258 5 easing contacts with the West, people discoy 1 Through ne ttractive environment in prosperous count, the relatively Sere ‘America, quite in contrast with Pictures in Western pein capitalist world portrayed by Soviet ropagans! the dirty and Pe med that dismantling the Soviet regime Would ales They widel i vdeliver ‘a better environment similar to that in the West. The auromarica'y “his view argued that economic liberalization would end aero, qutmoded industries, force factories to use resources more efficiently, and foster the adoption of modern, tes es from the West, Moreover, radical political reform would make the government nore accountable, transparent, and thus more responsive to the environ. mental concerns of its citizens. Environmental reform became a synonym for political and economic change. The most trying event for Soviet citi. zens, especially those of Belarus and Ukraine, was the Chernobyl nuclear explosion. For Gorbachev and his leadership, too, Chernobyl required coming to grips fully with perestroika and glasnost. i er society. ed The Chernobyl Disaster? The Chernobyl Disaster may be the most famous anthropogenic environ- mental event in history, along with the chemical disaster in Bhopal, India, in 1984, and one of the crucial factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet * Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 376. * Sergei Mirnyi contributed to this section on Chernobyl. Of the many fine books and articles on the Chernobyl disaster on which this section is based, see $, A. Amirazian, S. M, Filippova, and M. Iu. Tikhomirova, “Semiotika ‘Chornoby!'s'kogo Sindromu’ ta Rol’ Social’no-psihologichnyh Chunnukiv u Jogo Formuvanni ta Rozvytku,” Ukrain- skii Radiologicheskii zhurnal, vol. 5, no. x (1997), pp. 13-153 R. J. Baker and R. K. Chesser, “The Chornobyl Nuclear Disaster and Subsequent Creation of a Wildlife Pre- serve,” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, vol. 19, n0. 5 (2002), pp. 1231-1232 V. G. Bariakhtar, ed., Chernobyl'skaia Katastrofa (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1995); Gale and T. Hauser, Final Warning (New York: Warner Books, 1998); David Marples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR (London: Macmillan, 1987), and The Social ee of the Chernobyl Disaster (London: Macmillan, 1988); Zhores Medvedev, The Studies in Enorong ant” it Fifth Conference on Environmental Education ee pete Education and Research (Zurich, Switzerland, April pan > Liquidators’ Health as a Psycho-Social Trauma (Budapest: Bog Kiado, 2001), and Mi A : eee “ 5 tion Factors’ Impact on the cy itd A Yastezhembska, “Information and Communica Chernobyl Zo at New Soli’ (Journal of Er ‘one (1986-1990) Workers’ Health,” New age of Environmental Occupational Health Policy) vol. e3, no. 3 (2000) PP- 225°Gorbachev's Reforms, Glasnost, and Econgy ‘conationalism qione Its scale, long-term impact, and transnationa ae uni? leds The accident grew out of a series of huma in ed the station Operators Yet, thea man errors, and Soviet offi ich were not solely the responsibility ne cat had more sinister ee reveal the inadequacy of the entire safety : ee at the sta- cn ndustry a8 Well as the inherent danger faery of the Soviet nus ihc technology. The reactor design was, in fact “ain Operating the Pd the personnel of the industry had been overcome by rently unsafe, them almost inevitably toward disaster. On April 26, 1986, " a tm oory designed and foolishly-carried-out experiment, the fo rl four reactors (a total of ten were planned at this reactor “patk”) at ¢ Chernoby! nuclear power station exploded, releasing large pete ul - radioactive materials into the environment. — Considering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Chernobyl is not the world’s largest nuclear cata strophe. Considering, for example, the accident at the Bhopal, India, Union Carbide chemical plant in 1984 that released poi- sonous gas that killed more than three thousand people and seriously injured more than twenty thousand, Chernobyl has rivals for the world’s greatest technological accident. It led to more extensive radiation contam- ination than from the catastrophe at the Kyshtym nuclear waste dump in the Urals in 1957 connected with a plutonium production effort; this accident was shrouded in Cold War secrecy deep within Soviet borders; and when it was uncovered in the United States, it was kept silent lest ‘American citizens lose faith in a nascent nuclear power program.’ Cher- nobyl’s significance relates to a combination of factors: its impact within and beyond the Soviet Union to Europe; its symbolism as a failure of indigenous technology; its occurrence at the beginning of perestroika; and the failure of Soviet authorities initially to understand and reveal the extent of the crisis. On the morning of April 28, workers at a Swedish nuclear power sta- tion first detected an anomalous increase in airborne radiation. The search for its origin started. When it was determined to be the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities reluctantly admitted an accident had occurred. ee because of their tradition of secrecy and reticencts and ope . : id themselves did not initially fathom the extent of the serie ee Pread wildly throughout the nation and beyond that per a etic Sand people were killed in the initial explosion, although thisty I significance may be into Yorks‘An Environmental HISLOTY | Nusota 260 i actually perished, mostly firemen arriving on the scene to Put individuals actualy Ps flaming graphite that was ejected from the Teac. out the highly radioactive Granted, hundreds of thousands of peop} tor core during the Deen of radiation, both residents domi were exposed t0 eee ae and the “biorobots” ~ soldiers os especially in er xclusion bone to eradicate the disaster, others ordered into the € that Chernobyl’s impact has been exaggerated seme oe misleading stories about birth defects, cancers, and “ath 1 he scientific literature has been much more extensive and measured in its evaluation, although a wide gulf separates various esti. mates of total excess mortality worldwide from the accident. The Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has estimated that, over time, five thousand excess deaths will occur, while others argue the total will be closer to fifty thousand deaths.4 Given the failure of the Soviet authorities to inventory and track those individuals who may have been exposed to radiation after the accident, it seems fair to assume that the IAEA esti- mate is too low because it is based on incomplete information. Several critics have pointed out that it is also in the interests of IAEA personnel to arrive at a lower estimate because they support the further development of nuclear power and argue that it is safe. I Nothing indicated that the small, quiet, provincial Ukrainian town of Chernobyl would become world famous when the nuclear industry ordered the construction of a nuclear power station twelve kilometers to the northwest of the town on the Pripiat River that flows into the Dnieper River and directly to the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, only ninety kilometers away \Construction commenced in 1970; the first reactor gen- erated electricity in 1977, the second unit in 1979, the third in 1981, and the fourth in 1983. All were RBMK (channel graphite) reactors, as opposed to the safer pressurized water reactors that the Soviets and other nuclear nations had built as well, To many people, nuclear power stations were safe, reliable, and an undo bted i . Yenthe Cher’ ubted symbol of technological progres a combination of eee nearly inevitable. Its principal cause was Positive void coefficient th: eer design of the RBMK, al Positive void cofficien that made the reactor unstable at low power: A Brows because of incre ased b a as the void content inside the reactor ), the reactivi cased boiling or loss of coolant (in most reactors, ‘Y Increases. Because the coolant acts as a neutron 2ows ito , ony nies reactor ge id in 198 acs sande vet 08 ror the less coolant, the fewer neutrons are s0tO ore they lead to fisions of nuclear feeb teed by the water ste neutrons ~and vast quantities of hese, Then in tur oo pack Joop that can quickly ~ seemingly instan becomes a pos. fe eee or~ boil all the coolant in the reactor, and a ne iM an y esules- This happened in the Chernobyl disaster ree chain or yer Factors With a POSE Void coeficeme w en oe other country. Operators at the Chernoby! station did aatt understanding ofthese drawbacks, Instead, the ean pad reactor int positive void to save time rather than lose tim wn designed experiment. ime on a tent was not pursued ly at cident happened during the cooling down of reactor four bet scheduled maintenance. Operators intended to permit the turbines to a from their OWN momentum after the shutdown to see how long they al continue tO generate electricity. In the middle of the shutdown, the Kyiv ij called for more electricity. But rather than bring the reactor online again @ timely and costly process that would prevent the experiment, wat gators disabled various safety systems and removed control rods from the reactor core in order to keep electricity production up - but without any safety margin. Already at low power and without safety or control systems in place, the positive void coefficient came into play. In this case, the Chernobyl reactor began an exponential surge in power, the reactor core overheated, the cooling water boiled out of the core (increasing the power further), the core melted down, and a chemical reaction of steam with metal and/or graphite yielded an explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. Two powerful explosions ripped through the reactor, destroying it and lifting its lid - at 2,000 tons — into the air and down on its side, destroying the roof of the standard factory building. One hundred to two hundred megacuries of radioactive substances poured into the environment over the next ten days, falling onto the land and entering the water around the station and also into the atmosphere, where it spread through the northern hemisphere. Fuel rods, burning graphite, and other material scattered on the ground and the roof of reactor unit tee next door, which, against the regulations, had a flammable Pit over, and instantly caught fire. Inside several other areas eee ough the heroic - and mortal - actions of the es ae vis rt led nuclear reactor was open and its graP "i The base of the le fumes and invisible radiation into the environmé aoa ing demolished "actor was forced down by four meters, the explosion having de262 ‘An Envi nmental History of Russia H ing, structure: Highly radioactiv ing : Melted material flooded the lower corridor, Ncleay the support o ind. Toons * fuel and construction the building sities ordered the evacuation of the 45,000 resideneg ioe shildren) of Pripiat, the town just two fie ing 17:0 d their families to serve the seen 0% built for employees ane Station reactor after the explosion. Evacuation of such heavily cont, thirty-six ee as Chernobyl (with 20,000 inhabitants) and the Cont nated se rius followed days later. Sometime in August, the ewan eee Je from one hundred and eighty-eight towne tion of 166,000 peor! ese and villages in Ukraine and Belarus, was complete. In addi 1ON, 60,000 cattle were transported from the zone, some of which made IE INtO sausage solq through the Soviet Union — except for Moscow province.5 The authorities used 8,500 vehicles, including 2,500 buses, in the evacuation — Many of which were buried in a vehicle “graveyard” near Chernobyl. Eventually, they established a thirty-kilometer-radius exclusion zone surrounded by barbed wire and protected by armed guards. Soldiers were sent in to shoot all animals, including pets, lest they escape the zone. To prevent a spontaneous nuclear explosion should the fuel some- how gather in sufficient quantity and shape, and to suppress fire and prevent radiation from escaping into the environment, over the next two weeks military helicopters dropped about 5,000 tons of sand, clay, dolomite, lead (2,400 tons), and boron-containing compounds into the core. Already, thousands of people were working around the clock to mitigate the accident. Eventually, they put out the reactor fire, the reactor began to cool, and other stabilization measures commenced. Inorder to prevent further contamination of the aquifers, Donbass coal es a eae working conditions along bia tor and pumped ——— trilled a horizontal tunnel under ie be drilled watertable-depressng spel ee esse conc dish. them into a system and co ig wells at a larger distance and connec ; bank ofthe Pripiat. For monthe nso earthen embankment on the He stantly; dosimetric coe Onths, trucks washed down the main roads a Points and vehicle decontamination depots ¥° employed to red the io f e- Workers Scraped the Pread of radioactive beyond the exclusion pe (inl, Only ‘ ; it it into steel boxes, and tre t contaminated topsoil in the vicinity, oade’ Brounds. Neith Nsported it to n b ni er Soviet Nor forej, earby, newly estal ¢ IBN re Th ten wt Ta tic acsand, cs, ds into te ye lok the ect! bast : a a handle the intense radiation, so that sol aol on masks — some lucky individuals h mn most of the remedial work in the zo, vee vert A oo olunteets labored in dangerous conditions, To prever ive dust and protect the damaged reactor from the pois determined to build an enormous enclosure this roject involved ten thousand workers employed da dock shifts over a five-month period from August 1986, They poured tons of ‘iving at . ve Inall, they poured 360,000 tons of concrete a — a: etal girders and plates. Although the sarcophagus contains more than 180 fons of the spent nuclear fuel with more than twenty megacuries of radioactive substances, the releases from it have been negligible, Even in these conditions and with this kind of RBMK reactor, the authorities pushed to begin producing electricity as soon as possible from the remaining reactors. They restarted unit one on October 1, 1986; unit two on November 5; and unit three, just next to the destroyed unit and sharing some of its equipment, on December 3, 1987.° To operate the sation, the authorities hurriedly built a new town, Slavutich, only fifty kilometers from the station, and a special train to bring workers to and from the station. They promised higher salaries and coveted apartments toentice workers. The residents of Slavutich tended to be young people in pursuit of higher salaries and apartments. In Slavutich, they met people of the opposite sex, married, and had children - with more birth defects than in the normal population.” diers Wearing |i ittle m ad respiratoy ere TS ~ and lead nes of hi ree years, perhaps as many as nine eee amine: ‘and soldiers t the spread of fe elements, the OF sarcophagus, ily in round-the- i f concrete daily, with trucks arr Radiation Contamination The explosion expelled roughly 4 percent of the reactor’s radioactive hee "nt (100 to 200 megacuries) into the environment, about 40 a of which fell within the thirty-kilometer zone. The nature of the adi "adioactive material depended on its form, size, and the weather i tions (for example, wind and rain) and therefore was deposited un H ter FIOg§ 5) 1 . d bodies of wa soil, build i tion, roads, an' t . lings, machinery, vegetation, ‘ond. But uy 7 us, Russia, and bey’ roy bear Out large areas of Ukraine, Belar hr can enter the body 'S¢ of the nature of this radiation, some of which © ‘ >264 137Cs Contamination and Their Populas eas of on, TABLE I Are Guaranteed Regan Sf Obligatory Resettlement Resettlement cacy Zone of: ; 2 = = Contamination (Ci/km*) >40 os oy = ‘Area (1,000 km*) 35 ze 3 3, Population (10008) 334 ae Source: ariakhtar, ed., Chernobyl’skaia Katastrofa (Kiev: Naukova D ~V. G. Bariakhtar, ed., Chernobyl’'skaia Ke p.273a {Unit aise The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Ni . 275 and United e Hi ob: 95) cident Xt Sirategy for Recovery (Minsk: United Nations, 2002). ; only through contaminated ingestion as opposed to through the skin and all of which decays over time, it has been difficult to gauge its impacy ‘on ecosystems and people. Many officials and scientists have used this complex picture to downplay the impact, whereas others have generated a kind of “radiophobia” through an exaggerated picture.® One of the differences between the Chernobyl disaster and nuclear explosions is the presence of radioactive iodine (13*I) in the former, which is character- ized by the relatively short physical half-life of eight days and a rather long period of biological half-elimination from the body (120 days). Yet, deposited in the thyroid gland, the radioactive iodine represented a sub- stantial hazard, especially for children, and the authorities were inade- quately prepared with iodine pills to mitigate this hazard. This led toa sharp increase in childhood thyroid gland cancer in areas of Belarus. The fallout affected primarily rural areas, mostly covered with forest, wetlands, pastures, and arable lands. The main dose-forming radionu- clides are caesium, strontium, and plutonium.? The degree of the contam- ination usually is expressed in the average radioactivity of 37Cs (caesium) Per square kilometer, and scientists consider the area contaminated if the vant exceeds one curie per square kilometer (see Table 1). The on 1. See oii was taco gure oes area with 5 percens of TS ae ae (5 Percent of the coe ‘i ete in Belarus (23 percent and 1 Y Population), 43,500 square ®' ware Kilometers in Russia (r 9 Percent, respectively), and 595300 - “5 Percent and about x percent, respectively): radish Chernobyl, p. 895 Atlas Chermobyl'skoi 2 I. ia, 1996), pp. 22 United Naga 009!shaia Katastore, ‘ p-22-25, , 1B. 26, A 7) (Minsk: Unies ss MeMCeS Of the Chernabrl Nuclear Accident. ASH pre prGorbachev's Reforms, Glasnost, and Econay ationalismy 26: and Removed from Various Uses Beca 5 Hs Contamination (square km) "%® f Chernobyl ante 2 Hi Belarus Russia Sacto land 55120 24640 = Total forest Poon 2,000 os 7,930 fel rhecommryaree TE SIO agg, S840 percent of the COMNETY 166% 2.24% —o.oory 870 a tsnited Nations, The Human Consequences of . the Yor Recovery (Minsk: United Nations, zooay, "08D! Nuclear Accident. A irate | officals ordered that substantial radiation-affected areas outside the sone be removed from productive use (Table 2). In Belarus, the exen rnd constitutes the largest share of the affected countries’ area sale the best arable land of the country. This continues to puta strain on the economy into the twenty-first century, In the areas affected by the fallout, radioactive contamination contin- ues to pose health risks and economic constraints. However, the direct health risk for the majority of the inhabitants is insignificant and may be important only for a small group of rural dwellers, who depend for their nutrition on their own milk and wild berries, mushrooms, and game."* The indirect impacts - a dramatic decline in economic activi- ties and social life because of restrictions on the use of land and other resources, and migration of skilled and young people away - have been profound. The authorities have been unable or unwilling to invest suf- ficient resources toward the recovery of these affected areas. Part of the problem is that the costs of the Chernobyl disaster are difficult to assess. In addition to mitigation and recovery costs, direct losses (abandoned and destroyed equipment, buildings, and infrastructure), indirect losses (removal of the contaminated land from use, closure of enterprises, and diversion of resources away from productive use), and health and social Costs must be taken into account, and there is also the loss of electrical ‘nergy production to consider. Beyond the perhaps Sr9 billion spent a mitigation, other costs have been huge. Belarus estimates its losses wil 5235 billion for 1986 to 2016, whereas Ukraine estimates i a ie billion for 1986 to 2000. To help pay for some of these ce in 15644 and Belarus introduced a special Cher Ss jee } it Was 18 percent of wages for all nonagric™ Nuclear Accident. —History of Russia sironmental An Enviro! 6 : 26 sina of Chernoli Thoms (DOD Deconi, | Vietitns 2 200 TABLE 3 Ukraine Belary raine Belarus Russig ee cate Radiation Tor By . > . 62 5 i walids and Acut 2 Py Invali aa 1986-1987 489 0 eS Be Liguidaors, 1988-1989 ion oa jquidatorss 350 ‘located Inhabitants mgt 4st ge Feminaed Areas” Enhabit oy ta ee 856 ioe Population 4184 ae Country's y Perce Taman Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear ag fons idem, Source: ea Minsk: United Nations, 2002), 4 Strategy for Recove dered the tax as stultifying to economic development, and it has consider been progressively reduced cially, vietims of the ima oe ee with children included. In Ukraine, the number of Chernobyl “invalids” (invalidy) has increased from only 200 in 1594 to 64,500 in 1997 and 91,000 in 2001 because of both the health of the individuals directly affected and changes in requirements a citizen needs to meet to be formally recognized as an invalid. Ukraine recognize fifty different categories of people, whereas Russia and Belarus recone seventy (see Table 3). The total is nearly 7 million people, some of whom get several forms of compensation, but a number large enough to raise the question again of whether the IAEA estimate of total excess deaths of five thousand is too low. The data also reveal that Belarus, where nearly one-fifth of the people are entitled to some compensation as victims of Chernobyl, bore the brunt of the disaster, Chernobyl compensation takes such forms as welfare payments, free medicine and public transport, access to sanatoria, and pensions. The : , Ompensation program has become a severe burden on the national economies of the NIS, this, the Chernoby ne problem is that level of €xposure to radiati iation-coy Another flaw is that 7 ernobyl accident have been subdivide On top of ine 0: yl welfare system is flawed and likely ; it largely compensates for the estimated nnected risks rather than actual injuty: raurPensation is low, and many payments have limits in ae for example, $00,000 people - more me 1200 recived this herare, titled to access to sanatort bY a bal between roars PeRefit in 2000. In Ukraine, this benefit “ ary 7 le Bue that the 74 and 2000 and then eliminated. Several pe?! system al Iso Sncourages some individuals who até all |Gorbachev's Reforms, Glasnost, and Econational, nalism 267 disabled than they claim ~ or are not disabled i A at all — for psychosomatic or economic reasons. Still the to secure 2 traumas of Psychological damage severely benefits ean expose and relocation are real; the physical and of having € leave one’s home hurriedly is great; and many people h: ot adapted well to new homes in cities, having come from for oe agricultural regions. High levels of mental illness, post-traumatic “ree syndromes and crime affect these people. This may explain why thousands of peoples mostly elderly, have returned to the exclusion zone to live, and the authorities have left them alone.?* ° Uncertainties dating to the dawn of the nuclear era about whether low- dose exposures are sufficient to cause adverse effects or if some threshold Oty a oftotal exposure must be surpassed have also made evaluating the public mu health impact of the Chernobyl disaster difficult. If an individual develops the cancer, Was the cause genetics, smoking, exposure to industrial particu- : ate late, or radiation from Chernobyl? Still, evidence that has accumulated a, ens} since Hiroshima and Nagasaki indicates that low doses are sufficient to oy xpi cause cancers. And, of course, there is no doubt that acute radiation sick- oh fa ness (ARS) is directly related to exposure. For Chernobyl, of 237 ARS temas cases, 29 died within three months. This is a small number given the rine rags number of liquidators involved, for whom the mortality rate seems to Beis be within the normal range. But in any event, ARS is a horrific way to die, Also, the increase in thyroid cancer among children of Belarus will yi ea be scores, perhaps hundreds of times higher because of Chernobyl, with dy yy pethaps eight thousand cases; thyroid cancer is not necessarily lethal but je requires early detection, surgery, and lifelong attention. No matter the : 5 debate over threshold or low dose, Soviet officials ordered an increase in temporary dose limits after the Chernobyl disaster in 1987 and 1988. According to one source, cancers increased by 32 percent in Ukraine in ‘ first five years after the disaster, childhood cancers by 92 percent, and ‘tyroid cancers by 82 percent." Beyond death, cancer, destruction of nature, destruction of ae and amily history; beyond elimination of local cultures and ways © a” Pethaps the most unexpected impact of the Chernobyl eee cal © Process of perestroika. If Gorbachev was to demonstrate 7 i "” Petestroika and his belief in glasnost, then he and his oe a “leading Communist Party officials and administrators throug!‘An Environmental HIStOry of Kussia 268 id have to report openly on the nature of th i © dis, ¢ at eradication of the serious human and ¢ SAStep, Soviet empire, ee : extent, and eee the cost, in full view of oviet and world a eps — the initial reports out of Chernoby| Were ety, valuation of the extent of the greatest techy and lacked an po the authorities were much more fort disaster of human he mitigation took place on the worl, Perhaps they had siered help in the process, which the Sovi and oe a embarrassment, accepted. Given the fact that the Soviet a a a closed political system, eee seems to have Tisen to the level of openness required. And given his attempts to advance reforms in the sphere of environmental protection generally, Gorbachev indicated his faith in perestroika. Finally, Chernobyl contributed to a general ques- tioning of the Soviet development model and the technologies, factories, and agricultural systems at its core. : The nuclear industry in the Russian Federation has been rebuilt and has embarked on an ambitious program to recapture the nuclear enthu- siasm of the 1970s and 1980s. That enthusiasm — as manifested in the Soviet period by the design and construction of Chernobyl-type reactors; the construction of a factory, Atommash, in Volgadonsk to “mass pro- duce” eight pressurized water reactors and associated equipment annu- ally; and the use of nuclear explosives to build canals and dams — has been rediscovered in a program to build up to 100 reactors by 2030 and to manufacture floating nuclear power stations that can be moved around on barges. Granted, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power (Rosatom) fully subscribes to international safety standards. But the nuclear legacy of Soviet power ~ 50,000 tons of spent fuel rods, nuclear waste whose disposition is as yet unclear, such disasters as Kyshtym and Chernobyl, and so on ~ remains to be solved," its mental impact, After a few halting st = . Mological heomin, id's Stage, et leaders Perestroika : Publi and the Formation of New Environmental Institutions ublic discussio, 7 ronmental protean the need to create a single, nationwide env" Power in early 1985 4 Agency intensified after Gorbachev's accession tion of Sovier ee and gained impetus from Chernobyl. A new genera *™8S eager to demonstrate their commitment .0 4 Ond sak he rebirth Of nuclear amet