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  • Realisme Liberalisme Baylis

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    Mireia Escrivà Monzó
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    Puntos de vista de Baylis sobre el realismo y el liberalismo

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    Puntos de vista de Baylis sobre el realismo y el liberalismo

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    20 vistas27 páginas

    Realisme Liberalisme Baylis

    Cargado por

    Mireia Escrivà Monzó
    Puntos de vista de Baylis sobre el realismo y el liberalismo

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd
    Marcar por contenido inapropiado
    de 27
    Chapter.6.... ealism TIM DUNNE ¢ introduction: the timeless wisdom of realism ne realism, or many? © The essential realism onclusion: realism and the globalization of Reader's Guide Realism is the dominant theary of international relations. Why? Because it provides the most pow erful explanation for the state of war that is the condition of life in the intern a tional system, This isthe bold claim made by realists in defence of heir tradition, a claim that will be critically exam: ined in this chapter. After introducing the theory of alism, the second section will ask whether there is BRIAN C. SCHMIDT jorld politics 1 one realism or a variety of realisms. The argumen ant differ nd structural presented below is that despite imp ences, particularly between classical realism, itis possible to identify a shared set of core ns and ideas. The third section 0 assumpti lines these common elements, which we identify as self help, statism, and survival, In the final section, we return to the question of haw far realism is relevant for explaining or understanding the globalization of world polities TIM DUNNE - BRIAN C. SCHMIDT According to the conventional wisdom, realism emerged victorious over idealism in the field’s first Great Debate. Writing in the aftermath of the First ‘World War, the ‘idealists’ (a term that realist writers have retrospectively imposed on the inter-war scholars) focused much of their attention on understanding the ‘cause of war so as to find a remedy for its existence. Yet the realists argued that the inter-war scholars’ approach ivas flawed in a number of respects. For example, they ignored the role of power, overestimated the degree to ‘which nation-states shared a set of common interests, and were overly optimistic that humankind could over- come the scourge of wat. The outbreak of the Second ‘World War in 1939 confirmed, for the realists at least, the inadequacies of the idealists’ approach to studying international polities. ‘A new approach, one based on the timeless insights of realism, replaced the discredited idealist approach. Histories of the academic field of International Relations describe a Great Debate that took place in the late 1930s an carly 1940s between the inter-war ide alists and a new generation of realist writers who all ‘emphasized the ubiquity of power and the competitive nature of politics among nations (Schmidt 2012). The standard account of the Great Debate is that the realists ‘emerged victorious, and from 1939 to the pre theorists and policy-makers have continued to view the world through realist Ienses, Realism taught foreign policy officials to focus on interests rather than on id ‘ology, to seek peace through strength, and to recognize that great powers can coexist even if they have anti thetical values and beliefs. ‘The fact that realism offe something of a ‘manual’ for maximizing the interests of the state in a hostile environment explains in part why it remains the dominant tradition in the study of world politics. The theory of after the Second World War Is often claimed to rest on. -ealism that prevailed an older, classical tradition of thought. Indeed, many contemporary realist writers often claim to be part of an ancient tradition of thought that includes such illus trious figures as Thucydides (¢. 460-406 BC), Niccol® Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78). The insights that these political theorists offered into the way in which state leaders should conduct themselves in the realm of international politics are (eae eink aac) doctrine of raison d'état, often grouped under t bor reason of state. According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke, raison état is the fundamental principle g international conduct, the state's First Law of Motion, ‘It tel the statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State’ (1957: 1). Most impor, tantly, the state, which is identified as the key acto in international politics, must pursue power, and itis the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threat The survival of the sta ening environm fe can never be guaranteed, because the use of force culminating in ‘war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft. As we shall see, the assumption that the state is the principal actor, coupled with the view that the environment that states inhabit isa perilous plac ial cove of realism, There is, however, one issue in particu: helps to define the esse lar that theorists associated with raison d'état, and clas: with: the ethics occupy in interna sical reali role, if any, that morals an¢ tional politics. Realists are sceptical of the idea that universal moral principles exist, and therefore warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self interests in order to .dhere to some indeterminate notion of ‘ethical’ com duct. Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from tra Gitional notions of morality, Machiavelli argued thst these princi! by state leaders. It was imperative that state leaders learned a different kind of morality, which accorded positively harmful if adhered t0 not with traditional Christian virtues but with polit cal necessity and prudence, Proponents of raison détat often speak of a dual moral standard: one moral stat ard for individual citizens living inside the state and # different standard for the state in its external relation with other states, But before we reach the conclusio™ that realism is completely immoral, itis important © add that proponents of raison d'état argue that the state ents a moral force, for it isthe existence creates the possibility for an ethical polite itself repre thestate ceal community to exist domestically. Although the advanced student might be able '° ere detect some subtle differences itis fair to say that th is a significant degree of continuity between classi le viv su th ied ciple ot Motion, ve the impor actor dit ally the 0 a8 1 threat, ating in we shall al actor, sential particu ind clas vith: the niversal e leaders order to cal" con: survival rom tra ued that ed t0 » leaders accorded th polit on d'état ral stan ateanda relations mnclusion ortant (0 the state stence of I politi- classical yy and modern variants. Indeed, the three core se pd selthelp—are present in the work ofa cas- a een ee sachin identifies the group as the fundamen- -jant of political analysis, When Thucydides and wel were welting, the bast unit waste pois or Ma ae bat since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) rea iy snsider the sovereign state as the principal actor national politics. This is often referred to asthe de ists com jninter® in fecentric assumption of realism. Statism i the term io the idea of the state as the legitimate repre- ar are i etateney ‘nea its domestic border. Yet outside the boundaries eh atte realists argue that a condition of anarchy ort. By anarchy, what is most often meant i that Into a universal community and it has developed tothe pont where a violation of rights in one part of the wexid if" everywhere. The idea ofa cosmopolitan right i therefore fantastic and overstrained; it isa necessary complement ti ‘unwritten code of potical and international right, tasfo«™ ing it into a universal right of humanity: (ane 1991: 105-8 " | esis. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama wrote an ed “The End of History, which celebrated i of liberalism over all other ideologies, _ hypo! utile cium nis ety and ally ang) ter defenders af the democratic pence 08 er enol dere relations with authoritarian regimes and “ples (19954: 100). How then, should states he that liberal states were more stable inter: ore peaceful in their international relations more circumspect. As Doyle recognized, lib- one wh a tmp os hha pe liberal zone of peace conduct their relations antian These a taken up inthe final section ofthe chapter wo centuries after Kant first called for a ‘pacific federation, the validity of the idea that democracies are more pacific continues to attract a great deal of scholarly interest. The claim has also found its way into the pub- lie discourse of Western states’ foreign policy, appearing in speeches made by American presidents as diverse as Ronald Reagan, William Jefferson Clinton, and George W, Bush. Less crusading voices in the liberal tradition believe that a legal and institutional framework must be tstablished that includes states with different cultures ang traditions, Such a belief in the power of law to solve the problem of war was advocated by Jeremy Bentham at the end of the eighteenth century. Like many liberal thinkers after him, Bentham believed that federal states such as the German Diet, the American Confederation, and the Swiss League were able to transform their identity from one based on conflicting interests to a more peace~ ful federation, As Bentham famously argued, ‘between the interests of nations Cobden’s belief that free tr: Peaceful world arder is a core idea of nineteenth-cen ere is nowhere any real conflict de would create a more tury liberalism, ‘Trade brings mutual gains to all the Players, irrespective of their size or the nature of their economies, It is perhaps not surprising that it was in Britain that this argument found its most vocal sup Porters. The supposed universal value of free trade brought disproportionate gains to the hegemonic Powet, There was never an admission that free trade among countries at different stages of development would Lea nd subservi to relations of dominance ce. Neither was it questioned by nineteenth-century British liberals enemy of imperialism and not its servant, 2 point Which is de ‘at internationalism ought to be the oped in Case Study 1 Chapter7 Liberalism The idea of a natural harmony of interests in inter- ander national political and economic relations can challenge in the early part of the twentieth century. The hat Britain and Germany had highly interdepen: dent economies before the Great War (1914-18) seemed fact to confirm the fatal law in the association of economic interdependence with peace. From the turn of the cen- tury, the contradictions within European civilization, of progress and exemplarism on the one hand and the har- nessing of industrial power for military purposes on the other, could no longer be contained. Europe stumbled into a horrific war, killing 15 million people. The war not only brought an end to three empires, but also was 1 contributing factor to the Russian Revolution of 1917. The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards ‘a recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is ‘one that must be constructed. In a powerful critique of the idea natural o hat peace and prosperity were part of a latent det, the publicist and author Leonard Woolf argued that peace and prosperity required ‘consciously devised machinery’ (Luard 1992: 465). But perhaps the most famous advocate of an international authority for the management of international relations was Woodrow Wilson, According to this US president, peace could only be secured with the creation of an international organi zation to regulate international anarchy. Security could not be left to secret bilateral diplomatic deals and a blind faith in the balance of power, just as peace had to be enforced in domestic society, the international domain had to have a system of regulation for coping with dis putes and an international force that could be mobilized if non-violent conflict resolution failed. In this sense ‘more than any other strand of liberalism, idealism rests on the domestic analogy (Suganami 1989: 94-113). In his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech, addressed to Congress in January 1918, Wilson argued that ‘a gen: eral association of nations must be formed! to preserve the coming peace—the League of Nations was to be that general association. For the League to be effective it had tohave the military power to deter aggression and, when necessary, to use a preponderance of power to enforce This was the idea behind the ‘collective secu- rity’ system that was central to the League of Nations. Collective security refers to an arrangement where ‘each, state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response ssion’ (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993: 30). It can be contrasted with an alliance system of security, wherea number of states join together, usually asa response to a specific external threat (sometimes known as ‘collective Case Study 1..Imperialism and internationalism in,nineteenth-century Britain 8 | | oeriting bt opposte states of development required th xg, ence of diferent moral codes. Among cvlzed counties only mater to be reoted was the question of interfere sh 2006: 198) Between cvzed and barbarian peoples se both necessary and proper to permit imperial-even despues systems of authonty, it became commonplace for intelectuss to die item tional order into these three domains of ‘vied’ 'semine linea! and "barbaric: As such distinctions entered the langug international law, the effect was to produce a hight sims, fied view of intemational saciety-one where m bership was based on race and religion. The consequences ofthis apie cation of the standard of ciation to nineteenth cent diplomacy was hore! to borrow Mark Mazower’ desu tion (2012: 72). By the century's end, Arica was re-ordered ways that reflected the interests ofthe great colonial powers such naked exploitation was justified by @ mision tote the ‘savages: Small wonder that ane of the countries thet wes Biven to King Leopold of Belgium, the Congo Freestate hay been in such turmoil forthe last two decades. With milions op civllans murdereé, displaced, beaten, and raped, Congo is the epicentre of what has been described as Avica fist word was. From the time ofthe Berlin Conference (1884-5) to today imperialists and interationaits have conspired to colonte the territory, then decolonizeit, and finally condemn it tough neglect and moral inciference The life ofS. Mil lustates the ambivalent chatacter of nine teenth-century liberal thinking in Britain He was born in Londen in 1806, and became the intellectual protege oferemy Bentham, the ualtaian philosopher who coined the term ‘international By mid-century, Mil was a dominant figure in Victorian intelee- tual fe, He was no stranger to international issues and co infact, he was an employee ofthe East india Company for thirty. five years and later became a Member of Paiament ata time when Britain was atthe apogee of ts preponderance. In com | monwith many other Victorian intellectuals, Mill garded eral government asthe highest stage of civlzation, 2 socal reformer domestically, Mill was an imperast inter- Theory applied nationally He contrasted European liberal modes of governance Visit the Online Resource Cente to see real i with barbarism and savagery beyond Europes edge These two Discimareaer eee defencs In the case ofthe League of Nations, Article 16 if a newly self-determined state rejected liberal demo of the League's Charter noted the obligation that, in the cratic norms? event of war, all member states must cease normal rela- ‘The experience ofthe League of M tions was a dists tet. While the moral rhetoric at the creation of the Leagué necessary, commit their armed forces to the disposal of was decidedly idealist, in pr: the League Council should the use of force be to restore the status quo, | The L tions with the offending state, impose sanctions, and, if tice states remained imprisoned by self-interest. There is no better example of this than the USA decision not to join the institution igue’s constitution also called for the self- ithad created. With the Soviet Union outside the system | determination of all nations—another founding char- for ideoloy cal reasons, the League of Nations quickly became a talking shop forthe satisfied powers Hier’ relations. Going back to the mid-nineteenth century, decision in March 1936 to seoccupy the Rhineland self-determination movements in Greece, Hungary, — designated demilitarized zone according tothe terms and Italy received support among liberal powers and the Treaty of Versailles, ffectively pulled the plug on th Public opinion, Yet the default support for selfdeter- Leagu' life-support system (it had alread mination masked a host of practical aceite of liberal east thinking om nteseional been put oo nd moral prob- the ‘critical list following the Manchurian crisis in 193! lems that were laid bare ater Woodrow Wilson issued and the Ethiopian crisis in 1935) his proclamation. What would happen to newly created Accord minorities who felt no allegiance to the sel- determin g to the history of Int tional Relation’ the collapse of the League of Nations dealt a fatal blo ing state? Could a democratic process adequately deal with questions of identity—who was to decide what _ alism after 1945 was more pragmatic; how could anyor® | constituency was to participate in ballot? And what _ living inthe shadow of the Holocaust be optimistic? Ye to idealism. There is no doubt that the language of ibe red the ex, Unt, the imeterence pes itn, en despotic. vide ite, i Semi the language Diehl seat nDershP ws his app eth-centry ers desi. e-ordered in nial powers ies that was State, has h milion of Congo fe at ist world -5) 0 today, to colonize mn itrough peral demo was a disas Fhe League ¢ remained ter example + institution the system ons quickly ers, Hitlers hineland, 4 he terms of plug on the Deen put o isis in 1931 | Relations, 1 fatal blow ige of liber uld anyone imistic? Yet sa core ideas of iberalsm semained. Bren inthe ii there wa recognition ofthe need to replace cat ine wth another international institution with a ty for international peace and security. Only respon the case ofthe United Nations, there was an this warter of the need rnsensus between the great powers in order for mong the framers of its Cl for #07 a pexmanet members ofthe Secu Couel he thee elo This revision constituted an important Poveation othe dascal mode of oletive security is 1996315). With the ideolgia pola ofthe reppa the UN procedures for collective security we

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