D sr. ey : * CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ACDA Office of Public Affairs March 1990 — Sect tacoNegotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe On March 9, 1989, representatives of all 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries sat down together at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna and began the effort to negotiate a conventional arms control agreement for Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The scope of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Burope (CFE) sets it apart from previous conventional arms talks, which included only some members of NATO. and the Warsaw Pact and focused exclusively on central Europe. The objectives of the negotiation are to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, which include conventional armaments and equipment, as well as US. and Soviet ground and air personnel stationed in Europe; the elimination of disparities Prejudicial to stability and sccurity; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the ‘capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. ‘The CFE agreement which NATO secks is among the foundations for a new European order, both politically and militarily. A CFE Treaty will establish the obligation that equipment removed must be destroyed and US. and Soviet troops withdrawn must be demobilized. The verification provisions of a CFE Treaty, in addition to verifying compliance, will have important deterrent and confidence-building effects. Finally, only a CFE Treaty will constrain Soviet forces inside the Sovict Union, while at the same time increasing Soviet confidence that its legitimate security interests are being respected. ‘The CFE Negotiation has shown rapid progress and we expect to conclude a Treaty before the end of 1990. ELEMENTS OF A CFE TREATY ‘Armor and Artillery A key component of a CFE Treaty will be the reduction and limitation of the two main categories of armor—tanks and armored combat vehicles—and artillery, which together constitute the central elements of surprise attack or other offensive action in Europe. Tanks are the chief instruments of an offensive attack, and as such have been an important focus of the negotiation. At present, the Warsaw Pact nations hold nearly three-quarters of all tanks in Europe. Both East and West have agreed to set strict equal limits on tank holdings at 20,000 on each side. This would require the destruction of tens of thousands of Soviet tanks, thus significantly enhancing the stability of the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region. Armored Combat Vehicles,* such as armored personnel carriers and armored infantry fighting vehicles, provide mobility and support during combat, and can be a crucial "In the course ofthe negotiations, it became apparent thatthe breadth and scope of the armored trop caret definition was not adequate 10 meet the objectives ofthe negotiation, ‘The West. thereore, suggested changes to make concrete the general Eastern proposal for expanding the category to capruse a rosder ange of combat vehicles, This has resulted in renaming the category “armored combat vehicles” and adjusting the proposed Western lim.factor in an offensive campaign. Their reduction is thus intimately associated with the need to reduce tanks. The Westem goal is to eliminate the large asymmetry with the East in this category, which will contribute to the security of the region. Artillery provides necessary fire power for the staging of an offensive campaign. West and East have agreed on a definition for this important calcgory of armaments, including, which systems are to be eliminated. Negotiations in Vienna are now centered on the maximum number of artillery pieces which the two sides will be allowed to maintain, Manpower, Aircraft and Helicopters, In May 1989, President Bush outlined an initiative for the inclusion of three additional categories in CFE: manpower, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. Leaders of Wester, as well as Warsaw Pact, nations agreed to the expansion of the talks, and these elements have now become an important aspect of the negotiation. The East currently has a destabilizing numerical superiority in all of these areas. Manpower: In February 1999, the twenty-three states participating in CFE agreed to limit Soviet and U.S. ground and air force personnel stationed outside their national territories to a ceiling of 195,000 in Central and Eastern Europe; the US. will also be allowed 30,000 additional such personnel outside this. —Combat aircraft: Given the versatility and mobility of aircraft, the West believes that all combat-capable aircraft should be included in the negotiation, regardless of their ‘current role, mission or assignment. The West tabled a new proposal in February 1990 that would significantly curtail the number of land-based combat aircraft allowed in the ATTU region, and climinate the current disparity in favor of the East. The East has yet to respond to this proposal. —Combat helicopters, offering fire support, flexibility and rapid mobility, can also play a ‘important role in an offensive operation. The West has moved to put strict limits on the numbers of combat helicopters permitted in the ATTU region. In Vienna, West and East are currently discussing the types of helicopters to be limited under the treaty. Discussions center around a helicopter definition put forth by the West in February 1990, (Other Treaty Elements —Verification and Compliance: The ability to effectively verify the reduction of troops and armaments is an important advantage of a CFE treaty. The West has set forth provisions for detailed data exchanges, on-site inspection and monitoring of destruction. While the East’s approach differs in some respects, its response to Western verification proposals has been largely positive. —Demobilization/Destruction: The West believes that a key clement in ensuring our to monitor compliance and to prevent relocation of Treaty Timited items out of the 10 destroy equipment to meet ceilings. The West has also proposed that US. and Soviet troops withdrawn be demobilized. The East has not yet fully accepted this principle. —Stabilizing Measures: The Westem treaty text contains a number of other measures s that would contribute to regional confidence and stability. These include frequent ‘exchange of information, provisions concerning storage of equipment, notification of ‘movements, and constraints on the size of military activities.Regional Differentiation and Sufficiency: In addition to limits on the numbers of armaments in each category that can be maintained in the ATTU region as a whole, and by each side, the participants are also in agreement that regional numerical limits are needed to prevent destabilizing force concentrations of ground equipment in any region. Both sides also agree that limits must also be put on the proportion of arms held by any one country (“sufficiency”). ‘The regional distribution schemes of the two sides differ, however, as do their sufficiency quotas. While the East would permit a country to hold 35-40 percent of ‘the total quantity of equipment permitted in the ATTU, the West believes that the 30 percent it has proposed is adequate.CFE CHRONOLOGY January 10, 1989 March 9, 1989 March 23, 1988 May 5, 1989 May 29-30, 1989 July 13, 1989 July 13, 1989 September 7, 1989 September 22, 1989 October 19, 1989 October 19, 1589 November 9, 1989 December 14, 1989 Decernber 21, 1989 January 12,1990 February 8, 1990 February 13, 1990 February 22, 1990 In Vienna, the 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact initial a mandate defining the scope and form of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). ‘The 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact formally open the ‘CFE (aiks in Vienna, Initial NATO proposal calls for the reduction and limitation of main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery. Round I of CFE concludes. Round Il of CFE opens. Ata NATO Summit meeting, NATO leaders unanimously endorse President Bush’s proposal to expand the scope of CFE to include limitations on manpower, combat aircraft and helicopters, and to ‘complete the negotiation in six months to a year. In Vienna, NATO presents a comprehensive proposal incorporating the initiatives agreed to at the May NATO Summit. Round Il of CFE concludes. Round Il] of CFE opens. ‘The West tables proposals on information exchange, stabilizing ‘measures, non-circumvention and verification. Warsaw Pact nations table their version of verification, information exchange and stabilizing measurcs, many of which reflect the language of the previously tabled NATO proposals. Round Ill of CFE concludes Round IV of CFE opens. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact table dratt treaty texts. Round IV of CFE concludes. Round V of CFE opens. Western nations table new proposals on aircraft and personnel levels. In Ottawa, foreign ministers of the 23 nations participating in CFE agree to limit U.S. and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed outside national territory in Central and Eastem Europe to 195,000 for each side. In addition, the USS. is allowed 30,000 such personnel outside this region. NATO proposes a detailed inspection protocol.February 22, 1990 March 15, 1990 Round V of CFE concludes. Round VI of CFE opens. NATO tables a draft Protocol on Destruction and a Treaty Article on Reductions. NATO also announces plans to introduce, at the working level, a draft Protocol on Inspection and Related Treaty Articles. ‘The West has ‘now proposed all major elements on a CFE Treaty.A Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE Proposals (Definitions remain to be resolved for most categories) gisele) Ae) sare Le F NATO PLUS WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES NATO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL PROPOSAL es ‘Main Battle Tanks 40,000 40,000 a Artillery 33,000 40,000 a Armored Combat Vehicles” 60,000 56,000 Combat Aircraft”* 9,400 9.400 4,000 —Air Detense interceptors — 2.00 amis Combat Helicopters 3,800 3,800 } - * / Manpower **” NATO ard Warsaw Pact agree thal U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed manpower levis in Central Europe are to be limited ‘0 195,000 each, EQUAL NATO AND WARSAW PACT LIMITS IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS NATO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL PROPOSAL aa Main Battle Tanks 20,000 20,000 Artillery 16,500 20,08 an Armored Combat Vehicles” 30,000 28,000 ) > Combat Aircraft** 4,700 4,700 Manpower *** NATO and Warsaw Pact agree that U.S. and Soviet ground and air ‘stationed manpower levels in Central Europe are to be limited to 195,000 each 500 — Air Defense Interceptors — 1,000 Combat Helicopters 1,900 1,900 {,Setonanp. 1" Us puntadeplo a ard 0000s se, Seem 1 TUCO: jpn cle lll ATO sd Wn Pa bg! pmarey nese, buck Tt co ncaa pte fob stn Wart ayo Wan Foe le posed os (tone dat tna santoNo one country to retain more than a specified percent (NATO proposes 30%: Warsaw Pact 35-40%) of the overall limits (definitions remain to be resolved for most categories): NATO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL PROPOSAL Ps Main Battle Tanks 12,000 14,000 a ie Artillery 10,000 17,000 - ‘Armored Combat Vehicles 16,800 18,000 Combat Aircraft NATO has proposed a ceiling of 2,280 for hoidings by individual members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact cf permanently land-based, combat capable aircrat, wih up to 5C0 additional air defense aircrat alowed above this ceiling. TheWarsaw Pact which has proposed a ceiing ‘or indivigual ‘members f 3,400 for “combat arcrat of rontal'aetcal aviaten' oniy a Combat Helicopters 4,140 1,500 $f f # Manpower *** NATO and Warsaw Pact agree that U.S. and Soviel grourd and ait stationed manpower levels in Central Europe are to be fmited to 195,000 each. Each alliance may not station forces outside their national territory in excess of specified ls LIMITS ON FOREIGN STATIONED FORCES NATO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL PROPOSAL Main Battle Tanks 3.200 4500 .. (Getive units ony) {in active units and stereo) = Artillery 4,700 4,000 {(2ctive units only) {in active units and stored) Armored Combat Vehicles” 6,000 7,500 (active units only) {in active units and stored) Combat Aircratt Na‘ 4,200 (‘combat aircatt of frontaltatical aviation ony) Xacti Combat Helicopters Naw 600 Manpower *** 225,000 (U.S. groundia forces oniy) Has agreed with 195,000 (Soviet groundiair forces only) NATO's proposal +. Seotoaretep.1 *** Us. umted 130,00 cue thi 60 See map. 11. Due othe extreme mebity and speed of acral and hekcapers, NATO has not proposed celings of stained eget.NATO SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL FOR EQUIPMENT tom? HEE] tomes EB tenee BD prevent unstable concentrations of forces: NATO has proposed the following interlocking regional sub ceilings for each side for four geograhic sub-regions to Categories Zone 1 Zone 2# Zone 32 Zone 4 (Includes Zones 2,38 4) {includes Zones 3.& 4) _—_(indludes Zone 4) Tanks 20,000 11,300 10,300 8.000 atilery 16,500 9,000 7,600 4.500 ‘Armored Combat Vehicles 30,000 20,000 * 18,000 * 11,000 * Combet Aircraft 4,700/500 © NAS wae NAS Combat Helicopters 1,900 © NAS wae NAS 2 etn unts eny > Otwch re mere tan 14000 wou be Amored nancy Fahing Vics © Land-based combat aircralvhelicaptersiair delense interceptors: 4 uelothe exrome mobi and speed of aca andhelcptr, NATO hasnt proposed regina susceigs clings of Slatoed eupment * Susana for Armored Comat Voids subject achsientWARSAW PACT SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL fowenne BT] cotatoe Hl aaa Im May, the Warsaw Pact proposed the following regional sub-ceilings for three geographic sub-reg ons: | Categories Central Zone Forward Zone Rest Zone {includes Centra! Zone} Tanks 8,700 16,000 4,000 atillery* 7.600 16500 7,500 Armored Combat Vehicles 14,500 20500 7,500 Alrcraft 2 46.00 ————— Helicopters @ ——_— 1,90 — The Warsaw Pac revised procosal on attathlcopters tabled on September 28,1989, didnot warty any sub-rone ditrbuten for acral and helices * Subject to revisionWARSAW PACT ALTERNATIVE SUB-ZONE PROPOSAL caverzone nemo BB soumzone (On June 29, the Warsaw Pact tabled an aternative regional approach wih sub-cellings: Categories North Center South Rear Tanks 200 13,300 5200 1,300 Artillery* 1,000 11,500 8,500 3,000 ‘Armored Combat Vehicles 150 20,750 5,750 1,950 Alreratt —_ 0 $$ —_— Helicopters * —_—_—_——— 1,900 Tha iors Pacts redised proposal on atcrathclcoptrstabed on Sextember 29,1988, di at deity any sub-zone dstbuson for alia and helicopters Subject revision,U.S.SOVIET CENTRAL EUROPE GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL LIMITS NATO ana the Warsaw Pact have agreed that in Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S. and the Soviet Union may deplay no more than 195,000 ground and airforce personne! each. This will constitute the totality of Soviet forces in Europe outside of Soviet tentory. Outside of this ragion, the U.S. wil be restricted to no more than 39,000 ‘such personnel,