Property

USUFRUCT
1.In the matter of the testate estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach, deceased. MARY
McDONALD BACHRACH,petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SOPHIE SEIFERT and ELISA ELIANOFF,
DOCTRINE: The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000
shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits,
and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the
payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares, just as
the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or
part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman? That is the question
raised in the appeal.
FACTS:The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary
McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and
willed the remainder of his estate as follows:
Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my beloved wife
Mary McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of
all my estate after payment of the legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for
above; and she may enjoy said usufruct and use or spend such fruits as she may
in any manner wish.
The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of
the all his estate "shall be divided share and share alike by and between my legal heirs, to
the exclusion of my brothers."
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge
Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock
dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as
usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples
Bank and Trust Company as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to her the said
54,000 share of stock dividend by endorsing and delivering to her the corresponding
certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is
fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie
Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground
that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and
therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. And they have
appealed from the order granting the petition and overruling their objection.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES
HELD:, so called Pennsylvania rule, which prevails in various other jurisdictions in the
United States, supports appellee's contention. This rule declares that all earnings of the
corporation made prior to the death of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the
estate, and that all earnings, when declared as dividends in whatever form, made during
the lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant.
We think the Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the
Massachusetts rule. Under section 16 of our Corporation Law, no corporation may make
or declare any dividend except from the surplus profits arising from its business. Any
dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits. Article 471 of the
Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural,
industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. And articles 474 and 475 provide as
follows:
ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the
usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last.
ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or
periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or
securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be considered as the
proceeds or fruits such right.
When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an
industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed at
fixed periods, such profits shall have the same consideration.lawphil.net
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in
accordance with the rules prescribed by the next preceding article.
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of
stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the
delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of
said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares, just as the
offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother.
2MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the
title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states
"[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use
thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" What
may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the
preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins
who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of
cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the
maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes
an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the
succeeding Paragraph #4 In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the
atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the
petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
FACTS: In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila.,
she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach Thereafter, she worked at the Mental
Health Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years.
During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her two-month
summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in
Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of
her younger sister, Rosario.
Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the
outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were
victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened
about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlenes older sister,
with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could
transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-123125.
Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from
Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any
of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City.
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the
respondents on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their
relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her
suggestions and attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and
sanitation within their compound.
xxThen, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful
detainer suit against the respondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered
owner of the land on which the respondents built their house; that through her counsel,
she sent the respondent spouses a letter demanding them to vacate the premises and to pay
rentals therefor, which the respondents refused to heed.
ISSUE:II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT
INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
HELD The Court rules for the petitioner.
The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between the parties
herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the
property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2)
among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioners kin. The
Court, however, cannot go along with the CAs holding that the action for unlawful
detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy anothers
property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily,
including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus
disponendi or the power to alienate the same. 11
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her
intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of
her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right
"to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like."
Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties" for the petitioners "nearest kins who have less in life in
greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The
established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but
also granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof.
We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CAs ruling that usufruct was constituted between
petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract
between the parties.
However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of the next
issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or
terminated. If the question is resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents right to
possession, proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case,
petitioners action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer case could proceed and should
prosper.
We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term or period of the
usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary
to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or
instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure,
the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)

The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating,
and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone
of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof.
Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis
supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned
from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody
of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another."
That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly
deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my
kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to
look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the
atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship
between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the
petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts
and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or
extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title
creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on
July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents own evidence
before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to
almost an irretrievable level." 13 There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to
file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, and this instant complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she
could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes
family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced
age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been
terminated.
By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to

reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote
Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does
not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He
may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage
to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the
premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity
were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner
out of his property. 15 The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the
improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioners
property.
Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent spouses to use
and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time. They opted, however,
to repay a noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they really
cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their right of usufruct. The disposition
herein arrived is not only legal and called for by the law and facts of the case. It is also
right.
3. OSEFA FABIE, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of Manila, NGO BOO SOO
and JUAN GREY, respondents.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the
property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents claim
for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the
effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and
principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras
wrote on the matter:
If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case
like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3
Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil. 449). 14 (Emphasis ours.)
4. JUANA PICHAY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EULALIO QUEROL, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS: From the admissions made in the pleadings, and from the facts agreed upon in
the court below, it appears that the plaintiff, Juan Pichay, in April, 1905, conveyed to the
defendants an undivided one-third interest in twenty- five parcels of land situated in the
Province of Ilocos Sur, as payment of a debt of P1,500 which she owed them. The
contract by which this conveyance was made contained the following clause:
Third. The one-third part of these lands belong to me, it being my share in the inheritance
left by my deceased parents; but I have requested may said creditors to allow me to enjoy
the usufruct of the same until my death, notwithstanding the fact that I have conveyed the
said lands to them in payment of my debt, and I bind myself not to sell, mortgage, or leave
the said lands as inheritance to any person.
The defendants and appellants claim that this clause above quoted gave plaintiff no right
of usufruct in the land, saying that it appears that she only asked for this right and it does
not appear that the defendants gave it to her. This contention can not be sustained. The
only reason for inserting this clause in the contract was for the purpose of securing to the
plaintiff the right which is therein set out. The form of the words used is not sufficient to
defeat this purpose.
On the 10th of August, 1905, the owners of the twenty- five parcels of land made a
partition thereof among themselves, in which the plaintiff took no part, and in this
partition certain specific tracts of land were assigned to the defendants as the third to
which they were entitled by reason of the conveyance from the plaintiff to them. They
have been in possession of the tracts so assigned to them in partition since the date
thereof, and are now in such possession, and have refused to recognized in the plaintiff
any right of usufruct therein.lawphil.net
In February, 1907, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, asking that it be
declared that she had no right if usufruct in a third a twenty-five parcels of land; and that
she had the right to the administrations of land, and that the appellees pay her the rents
which they had received during the time of her dispossession.
The third proposition can not be supported. Article 490 of the Civil Code is as follows:
ART. 490. The usufructuary of part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights
corresponding to the owner thereof with regard to the administration and collection of
fruits or interests. Should the community cease by reason of the division of the thing
possessed in common, the usufruct of the part awarded to the owner of co owner shall
appertain to the usufructuary.
As to the fourth proposition, the agreed statement of facts shows that, while the
defendants are in possession of the tracts which had been assigned to them, they received
the crops for only two years; that the crop for the year 1906 amounted to 14 uyones and
13 manojos, of the value of P4 for each uyon, and that the crop of 1907 amounted to
15uyones and 4 manojos, of the value of P6.25 for each uyon. These are the only amounts
which the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
As to the fifth proposition, while it appears that the plaintiff excepted to the judgment, and
stated that she desired to present a bill of exceptions, yet she is in fact did not present any.
The error, therefore, assigned by her with reference to this fifth proposition can not be
considered.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded, with directions to
enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that she is entitled to the right of
usufruct in the lands assigned to the defendants by the partition of August 10, 1905, and to
enter a judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant without cost of to
either party.
JESUS M. GABOYA, as Administrator of the Estate of DON MARIANO
CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.ANTONIO MA. CUI, et al
The court rendered the following judgment:

In view of the allegations and evidence adduced by the parties, the court concludes: (1)
That all the lands described in the complaint be delivered to Juana Pichay for
administration; (2) that Juana Pichay has a right of usufruct in a third party of the said
lands until her death; (3) that the partition of the said lands, made by the coowners of
Juana Pichay can not affect the latter; (4) Eulalio Querol is hereby directed to deliver to
Juana Pichay two crops from the third part of the lands in question, or the equivalent
thereof, taking as a basis the present crop that is, the crop to be harvested within a short
time and (5) Juana Pichay is sentence to indemnify Eulalio Querol in the sum of P300
on account of the past suit, without costs.
The first proposition contained in this judgment finds no support in the record, and there
is nothing therein to show that the plaintiff had any acquired right to the administration of
the lands described in the complaint.
The second proposition finds its support in the record if it is limited to the lands which
were assigned to the defendants in partition.
DOCTRINE:. The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He
only owned the rent for the portion of land occupied by the building; thus, the estate could
only claim the rent on that piece of land and not on the entire parcel of land. The children
are entitled to the rents of the building. (A usufruct on the land may be separate from the
building.
FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his children became
co-owners of the property. Don Mariano executed a deed authorizing the children to apply
for a loan w/ mortgage with a stipulation reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The
children then constructed a building on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof.
Much later, when Don Mariano died, his estate was claiming the fruits of the building
ISSUE: whether the usufruct reserved by the vendor in the deed of sale, over the lots in
question that were at the time vacant and unoccupied, gave the usufructuary the right to
receive the rentals of the commercial building constructed by the vendees with funds
borrowed from the Rehabilitation and Finance Corporation, the loan being secured by a
mortgage over the lots sold. Similarly, if the usufruct extended to the building, whether
the failure of the vendees to pay over its rentals to the usufructuary entitled the latter to
rescind, or more properly, resolve the contract of sale. In the third place, should the two
preceding issues be resolved affirmatively, whether the action for rescission due to breach
of the contract could still be enforced and was not yet barred.
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity. (Emphasis supplied)
HELD: As therein pointed out, the terms of the 1946 deed of sale of the vacant lots in
question made by the late Don Mariano Cui in favor of his three children, Rosario,
Mercedes and Antonio Cui, in consideration of the sum of P64,000.00 and the reserved
usufruct of the said lot in favor of the vendor, as amplified by the deed of 7 January 1947,
authorizing Mercedes, and Antonio Cui to borrow money, with the security of a mortgage
over the entirety of the lots, in order to enable them to construct a house or building
thereon
Nowhere in these articles on industrial accession is there any mention of the case of
landowner building on his own land with materials owned by himself (which is the case of
appellees Mercedes and Antonio Cui). The reason for the omission is readily apparent:
recourse to the rules of accession are totally unnecessary and inappropriate where the
ownership of land and of the, materials used to build thereon are concentrated on one and
the same person. Even if the law did not provide for accession the land-owner would
necessarily own the building, because he has paid for the materials and labor used in
constructing it. We deem it unnecessary to belabor this obvious point. .
provided, however, that the rents of said land shall not be impaired and will always
received by me.
clearly prove that the reserved usufruct in favor of the vendor, Mariano Cui, was limited
to the rentals of the land alone. Had it been designed to include also the rents of the
buildings intended to be raised on the land, an express provision would have been
included to the effect, since in both documents (heretofore quoted) the possibility of such
construction was clearly envisaged and mentioned.
Appellants, however, argue that the terms of the deed constituting the usufruct are not
determinative of the extent of the right conferred; and that by law, the enjoyment of the
rents of the building subsequently erected passed to the usufructuary, by virtue of Article
571 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Article 479 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889)
prescribing that:
Art. 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to enjoy any increase which the thing in
usufruct may acquire through accession, the servitudes established in its favor, and, in
general, all the benefits inherent therein,inasmuch as (in the appellants' view) the building
constructed by appellees was an accession to the land.
This argument is not convincing. Under the articles of the Civil Code on industrial
accession by modification on the principal land (Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code)
such accession is limited either to buildings erected on the land of another, or buildings
constructed by the owner of the land with materials owned by someone else.
Thus, Article 445, establishing the basic rule of industrial accession, prescribes that
Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land subject to the provisions of the
following articles.
while Article 449 states:
Articles 447 and 445, in turn, treat of accession produced by the landowner's building,
planting and sowing "with the materials of another" and when "the materials, plants or
seeds belong to a third person other than the landowner or the builder, planter or sower.
There is nothing in the authorities (Manresa, Venezian, Santamaria, and Borrell cited by
appellants that specifically deals with constructions made by a party on his own land with
his own materials, and at his own expense. The authorities cited merely indicate the
application in general of the rules of accession. But as already stated above, the Civil
Code itself limits the cases of industrial accession to those involving land and materials
belonging to different owners. Anyway, commentators' opinions are not binding where
not in harmony with the law itself.
Scaevola's opinion is entirely in harmony with Article 595 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, prescribing that
The owner may construct any works and make any improvements of which the
immovable usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if it be rural, provided
that such acts do not cause a diminuition in the value of the usufruct or prejudice the right
of the usufructuary.
Note that if the income from constructions made by the owner during the existence of the
usufruct should be held to accrue automatically to the usufructuary under Article 571,
such improvements could not diminish the value of the usufruct nor prejudice the right of
the usufructuary; and the qualifications by Article 595 on the owner's right to build would
be redundant. The limitations set by Article 595 to the construction rights of the naked
owner of the land are evidently premised upon the fact that such constructions would
necessarily reduce the area of the land under usufruct, for which the latter should be
indemnified. This is precisely what the court a quo has done in sentencing the appellee
owners of the building to pay to the usufructuary a monthly rent of P1,758.00 for the area
occupied by their building, after mature consideration of the rental values of lands in the
neighborhood.
Additional considerations against the thesis sustained by appellants are (1) that the
amount invested in the building represents additional capital of the landowners not
foresee" when the usufruct was created; and (2) that no land-owner would be willing to
build upon vacant lots under usufruct if the gain therefrom were to go to the usufructuary
while the depreciation of the value of the building (as distinguished from the necessary
repairs) and the amortization of its cost would burden exclusively the owner of the land.
The unproductive situation of barren lots would thus be prolonged for an indefinite time,
to the detriment of society. In other words, the rule that appellants advocate would
contradict the general interest and be against public policy.
Appellants urge, in support of their stand, that the loan .for the construction of the
building was obtained upon the security of a mortgage not only upon the share of
appellees but also upon the undivided interest of Don Mariano Cui in the lots in question.
That factor is irrelevant to the ownership of the building, because the money used for the
building was loaned exclusively to the appellees, and they were the ones primarily
responsible for its repayment. Since the proceeds of the loan was exclusively their
property, 1 the building constructed with the funds loaned is likewise their own. A
mortgagor does not become directly liable for the payment of the loan secured by the
mortgage, in the absence of stipulation to that effect; and his subsidiary role as guarantor
does not entitle him to the ownership of the money borrowed, for which the mortgage is
mere security.
We agree with the trial court that there was no adequate proof that the vendor, Don
Mariano Cui, ever renounced his usufruct. The alleged waiver was purely verbal, and is
supported solely by the testimony of Antonio Cui, one of the alleged beneficiaries thereof.
As a gratuitous renunciation of a real right over immovable property that as created by
public document, the least to be expected in the regular course of business is that the
waiver should also appear in writing. Moreover, as pointed out in the appealed decision
(Record on Appeal, page 184, et seq.), in previous pleadings sworn to by Antonio Cui
himself, in Civil Case No. 599 and Special Proceeding 481-R of the Cebu Court of First
Instance (Exhibits "I", "J", and "20-A"), he and his sister Mercedes had contended that
Don Mariano Cui had been receiving from them P400.00 per month as the value of his
usufruct, and never claimed that the real right had been renounced or
waived.lwph1.t The testimony of Antonio Cui on the alleged waiver, given after the
usufructuary had been declared incompetent and could no longer contradict him, is
obviously of negligible probative value.
Turning now to the second issue tendered by herein appellants, that the non-compliance
with the provisions concerning the usufruct constituted sufficient ground for the rescission
(or resolution) of the sale under the tacit resolutory condition established by Article 1191
of the Civil Code. What has been stated previously in discussing the import of Don
Mariano's usufruct shows that the alleged breach of contract by the appellees Antonio and
Mercedes Cui could only consist in their failure to pay to the usufructuary the rental value
of the area occupied by the building constructed by them. But as the rental value in
question had not been ascertained or fixed either by the parties or the court, prior to the
decision of 31 October 1961, now under appeal, nor had Don Mariano Cui, or anyone else
in his behalf, made any previous demand for its payment, the default, if any, can not be
exclusively blamed upon the defendants-appellees. Hence, the breach is not it "so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement" 2 as to justify the radical remedy of rescission. This Court, in Banahaw, Inc.
vs. Dejarme55 Phil. 338, ruled that
...Under the third paragraph of article 1124 3 of the Civil Code, the court is given a
discretionary power to allow a period within which a person in default may be permitted
to perform the stipulation upon which the claim for resolution of the contract is based.
The right to resolve or rescind a contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations is,
therefore, not absolute.
We have stated "the default, if any," for the reason that without previous ascertainment of
the exact amount that the, defendants-appellees were obligated to turn over to the
usufructuary by way of reasonable rental value of the land occupied by their building, said
parties can not be considered as having been in default (mora) for failure to turn over such
monies to the usufructuary. "Ab illiquido non fit mora": this principle has been repeatedly
declared by the jurisprudence of Spanish Supreme Court (v. Manresa, Commentaries to
the Spanish Civil Code [5th Ed.], Vol. 8, No. 1, page 134) that is of high persuasive value
in the absence of local adjudications on the point .
In the absence of default on the part of the defendants-vendees, Article 1592 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines that is invoked by appellants in, support of their all right to
rescind the sale, is not applicable: for said article (which is a mere variant of the general
principle embodied in Article 1191, of the same Code) presupposes default of the
purchasers in the fulfilment of their obligations. As already noted, no such default or
breach could occur before liquidation of the usufructuary's credit; and the time for paying
such unliquidated claim can not be said to have accrued until the decisions under appeal
was rendered, fixing the rental value of the land occupied by the building.
The filing of the initial complaint by Victoriano Reynes, then guardian of the late Don
Mariano in 1951, seeking to recover P126,344.91 plus interest, did not place appellees in
default, for that complaint proceeded on the theory that the usufructuary was entitled to all
the rentals of the building constructed by the appellees on the lot under usufruct; and as
We have ruled, that theory was not legally tenable. And the 1957 complaint in
intervention, seeking rescission of the sale as alternative remedy, was only interposed
after the death of the usufructuary in 1952, and the consequent extinction of the usufruct,
conformably to Article 603, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code.
It is also urged by the appellants that the usufruct was a condition precedent to the
conveyance of ownership over the land in question to herein appellees, and their failure to
comply with their obligations under the usufruct prevented the vesting of title to the
property in said appellees. We need not consider this argument, since We have found that
the usufruct over the land did not entitle the usufructuary to either the gross or the net
income of the building erected by the vendees, but only to the rental value of the portion
of the land occupied by the structure (in so far as the usufructuary was prevented from
utilizing said portion), and that rental value was not liquidated when the complaints were
filed in the court below, hence, there was no default in its payment. Actually, this theory
of appellants fails to take into account that Don Mariano could not retain ownership of the
land and, at the same time, be the usufructuary thereof. His intention of the usufructuary
rights in itself imports that he was no longer its owner. For usufruct is essentially jus in re
aliena; and to be a usufructuary of one's own property is in law a contradiction in terms,
and a conceptual absurdity.
The decision (Exhibit "30") as well as the resolution of this Court upon the motion to
reconsider filed in the previous case (100 Phil 914) refusing to adjudicate the usufructuary
rights of Don Mariano in view of the pendency of the present litigation (Exhibit "22")
amply support the trial court's overruling of the defense of res judicata.
Summing up, We find and hold:
(1) That the usufructuary rights of the late Don Mariano Cui, reserved in the deed of sale
(Exhibit "A" herein), was over the land alone and did not entitle him to the rents of the
building later constructed thereon by defendants Mercedes and Antonio Cui at their own
expense.
(2) That said usufructuary was entitled only to the reasonable rental value of the land
occupied by the building aforementioned.
(3) That such rental value not having been liquidated until the judgment under appeal was
rendered, Antonio and Mercedes Cui were not in default prior thereto, and the deed of sale
was therefore, not subject to rescission.
(4) That as found by the court below, the reasonable rental value of the land occupied by
the defendants' building totalled P100,088.80 up to the time the usufructuary died and the
usufruct terminated.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK
FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos
set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA[4] as reserved
property for the site of the National Government Center (NGC). On 19 September 1977,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a seven-hectare portion
from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights
over this segregated portion, as follows:
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years, MSBFs
occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights. By 1987,
MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied by MSBF was
bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the
east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other
stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square meters
of the 16-hectare area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127
(MO 127) which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less,
remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National
Government Center. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to
sell it to the public.
On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten
days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the tenday period will be demolished by NHA.
BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On 26
May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
The Issues
DOCTRINE: ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town,

corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and
before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or
association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis
added)
WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE

SEVEN-HECTARE AREA THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1670 GRANTED TO MSBF
BY WAY OF USUFRUCT.
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to
50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a
corporation or associations lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would
then be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a
corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19
September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of
MSBF has 22 years left.
We remand this petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally the metes
and bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBFs usufructuary rights.
Facts
The Ruling of the Court
The entire area bounded by Agham Road to the east, EDSA to the west, Quezon Avenue
to the south and by a creek to the north measures approximately 16 hectares.
Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF a usufruct over only a seven-hectare area. The
BGCs leased portion is located along EDSA.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the
parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct.[9] A usufructuary
may lease the object held in usufruct.[10] Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590
square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held in
usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the
usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.[11] However, the NHA has the right to evict
BGC if BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBFs
usufructuary rights.
xxxxOn the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the
seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. A usufruct is not simply
about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners interests.
One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third
person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been
caused through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. [22]This
controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use
given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its benefactors property gave birth to the confusion
that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to remind the
NHA to respect MSBFs choice of the location of its seven-hectare area. MSBF, for its
part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. MSBFs rights begin and end
within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that
MSBF has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The direct
corollary of enforcing MSBFs rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation of any
of MSBFs acts beyond it.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable considering the
varied structures erected within and surrounding the area. Both parties advance different
reasons why their own surveys should be preferred. At this point, the determination of the
seven-hectare portion cannot be made to rely on a choice between the NHAs and
MSBFs survey. There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and
MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid
future controversies. This new survey should consider existing structures of MSBF. It
should as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare
portion without sacrificing contiguity.
A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or
association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the
expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is

dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to
50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a
corporation or associations lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would
then be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a
corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19
September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of
MSBF has 22 years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the
National Government Center. However, MO 127 does not affect MSBFs seven-hectare
area since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area was already
exclude[d] from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which
established the National Government Center Site.
Vda .de albar vs. carandang
FACTS: Doa Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a
building and improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly
probated she devised the naked ownership of the whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de
Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for life.
During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of
Manila, the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other
improvements that were not destroyed by the fire.One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to
lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time agreeing to construct on the
lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary sign the
agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to
cede the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to
usufruct while on the other hand the naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was
extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right of the usufructory being limited
to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in order that the agreement of
lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the naked
owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the
usufructuary the balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was likewise
stipulated in the agreement that the title to the building to be constructed would accrue to
the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the transfer certificate
of title issued in the name of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct of
Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims
after the termination of the contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally
correct.By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United
States War Damage Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage
caused to the property, paid to and received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the
usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to
1952.
ISSUE:Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the
usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the
reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?
HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that
when the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin
and Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the
land on which it is erected for indeed the building cannot exist without the land. And as
this Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable part of the rented premises cannot
be considered as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language,
the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well.
(Diccionario Ingles-Espaol, por Martines Amador) Since only the building was
destroyed and the usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on the land as well,
then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the destruction of the building for under
the law usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the
encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is
addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and
purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property. This has been clarified in the case
of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536, which was litigated between the same parties
and wherein the scope of the same provision of the will has been the subject of
interpretation.
The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the
real estate taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years
previous to the present litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by
petitioners not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement
approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the
same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which
was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to
pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the
necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with
said agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.
EASEMENT
1.BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI),
vs.EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, et al
DOCTRINE: the conclusion is inevitable that the road in dispute is a discontinuous
easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are
either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not
according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been improved and maintained
over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply make the
same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The facts of the case:Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation
(BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year,
BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road") measuring approximately 7 meters
wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and
transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become
indispensable to its sugar milling operations.4
On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc.
acquired the assets of BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a
Complaint5 against respondents Edmundo Obias, , alleging that on March 27, 1993 and
April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos,
woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioners and the other sugar planters
vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and
prejudice to petitioner.6
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement provides
that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange
for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through
prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way
over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when
it bought BISUDECOs assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered
to restrain from barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free passage. 7
In an Order8 dated April 19, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Pili (RTC), Camarines Sur,
5th Judicial Region, Branch 31, ordered respondents, their agents and representatives to
cease and desist from placing barricades on the disputed road.9
HELD:
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently
establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding
the construction of the disputed road.30 Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement
of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. 31 The CA
likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory
easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents. The CA,
however, declared that ownership over the disputed road should remain with respondents,
despite the grant of a compulsory easement.
:On the Existence of an Agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents
Anent the first error raised, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that
BISUDECO and respondents forged an agreement for the construction of the road in
dispute. Petitioner thus asserts its entitlement to an easement of right of way over the
properties of respondents by virtue of said agreement.
An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by the CA in the following manner,
to wit:
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will of the parties (a
voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way the privilege of persons or a particular
class of persons to pass over anothers land, usually through one particular path or
linen is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals
and depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of
way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.40
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent
or not, may be acquiredonly by virtue of a title.
Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an
easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by
an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the alleged agreement, petitioner
posits that they presented circumstantial evidence which, if taken collectively, would
prove its existence.41 Specifically, petitioner cites the following circumstances, to wit:
a. The agreement was of public knowledge.42 Allegedly BISUDECO and
respondents entered into an agreement for the construction of the road provided
that the latter, their children or relatives were employed with BISUDECO.
b. The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and the public in general. 43
c. There was no protest or complaint from respondents for almost a period of
two decades.44
d. The portions of the land formerly belonging to respondents affected by the
road were already segregated and surveyed from the main lots.45
e. The road in dispute is already a barangay road.
Crucial to the petitioners cause was its burden of proving the existence of the alleged
agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the road. In this
regard, the RTC found that petitioner failed to prove its existence, to wit:
10
These aforequoted testimonies of the plaintiffs witnesses failed to satisfactorily establish

the plaintiffs contention that there was such an agreement. Likewise, the list of the
Employees of Defendants relatives, son/daughter employed by the BISUDECO (Exhibit
H) does not in any manner prove the alleged agreement.47
For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the said
agreement, to wit:
Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence
of an agreement between BISUDECO and the defendants-appellants regarding the
construction and the use of the disputed road. Based on the foregoing, the inability of
petitioner to prove the existence of an agreement militates its allegations in herein
petition..
On Acquisition by Prescription
Petitioner would have this Court re-examine Costabella Corporation v. Court of
Appeals50 (Costabella) where the Court held that, "It is already well-established that a
right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."51 Petitioner contends that some recognized authorities52 share its view that
an easement of right of way may be acquired by prescription.
Be that as it may, this Court finds no reason to re-examine Costabella. This Court is
guided by Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals53 (Bogo-Medellin),
involving the construction of a railroad track to a sugar mill. In Bogo-Medellin, this Court
discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of right of way and the rule that the
same cannot be acquired by prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the
railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in nature. The
more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement
granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year
prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of right of way
over the subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of
persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes
continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent
signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man,
like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends
on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a

person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles
or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the
right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's
property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert the
nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather
the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement
into apparent ornon-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window
(which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of
not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.
In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the
right of way a continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by
prescription. In Louisiana, it has also been held that a right of passage over another's land
cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is discontinuous and can be
established only by title.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes
the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under
Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the
use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or
contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the
easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of
way can only be acquired by title and not by prescription.54
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road in
dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To
reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they
are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been improved and
maintained over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but simply
make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a
title.
On Laches and Estoppel
Petitioner argues that estoppel and laches bar respondents from exercising ownership
rights over the properties traversed by the road in dispute. In support of said argument,
petitioner posits that BISUDECO had been peacefully and continuously using the road
without any complaint or opposition on the part of the respondents for almost twenty
years. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that they merely tolerated the use of their
land as BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation and considering
that the disputed road was constructed during the time of Martial Law.
11
As previously explained in our Decision, the applicable law is Article 622 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, opines that this provision seeks
to prevent the imposition of a burden on a tenement based purely on the generosity,
tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the owners thereof.
We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that no easement of right of way was
acquired; based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to satisfactorily
prove the existence of an agreement evidencing any right or title to use the disputed road.
We additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellants position that it had acquired the
easement of right of way through acquisitive prescription, as settled jurisprudence states
that an easement of right of way cannot be acquired by prescription.
We hold the same view on the issue of acquisition of an easement of right of way by
laches. To our mind, settled jurisprudence on the application of the principle of estoppel
by laches militates against the acquisition of an easement of right of way by
laches.xxxThis Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that
discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against petitioners
claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by title. More
importantly, whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a
factual determination by the trial court.58 Hence, the same being a question of fact, it
cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. On the other hand, as to the issue of
estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioner did not
present any evidence that would show an admission, representation or conduct by
respondents that will give rise to estoppel.59
Petitioner likens the proceedings at bar to an expropriation proceeding where just
compensation must be based on the value of the land at the time of taking. 68 Petitioner
thus maintains that the compensation due to respondents should have been computed in
1974 when the road was constructed.69
This Court does not agree. Article 649 of the New Civil Code states:
The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for
all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall
consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage cause to the
servient estate.
In addition, the CA ruled:
We stress that the amount of proper indemnity due to the landowners does not only relate
to the market value of their property but comprehends as well the corresponding damage
caused to the servient estate. It is undisputed that the BISUDECO began the construction
and used of the disputed road in 1974. While the maintenance was borne by BISUDECO
and now by BAPCI who principally used the disputed road for their sugar milling
operations, the defendants-appellants have been deprived of the use do their ricefields
because of the roads construction since 1974. Thus, it is but proper to compensate them
for this deprivation, over and above the prevailing market value of the affected property.
To our mind, in light of the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the affected
ricelands and the construction of the disputed road, particularly the absence of a definitive
agreement to show that the defendants-appellants consented to the roads construction, we
find the P70.00 per square meter indemnity awarded by the lower court in accordance
with the Real Property Field Assessment Sheet No. 009-756, to be fair and reasonable
under the circumstances.71
2. DOMINGO LAO and ALBINA DE LOS SANTOS, applicants-appellants,
vs.THE HEIRS OF LORENZA ALBURO, objectors-appellees.
FACTS: On May 8, 1914, counsel for the said husband and wife filed a written
application in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of four parcels of land,
together with the buildings thereon, of which they claimed to be the absolute owners. The
street numbers of the two latter properties appear in the said judgment, and their
boundaries are given in both the said plan No. 1 and in their respective technical
descriptions.
The application recites that the first of the four above-mentioned properties was appraised
in the last assessment, the land at P4,664 and the buildings at P4,000; the second parcel,
the land at P5,492 and the buildings at P3,600; the third parcel, the land at P6,329 and the
buildings at P4,000; and the fourth parcel, the land at P8,529 and the buildings at P22,500;
and that the said properties are all unencumbered and no one has any right or share therein
except the applicants, who acquired them by purchase, the first parcel from Felix
Zalvidea, by a public instrument of June 11, 1912; the second parcel, from Clara Lichauco
and her husband Catalino Arevalo, by a public instrument of September 12, 1912; the
third parcel, from Antonio Abraham Brimo, by a public instrument of March 28, 1911;
and the fourth parcel, from Marcela Lao, by a public instrument of April 17, 1914. The
application recited the names of the tenants who occupy the first three properties and
states that the applicants occupy the fourth. The names and addresses of the owners or
proprietors of the adjoining properties are also given.
After due service of notice, counsel for the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Lorenza Alburo filed in court a written objection, alleging that in the part of the
application relative to the second parcel of the plan No. 1, a stone wall shown in that plan
to be northeast of the said parcel had been improperly included; that this wall had
belonged to the said Lorenza Alburo, for it had existed since March 8, 1881; that the
principal timbers of the building that had belonged to the said deceased had rested on it
for more than thirty-five years, and the latter's successors had been and were now in the
quiet, peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the said wall.
12
.In the judgment appealed from it is held that the applicants, Domingo Lao and Albina de
los Santos, conclusively and satisfactorily proved that they were, and had been for about
forty years, the lawful owners and possessors of the four properties sought to be
registered; wherefore the court decreed the registration thereof in their names, but ordered
that record be made in the decree that the wall marked on the plan of the parcel No. 2 as a
stone wall was a party wall.
Hence the question to be decided relates solely to the matter of the said wall of the
property designated as parcel No. 2 the subject matter of the objection filed by the
administrator of the estate of the deceased Lorenza Alburo, owner of the property
adjoining that designated as parcel No. 2 inasmuch as the administrator alleges in his
objection that the said stone wall forms a part of the property that belonged to the said
deceased while the applicants claim that this wall is theirs, being a part of the strongminded material house constructed on the said parcel of land, Lot No. 2 according to the
plan, Exhibit A.
HELD:
Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is presumed,
unless there is a title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of
adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. As the court held judgment
appealed from that the wall which lies between the properties of the applicant and the
objectors was a party wall, and as the applicants appealed from this ruling, it devolves
upon us to decide whether it is in fact a party wall, as counsel for the administrator of the
estate of the deceased Alburo or for her heirs finally admitted that it was in assenting to
that decision, although he averred in his written objection that it was the exclusive
property of the objectors; or whether, on the contrary, this wall is a part of property
marked No. 2 on the plan Exhibit A, as the applicants claims.
Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are
exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among other
circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not on the line dividing the
two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being constructed of stone and cement, has
stone projecting at intervals from the surface on one side only and not on the other; and
when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of
the adjoining building.1awphil.net
The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the
plan Exhibit A, belonging to the applicants, is much higher than the adjoining building of
the objectors; that along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain
water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants' building and carries it thence to Calle
Juan Luna through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the
said wall is covered by the roof of the applicants' building; that the supports of the said
wall project toward the side of the applicants' land and that none of the buttresses are on
the side of the objectors' lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the
rear enclosing wall of the applicants' property in such wise that the two walls that inclose
the lot form but a single construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in
question is not a party wall, but that it forms a part of the applicant's building and belongs
to them.
Besides the signs just referred to, the evidence also shows that on the objectors' land and
flanking the disputed wall there is another and lower wall which has no connection with
the one in question. Cayetano Arguelles, a master builder, who climbed to the top of the
wall in question and examined it, testified that the aforesaid drain caught the rain water
from the eaves of the applicants' roof, and that from the outside the division or space
between the applicants' wall and the wall on the objectors' land could be seen; that the
lower part of this latter wall had two arch like hollows; that according to the testimony of
the objector, Ireneo Mendoza, the latter wall was that of an old building that had belonged
to the said deceased and was destroyed by an earthquake; and that in the rear of the
objectors' land were the ruins of a wall which had also flanked the wall in dispute, and
these ruins, according to the said witness Mendoza were what was left of the wall of a
latrine formerly existing there.
These exterior signs contrary to the existence of a party-wall easement cannot be offset by
the circumstance that the dispute wall projects into Calle Juan Luna 74 centimeters farther
than the applicants' building, and neither can the fact that the face of this projecting wall is
on the same street line as the objectors' building, for the reason that, in view of the said
signs contrary to the existence of the easement of party wall, the projection of the wall
does not prove that it was a party wall belonging in common to the applicants and the
objectors and that the latter shared in the ownership thereof.
The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation was erected
on the land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The fact that the owners of the
objectors' property may have surreptitiously inserted some of the timbers or joists of their
building in the wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a
party wall, when there are so many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive ownership of
the wall and to conflict with the existence of the easement that the objectors endeavor to
establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong exclusively to the
applicants.
All of the applicants' properties, including the wall in question, should therefore be
registered.itc-a1f
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, but the decree of
registration of the property designated as Lot No. 2 shall include the disputed wall as
belonging exclusively to the applicants, and that part of said wall is a party wall is hereby
reversed; without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
3.CID, , VS. IRENE P. JAVIER,
The legal issue is whether the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building
standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by
prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to
13
obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioner's predecessor-ininterest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are of the view and so declared that
respondents Javier et al., did acquire such easement and gave judgment accordingly.
Hence, petitioner has come to us seeking review, alleging that both courts are in error.
HELD:The windows in question are admittedly in respondents' own building erected on
their own lot. The easement, if there is any, is therefore a negative one.[1] The alleged
prohibition having been avowedly made in 1913 or 1914, before the present Civil Code
took effect, the applicable legal provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code which
provides:
"ART. 538. In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the next
preceding article, the time of the possession shall be computed, * * * in negative
easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act,
forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful
without the easement." (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be seen, the only question hinges on the interpretation of the phrase "a formal
act". The lower court and the Court of Appeals considered any prohibition made by the
owner of the dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient compliance with the law. The
Court of Appeals declared:
"In the light of the foregoing decisions, (Cortes vs. Yu Tibo, 2 Phil., 26 and the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited), we agree with the trial court that the 'formal
act' of prohibition contemplated by Art. 538 of the old Civil Code may be either a written
or verbal act. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain above-quoted do not at all
mention written but merely some act of prohibition. * * *."
We are inclined to take the contrary view. The law is explicit. It requires not any form of
prohibition, but exacts, in a parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a
specific, particular act, but a formal act. The following definitions are pertinent:
"Formalor pertaining to form, characterized by one due form or order, done in due form
or with a solemnity regular; relating to matters of form." (C. J. S. vol. 37, p. 115.)
"ActIn civil law, a writing which states in legal form that a thing has been done, said or
agreed.From these definitions, it would appear that the phrase "formal act" would require
not merely any writing, but one executed in due form and/or with solemnity. That this is
the intendment of the law although not expressed in exact language is the reason for
the clarification[2] made in Article 621 of the new Civil Code which specifically requires,
the prohibition to be in "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public". This is as it
should be. Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They
constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property.
Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by prescription, in the case of positive
easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the
servient estate. By the same token, negative easements can not be acquired by less formal
means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of the act of invasion)
should be by "a formal act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public."
The Court of Appeals found as undisputed the fact 'that plaintiffs' lot (dominant) as well
as defendant's lot (servient) are covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. 7225 and
7545, respectively", both issued by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte, in pursuance of
the decrees of registration issued on December 27, 1937, in Cadastral Case No. 51,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1212 of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Certified copies of these
certificates of title are found as Annexes "A" and "B", pages 77 to 80 inclusive of the
Record on Appeal. In both of them, it does not appear any annotation in respect to the
easement supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20) years from
1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of registration.
Consequently, even concedingarguendo that such an easement has been acquired, it had
been cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens
System (without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title,
pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.[3]
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby reversed; the
injunction issued herein dissolved; and the case remanded to the court of origin for
adjudication of the damages, if any, occasioned by the issuance of the injunction. Without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
NUISANCE:
EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
The Facts :In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land
located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),3 Quezon City with an area of 375
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An
Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be
Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City,
and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof."4
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the
sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.5
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a
width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan
Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the
Botocan transmission line.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the
regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government
14
units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be
created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away
from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the
edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect,
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians,
instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the
Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the
construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513,
extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street.
Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to
three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965,
Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing
an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and
issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City
Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at
his own expense when public interest so demands."6
Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City
pursuant to Metro Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.7 The
resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal
structures and obstructions."8
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a
portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building
Code)9 in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15)
days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA. 10
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15)
days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing
walls," of the ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear
on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the
time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition11 with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City
Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition, 12 he alleged that
the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from
the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and
discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings
located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle
Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of
Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment
of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out
that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an
ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance
impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904. 13
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS
BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
The Courts Ruling
as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to
the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of
the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA illegally demolished
the property of Justice Gancayco.
MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is
empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila
Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal
structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the
Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.
The "wing walls" of the building are not

However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building
Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:
nuisances per se.

The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances
per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons
and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily
make that structure a nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per
se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons
and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. 29
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city
council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a
threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA
against summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law
have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle
Properties Corp.,30 we held:
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the
power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that
15
SECTION 205. Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building
Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as
the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.
Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works
District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their
respective areas of jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular
positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided
by law or decree.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the
Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this
Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official
charged with the duties of issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at
all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this
Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building
Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the
work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the
discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found
to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is

found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair,
vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is
without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482
and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc. 31 is applicable
to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code,
summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3.
This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of
Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power
on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising
media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the
Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, vizxxx
16

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USUFRUCT

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(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)

By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to

4. JUANA PICHAY, plaintiff-appellee,

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

The court rendered the following judgment:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

DOCTRINE: ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town,

WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

The Ruling of the Court

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

These aforequoted testimonies of the plaintiffs witnesses failed to satisfactorily establish

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

The "wing walls" of the building are not

nuisances per se.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 PROPERTY CASES

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