditional Roman ideology of military virtus as the most
proper route to glory and opposed to a more recent embrace of Greek appreciation of
71
eloquence as a glorious activity, exemplified and promoted by Cicero among others. On top
of Pompeian self-fashioning, the sources added their rhetorical embellishment. The study of
Bell underlines how far the sources can differ, and for what reasons, when it comes to the
short but momentous event of Pompeys death in Egypt.
72
the future interpretation of newly deceased figures such as Catiline, Cato Minor, Crassus,
Pompey and Caesar by evaluating their actions and legacy shortly after their deaths and
73
therefore perhaps before anybody else put their interpretation in writing. Ciceros success in
70
See the Appendix for a list of Pompeys public speeches. Tans (n. 2) study confirms the
general impression that contiones more often than not were used to advocate views and
profile individuals popular with the people.
71
Ciceros promotion of glory obtained through civil actions such as oratory: Cic. Arch. 21-4;
Off. 1.74, 1.77-8. (Cicero could also argue the opposite when expedient: Cic. Mur. 19-22.)
Ciceros criticism of generals pursuing glory for their own sake and against the interests of
the state: Cic. Tusc. 1.89-90, 3.3-4, 5.49-50; Fin. 5.69; Off. 1.26, 2.43, 3.36, 3.83.
72
A.A. Bell, Fact and Exemplum in Accounts of the Deaths of Pompey and Caesar,
Catiline: Cic. Flac. 102; Har. resp. 18; Pis. 95; Phil. 2.1, 3.18, 4.15, 8.15, 13.22, 14.14.
Cato Minor: Cic. Off. 1.112. Crassus: Cic. Fin. 2.57, 3.75; Tusc. 1.12, 5.116; Off. 1.25, 1.109,
influencing the tradition of Cato in particular suggests that he also coloured the later
74
reception of Pompey. Each of the later writers had his own purpose for depicting Pompey in
3.73. Pompey: Cic. Fin. 2.57; Tusc. 1.12, 1.86; Div. 1.24; Off. 1.76, 2.20, 2.60; Phil. 5.43-4.
Caesar: Cic. Div. 1.119, 2.23-4, 2.52, 2.99; Off. 1.26, 1.43, 2.23-8, 3.83-5.
74
The contemporary discussion of Cato, after his suicide at Utica in 46 B.C., in the works of
Cicero, Brutus and Fabius Gallus (each wrote a Cato) and Caesar and Hirtius (each wrote an
Anti-Cato): Cic. Att. 12.4.2, 12.5.2, 12.40.1, 13.27.1, 13.46.2; Top. 94; Orat. 35. Brutus and
Fabius Gallus works called Cato: Cic. Att. 13.46.2, Fam. 7.24.2. Caesar and Hirtius works
Anti-Cato: Cic. Att. 12.40.1, 12.41.4, 12.44.1, 12.45.2. See R.J. Goar, The Legend of Cato
Uticensis from the First Century B.C. to the Fifth Century A.D. (Bruxelles, 1987), 15, 24-5,
101, and R. Stem, The First Eloquent Stoic: Cicero on Cato the Younger, CJ 101 (2005),
37-49 for Ciceros influence on the reception of Cato. See M. Griffin, Philosophy, Cato, and
Roman suicide, G&R 33 (1986), 64-77 and 192-202 for philosophical aspects of Catos
suicide. The later tradition of Cato is reflected, inter alia, in Tac. Ann. 16.22. See R. Syme,
Tacitus (Oxford, 1958), 104, 110, 140 for Curiatius Maternus tragedy Cato and its focus on
the suicide, and J. Geiger, Munatius Rufus and Thrasea Paetus on Cato the Younger,
Athenaeum 57 (1979), 48-72, at 48 n. 1 for further literature on the topic. For Catiline, F.
Bcher, Verargumentierte Geschichte. Exempla Romana im politischen Diskurs der spten
Republik, Hermes Einzelschriften 96 (Stuttgart, 2006), 314 argues that this exemplum is one
of Ciceros creation more than anything else. For Ciceros use of Catiline as an exemplum see
A.W. Robinson, Ciceros Use of People as Exempla in His Speeches (Diss. Indiana
University, 1986), 83-175; for Ciceros role in creating a standard catalogue of exempla used
by later authors see 35, 161; M. Bloomer, Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New
Nobility (Chapel Hill, 1992), 4-5; A.M. Riggsby, The Post Reditum Speeches, in J.M. May
(ed.), Brills Companion to Cicero. Oratory and Rhetoric (Leiden, 2002), 159-96, at 167.
a specific manner. Their various agendas determined their selection of evidence and the
presentation thereof, which, in turn, influenced the overall picture of Pompey formed by
modern scholars. Some aspects shine through more clearly than others: Pompeys oratorical
ability when praising his own military victories, his reluctance to speak at public occasions
when avoidable and vagueness of expression when a speech was unavoidable, his willingness
to speak forcefully and straightforwardly when expedient (or when frustrated), and his
attempts to bolster his oratory through declamation exercises and, perhaps, ghost-writing.
Pompey probably avoided advertising the last aspect, but certainly built his political persona
on the two first aspects. In terms of oratory, only the first aspect of self-praise and the third
aspect of straightforward expressions could be said to cast light on Pompeys oratorical
qualities.
Pompey does not fit the bill of Ciceros bonus orator who masters and displays all styles and
techniques for the benefit of the res publica. His tactic of avoiding public performances,
whether out of timidity, conscious deliberation or, perhaps more likely, both, provided him
with fewer occasions for public display of oratorical talent and skill. His choice of absence
does not automatically mean that he was not an accomplished speaker, but his lack of
senatorial experience before his consulship meant that he had a lot of catching up to do, also
on the oratorical side, when entering the senate in 70 B.C. Furthermore, Ciceros services in
form of speeches delivered and written on his behalf, as well as Pompeys decision to take up
declamation exercises just before the civil war, suggests that he wanted to hone his skills and
make the best possible address when called upon. Velleius judgement of Pompey as
eloquentia medius seems not entirely unfounded.
Of course, oratorical performance was not the only way to move the political agenda in Rome
or forward a political career. Indeed, descent from famous generals or senators provided a
powerful claim to political influence. But Pompeys descent from a victorious, yet hated,
general, Pompeius Strabo, made any references to ancestry a dead-end, and Pompey wisely
decided not to adopt his fathers cognomen, but instead waited for his own exploits to be
75
crowned by the name Magnus. Patronage from a politically dominant figure or family could
also help pave the way, and in his early career Pompey certainly exploited his connections to
Sulla and, through marriages to Aemilia and Mucia, the Metelli. His divorce from Mucia
upon the return from the East and his unsuccessful marriage proposal to Catos niece show
that he erroneously thought that he was now the one to bestow patronage rather than
benefitting from it. His need for political connections was only met when a politically savvy
Caesar approached Pompey and Crassus separately to form an alliance. Here, Pompeys
popularity with the people, re-emphasised at his triumph in 61 B.C. and based entirely on his
military victories, must have made the crucial difference to Caesars decision to take Pompey
on board. Wealth was another factor and his inheritance of large areas of land in Picenum
must have bolstered his personal fortune considerably. Influence in the local towns in
Picenum mattered too, as they could soon vote and would form the powerbase of his later
military commands.
76
Pompeys political shrewdness must be taken into consideration too. He often managed to
network with the right people at the right time, although his towering status as a returning
75
See M. Gelzer, Cn. Pompeius Strabo und der Aufstieg seines Sohnes Magnus,
general made him less attractive to the conservative and arrogant nobiles among whom he
most wished to be accepted. Yet he knew when not to speak, or not to speak his mind,
thereby forcing people to pay him and his words attention when it mattered. Furthermore, his
well-developed sense of speaking in deliberately vague terms compelled his audience to think
hard about the most likely, or most beneficial, interpretation of his words. In such situations,
his behaviour and its effect appear almost regal. The effect was broken only when Pompey
spoke in almost violent terms. He seems to have been most confident and eloquent when
speaking in the contio, both popular and military, addressing the adoring city populace or his
loyal soldiers, but could also deliver his message to a hostile audience. Being eloquentia
medius was not a hindrance to a political career based on an extraordinary military ability, the
resultant popularity, and a cunning sense for politics behind the scenes.
77
77
I should like to thank the Carlsberg Foundation, Denmark, for generously supporting a
research project on Roman oratory and political career from which this article originates. I
am also grateful to audiences at Zaragoza and Glasgow for useful feedback on oral versions,
and to Erich Gruen, Catherine Steel, Annelies Cazemier and the anonymous referee for the
journal for valuable comments on drafts of this article.
Place
Topic discussed
Source
71 B.C., Dec.
contio
contio
public
meeting in
reconciled
Pomp. 23.1-2
the Forum
(perhaps
technically
a contio)
?69/68 B.C.
court
67 B.C.
contio
Pomp. 25.5-7
61 B.C., Feb.
military
contio
Theophanes of Mytilene
Max. 8.14.3
contio and
senate
61 B.C., 28
contio
Sept.
Plin. HN 7.99
60 B.C.,
senate
various dates
several speeches
(March 60 B.C.),
1.20.2 (May 60
B.C.), 2.1.6 (June 60
B.C.)
59 B.C.
contio
59 B.C.,
contio
summer
38.4-5
edicts
58 B.C., 1
senate
June
Cic. Sest. 67
58 B.C.,
colony of
Aug/Oct.
Capua
on Ciceros exile
57 B.C., 1
senate
78
January
Pis. 34
78
For dating, see Kaster (n. 1) 398 with n. 18. R.G.M. Nisbet, M. Tvlli Ciceronis in
Calpvrnium Pisonem oratio (Oxford, 1961) xiii places this event in spring 57 B.C. without
explicit arguments for this dating.
57 B.C., ca.
contio
9 or 10 July
Court (in
Febr.
contiones)
and senate
defends Milo
56 B.C.
contio
discussion in the
senate)
56 B.C.,
court
autumn
55 B.C., Oct.
court
Cornelius Balbus
19, 59
Scribonius Libo
55 B.C.
court
Balbus
54 B.C.,
summer
court
54 B.C.,
79
autumn
assembly
or letter
Dio 39.63.4-5
51 B.C.,
contio
to murder Pompey
Mil. 51C
Pomp. 57.5
Italian
towns
senate
various dates
49 B.C., Feb.
80
not
Sept.
delivered
79
For dating, see C. Klodt, Ciceros Rede Pro Rabirio Postumo (Stuttgart, 1992), 34-6.
80
For discussion of the form of Pompeys testimony, see M. Siani-Davies, Marcus Tullius