DearprofessorOppy,

Ihavecraftedthis"apriori"argumentthataimstoprovethenecessaryexistenceofGod.Isubmitittoyour
consideration,soanycritiqueiswelcome.
Bestregards,
Daniel
***
Definition1
Possibleiswhatcanbethoughtwithoutcontradiction.
Thoughtbywhom?Surelythereshouldbenomentionofthoughtinthisdefinition.
Thoughtbyanyrationalbeing.EvenifIdidn'tmentionthoughtexpresslyinmydefinition,itwouldbe
obviousthatwhenIstatethatsomepropositionisnoncontradictory(i.e.,selfconsistent)Iimplythatit
issuchforanyonewhoisabletothinkaboutit.

Ithinkthatwhatyouhavesaidisambiguousmoreimportantly,Ithinkthatitfailstomeetanimportant
conditionondefinitions.
Perhapsyoumeanthis:pispossibleiffforanyx,ifxisarationalbeing,thenitispossiblethatxbelieves
thatpwithoutcontradiction.
Orperhapsyoumeanthis:pispossibleiffforsomex,xisarationalbeinganditispossiblethatx
believesthatpwithoutcontradiction.
Eitherway,thedefinitionisimproper,becausethetermtobedefinedontheLHSofthedefinitionisused
ontheRHSofthedefinition.
TheadvantageofomittingmentionofrationalbeingsisthatyoudropmodaltalkfromtheRHSofthe
definition.(pispossibleiffpisnotacontradiction.)Ofcourse,asIgoontonote,theresultingdefinition
isstillunacceptable.Butatleastitdoesn'tviolateoneoftheformalconditionsonproperdefinitions.
Imustadmitthatyouarerighthere.Then,let'ssay:"Possibleiswhatentailsnoselfcontradiction".

Thereareotheradvantagesinnotinvokingrationalbeings.
Suppose,forexample,thattherearerationalbeingsthatnecessarilylackcertainconcepts(e.g.because
thoseconceptsaretoocomplicatedfromthemtograsp).Inparticular,let'ssupposethatwelack
conceptsofGod'sintrinsicproperties.Suppose,further,thatwelet"F"standforoneofGod'sintrinsic
properties.ConsiderthepropositionGodisF.Sincewecannotgraspthisproposition,itisnotpossible
forustobelieveitwithoutcontradiction.So,itisnotpossiblethatGodisF.That'saveryquickproofof
theclaimthatGod'snatureisperfectlyandcompletelyaccessibletous,onthefirstofthe
disambiguationsgivenabove.Moreover,theseconddisambiguationwon'thelpunlesswesupposethat
there*is*arationalbeingthatpossessesallconcepts.Buttosupposethatissurelytogoalmostallof
thewaytotheconclusionthatissupposedtobeestablishedbytheargument.(Bymynaturalistlights,it
isnecessarythatthereisnorationalbeingthatpossessesallconcepts.)
Ok.

Therearewellknownobjectionstothesuggestionthat"pispossibleiffpisnotacontradiction".
ThatwaterisnotH20isnocontradictionbutmanycontemporaryphilosophersfollowKripkein

thinkingthatitisnecessarythatwaterisH20.
But,since"water"isthelayman'snamefor"H2O",statingthat"itisnecessarythatwaterisH2O"
equalstosaythat"itisnecessarythatwateriswater".Thiswouldbeundeniablytrue,likeevery
tautologyis,accordingtotheprincipleofnoncontradiction.
Itisn'ttruethat"water"isjustthelayman'snamefor"H2O".Theword"water"wasincommonuse
amongscientistslongbeforeitwasdiscoveredthatwaterisH20.Ifwaterwerejustthelayman'snamefor
H2O,thenitcouldnothavebeenasubstantivescientificdiscoverythatwaterisH2O.(Instead,everyone
wouldhaverecognisedthistobeatautology.)Ifyourviewofmodalityturnssubstantivescientific
discoveriesintotautologies,thenyourviewofmodalityisjustwrong.

Imeantthat"water"isnowadaysthelayman'snamefor"H2O".ButIstilldon'tseehow"thatwaterisnot
H2O"can'tbeacontradictioneveninthepast.WaterhasalwaysbeenH2O,regardlessofwhatwethought
ofit.Thus,youcouldonlyassertthatatsometimeourideaofwhatwaterwasdidn'tmatchitscurrent
definitionasH2O.Summingup,itisnecessarythatwaterisH2O(sincewatermustbewater),butitisnot
necessarythatwaterexists.

Definition2
Impossibleiswhatcannotbethoughtwithoutcontradiction.
Definition3
Necessaryisthatwhosedenialcannotbethoughtwithoutcontradiction.
Definition4
Nothingnessisthetotalabsenceofmatterorenergy.
Nothingnesswouldbethetotalabsenceofeverything(notjusttheabsenceofmassenergy).
Idisagree.Nothingness,asIdefineit,isthetotalabsenceofmatterorenergy.Ifyoudon'tliketheword
"nothingness"forthisdefiniens,youcouldcommuteitforanyotherone("absolutelackofauniverse",
forinstance)andthedemonstrationwouldstillkeepallitspower.
Itisalwaysdangeroustogivenoveldefinitionstowordsincommonuse.Itwouldhavebeenbetterto
makeupanewword,orelsetojustusethedefiningexpression'totalabsenceofmassenergy"
throughout.

Reallyitisnotthatnovel.WhenSaintAugustinewroteonthe"creatioexnihilo"oftheuniverse,by"nihilo"
hemeant"totalabsenceofmatter",butnot"totalabsenceofanything",sinceheassumedGodasa
necessarybeing.

Definition5
Theuniverseisthesetofallmatterandenergy.
(Quibble):Theuniverseisnotaset.Setsareabstractentitiestheuniverseisnotanabstractentity.
Imeantheelementsofthisset.
Ithinkitwouldbebettertoviewtheuniverseasthe(mereological)*fusion*ofitselements.Thatway,it
doesnotcomeoutasanabstractentity.

Ok.

Definition6
Godistheimmaterialcreatoroftheuniverse.
Thissurelybegsthequestion.Perhapsyoumightsay:IFthereisjustoneimmaterialcreatorofthe
universe,THENthatoneisGod.
JustbydefiningGodthiswayI'mnotassumingthatGodexists.Isimplyassertthat,ifGodexisted,it
wouldneedtomeettheserequirements.

From"GodistheF"itfollowsinclassicallogicthatthereisatleastoneF.HadyousaidasI
suggestedthat,ifthereisexactlyoneF,thenGodistheF,thenyourdefinitionwouldhavebeenfine.

Ok,Ithinkthisisnotsubstantialanyways.

Definition7
Oppositeiswhatcannotbethoughtofasexistingalongsidewithitsdenial(EitherAorA).
Ithinkthatyoushouldsay:~(A&~A).(Ofcourse,classically,thisamountstothesamething.But,
forexample,intuitionistswillbaulkattheinferencefrom~(A&~A)to(Av~A)
Ok.

Axiom1
Theoppositeofwhatispossibleisalsopossible(IfAispossible,thenAispossible).
Falseinstandardmodellogics.
LetA=NeccB.
IfPossA,thenPossNeccB.But,instandardmodallogics,ifPossNeccB,thenNeccB.And,in
standardmodallogics,ifNeccB,then~Poss~B.

IfPoss~A,thenPoss~NeccB.IfPoss~NeccB,thenPossPoss~B.But,instandardmodallogics,
ifPossPoss~B,thePoss~B.
So,ifA=NeccB,thenPossAand~Poss~A.
Ithinkthatyouaremisrepresentingmypoint.I'mstatingthat,ifAispossible,thenitisnecessary
thatAispossible.OtherwiseAwouldbenecessary(byDefinition3,whichyouhaveacceptedasa
validone).
MycriticismsofDefinition1obviouslyapplyequallytoDefinition2andDefinition3.So,no,Ididnot
acceptthosedefinitionsasvalid.(Sorryfornotspellingthisout.)
Iwasn'tconvincedbyyourcriticismswhenyouusedtheexampleofwaterandH2O.But,inanycase,could
youpleasedefine"possible","impossible"and"necessary"inawaythatyoudeemacceptable?

And,no,Ihavenotmisrepresentedyourpoint.Yousay:ifAispossible,thenitisnecessarythat~Ais

possible.Igiveacounterexample.SupposethatAisoftheformNecessarilyB.(Suppose,forexample,
thatAis"ItisnecessarythatwaterisH2O".)Forthesakeofmyexample,grantmethatitisnecessary
thatwaterisH2O.SoBisnecessarilytrue(andAistrue).Sincewhateveristhecaseispossible,Ais
possible.Thatis:itispossiblethatitisnecessarythatwaterisH2O.QUESTION:Isitnecessarythat~A
ispossible?Thatis,isitnecessarythatitispossiblethatitisnotnecessarythatwaterisH2O?By
standard(S5)modallogic,itisnecessarythatitispossiblethatitisnotnecessarythatwaterisH2Ois
EQUIVALENTTOitispossiblethatwaterisnotH2O.Butweagreedthatitisnecessarythatwateris
H2O.Contradiction.Wehaveacounterexampletoyour"Axiom".
I'malawyer,notalogician,butIunderstoodwhatyoumeanthenceIwrotethatyouweremisrepresenting
myargument.Thetrickeryofyour"refutation"isprettyevident:youcannotassumethat"Aisoftheform
necessarilyB",sinceby"possible"Imean"noncontradictoryandnotnecessary",asIalreadyclarified.

Irecommendthatyoulookupastandardtextbookonmodallogic.(Say:HughesandCresswellor
maybeChellas.)

Thanks.

Axiom2
Whatisneitherpossiblenorimpossibleisnecessary(quartumnondatur).
False.Everypropositioniseitherpossibleornotpossible(=impossible).Thereisnothirdoption.
Everynecessarypropositionispossible.(Instandardmodallogics,ifNeccA,thenPossA.)
That'sright,butnoteverypossiblepropositionisnecessary.Then,by"possible"Idon'tmeanjust
"noncontradictory",but"noncontradictoryandnotnecessary".IshouldspecifyitinDefinition1to
avoidinconsistency.
ItisstandardtosaythatitisCONTINGENTthatpif(a)itispossiblethatpand(b)itispossiblethat~p.

I'monmyrighttousemyowndefinitions,aslongasIpresentthemwithanunequivocalandconsistent
meaning.

Everypropositioniseithernecessarilytrue,contingentlytrue,contingentlyfalse,ornecessarilyfalse.
Ifweacceptthisrevision,thenweneedtogobackandreconsidereverythingtothispoint.
Lookattherevisedversionofdefinition1:pisCONTINGENTiffpisnotacontradiction.2+2=4isnota
contradictionWHENCEitiscontingentthat2+2=4.Oops!
Idon'taccepttherevision.SoIwouldsay:pisPOSSIBLEifpisnotacontradictionandisnotnecessary.
2+2=4isnecessary,whenceitisnotpossiblethat2+2=4.Obviously,whenIsay"itisnotpossiblethat
2+2=4"Idon'tmeanthatitisimpossible,butthatitisnecessary.IuseatripartitedistinctionandIreachthe
followingconsequences:
1)Theoppositeofwhatisnecessaryisimpossible.
E.g.:ItisnecessarythatIamaliveornotalivethisisincompossible[=opposite]withmebeingneither
alivenornotalive.Therefore,itisimpossiblethatIamneitheralivenornotalive.
2)Theoppositeofwhatispossibleispossible.
E.g.:ItispossiblethatIamalivethisisincompossiblewithmebeingnotalive.Therefore,itispossible
thatIamnotalive(thatis,thatIdie).
3)Theoppositeofwhatisimpossibleisnecessary.
E.g.:ItisimpossiblethatIamneitheralivenornotalivethisisincompossiblewithmebeingaliveornot
alive.Therefore,itisnecessarythatIamaliveornotalive.

Allthisseemstobeundeniablytrue.
(Atthispoint,the"proof"hasbrokendowncompletely.Ofcourse,youmaythinkthatthereissomeway
ofrepairingit.Ifyoutry,makesurethatyougobacktothestart,andredothewholething.)
Nowthatmydefinitionsareclear,Idon'tthinkIneedtoredoit.

Axiom3
Whatisneitherimpossiblenornecessaryispossible(quartumnondatur).
True,butunnecessarilycomplicated.Whatisnotimpossibleispossible.
Axiom4
Whatisneitherpossiblenornecessaryisimpossible(quartumnondatur).
True,butunnecessarilycomplicated.Whatisnotpossibleisimpossible.
Proposition1
Anyuniverseistheoppositeofnothingness.
AnyuniverseisANoppositeofnothingness.(AsisGod.Asisanythingatall.)
Godisnottheoppositeofnothingnessifyoudefine"nothingness"asIdid.

Demonstration:
Nothingnessisthetotalabsenceofmatterorenergy(byDefinition4).Theuniverseisthesetofallmatter
andenergy(byDefinition5).Oppositeiswhatcannotbethoughtofasexistingalongsidewithitsdenial(by
Definition7).Therefore,anyuniverseistheoppositeofnothingness.
Proposition2
Nothingnessispossible.
Somethinksomanydonot.ThosewhobelieveinanecessarilyexistentGodCANNOTbelievethis.
Seepreviouscomment.

Demonstration:
Anyuniverseistheoppositeofnothingness(byProposition1).Theoppositeofwhatispossibleisalso
possible(byAxiom1).Anynoncontradictoryuniverseispossible(byDefinition1).Therefore,nothingness
ispossible.
Proposition3
Anoppositeofapossiblecasecannotbenecessary.
Demonstration:
Theoppositeofwhatispossibleisalsopossible(byAxiom1).Thepossibleandthenecessaryare
mutuallyexclusiveinthesameevent(byDefinitions1,3and7).Therefore,theoppositeofapossiblecase
cannotbenecessary.
Proposition4

Anyuniverseisnotnecessary.
Notifthereisjustonepossibleuniverse.Somedeterministsbelievethis.
Theysurelybelieveit,buttheycannotproveit.
Trueenough.Butthereis(almost)nothingsubstantiveinphilosophyforwhichthereisproof.Where
thereisseriousdisputebetweenphilosophers,itisatleastLondontoabrickthattherearenoproofs.

Ithinkthatyouareawareofthis:yourstatement"Wherethereisseriousdispute,etc."isaphilosophical
onetoo,andnoteveryoneisdisposedtoacceptit(notme,forinstance).

Demonstration:
Nothingnessispossible(byProposition2).Anyuniverseistheoppositeofnothingness(byProposition1).
Theoppositeofapossiblecasecannotbenecessary(Proposition3).Therefore,anyuniverseisnot
necessary.
Proposition5
Iftheuniverseisnecessary,Godisimpossible.
NotifitisnecessarythatGodcreatesthebestpossibleworld.(ThiswasLeibniz'sview.)
ThisnecessityderivesfromGod'sownnecessityandperfection.So,evenadmittingthatitisnecessary
thatGodcreatessuchaworld,itfollowsthatthisworldisnotnecessarybyitself,butbyGod(and
thereforenotnecessary"strictusensu",sinceitwasproduced"exnihilo",fromnonexistenceto
existence,whichmeansthatitsdenialdoesn'timplyanycontradictionatall).
Whatyousayhereseemsnottomakesense,giventheearlierdefinitionof"necessity".
Clearly,youcandisagreewithLeibniz,anddenythatitisnecessarythatGodcreatesthebestpossible
universe(andnoother).But,ifyougrantthatitisnecessarythatGodcreatesthebestpossibleuniverse
(andnoother),thenyougrantthatitisnecessarythatthereisjustoneuniverse(thebestpossibleone).
Leibnizstatementwasthat,ifGodcreatedanyworld,itwouldbenecessarythatsuchworldwasthebest
possibleone.Hedidn'tbelieveATALLthatGodwasmetaphysicallyforcedtocreatetheworld,since
nothingcanforceGod,whichisthegreatestpowerandremainstotallyunconditionedbyanyexternal
factor.Thus,Godisonlycompelledinsomewaybyhisownnature,thatis,byhissupremeperfection,that
doesn'tallowhimtoproduceaworldwhichisnotthebest.

Leibniz'sviewishardlypopularitleavesnoroomforeitherdivineorhumanfreedom,onstandard
libertarianaccountsoffreedom.
I'vebeenaLeibnizianforthelast13years,sinceIam22,soIdon'tseemyselfapostatizingnow.Despiteof
yourclaim,Icanguaranteethathisphilosophyleavesenoughroomforareasonablenotionoffreedom.