Nationalism in Japans Early Modern Period: A Cultural or

State-Based Game?

Jessica Haynes
Senior Seminar International Relations
Dr. Barbara Donovan
January 22, 2015

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When Japan was suddenly thrust out of its period of total seclusion by the arrival of
Commodore Perry and his Black Fleet in the 1853, the first seeds were sown for a whirlwind of
changes within the state that would occur over the next century. After emerging from a twohundred year period of isolation known as sakoku, Japan rushed forward into the modern era,
emulating the Western powers in its education system, its politics, and its technology. Along with
these drastic changes came a surge of Japanese nationalism that shocked the world with its
intensity, especially during battles in the Pacific in World War II. This nationalistic fervor, fueled
to a peak during the late Meiji era and Imperial period, was largely spurred on by the creation of
State Shinto shortly after the restoration of the emperors power. While most current Western
research agrees that State Shinto is largely the source of Japanese nationalism, can we be sure
that Western scholars have considered both the background of nationalism in Japan and the scope
of State Shinto in a balanced manner? When looking at the original definition of State Shinto
offered by the Shinto Directive, one can see that the scope and meaning of State Shinto was
unclear at the time of the US dismantling of the Imperial Japanese system, and a continuing lack
of clarity seems to plague current researchers as well. Considering too narrow a scope of State
Shinto makes the type of early modern Japanese nationalism appear to fall either on the side of
civic (state-based) or cultural nationalism, but can we be sure that the issue is clear-cut? In this
paper, both the cultural and political aspects of State Shinto and the broader Kokutai system will
be considered in order to explore the true, nuanced nature of early modern Japanese nationalism
during the Meiji and Imperial periods that very well may defy single-category sorting.

Before being able to analyze Meiji Era nationalism thoroughly and objectively, the nature
of nationalism itself must first be considered. Though the amount of research concerning

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nationalism is overwhelming, the phenomenon continues to baffle the collective intellectual

community, since no single, definitive definition for the term has arisen. As a result, nationalism
is normally only loosely understood as feeling loyalty towards a state and wishing to protect it
and its autonomy, as well as feeling a sense of camaraderie with others living in said state due to
belonging to the same nation: sharing a heritage or culture. The meeting of the cultural and
governmental aspects of this phenomenon led to the creation of the modern nation-state, in
which feudalistic separations between individuals of a specific state such as economic class or
race, for example are overcome to create a unified populace that backs an independent state
(Auerbach 2009). In order for nationalism to appear within a population, both the nation and the
concept of a state must be adequately formed within the society. That is, the political entity in
question must be a sovereign state with an autonomous government that controls a monopoly on
coercion, thus exercising effective control over a territory, or the citizens of a given nation must
be striving for or working towards the creation of said state (Smith 2000, 1). In addition, within
the state, a nation must be present, made up of a group of individuals who recognize their unity
based on heritage, language, tradition, religion, or other cultural norms and establishments
(Smith 2000, 1). A state is a relatively graspable concept, but even this definition leaves a fair
amount of space for gray areas, due to there being possible loopholes in the sovereignty
requirement, such as the possibility of de-facto recognition of a state in times of turmoil or a
displaced, provisional government existing outside its own territory during wartime. Nations face
even more definitional difficulties, since nations can extend beyond state lines and do not always
affiliate themselves with specific governments, as is in the case of the Jewish nation, for
example. However, in the case of nationalism, it is assumed that the individuals within a state

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would think of themselves as simultaneously affiliated with the state and the cultural group
within it, creating nationalistic zeal only within nation-states (Auerbach 2009).
With so many loopholes and exceptions in the definitions of nation and state, nationalism
as a concept inherited a relatively shaky foundation that allows for most cases of nationalism
to be disputed in one way or another due to the disputed eligibility of a country to be called a
nation-state. However, even more troubling to the concept of nationalism is that researchers
disagree on the balance of cultural and political aspects that make up nationalism, as well as on
the origins of this phenomenon. For example, one camp of scholars believe that nationalism
originated in the late 1600s or 1700s, making nationalism a new and modern occurrence unlike
any trend of group behavior seen before within the international system. These scholars, fittingly
called modernists, tend to reject the notion that any traceable development that suggests the rise
of nationalism could have existed before the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Directly pitted against
modernist theory is perennialist theory, which argues that the formation of nationalism had long
been in the works before the 1700s or the Treaty of Westphalias introduction of sovereignty. Of
course, there are many more subtypes of nationalism that have been theorized, but in the interest
of time and due to the nature of this study, only modernism and perennialist theories are
discussed here in terms of temporal categories. Following directly after the discussions of these
theories is a brief overview of civil and cultural nationalisms, which are often paired to
modernist and perennialist theories, respectively.
The divide between perennialist and modernist theory is extremely straightforward, but
has a heavy influence on the way researchers view the case of Japanese nationalism and the way
it developed. Perennialists, as stated before, believe that nations, or the concept of large groups
of people identifying as a member of a group even without the interference of the state, had

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existed long before the Treaty of Westphalia and the turbulent 1700s. Perennialism can be found
in two main forms: continuous which is more often found in nationalistic movements within a
state and recurrent (Smith 2000, 3). The continuous viewpoint describes nations being made up
of the feeling unity amongst a group of individuals due to cultural attachments and similarities
that has existed since time immemorial, meaning that the cultural sector of nationalism has
always existed (Smith 2000, 2-3). This viewpoint is extremely useful for nationalist movements
due to its ability to justify a group being recognized as a nation, since the group in question
would most likely be claiming to have existed in one form or another for thousands of years.
Thus, in the face of this argument, the denial of rights to a group with these claims would seem
immensely unfair, giving the group more influence and recognition, in theory. On the other hand,
the recurrent view of perennialism claims that nations appear and disappear throughout history;
that is, humans band together to make identifiable nations in every time period, but with the rise
and fall of certain civilizations, so comes the rise and fall of nations. Nations, then, have existed
since the dawn of human civilization, but no specific nation has necessarily existed throughout
that entire time (Smith 2000, 3-4). Therefore, this view would argue that even before the creation
of the concept of nationalism and the rise of the nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia, the
roots of certain modern nations were present (Karolewski and Suszycki 2011). These roots,
however, can be described as many different aspects that would draw a group of people towards
unity, ranging anywhere from cultural aspects to blood ties, since perennialism is merely a
temporal standpoint on the nature of nations.
On the other side of the temporal spectrum is modernism, which states that nations are
modern concepts and developments, and therefore, nationalism itself is, too, a modern
development that has only recently arisen due to the unique international system of the modern

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era (Smith 2000, 4-5). For the most part, modernists attribute the rise of nations to the changes
made to the international system by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, at which point absolute
sovereignty was attributed to the ruling parties of kingdoms. The creation of the notion of
sovereignty was the killing blow to decentralized power as seen in feudalism, which allowed for
the state and later, in the 18th century, the nation-state to enter onto the international stage.
One of the most well-known modernists today, Ernest Gellner, draws the line between
perennialism and modernism by explaining that the former focus too heavily on cultural aspects,
essentially reducing the issue of nationalism to a form that is lacking in the discussion of
statehood and citizenship (Gellner 1995). He explains that nationalism arose in states that had no
specific cultural foundation, such as in Estonia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Estonians were
not even established as a nation by the 19th century, and yet Estonians have formed for
themselves a thriving ethnic and cultural identity following their short lived independence in
1918 and later, the fall of the USSR: thus becoming truly Estonian. Therefore, he concedes to the
fact that cultural foundations can allow for the foundation of nationalism when the correct
statehood conditions are present, but he says that it is not necessary for the creation of a
nationalistic movement within a region. Because much of perennialist thought relies so heavily
on the communities forged by language, heritage, tradition, and culture, Gellner explains that
perennialists are missing the point by assuming that these people would be able to self-identify a
group in a political sense without an overarching, centralized state structure: an assumption he
claims is simply ludicrous (Gellner 1995).
Gellner, in drawing the lines between modernist and perennialist theory, has also alluded
to another major divide in nationalism theory that will play greatly into ones understanding of
the Japanese case study: the line between civic and cultural nationalism. Perennialists, because

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they focus often on time periods prior to 1648, rely more heavily on cultural attachments that can
define a group, making them oriented more towards cultural nationalism, while modernists tend
to rely more heavily on civil subjects that appeared during the 18th century. To begin with the
perennialists preference, cultural nationalism is, as its name suggests, a movement of loyalty and
fervor for a state that is deeply entrenched in the shared culture of the individuals within the
movement. Therefore, while nationalism is still recognized as a political fervor to protect a state
and its autonomy and thus, can inspire revolutionary fervor, the foundation of this movement is
believed to be primarily entrenched in the sharing of a nation instead of a state (Karenga 2014, 34). For example, Adrian Hastings, a well-known perennialist and cultural nationalist, explains
that, in the case of Europe, states coming and going over the years has not led to the death of
nations (Karolewski and Suszycki 2011). According to Hastings, nations in Europe formed due
to the spread of Christianity in Europe, which not only brought many groups together with a
common religion, but also with common languages. When the Bible was translated from Latin
into vernacular languages for the publics consumption, the spread of the book lead to a
standardization of many different early European languages, therefore linking large groups of
people together with language in a way that had not before occurred (Hastings 1997, 20,24).
These groups, brought together by vernacular language, then became the beginnings of nations
that would stand strong throughout the many medieval wars of Europe and the resulting shifts of
power and authority.
Civic nationalism, like modernism, leans more towards the state as being the most
important factor in the development of nationalism in a region, saying that political actions and
affiliations play more heavily into nationalistic identity (Hall 2003, 28). Civic nationalism often
conjures the images of the American and French Revolutions, which demanded liberty and

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equality for mankind that should be given to all citizens: a new concept at the time which
encouraged individuals to become active members of political movements in order to take part in
the governing of their state. Like modernists, those who side with civic nationalism tend to
believe that the creation of a state and a political culture is what pushes individuals to band
together, meaning that the cultural aspects or nations are merely secondary affiliations that add to
the pull of the state. According to Jean-Franois Dupr, civic nationalism normally takes two
different stances, the first embodied by the nature of the United States relationship between state
and nation, while the other is more visible in the French model (Dupr 2012, 232). In the United
States, it is no surprise that the civic life of an individual tends to take precedence in the
nationalism movement. After all, the liberal history of the country and its founding on the
teachings of Locke promoted the forging of a relationship between the individual and the state,
thus giving political identity and influence to the masses. In a state that places such an emphasis
on civic life, national affiliations, though still important, tend to fall to the wayside when
political issues come to the forefront, making the United States a prime example of civic-liberal
nationalism (Dupr 2012, 232-233). In brief, Americans self-identify as Americans in a civil
sense as free and active citizens and only think of themselves as members of separate
ethnicities or nations second, hence the use of hyphened terms such as African-American,
Chinese-American (232). In terms of grammar, the fact that the national or ethnic term precedes
American means that the ethnic term acts as an adjective: merely a description of the root
noun. While each American identifies as an American in the public sphere, their ethnic identities
are more private and tend to be removed their civic identities. However, in the French model of
civic nationalism referred to by Dupr as the civic-republican model, civic nationalism and
identity is used in order to bring together individuals on a cultural level. As Eugen Weber

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mentioned, for example, the French civic model is founded on individuality and freedom, as well
as active citizenship, but unlike the United States the French system also aims to assimilate
newcomers into the French system on a cultural level (Weber 1976). In order to become a true
member of French society that can participate in society on an equal footing, newcomers are
encouraged to adopt French political views, the French language, and a French identity, in order
to avoid the creation of well-defined minority groups (Dupr 2012, 231). These minority groups
are viewed as roots of social instability, and should be avoided at all costs in order to prevent any
endangerment to the governments authority.
As you can see, nationalism even when considering a limited scope of the issue is an
extremely complex concept that leaves an incredible amount of room for individual
interpretation. Depending on what type of nationalism one considers and the temporal nature of
nationalism that one adopts, one could feasibly find at least whispers of nationalism anywhere at
any given time. Before discussing Meiji era and Imperial Japan, it is worthwhile to note that
many researchers claim to have found the roots of Japanese nationalism during the reign of the
Tokugawa Shogunate, even before the fall of feudalism in the region. In the late 17th and 18th
centuries, for example, philosophical movements and schools of thought appeared that began to
stress the need for the study of Japanese history and philosophy (Pyle 1971, 6). The Mito and
Kokugaku (national learning) movements of the time were in response to the NeoConfucianism and Chinese learning in the region, and thus began to push for the creation of a
History of Great Japan (Dai-nihon-shi) and a revival of Shinto to rid Japan of Buddhist
influence (Kokugaku). These schools of thought and the following they garnered is
occasionally considered to be the foundation of Japanese nationalism that were later spread to the
masses during the Meiji Restoration of the late 1800s and early 1900s (Wilson 1969).

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Unfortunately, studies concerning these movements are extremely hard to come by in English,
leaving most of the scholarship on these topics solely in the hands of those who can read
Japanese. From the small amount readily available to English audiences, one of the major flaws
consistent throughout these documents seems to be the assumption that the development of
ethnic zeal denotes the formation of nationalism within a region. Though the logic behind this
assumption seems to stem from perennialist influences, it is flawed to assume that a nationalist
movement could have evolved to full fruition before the appearance of a Japanese nation-state,
or at least the centralization of power within Japan. Nationalism is, at its core, a movement in
support of a nation-state, involving both national and political elements in varying degrees.
However, the first purpose of this paper is to explore the nationalism of Japan during the
Meiji Revolution and Imperial period, without concerning itself on the possibility of Tokugawa
period nationalism due to both limitations in sources and in document length. By studying
governmental decisions and the teachings of State Shinto during the Meiji era and Imperial
period, this paper will attempt to sort Japans early modern nationalism into either cultural or
civic nationalism, bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of the material on the topic
has favored the former category. Very few researchers have dared to approach the matter with a
broader outlook on State Shinto that would allow for both cultural and civic elements to play into
its implementation in the lives of Japanese individuals at the time. Those researchers who do take
that step, like Shigeyoshi Murakami did in his book Kokka Shinto (State Shinto) in 1970, are
often met with heavy criticism (Murakami 1970). Despite Murakami explaining that State Shinto
transcended the religious sector even in the lives of Japanese individuals due to its influence
touching every aspect of Japanese life up until 1945, many other researchers refute his claim by
relying on a cripplingly narrow definition of State Shinto.

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While there are plenty of studies that cover Meiji Japans nationalism that are readily
accessible, I fear that our understanding may be heavily clouded by both our own nationalistic
paradigms and by our focusing unfairly on the oppression aspect of State Shinto and the resulting
nationalist movement. As Susumu Shimazono points out, Western researchers are almost too
eager to limit their studies of Meiji and Imperial nationalism to a national brainwashing that
inspired fervor in the masses, due to them buying into a new form of the traditional religion of
Japan (Shimazono 2005, 1080). For example, instead of approaching the implementation of State
Shinto from both a cultural and political angle, Western researchers tend to use a narrow
definition of State Shinto that considers it merely the bastardization of tradition, taken too far by
the authorities, that allowed the government of Japan to manipulate the population into following
their political agenda, which would have made the nationalism of the population solely cultural
in nature. Due to this stance, State Shinto seems to break apart into two separate phenomena,
with the cultural aspect remaining with the masses, and the political aspect only being present
within the Japanese governments motives. Western researchers seem to become biased by their
affinity for separation of church and state, and therefore, are unable to take a more nuanced
approach to viewing State Shinto. Their view on State Shinto falls almost parallel to the
definition used in the Shinto Directive the order that dismantled State Shinto during the
American occupation of Japan which repeatedly described State Shinto as a perversion of
Shinto theory that caused a compulsion in the Japanese people to believe in an imperial cult
(Shimazono 2005, 1080). Because of this similarity, it almost appears to be a case of victory bias
in the case of Western writers, who look back at State Shinto as an evil institution of tradition
without fairly assessing its workings.

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A Brief Explanation of State Shinto Ideological Structure

Due to their failing to consider the political aspect of State Shinto in the experiences of
Japanese individuals, Western researchers have often failed to draw a clear division between
State Shinto and traditional Shinto teachings, which will be referred to here as Shrine Shinto
(Jinja Shinto). In fact, there are several branches of Shintoism, as well as relationships between
these branches that are often poorly covered by researchers who attempt to discuss State
Shintoism. The simplification of the understanding of State Shinto, then, leads to an incredibly
warped sense of the subject itself, essentially preventing any fair assessment of Japanese
nationalism at the time, since State Shinto is widely accepted to be the root of Japanese
ultranationalism during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Wilbur Fridell, in his extensive study of
State Shinto, suggests that the body of religious and political actions that is colloquially referred
to as State Shinto is actually the meeting of many different sects that is mistakenly viewed as a
single phenomenon (1976). According to Fridell, State Shinto (Kokka Shinto) is nothing more
than the Japanese governments influence on certain aspects of Shinto tradition that were used to
promote the ideas of a wider, even more powerful force that is often overlooked: the Kokutai
Cult (1976, 552). The Kokutai Cult (National Polity Cult) is the foundation of ideas and beliefs
that glorify the connections between state-nation-emperor, such as the teachings of Japanese
specialness and the stressing of the emperors importance as both divine ruler and head of the
state and Japanese nation (Fridell 1976, 550-552). Though the stressing of the importance of the
state-nation-emperor system often relied upon elements of Shinto doctrine for instance, the
creation story in order to arouse feelings of nationalism in the Japanese population, the ideas
contained within the Kokutai Cult do not all necessarily follow the teachings of Shinto directly.
The Kokutai Cults focus is the uniqueness of Japan, and the importance of the emperor and the

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nation in the state (Woodard 1972, 11). Therefore, the Cult could be loosely referred to as an
ideology that likened the Japanese state to a divine family, meaning that, in order to remain a
member of this family, a Japanese person must focus on national morality: obedience to the
emperor, reverence of Japan as a unique state and nation, and reverence of the emperor as a
divine head of state (Woodard 1972, 11-12). The Cult is sometimes defined even more broadly,
encompassing every bit of the official Japanese national image, or the attributes of Japanese
individuals that make them Japanese (Fridell 1976, 555). In a nutshell, then, the Kokutai Cult is
the set of beliefs and ideas that fueled much of the ultranationalism in Japan in the modern
period, but is a completely separate phenomenon from Shintoism, despite State Shinto often
being used to describe the beliefs of the Kokutai Cult.
State Shinto undeniably built upon the teachings of the Kokutai Cult, but was not the
source of a sense of Japanese specialness or superiority like many researchers and novices alike
seem to assume. State Shinto is, instead, the use of Shinto ideas, institutions, and traditions by
the state in support of the Kokutai Cult (Fridell 1976, 554). This form of Shintoism came into
being at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, when the Meiji government nationalized many
Shinto shrines in order to consolidate power within the emperor through the governments overt
support of a divine emperor and state (Fridell 1976, 556). State Shinto is sometimes said to be
for example, by William Woodard the same as Shrine Shinto (Jinja Shinto), only with the
added aspect of nationalized shrines (Woodard 1972, 10). Though this definition is popular
among Western researchers, a small number of scholars argue that such a definition is unfair to
both Shrine and State Shinto, as they operate on different foundations and employ different
institutions to spread their messages (Fridell 1976, 556). Shrine Shinto is the religion that one
usually imagines when Shintoism is mentioned: that is, the animistic religion that honors the

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spirits of nature and the dead through prayers and other traditions held at a community shrine or
a shrine within ones home (kamidana) (555-557). Shrine Shinto and State Shinto are not the
same thing, according to Fridell, but share many traditions in common, since State Shinto is
based heavily on the usage of Shinto traditions to support the Kokutai Cult. The practices of
Shrine Shinto were incorporated into the wider State Shinto, which also includes elements not
present in the Shrine form of the religion, such as a heavy focus on a divine god-emperor and the
heavily governmentalized Cult of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu. Therefore, State Shinto can be
understood as the usage of Shrine Shinto practices to promote the interests of the Kokutai Cult,
as well as the addition of several new traditions meant to further support the state-nation-emperor
structure of the Japanese state in the late 1800s and early 1900s. When considered in this light,
the dual nature political and cultural of State Shinto becomes clear, making much of the
previous discussions of State Shinto appear to be too limited in scope or too simplified.
The blending of the ideas of Shrine Shinto, State Shinto, and the Kokutai Cult that is
often seen in research considering modern Japanese nationalism also tends to overlook the fact
that the ideas on which State Shinto were founded were not unique to the time period. As you
will see in the following section of this paper, many of the ideas and beliefs that would later
become the fuel of the Kokutai Cult and later, the founding motivation of State Shinto can be
traced back hundreds of years before the Meiji Restoration. These longstanding ideas suggest
that the roots of Japanese cultural nationalism have been in place for a very long time, but never
reached widespread fruition in the early days of the Japan. These beliefs are not as widely
studied for their influence in ancient times due to the relatively overwhelming effect they had in
modern Japan. The fact that the cultural foundation of modern Japanese nationalism has existed
for so many centuries suggests to me that, like the modernists and civic nationalists suggest, the

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foundation of a centralized and powerful state is the aspect that is the most important in the
formation of nationalism in a region. While I do believe that the Japanese state is responsible for
the spreading of the ideas of the Kokutai Cults ideas and, thus, forming the ultranationalist
movement in early modern Japan through governmental action, I will not take the leap to say that
cultural foundations are not important to nationalism. Gellner suggests in his comments during
the Warwick Debates on nationalism that whether or not a state has a navel cultural basis, or
a clear sense of nation before statehood is achieved is irrelevant to the states formation of a
nationalist movement (1995). While this idea seems to work for some states such as Estonia,
which was mentioned as an example earlier in the case of Japan, the navel of the Kokutai
movement is of extreme importance. The Meiji and Imperial governments of Japan successfully
used governmental action to create a strong, centralized state through fostering loyalty to both
the state and tradition, emphasizing the importance of Japanese individuals obedience to both
the state and the Japanese way of life. Because of the multifaceted nature of Japanese
nationalism during the time period, one cannot successfully argue that the system was solely
cultural or civic in nature. Because the state used its power to secure the creation of nationalist
fervor by using ideas that failed to create widespread nationalism on its own during centuries of
prior existence, civic nationalism is the more important of the two facets. However, the Japanese
governments emphasis on cultural homogeny appears to suggest that the Japanese nationalism
model of this period is actually an example of the civic-republican model of nationalism.

The Cultural Arm of Nationalism: The State-Nation-Emperor System

As explained in the previous section of this paper, the Kokutai Cult is the body of ideas
and beliefs that, in the early modern era, became the foundation of State Shinto, and was spread

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throughout Japan due to governmental involvement in most areas of Japanese life. Though the
ideas outlined within the Cult gained massive popularity and influence during the State Shinto
period of Japan roughly 1868 1945 these beliefs were, by no means, new to the Japanese.
In fact, ideas of racial superiority, emperor divinity, and territorial divinity were present in Japan
for hundreds of years even before the first whisperings of the modern era. These notions, which
attributed to the creation of a proud cultural foundation for the Japanese nation, can be traced
back to documents like the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters) and the Nihon Shoki (Chronicles
of Japan), which were penned in the 8th century as attempts to record the divine origins of Japan
at the request of the Imperial House. Hence, the Japanese nation had a powerful foundation built
up already by the time the Meiji Revolution came about. These teachings, when paired with a
strong definition of otherness against the rest of the world and the rise of Japan-centric studies
during the Tokugawa period, point to the existence of at least the beginnings of a Japanese nation
before the modern Japanese state was born in the 1860s.
The earliest Japanese chronicles known to modern researchers, the Kojiki penned
between 710 and 711 AD and the Nihon Shoki penned around 720 AD laid the groundwork
for glorifying the Japanese archipelago, population, and monarchy in the name of the Shinto
religion, despite the religion not necessarily containing these themes in the first place. Before the
release of these two extremely influential documents that were aimed at the legitimizing the
power of the imperial family, Shintoism was an extremely disorganized set of beliefs that
reached back into times immemorial (Zhong 2014, 56). Shintoism is and always has been an
animistic religion that emphasized the worship of divine spirits known as kami that were
believed to reside in nature, representing the elements, specific natural landmarks, spirits of the
dead, or even human emotions (BBC 2009). Originally, individuals would worship local kami at

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local shrines and during local events, meaning that there was very little continuity in beliefs and
worship style from region to region. The added lack of sacred texts meant that Shintoism, at the
time, was nothing more than the recognition and worship in some form of spirits, making the
aboriginal Japanese religion hardly any different from most rudimentary animistic faiths (BBC
2009). Shintoism continued to exist as a nondescript, decentralized faith up until the 8th century,
even after both Buddhist and Confucian influences began to reshape the religion starting in the
6th century (BBC 2009). Because the imperial family of Japan had previously seen potential in
the use of Shinto to legitimatize their rule over the archipelago, the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki
both contained a mixture of historical chronology of rulers, as well as mythological stories that
explained the creation of Japan and the fate of the people who inhabited the archipelago. These
stories would become not only important within the doctrine of Shintoism, but would also be
considered as the true history, starting in the early Tokugawa period (Zhong 2014, 57).
The Shinto creation story, which focuses solely on the creation of the Japanese islands,
tells of the great kami Izanagi-no-Mikoto and Izanami-no-Mikoto, the god and goddess of
creation who brought a divine land into existence at the beginning of time. Depending on which
document the Kojiki or the Nihon Shoki that one cites, the order of birth of the Japanese
islands and other minor details may differ, but both stories highlight the great importance of
these islands as a blessed land that came into being due to the direct actions of kami. In these 8th
century texts, the Japanese archipelago is presented as a mixture of creation and kami spirits. The
Gods of Heaven, who are considered to be the two first kami in existence and the creators of
Izanagi and Izanagi, told the two to descend from Heaven to create the earth and bring it under
their control (Berkeley 2006). The Gods of Heaven then bestowed upon them a jeweled spear,
which Izanagi took and, plunging its point into the sea, summoned forth the first island, called

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Onogoro. On this island, the couple built their palace and established their kingdom of Heaven
on earth, from which was born all other kami, the other Japanese islands, and all terrestrial life
(Berkeley 2006, 38). In these versions of the story, not only are the islands of Japan holy in that
they were created by the kami, but they are themselves kami, since they were born of the union
of Izanami-no-Mikoto and Izanagi-no-Mikoto, making them revered spirits in and of themselves
(Chamberlain 2009, lxiii). In addition to the islands inherited kami status, the islands are
considered to be even more special, due to the fact that the god and goddess of creation decided
to make their home in the archipelago, suggesting that they themselves believed the land to be
divine and suitable for a kami dwelling. Also mentioned within this creation story is the origin of
human beings upon these islands: an origin story that paints the Japanese people as chosen or
divine in comparison to the rest of the world.
Unlike the Japanese islands, the Japanese people are not described to be direct
descendants of kami; instead, Izanagi-no-Mikoto appears to be credited with the proliferation
and protection of human beings on the divine archipelago, making the Japanese people appear to
be chosen by the god of creation. In the beginning of the universe, kami and forces of nature, and
a small number of created humans populated the world, and Izanami-no-Mikoto continued to
bear more children in an attempt to fill the earth with life. However, after birthing all of the
Japanese islands and countless other kami, Izanami fell horribly ill during the birth of her final
child, the kami of fire (Chamberlain 2009, lxii). She died painfully during the birth of the
dangerous kami, and, upon her death, she descended to the underworld. In grief, Izanagi slayed
the fire kami and descended to the underworld after his beloved wife, intending to bring her back
to the overworld with him (lxii). However, Izanami had been transformed into a hideous spirit by
the time he reached her, and, fleeing from her, Izanagi proclaimed his desire to divorce her. Upon

Haynes 18

hearing his proclamation, Izanami swore to kill one thousand of Izanagis people each day, to
which Izanagi promises to cause the births of fifteen hundred per day (Berkeley 2006, 61). Due
to this single exchange, Izanagi became the kami of life, while Izanami assumed the role of kami
of death. It is interesting to note that the humans living on the archipelago are referred to as the
people of Izanagi, suggesting that the Japanese people are, indeed, the chosen people of the kami
of creation and life. Additionally, this exalted status is further proven by Izanagis promise to
protect the bloodline of these people by ensuring that more births will occur each day than the
number of people the kami of death can slay. Izanagis devotion to the well-being of the Japanese
people is further evidenced in the Nihon Shoki, when, after the couple bore their first child a
kami of a wicked nature who killed many humans and crumbled mountains Izanagi banished
the child from the archipelago in order to protect the humans that dwelt there (Berkeley 2006,
49). The kami of creation seems to be eternally willing to protect the Japanese people during
these early stories, including in situations that force him to choose between those he loves (his
wife and his child) and the humans of Japan. Interestingly, too, is the fact that risks to the
people of this country or of this land are often mentioned, while the well-being of other races
is not addressed in the creation stories of the Nihon Shoki and Kojiki, creating a sense of
increased importance for the Japanese people through their native religion.
Yet another aspect of early Shinto documents that paints the Japanese as a divine people
is the story of the imperial line, which is present in both 8th century documents as well. Most
scholars agree that the imperial Yamato family at the time, wishing to legitimize their rule in the
face of uprisings and unrest, influenced the writers of the Kojiki and Nihon Shoki to claim a
divine origin for their family (Zhong 2014, 56). According to these documents, the Sun Goddess
Amaterasu born of Izanagi-no-Mikotos left eye sent her descendant, Jimmu to rule over the

Haynes 19

Japanese people and to establish a royal family that would govern that kingdom forever
(Berkeley 2006, 254-255). Though this claimed divine lineage would play a large role in the
legitimization of the Yamato Dynastys rule, the idea of a the emperor being more than human
did not arise solely from the writings in the 8th century. In fact, the early Yamato emperors from
around 300 BC were viewed as supernatural leaders with the ability to ensure good rice harvests,
thus making harvest time akin to worshipping the emperor (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). Fearing that
the emperor would not grant the population good harvests, the Japanese people would throw
matsuri (festivals, usually in celebration of kami) and would take part in various harvest rituals
in glorification of the emperor (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). However, at this time, the emperor
himself was not viewed as a kami, but was, instead, something like a medium who was pure
enough to make direct offerings to the kami and, thus, received limited supernatural powers due
to his purity (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). Only later, in the eighth century, when the imperial system
was at its strongest point in Japanese history, did the imperial family take the leap to claim to be
descended from kami themselves. After Amaterasu was established as the progenitor of the
imperial family, thus suddenly becoming the most influential kami of the Shinto pantheon, the
imperial family continued to hold the harvest festivals of ancient times, but focused more often
on the Sun Goddess than on lesser kami. Despite the loss of power experienced by the emperors
following the eighth century AD and following the Second World War, the Yamato family, to this
day, remains in power, suggesting that their divine legitimacy seems to have succeeded to a
degree.
What we see here is an early version of the state-nation-emperor system that became so
important to the Kokutai Cult school of thought during the Meiji Revolution, meaning that the
foundations of cultural nationalism has existed in Japan for hundreds of years. These ideas alone,

Haynes 20

however, were not enough to bring a Japanese nation into existence as far back as the 8th century
AD. Before a people can be successful in creating for themselves a group identity, they must first
be able to grasp a sense of otherness towards outsiders. The first concrete evidence of a
developing sense of otherness arose in the 6th century AD: the century that saw the arrival of
Buddhism to Japan (BBC 2009). Before the arrival of this rival religion, Shintoism did not even
have a name for itself and was nothing more than a disorganized tendency towards animism.
However, when faced with a radically different set of beliefs, the native Japanese religion was
finally granted a name, and was, thus, recognized as a force separate to that of the other that
was Buddhism (BBC 2009). The sense of other, however, was not strong enough at this point in
history to create the sense of strong Japanese identity, as Buddhism and Shinto tended to exist
within the same temples and homes, thus creating a strange mixture of the two religions that is
still evident in todays worship (BBC 2009). This sense of otherness intensified during the Edo
period, most likely spurred on by the Tokugawa Shogunates enactment of sakoku starting with
the Sakoku Edict of 1635, which closed Japan off from most outside contact. This policy of
isolation was meant to close off Japan from any outside influences, showing not only a strong
sense of xenophobia during the age of colonialization, but also a strong sense of Japan as a unit
with a culture and a way of life that needed to be protected (Itoh 1996). Though limited trade was
allowed in Nagasaki with certain foreigners namely, the Dutch contact with foreigners and
travel outside of Japan was strictly prohibited, as the ideas of the outside world were viewed as
dangerous to the Japanese system and could product large-scale instability. During this time
period of seclusion, new Japan-centric schools of thought began to emerge, which supported the
study of Japanese history, art, and culture while simultaneously rejecting Chinese influence in
the forms of both Confucianism and Buddhism (Kokugaku). One of the schools, the Mito

Haynes 21

school, supported the idea of Japanese scholars creating a great body of knowledge to chronicle
the development of Japan to create a Dai-nihon-shi (Great History of Japan) in the image of the
many historical documents kept by China. While the Mito supported the idea of shifting the
focus of education and research away from the Chinese subjects, the Kokugaku took the
rejection of foreign influence one step further by preaching the eradication of all foreign
influence in Japan (Kokugaku). These stances are certainly reminiscent of the fanaticism that
rises to the forefront of political life during the Meiji Revolution, but we do not see the rise of
fanatic Japanese ultranationalism since the spread of this early prototype of nationalism was
not broad enough until then, despite many of the factors that would have supported cultural
nationalism already being in place for hundreds of years. For this reason, one can argue that the
Japanese states actions during the Meiji Revolution and up until the end of World War II are the
stimuli that truly allowed for widespread nationalism to occur, making the case study of Japan
seem to lean more towards the side of civil nationalism and modernism. The state effectively set
off the chain reaction that lit long-stashed gunpowder.

The Political Arm of Nationalism: State Shinto and Conformity

While the Japanese state appears to be the factor responsible for setting off the chain
reaction that created Japanese ultranationalism in the modern era, the form of nationalism that it
created is not parallel to other forms of civic nationalism that is seen in the West. For example, as
mentioned previously, civic nationalism normally brings the systems of the United States and
France to mind, in which individuals living within the state are empowered to make decisions
and have their voices heard in the governments. This form of citizen empowerment did not exist
in Meiji and Imperial Japan, meaning that the state-created nationalism had to rely on loyalty to

Haynes 22

another cause to ignite the passions of the Japanese people. One possible reason for this
difference in nationalism type is the lack of individualism in Japanese culture, meaning that the
creation of nationalism identical to that of the American or French system would have taken a
long time. To secure Japan against the sudden wave of foreign contact following Commodore
Perrys forced opening of Japan to the rest of the world, however, the Japanese government had
to act quickly. Thus, once the Tokugawa Shogunate fell in 1868and the Meiji Restoration
commenced, the new state built a type of nationalism that fed off of Japans supply of cultural
pride that had been building over the previous centuries. What was created from this meeting of
political and cultural nationalism was a civic nationalism that was controlled by the state, but
which supported homogeneity within Japan. By encouraging widespread cultural conformity, the
new Meiji government successfully centralized the states power, putting an end to feudalism and
discouraging uprisings against the government. The focus on conformity in the states actions
between 1868 and 1945 can perhaps most clearly be seen in three categories: the exploitation of
the Shinto story of the imperial family, the educational system in Japan during this time, and the
creation of the Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu.
The Meiji Restoration brought an end to the over two-hundred year period of the
Tokugawa rule alongside a powerless emperor, ushering in a new era of loyalty to a seemingly
all-powerful emperor who answered to the Imperial Diet on political matters. The emperor was,
however, the holder of absolute sovereignty and legitimacy in the Japanese system, due to the
emphasis placed on his divine origins as understood by traditional Shinto thought. However,
instead of recognizing the emperor as merely a descendant of kami who possessed certain
supernatural powers, the Meiji government took the emperors power one step further by
proclaiming him to be a living kami himself (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). The Meiji Constitution of

Haynes 23

1889 Chapter 1, Article 3 outright describes the emperor as arahitogami (human-kami), and
ensures the recognition of this fact through the nationalization of a large majority of Shinto
shrines (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). Over 170,000 shrines were brought under the direct power of the
royal family, and Buddhist influences within these shrines were systematically eradicated
(Murakami 1977, 132-140). As a result, Shinto experienced a purification across the state that
separated the religion from most Buddhist influences including deities and rituals and
focused heavily on the worship of Amaterasu, who was placed at the head of the Shinto pantheon
due to her connections with the emperor (BBC 2009). The Grand Ise Shrine the main shrine of
Amaterasu became the holiest shrine in all of Shintoism during this period, resulting in an
astounding weakening in regional kami followings (Loo 2010, 376). In addition to glorifying the
Grand Ise Shrine due to its ties to Amaterasu, it is worth saying that a new shrine was built in
1889 in honor of Jimmu, the mythical first emperor of Japan and progenitor of the Yamato family
(Japan National Tourism Organization). Despite Emperor Jimmu being an immensely important
historical figure in Japan since the publications of the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki in the eighth
century, it was not until the Meiji governments attempts to consolidate total power in the
imperial family that Jimmu was given his own shrine. Suddenly, all of Japan was brought under a
single system of worship, successfully bringing the population together by likening worship of
Amaterasu and the emperor to traditional ancestor worship (Loo 2010, 377). With the entire
nations political and spiritual focus drawn towards the emperor, Amaterasu, and the Grand Ise
Shrine, the emperor and those who spoke for him were suddenly in a position to alter the nature
of thought in Japan, even in fields outside of religion.
The power of the emperor was more powerful in education during the Meiji Restoration
than perhaps in any other field of public life, spreading conformity in beliefs and practice to

Haynes 24

several generations of Japanese at once. Even before the Meiji Constitution was put into effect,
the Ministry of Education was founded in 1871 under the leadership of Mori Arinori, an early
Meiji politician (Shibata 2004, 78). Arinori, inspired by the educational system and its
standardization in the United States, set out to standardize Japanese education to foster patriotism
and loyalty to the Japanese state for all Japanese citizens of any background (Shibata 2004, 78).
The educational system created by his hand incorporated Shinto priests, who were now
considered both political figures and instructors (Zhong 2014, 57). Due to their presence within
the education system, the teachings of the Kojiki and the Nihon Shoki continuing the trend that
had begun during the Tokugawa period were treated as factual records of the history of Japan,
meaning that Emperor Jimmu, the imperial blood of Amaterasu, and the divinity of the Japanese
homeland became central teaching points in schools (Zhong 2014, 57). Alongside the teachings
of the superiority of the Japanese homeland were lessons that focused heavily on loyalty and
obedience towards the emperor and the state, drawing on Confucian influences that emphasized
filial piety as a mark of model behavior (Partner 2004, 55-56). Children were indoctrinated into
the ways of being a good Japanese through unquestioning obedience and reverence to the
emperor, which created a population of nationalistic, conforming individuals within the span of a
couple of generations (Partner 2004, 56). The children submitted to the teachings of their
educators willingly due to the emperor becoming directly and personally invested in the
education system after the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, in which the emperor
commanded all proud Japanese citizens to take seriously their education for the good of the
empire and for the glorification of their ancestors (Lu 1974, 70). Following this declaration,
aspects of emperor worship were incorporated even into the school day, with students and
teachers alike required to bow to portraits of the emperor that were kept in each classroom, as

Haynes 25

well as to bow to a copy of the Rescript that was housed in a sacred cabinet within each room
(Shibata 2004, 79; Partner 2004, 56-57). While the Japanese youth of all backgrounds did,
indeed, receive high quality state-provided schooling for the first time in Japanese history, their
lessons in logic, reading, and fairness were always interwoven with reminders of the greatness of
the emperor, the Japanese state, and their own responsibilities to honor their family-state. The
incessant repetition of these values served to shape a strong base of nationalism within the
population, with disobedience towards the emperor and the state being a bad Japanese
slowly becoming among the worst sin that a Japanese citizen could commit.
In addition to constructing a culture based on reverence and obedience to the emperor and
the family-state, the Meiji Restoration also saw the creation of strict laws and supervisory bodies
that punished non-conformity very severely. Due to the emperor being described as an
arahitogami in the Meiji Constitution, crimes against the emperor were punished with particular
severity, making high treason the gravest crime that one could commit (Mackie and Susumu
2013, 2). High treason was defined as any attempt or intention to harm the emperor or his
immediate family or direct descendants, and was cause for an automatic death sentence if the
accused were convicted regardless of intent due to the updates to the Meiji Criminal Code in
1908 (Mackie and Susumu 2013, 14). While the severe punishment for treason is not new to
world history, Meiji Japan was known to make use of this charge on at least one occasion to
silence an entire group of liberal Japanese figures, many of whom were never proven to be tied
to a plot against the emperor at all. In 1910, a plot against the emperor that came to be known as
the High Treason Incident was brought to light, which ended in the arrests of twenty-six people
who were allegedly planning to assassinate the emperor (Mackie and Susumu 2013, 1-3). The
first four arrests in May 1910 were of Miyashita Takichi and his partners for the making of

Haynes 26

explosives, which were determined to be tied to a larger plot to assassinate the Meiji emperor.
The lead conspirator in the plot, Kotoku Shushui, was later apprehended, but after this point, the
Japanese government used circumstantial evidence and past ties between individuals to
apprehend a total of twenty-one more known Japanese leftists (Mackie and Susumu 2013, 1-4).
Of the twenty-six tried in connection with the crime, twenty-four were executed, even after
Kanno Suga the only woman arrested during the plot admitted to the authorities the
involvement of only about six individuals in the plot, saying that the other twenty were innocent
of high treason (2). The Japanese government kept the proceedings tightly under wraps, and to
this day, have not released all of the documents connected to the case (14).
Perhaps out of paranoia for the possibility of other plots forming against the emperor at
the time, the Meiji government created the Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu (the Tokko) the year after
the High Treason Incident in an attempt to investigate any and all hints of anti-emperor sentiment
that came to the governments attention. The Tokko was essentially the Japanese thought police,
which would watch for any sign of action or word against the Meiji government, and would
watch the people involved secretly until it had amassed heavy enough evidence to bring the
individuals to court (Harding 2014). While the Tokko were largely responsible for crippling the
leftist movement in Japan after 1911 due to the number of investigations that were launched
against known leftist supporters, the organization was also known to pay attention to even the
most absurd of incidents that showed any sign of anti-emperor sentiment (Mackie and Susumu
2013, 4). As the number of left-wing activists dropped in Japan following the High Treason
Incident and the ensuing spike in investigations, the Tokko found itself looking into such trivial
matters as statements made by school children. The Tokko kept an archive of postcards sent to
the emperor from school children that were deemed suspicious, as well as reports of

Haynes 27

conversations between both civilians and political figures (Harding 2014). Being that no one was
safe from investigation, the leftist movement suffered a terrible blow in the early 1900s, which
helped the government maintain the status quo throughout the half-century of wars that followed.

Conclusions
Despite the existing studies of Meiji and Imperial Japan tending to argue that the Meiji
system relied solely on cultural nationalism, the form of nationalism that drove early modern
Japan was much more nuanced than it is usually depicted. The state did use a large amount of
cultural fuel in the forms of racial supremacy, divine emperor beliefs, and reverence of the
Japanese land in order to build the strong state-nation-emperor connection that was central to
motivating the Japanese people to support the nation-state of Meiji Japan. The ideas upon which
the Meiji government built cultural fervor, however, had been present in Japan for centuries, and
only had begun to gain a bit of speed during the Tokugawa Shogunates rule, at which point
power was beginning to be centralized more than it had been previously. However, nationalism
did not take off in Japan until after the shogunates fall in 1868, suggesting that the Meiji
governments actions were more important in the case of the development of Japanese
nationalism. Being that the state is the stimulus that set nationalism off in Japan, modernism
appears to be applicable to the case study of Japan, since the centralization of power within the
modern state was required to produce this fervor. However, while the Meiji government
successfully centralized power within itself by creating a large amount of loyalty towards the
state, the population was driven by cultural fervor just as much as they were by positive feelings
towards the state and emperor. Because of the successful mixing of both cultural and political
fervors in the population, the Meiji government was able to promote the idea of conformity as

Haynes 28

the most important and honorable attribute of a good Japanese. Widespread conformity
enforced by severe punishments, investigations, and the strength of indoctrination in both the
education system and the Shinto sphere then bred a population with similar viewpoints, beliefs,
and behaviors, which allowed Japan to successfully react to the influx of foreign influence after
the end of sakoku in the mid-1800s. This dual nature of cultural fervor and state-induced
conformity seems to mirror more closely Jean-Franois Duprs description of the civicrepublican model of nationalism, making early modern Japans nationalism is much more
complex than simple cultural nationalism caused by the bastardization of Shinto tradition.

Haynes 29

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