In WW2 the germans developed the first guided bombs, like the Fritz X which sunk the italian Battleship "Roma" in 1943. Another secret weapons was the HS 293 "air to land" guided missile. The american built and used with some succes the TDR drone (a "cruise missile"), and the guided bombs BAT and Azon
In WW2 the germans developed the first guided bombs, like the Fritz X which sunk the italian Battleship "Roma" in 1943. Another secret weapons was the HS 293 "air to land" guided missile. The american built and used with some succes the TDR drone (a "cruise missile"), and the guided bombs BAT and Azon
In WW2 the germans developed the first guided bombs, like the Fritz X which sunk the italian Battleship "Roma" in 1943. Another secret weapons was the HS 293 "air to land" guided missile. The american built and used with some succes the TDR drone (a "cruise missile"), and the guided bombs BAT and Azon
Bombs That Were -
SMART
Before Their Time
USS savannah is
crippled by a German
; Fritz X bomb on.
m vs ‘September 11, 1943
Plunging through
‘ tthe No. 3 turret,
/ the bomb exploded
e F r { deep in the hull(On the afternoon of Thursday, September 9, 1943, Adm.
Carlo Bergamini was a worried man. The day before the Italian
‘government had signed an armistice, and that morning, at 2:30
aum., he had sortied from La Spezia to deliver the remains of
Mustolin’s once-proud fleet to the Allies at Malta, as required
by the armistice terms. Even as his ships left harbor—the bat-
tleships Roma, Italia, and Vittorio Veneto, accompanied by three
cruisers and an escort of eight destroyers—the first American
troops were storming ashore at Salerno in the face of what
would soon be ferocious German resistance. Hitler's military
‘was not about to accept Bergamini’s move without a fight,
cithersindeed, the ships had departed just ahead of German sol
diers seizing the port.
Roma, his flagship, was just overa year
old, a graceful ship of over 45,000 tons
displacement, armed with nine fifteen
inch cannon in three triple-mount tur-
rets, capable of making nearly 32 knots.
Even so, Bergamini was under no illu-
sions as to its vulnerability. Air attacks
had already savaged Italy's fleet, most
notably inthe British trike at Taranto in
1941, Bergamini’ fleet was far from the
reach of friendly air cover, operating in
‘waters that the Luftwaffe considered its
‘own, and facing the risk of aerial attack-
ers moving ten times as fast as they.
‘As dawn rose, he sailed west of Corsica,
and then turned south, hugging its
coast, joined by three more cruisers and
two destroyers that had left Genoa. Allied
reconnaissance aircraft reported his move-
ments, and British and American naval
authorities noted with approval that the
Ttaian fleet was complying with the instructions they had given.
‘At approximately 3:50 p.m.,a formation of five twin-engine
airplanes passed high overhead. Lookouts at first likely thought
them Allied aircraft, but instead they were Dornier Do 217K
bombers from the Luftwaffe’ II Gruppe of Kampfgeschwader
100. A second formation of six aircraft followed close behing.
Based at Istres, France, and commanded by Maj. Bernhard Jope,
a legendary ship buster, III/KG100 was one of the Luftwaffe's
‘most notorious antishipping bomb wings.
As the intent ofthe airplanes became clear, the ships began
evasive maneuvering, causing the bombs from the first group to
fall harmlessly into the sea. The second group, however, struck
‘with unerring accuracy alia took a bomb hit that damaged
steering and temporarily left it out of contro. But it was the flag-
ship thatthe Luftwaffe pounded with particular effect. As Roma
turned, one bomb struck its bridge, the detonation instantly
kcling Bergarsini and his staff. A second bomb followed, slicing
through the deck between B turret and the shattered bridge,
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burying itself deep in the ship before exploding, B turret was tom
from its mounts, the ship’s hull opened to the sea, and a raging
fire broke out. Listing and burning, Roma drifted out of control,
as its crew desperately tried to save their ship. Twenty minutes
after the attack, the forward magazine erupted in a thunderous
blast, tearing the ship asunder. Its broken halves swiftly sank, car-
rying with them over 1,350 of Roma's crew.
Bergamini’ flagship had been destroyed by a PC1400X, a
{guided bomb known more familiarly as the Fritz X. It amtici
pated by a quarter century the smart bombs that are now com-
monplace in the air arsenals of many nations. Basically a
conventional PC1400 bomb equipped with guidance package,
four fins to give it some gliding ability,
and a twelve-sided box kiteHike tail unit
for stability and control, Fritz X was a
lethal ship killer. Do 217K medium
bomber could carry two of them, one
under each wing, hanging from pylons
between its engines and fuselage. The
Dornier approached and bombed its
target as if on a conventional bombing
ran. But then its pilot throttled back, so
that the plane would not overrun the
falling bomb. The descending Fritz X
displayed a bright flare, which the
Dornier’s bombardier used as a refer-
ence point, manipulating a small joy
stick to send radio pulses to the bob's
tal surfaces, controlling its descent path
until che flare merged with the target.
In 1938, German airmen were fighting
cover Spain, already finding it dificult to
attack small targets with precision, Max
Kramer, an engineer at Berln’s Deutsche
‘Versuchsanstalt fiir Luftfahrt (German Aviation Research
Institute) began experiments using control surfaces to alter the
path ofa falling bomb. Although he began with small weapons,
the German Air Ministry recommended he work with the
heavyweight PC1400. By the end of 1939, Kramer and a three-
ppetson team had evolved the Fritz X, dropping their first exam
pile in June 1940. Extensive testing in laboratories at Gottingen
University, Aachen Polytechnic, and Telefunken, followed by a
series of drop tess over specially instrumented bombing range
at Peenemtinde, refined its aerodynamics, guidance, and per-
formance, Ina final series of drop tests in early 1942, crews
launched the experimental bombs from 20,000 feet. For the
time, the results were extraordinary: 50 percent fell within 23
feet of the aim point, and 100 percent within 48 feet. Later that
year, Rheinmetall-Borsig put Fritz X in full production,
{in the summer of 1941, British intelligence had obtained
¢glimmerings of Germany's guided bomb experiments from
POW revelations and information sent by agents. The reports
SEPTEMBER 2007sed little alarm; such efforts had a long and I
ductive history. As early as 1918 the Siemens-Schuckert com:
pany had developed a gliding torpedo for possible use from
Zeppelins and large bombers, making a number of disappoint
ing test drops. At the same time, British and American develop-
ers had t
ed their own experimental gyro-stabilized “aerial
torpedoes”—drone airplanes—and in the late 1930s, both
countries had developed radio-controlled flying targets: more
P 8 tag
promising, but still far from practicable for a weapon,
aled in late July 1943 that
's equipped to carry two
Even after Enigma intelligence re
fifty specially modified Dornier Do
such weapons were being sent to Istres, Allied commanders still
interest, Only in August of 1943 would they awake
evinced litt
and even then they failed to realize the
to any potential dange
truly punishing trial they were about to experience
The devastating attacks began the final week of August,
with Dorniers from I11/KG100 targeting antisubmarine vessels
patrolling the Bay of Biscay. On August 25, they near-missed
HMS Landguard and HMS Bideford, killing one sailor. On
August 27, Egret, a small Royal Navy sloop, tooka direct hit an¢
went down, with the death of 194 sailors.
The sinki
sharply more dange
of Roma on September 9 heralded the start of a
1s phase, Just two days later, US. Army
netal Mark W. Clark stood on the bridge of his command
ship, Ancon, watching the approach of the light cruiser
Savannah. The ships were off Salerno, supporting the Allied
landings on the Italian mainland. Suddenly Clark heard “a ter-
rific screeching noise” that “seemed to be heading directly
toward the Ancon.” But, instead, a Fritz X plunged into the
‘ruiser’s No.3 turret, exploding deep within the ship. “Instantly
all was chaos, smoke, blood, and death,” as a navy report later
described the scene. The blast ripped open the hull and seawater
flooded in. The forecastle was awash within minutes and the
ship seemed almost certain to go down. Neatly two hundred
sailors were killed in the blast and fire, with most of the gun
crews asphyxiated in their turrets by smoke and fumes. The
blast knocked out all the ship's boiler fires, leaving it without
power. Heroically, and against all odds, the crew mai
ged to
right the seriously isting vessel and get the boilers ret, and
Savannah was able to limp into Malta, Four crew members
trapped in the radio room were freed only when workers in
Malta, sixty hours later, drilled and chipped theit way through
the steel deck to reach them.
(Over the next five days, four more ships were hit off Salerno:
A Fritz X crippled the British cruiser Uganda on September |
tugs towed it to Malta. The next day, a guided bomb sank a
tanker, Bushrod Washington, On the fifteenth, another so badly
damaged 8S James Marshall as to render it only ft for service as
part of an artificial harbor constructed for the Normandy inva-
sion. Then, on September 16, the British battleship Warsp
took three Fritz X hits, one a near-lethal hit in a boiler room,
WORLD WAR It
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TAO. MQ. RAF. ML.STRAIGHT COURSE
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clectrical
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main wing spar rocket
Droputsion unt
The Hs 293 could be launched 3/4 mile to
Perr)
Cecabriefly robbing the tough old Jutland veteran of all power and
causing extensive flooding. Very badly battered, it, too, joined
the growing flet of damaged ships undergoing repairs in Malta
Allied experts soon discovered that several of the attacks
including those on Egret and Bideford—had been carried out
with a second, and even more sophisticated, radio-controlled
‘weapon. The Hs 293 was actually more airplane than bomb,
befitting the background of its creator, Herbert Wagner. A
former marine engineer who became one of the most distin-
Buished figures in German aeronautics, Wagner had pioneered
the design of lightweight all-metal structures,
designed an early jet engine for Junkers,and then,
at the invitation of the air ministry, joined the
Henschel company at Berlin-SchOnefeld to assist
in their weapon development.
‘The Hs 293, which had its first test flight in
1940, amply reflected his expertise. Equipped with
a rocket booster and weighing just half as much
as the Fritz X, it was a true pilotless aircraft
Launched from the twin-engine Do 217E and,
later the four-engine Hie 177A, it had nearly three
times the range of the Fritz X. The attacking
bomber could launch it as much as five miles
from the target, safely out of range of shipboard
antiaircraft guns. What was more, the bomber
could pass three-quarters of a mile to one side of
the ship, rather than straight toward it. After
launch, the missile fell away, and its engine and a
flare ignited. The engine burned for approximately twelve sec-
‘onds, producing a thrust of 1,500 pounds, accelerating the
‘bomb and boosting its range. As with the Fritz X, the bom
bardier tracked its progress by following the tail flare and
radioed steering commands via a joystick
In the face of the unremitting assault, Allied scientists
sctambled to devise ways to foil the bombs. Ideas included
pointing searchlights atthe attacking bomber to momentarily
blind the bombardier or firing flares to mimic the glide bomb’s
{guidance flare. More conventional tacties were also proposed,
including smoke screens, evasive maneuvering, intensive anti-
aircraft barrages, and constant fighter patrols
‘The most promising new idea was to jam the radio guidance
link between bomber and bomb. The catch was that scientists
needed an intact bomb, so they could take apart the radio gear
and figure out the frequency it operated on, as well as the
method used to encode the steering instructions within the
radio signal. Technical intelligence personnel from Britain's Air
Ministry pored over bomb fragments for vital clues, their job
made harder by the Germans’ practice of equipping the bombs
with small self-destruct charges that would blow up the guid-
ance unit even ifthe bomb itself failed to detonate on impact.
Finally, in October, British scientists discovered nine Dorniers
WORLD WAR II
Fritz x hit within 48 feet
ets
abandoned at Foggia: seven Fritz X-launching Do 217Ks and
two Hs 293-launching Do 217Es. These contained sufficient
portions of Telefunken FuG 203 Kehl transceivers and their
aerials, control panels, and bomb launch mechanisms, to
permit technical analysis.
They could not, however; put this find to practical use fast
enough to prevent serious losses throughout November. On the
thirteenth ofthe month, a bomb struck MS Dulverton off Kos,
forcing the destroyer’ scuttling. On the twenty-first, twenty-
five He 177As from the Il Gruppe of KG40 (an antishipping
sq bomb wing based at Bordeaux-Mérignac)
attacked a convoy off Spain. Thanks to adroit ship
handling, the Luftwafie’s own blundering assault,
and the actions of an RAF Liberator crew, which
repeatedly attacked the wheeling bombers, only
two of the forty-six bombs that were launched hit
still, they damaged one vessel and sank another,
$$ Marsa. On the twenty-sixth, during another
He 177 attack on a Suez-bound convoy off the
Algerian coast intercepting fighters shot down six
of the bombers, However, at least one bomber
managed to score, and with terrible effect. An
Hs 293 hit the Rohna, a converted British troop-
ship, starting raging fires. Nearly twelve hundred
men perished on the blazing ship or in the water,
including more than a thousand American Gls—
2 shocking los whose details were kept secret for
many years after the end of the wat.
Countermeasures were still not fully effective when, on
January 22, 1944, British and American forces commenced
Operation Shingle, the landing at Anzio-Nettuno. An Hs 293
dropped at dusk damaged the British destroyer Jervis on
January 23, Fear of more such attacks prompted the Allied naval
‘commander, Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry, to order his cruisers
and destroyers out to sea every afternoon, even though this
meant abandoning nighttime fire support missions for troops
already fighting ashore.
Even with this precaution, on the twenty-ninth, guided
bombs hit the British cruiser Spartan, capsizing it and set the
American transport Sarauel Huntington ablaze; it blew up the
next morning. In response, Adm. Sir John Cunningham
‘ordered that the large cruisers be sent to the roadstead only if
troops ashore were facing extreme threats. The many lightly
armored destroyers, transports, and landing craft plying waters
off the beachhead would have to continue to take their chances,
Consequently, on February 16, the SS Elihu Yale took a bomb
hit that sank it and a landing craft moored alongside, and on
the twenty-fifth, the British destroyer Inglefield sank under
another missile attack.
Fortunately, with these assaults, the high-water mark of
German antiship missle warfare had passed. Over the next few
‘months, the Allies introduced electronic jamming countermea-he effectiveness of the Fritz X and Hs 293; of
greater significance, Allied fighter patrols and antiaircraft fire
increasingly made operations ear naval forces even riskier than
they had been, Only occasional successes attended subsequent
‘German use of precision bombs against shipping. At Normandy
in 1944, an unjammed glide bomb attack on the night of June
6 destroyed one LST, and in the early hours of June 8, another
undetected glide bomb so damaged the American destroyer
Meredith that it had to be abandoned.
After the landings in Southern France and Normandy, Ger
rman antishipping operations of all kinds declined dramatically,
In the meantime, German scientists and engineers attempted
to build on the success they had achieved with the Fritz X and,
particularly, the Hs 293. They explored wire and television
guidance to overcome the effects of jamming and created new
and potentially even more devastating designs, including the
Mistel program, an effort to modify war-weary Ju 88 bombers
into remote-controlled flying bombs carrying a 7,700-pound
shaped-charge warhead
Such work complemented the Nazi regime's heavy invest
‘ment in futuristic weapons such as et fighters, long-range rock-
Grumman TBM Avenger torpedo bomber whose operator
“saw” through the TV eye of the drone, the TDR could carry a
2,000-pound bomb. Deployed to the Solomons, TDR drones
saw a month of combat testing. Their first sorties took place on
September 27, 1944, when four were launched by Special Air
‘Task Group 1 from Stirling Island against a Japanese merchant
ship used as an antiaircraft trap off South Bougainville, Two
destroyed it. Trials ended in late October, by which time the
group had launched 46, of which 21 successfully hit ther tar-
gets (That success dramatically contrasted with conventional
bombing. When 47 B-29s raided Yawata Japan inthe summer
cof 1944, only 1 of their 376 bombs actually hit the target. It took
108 B-17s dropping 648 bombs to guarantee a 96 percent
chance of getting just two hits on a Nazi power plant.)
‘The U.S. Navy also developed a self-guided bomb, the Bat,
\which used built-in radar to home in on an enemy target. When
deployed in the lst few months of the war, it sank a destroyer
and several freighters. Moreover, during the last year of the war,
the air force produced a third American guided bomb, Azon.
Like the Fritz X it was steered overa radio link by a bombard,
‘who followed the bomb’ fal visualy with the aid ofa flare. By
Interest in precision guidance vanished after the war
ets, pilotless cruise missiles, and air-to-air and air-to-surface
missiles. But most of these efforts proved woefully fanciful
technological dead ends, or were impossible to achieve before
the Hitler regime’s collapse. Thus, Navi precision weapons, far
from constituting war-winning strategic wunderwaffen, fur-
nished at best temporary tactical hindrances to the lies’ inex-
‘rable drive to Berlin.
Yet the Nazis’ smart weapons offered a glimpse of the future:
cone the Allies, particularly the United States, would over time
embrace. The loss of the Roma in particular greatly accelerated
official interest in several American research programs that had
‘been under way since the beginning of the war but had yet to
yield practical results.
‘One was the navy’s TDR, which would become the antecedent
‘of the modern cruise missile. The TDR owed is origins toa for-
‘unate partnership between Commodore Oscar Smith, a vision:
ary surface officer; Lt. Comdr, Delmar Fahey, a flying bomb
enthusiast; and television pioneer Vladimir Zworykin, a Russian
‘émigré and RCA’ chief scientist. In 1942, the three men success-
fully demonstrated controlling a drone aircraft while it ap-
proached and then dropped a dummy torpedo against a
‘maneuvering destroyer. The results so impressed Fleet Admiral
Ernest J. King that he authorized development of an assault
flying a specially built attack drone.
‘The TDR was built by a small firm, the Interstate Aircraft
Company, assisted by the Wurlitzer organ company and a fur-
niture manufacturer. Controlled from an accompanying
‘war's end, over 15,000 had been produced by Gulf Research and
Development Company. Early trials in Europe met with indif-
ferent success, but by December 1944, Azon had been refined
to a point of deadly efficiency. In Burma, the 7th Bomb Group
used it with extraordinary effect against bridges. On December
27, six B-24s of the 493rd Bomb Squadron dropped eighteen
Azons, which destroyed a 300-foot steel bridge at Pyinmana
that had withstood scores of attacks. Altogether, twenty-seven
Japanese bridges fell at a cost of 450 Azons.
TDR, Bat, and Azon were the apex of American smart air
‘weapons in the Second World War, but already developers were
looking well beyond, envisioning supersonic and hypersonic
global-reaching cruise-and-ballistic missiles, heat-seeking
bombs and missiles, and robot aircraft. Out ofthe spoils of Nazi
Germany's technology came even more ambitious projects.
Nonetheless official interest in precision guidance all but van-
ished after the war, For much of the next two decades, unguided
“dumb” bombs continued to dominate America’s weapons
inventory, and military commanders saw lite reason to change
that. The advent of the atomic bomb added its own limits on
military thinking; planners saw conventional war as outdated.
Only when America found itself once again in a major con-
ventional war in Vietnam, and American jets took a painful
pounding when attacking difficult and well-defended targets
such as bridges, was interest in precision guidance reborn for
‘g00d—with the legacy that the world witnessed so vividly in
the air war over Serbia and the two wars in Iraq.
SEPTEMBER 2007