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~ P A M P H L ET S ~
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:t1 New Subjec t Matter, New Illustrati o11s, Complete-Offi c i al :t
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:t1 For all Coast Artillery Organizations. Fully meets the requirements of Training Regulations :t
>H 435.310 (Examination f or Gunners). Used f or instruction inanumber of RO. T.C. units. '"
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:t1 NUMBER GUNNERS' INSTRUCTION PAMPH LETS PRICE ~
>H . ; .
>H I. 2nd Class Gunner, Antiaircraf t Artillery (Except Searchlight Battery) $0.65 '"
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>H II. 2ndClass Gunner, Antiaircraf t Artillery (Searchlight Battery) 0.50 '"
:t1 III. 1st Class Gunner, Antiaircraf t Artillery (Except Searchlight Battery) 0.65 :t
>H IV. 1st Class Gunner, Antiaircraf t Artillery (Searchlight Battery) 0.40 .; .
>H ' " >H V. 2nd Class Gunner, Fixed Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.55 .;.
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>H VI. 1st Class Gunner, Fixed Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.50 ~
>H VII. 2nd Class Gunner, l,[obile Seacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.65 .;.
:t1 VIII. 1st Class Gunner, 110bileSeacoast Artillery (All Units) 0.75 ~
:t1 IX. Expert Gunner, Antiaircraf t Artillery 1.00 .;.
:t1 X. Expert Gunner, Fixed Artillery 1.00 ~
>H XL Expert Gunner, Mobile Seacoast Artillery 1.00 .;.
~ XII. Submarine :Mining - 1.25 i
>H ============:============================== .; .
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:P These pamphlets recently have beenrevised and brought up- to.date. They cover the instruction of all .;.
:t; 2nd Class, 1st Class, and Expert Gunners of Antiaircraf t, Fixed and Mobile Artillery. .;.
~ Invaluable f or the training and instructionof Coast Artillery personnel. Each enlisted manof a submarine t
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:t The above prices are retail (postpaid) f or single copies. To ORGANIZATIONS of the military establishment a :;:_ ::.
" T discount of 20% will be allowed onany order regardless of number. F.a.B. Washington, D. C.
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G U N N ER S '
C O A S T A R T I L L E R Y
J O U R N A L
FOUNDED IN 1892 AS THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY
MAJ OR AARON BRADSH A \VI, J R., Edi tor
VOLUME LXXXIII
J ANUARY- FEBRUARY, 1940
C O N T EN T S
NUMBER 1
COVERDESIGN: " A Mi ne Goes Oloer the Si de." Photo by Si gnal Corps, U. S. ArlllY
~ATIONAL DEFENSE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE. By Mai or Tbolllas R. Pbi lli ps 2
H OFFMANN. By H . A. DeU' ' ' eerd 14
FINNS, NORWEGIANS, SWEDES: Pi c tures 26
TH E KNOX TROPH Y. By Captai n ,. F. Gamber 32
BACKGROUND FOR LIGH TNING WAR. By Bri gadi er General Henry J . Rei lly 34
A ~IILlTARY VACUUM. By Mai or J. Halpi n COi l/lOlly 44
OLD ROUGH AND READY. By Captai l] Fai rfax Downey 50
\X'H ATMAKES TH E WH EELS GO 'ROUND. By W' arral1t Offi c er B. C. Elders 57
BEACH DEFENSE. By Li eutenant ,. H . Tw)' mal1, , r 60
TH E STORY OF ARTILLERY TH ROUGH TH E AGES. By W. A. W' i ndas 63
NEWS AND COMMENT 64
COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES 70
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 74
TH E CONTRIBUTORS 89
COAST ARTILLERY ORDERS 90
BOOK REVIE\\/S 91
PUBLICATION DATE: FEBRUARY 1, 1940
[
Opinions expressed and conclusions drawn inarticles are solely those of J
the authors and are inno sense of f icial. They should not be considered as
those of the Chief of Coast Artillery or any branch of the War Department.
~~~'hed bi'monthly by the United States Coast Artillery Association. Editorial and e:!:<'Cutiveof f ices, 1115 Seventeenth Street, X.W.,
~ lDgton, D. C . T erms: $4.00 peryear. (C oast A rtillery A ssociation members, $3.00 peryear.) S ingle copies, 7S e. EntE"red8S second-
mailer at Washinl:ton, D. C.; additional entry at Richmond, \'a .under the Act of ~Iarch 3, 1879. Copyright, 1940, by the United
.. -< ; i ' .... ; 'p . (; "pO
'B y
M ajorT homas R . P hillips
, C O A S T A R T I L L E R Y C O R P S 0
of f German commerce raiders f rom the Atlantic. If it is
not ef f ective, the British Aeet will be f orced to maintainits
blockade f ar at seaand beyond the range of Germanbomb-
ers. If Italy were to enter the war, the ability of antiair.
craf t guns to def end Malta and Cyprus, as well as th~
Aeet, would be the determining f actor whether Britain
gives up operations inthe Mediterranean or remains in
control of that vital sea.
The same consi tions will inAuence the locationand
def ense of in 1:11areas inEurope. If these canbe de.
f ended, t ley should be concentrated and the strong.
Ie def ense provided. If the antiaircraf t artill
is not ef f ective, then they must be dis sed
widely, and moved as f ar as possible f rom v erabl~
borders.
It is the opinion of General Armengau
--
spector General of the French Air Army, that antiaircraf t
artillery canf urnish the necessary def ense f or bases and
ships. H e considers the abandonment of lYblta by the
Bririshf leet during the Ethiopian crisis to have been un-
necessary. Insupport of this thesis he cites the antiaircraf t
def ense of Cartagena during the Spanish Civil \Var.
C3rt3gena was the naval base of the Loyalist f leet. Dur-
il1<J the entire course of the war the f leet was based inthis
~
l13rborand suf f ered no damage f rom bombing operations,
although it was vulnerable to attacks, both f rom Majorca
andwesternSpain. Cartagena, General Armengaud states,
\\"3Sdef ended by eight modern antiaircraf t batteries, f if teen
searchlight sections, and the necessary range f inding 3nd
subsidiary equipment.
The successf ul def ense of Cartagena can be of f set by
f igureswhich show that antiaircraf t def enses of Barcelona
and Valencia f ailed to protect these cities. Datum is not
available to draw any conclusions f rom this. It is not
knownwhether the best batteries and crews inLoyalist
Spainwere concentrated at Cartagena, what types and
kindof equipment were available at Barcelona and Valen-
4 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL ! alJuary-Febru4' J,
cia.A muchgreaterquantity of materielwouldhavebeen Littledataisavailablef romthecurrent Europeanwar.,
required to def end these sprawling cities thanthat re- TheGermansclaimtohaveshot downf iveplanesf roma
quired to def end the relatively limited areaof a naval twelve- planeattackingsquadronbygroundf ire.This raid
base.Likewise,thecitiescouldbebombedf romgreatalti- wasat lowaltitude, incloudyweather,andadif f iculttest
tudes,whereasthebombing of navalvesselsrequirespre- f or antiaircraf t f ire.The raidersclaimto have damaged
cisionbombingf romloweraltitudes. twoGermanshipsseriously,but this isdeniedf romGer-
Inarecent articleinPopular Avi ati on, entitled "Anti- many. The Germanstatement claimsthat the onlydam-
aircraf tFailedinSpain,"theauthor, af ormer antiaircraf t agedonewasby anEnglish planewhich crashedintoa
gunner with the Loyalist f orces, states that his group Germanship.
"consisting of three batteries shot downseventy- three Onanother raid onthe Germanf leet, the Germans
bombersandtwo f ightersinabout twenty- sixmonths of claimthat f iveof thesixraidersweredestroyedby inter.
action."Thesewerebrought downin400 airplaneraids ceptor pursuit af ter the bombing. The Britishstatement
inwhichtheantiaircraf tgroupwasinvolved.This mayor indicatesthat thebombing againwasat lowaltitudeand
may not havebeenaf ailure.Seventy- threebombersis a was opposedby strong antiaircraf t f ire; they admit an
pretty goodscoref or threeantiaircraf tbatteries,but that unstated number of losses.
doesnot supply the answer to the problemof successor COOPERATIVE DEFENSEOFAVIATIONANDAA ARTILLERY
f ailure. This should be judged by how ef f ectivelythe Thebestof allantiaircraf tdef ensesisthedestructiono f
gunskept hostileaviationaway.The author doesnot ex- h h 1 b f f b
t e osti eaviation y0 ensiveoperations your ownair
P
lainwhether hostileaviationavoidedhisbattery whenit f Th' l'h db th' J . L.
orce. IS wasaccompIS eye apaneseagalOstUK:
waslocated,orwhether itsopponentscontinuedtobomb Ch b G 1
ineseand y ermanyagainst thePoes.But thecon-
initsvicinityregardlessof lossesand f ire. d
itions that madethis possiblewereaten- to- oneair su-
GeneralRudel, who commanded the Germanantiair- periority.Without overwhelmingsuperioritysuchopera-
craf t artillery inSpain, wrote inVi i lki sc her Beobac hter, tionscannot anticipatecompletesuccess.Inwar between
ChancellorH itler's newspaper,that thef ireof hisbatteries thegreat powersit isout of thequestion. Everypossible
wassoef f ectivethat theLoyalistaviationavoidedthe10- element of def ensemust beresortedto,intheairandon
calitieswhereitwasemplaced.H e statedthat theCondor the ground.
Legionmannedf iveheavybatteriesandanunstatednum- Berlinis def ended by anenormous concentrationof
ber of light batteries,using 1 28 of f icersand4,7
1
7men. antiaircraf t artillery and pursuit. The Ruhr industrial
The widespread dif f erencesinef f ectivenessreported area,however, is too closeto the Germanborder to be
f romSpaincanbeexplained,both by the dif f erencesin protectedby aviation.Field Marshal Goering, speakin~
excellenceof materielandby theexpertnessof thecrews. totheworkersthereearlyinAugust, stated that thede~
TheWorld War typeof materielf irstusedby theLoyal- f ensesof the Ruhr wereimpregnable against air artack.
istswaspracticallyuseless.That usedf or the def enseof The Germanband of antiaircraf t def ense, he said,was
CartagenaisbelievedtohavebeenmodernSkodaequip- thirty- sevenmilesdeepandunpassableby anyhostileair.
ment. The Germanequipment was completely modern plane.
and wasmanned by well- trainedGermancrews. Army TheBritishplantousebothinterceptorpursuit andanti.
witnessesbef orethemilitarysub- committeeof theH ouse aircraf t artilleryf or the def enseof southernEngland.In
AppropriationsCommittee testif iedthat half theairplane airdef enseexercisesheldinAugust, 1939, thepressstated
lossesinSpainweredue to antiaircraf t f ireand that at that hundredsof antiaircraf tbatteriesweremannedf orthe
Cantonone Germanantiaircraf t battery accounted f or def enseof southeastEngland.
sixty per cent of the ~apaneselosses. Theentireproblemof theusef ulnessof interceptorpur.
Anillustrationof theef f ectof antiaircraf tf ire,inwhich suitf orantiaircraf tdef enseisamatter of timeanddistance
therewerenoplanesshot down,issuppliedby thecorre- f actors,andof visibility.Pursuit def enseat night durin?;
spondent inChina of the British aviationmagazine, theWorld War waspracticallyhopelessand thiswasad.
Aeroplane. This correspondentinterviewedsomeChinese mitted af ter extensiveattempts inFrancein1918. Cap-
f lyerswho had attempted to bomb a J apaneseairplane tainWeiss, aspecialistinnight pursuit, wrotei~,R~lu
carrier.They stated that as they approachedthe carrier Mi li tai re Generale (November, 1920) that: Nl~t
the protectingring of destroyerscommencedtravelinga pursuit hasnevergivenresultscomparabletoitsexpendl'
sinuouscourseathighspeedandat thesametimef iredall tures.... Therearealsosomeexamplesof night c~bat
their antiaircraf tguns asf ast asthey could.The Chinese betweenour bombersandtheenemypursuit andreclpro-
airplaneswerenot hit,but theconcussionf romshellbursts cally, but all these combats are exceptions.... ~
tossedthemaround and turned themover so that they aviationof Parisobtainedno successwith night pursuit.
weref orcedtodroptheir bombsandrunf or saf etywith- The aviationf orcesof Le Bourget, charged duringth e
out ever approachingapositionf romwhich tobombthe war with the security of the capital,didnot prevent,ac
carrier. It was J apanese antiaircraf t f ire which f orced eventrouble, anyraidof theGothasor dirigibles.S ev eral
Chinese f lyersto drop their bombs ontheir owncity, of our comradeswereinjuredor killedonreturningfro m
Shanghai- still the most disastrousbombing inthe his- these excursions,which ended at times with disastf OUS
toryof warf are. crashes.Ihavenever heardof authentic aerialcombats2
Tbe 3-i llc b allti ai rc raft gUll i s stalldard equi pme1lt i ll tbe UIli ted States Arm)'
night above Paris. The Antiaircraf t Def ense Corps can
thus inscribe inits book of honor all the victories reported
bytheboasters."
British experience was similar, although the British
claim to have had some slight success. H owever more
British and French planes were lost by accident in at-
tempted def ense than they claim to have brought downof
enemy aircraf t.
More serious than the lack of success of pursuit, was
their imerf erence with antiaircraf t f ire. The gunners, un-
able to distinguish f riend f rom enemy, withheld their
f ireumil too late. This f inally resulted inanorder, issued
~lay 20, 1 91 8, sending all airplanes previously held f or
thedef ense of Paris to the f ront with instructions to anack
Germanbombers ontheir return, af ter they had bombed
Paris. From then on, according to Gen~ral 1vf ordacg,
Clemenceau's Chef de Cabinet, the def ense of Paris was
, assured. The antiaircraf t def enses were constantly
strengthened and onSeptember 20, 1 91 8, General Mor-
dacqreponed that they were complete. September 20 was
the date of the last German raid onParis. According to
General Mordacq, sixty to eighty planes participated in
this raid. Only three got through the outer rings of de-
f enses and Aew over Paris and two of these three were
shot down.
"Ithad taken time," remarks General Mordacq, "to
f ight the stupid ideas of certain inAuential personages,
who had no competence inthese maners, and arrive at
last at a logical and practical result."
The lack of reliability of night pursuit was shown 1 1 1
the Spanish Civil War. There were a f ew instances of
night combat, but these appear to have beenaccidental and
exceptional.
The only rational and ef f ective def ense of anobjective
against night anack is provided by antiaircraf t anillery.
Daylight presents a more f avorable problem f or inter-
ceptor pursuit. Time and distance enter this problem.
Aviation was inef f ective f or the def ense of Paris because
there was insuf f icient time to give warning, gain altitude
and attack the bombers. Inthe caseof Berlintoday, French
bombers must Ay more than three hundred miles over
Germany to reach their objective. \Vith anef f ective warn-
MATERIELREQUIREMENTS
Tenyears ago the American antiaircraf t artilleryman
could report, with justice, that his gunhad the bomber
stopped. The electricaldatacomputationand transmission
systemhadsolvedtheworst of f irecontrol problems. The
3- inch gunwas ef f ectiveat altitudes well abovethe ca-
pacity of loaded bombers at that time. Since then, the
speedand ceilingof bombers has doubled. Loadedbomb-
erscanf lyat 28,000f eet. Our ownAir Corps isbombing
at 22,000f eet moreaccurately thanthey werebombingat
one- third that altitude teny~arsago. Speed has incre:ised
f rom100milesper hour to300milesper hour. Antiaircraf t
artillery nowbeing manuf actured should be ableto cope
CANWE BE BOMBED?
Whenatwar wealwayshavebeensubject tonaval raids
and bombardment. Fif teenyears ago we had no f ear of
aerialbombardment. Today wecanbebombed. Airplanes
nowareinbeingthat canmaketheroundtripf romEurope
to the United States with asmall load of bombs. Such
bombing would not beef f ectiveandit would becostly. It
would be inthe nature of the Paris gunof the World
War, of military value only f or its moral ef f ect, and un-
productive inany other senseinrelationto itscost.But it
ispossibletoday.
Airplane carriersthat managed to avoidour f leet,could
come within a f ew hundred miles of the coast, drop
bombs at dusk and returnto thecarrier indarkness. Such
bombing alsowould besmall- scale,but the results against
our great ports arealmost incalculable. The demands f or
def ensewouldbe immediate andenormous. And most im-
portant of all- this could happenimmediately uponthe
outbreak of war.
6 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-FebruarJ
ing net, this gives ample time f or interceptor pursuit to ANTIAIRCRAFT READINESS
gainaltitudeandmeet theattackers inf ront of Berlin.The Our traditional def ensehas beenbased onagreat nav)'
def ense of Paris, with approximately half the warning and substantial coast def enseableto buy us time to raise
distance available, againmay have to be lef t exclusively anarmy if needed. The navy isalways ready f or war, th e
to antiaircraf t artillery, just as Germany depends upon army never. Coast def enses were insubstantial readiness
antiaircraf t artilleryf or thedef enseof itswesternindustrial prior to the World War, but have beenneglected since.
areas. With theadvent of air power, our national instinct hasde-
The distancef romwhich warning must begivento in- manded aerial readiness. Antiaircraf t artillery has been
terceptor pursuit, if they aretobeabletomeet anattacker, neglected asoneof the armsof instant readiness.
depends uponthe degree of readiness of the def enders, Th 1 f
h 1 d d
e ogic0 anavy inreadinessis apparent- it might
the rapidity wit which they cangainatitu e, an the h h d
aveto meet anot er great navy imme iately uponthe
dif f erenceinspeedbetweenthe pursuit and the bomber. f Th
outset 0 war. esamereasoning appliesto the coastde-
With pursuit speeds of 300 miles anhour and bomber f 1 1 1
enses,essentia y anava adjunct. The identical logichas
speedsof 250miles anhour, and analert f actor of f if teen bId h A
eenappie tot e ir ForceasanM- day def ensivef orce.
minutes, a 200- mile warning is required to of f er a f air Does not antiaircraf t readiness bear the same relationto
chance of meeting the attacker inf ront of the objective. d
aviationrea iness as coast def ense preparedness doesto
With af if ty- mile increaseinpursuit speed and ashorter I d? All
nava prepare ness. of these elements of national de-
alert f actor, the warning distance may be reduced to 100 f h
1 d
h
ense may ave to meet anenemy almost immediately
mi es. Un er exceptional conditions it mig t evenbe f Th
ater war starts. enavy cannot guarantee completepro-
slightly lessened, but this cannot be depended on. 1 d
Fromtheseconsiderations oneconclusioncanbedrawn tectionagainst nava rai snor canthe air f orceguarantee
complete protectionagainst aerial raids. Both canguar-
def initely: our antiaircraf t coast def ense cannot be sup- -
antee protectionagainst invasionby a great land army;
pliedby interceptor aviation. 1 d d
consequent y,we 0not nee agreat competitive armyin
Warning f romseamay begivenoccasionally,but can- hEW 11
t e uropeansense. esha havetime to build it if we
not be depended on. Our owninterceptor pursuit will haveasuitablenucleus. But wehavenoassuranceof time
f inditsusef ulness inchasing theattackers after they have tobuild our antiaircraf t coastdef enseaf ter thestart of war.
dropped their bombs. For the def enseof inland objectives M d f
It, too, isan - ay orcejust asisthe navy, the coastde-
interceptor pursuit isef f ective. f ensesand the air f orce.
Our antiaircraf t coast def enseis supplied by the Navy InAugust, 1939,the Germanantiaircraf t artillery and
which triestocompelanenemy tobasesof ar awayastobe 1
warning servicewasony slightly smaller thantheUnited
harmless, by long- range bombers which attack hostile States Army. The British antiaircraf t Territorials were
bases either oncarriers or land, by antiaircraf t artillery Th
140,000strong. e Germanantiaircraf t detachment in
which provides protectionat the objective, and by inter-
Spainwas greater thanthe entire American antiaircraf t
ceptor pursuit which attacks bombers after bombing of A bId
service. eate recognition, primarily inCongress.
coastal objectives and before bombing of inland objec- h
tives. All of theseelements of antiaircraf t def ensearees- wit inthepast twoyears has resulted inearnest ef f ortsto
build up our antiaircraf t def enses. The long neglect and
sential and all arecoordinateand cooperativeelements of dd 1 f
national def ense. su enspurt amost ound uswithout arational program
either f or personnel or materiel. What type of guns do
weneed? Do thosebeing manuf actured meet today's re-
quirements? Where is personnel to comef rom? Will it
beNational Guard or Regular Army? IstheArmy ready
with long- range recommendations? Should we make
periodic studies of antiaircraf t def ense requirements?
Tbe Germa1l forc es take AA gullS to sea. (Pboto passed by German c ellSor)
TH E COAST ARTILLERY ]OCRNAL
8
with a3OQ- mileper hour plane R~'ingbetween 25.000 and
30.000 f eet.
\Vhile aviation has progressed b~'~'earl~,bounds. Ameri-
can amiaircraf t has devoted itself ro ref inemem of the
materiel of tenyears ago. Ir no longer canf ulf ill its mis-
sion. Area targets can be bombed f rom J ltjrudes f ive ro
eight thousJ nd f eet inexcess of the ef f ective rJ nge of the
J - inch gun. Above 18,000 f eet the ef f ecrive radius of f ire
decreases so rapidl~', that it canbe SJ id dut the 3- inch gun
is pracrically useless above 20,000 f eeL Because of the
small radius of ef f ecrive f ireat and above this altirude, the
number of baneries required ro protect anareJ becomes
almost astronomical and cerrainly imprJ cricable.
The theoretical ef f ecriveness of amiaircraf t materiel can
bevaried by the standard of airplane perf ormance J dopted.
In the Coast Arti llery Fi eld l11anual. Volume II, PJ rr
one. "AmiJ ircrJ f r Artillery," 1933, the compurations of
the bomb release line and the size of the critical zone were
based onan120- mile anhour bomber and analtitude of
15.000 f eet. Inthe SJ me l11anual, page 14. it isstated that
light b,ombardmem J irplanes have anoperating speed
180 mIles per hour J nd heavy bombJ rdmem a speed
ISO miles per hour. B~'J dopting perf ormance f igures f
this ma11lI:J I that J lready hJ d been exceeded. unjusrif iQI
conclusions of amiaircraf t perf ormJ nce and ef f ecri\e~
were deduced. If J speed of 200 miles per hour. which
then in sight, had been J dopted, it would Im'e
f ound thJ r f our baneries, insteJ d of three were required
def end a poim target according ro the standJ rd set f o
If J 5.000- f oot increJ se inairplane altirude bd beenam
pJ ted, and this also was in sight, it would have
f ound that the 3- inch gun was incJ pable of f urnishing
f ective def ense against extremel~' high bombardn;
such as may be employed agJ inst large areJ tJ rgers.
This should have beenasuf f iciem demonstration of
need of amicipating airplane perf ormance. But in
1938 edition of the SJ me 1I1anual, the speed of bom
f or purposes of calculating the bomb release line. istak
as 200 miles per hour. about what should have been
sumed f iveyears ago. Iralso isassumed that" atl110sph
Tbe Swedi sb Army uses tbe Bofors anti ai rc raft gun
Tbi s i s a Dalli sb AA gUll alld c rew
conditions of visibility and density and decrease in ac-
curacy of bombing at increased altitudcs will probably
conf ine bombardment attacks to much lower altitudes
and,sinceanaverage bombing altitude may reasonably be
takenas 17,100 f eet, this f igure is used."
Seventeenthousand one hundred f eet happens to be the
approximate altitude above which the ef f ective radius of
f ireof theyinch gunbegins to decrease so rapidly that de-
f enseat higher altitudes will require quantities of materiel
that never will exist. At analtitude of 22,000 f eet, the ef -
f ectivearea of f ire of the 3- inch gun is less than one- third
asgreat asat 17,100f eet. By using f igures of airplane per-
f ormance that again have been surpassed at the time of
publicationof the Manual, the 3- inch gun is made to ap-
~r still to be ef f ective against all bombardment. Even
usmgsuch data, six batteries are indicated inthe j\1anual
asnecessary to def end anarea target 4,000 yards indiam-
~r.
\\'erealarger gunwith aradius of f ireof 6,000 or 7,000
yards at 22,000 f eet available, f ive batteries could provide
~
df ecriV: def ense f or the critical zone of apoint target. For
P':0tectlonof the area target shown inthe Coast Arti llery
F,eld "1anual, f our of the larger batteries would supply
a more ef f ective def ense than six 3- inch batteries. Even if
higher ef f ective altitudes are not yet essential. one- third
less m:ltcricl is needed of the larger type than the present
type.
This is animportant economy when the enormous re-
guiremcnts f or antiaircraf t def ense are added up. The
iarger gun can reach into any immediately possible alti-
tude of bombardment, while the yinch gunpermits bomb-
ing with impunity at altitudes that today are practicable
to the bombers of every nation inthe world.
InEngland, early in 1938, when the press discovered
that the War Ministry was remodeling a large number of
3- inch antiaircraf t guns, popular protest roseto the volume
of a public scandal. The Government was questioned in
the H ouse of Commons. It was explained that this was
only astop gap; that the 3.7 inch antiaircraf t gun was the
weapon onwhich the War N1inistry was concentrating its
production. InEngland, not only the War Ministrv but
also the public- educated during the past three years to
antiaircraf t def ense- is aware of the lack of ef f ectiveness
of the smaller gun against modern aircraf t.
It is aserious error toassume that bombers will not use
their higher altitudes. Altitude requirements are placed
10 TH E COASTARTILLERY J OURNAL January-Februar,
indesignspecif icationsf or theverypurposeof protecting The3- inchgunnowinproductionisnot awaste.Itwill
bombersagainst antiaircraf tartilleryandpursuit aviation. alwaysbe valuableto useinthef ieldand f or def enseof
If the pilot is f acedwith the possibility of being hit at targets which require precisionbombing. But a larger
q,OCJO f eet and escapingat 25,0CJ 0f eet, therecanbeno gunisessential,andmoreeconomical,f or antiaircraf tde-
questionabout thealtitudehewillchoose.At higher alti- f enseof cities,industries,hatborsandbases.
tudes he has the additional advantageof relativeinvisi- Slight excusecanbegivenf or af ixedantiaircraf t gun
bility and noiselessness.Any assumptionbased onthe inthe continental United States. InPanama, yes. But
theory that bombardment willnot useitsmaximumalti- inthe United States all antiaircraf t guns should have
tudeisf alse,anyreasoningtosupport it isspecious.H aze strategical mobility so that all canbe concentrated on
or scatteredcloudsareanassetto thebomber.The pilot either coastincaseof need.Our lOs- mm.f ixedgundoes
needsonlytolookdirectlybeneathhimself f ororientation, not meet this requirement. Itisplanted inconcreteand
while the ground observer must searchalong the slant itwouldtakemonths toreplant it ontheoppositecoastif
tange. The earththepilotsseeoccasionallyiseverywhere needed.It isprobablethat amobilegunof betweenthree-
below; but tothegroundobservertheairplaneisaspeck and- one- half andf ourincheswillmeetalltherequirements
inthehemisphereof thesky. of antiaircraf t coast def ensef or sometime to comeand
Regardlessof altituderequirements,the3- inchgunhas that thereisnoneedf ortheinstallationof anymoref ixed
never beenthemost ef f icientsizef or anantiaircraf t gun. antiaircraf tgunsincontinentalUnited States.
Perhaps exaggeratedideas of the need f or light weight Machine guns arenot nowand never havebeenef f ec-
andhigh tacticalmobility had somethingtodowith the tiveweapons against lowf lyingplanes. The antiaircraf t
adoptionof this size.The most ef f ectiveantiaircraf t gun artillery has beentrying to make itself a machine- gun
is acompromisebetweenconf lictingrequirements. One outf it f or twenryyearsandhasf ailed.ColonelJ . P. H op-
wants agunwithhigh muzzlevelocity,high rateof f ire, kins, Chief , Antiaircraf t Service,AEF, inhisreport De-
highballisticcoef f icientof projectile,andalargebursting cember}l, 1918,stated: "Onour Army f ront therewere
areaof theshell.The larger gunhas alower rateof f ire. probably I,SOO antiaircraf t machine guns which were
Great muzzlevelocitiesrequireathick walledshellwhich identicalwiththetotalof ninety- sixthat wereusedbyour
limits the burst ef f ectiveness,etc. One limiting require- two antiaircraf t machine- gunbattalions. Probably there
ment is a reasonable mobility, which limits weight; wereplanesbrought downby these1,500guns, of which
another is a requirement of high altitude ef f ectiveness, wehavenot hadareport; but thetotalof whichwehave
whicheliminatessmallguns. specif icinf ormationistwo. Thenumber of planesbrought
The Germancompromiserepresentingthe most ef f ec- downontheentireBritishf ront isabout twoper month."
tivesizeisthe88- mm.gun(about 3}'i inches). This gun Today,wecountholesinasleeveandthink thepractice
was developedasthe most ef f ectivesizebef orethe high ispretty good.InEthiopia, 259planeswerehit by small
altitudef ireof which it iscapablewas necessary.Itwill armsf ire,most of themmany times,andonlyeight were
f ireat arateof twenty roundsper minute andhasample shot down. AnAmericanpilot f lyinginLoyalist Spain
tacticalmobility.Itsef f ectivealtitudeissaidtobeinexcess had anair duelwith BrunoMussolini. Whenhelanded
of 25,000f eet.The Britishhaveadoptedthe3,7 inchgun hecounted326 entering bullet holesinhis airplane,his
asstandard. Its perf ormanceexceedsthat of the German instrument boardwasshot away,but stillhewas ableto
gun.The Frenchusea90- mm. (about 3.6 inches) inthe returntohisf ield.Ef f ectivef ireagainst low- f lyingplanes
def enseof Paris.This wasoriginally anaval design,the demands anexplosiveshell and a gunlight enough to
army having beenlaggardinprovidingthe larger guns. keepaheadof the tremendous angular travel of aplane
A uniquef eatureof theFrench90isanautomaticloader closetotheground.
that givesitarateof f ireof thirty roundsperminute. The 37- mm. gunis not asubstitute f or the machine
A sizesomewherebetweenthree- and- one- half andf our gun. AccordingtoDr. H elmut Klotz, af ormer German
inchesprobably representsthe most ef f ectiveantiaircraf t of f icerwhoobservedtheSpanishWar closely,the2o- mm.
gunwith tactical mobility today. But this, whende- automaticcannonissuperiortothe37- mm.Itsrateof f ire
veloped,shouldnot beconsideredtheultimateinguns,or is300 rounds aminute against 150rounds aminute f or
weshallrepeat themistakealreadymadeindelayingtoo the 37- mm. Although its shell is much smaller,the ex-
longtoreplacethe3- inchgun.It isquitepossiblethat new plosiveit containsstill is suf f icientto wreck anairplane
detectionandtrackingdeviceswillpermit f ireonairplanes wing. It canf ollowalow- f lyingplanewhilethe 37-
mm
.
at rangesf arbeyondthosenowconsideredpracticableand cannot at equally lowaltitudes. The f irecontrol cannot
that theincreasedtimethat aplanecouldbeheldunder takeadvantageof theincreasedrangeof the37- mm.can-
f irewouldwarrant thebuildingof agunwithstillgreater non.Boththe37- mm.andthezo- mm.arelimitedtoabout
range.It might havetobebuilt intwoloadsf or mobility thesamealtitudeby f irecontrol- that isto about 4,000
and would requireanautomatic loader, but it may be- or5,0CJ 0f eet.Inadditionthe2o- mm.cannonweighsabout
comenecessaryto have such a gun. Inspite of greater 800pounds and canbemanhandled anywhere. Itssmall
cost,itssuperiorrangewouldmakef ewer guns necessary sizeandlowsilhouettemakeit apoor target f or aerialat-
f or the def enseof anareaand thus the larger gunis tack or groundf ire.
cheaper thanthe smaller one. If andwhenthe37- mm.f irecontrolsystemisperf ected
1 1 " " " " " " ------
I9~O
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE 1 1
Tbi s Bri ti sb ).7-i llc b AA gUll i s sbowlI i ll tbe outski rts of LOlldon
before tbe outbreak of tbe war
tomake it a usef ul gunat altitudes of
f rom4.000to IO,OOO f eet, it will be an
enormously valuable weapon and will
replace the heavier guns in f orward
areas. Cntil the f irecontrol problem is
soh- edthe 20- mm. cannon is superior
to the 37- mm. and should be :tdopted
as a substitute f or the m:tchine gun.
EH 'nwhenthe 37- mm. f ire control is
perf ected, the 20- mm. c:tnnon will re-
mainessential f or :tllthe missions now
a~sianed to the anti:tircr:tf t m:tchine
::J
auOS. The Germ:tn 88- mm. b:ttteries
~resupplied with two 20- mm. c:tnnon
f or protection of the batteries :tg:tinst
low- Aying:ttt:tck.
BLACKOUT
The :tircraf t warning service is no-
body's b:tby :tnd no one w:tnts to:tdopt
it. Who will org:tnize :tnd m:tn it in
the f ield? Will the technic:tl equip-
ment besupplied by the Sign:tl Corps
or the Co:tst Artillery Corps? H ow
milch w:trning is required f or m:trch-
mgtroops? Truck columns? R:tilw:t)'
trains? H ow wide must the intercep-
tor pursuit net be to en:tble them to
meet an :ttt:tcker? No :tnswers :tre
a\'aibble. But a w:trning service is
just as import:tnt to :tnti:tircr:tf t de-
f ense as are the :tnti:tircr:tf t guns. A
year and ah:tlf :tgo Germ:tny h:td 15,-
000 men intheir pe:tcetime w:trning
service.This was to have beendoubled
by the present time, along with the
more than doubling of the air f orce
and antiaircraf t artillery. Like anti-
aircraf t def ense, of which it is :t part, the aircraf t w:trning
servicehas adouble f unction. It must be supplied f or the
f ieldf orces as well as f or antiaircraf t coast def ense.
The problem of aw:trning service f or the f ield f orces is
relatively simple. The approximate extent of division,
corpsand army are:lS inbattle is known. It is easily prac-
ticable to devise a type organiz:ttion suited to these units
and to provide the staf f and personnel to operate and co-
ordinate the system. There will be f ew commercial instal-
lations inthe f ield f or conversion; the entire net will have
to be a military installation. These needs cannot be met
bv superimposing a w:trning system upon the existing
means of milit:try communication, nor by attempted co-
ordinationof existing agencies.
The antiaircraf t artillery cannot stand to their guns
twenty- f our hours aday; they must have warning. Troop
columns must be warned to give them time to disperse
and deliver ef f ective f ire. H ow much warning do they
need? Two minutes will require warning f rom a distance
of eight or tenmiles. They cannot supply it themselves.
Truck columns should have warning intime to halt, dis-
perse when practicable, and get ready to f ire. A small
bomb onamoving convoy might pile up a dozen trucks.
H alted, the damage would be limited.
Railway tr:tins must be w:trned, when threatened with
:tir :ttt3ck, and stopped. In 1917, a low- f lying German
plane dropped a sm:tll bomb just in f ront of a moving
trainne:tr Abbeville, onalong, low brick arch bridge. The
bridge w:ts undamaged, and the crater inthe track was
very small, but suf f icient to derail and pile up the train.
This double line took nearly twenty- f our hours to clear.
Onthe other hand, three heavy shell craters and one large
bomb crater ina main double line near Poperinghe took
only just over f our hours to repair indarkness one night in
1917. All f our craters were large ones, eighteen to twenty-
two f eet indiameter.
Quite obviously the warning service must dispose of
radio communication as well as wire. Personnel of the
w:trning service will have to be attached to all movements
of all sorts just as antiaircraf t artillery may be attached.
All major movements inthe f ield will have to be- plotted
so that warning will be given onl;, to those endangered.
12
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL 1an oa1" J-February
Broadcast warnings would hold up all movements sof re-
quently anduselesslythat they soonwouldbedisregarded.
No organizationof f ieldf orcescanbecompletewithout
warning batteries. They areas essential asany other part
of antiaircraf t def ense. They should be apart of existing
organization. Until they have beenf ormed and used ex-
tensively inmaneuvers noonecanknowwhat they cando
nor what their requirements inpersonnel and equipment
will be. A minimum peace organizationmight be one
warning battery ineachcorpsarea.Today therearenone.
More dif f icultistheproblemof providing warning serv-
icef or antiaircraf t coast def ense. This will require use of
existing commercial f acilities under military supervision
and incooperationwith civilagencies. Itwill betoo late,
af ter awar starts, to commence the organizationof the
antiaircraf t coastdef ensewarning service.Anorganization
consonant with our military establishment wouldbebased
uponaspecialbranch of theNational Guard. The neces-
saty specialistscould be enlisted with the understanding
that they would perf orm their duties intheir home area
and, inmany cases,they couldcontinue normal work. A
very considerable group of permanent personnel would
berequired to insurethe organizationand training of the
servlCe.
TH E REQUIREMENTS OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
There aretworeasonsf or thegeneral delay, both inthe
army and by the public, inrecognizing the requirements
of antiaircraf t def ense. One of these, ef f ectivef or many
years, was a def eatist attitude about the ef f ectiveness of
ground def ense. Many soldiers had witnessed the f utile
f irings of the Archie guns during the World War and
counted their ef f ectivenessby thenumber of misses.They
f ailed to realize that it was not the number of planes
brought downthat was the measure, but rather the num-
ber of raids disrupted and brokenup. It was easyf or the
civilianto see a Sunday supplement picture of a great
bomb being loadedinto agreat bomber and thenlater see
anairplane above him and imagine that bomb being
dropped at hisf eet. Conversely, it wasdif f icultto imagine
hitting that barely visiblespeck high inthe sky.
Our great citieshave to be def ended and canbe. The
moral ef f ect of untesisted attacks inincalculable. If the
army f ails to realize and demand the means to f ulf il its
obligationof def ense, it canhave no alibis when war
comes. Of courseexpenditures will be large; but SQ are
navalexpenditures; soareair f orceexpenditures. But anti-
aircraf t costswill be trif ling compared to passivesubmis-
siontopartial destruction. No excuseavailsthe army un-
less it has thought large and has presented its needs to
Congress.
The secondreasonf or our laggard antiaircraf t prepara-
tionsisdirectly attributable tothearmy itself .Antiaircraf t
artillery isanewarm. It isaddedtothemilitary team, but
the older members of the teamtend toseeonly that their
proportionof the f orces is reduced and resist it. For the
samereason,air increaseshavebeenresisted.Soldiershave
knownthat the air f orce must be added to the def ense
f orces,but resisted a reapportionment of available f unds
that appeared to be to their owndetriment. The air f orce
that alladmit weneedwasf orcedonthe army by popular
demand and congressional action, however little wemay
like to admit it. The antiaircraf t artillery is inthe same
category. It isincredibletotheolder arm~that this upstart
should needmoremenand money thanthey areallowed.
But this is just as certainto happenas the air corpsex-
pansionwhich already hastakenplace.With the develop-
ment of the airplane must come protection against it.
Every increaseinour ownair f orceis asignal that anin-
creaseisneeded f or antiaircraf t def ense.
H ow much antiaircraf t def ense do we need? Unques-
tionably asmuch asGreat Britaininpeacetime with her
140,000 Territorialsinadditiontoher Regular f orces.Our
two constant allies, the Atlantic and Pacif ic oceans, are
still ef f ectiveto giveus asmall delay inassuming def en-
sivereadiness.For this reason,welikethe British, cande-
pend uponthe National Guard f or the major increments
of necessary antiaircraf t def ense.
Nevertheless, the irreducible minimum of permanent
personnel ismany times asgreat asthat nowinexistence.
Congress recognizedthe needinPanama andadded8,000
mentotheArmy f or increasingantiaircraf t def ensethere.
The H awaiianIslandsrequiremore, sodothePhilippines,
and the antiaircraf t def ense of Puerto Rico is just being
started. For protection of vital coast cities, industries,
harbor def enses and naval basesonboth coasts, alargely
increased nucleus of permanent antiaircraf t personnel is
indispensable. Interms of permanent personnel, thesere-
quirements, very roughly estimated, might amount to:
100 batteries f or f oreignpossessions,thirty- six batteries in
theninecorpsareas,sixteenbatteries f or thePacif icCoast,
and twenty- eight batteries f or the Atlantic Coast.
This totals 180 batteries, not including headquarters,
searchlight andwarning units. The personnel requirement
exceeds25,000 of f icersand men. The existing army can-
not provided thesemenby taking them away f romother
arms. They must bef urnished f romarmy increases.Ab-
surd? Not intheleast.This istherequirement tomeet the
threat of anewarmwhich werecognize,but f ailtorealize
that anew armisrequired to counter the new enemy.
But this is only the beginning. Anadditional f orceof
800 or 1,000 batteries of antiaircraf t artillery, with the
necessarywarning elements, must besuppliedby theNa-
tional Guard. At least 100,000 menwill be needed. The
major portionof the National Guard f orce could be a
strictly home def ense element, menphysically unf it f or
other 'military service,menwith dependents servingin~e-
f enseof their owncitiesor ownf actories.Inthe protectiOn
of industries removed f romthe coast, if anef f icientwarn-
ingservicewereprovided, theseunits couldcontinue t~eir
normal work, manning their guns onreceipt of warnIll?;.
The antiaircraf t coast def ensewarning servicecouldbe
organized similarly. Itshould extend several hundr:d
miles inland. Certainport cities of great importance Will
requirewarning f romships stationed at seaf or that pur-
- -
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE 13
years has resulted inalmost no def ense. Itis not too late to
think big and repair the dela~,s of the past. An:' f urther
dela:' ma:' be too late. :.f oney and personnel will be sup-
plied generousl:' whentrue need isdemonstrated. And it is
up to the army to demonstrate dut need to our people.
EDITOR'SNOTE: It should be borne inmind that this
article was complered during the early days of the current
war inEurope. This accounts f or the lack of comment on
more recent events inair warf are. But our readers will also
note rhat no event to date of going to press has invalidated
any of the author's major premises.
poseand cannot be def ended adequatel~' unless antiaircraf t
shIpsare provided to complete the def ensive ring. A sea
gomg antiaircraf t service will have its charms f or our
~ach~ingenthusiasts.
Ir is also inevitable that commerce destruction bv air-
plane bombing will require that our merchant ships be
armedwith antiaircraf t guns, both large and small. The
arm\'should be prepared to supply the materiel and per-
soO/;elto meet this need when it comes. Inthe Spanish
war more merchant ships, b:' ten to one, were sunk bv
airplanes thanby submarines. Such a method of blockade
isme\'irable againwhen the going gets hard,
CONCLUSION
ThinkinO"small inrerms of antiaircraf t def ense f or manv
:>
~ ~ ~
Thi s i s a Ger111a/188- 111111. AA gU/1111oll/lted alo/1g the It'"est W' all
iz tlte /
ke~d fu~elume j r/ t o t k t m e n
B y H . A .D e W e e rd
It has become increasingly f ashionable to interpret
leaders of the First \Vorld Vi ar interms of their closest
advisers. Thus Foch tends to appear as the "action mech-
anism" of Weygand. Old Paul vonH indenburg becomes
the rubber stamp f or his all- absorbing Quarter-
master- General, and Max H of f mann is de-
scribed as the alter ego and lucky star of Erich
Ludendorf f . This last assumption has
been made because, with the exception
of the Rumanian campaign, Luden-
dorf f 's luck deserted him when he lef t
H of f mann. Like most catch phrases, no
one of these evaluations is strictly accu-
rate. Although most of the important
leaders of 1 91 4-1 91 8 have beensubjected
to intense and in some cases painf ul
scrutiny, H of f mann has received less at-
tention outside Germany thanhis importance
seems to warrant. H is portrait is conspicu-
ously absent f rom the various volumes of military
reputations. This may be due to the f act that, to use
the title of one of his own volumes, H of f mann's career
was ina sense one of "lost opportunities." The vicissi-
tudes of war raised him f rom the rank of colonel to that
of Chief of the Staf f of the Eastern Armies. Inthe latter
role he perf ormed miracles of military econom:v and
achievement- but always ina minor theatre. H e missed
the procession of destin'y that led to the f atef ul and de-
c i si ve theatre inthe \Vest. H e alwavs worked under the
shadow of a greater or at least a royal name. And just
when. at the summit of his career. he might normallv
have beenthe next chief of the great German general staf f ,
the Versailles restrictions cut away the old army :lI1dlef t
no place f or his restless spirit.
Carl Adolf Maxmilian H of f mann was born inH am-
burg onJ anuary 25. 1 86<j. H is f ather was a substantial
member of the legal prof ession, his mother a descendant
of the f amous du Buisson f amily. Af ter a period of
elementary education, H of f mann passed the Krie f!,s-
sc hute and entered the K ri egsakademi e at T orgau. H ere
the young H essian cadet of f icer demonstrated a li~I1t-
ness of touch and quickness of mind at once a source of
wonder and exasperation to his teachers. H e was a talt,
slight youth, of tenaciously indolent habits. but un-
f ailingly lucky. H is unsoldierly qualities were
marked; he hated all f orms of militarv drill
and athletics. H e disgraced the co;ps bv
sloppy perf ormances at swordplay and
horsemanship. On the other hand his
capacity f or downing Moselle and wolf .
ing sausages was unrivaled at Torgau.
\Vhile other student of f icers were plug-
ging away at their books, H of f mann
spent his nights at the of f icers' club leav-
ing his study lamp burning inthe win-
dow. Favored with a photographic tvpe
of memory which rarely f ailed him and are-
markable f acility f or learning by listening,
H of f mann swept by his heavier- f ooted colleagues
inexaminations, passed with distinction, and was chosen
f or atour of special duty inRussia.
During asix- month stay inRussia H of f mann perf ected
his knowledge of Russian and became acquainted with
the people against whom he was to distinguish himself in
the f ighting of 1 91 4-1 91 8. Of ten in the war years he
used to clinch his arguments f or acertain course of action
by insisting: "I know the Russian people." Onhis return
to Germany inI~ he was attached to the Russian sec-
tionof the general staf f and came under the eye of \Varten-
burg and Schlief f en. Despite asurviving tendency toward
youthf ul irresponsibility. he seems to have wonthe f avor
of Schlief f en. For that hard taskmaster once approved a
bill f or a special train to Warsaw made necessary bv an
act of carelessness onthe part of H of f mann. Doubtless
the old man gave him a withering reprimand but when
the Russo- J apanese \Var broke out selected him f or the
post of observer at the J apanese headquarters. This mav
have been a decisive stage inthe career of H of f mann.
AT OBER- OST - H EADQUARTERS, EASTER1~FRONT
Llldendorff (left) thema11 of mergyj Hi lldmbllrg (c enter) the soc i al frollt;
Hoffmallll (ri ght) themall of ferti li ty of i deas
16 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL fal/Nary-February
Many of the military observersinthe Russian- J apanese Af ter his returnf romManchuria H oH mannwas pro-
campaignaf terwardsbecameimportant leaders. The list mated tothe rank of major in1907,f illedstaf f appoint-
is impressive: GeneralsMarch, Pershing, and Crowder mentsinPosenandBerlin,anddidnot- as inthecaseof
of theUnited StatesArmy; SirIanH amiltonof Gallipoli Ludendorf f ,withwhomhewascloselyassociated- make
f ame; and General Caviglia who later became Italian himself unpopular by championinglost causes. H e lived
War Minister. inthesamehousewith Ludendorf f f rom1909to 1913in
No doubt this periodof travel and observationhad a Berlin,andsawhimstrugglesovigorouslyf or anincrease
broadeningandsoberingef f ectonthesomewhat arrogant inthesizeof thearmy that in1913hewastransf erredto
H of f mann. H is proud J unker naivetewas punctured in aninf antrycommandbywayof punishment. H of f mann's
conversationby sly Chinese mandarins, and his air of rank wasthat of lieutenant colonelin1914,andhiswar
superiority was shattered onthe tough imperturbability assignment was G.S.O.1(f irst general staf f of f icerin
of J apanesestaf f of f icers.Though disarmingly amiable chargeof operations) attachedtothe Eighth Army.
whenhewantedtobe,H of f manncouldbeandsometimes Advancingyearshadbythistimef illedout H of f mann's
wasathoroughlyirritatingperson. Inthetiresomeperiods hugef rame; hisruddy f acewasround; the light hair on
of inactivitybetweenbattleshewasof tenagreat trialto his "Bismarckianskull"wascroppedalmost to baldness.
hisGermancolleague,Major vanEtzel. Frederick Palm- H e wasextremelyvainabout hisappearance,trainedhis
er,thef amousAmericanwar correspondent,sawhimas bushy eyebrowsto slant upward, paid great attentionto
"a domineeringJ unker of theBismarckiantype." Of ten hisdelicatehandsandthecreaseinhistrousers. Pince- nez
he tried to get his ownway by sheer f orce,aprocedure glassesaddedanef f ectof superciliousdetachment to his
whichseldomworkedwith theJ apanese. Likeother ob- appearance. H e might have servedas a model f or the
serversheresentedtheintensesecrecyand excessivecau- war- timecaricatureof atypicalPrussianof f icer.H e had
tionof the J apanesestaf f . H e wanted toseemilitary ac- alreadybeguntodemonstrateanirrepressibleimpatience
tionsf romcloseup. Ononeoccasionheaskedpermission and growing irritability with slower minds, and anun-
towatchanoperationf romanearbyhill. WhenGeneral shakablesenseof self - conf idence.Survivingtracesof his
Fujii ref used,H of f mannlost his temper andshoutedbe- youthf ul recklessnessand buoyant spirit werenot to be
f orethegroupof f oreignattachesthat the Germanshad extinguishedby the day- and- night trialsof f our yearsof
taught theJ apseverythingtheyknewaboutwar,andnow staf f responsibility.
theyinturnwouldshowthemnothing. "Youareyellow H is colleaguesonthe staf f of the Eighth Army were
- you arenot c i vi li zed if youwillnot let mego tothat wellknowntohim. They includedColonel- Generalvon
hill!" ThediminutiveJ apaneseof f icerf lushedbut didnot Prittwitz, der di c ke soldat (thef at soldier), commander-
payH of f mannthecompliment of raisinghisvoicewhen in- chief ,"acleverbut harshsuperior"; Major- Generalvon
saying: "Youmay not go." Later GeneralFujii observed Waldersee,chief of staf f ,f ormer Quartermaster- General,
to thetactf ul Palmer: "We J apanesearepaying f or this but recentlyrecoveredf romaseriousillnessandoperation;
military inf ormationwith our blood: wedon't proposeto and General Griinert, Quartermaster- General. Though
shareitwithothers." H of f mannobservedasearlyasAugust 13: "Walderseeis
H of f mann returned f rom the East with f irst- hand rather weak- I hopehewill not let us downat thelast
knowledgeof howtheRussiansf ought, with anewlyde- minute," the divisionaland corpscommandersand staf f
velopedcynicismregarding the f olliesof his prof ession, of f icerswereof much sterner f ighting stuf f : Mackensen,
and aphilosophicalattitude towardsomeof the vagaries Fran<;ois,vonder Goltz,Kundt, Litzmann, Morgen, von
of of f icialdom. "The most important matter inthe Below,H ell- names that af terwardsbecamewell- known.
world," heusedto say, "is not how to mount aperf ect The roleof theEighth Army intherevisedSchlief f en
inf antry attack." H e tried to describethe warf are of planwas to hold of f aRussianinvasionof East Prussia
trenchesashesawit inManchuria, but expresseddoubts until af ter adecisivesuccessintheWest. Though itwas
astowhether itslessonswouldbegraspedinBerlin. As assumedthat theRussiansystemof reserveunitshadbeen
might beanticipated,trenchwarf areannoyedthehigher revampedaf ter 1905,therewaslittle def initeknowledge
of f icersof thegeneralstaf f . The younger Moltke wrote: of their numbers, organization,or f ighting value. From
"There neverwassuchacrazywayof makingwar." Sir inf ormationobtainedin1910 by ColonelNicolai of rhe
IanH amiltongot the sametreatment whenhe reported Germanintelligenceservice,itwasassumedthat aRussian
that theJ apanesehaddecidedthat theonlything cavalry attack onEast Prussiawould take the f ormof adouble
coulddointhef aceof entrenchedmachineguns was to advancef romthenorthandsouthwithajuncturebehind
cook ricef or the inf antry. "H e must have a tile loose the MasurianLakes. Fromthe dateof the Russianad-
somewhere"was the War Of f icecomment. H of f mann vance,it couldbededuced,however,whether or not the
alsobrought back withhimadear pictureof thepossible f orcewould includeunits f romthe easternmilitary dis-
military consequencesof previousmistakesindiplomacy. tricts (Moscow, Kazan, Caucasus, Siberia). If it came
H is contactswith J apaneseof f icersconvincedhim that soonaf ter the estimated completionof mobilizationf or
Germany would some day pay dearly f or the f olly of thewesternmilitarydistricts (Warsaw, Vilna, St. Peters-
f orcingtheJ apaneseto revisetheTreaty of Shimonoseki burg) onAugust 15,it wasobviousthat thetroopsf rom
inI~5. distant areaswouldnot beavailable. What surprisedthe
1940
H OFFMANN
1 7
of f icersof theEighth Arm:' wasthat thearmiesof Rennen-
bmpf and particularly Samsonof f were prepared to ad-
vancebef oretheir transport equipment was complete.
II
Likethat of H indenburg and Ludendorf f , the star of
H of f mannroseat Tannenberg. Becauseof the change of
commandwhich f ollowedthe momentary panic of Pritt-
witz,hewasoneof thef ewsenior staf f of f icerswho guided
thedestiniesof the Eighth Army f romthe f alsestart at
StallupOnento the crowning triumph of Tannenberg.
Noother campaignduring theFirst World War produced
moref antastic legends or more unsoldierly scrambling
f orhonorsamong theparticipants. Sincethemainf eatures
of theoperationarewell knownno attempt will bemade
torepeatthemhereexcept insof ar asthey relatetoH of f -
mann's activity.
Despiteattempts of somecriticsto attribute thesuccess
primarilyto his inRuence, H of f mann insisted that Tan-
nenbergwas not the victory of a single individual. H e:
maintainedthat asanexample of ef f ectivestaf f work, it
couldnot becompared to certainother operations inthe
East,notably the campaignof Lodz in1914. A study of
theoperationconf irmsthis opinion. It wasthespectacular
culminationof thebattle, comingontheheelsof Gumbin-
nenand of f setting the disaster at the Marne, which
appealedto the imaginationof the Germanpublic. But
thosewho eagerly accepted the legends of Tannenberg
didnot knowof thehasty improvisations, thef alsemoves,
theconf usion, and the decisive acts of insubordination
andinitiative by corps and divisional commanders, and
theheart- breaking marches of the inf antry which com-
binedtohidetheseweaknesses.
To anystaf f of f icerwho had sat at Schlief f en's f eet, the
correctlineof actionf or the Eighth Army inevent of a
convergingattack by two Russianarmies was pike- staf f
plain. The whole Germanf orceshould be directed f irst
against one, thenagainst the other Russianf orce. De-
structionof potentially superior f orces indetail was the
ancient and appropriate solution. Itwas, inf act, the
coursedecided uponby Prittwitz, Waldersee, Griinert,
andH of f mann af ter Gumbinnen had shakenthe nerve
of Prittwitz and he had secretly telephoned his jittery
resolutiontoretirebehind theVistula to thef alseserenity
of Moltke's headquarters intheWest.
FromH of f mann's diariesit becomes clear that the date
of themuch disputed General Order No.8, which pre-
paredthe way f or Samsonof f 's disaster, was August 20
at9:30P.M. andnot asstatedintheof f icialaccount of the
Rei c hsarc hi v, August 21. The matter of the changed
dateonthis all- important order withdrawing f orcesf rom
inf ront of Rennenkampf and concentrating them against
Samsonof f is closely bound up with the questionof su-
premehonorsf or H indenburg andLudendorf f . The popu-
lar versionof Ludendorf f sending battle orders to the
Eighth Armv while enroute to the east will not bear
examination.' Indeed, the only orders received by the
headlessEighth Army had e;il results. Not only was
the whole command upset by the brusk replacement of
Prittwitz and conf used by letting the command tem-
porarily f all to each corps, but a day's rest was ordered
f or all corps, which had to be made up later by f orced
marches, and the headquarters of the army was moved
back to Marienburg- a most illogical choice. All these
unhappy decisions could havebeenavoided had Moltke
or the new commanders usedthe telephone. WhenH in-
denburg andLudendorf f arrivedinMarienburg and asked
H of f mann as the remaining staf f of f icer to explainthe
situationindetail, they f ound that allthe necessaryorders
preparing f or anatt~ck onSamsonof f s army had already
beengiven. The questionof transf erring the remaining
I Reserve Corps and the XVII Corps depended upon
Rennenkampf 's actionwhenhediscoveredthe evacuation
of the Germanpositionat theAngerapp.
H of f mann's knowledge of Russianmentality was soon
of great valueto the newly arrived commanders. Russian
wirelessordersen c lai r hadbeenintercepted bytheKonigs-
berg radiostationandf orwarded toheadquarters. One of
these messages set Rennenkampf 's objectives f or August
26 as the line Gerdauen- Allenburg- Wehlau. The other
showed that Samsonof f had interpreted the retreat of the
German XX Corps as indicating a general retirement.
If genuine, thesemessagesshowedthat theRussianmove-
ments would play directly into the Germanhand. But
couldthey beregarded asgenuine and not asubtle trick?
H of f mann assured Grunert this "naivete was typically
Russian" and insisted they werebonaf ide. Whensubse-
quent Russianactionconf irmed this opinion, other wire-
lessmessageswere correctly regarded as genuine. These
interceptions proved of immense value to the Eighth
Army, and whenthe Russians f inally adopted a cipher,
the code was easily discovered by the German experts.
Throughout all the stages of Tannenberg H of f mann
urged that theGermans couldaf f ordtotake great risksin
dealing with their enemy commanders. H e told Luden-
dorf f howSamsonof f 's heroicSiberiantroops had beenlet
downby Rennenkampf while def ending the Yentai coal
mines in1905. H e also told of the blistering interview
betweenthese two commanders af ter the battle onthe
Mukdenrailwaystationwheretheseunlucky commanders
nearly came to blows bef ore a group of embarrassed
f oreignattaches. To the anxiously repeated question:
"Will Rennenkampf march?" H of f mann replied, ''I'm
damned if hewill!"
The written accounts and diaries of H of f mann show
that the popular misconceptionof the battle as having
beenplanned and executed onthe Cannae principle can-
not bemaintained. The wholemovement of the German
east wing to envelop Samsonof f developed out of the
heaven- sent inactivity of Rennenkampf . H e thus ref utes
theeloquent special- pleadingof certainGermanhistorians
such as Dr. H ans De1briick. Nor does he share Mr.
Churchill's enthusiasm f or General Fran~ois as the prin-
cipal hero of Tannenberg. H e praisesFran~ois'judicious
insubordinationinslowing up the attack onUsdau and
inadvancing along the N eidenburg- Willenburg railway.
IS
w
~ 1 00
.
S CALE IN MILE S
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
B A L T IC
PR O VI N C E S
~OVNO
Map 1: Tbe si tuati on before Ta1l11enberg
/tll1l1tlrY-Febrrta]
GE RMANS n'
I!m AUS T RIANS
CJ RUS S IANS
.VI L N A
MI N S K
1940
H OFFMANN
19
As the German i nfantry marc hed ;' lto Lodz
These acts of initiative, like those of Morgen :ll1d1\'f ack-
ensen, added greJ tly to the success of the Eighth Army,
but he also remembered Fran~ois' rash action at StaI-
lup6nen. H e protested when Fran~ois wrote J gainst Lu-
dendorf f in the Rei c hsflagge f or September 17, 192),
claiming that Ludendorf f 's memoirs concerning T J nnen-
berg were of "no historicJ I vJ lue." H e J ppJ rently f elr
that H indenburg made his weight f elt only onone OCCJ -
sianduring the encounter, when the situJ tion of the XVII
and the I Reserve Corps seemed criticJ I on August 27.
H ere the ponderous H indenburg bolstered the shJ king
nerve of Ludendorf f J nd insisted that previous decisions
beadhered to. Of f iciJ lly H of f mJ nn observed insummJ ry:
"The decision to f ight the bJ ttle WJ S tJ ken under the
commJ nd and on the responsibility of Colonel- GenerJ I
\'onPrittwitz; J nd the logical and inevitable f ulf illment
of that decision, which led to the great victory, took pbce
under the commJ nd J nd onthe responsibility of Colonel-
GenerJ ! von H indenburg." Privately he used to show
\'isitors H indenburg's old bed at Ober-Ost J nd remJ rk:
"There iswhere the Field Nf arshal slept before the battle,
that iswhere heslept after the battle, J nd thJ t, my f riends,
iswhere he slept duri ng the battle."
Inaddition to giving the name T J nnenberg to the
\,ictory, H of f mJ nn hJ d to intervene personally on two
occasions to stem the tide of pJ nic incertain units of the
Eighth Army. The bt of these wild unpredictable our-
breaks came af ter the Gern1J n victory was absolutely J S-
sured J nd it WJ Sonly J mJ tter of collecting Russian pris-
oners. T annenberg had all the earmarks of a f irst cam-
paign. Even those who were supposed to know most
about the af f air were f rankly astonished J t the bag of
prisoners. H of f mann and Count Dohna were talking on
September 1st abom the probJ ble number of prisoners.
Dohna set the number at 20,000 and H of f mann at ,0-
40,000. The total captures ran to 92,000 men and .150
guns. When the def eat of Rennenbmpf September 9- 14,
cleared East PrussiJ of the Russian invader, the theatre of
activity of the Eighth Army widened. The armies of
Austria needed quick relief .
III
T annenberg and the Nf asurian Lakes brought H of f -
mann the IronCross First Cbss- won, as he observed, by
sitting at the telephone. Although he gradually assumC<1
a dominating role inall operations matters inthe East,
he did not receive the coveted order Pour Ie Meri te nor
anincreJ se inrJ nk until he WJ Sinthe curious position of
being the Chief of StJ f f to the CommJ nder- in- Chief in
the EJ st with the rJ nk of lieutenant- coloneI. The com-
binJ tion H indenburg- Ludendorf f - H of f mJ nn proved to be
In unusually ef f ective one. H indenburg provided the
sociJ I f ront and bJ bnce, Ludendorf f the driving energy
J nd rare organizing ability, H of f mann the f ertility of
ideJ s and CJ ustic sense of reality. H e knew the Russians
so well that they only surprised him once during the war
20 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL Ja1J/JaI' J-Febrnary
and- - to hissorrow- he sooncametoknowtheAustrians ThequarrelwithFalkenhaynwasbasedonanessential
equallywell. dif f erenceof views. AsChief of Staf f of theFieldArmies
While Falkenhaynwasattempting to retrievethe loss Falkenhavndidnot believeinthe attainment of decisi~
suf f eredbv Moltke inthewest,theGermanarmiesinthe resultsf r~manexperiment ona600- kilometerf ront with
eastunde~ook aseriesof brilliant movementstoof f setthe the small Germanf orcesavailable. H e was essentially
Austriandef eat at Lemberg. Conrad vonH otzendorf f 's a limited- objectiveman, who regarded the activitieso f
audaciousplanshadcollapsedandnearlyseventyAustrian the Easternarmiesasmerely "collectingRussianprison-
divisionshadbeencrowdedintoapocketonthewestbank ers." As if to vindicatehis rather discouragingf orecast,
of theVislokabetweentheVistulaand theCarpathians. the armiesof Conrad bogged downintheir attack, and
To relievethemaboldadvancebythenewlyf ormedGer- theadvanceof thereinf orcedGermanarmiesinthenorth
manNinth Army wasmadeonSeptember 27 ontheline imposed bitter suf f erings onthe troops inthe winttt
Opatov- Ostrowiec- Ilza- Radom- Tomaszow- Koliszki. The battleinMasuria (February7- 21, 1915) andonlyresulted
rapidityof thischangeof f ront by theGermancommand inthe destructionof the RussianTenth Army.
surprisedthe Russians,and causedthemto withdraw 14 Whenoperationswereresumedinthe springof 19
1
5.
army corpsf romtheAustrianf ront. ByOctober 12 the Falkenhayninvaded the preserves of H indenburg and
GermanNinth Armywaswithintwelvemilesof Warsaw, Ludendorf f by sending Mackensenonanindependent
but wasf orcedtoretreat by heavyRussianpressure. break- throughmissionat GorIiceinMay. Widestrategic
As soonastheRussianadvanceweakened, theNinth resultsf ollowed. ThewholeRussianf ront recoiled.Falk-
Army wasquickly withdrawnf romthe southernPolish enhayn's star continuedintheascentwith therepulseof
f ront and transported northward. OnNovember 3 it FrenchandBritishattacksontheWesternFront in19
1
5,
wasinplacepreparedtoadvanceagainsttheRussianFif th, and intheconquest of Serbia. The great heroesof 1 9
1
4
Second,and First Armies. These operationsresultedin - H indenburg- Ludendorf f - H of f mann- were now play-
thef amousbattleof Lodz. They representedthewar of ing minor roles. When they resistedFalkenha~:n'sef -
movement at its highest point of development inthe f orts to reducetheir f orcesf or the Serbianventure, he
East. AstheGermanXX andXXV ReserveCorpsturned wiredbluntly: "Whether your Excellency (H indenburgJ
the Rank and virtually surrounded parts of the Russian agreeswith the viewsof OH L doesnot matter. Everv
SecondArmy, they inturnwereattacked and virtually portionof our f orcesmust adapt itself unconditionallv
surroundedbytheRussianLovitchf orce.Daysandnights to OH L." H of f mannopenlygrousedat thedistribution
of ceaselessanxiety f ollowedf or H of f mann. "One has of decorationssaying ironically: "Mackensenis tohave
needof nerveslikeropes,"hecomplained. Intheendthe command. Now that all availablehonors, titles, and
Germanf orcesbrokethrough theRussianlinescarrying ordershavebeenshoweredinsoshort atimeonthisone
their prisonerswiththem. Whenthebattledieddownon devoted head, af ter the capture of Belgrade there is
thenorthernPolishf ront at thecloseof theyear, atem- nothing lef t but to rechristenhim'Prinz Eugen.''' As
porarylineof positionsranf romEast Prussiasouthward theyear 1915drewtoitsdose, andasH of f mannwatched
through Plotsk, alongtheVistula and Nida to Tarnow hisrestlesschief sat Kovnointrigue against Falkenhavn.
andtheCarpathians. hecametoseef or the f irst time "history asit realh.0(-
Thesestrikingoperationsnot only brought H of f mann curs."Though hisownhatredf orFalkenhaynwasintense
into contact with the exasperating inef f iciencyof the andunremitting, hesawthat this continual strugglef or
Austrianwar machine, but the succeeding operations power at thetop of the army "destroyedallmen's char-
brought hissuperiorsintodirectconf lictwithFalkenhayn. acter." H e saw that the much- vaunted loyalty of the
TheEasternCommandhadbeendisappointedinOctober Germanof f icercorpswasjustsomuchidletalk. "If anyone
andNovember, 1914, whenthef our newly raisedarmy comesnear me with a Nibelung's oath of f idelity and
corpshadbeensent tothewest andwastedintheattacks of f erstodieinbattleat my side- I shallknock hishead
onYpres. Inthe opinionof Ludendorf f and H of f mann of f ."
thesecorpsmight haveproduced decisiveresults inthe H e regarded Falkenhaynas "the evil genius of the
East. With Conrad they urged that, oncethe modif ied Fatherland" and sawlittlehopef or Germany aslongas
Schlief f enplanhadf ailed,themajor ef f ortof theCentral "that criminal- had theKaiserinhispocket." ToH of f -
Powersshouldbedirectedagainst Russia. SinceFalken- mann's repeatedappealsf ortroopsto carryout hopedf or
hayn's battles inFlanders had merely produced heavy decisivestrokesagainst Russia,Falkenhaynturnedadeaf
casualtyliststhe EasternCommand made adetermined earorwithlof ty ironyremarked: "Againandagainthere
bidtowrestf our newarmycorpswhichwereavailablein werelocalcommanders who maintained that thev had
J anuary, 1915, f romthe control of Falkenhayn. Ina discoveredasureway of striking amoreor lesss~rious,
showdownmeeting at the Imperial War Ministry on indeed,adecisiveblow- if onlythenecessarymeanswas
NewYear'sDay, 1915,theKaiserf inallydecidedinf avor placedat their disposal. Now itwasf our,nowtwent\'or
of the EasternCommand. The f our new corps were moredivisions,of course,with the correspondingheavy
transf erredtotheEast,andConradandLudendorf f under- artilleryandammunition. _ _ "
took a gigantic double- envelopment attack f rom East H of f mann's irritationat Falkenhaynextended to th e
Prussiainthenorth toGaliciainthesouth. government which supported him. Sometimes, when
-
1940
>-
z
H OFFMANN
MaP 2: The whIter of 1915-' 16
MI N S K
N
21
R1I5si al1 tToOPS evac uati ng If/arsalV
sbortly before tbe fall of tbe c i ty
~ ,
:); ;
Even bef ore H indenburg and Ludendorf f departed f or
their historic and f atef ul mission inth~West, it was clear
that H of f mann was the intellectual mainspring of the East-
erncommand. H is special province was operations gu~s-
tions, and inthis f ield he earl" reached anef f ective work-
ing arrangement with Ludendorf f . H is diaries reveal that
22 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL lal1/1ary-Februar)
vexed beyond endurance by the "slimy treatment" his in most cases he had his way. \Vhere he did not, he
chief s were receiving, H of f mann would break out bef ore always put f orth his views with vigor, and made the best
the visiting politicians at ObeT-Ost saying: "\Ve can't ~o of the other plans. H e was aglutton f or work, took verv
onmuch longer with adamned slack government like ours little exercise, and f ound it impossible to get his quota of
- it isbeginning to smell to heaven." H e took anactive sleep. \Vhen perplexed subordinates brought their prab-
part in the intrigues of H indenburg and Ludendorf f lems, he would call f or the maps and end by doing the
against Falkenhayn, writing the critical statements, work himself . To keep going he drank black cof f ee and
speeches, and telegrams of H indenburg. Nf ore than once cognac incessantly. As his blood pressure increased under
during the period of Falkenhayn's ascendency, H of f mann the strain, so did his temper. H is already bitter tono- lie
longed f or the assignment to a f ighting command, but became increasingly acid. \Vhen well- meaning di;lo-
Ludendorf f would not spare him, and his relations with his matists asked what the best means of breaking the power
two f amous chief s were onsuch independent lines that of the sluggard aristocracy of Vienna, H of f mann answered
he would have beenlost inany f ighting position towhich "strychnine!" As f or his relations with Ludendorf f he
his low rank would have entitled him. H e stayed, and the observed: "\Ve get onexcellently inspite of a f ew dif -
meninthe East soonhad their innings.' f erences of opinion, over which he f inally gives wav."
Falkenhayn's luck ranout inthe spring and summer of Although H of f mann charitably ref erred to his new chief .
1 9
1 6
. H is tragic decision to attack Verdun was f ollowed Leopold of Bavaria, as "an impassioned soldier and a
by the Brusilov of f ensive, the English attack on the Grand Sei gneur," he also makes it clear that f rom Septem-
Somme, and Rumania's entrance into the war onthe side ber, 1 91 6, on "the entire responsibility f or the Eastern
of the Entente. The pressure f or his removal became over- f ront" was his own. The routine at Ober-Ost was as
whelming. On August 31 , 1 91 6, H indenburg replaced f ollows:
him as Chief of Staf f of the Field Armies with Ludendorf f "Every morning at about eleven o'clock H .R.H .
as his Quartermaster- General. Falkenha)'n's f ace was (Leopold) came to my of f iceto hear the report; hehad
saved by giving him command against Rumania, and his mid- day meal at home (Szkoki), and inthe eve-
H of f mann inherited the whole military burden of the ning at balf - past seven be came to the mess dinner at
Eastern f ront as Chief of Staf f to Leopold of Bavaria. the of f icers' quarters .... H e was always at m)' dis-
H of f mann apparently never overcame his distaste f or posal at any time if he were required (except inshoot-
Falkenhayn. \Vhen the latter came to the Eastern f ront ing season)."
as anarm)' commander af ter the Rumanian and Turkish \Vhile Falkenha)'n overwhelmed Rumania and Luden-
campaigns, H of f mann dealt with him onl)' through his dorf f repaired the mistakes of the previous regime inthe
chief of staf f . V./est, H of f mann's main task was to support the Eastern
IV f ront with the limited resources at his disposal. Inthis
task the undependable character of his Austrian allies was
his main headache. Itwas necessary to bolster their sag-
ging morale and f ighting capacity b)' inserting more and
1940
H OFFMANN
23
moreGerman"corset- stave divisions"into the line. H is
ironywasboundless:
."The Austrians have grownmore and more dear to
me inthe last f ortnight. They are really impossible.
... Not content with running away, they lieand send
inf alsereports, and with it all arequite unashamed.
.. Ishouldliketogo towar with them! "
To this sort of criticism, the Austrians replied with
subtlety, conf erring uponH of f mann the Austrian Iron
Cross,Second Class! Ef f ective cooperationbecame even
moredif f icultaf ter theArchduke Karlreplacedthe talent-
edConrad with ameremilitary errand boy, General Arz.
The GermanGeneral vanSeeckt who was sent asamili-
tary adviser to Karl helped somewhat, but he seemed to
become"Austrianized" intheprocess. H of f manndidnot
sharethe post- war Germanenthusiasm f or vonSeeckt's
militarytalents.
Throughout 1916 and 1917 H of f manncooperated very
closelywith Ludendorf f inthe advancement of the Ru-
maniancampaign and inthe def ensive battles inthe
West. H e describedtheEasternf ront asa"widow's cruse
of oil"f rom which he always managed to scrape up a
f ewreinf orcements whenthey were badly needed. Ina
moment of self - conf idenceheoncedeclaredhewould hold
theEasternf ront single- handed if necessary! This close
cooperationwith the Quartermaster- General continued
until larger questions of policy: Poland, the V- boat war,
andpeaceterms, gradually separatedthem.
H of f mannseems to have beenoneof the f ew soldiers
who throughout the war kept the f act inmind that the
purposeof war isto make peace. Fromthe f irst he advo-
catedstrictly limited territorial claims. The arrogant and
absurdclaimsof the Pan- GermanParty he opposedwith
allhismight. They wereacting asif thewar was already
won- H of f mann knew better. H e saw that Germany
couldnot hope towinamilitary victory over her enemies
before theRussianrevolutionchanged the whole picture.
H ewanted nopart of Belgiumexcept Liege, and nomore
of Poland thanwould give Germany a strong def ensive
lineinthe East. For atime Ludendorf f seemed to share
theseviews. H e promisedH of f manninSeptember, 1916,
that if the slightest possibility of areasonable peace pre-
sented itself , he would grab it with both hands. The
U- boatwar heopposed,not onmoral grounds, but onthe
strongsuspicionthat Germany did not possessthe neces-
sarynumber of U- boats to carry it of f successf ully. To
theendof thewar heremained ignorant and f rankly con-
temptuous of Americanmilitary strength. These erratic
views ref lected his absorptioninthe af f airs of his own
f ront. H e naturally appeared at his worst whenof f erin?;
anopiniononsomething heknew nothing about.
InMarch, 1917, the Russianrevolutiontook placeand
theregime of Kerensky replaced that of the Romanovs.
Sincethe aimof the provisional government was to con-
tinuethe war f or the previous imperialistic objectives, no
immediate change occurred inthe af f airs of the Eastern
command. Until theNovember RevolutionRussiantroops
still f ought with dogged resolutiononthe def ense and
WIth anoccasional display of dash inthe attack. H of f -
manndidnot haveenough troopsf or big- scalemovements
of the 1915type, but hewas ableto cany out anumber
of tidy limited attacks. H e combined a remarkable eye
f or points of strategic advantage with avery realistic ap-
preciationof the troop and transport requirements. H e
worked out a theory onthe extent of Russianadvances
against the Austrians by calculating the distance f rom
where railway destructionbegan. H e discoveredinLieu-
tenant- Colonel Bruckmiiller anartillery expert whoseskill
inreconnaissance enabled him to estimate to ahundred
shellstheartillery preparationrequired f or agivenattack.
InApril, 1917, hesupervisedaneat and economicalopera-
tioninvolving the capture of the Toboly bridgehead. In
J uly, 1917,hecounteredthef inalRussianof f ensiveagainst
the Austrians by a swif t attack against Tarnopol which
caused the whole Russianf ront inGaliciato recoil. The
troops which H of f mann borrowed f romthe west f or the
Tarnopol operationwereretained until September to en-
ablehimtocarryout along- desiredattack onRiga.
The Rigaoperationby theGermanEighth Army under
General vanH utier beganonSeptember 1 and was in-
stantly successf ul. This f ar- reaching victory not only vin-
dicated the new inf iltrationmethod of attack but it re-
vealed astartling declineinRussianmorale. The enemy
inf antry no longer held its ground long enough to be
scoopedup by the Germandragnet. H of f mann decided
to take advantage of this conditioninorder to take the
J acobstadt bridgehead ontheDuna. H e alsoarranged f or
a joint naval and military operationagainst the Dago,
Moon, and Osel Islands. With these successf ul move-
ments active military operations against the Russians
ceased,pending theassumptionof peacenegotiations.
Intheautumnof 1917 H of f mannassertsthat hewould
have beenable to add considerable Germanunits f rom
the east to the Caporetto attack onItaly- had he been
askedtodoso. Whether or not theAustrianrailway sys-
temcould have handled them intime f or the attack is
doubtf ul. None the less, this curious observationof his
indicates agrowing lack of coordinationbetweenLuden-
dorf f andhiserstwhilecolleague. The realbreak between
thetwo, however, cameover political rather thanmilitary
questions. H of f mannopposedthef ormationof aseparate
Polish state onthe grounds that its creationwould bring
no military advantage to Germany and would dim the
prospects of a separate peace with Russia. Ludendorf f
wanted toaddaconsiderablestrip of Polishterritory tothe
Empire. The GermanEmperor sharedH of f mann's views.
To the latter's embarrassment the Emperor ordered him
to attend a painf ul meeting with OH L onJ anuary 2,
1918, inorder topresent hisviews. Bef oredoing soH of f -
manntried repeatedly to seeLudendorf f to explainthat
the Emperor had ordered him to take this step. H e
f ound Ludendorf f "too busy" to seehim bef ore or af ter
themeeting. -
So H of f mann appeared at the f atef ul meeting and ad-
vocated adding only the districts of Bendzinand Thorn,
the heights of Mlava, and the crossing of the Bohr at
24 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
Osowiecto Germany. Ludendorf f 's planscalledf or add- ly over- estimatedtheir capacity to sell f oodstuf f s. Con-
ingabout 2,000,000 PolestotheGermanpopulation,and stant f rictionbetweenGermansandUkrainiansf inallvled
theEmperor f irmlydecidedinf avor of H of f mann's pro- to themurder of GeneralEichhorn, the GermanGover-
gram. This led Ludendorf f to ask f or H of f mann's dis- nor, onAugust 1. And toaddtoH of f mann's problems,
missalandmadeplanstotransf erhimtothecommandof theGermantroopsintheoccupiedareaswerewilly- nilly
a di vi si on by way of punishment. But by this time the thrownincontact with Bolsheviki ideas and doctrines.
Emperor was getting tired of Ludendorf f s prima donna H of f mannlaughed early in1918 whenthe RussianAd-
temper andstronglysupportedH of f mann. At theendof miralAltvater toldhimhowhissailorsinthe Balticsta-
this painf ul episodeH of f mannwent back to his head- tions had simply melted away af ter being exposedto
quarters at Brest- Litovsk,but Ludendorf f never f orgave Bolsheviki propaganda and warned that the samethi~
him. wouldhappentothe Germannavalandmilitary leaders.
V Later, asthe f ortunesof war turned against Germanv in
H of f mann's roleat thetreatv of Brest- Litovskhasof ten theWest, H of f mannrecalledAltvater's warning andad-
beenwildlydistorted. H ewa; OH L representativeat the mittedthat theRussianwasright. Studentsof thepresent
meetings. Under the constitutionof the Empire, Secre- conf lictmay f indinexistingconditionsanumber of in-
tary of State Kuhlmannhad soleresponsibility f or the tetesting patallelsto thesituationintheEast in1918.
negotiationof the treaty, but actually Ludendorf f was VI
running the GermanEmpire at this stage. H of f mann To H of f mann's wayof thinking thecollapseof Russia
merely carriedout thewishesof OH L. Whenthe Bol- of f eredthe Germans ararebit of soldier'sluck. If onl"
sheviki delegatessought tomakeBrest- Litovskthesound- the assumptionof unrestrictedU- boat warf arehad bee~
ingboardf or their propagandaef f orts,talkedblandly of delayedaf ewmonths, the advantagesof its occurrence
peacewithout annexations,anddelayedprocedureonsilly might not havebeenof f setby theentranceof theUnited
pretexts, H of f mannput them intheir place. Taking a Statesintothewar. H estillhopedinthespringof 19
18
lessonf romthe experiencewith General Fujii in1905, that apeaceacceptableto Germany might be attained.
H of f manndid so without rising f romhis placeat the Ludendorf f ,however,hadby this timenervedhimself to
table,without poundingthetableor raisinghisvoice. In takethegreatestmilitary gambleinhistory. H e decided
plainsoldier language he told them that the Russian onapeaceof f ensiveinthe west aimed to winthe war
delegatesweretheretoreceiveterms not todictatethem. bef oreAmericanmanpower could turnthe balance. A
This put anend to Trotzky's oratory. Whenthe latter steadystreamof Germandivisionsmovedf romtheEast-
lef ttheconf erencewiththedizzy announcement that the ernf ~onttothewest. Whenthedependabledivisionshad
Russianswould not signthetreaty- but that the war was beensent, H of f manngraduallysent smaller artilleryand
at an end, H of f mannbrought themback to realitiesby engineer units, leavingf ormations of older mento hold
settingtheGermanarmiesinmotionallalongthef ront. theoccupiedareas.
This advance presented interesting military problems, Unf ortunately f or Germany the old liaisonbetween
chief lythoseof transport. Russianresistanceexcept f or H of f mannandLudendorf f nolonger existed. The Quat-
localunits disappearedand inf antry pushed f orward in termaster- General evidently did not f eel the need of
trucksandrailwaycars. TheBolshevikigovernmenr soon usingH of f mann's brainontheWesternf ront. Truethe
sawthewisdomof signingthetreaty. latter knewthesituationintheeastbetter thananvonein
These experiences gave H of f mann a prof ound con- Germany, but the f ighting was over onthat f ro~t, and
tempt f or the Communist mind and a convictionthat H of f mannwasenoughof asoldiettocraveactiveservice
their crazy and murderous conduct and philosophy held whenevet possible. Perhaps H of f mann's utter f rankness
great potential menacetoallof Europe. H is relationsat hadendedallhopesof renewedcooperation.WhenLuden-
Brest- Litovskwith the Austrians were along the usual dorf f at their last meeting in1918 spokeof his coroin?;
unpleasant lines. Count Czernin, theAustriandelegate, of f ensiveinthewest,sayinghe"didnot knowwhether it
was so eager to have a treaty concludedf or f ear of an wouldbebetter toprobe thef ront byindividualattacksor
Austriancollapse,that whenthingsdraggedonhethreat- makeagigantic driveat agivenpoint with concentrated
enedtosignaseparatepeacewith Russia. If heintended f orces,"H of f mannis said to have replied: "Excellenz,
this as aweaponover the Germans' heads, H of f mann anysecondlieutenant who answeredthequestioninthat
neatlybrought it downonhis ownby observingthat he w~yonhis examinationwouldbehopelesslyploughed!"
f avoredthissplendi d plansinceit wouldf reetwenty- f ive Thus, whileGermanyapproachedhergreatcrisis,thetwO
German divisions which were necessary to hold the best military brains inthe Empirecontinuedto work in
Austrianf ront. That wastheendof sep~ratepeacetalk. separateair- tight compartments.
With theconclusionof thepeacetreaty Germanef f orts The moment it appearedthat theMarch of f ensiveta-
tosecurestocksof grainf romtheBalticprovincesandthe wardAmiens hadf ailed,H of f mannheldthat Ludendotf f
Ukraine began. Onpaper the Germanprogramlooked should have advisedthe Chancellor that all hopeof a
good,but it f illedf ewf oodbins. The peasantshidtheir military victory inthe west had passed away. OH L.
stocks,transportf acilitieswerelimitedorcrippledthrough however,continued its programof piecemealof f ensives.
want of lubricants,andtheUkrainiandelegatesenormous- eachf ormidableyet f ailingtoproduceadecision. Onecan
1940 H OFFMANN
25
searchmilitary literatureinvainf or anexampleof more
torturouslanguage or moremuddled thinking thanwas
usedby H indenburg to explainthis policy. The Field
Marshalwrote: "Wealso wantedsotoshattertheenemy's
structureby closelyconnectedparti al blowsthat it must
4tc r all sometimebreak down." Words such as "also,"
"partial," and "af ter all" had no placeinthe German
crisisof 1918. Meantime H of f mannwasholdinghispost
intheeastwithatotalof twelveGermandivisions.These
werestrung along the new f rontier f romthe Baltic to
the Ukraine. With these f orceshe could protect Ger-
manyf romtheinvasionof aRedarmy, but hecouldnot
sealthe f rontier against the penetrationof Communist
propaganda.
Twiceduringtheimpendingcollapseinthewesthewas
sent to Berlinto appear bef oremeetings of OH L repre-
sentativesandthePrivy Council. H ereheobtainedf irst-
handevidenceof direstraits of theFatherland. H e was
appalledat theconf usionof itsmilitaryandpoliticallead-
ers. Ludendorf f playedto the gallery of politicianswith
sugaredwordsabout "my loyalcomradeH of f mann" but
f oundmeanstosidetrackmost of histestimony. For the
rest he f retted away the tragic hours at Kovno piecing
togetherf romrumor andsecond- handaccountstheagon-
izingstoryof thecollapseof theCentral Powers. What
madeit hardwasthat hecouldseemuch of it coming:
the Bulgariansurrender, the Austriancapitulation, and
the slowly mounting disaster inthe west, but had no
powerto alter thesituation. H is elasticmind couldstill
f indalittlecoldcomf ort inthe Austriandebacle: "We
shallcurluplikeahedgehog ... andtaketheGerman
part of Austria ascompensationf or what weshalllose."
Whenthingsbecamehopelessinthewest andLudendorf f
resignedonOctober 27, H of f mannwasgladtobepassed
overf or Groner who replacedhim. Under lessdesperate
conditions H of f mann would have been Ludendorf f 's
logicalsuccessor,but hewanted no part of the "under-
taker'sr8Ie."
Whenthe armisticeand abdicationof the Emperor
cameinNovember, it wasof somesatisf actionto H of f -
mannthat hecouldstillwalk around ObeT-Ost without
aguard. H e never f ound it necessarytodisguisehimself
withbluespectaclesf romtheattentionof his owntroops
aswasthecasewith Ludendorf f . H e stayedonthe job
withtheEasternarmy, andalthough it involvedthedis-
tastef ul task of dickering with soldiers' councils, he
brought the army home. To the end hetried to set an
example of order which he f elt was necessaryf or the
survivalof the Germannationinits great trial. But be-
f orethe vast af f airsof the Easterncommand could be
wound up, the mencouldno longer bedependedupon.
The f inal entry inhis war diary was f or December 31,
19
18
. Itrepresentedaf ar cry f romthe gloriousdays'of _
Tannenberg saying simply: "The troops will f ight no
" more.
Af ter thewar H of f mannretainedhis intensehatred of
Bolshevismandsawinit theprincipaldangertoEuropean
stabiliry. H etriedhardtoingratiatepostwar Germany in
theeyesof theAlliesby proposingajoint Allied- German
"sanitarycampaign"againstRussia. H is Berlinhomebe-
came the mecca of all types of anti- Communist sym-
pathizers f romcrackpotsto oil magnates. But his anti-
Moscow drivenever materialized. Though he still ap-
pearedhaleandvigorous,theunremitting nervoustension
of thewar yearshadundermined hisphysicalhealth. An
illnessintheyear 1927 provedf atal. H e diedinBerchtes-
gadenonJ uly 8. Inhis f inal moments of deliriumhe
seemedtobelivingoverthedecisiveattack onUsdau. H e
diedshouting: "Fire! Fire! Artillery f orward!"
Perhaps the best estimationof H of f mannas asoldier
wasthat of his adversaries,the Russians. They, at least,
hadnoreasontowithholdtheir admirationf orhismilitary
resourcef ulnessand intrepidity. They regarded "Gof f -
mann," asthey calledhim, withakindof awedaf f ection.
Wherever they f lungtheir massesof inf antry,.sooner or
later (depending ontherailways) they met with theun-
yielding barriersof his Germaninf antry and artillery or
suf f eredthe swif t piercing stroke of his counter thrust.
H e was too intellectually arrogant to be popular with
manypeople. H is verypresencealwaysmadethelessin-
telligent half of his associatesuncomf ortable. H is war
memoirsweref ar tooacidto bepublished inf ull. And
sincehis criticismof the Germanhigh command inthe
crisisof 1918 wassodestructivetothef amousDolc hstoss
legend (thehomelandstabbedthearmy intheback), he
hasnot beenimmortalizedby theNazis who havetried
tobuildtheir newarmyonthepsychologicalf oundations
of thismyth. H ewillnot need- anyartif icialhonors,how-
ever,sincehistorywilldoubtless.vindicatetheobservation
of Conrad vonH otzendorf f : "H of f mannwas the only
manof ideasontheEasternf ront."
1
<
Tbese Fi nni sb soldi ers
were pbotograpbed dur-
i ng maneuvers pri or to
tbe outbreak of bosti li ti es
)
A Fi nni sb fatber and two S01lS en
route to answer tbe mobi li zati on
c all
A Fi nni sb i nfantryman
)
Tbe spearbead of one of tbe Fi nni sb
flyi ng COIU11/115 tbat balle been bar-
assi ng tbe Red ;,waders
~- - _ ......~
- .
-... ~ ...-
~...::~

)
Tbese are ski -11/ounted
i nffllltr)' 11/en awai ti ng ac -
ti on. Noti c e bow even at
c lose range wbi te lmi -
forms blend i nto the snow

(
A twi n-11/ount anti ai rc rtlft mac bi ne
gun stands on tbe alert agai nst tbe
hedgebo/}per
One of Norway' s i nfantrJ' men.
Note tbe sbort ba)' onet
J , A li gbt mac bi ne-gr~n ~lItpost ne.ar
T tbe Norwegi an-Fr1l1l1Sb frontIer
- -
Top: Tbe frollti er troops are equi pped wi tb li gbt mortars
Bottom: Tbe border i s buttressed by mac bi ne gll1mers
---
Left: Ski s help thi s Swedi sh i nfantryman to negoti ate
snow-lad en c Ol/ntr)'
Center: Thi s i s an automati c ri fle nest i n Laflland
In wi nter, Swedi sh soldi ers trlwel by straw-li ned truc k
~
By C aptain J . F. G amber, C oast A rtillery C orps
The Knox Trophy- presented annually by the Society
of the Sons of the American Revolution inthe Common-
wealth of 1vf assachusetts f or excellence intarget practice
- this year goes to anantiaircraf t organization: Battery
B. 63d Coast Artillery of Fort MacArthur, Calif ornia.
As commander of the battery at the time it f ired its prac-
tice I should like brieH y to summarize the excellent work
and wholehearted cooperation of the battery personnel
which brought success to the organization.
In1939 Battery B. 63d Coast Artillery (AA). held its
target practice on the Upper Reservation of Fort ?vbc-
Arthur. Calif ornia. In previous years. the battery had
moved to atent camp at Carlsbad. Calif ornia, about sixty
miles south of Fort MacArthur. inthe belief that better
weather prevailed there. H owever. the new regimental
commander. Colonel E. A. Stockton. J r.. held to the
opinion that f iring should be conducted at home where
the men had more comf orts and consequently higher
morale and spirit. Itwas theref ore decided to f ire f rom
Fort Nf acArthur.
During the latter part of February the battery received
the latest type materiel. consisting of the ?vI- 4 director,
M- I height f inder, M- 4 data transmission system, NI- S
f uze setters. and the ?vI- 3 guns onthe NhA 1mounts.
During most of ?vIarch. the training consisted principally
of individual and group instruction onthe care and opera-
tion of the new equipment. The latter part of ivIarch
and most of April was devoted to the corps area ordnance
inspection, and the tactical and garrison inspections by
district and corps area commanders.
The battery went into its target practice position dur-
ing the last week of April. Air missions began early in
?vIay. and were to be completed by the f irst of J une.
The weather during ?vby was not ar all ideal f or anti-
aircraf t gun training. Only about twenty per cent of the
available H ying hours could be utilized. A great deal of
training theref ore. had to be accomplished by the useof
"canned courses." This medium does not give much
training to the lateral and tracking observers on the di-
rector, and none at all to the height f inder section, but it
does give very valuable training to the clock- men at the
guns.
The spotting section was trained by the use of atrain-
ing f ilmof actual practices held at Fort Monroe. At night
the f ilm was projected against the side of awhite building
and the spotters would spot the bursts as they appeared.
This is ideal training f or spotters ..
The height f inder section including the stereosCopiC
observer received very little training. except theoretical.
prior to 1vIay. Their practical training was conducted
almost entirely at anactual aerial target. The results ob-
tained by the stereoscopic observer during the practice
were excellent.
The regimental commander saw to it that all batterY
personnel was present with the organization during the
momh of May. H e also made it plainthat the success ~r
f ail~re of the practice was the responsibility of the organI-
zatIon.
Nbjor H . P. Detwiler, regimental executive was plane
director and saf ery of f icer. During the period of training
1940
TH E KNOX TROPH Y 33
he rendered capable assistance and made suggestions
which were always timely and appreciated.
During the practice capable assistance was received f rom
Lieutenant Norman H emphill, battery executive and
Lieutenant Ray H ales, range of f icer, both Thomason Act
of f icers. Lieutenant Dabnev R. Corum, a f ormer member
of the battery, acted as ral~geof f icer f or the last practice.
The menof the battery, under the capable handling- of
First Sergeant Thomas J . Coyne, worked together splen-
didly, and always evidenced keeninterest inall phases of
the work. To name anyone without naming all, would
be aninjustice to all. It canbe stated, however, that on
August 26, 1939. f if ty members of B Battery, 63d Coast
Artillery (mostly key men), were ordered to Panama and
are now scattered throughout the 73d Coast Artillery
(AA). Every man is acredit to his new organization.
The record section under the ef f icient direction of Lieu-
tenant Roy K. Kauf f man, obtained camera records of
every course of the practice; only part of one course was
lost whenthe target was towed across the sun.
The f irst practice was carried of f with great rapidity. On
the night of Nf ay 24th the target appeared onthe course at
scheduled time and was perf ectly illuminated. The f irst
coursetowed was f ired uponaswas each succeeding course.
The f irst round was f ired at 8:41P.~1. and the last round at
9:09 P.~1. giving anelapsed time of twenty- eight minutes.
A great deal of the success of this practice was due to the
splendid illumination of the target by Battery A, 63d
Coast Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant \Villiam
Massello, J r. The second practice was held onNf a:' 26th
and the last practice onNf ay 30th.
The new scoring system was received prior to May.
Af ter caref ul study it was decided to f ire at extreme slant
ranges when obt;inable. This was carried out inso br
as possible in all towing miSSions. In one practice the
average slant range was over 7,000 yards.
\Ve encountered no particular dif f iculties with the ~\'[- 4
director. Af ter the f irst practice, it was f ound that ona
right- to- Ief t course a correction of right twelve mils was
called f or and onalef t- to- right course a lef t f our mils. By
using these corrections onsucceeding practices the initial
bursts were much closer laterally.
Itwas also discovered during the preliminary practice,
that if a range correction is applied while f iring, as an
altitude correction, dispersion inall directions was quite
noticeable f or several bursts. \Vhen analtitude spot is
applied the range rate operator must cease f ollowing- the
rate with the range rate knob, push inthe prediction ar-
resting button and match pointers with the range setting
hand wheel. Af ter the pointers arematched, it isnecessary
to hold the prediction arresting button inf or at least three
seconds to avoid excessive upsetting of rates. During- this
elapsed time inall probability the range rate has changed
and when the button is released it is necessary to re-
establish the rate. This operation of changing' altitude
plus change of rate causes all data to Auctuate f or several
seconds. The receivers on the guns oscillate clockwise
and counter clockwise past the true data several times be-
f ore they settle. All rounds f ired during this operation
aive erratic deviations.
:-.
Itwas decided to apply all range corrections as f uze
spots and not altitude spots. The f uze Spot merely f eeds
into the outgoing data through a dif f erential and causes
no change inany receiver except that of the f uze and this
chang- e is positive and not accompanied by oscillations.
During the entire practice when range corrections were
called f or they were applied as f uze spots.
"I I I I I H I I I I I I I I I I "'I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 'I ,I I I I I I I I I " 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11.1111111111 ..... '11.11111111111111.11111111111111111111111111111'.111111.111111.11.1111111 '1111111"'1111'1","111111111"11111111111"11111111111111111111111111111"11111111
REGULAR CLASS, COAST ARTILLERY SCH OOL, 1939- 1940
Rear row, lefl 10 ri gbl: Lieutenants Greenlee, Root, H ale, Foote, Baynes, \X'alter, Miner, H owell, Alf rey, Morris, ~lor.
gan, Murrin, Frith, Kramer, Spann.
Mi ddle row, left 10 ri gbt: Lieutenants H ampton, Steele, Farnsworth, Longanecker, Somerville, Massello, Schenck, Law.
lor, Shepardson, Porter, H ill, Waugh, \X'aterman, \X'eld, van armer, H ildebrand, Moore.
Fronl row, left to ri ght: Captain Brownlee, Lieutenants Bosworth, W'ood, H aggerty, Boyd, Carter, de Goma (PA),
Godbold (USMC), Bascunan (CN), Lieutenant Commander Aguayo (CN), Lieutenants H emphill (USMC), Stone-
clif f e (USMC), Ellis, Stiness, Mansf ield, Duf f , Diestel, Spangler.
\Ve have decided to rearm. H ow are we going to rearm? Are we
simply going to make better models of types of weapons we already
have, or have we available anexample of a new type of war- making
use of all the latest technical advances- which we cansaf el" take as a
m~d? J
We have evenabetter opportunity thanhad Germany, disarmed by
the T reary of Versailles, because she rearmed bef ore the Spanish Civil
\Var was over. \Ve, disarmed by our ownf aith inpacif ism, cantake
advantage of the lessons of that war, the seizure of Albania by Italy,
and Germany's lightning campaign inPoland. Oddly enough, while
discussing rearmament we have not yet begun seriously to rearm.
These three campaigns f urnish examples which it will pay us to
study inour rearmament.
The author inthe laSt two and one- half years has traveled throughout
Europe and around the ~'f editerranean Sea.
1
H e studied the European
military and political situation, the relationship of nations to each other
and the lessons to be ascertained regarding the most modern type of
war and the armament necessary to wage it.
H is conclusions are: (I) Spainwas the proving ground f or German
and Italian arms; (2) Albania was the dress rehearsal; and (3) Poland
the proof . From it all this evolves: Bli tzkri eg i s the latest type of war.
It can be used everywhere, except against heavily f ortif ied f rontiers
whose Ranks rest on natural obstacles, such as the Franco- German
f rontier and the Alpine f rontier of Italy and France.
As the United States possesses no such f rontiers, blitzkrieg- the
lightning war- is theref ore the best example f or us to choose as a
model f or our rearmament and reorganization. For def ense or def ensive
attack that iswhat we need.
At present wearenot prepared towage such atype of warf are or even
'\Vith previous trips, the f irst in1904,this makes atotal of approximately elev
years spent inEurope.
By Brigadier G e11eral R e11r
Of f icers' Reserve Corps
-----

l
to resist it should we have to f ac er that.
wf ore dangerous is the f act t our ex em and tre-
mendo sAmerican indust, ISnot pr red to f urnish the
sthan a riod of years.
ace d 'g which many technical
armam and transport have developed,
t dif f ic to decide what types of armament
Ization tI best f it the battle of the f uture. If
roper ty s are not selected the considerable sum of
s t upon rearmament is wasted and def eat at
s of a better- armed enemy is inevitable.
Ir is now something over twenty- one years since the
Armistice closed the last combat chapter of the Fourth
\Vorld War of modern times, that of 1914- 18.3 During
this period many new battle theories have been evolved.
These have run intwo general channels. The f irst con-
sists of the vivid imaginings of those with little or no
military education but perhaps some battle experience.
They have maintained that aviation and mechanization
have made the inf antrymen, f ield artillerymen and cav-
alrymen asobsolete as the pike carriers, the horse, armored
men- at- arms and knights, the culverins, and bombards
of the oldendays when our ancestors inEurope were f irst
groping to bring some organization and discipline to the
armed mobs which settled the so- called battles of those
days.
The second current of thought has been held by the
prof essional soldiers who, inmost cases, not only had ex-
perience in the Fourth World War but also in other
wars. These soldiers, while greatly interested in the
development of aviation and mechanization, have not
beensatisf ied as to the precise roles of these new develop- .
ments. What part their powers and limitations enable
them to play has not been decided. There is a Auidity
about it all.
Peacetime experimentation showed the powers of avia-
tionand mechanization to be limited, and this limitation
was f requently great. Inconsequence, the second group
of studious soldiers could never subscribe tothe imaginings
of the f irst group, whose ignoring of limitations or exag-
geration of powers led to the f ear of destruction of great
metropolises or the poisoning of millions- Qr other f anci-
f ul disasters. Of course, among the second school there
are conservatives who entirely underestimate the powers
and overestimate the limitations of aviation and mechan-
ization. Yet this f ine balance must be maintained.
Aside f rom the dozen or so minor conAicts incident to
settling down af ter the Fourth World War and the Rus-
sianRevolution, there has been inrecent years the Abys-
sinian- Iralian War, the Second Sino- J apanese War, the
Sp:lI1ish Civil War, the Albanian Occupation, and the
Polish- German War.
'''H ad our mechanized units met the German(>ull=e rs wewould
have beenoutnumbered incombat cars, inlight tanks and in
medium tanks. Against them we could raise 'but a f ew antitank
guns, \Ve have not evenone f ull- strength mechanized brigade. In
Poland aloneGermany usedtenpanzer divisions."- Speech of H on.
Louis J ohnson, Assistant Secretary of \Var, October 10,1939.
'I usetheterm"Fourth \Vorld \Var" becausetheaverage person
believes that the war of 1914- 18was the f irst world war. Discard-
ing'the world wars of ancient times, the f irst world war was that
of the Spanish Succession, the second the SevenYears' \Var, and
the third the French Re,'olutionand Napoleonic wars.
36 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
J fl1/ lIary-Fe bmar)
The Italians themselves discounted the lessons learned
inAbyssinia because the enemy was semi- savage and did
not possess modern armament. The Second Sino- J apanese
War is a special case, because it is anexample of a well-
armed modern army of acomparatively small nation using
all types of troops against abadly organized, badly armed
and badly equipped army of a much larger nation.
The Spanish Civil War inits last year was a modern
war. H owever, except inGermany and Italy the tendency
has been to pay but little attention to it, because ingen-
eral the belief has obtained, even in France, that f ew
lessons of importance could be gained f rom its study.
In general, the military world was convinced that
Poland had the armed f orce suf f icient to hold out at least
three months against the German invaders. Few, if any,
saw any way inwhich France and Great Britain could
send military aid to Poland. H owever, they were con-
vinced that if Poland held out three months, France and
Britain would be able to bring enough pressure along the
Westwall to f orce Germany to f ight ontwo f ronts. Yet
f ighting ontwo f ronts was the nightmare of the German
H igh Command during the Fourth World War. From
then on, Germany's one desire has been to avoid f acing
this situation again. Yet had Poland held out, Germany
would have been conf ronted with it. The German plan,
theref ore, was to quickly dispose of Poland.
As a consequence of all this, Germany's armament,
oraanization, tactics and strategy were based onthe blitz-
krieg that Spain and Albania proved f easible. As a result
Poland collapsed inthree weeks.
Germany's rearmament was based initially on con-
clusions arrived at f rom study of the Fourth World War
and the technical improvements made inthe period of
peace which f ollowed. She had largely completed her re-
armament bef ore she had the opportunity to test inbattle
whether or not these theories were sound. Not until the
Spanish Civil War did she have the opportunity totest her
new materiel.
Italy, emerging f rom the Fourth World War of modern
times as a victor, was inthe same position as France and
J apan. She had onher hands atremendous amount of ma-
teriel accumulated during the Fourth World War. Due
to the cost of its replacement she had to move slowly in
the adoption of any new armament.
Italy worked steadily onthe production of new types to
f it the theory of what war would be. Like Germany, she
evolved this theory f rom her experiences in the Fourth
World \Var and peacetime technical developments. And
also f eeling doubtf ul as to whether or not this theoretic de-
velopment would prove correct when tested, th~Itali~n.s
welconled the opportunity af f orded by the Spamsh CIVIl
War.
Germany sent aviators, airplanes, antiaircraf t artillery,
some tanks and signal corps personnel to Spain. Prob-
ably at no time did her personnel there exceed 10,000.
Italy sent aviation and anarmy corps. It consisted of corps
troops and three divisions of inf antry including tanks and
also a cadre of of f icers and twenty per cent of enlisted
menf or two inf antry brigades. Probably the maximum of
Italians present in Spain at anyone time was 60,000.
Both the German and Italian f orces were visited f requently
by of f icers studying questions of organization and arma-
ment. Since the majority of the f ormer Spanish regular
army of f icers were onthe side of Franco, his f orces, both
land and air, were organized and trained f rom the begin-
ning by prof essionals.
Two things helped to bring the insurgents to a rela-
tively high state of ef f iciency. The f irst was that Franco
and his young generals made up the group of Spanish
regular of f icers who prior to the downf all of the king
struggled to correct the inef f iciency of the Spanish Army
and Air Force and tried to make Spaina modern military
power. They welcomed the republic because they thought
the opportunity would be af f orded them. Probably the
f act that this did not happen was the primary reasonf or
their subsequent revolt. Inany case, no of f icer inFranco's
army could hold command and no of f icer could be pro-
moted who did not prove his ef f iciency and leadership
incombat.
The second f actor was that the Germans and Italians
helped trainthe new Spanish Army and Air Force. Above
all, this training innew technical methods was invaluable.
As a result of this Spanish combat the Germans an?
Italians had the opportunity of f inding out whether theIr
organization, equipment and armament were suited to
modern war. Also, they both had anexcellent opportunity
of watching the experiences of the Spanish Army and
Air Force.
-
1940
BACKGROUND FOR LIGH TNING \' X' AR
37
As Ff 3nco's army reached a strength of more than
Soo.ooo- that is, exclusive of },/f oors- and his air f orce
:I probable strength of 600 aviators, the f orces engaged
werelargeenough to make it saf e tobase broad conclusions
onthe conduct of the march and battle.
The author spent f our and one- half months inSpain.
This period began with the termination of a successf ul
pursuit to the wf editerranean af ter a large- scale battle-
rh:lt of the Albmbra. Itf inished just as the Battle of the
Ebro was coming to a close, and the assault across the
Segri River which opened the way to the conquest J f
C:ltalonia was abour to begin.
Franco's answer to the governmental of f ensive which
brought onthe Battle of Teruel
4
was a general of f ensive
f romTeruelnorth, practically to the French f rontier. This
of f ensivebeganwith the Battle of the Alf ambra which was
and right of the Catalonian of f ensive. By noon of the
second day it was evident that the Catalonian surprise
assault had biled.
Franco then made the decision to destroy the Army of
Catalonia and thus conquer that province. H is plan was
simple. A reasonable estimate showed that Catalonia had
eighteen f airly good inf antry divisions. Nine had crossed
the Ebro, two were inclose reserve onthe other side. This
lef t but sevengood divisions available to meet any assault
Franco might make elsewhere than on the Ebro. H is
plan was to avoid any general assault onthe nine Cata-
Ionian divisions across the Ebro which would cost him
heavy losses and might cause a withdrawal of the Cata-
Ionian divisions bef ore they were used up. H e decided to
wear them down onthe ground onwhich they stood by
heavy artillery f ire and aviation bombardment and by
the~rst of aseries of blows which drove the governmental
troopseastward to the Ebro Rivcr and the Mediterranean.
This cut the governmental army intwo. From then on
Catalonia w"ascur of f f rom the rest of governmental Spain: .
The Battle of the Ebro began when the Catalonian
troopscrossed the river ina surprise attack against Gen-
eralYague, inhopes of stOpping Franco's successf ul of -
f ensivef rom T eruel sourh towards Valencia. Franco im-
mediately ordered divisions inreserve of Arande's Army
Corps, then f acing south astride the highway running
f romthe mourh of the Ebro to Valencia, sent north by
truck to strike the lef t f lank of the Catalonians. These di-
visions drove this f lank back and inf licted considerable
losses. Other reserve divisions, sent by motOr trucks,
coupledwith General Y ague's reserves, stopped the center
-
'The Battle of Teruel was not conf ined to the f ighting around the
town.of that name. The battlef ield stretched f or many miles along
thehIghway running north to Zaragoza.
This operation, highly successf ul inits f irst phase, had already
C0!1'eto the pause which exhaustion of troops and ammunition
bnngs inany of f ensive. I heard f rom reasonably reliable military
SOurcesthat a discussion began at Franco's headquarters as to
whether,inview of the reorganization and rearmament of the gov-
?"J 11I1ental army inCatalonia and the general political situation
1 ~ ~urope, it would not bebetter to wipe out Catalonia bef ore con-
tmumg the advance onValencia. The surprise attack across the
ea
Eb
ro
indicated dearh' the decision had beenreached to wipe out
Ialonia f irst..
periodic inf antry assaults supported by tanks to seize the
more important parts of their def ensive system.
This wearing- down process was to continue until the
nine divisions were no longer f it f or cof nbk Itwas hoped
that the two inreserve could be drawn across the Ebro to
suf f er the same f ate. Then, when at least nine and possi-
bly eleven of Catalonia's eighteen divisions were worn
down, a general assault was to be made along the line
of the Segri River f rom near where it runs into the Ebro,
north almost to the French f rontier. With at least f if ty
per cent of Catalonia's best divisions used up there was
little doubt that this assault would succeed and open the
way f or a rapid advance through Catalonia inthe same
f ashion that the Alf ambra serics of assaults had opened
the way f or the rapid pursuit which brought Franco's
troops to the Mediterranean the previous spring.
s
Events worked out as Franco had planned. Instead of
retreating the Catalonian troops tried to hold their position
'The author was told twice of the order with regard to the wear-
ingdownof the Catalonian troops across the Ebro. Once was when
the chief of staf f of General Vague explained the matter while the
author visited the Ebro f ront during the course of the battle. The
other instance was when the commanding of f icer of the Italian
heavy bombers which were bombarding the Ebro positionday and
night explained inexactly the same way what Franco's planwas
and said that those were the orders they had received and were
~ying .
"TheSpanish divisionconsists of twelw battalions of inf antry.
withartillery andservices.
I NFANTRY
The inf antry isstill the "Queenof Battles." H owever,
the Queenmust have the most modernarmament and
must keep up to datewith all new technical methods of
industry.
The inf antry must control the f orward zone of the
battlef ield. That areaisthe zonewhich delivers f iref rom
inf antry weapons and inwhich the enemy's f ireisgreat
and accurateenough toput out of actionanything which
makesatarget morenoticeablethantheinf antry.
As aconsequence, each sectionof the Spanish inf antry
had at least one small trench mortar and several auto-
matics. Every Italianinf antry regiment had abattery of
nine6s- mm. mountainguns. Therewerenumerous moun-
tainbatteries among the Spanish troops which, likethe
Italianones, were practically under inf antry control. In
additionto the smaller trench mortars of f rom2S- to So-
mm. caliber there were trench mortars of larger caliber.
These alsowere inthe hands of the inf antry, but not in
the companies aswerethe light trench mortars. For close
def ense the inf antry had antiaircraf t and antitank guns
of various calibersup to include the 37- mm.
The questionastothe best caliber f or AT and AA in-
f antry def ensehad not beendecidedwhenthewar ended.
Opinionwaveredbetweentwoqualif ications.The f irstwas
that noweaponintheinf antry zonewhich makes toobig
38 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-Fehruary
west of the Ebro. Consequently they weresteadily worn theheadquarters of theSpanish, Italianand Germanavia-
downwhileFranco'sinf antry suf f eredmuch smaller losses. tion. At or nearby werethe f ieldsf romwhich the Italians
Whenthetimewasripe,Francoorderedthegeneralassault and many of theSpanish air squadrons operated.
acrosstheSegri River.Oncethepositionontheother side During twenty visitsto thef ront, someof which lasted
waspierced,theCatalonianArmy wasthrough. Fromthat severaldays, theauthor sawall types of Spanish, German
time onno actions took placeother thanthe small ones and Italiantroops, equipment and armament inaction.
incidental to the retreat to and acrossthe French f rontier. H e saw nine assaults, the smallest being that of a di-
These twomajor operations, onewhich beganwith the visionand the largest that of two army corps, each of
Alf ambra battle and the other with the Battle of the f our divisions.
6
During thisperiodhehad theopportunity
Ebro, areworth closestudy. They illustrate the problems to talk to Spanish of f icersand f lyers of all grades, Italian
which must be met inmodernwarf are other thanina of f icersof all grades, occasionally to Germanf lyers and
stalemate of two opposing f ortif ied lines with f lanks rest- quite f requently to the Germans at the Germanhead-
ing onnatural obstacles. quarters.
Too much military thought hasbeeninf luencedby the The older Italians and Germans who had f ought inthe
tendency totakeasstandard modernwarf aretheoperations Fourth World War were always pleasedto discussit and
which resulted f romthecontinuous lines of trenches f rom tocomment onthechanges theSpanishwar showedtobe
the Swissborder to the North Sea. As amatter of f act, essential i~armament, organization, tactics and strategy.
it was the exception, as there is no other place onthe The Spamsh werevery proud of their new army andair
earth's surf ace except the Alps f rontier betweenFrance f orce.They wereeager to seeSpainrestoredto aposition
and Italy, where acomparatively short line with natural as a f irst- classpower inEurope and the Mediterranean.
geographical f eatures protecting its f lanks could be the They wereanxious to provethat Spanish military ability
battleground f or two peoples, eachwith adense popula- which had madeSpainagreat nationinthepast hadbeen
tion. rebornandwassaf eintheir hands. As aconsequencethey
These twoSpanish campaigns probably typif y thecon- wereeager todiscusstechnical questions with anyonewho
ditions which would be met by armies f ighting inother had amilitary background, educationand experiencein
parts of the world. Above all, this is true of the con- battle.
ditions Americanarmies would meet. From all this the f ollowing canbe stated. For heavy
The mainlessontobedrawnf romthesetwocampaigns combat theSpaniards, Italians andGermans wereinagree-
isthat there aretwo general classesof combat. The f irst ment onthef ollowing:
is heavy combat, the hard f ighting necessary to wina
knock- down, drag- out battle inwhich eachsideexerts its
maximum power. The second is light combat against a
weak f oe,orinadvance- andrear- guardwork andinapur-
suit. For the f irst of these the ability to give and take
hard blows isessential, speedisof insuf f icient importance
towarrant any subtractionf romcombat power inorder to
increasemobility.
Inthesecondof these, speedisof great importance, but
at the sametime if the resistanceisto beovercomethere
must be suf f icient power availableor the movement will
be brought to ahalt and another knock- down drag- out
combat isinevitable.
Inother words,if thef ruits of victory aretobegathered,
af orcemust have not only the means to f ight hard but
alsotomovequickly.
This is the prescriptionf or blitzkrieg.
This divisioninto two types of warf areisimportant be-
cause onit is based the armament and organization of
dif f erent types of troops. Also, the use made of aviation
and mechanized f orces isbased uponit. Inf act, the dif -
f erent types of mechanizationdepend entirely uponit.
The author hadthegoodf ortunetospendf our andone-
half months at thetownof Zaragozawhich was thehead-
quartersof Franco'sArmy of theNorth. This army carried
out the principal campaigns f rom the beginning of the
Battle of Teruel to the end of thewar. It was the onein
which the Italianexpeditionary f orcesservedand most of
the Germans inSpain. The townof Zaragoza was also
19.10
BACKGROUND FOR LIGH TNING \'\'AR 39
atarget will survive the pteliminar;' artillery and aviation
mbardments. On the other hand, the enemy tanks'
4s- mm. cannon inthe last ~'ear of the wa~did not
. hin r:mge of the 37- mm. or smaller antit:mk
uu _ hanks were put out of action.
:>Bot1 e ani:lrds and the Irali:lns m:lintained that
their best <Yainsttanks W:lSthe 6s- mm. mountain
gun. bec:luse u 1ged the tank cannon. Also, one of
'en I 10t direct hit, could damage :l tank
i:lns considered dut :l7s- mm.
better.
depend upon it both in:lttack :lnd def ense, but :llso tanks
and avi:ltion need its support.
There is :Inincre:lsing tendency co f ollow the German
Army insubstituting the IOs- mm. howitzer f or the 77-
mm. :lnd guns of similar caliber.
Similarly. the 77- mm. AA guns used at /lrst by the
Germans were f ound in:ldequ:lte. As :lconsequence a new
anti:lircraf t gun of 88- mm. c:lliber W:lStested inSp:lin.
Both the :lrtillerymen and :lvi:lcors believed these pieces
solved the problem of re:lching :ln~' bomber c:lrrying a
waf load.
The bomb:lrdments of the enemy positions by he:lvy
bombers. the invari:lble pr:lctice of Fr:lnco. could not bve
been c:lrried onwithout undue loss h:ld not :l thorough
:lnd :ldequ:lte :lrtillery bomb:lrdment preceded it. The
S:lme is true of the dive :ltt:lcks with light bombs and
'The method consisted of throwing winebottles f ull of gasoline
and sulphur to which several "potato- masher" hand grenades had
beenwired, into the greasy tractors of the tanks. This was f re-
quently f ollowedbyahand grenade through therear ventilator and
also setting f iretothegasolinetank if its plug couldbepried open.
The operationrequired great courage.
AVIATION
Aviationplayed aconsiderablepart inallcombats. Be-
sides its use f or reconnaissance and observationit had a
def initebattle mission. Inallassaultsastheartillery prep-
arationclosed, heavy bombers H ew several times f rom
oneH ank to another over the enemy's position, bombing
it. As theheavy bombers lef t, light bombers madediving
attacks. The f irst f ewtimes around they would uselight
bombs, the next f ew times alternate planes would use
bombs and machine- gun f ire. Ona divisionf ront such
diving bomb attacks were made as of tenas twelve or
thirteentimes by the same planes inthe courseof ahalf
hour. As these lef t, other light bombers appeared to aid
thetanks tosubduesuchpoints asheldup theinf antry.
T ANKS
The light tank soonshowed that it was not f itted f or
heavy combat. First, becauseit was armed with machine
guns alone instead of at least one cannon. Second, be-
cause insuf f icient armor led to rapid disablement or de-
struction.
The longer the war went on, the more evident it be-
camethat the only tank f it f or heavy combat isareason-
ably armored vehicle carrying a cannon.
The idea that speed f urnishes protectionagainst f ire
wasprovedtobeaf allacy.
Franco's inf antry f requently burnt
8
tanks which had
gottenamong them with little or no support f romtheir
owninf antry and artillery. The consequencewas the day
arrivedwhentanks wereonly used aspart of aninf antry
assault, with their owninf antry inclosesupport.
40 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
machine guns made by light bombers f rom H ank to During all this, pursuit planes high abovewatched f or
H ank of the enemy's positionduring the advance of the enemy aviation. Insome of the larger combats it W:b
inf antry and the tanks. evident that complete control of the air was not essential,
Similarly, tanks during the assault suf f ered undue loss because onseveral occasions enemy aviationH ewOver
inmateriel andpersonnel unlessthe artillery andbombers Franco's troops and bombed their rears while the assault
had prepared the way. wasgomg on.
Franco and his generals understood the importance of Inother words, heavy combat inSpainproved that
having enough guns to prevent the inf antry f romsuf f er- neither aviationnor mechanization canreplace the in-
ing asthey f requently did inthe Fourth World War by f antry and artillery. Onthe other hand, it showed that
making improperly prepared assaults which f ailed. From both areessentialcomponents alongwith the artilleryand
time to time the chargewas made that he was too slow. inf antry of any battle team.
H e was slowbecausewith limited means he f requently So much f or the general lessons of heavy combat in
had towait sometime af ter onebattle bef orehecouldac- Spain.
cumulate the ammunitionnecessaryf or the next if heavy The picture of what is necessary inlight combat dif .
inf antry losswas to be avoided. f ers ina number of ways. H ere speed, which inheavy
As aresult his inf antry always attacked conf ident that combat is subordinated to f ire- power and the ability to
eventhough lossesmight be severe, they would seldom survive f ire either through making a small target or
f ail to drive the enemy f romhis position. through armor, isimportant.
Inother words, the Queenknew that the Prince Con- Until theSpanish Civil War, themachine gunenabled
sort was always there to give her the greatest possible small groups to hold up advance guards or pursuing
help inher most dif f icultmoments. groups, becausethenecessary artillery, tanks andinf antry
to dislodge machine guns were with the mainbody, i:t
therear.
The time it took f or these f orces to arrive gave the
enemy machine guns thechancetoget awayor tobecome
the basisof adetermined def ense.
To prevent the enemy f rom occupying a strong de-
f ensivepositionistheobjectiveof aspeedy advanceof the
troops preceding the mainbody.
The high speedessential to such anadvancehasf orced
horsedcavalry, armored carsandlight tanks torelinquish
thef ire- power andarmor necessarytocopewith theresist-
anceof small groups armedwith machine guns and light
artillery. InSpainthe useof armored tanks with cannon
asmobilef ieldguns hasincreasedthe def ensivepowersof
such groups.
To increasethef ire- powerof theadvancegroups, motor-
cycleinf antry and machine guns havebeenadded. Also,
motorized inf antry andartillery havef ollowedintherear.
H owever, the motorcycle inf antry and machine guns
did not add enough f ire- power, while the time necessarY
tobring up themotorized inf antry and artillery over poor
roadsand particularly whenbridges had beenblownout.
was too long.
Aviationf urnished the solution. Inadditionto recon.
naissancef ar totherear it didthree
9
things.
(I) Through bombing it f urnished a substitute f or
artillery concentrations.
(2) Through light bombs and machine- gun f ire d.e-
liveredindiving attacks it f urnished asubstitute f or artll.
lery accompanying f ireduring the assault.
(3) It bombed and machine- gunned the mainf orces
of theretreating enemy, thus encouraging himtocontinue
hisretreat, insteadof settling downinanew def ensivep0-
sition.
As thewar inSpainprogressed therewas anincreasin~
demand f or horsed cavalry, becauseof its ability to move
IQ.jO
BACKGROUND FOR LIGH TNING \'\,AR 41
and f ight Incountn' 1 1 1 which mechanized f orces could
not operate.
Thus Spain proved to the Germans. Italians. and Span-
iJ rdsthat f orces f or light combat should consist of motor-
,deinf antry and machine guns, armored cars, light tanks
t~ oedintrucks), horsed cavalry and aviation.
lO
It ved to these three countries that light f orces,
I) "d bv motorized inf antn' and artillen', used
nl -' epared enem:- ' mea~s certain vict~r:',
use irplanes to transport troops f rom Morocco
or J .i WS of no incident inthe Spanish war in
acli guns were transported by airplanes. to
one by the Italians inAlbania and as
trucks and horsed artillery were
Theref ore Spainshowed blitzkrieg to be certain of suc-
cess under the conditions met with inthe last vear of the
Spanish war. .
The quick seizure of Albania by Ital:- 'has beenignored
onthe grounds that the Albanians were not prepared to
resist. As a matter of f act, due to Italian militan' tutela~e
. ,..,
over a period of years, Albania was quite well prepared
to mobilize a reasonably well- equipped army which, had
it been given time to mobilize, could have of f ered con-
siderable resistance. This would have been all the more
true inmountainous Albania, particularly as most of the
mountaineers were armed.
Even those who at the time the invasion started were
loudest inpredicting that it would take Italy months-
-
-1 2
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL Ie lll / le lr) - Fe bl"lte lry
perhaps years- to subdue the country. seem uninterested
as to why it was all over inaf ew days. Many of these are
the same military critics who maintained that the conguest
of Abyssinia would take years.
The author inRome talked with General Pariani. then
Assistant Secretary of War and Chief of Staf f . Pariani
showed the order f or the invasion and explained his plans
f or a "surprise intime." H e insisted 23.000 troops of the
types needed f or light combat were enough. H is gen-
erals opposed him because they wanted to send 80.000
- planning to crush the Albanians after they were mobi-
lized instead of catching them before the~'could mobilize.
General Pariani explained the reorganization of the Italian
Army and how this was based onthe experience inSpain,
with minor modif ications.
The reasonthat there was no f ighting to speak of and
that the invasion was completed within a f ew days was
that the Italians prof ited by the lessons of Spain. They
used light troops and aviation backed up by hard- hitting
f orces and ef f ected a "surprise intime." Inother words,
they occupied all important points bef ore the Albanians
had the time to mobilize.
This surprise intime was carried out by ground troops
and aviation which had to make a sea crossing to reach
the scene of operations. Some of the inf antry was trans-
ported by air f rom Italy. The Italian plan succeeded
admirably .
.'
At the same time the inf ormation available with regard
to the German campaign inPoland proves that it tOOwas
---
1940
BACKGROUND FOR LIGH TNING \'1/ AR 43
a successf ul application of the idea of a surprise intime.
The wa)' f or the heav)' troops was opened b)' the light-
combat troops, supported by aviation. The Germans did
not have to use the total of the f orces originally set aside
to suppress Poland.
11
The initial bulty concentration of
thePolish Army and the entry of the USSR do not change
this f undamental f act.
\Vithout doubt, modern war'calls f or both light- combat
and heav)'- combat troops designed to ef f ect initially a
"surprise intime" and then to crush the f orces of the
enemy. The blitzkrieg type of war, while making use of
a\.iationand mechanization, restores to the older arms-
the inf antry, artillery, and horsed cavalry- their powers
[or march and battle. Itnullif ies the idea that the world
war of 1 91 4-1 8 had taken these powers f rom them f orever.
But lightning war canonly be waged- and successf ully
countered- by f orces f ully provided with the latest types
of armament and mechanization onland and inthe air.
Moreover, these f orces must be backed by a f irst- class in-
f antry, artillery, and cavalry.
llSeventy to se\'enty- f ive divisions, including six panzer (armored
mechanized) and f our motorized, were earmarked f or the Polish
campaign, Of the inf antry di\,isions not more thanf orty were used
and possibly as low as thirty,
The Industrial Revolution has given the industrial na-
tions the f irst- class navies necessary to dominate the seven
seas. Similarly, it has put into their hands the power to
dominate the land surf aces of the globe.
The United States of America is one of the leadinCT-
:- >
if not the greatest- industrial nations inthe world. Yet
its army lacks the armament not only to,waCTeswif t war,
/ t:>
but what is more dangerous, to resist the liCThtninCTon-
~ t:> ~
slaught.
Ivf oreover, our industry has scanty armament orders.
At the same time, it hesitates to call attention to the
danger of the situation f or f ear of drawing the charge of
being "merchants of death." Yet it takes at least a year
or more bef ore industry can produce the wartime arma-
ment needed f or the small Regular Army and its not much
larger brother, the National Guard. What can be said
of awar army of huge size?
Marshal Petain once remarked to the author that in-
dustrial preparation f or wartime production isof prime im-
p0rt:lI1cetoday. Ivf oreover, he believed that anation with
lesser industrial power but which was prepared could
def eat anunprepared nation of a much greater industrial
power- because by the time the second nation was ready,
it would be too late.
\\1c might think that over.
Unquestionably the Army displays anabysmal igno-
rance of the intangibles that actually make a military or-
ganization. Such words as discipline, morale, and leader-
ship are used continuously, f or they are the core of war-
making. Yet no general understanding of them prevails.
No precise and accepted def inition of them exists; no
knowledge of their derivation and growth is extant. Yet
the learned, pedantic military writer patters inanabstmse
way about such things. Perhaps he may have his own

4 0U c m / t ':.e ~uisitiOt1
d i J c i
p
l i t 1 e 0' : . m o ' : . a . l e

T
,
def inite idea of the qualities and how they emerge and
grow. Bur perhaps his readers have other ideas, vague,
nebulous ones, or perhaps none at all. And f urthermore,
the writer may be wrong. Theref ore we are not dealing
with f actual matter but airy ideas, and to top it we allow
our regulations to ignore or bef uddle such basic military
f actors. All this despite the f act that science can give
light onthese matters.
Yet how these intangible qualities are derived, f rom
what they spring, what actually is this very substratum
of anarmy f rom the squad up, has beenblandly passed by.
What is military discipline? one may ask, and undergo a
deluge of def initions. H ow canone go about instilling it?
And then inall likelihood one will get the old worn yet
calmly accepted explanation that it is "based onhope of
reward and f ear of punishment." What a f utility! What
error! Frankly, such a method does not produce military
discipline or anything worthwhile. It is but the basis of
prisondiscipline.
Itis such anironrule that governs Alcatraz or Atlanta
penitentiaries. But the people incarcerated never become
soldiers. A little lack of vigilance and a prison may be-
come a howling inf erno where death stalks and the direc-
tors f all. It has happened of ten. These menare not soldier
material, some may say. But be cautious here, f or the
cases are many where such people ina wartime military
organization have gone out to battle. They f ollowed their
leader to the very point of death and did not shoot him
downas inprisonbecause the meals were poor or f reedom
was denied. Yet there is no f reedom when moving into

B~
?najea. g .Hal
p
il1 e 0l1l1011~

46 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL J a1/ lIar)'-Fe bruar) l
battle. meals are sparse and sketchy, and death is ever-
present.
What reward or punishment governed Napoleon's Old
Guard at Waterloo? There, with the French f orce ina
rout, the Guard stood staunchly and ref used to lay down
their arms. Their case was hopeless, but to the English
demand their reply was, "The Old Guard never sur-
renders." There they stood rocklike until volleys of
musketry f ire laid them all low and something of great
worth- a rare, exquisite, human f eeling- passed away in
the smoke of the muskets. The originand growth of this
f eeling, its development within the breast of man, the
method of inculcating it and using it, isof f ar more impor-
tance to the soldier th:1nall study of the Napoleonic era.
For warf are today isvastly changed and it will keep chang-
ing. Man alone inthe kaleidoscopic whirligig of modern
times is static. But at least all should know this: Soldiers
are not the product of prison methods of discipline.
Strange, wedo not preach or evenadmit that.
What punishment could the military give that was
greater than the death that f aced the Guard? What re-
ward could be conf erred onthese individuals inthe here-
af ter? Since when did the military parade ghosts and give
them the reward of medals and honorable places inVal-
halla, Elysium, Nirvana, Paradise, H eaven- - <.:all it what
you will? Again, what about the Spartans at Thermopyla::,
the men of the Alamo, and countless other groups who
have brightened the drab history of war, gave it a
coruscating light and lef t aprecious memory inthe world?
They showed us the greatness that lies in man; they
should make us humble, f or very likely we lack this great-
ness of spirit- and so does the unit under us. But at least
we can and should study such matters and discern how
they develop. Yet we do not. The worst blunder of all
is that we soldiers have little sound material concerning
this aspect of war- making. Where is our literature about
it? It isslender- and who knows if any of it is true? We
will spend pages discussing river crossings and blandly
wave aside inaf ew words one of the very f undamentals of
war- discipline.
True, there isno question that inpeacetime one canrun
a unit on a reward- and- punishment basis and one may
obtain a snappy outf it that appears admirable. But this
surf ace glitter will always lead one astray, f or such units
will not be f it f or combat. Despite smartness they will
lack the deeper spirit, the inner grimness, something, that
enables a unit to f ight its desperate way through battle
which is harsh, slimy and revolting- nothing very glori-
ous about it. For instance, the smartest and best- rated
corps inthe Army of the Potomac- judged so af ter a
whole winter of observation- f ailed miserably at Chan-
cellorsville. Itbroke wide openand f led. Were these sur-
f ace results so noticeable inthe corps produced by the ap-
plication of reward- and- punishment? \\'ho knows? But
inany event the high command was sadly deceived about
this corps. Itcould not judge the moral and disciplinary
'lualities of troops. And who canlay down the specif ica-
tions today that will help in judging any war- making
body? Check all the books and see how little we have.
Check the regulations that are skimpy and f illed with old
saws, aphorisms, and unctuous, erroneous thoughts.
Inf act, the military neglect almost completely a study
of this phase of war while it muses on the intriguing
geometry of battle which changes as new weapons come
in. From all this the scholastics try to produce anesoteric
literature of physical war to the neglect of the human and
unchanging element of war. Knowledge of discipline is
anintangible something desperately needed, to be sure,
but so f ar as our military culture is concerned it is not
studied nor written about extensively so all might benef it.
Frankly, there is abasis of science f or these intangibles of
war; the rest of warf are is anart. To be brutally f rank,
we airily ignore what science can give us and like dil-
ettantes play with anart- and anarchaic art.
We have become so awry inour thinking of discipline
that if a higher commander directs that "disciplinary ac-
tionbe taken," the subordinate commanders hastily ladle
1940
A MILITARY VACUUM 47
l
I
l
out punishment. Actually, the lower commander could
inresponse and inall justice pass Out a commendation.
But memory f ails to recall one that did, because we have
actually tied up discipline with punishment. Yet, the two
do not belong together- - except inprison.
Morale- another word denoting anintangible human
quality- is just as little understood. H ow is good morale
produced? What must commanders do to obtain it? H ow
canwejudge it? Frankly. we know little of it except that
it of tenexists and is militarily indispensable. Good lead-
ership produces it, it is of ten said. Quite true. But what
isgood leadership, how isi t developed and applied? H ere
isanother intangible that canbe recognized. but how it
acts is so dif f icult to analyze that little valuable has been
written about it. Morale and discipline both depend on
this leadership, it issaid. So what have we got? Nothing
but a piece of circular argument. We are still among
intangibles. \Ve explain one by quoting another. The
military are scholastic thinkers, not scientif ic ones.
At the same time our schools insidiously and uncon-
sciouslv indoctrinate the students with error about the in-
tangibles. For instance, ina problem they state acenain
unit has lost a meal, theref ore their morale is low. This is
wrong. H ow did Lee's army f ight its terrif ic battles of
the latter Civil War with little to eat? Study the Wilder-
ness battle- Spotsylvania. If Lee's men had poor morale
let's hope our army always has it. Another example is to
quote that an outf it has marched a great distance and
theref ore their morale is low, or is not excellent. Wrong
again! A corps commander once marched his corps
seventy- seven miles inf orty- f our hours. With f ive hours'
rest he was placed inthe battle line by the commander in
chief exactly in f ront of the enemy's main blow. H is
corps f ought like tigers despite their march. Their morale
was so high that notwithstanding the f act that they were
f orced back by sheer weight of numbers, they clung tena-
ciously to positions. This morale was almost exalted. But it
should be noted that this was abattle, not amap problem.
If one thinks that this is sheer lunacy inwar, it would be
well to mention that the corps commander was ivf arshal
Davout, and the battle was Austerlitz. Certainly Na-
poleonknew what morale was. Itwas not vitally necessary
to place Davout onthe line. H e had other and f resher
troops to go there and reserves aplenty. But Davout went
into meet the main blow- Davout, the backstairs, un-
tried, waltzing marshal. The scholastic soldier would
hand out a Uf or that. Napoleon won a battle with it.
Take your choice.
Frankly, we think that any discomf ort always lowers
morale. This is not so. Itis almost as great anerror as
the wartime custom of appointing amorale of f icer to pump
morale into the troops- with mass singing, motion pic-
tures, and dancing girls. If there isanything more ridicu-
lous than this, it is hard to say what it is. Morale comes
f rom the leadership of the commander and no one else.
For the high command to believe that the morale pro-
curement could be passed onto astaf f of f icer and f or local
commanders to placidly accept this condition without a
howl of rage, indicates clearly that all know little of
morale. One cannot requisition it.
Frankly, all these events disclose one thing; and that is,
we know nothing of morale. Yet it is aword that isof ten
used. We cantell af ter abattle when one side has shown
good morale, but how to judge it bef orehand and how to
produce it, both arebeyond the kenof all except the good
leaders. To try to judge such a subject is f utile, f or our
standards mean little. All this because too little study has
been given to the subject, and less is written. The core
of a military organization is morale, leadership, and dis-
cipline. These things need f ar more study' than river
crossings, wide envelopments, or the like; f or the whole
game of war rests onthese intangibles. Strange, wedo not
go into them more. Certainly it is true that "the moral is
to the physical as three is to one." But knowing that
means little; knowing what this morale is and how to
arouse it and develop it, means everything to a soldier.
The same goes f or the other intangibles called discipline
48 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL J an lIary-Februar
and leadership. It is time we ceased memorizing and
muttering old saws and maxims and stan the study of the
f oundation of anarmy.
To indicate how much we skip inthe study of war, it
may be well to mention a cenain general. H e never
Ragged his troops f or inf ractions of discipline, yet all other
armies did- even our own. Of ten at night he used to
wander between the campf ires af ter he had f inished his
work. \Vith the soldiers seated about the f irehe exchanged
stories- salty ones no doubt- and roared with laughter.
But the strangest of all things was that he granted cor-
porals and sergeants permission to try any of their number
who was deemed guilty of a dereliction of duty. The
of f icers did not have to worry about that. At inspection
any soldier might have a written complaint or rC<J uest
stuf f ed into his musket barrel. It was extracted, read by
the general, and actiontaken immediately. Money might
be given, or asword awarded or apromotion made onthe
spot. The soldiers had no hesitancy in writing direct
letters to him, and of ten received a complimentary reply
inthe general's ownhandwriting. Once when going into
action with a large army he himself actually helped his
artillery by doing a private's job.
Certainly some or all this is queer to us today. But if
this man was good and had a good army, then some of
our f eeling of queerness is born of a def ective military
idea of armies of war. Flatly, it can be stated that this
soldier built and led a superb army. H is victories were
stupendous and his military stature has never been ~x-
ceeded. H is name was Napoleon.
The queer thing is not what he did. but our lack of
study and understanding of this aspecr of his work. W~
ignore that completely. H ence we cannot say what thinlts
he did that were wrong and what were right. Let us be:
honest- we don't know. Those who think they do are
doctrinaires. not thinkers. Oddly, it is useless to f ollow in
his tactical steps, f or war has changed immensely; but to
f ollow inhis steps inthe handling of men- there issome-
thing to think about. Napoleon had something of Super-
lative merit inthis f ield. What was it? We do not know.
\Ve do not study it.
1940
A ~nLITARY VACUUM
49
One canget a precise and exact story of how he f ought
the battle of ]ena, and adjacent Auerstadt, and then rolled
over all Prussia inless than amonth. But- Napoleon was
mistaken about the Prussians; he did not f ight their main
body as he thought; his scheme was entirely awry and
Bernadotte's corps, though on the line, never got into
action. H is pbn of battle was amasterpiece but it did not
work. Something elsewon. Itwas Davout's corps f ighting
like demons against a huge main f orce that won
Auerstadt, connected it with ]ena, and brought on the
Prussiandebacle. What weshould strive to know isnot the
geometry of the battle- it was all awry anyway- so
much as why the soldiers of Davout smashed up a much
larger f orce inastraight slugging battle. They had morale,
battle discipline, and Davout was agreat leader. Granted.
But what made this morale, battle discipline, and leader-
ship? And why was it the Prussians did not have it then?"
They did bter. This is the subject that should be getting
laborious study but instead we hear only prattle of Na-
poleon's genius and Davout's leadership- both are re-
garded as unexplainable. The military are worshipers at a
veiled shrine of mysteries instead of students of human
action. Yet there is no mystery here; hard study of years
will give us the answers. But we would rather pby with
battle geometry. It gives such lovely pictures.
Times change, people change. Thus the culture that
produces soldiers needs study. True, all menareessentially
alike, but each generation, each nation, shows achange in
soldiers as the people's society changes. Itis not a change
of the primitive man but the culture which calls f or a
dif f erent approach to the man. Today inthe mechanized
age the rapidity of change is breath- taking; stupendous is
the speed of change. There has been nothing like it in
all the world's history. And we do nothing about it. We
make no study, we do little thinking. We accept the past
and if anything is likely to be wrong that is it. For the
past is good only in telling about the pri meval nature
of man, not his complex civilized nature, which is the
product of society- and society always changes. Who can
tell us the dif f erence between the Civil War and \\Torld
\Var soldier? There was adif f erence but just what was it?
\Ve should be studying, delving into the world about
us and the soldier material civil lif e is turnin<T out. The
t>
man tlut walks the street is the one who will make our
war army. Never f orget that. Itis he that should be
studied. H ow canhe be led, how disciplined, what pro-
duces morale? Do not try what has happened inthe past
or very likely we will be wrong. Study the subject scien-
tif icallv. There is material turned out onit.
On~great project entirely controlled by the military
should be extensively and scientif ically studied. That is
the Civilian Conservation Corps. Ithad no standard mili-
tary discipline but it ranlike a piece of great machinery.
Things went smoothly despite the f act that nothing in
the army's past was utilized to inculcate standard army
discipline. \\That kind of discipline controlled 300,000
men? H ow was leadership promoted? What made a
leader? The very least we can say is that all was guite
high. But how was morale produced and kept ona high
level? Finally, could military instruction be introduced
and succeed, using the same type of discipline and leader-
ship? If this could be done, then we have struck some-
thing of tremendous military value. Even if certain slight
changes are necessary, still we have f ound what the com-
monAmerican desires, what he will work under with great
good will, what is the method of group discipline, leader-
ship and morale common to Americans. That we do not
know today. We let it pass. Inmilitary lif ewe have copied
too much f rom abroad. Yet we are a dif f erent people.
Foreign material does not f it us.
There may be gold inthis CCC hill. Why do we not
study it to f ind out? Good or bad, it needs intense study-
ing, as do other mores of American lif e. But no such
studying isgiveninany of our military schools. It appears
we are but a bookish soldiery that studies old and out-
moded things.
Some may scof f at such study of modern trends because
soldiery has always beenthe same. They may enjoy their
chuckles now, but as commanders inthe next war they
will be old, guerulous, and valueless. Chalk that up.
-... -.. ------
-------. ~llII
I n ..... --
..._ - - ._ ~
Illustrated by H . Charles McBarron, J r.
"Double- shot your guns and give' em hell!"
That was General Zachary Taylor's command to Bragg
and his battery standing between a crumpling American
wing and the oncoming charge of the NIexican inf antry
abour to winthe day at Buena Vista. So testif ied anauthor-
itative witness. Yet the textbooks have it that the Gen-
eral shouted above the dinof battle:
"Give them alittle more grape, Mr. Bragg."
So areheroic phrases tidied up f or historical and political
purposes. Thus did the Forties smooth out the rough and
ready utterance of Old Rough and Ready so that it might
ring more politely down our annals. In any event, NIr.
Bragg and others obliged with grape- shot, double- shot
and what- not. The Mexican charge reeled back, the tide
of victory turned, and the battle of Buena Vista, which
he f ought against orders and risked dangerously, made
Zachary Taylor President of the United States.
The political ball rolled back and f orth merrily in
those days f rom \Vashington to the Rio Grande, and the
best ball- player was the man to whom the usually astute
Daniel \Vebster ref erred as "an ignorant old f rontier
colonel." Taylor outplayed the regular politicians, f or
politics was the Old Army Game and the Old Navy
Game, too, then as now. Passing the buck, that adroit
military exercise, is only one of the methods of warming
up onthe sidelines. Non- voting of f icers, limited though
they are, inf requently resist the aid of f amily political con-
nections to speed the long, dreary wait f or promotion. \Var
gives the successf ul soldier achance to knock the ball over
the f ence. Small blame to that indubitably strong and
honest character, Old Zach, that like J ackson, H arrison,
Grant and Roosevelt, he took that chance.
Buried beneath the obscurity of campaign pamphlets
and old- f ashioned biographies is the story of a unique
career ina critical period of our history. Cross currents
clash to produce unexpected results. Aaron Burr's schemes
launch a f uture champion of the Union. The Mexican
War trains more good generals f or the South but makes
President a man who does much to delay Secession f or
~enprecious years which strengthen the all- important
mdustrial sinews of the North. Such is the story of
Zachary Taylor who bent victory to his purpose as
shrewdly as ever did Caesar or Napoleon.
It isnot of record that Colonel Richard T avlor, aveteran
of the Revolution, told his third child, Za~hary, that he
might he President some day if he were good, but he gave
the lad a splendid start by begetting him in Virginia.
Bornin1784, Zachary was less than a year old when his
f ather emigrated to Kentucky. H e could clothe himself in
the purple of the Old Dominion dynasty and add the
f rontier tradition f or good measure. When later he was
stationed and made his home inLouisiana, it was evident
that a f airy god- mother had been hovering around in
' i
8
4 and had graciously remarked: "And when the time
comes, I 'll deliver the Southern vote."
As if this three- starred nativity were not suf f iciently
BUella Vi sta: Through i t all, Old Rough alld
Ready sat c almly 011 hi s warhorse, Old W' hi tey
potent, the pamphleteers in Taylor's Presidential race
were subsequently to indulge in some naive pre- natal
diagnostics. The spirit of prowess, they said, had been
generated inthe candidate by his f ather's encounters with
the savages. While this was a triAe ex post fac to, it was
true enough that the elder Taylor had beenencountering
the British and that would account f or the prowess. The
II
It isnomeanhitch alongtheroad,if amanlooksthe
partheintendstoplay.ZacharyTaylor didnot.H is direct,
grayeyesandf irmmouthwerewellenoughf or asoldier,
but hesadlylackedthemilitary stature. H e was always
theshort,thickset backwoodsman."Fromtheequestrian
exercisesthenature of his lif ehas ledhimnecessarilyto
undergo,"wroteanapologist,"his extremitiesaresome-
what bowed."EvenGrant wastobeaf ar moresnappily
unif ormedgeneralthantheheroof theMexicanWar. In
spiteof all this- and evenbecauseof it- Taylor man-
agedtoachievehisambition.
Frontier lif epointedhimtowardthecareerof asoldier,
but anelder brother wonout onseniority.Young Zach
hadtocontent himself withsuchadventuresasswimming
the Ohio, whichthepamphleteerslater comparedto the
H ellespont, addingthat Taylor didn't haveaboat along,
likethat f ellowByron.Thenburst f orthAaronBurr with
his idea onexpansionwithout benef it of the United
States. The ensuing excitement accomplishedthe result
of putting young Taylor inthe militia, thoroughly in-
oculating himwith the army virus and starting achain
of eventswhichwastocurblater separatistideas.
The elder brother died and President J ef f ersongave
Zachary the covetedcommissionin1808 making him a
f irstlieutenant. H erewasluck,asanyonewhohasbeena
secondlieutenant willtellyou. And ontop of that, Mr.
Madisonbecamethe next President, and Mr. Madison
wasarelativeof theTaylor f amily. The advantageto an
of f icerof ahighly- placedkinsmanisperennial inarmies
andgovernments.
The newof f icer'sregiment wasthe7th Inf antry which
seemedto havef ewprospectsof permanency. Older of -
f icerseschewedit caref ully, since promotionwas regi-
mentalinthosedaysandtheyhadnodesiretobelef t H at
52 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
mind of the candidate's mother, they wrote, had been inadisbandment.Not soTaylor.H estoodpat,thoughhe
morethanordinarilywrought onand this excitedinher might havewangledatransf er.The7th wasretainedand
brainthosequalitieswhichphrenologistsinf erarerequisite Taylor movedup rapidly.Intwoyearshewasacaptain.
f or the f ormationof a hero. Nobody caninf er more It wasasgoodasawar.
handsomely thanphrenologists, saveperhaps pamphle- Fateput himout inFort H arrison,Indiana,f ortheWar
teers. Yet nonecould deny that at the rime of writing of 1812. While other parts of the army wereletting the
Zachary Taylor had f ully demonstrated both his power BritishbumWashingtonand wereotherwiseinglorious,
and hisheroism,and theonly argument couldbewhen Taylor was def ending his little f rontier f ott against Te-
he developedthose qualities, which seemed and was a cumseh's bravesand doing it nobly. With only f if teen
minor matter. menf it f or duty hebeat of f the Indians attackingoneof
A birthright of primepoliticalgeography,solidpersonal his blockhouses,inH amesf ed by asupply of nef arious,
worth and thenthe lucky break of f our wars- two In- pre- Prohibitionwhisky. Inhis report to his superior of -
dianandtwof oreign.It wasthemaking of apassportto f icer,hegaveadelightf ullyunsophisticatedpictureof the
thePresidency.But other soldiershavehadtheequivalent action,writing:
and whenthe inaugural parademarched downPennsyl- "And sir,what f romthe raging f ire, the yelling and
vaniaAvenuethey wereonahorsebehind the civilian howling of severalhundred Indians, the cries of nine
gentlemaninthe open- f acedcarriageup f ront. Taylor womenand children... and the despondency of so
took f ull advantageof thecircumstanceswith whichf or- manymen,whichwasworsethanall,Icanassureyouthat
tune f avoredhim, but hewasrather morethesagethan my f eelingswereveryunpleasant.... But my presence
theschemer,moretheplain,practicalmanthanthe pre- of minddidnot f oramoment desertme."
cipitousopportunist. For that was theway to get ahead It madehimabrevet major. H e was f ull major when
inthe army- and inpolitics. Congressresortedtoitscustomarysportof reducingaf tera
war anarmy that had beenwoef ully inadequateduring
theconRiet.This steppedTaylor back toacaptaincy.H e
promptly resignedandwent hometoraiseacropof corn,
f armrelief being entirely uncongressionalinthosedays.
Itwasawrenchf oramanwhohadthearmyinhisblood,
but Mr. Madison, likeTaylor'spresenceof mind, didnot
deserthim. The comcouldscarcelyhavebeeninear be-
f oreTaylor was back inthe army as amajor againby
order of the President.
Thencameyears of army routine, variedby Colonel
Taylor's receivingthe surrender of the Indianchief tain,
Black H awk. To the colonelin1838 f ell the important
assignment of putting downthe revolt of those tough
customers,OsceolaandhisSeminoles.
Itwasahardtask,that campaignwhichwastoopenup
Floridaeventually to realestateboomsand PalmBeach
costumeballs.Taylor andhis troopswaded through the
swampsandsnakesandcorneredChief Alligator andhis
band. Ina severe actionwhich cost him twenty- six
killedand 112 woundedbef oreheroutedthe Indians,he
wonthegradeof brevet brigadier- generalandsomething
worth more,thesobriquet Old RoughandReady- both
well- deservedtributes. That excellentvote- catchingnick-
namewaslater tobenotedinnumerouscampaignsongs,
of whichthef ollowingisapattern:
I knew hi m fi rst, the soldi er sai d,
Among the Everglades,
When we gave the savage redski ns
Our bayonets and our blades
I thi nk I hear hi s c heerful voi c e,
" On c olumn! Steady! Steady! "
So hardy and so prompt was he,
We c alled hi m Rough and Ready.
There remained troublesomeguerillaf ighting. Taylor
went at it earnestly. H ampered by interf erenceand the
" Al1d si r, wbat from tbe ragi l1g fi re, tbe yelli llg of several blmdred
11ldi am.... I c all asmre )'01/ tbat m)' feeli llgs were t.er)' I/l1pleasal1t"
54 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL !aUlIal' y-February
" Hi s extremi ti es are somewbat bOlVed"
and Taylor and any quantity ot
Congressmen sitting inthe game.
From the f irst the cards were
stacked against General \Vinf ield
Scott, the experienced commander
of the army. Beneath his pomp-
ous manner which won him the
~ickname of "Old Fuss and Fe:lth-
ers," he was anable and intrepid
soldier, but he was also a known
\Vhig candidate f or the Presi-
dency. At the time no such dire
disqualif ication existed inthe case
of Old Rough and Ready. To the
Democratic Administration the
choice appeared simple. SCOttto
the pigeonhole, the less accom-
plished Taylor to Mexico.
Taylor,in the estimate of J ustin
H . Smith, inhis The War wi tb
/11 exi c o was a strong character,
every inch a man, with a great
heart, a mighty will, a prof ound
belief inhimself , and a prof ound
belief in human nature. Yet he
was of ten obstinate and ponder-
ous. Inhis lif etime inthe service,
he never had f ought a big battle
nor led a real army" Still Old
Rough and Ready did his best.
With the assistance of f ate, that
served.
Taylor's command reached the
Rio Grande inMarch, 1846, af ter
breaking an encampment in
which sickness, quarrels and indis-
cipline had been rif e. H is volun-
teers were sadly untrained. One
inevitable bout inthe Old Arm\"
Game was already well under wa\'
- the contest between \Vest
Pointers and of f icers who had en-
tered the service f rom civil lif e.No
West Pointer himself , Taylor was
the object of considerable distrust
by his subordinates f rom the Mili-
tary Academy and not all of it was
groundless. There he had ananti-
dote inthe adjutant General Scott
" had purposely sent him, the West
Point graduate, Captain Vl. W. S. Bliss. Called without
any sarcasm, "Perf ect" Bliss because of his high capacities.
the captain was Taylor's right- hand man throughout the
war, winning f or his reward his chief 's daughter, the
charming Betty Taylor.
Of the actions of the wlexican War, no more need here
be given than such brief account as will indicate the p0-
litical undercurrent which swept Taylor into the presi-
I
(
(
war was on.
American contempt f or "Nf exico
was strong. J okes about the Mexi-
can army and its superRuity of
generals had some basis. At one
time it consisted of 20,000 soldiers
and 24,000 of f icers. Six successf ul
revolts it was said, would promote
a second lieutenant to a general.
The army like the government
was rotten with graf t. Yet what
wehad to f ight with was aregular army of only eight regi-
ments of inf antry, f our of artillery and two of dragoons,
with amilitia called to arms that illustrated all the evils of
unpreparedness. "Nf exicobehind the barriers of her deserts
was to be guided by the unscrupulous but strong hand of
her dictator, Santa Anna, while the military f ortunes of
the United States were on a political poker table with
President Polk, Secretary of \Var whrcy, Generals Scott
Intrigues of army contractors who
were unwilling to have good busi-
ness concluded by peace, he made
little progress. It was time f or a
f arseeing of f icer to get f rom under.
Old Rough and Ready obtained
his transf er tothe command of the
department of the South. Now
he could settle down at leisure at
BatonRouge, acquire slaves, work
a plantation and make Southern
f riends. As if his f airy godmother
f elt she had not done enough f or
him, it f ell out that one of his
daughters married J ef f ersonDavis.
And down onthe Border, tur-
bulent Texans and irritable "Nf exi-
cans were busy guaranteeing all
the martial prospects a soldier's
heart could desire. Nobody was
handier to the scene than General
Taylor.
III
The causes of the "Nf exican
War: advisability of annexing
Texas rather than allow Sam
H ouston to hook up with Cali-
f ornia and Oregon inanew Amer-
icanrepublic- the not- to- be- con-
ciliated, chip- on- the- shoulder atti-
tude of revolution- ridden Mexico
- the growing menace of Euro-
pean interf erence- these and the
rest were not the concern of Gen-
eral Zachary Taylor. H e was a
soldier. H is not to reasonwhy.
"This child of destiny" concen-
trated his troops on the f rontier.
H e advanced as ordered and the
--
1940
OLD ROUGH AND READY 55
dency. Building Fort Brownacross the River, General
Taylor lef t a small garrisonand made a belated march
toPoint Isabelf or needed supplies. The f ort still held out
whenthe Mexicans under Arista were f orced to leave
thesiegeto meet the returning Taylor who routed them
at the battle of Palo Alto. Again he was successf ul at
Resacade la Palma, the dashing American batteries of
light artillery doing excellent serviceonboth occasions.
The bright halo of the f irst victories of the war settled
overthehead of Old Rough andReady. Amid the cheers
of thenation, hewas made abrevet major- general. "The
General" wrote Prof essor Smith, "had shown himself
slow,unskillf ul, wanting inpenetration and f oresight,
and poorly grounded prof essionally" in these battles.
What was that to the people? H e had won, hadn't he?
H is name rode onthe crest of the tide of popularity to
mentionasacandidate f or thepresidency.
H opeof beingPresident probably wasnot andcertainly
couldnot havebeenentertained with any logicby Taylor
bef oretheseevents. Now it couldwell be. The President
of theUnited States isCommander- in- Chief of theArmy.
Fewsoldiers canresist the lure of promotion, and here
waspromotiontothevery top beckoning.
What a pretty pickle it put the Administration in!
Scott had beenshelved, but here was another general
gaining glory and possible votes. Polk and Marcy took
Scott downof f the shelf , dusted him of f and routed him
f orMexico. Competitionmight whack up the glory suf -
f icientlysothat it would not carry the next election.
Forthwith Taylor proceeded to storm and take Mon-
terey.Itwas costly but "it was af amous victory." Old
RoughandReady'sownhigh valor intheleadershipof the
assaultlif ted gallant mentoheights of heroism. Criticism
of hisgeneralshiptheremight be,but thecountry sawthe
redbadge of courage upon his breast and his troops'.
Little could be done inWashington against Taylor.
Scottsupported him nobly. The best strategy seemed to
beto hastenScott and anarmy to Vera Cruz f or avital
thrust at theCity of Mexico.
The expeditionwas sound both inamilitary senseand
politically.The bulk of the regulars under Taylor were
ordered,as was necessary, to join.Scott, with Taylor to
remainstrictly onthe def ensiveat Monterey.
To these def inite orders, the ears of Old Rough and
Ready, f illed with the buzzing of the Presidential bee,
weredeaf . To the suggestionthat he of f er himself as a
candidatehehadwritten: "I couldnot, while thecountry
isinvolvedinwar,andwhilemy duty callsmetotakepart
intheoperationsagainst theenemy, acknowledgeany am-
bitionbeyond that of bestowing all my best exertions
toward obtaining anadjustment of our dif f iculties with
Mexico." But the ambitioncould exist unacknowledged
and its owner was f urious at what he saw as a plot of
Polk'sand Scott's.
Whereuponheplainly announced his candidacy. Cast-
ingordersandprudence tothewinds, headvanceddeeper
intoMexico.
But now the talented Santa Anna, returned f romexile
inCuba, was back inMexico and insupreme power.
This f ar f romincompetent leader sizedup the situation,
sawScott's strong f orceapproaching andthe rashadvance
of theweakened army of Taylor. There wastimeto crush
Taylor bef ore Scott could strike. Santa Anna pushed
rapidly north with his army.
IV
"Old Zach" led into anadventure which might easily
prove catastrophic to anarmy which f elt f or him a de-
votioncomparable almost to that which Napoleon in-
spired inhis troops. The talismanof his successand his
personalcouragehad beenimpressed anewonhissoldiers
hallowed inthe glowing paragraphs of newspapers f rom
home. Their generalinhisbroad- brimmed hat, oldbrown
roundabout coat and linenpantaloons endeared himself
to them by the very f act of his unkempt and unmilitary
appearance and his genial and approachable manner.
Other generals intheir army blue and plumed hats and
their air of disciplineseemedtothe volunteers lordly, dis-
tant and unlovable- almost un- American. Old Rough
and Ready was amanto die f or, thought the volunteers
asthey swung af ter him. And volunteers aretheladswho
cast thevotes af ter thewar isover.
So Taylor and Santa Anna met at Buena Vista, the
Americans outnumbered f our to one. It is a gorgeous
canvas inour history, that two- day battle. The Mexican
army, brilliant inits panoply, hearing mass bef ore the
combat. The Americaninf antry H amingwith volleys of
musketry, as the lancers of Mexico charged. The light
batteries at a headlong gallop across the f ield f rom one
sorely threatened point to another, unlimbering and del-
uging the f oewith grape and canister. The collapse of
oneAmericanwing and thebraverally that turned def eat
into victory. Through it all, oldRough and Ready sitting
calmly onhis war horse, Old Whitey, while f ragments
f rom bursting Mexican shells whistled through his
clothes.
Among thepaeanswhich arose,it may seemsuitable to
select a stanza of a rousing song which was later to do
yeomanserviceinthe political campaign.
Zac hary Taylor was a brave old feller,
A Bri gadi er-General, A No. I.
He fought twenty thousand Mexi c anos.
Four thousand he ki lled; the rest they" c ut and run."
In the thi c kest of the fi ght, Old Zac hary appear-ed
The shot flew about hi m thi c k as any hai l,
A nd the only i njury he there rec ei ved
Was a c ompound frac ture of hi s brown c oat tai l.
Somuch f or the only injury. And the benef its? Fran-
tically enthusiastic celebrations allover thecountry. Wild
ovations towhich the brilliant victories of Scott at Cerro
Gordo, Chapultepec and the City of Mexico were only
somany more f ireworks to add to the glory of the main
piece,thelaurel- wreathed imageof Old Rough andReady.
56 TH E COAST ~TILLERY J OURNAL Jaullary-February
No chance f or Candidate Scott. In vain the oratorical back inch by inch to the last rampart of the \\'hite H ouse
thunders of perennial Candidates Clay and Webster. Con- and was def ending himself with his old Mexican sword
f usionto the Democrats and Candidate Casso Popular and against a cloud of of f ice- seekers who were charging him
electoral, the VOtes piles up f or that "moderate Clay inasolid column twenty- f ive deep."
Whig," Candidate Taylor. Taylor's administration lay inthe great Era of Compro-
The General's Clay \Vhiggery seemed to matter as mise. Yet the old soldier of whom Abraham Lincoln
little to the South as his ownership of three hundred wrote ina recently discovered eulogy, "No man was so
slaves did to the North. Those items were lost under a little disposed to have trouble with his f riends," still
post- war avalanche of Old Rough and Ready songs, Old could be staunch. \Vhen Southern representatives came
Rough and Ready dramas, Old Rough and Ready alma- to him with plans f or secession, he declared that he would
nacs and anecdotes. crush such a movement unhesitatingly, if necessary with
Itwas Taylor and Fillmore in'49. "Old Zach" had his volunteers f rom the South.
promotion, or rather his inauguration. Following that That deadly combination, the cares of of f ice and the
ceremony, a contemporary writer jovially draws this \Vashington heat, ended his lif e af ter eighteen months in
pIcture: of f ice. H e was not destined to hear the bugle calls of the
"When last heard f rom, General Taylor had drawn Civil \Var. That was f or the next generation of soldiers.
DI/tc b allti ai raa! t lIIac bi ne gUllllers I/se a 1II0torc yc le si dec ar 1II0l/nt i ll order
to gai ll 1II0bi li ty
W hat M ak es the W heels G o'R ou nd
B y W arrant O fficer B . C . Elders, A rm y M ine P lanter S ervice
The recent co.mmissio.ning o.f the mine pl:lI1ter Ni les
and the prospect o.f f uture replacement o.f o.thers no.w
growing o.bso.letehas given rise to co.nsiderable discussio.n
as to design and Po.wer. On these subjects there seem to
be as many dif f erent ideas as there are individuals taking
part inth; discussio.n. But we o.f the o.perating craf t, int~
who.secare the planters areeventually co.nsigned, are rather
br do.wnthe line o.f command and inthe natural co.urse
o.f events are little co.nsulted during the perio.d that ideas
are abo.rning. A sincere desire to view the subject inthe
Co.ldlight o.f reaso.nand witho.ut bias prompts the writer to
present asho.rt resume touching uPo.nthe subject o.f Po.wer-
ing amine planter. I realize that an)' engineer who.setime
has been served in steam is immediatel:' suspected o.f
antago.nism toward Diesel engines. Bethat as it may, this
argument ho.pes to maintain a f air and impartial attitude.
It isgenerally co.nceded that amine planter sho.uld have
ample Po.wer inher main engines, no.t so.much f o.r speed
while cruising but f o.r maneuvering. Since she has no.
co.ntact with anything more substantial than water her
"wheels" must act as brakes as well as to.propel the vessel
and n1l1st also.augment the steer!ng gear o.nquick turns
during which o.ne engine goes f ull ahead and tlw o.ther
f ull astern.
Co.st, while animpo.rtant f actor is no.t the deciding in-
Auence as these vessels are c1o.selycomparable to a naval
vessel, and must abo.ve all acco.mplish their missio.n.
There aretwo. (o.rperhaps mo.restrictly speaking, three)
general metho.ds which may be used to Po.wer vessels o.f
the mine planter type, These are steam, using reciprocat-
ing o.r "up and do.wn" engines; steam, using turbines;
and Diesel engines.
The reciprocating steam engine is witho.ut do.ubt the
simplest and mo.st reliable o.f the three metho.ds. ivf o.re
than thirty :'ears o.f service rendered by several o.f tho.se
no.wino.peratian attest to these bcts. The ariginal draw-
back o.f co.al- burning Scatch bailers has beensuccessf ully
avercame by canversio.n to ail- burning express- type water
tube bo.ilers. Bo.ilers themselves may be cansidered an
abjectio.n to the use o.f steam engines 'but with later t:'Pes
very little trouble is experienced; the chief problem is to
keep dawn scale anthe water side. Scale has beenlargely
o.vercame in the later canimercial installatians by pre-
treatment ar distillatio.n o.f bo.iler f eed water bef ore it is
used. There isacertain amaunt af unavaidable upkeep an
bailers but the autlay is quite mo.dest.
Reciprocating engines are caupled directly to the pro-
peller shaf t and thus eliminate an)' problems o.nthis scare.
l
Swi tc hboard of tbe mgi 11e room of the mi 11epla11ter Ellery W'.Niles.
58
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
Tbe engi ne room of tbe mi ne plallter Ellery W' . Niles. Tbi s I' essel i s powered by Di esel ellgi nes.
,
t
They are easily reversible and extremely Aexible, both
desirable f eatures. They may saf ely be thrown f rom f ull
ahead to f ull asternmerely by use of the valve link motion
without touching the throttle and the steam acts as asof t
brake onthe propeller shaf t and cushions the entire as-
sembly (f rom engine to propeller) f rom shock or vibra-
tion. It may be possible that the time required to attain
maximum torque f rom f ull ahead to f ull astern is less
when using electric drive; but the dif f erence, if any, is so
small asto be negligible ..The more sudden torque applied
to the shaf t by the electric drive is almost certain to set
up crystalliza~ion f rom shock and whipping which will
result ina high percentage of propeller shaf t breakage.
Itis believed that no recorded instance of this mishap in
the planters now inservice isknown.
In the matter of thermal ef f iciency the reciprocating
engine is def initely below the Diesel, but it compares f av-
orably with the turbine. Inpoint of f act, one American
manuf acturer claims that his engine will equal or excel
;1I1Y turbine. The improvements in this f ield probably
have equalled if not exceeded those made inthe Diesel
engine during recent years. An example of the use of
these modern engines isshown by their installation inthe
Pennsylvania Railroad steamer Pri nc ess Anne, onc of
the f ew streamlined f erries now inservice, as well as in
other ships of this line, where it is understood they havc
met with marked success. The steam plant canutilizc a
much cheaper grade of f uel, and owing to this f act will
probably excel the Diesel engine ona cost- per- mile COI1 1 -
panson.
Maintenance and repair of the reciprocating engine
requires only aminimum of ef f ort and cost. The engines
are of comparatively simple design and the pam have an
extremely long lif e because they are not subjected to am'
sudden shock or strain and opc'rate at a very low rotative
speed.
Operation of the reciprocating engine presents no great
dif f iculties, and this f eature means alot to the engineer on
the job. Crews are picked at random f rom men of the
harbor def ense organizations and must be trained f rom the
ground up. The turnover islarge, and good oilers and f ire-
menare hard to get and easy to lose, because the training
they receive aboard mine planters enables them to f it in
very nicely and at a higher salary oncommercial ships.
Itis the policy to hold the enlisted crew to a minimum
with the result that the loss of two or more trained person-
1940
WH AT MAKES TH E WH EELS GO 'R O U N D
59
The f oregoing isbasedinthemainuponpracticerather
thantheory, but the reader candrawhisownconclusions
For my p~rt I'll take steam, and I meanreciprocating
engmes.
Diesel Turbine Reciprocating
Y:xceIlent (Duelvery good jFair (Dif f iculty
to simplicity) (Simplicity with f ouling
"
of f set by use, at idling
of electric speeds or on
_ _ _ )~Ye) I light load)
I
\>erygood (1!s- :Fair (Too much
ingelectric i sacrif ice of
drive) I other princi-
I pIes) .
Flexi hi li ty
() j> erati olt
Diesel. Di-
rect connect-
Rec~procat- Turbo- Diesel ed 2 stroke
Ing electric Electric cycle
Si mPli c i tY' l Excellent 1 \ "erygood iFair; ).[an1'I Very good
lVai nte- 'mOVlIl"partsI
nanc e and I II inaddition
Repai r I to ~lectrical
1 , eqUipment
-P-e-rS-O-Jlj-l -' /-! Exccllent- .-IYery gOod'I- F- a- ir- . - L- o- ng- e- r'l- V- er- y- g.oo- - d- .
Pro c ure- I Short train- ' Longer training per- 'Slightly
1I1mt i ing period. I training per- ,iod. Princi- ; longer train-
1f ore men ,iod requiredIpIes of in- \ 1 iug period
I, available, due to elec-
I
, ternal com- ,thanwith re-
Iwith previ- trical de- bustion Iciprocating-
iousexperi- vices. coupled with due to more
ence. :electrical de- 'complicated
I jvicesmust be, design.
, Itaught. ! _
================- ==- ==~
able load, since their chief characteristic is a tendency
to runwell anI" whenboth conditions of f ull load and
constant speed~resatisf ied.
The electric drive job is the better method f or pilot
house control, but this f eature may be had with either
reciprocatingorturbineengineswithout toomuch trouble.
The advantage of pilot housecontrol consistschief lyina
f ew seconds time- saving over the engine roomtelegraph
method and the value of this is debatable. The master
who cangaugehis momentum to thef inepoint necessary
to makethis advantage of any material valuemust needs
havekeenperceptionindeed. Pilot housecontrolwastried
out by theSanFranciscof erryboats andabandoned at the
insistence of the Inspectors of the Bureau of Navigation
and Steamboat Inspectionaf ter hearings ona f ew cases
dealingwith somematters of carrying awaypilings, docks,
andsoon, during thecourseof making alanding.
A tabulation of the various good and bad points in-
herent ineachof the f oregoing powering methods, with
more or lessarbitrary ratings, ma:' beof someassistance.
IExcellent
- -
Abi li ty to per- Excellent Excellent
fa I' m mi ssi on
Ini ti al c ost Low H igh H igh
[,! > keep Low 1fode rate Hi gh
Tha1l1aJ ef- \'ery good \"ery g- ood Excellent (of f -
fi c i enc y
I
set by hig- her
f uel cost)
,
ne!disrupts the routine of the remainder until new men
canbebrokenin. This conditionwould probably become
acuteinwartime. It istheref oredesirablethat theperson-
neltraining periodbeshort aspossible.
The steamturbine has mam' f eatures which make its
useasaprimemover desirablebut it alsohasmany serious
drawbacks f rom a marine standpoint. Its thermal ef -
f iciencyisexcellent; it hasf ewer parts thanthereciprocat-
ingengine; and requires evenless maintenance and up-
keep. Its inherent characteristics of high rotative speed
and use of extremely high steam pressure are serious
deterrents to its useinmine planters. Speed at the pro-
peller shaf t must be reduced either by gearing, which is
outof thequestionduetolack of f lexibility,orby employ-
ment of electric drive, which requires installationof gen-
erator and motors. This adds greatly to initial cost and
introduces the dif f icult problem of upkeep onmotors,
generators, switchboards, and control devices. Direct
current commutators have atendency to f ly apart when
turned at ahigh rotative speed,but it ispossiblethat the
entireproblemof electric drivecould be solvedby useof
alternating current machines. Turbines require speed
governors, high pressure superheated steam, and high
vacuum equipment, none of which are necessary ina
reciprocating job. It is believed that turbine limitations
outweio- hthe advantages. Inadditionthese installations
n .
requiremorespacethaneither of theother two types.
Diesel engines areundisputed champions f rom ather-
malstandpoint and their useeliminates the necessity f or
boilers,anadvantage which isnot tobelightly dismissed.
But that lack of f lexibility, which has prevented Diesel
useinautomobiles, is also the greatest deterrent to their
useinmine planters. Inorder toemploy them ef f iciently
it has beendeemed necessary to use electric drive with
theundesirablef eatures of high initial cost,high upkeep,
dif f icultmaintenance and operation. The Diesel engine
doesnot f unctionwell onlight loads becauseit isbetter
adaptedf or steady running onf ull load. This is anun-
desirablef eaturewhich evenelectricdrivehasnot entirely
eliminated. While amoreor lessminor point, theDiesel
engineisnoisyinoperationandsetsup considerablevibra-
tionwhich makes it anunpleasant machine f or closedaily
association. This f eature is probably responsible f or the
tenper cent additional pay which west coast unions re-
quiref or engineers serving onDiesel powered vessels.
The useof Diesel electricdrivemakeselectricallydriven
auxiliarymachinery imperative, whereas inreciprocating
orturbine methods achoiceisavailablebetweensteamor
electrically operated small machinery. The Diesel is en-
titledto someadditional weight asaspacesaver,but this
advantage diminishes with the increased spacenecessary
f or motors, generators, and switchboard. With. the im-
provement instarting methods f ound inmodernDiesel
practice, it would probably be better to connect Diesel
enginesdirectly totheshaf t, which would eliminatemuch
of theinitial cost and operating ~xpenseaswell as greatly
reduce the maintenance problem. The engines would
operatejust assuccessf ullyat variablespeedsasonavari-
BEA C H DEFEN S E: A S olu tionto
t he Fi re C ont rol Proble m
A couple of years ago the 4th Coast Artillery started
tests at Fort Amador, Canal Zone, to determine whethn
minor caliber armament could f ire accurately using a
locall~'constructed predictor system, without the use of
plotti:lg boardsandtimeinterval apparatus. During these
tests, which beganinDecember, 1937, all f ire control
equipment- except the range f inder- W:J s improvised.
The armament used included 155- mm. guns and 6- inch
guns.
Now that sixpracticeshavetakenplaceduring aperiod
of two years with more thansatisf actorv'results, it isbe-
lieved that the systemis sound and w~rthy of adoption.
Since all practices f ired were based onthe procedures
and equipment usedinthe f irst practice, that onewill be
described ingreat detail. The subsequent pnctices will
not begoneinto soelaborately.
TH E PROBLEM
(1) CaseII tobeused.
(2) No equipment to be f urnished except aDPF or
'CRF.
(3) Firetobeopened at maximum range.
(4) Target to be incoming, at the minimum VTG
anglepermitted by saf ety.
The solutionof the problem necessitated improvisation
of somef ormof predictor, that would correct f or height of
site, displacement of the DPF f romthe directing point,
andpredict f or thetravelof thetarget inrangeduring the
time of f light and dead time. It was decided to set this
predicted range ona range percentage corrector, which
would permit ballistic and arbitrary corrections, and pro-
videarange- elevationrelationf or theguns. Itwasf urther
decided to eliminate atime interval system, and f ire the
gunswhenever they wereready. This ~alledf or acontinu-
ous f lowof data.
TH E SOLUTION
The "predictor" developedconsistedof atapemou:1ted
onapair of rollersinasmallbox. This tapewasgraduated
inelements of predicted range, using as arguments the
DPF (uncorrected) range and rate of range change in
yards per second, f or any DPF range and any speed of
target. The height of site and displacement f rom the
DPF of the directing point were algebraically added to
this predicted rangeonthepredictor. (Fig. 1.)
The f ollowing assumptions were made:
(I) Dead time tenseconds.
(2) Target incoming.
(3) Closest practical reading twenty yards.
(4) Normal charge.
To compute atypical prediction: (Fig. 2.)
Range 14,640 yards
Time of f light f orty- sevenseconds (Firing Tables
155-
B
-})
Time of f light plus dead time f if ty- sevenseconds.
Rateof range change f iveyards per second
Travel equals 5x 57 or 285yards (minus, as target
incoming)
Displacement correctionminus 320yards
H eight of site 150f eet; correctionequals f ort\'- eight
yards minus
o Total correctionequals 285plus 320 plus f ort~'- eight
or 653; use660 (minus)
Predicted range equals 14,640minus 660 or 1),980
yardsANSWER.
.I
For simplicity, the tape was graduated only f or i'l-
coming targets, and thelimit of rateof rangechangewas
established by the knownmaximum speed of the towing
vessel.H owever, if anall- purpose tape had beendesired,
another set of f igures couldhavebeenadded f or outgoing
targets, and the rate of range change extended as f ar as
necessary. For example, if the target inthe preceding il-
lustrationwere ourgoing, all other conditions remaining-
the same, the predicted range would be 14,640plus 283
minus }20 minus 48, equalling 14,557 or 14,560yards.
This f igure could beentered inthe same spacewith the
13,980f or anincoming target, inadif f erent coloredink.
Fi gure 1: The " predi c tor"
1940
BEACH DEFENSE
61
Fi gure 3: Tbe range sec ti on
guns). No dif f icultieswereexperienced, but af ewmodi.
f icationsweresuggested, and tested inlater practices.
SECOND TEST
The next practiceto bef ired utilizing this systemwas
the annual practice inMay, 1938, of Battery D, 4
th
Coast Artillery, f iring Battery Birney, 6- inch DC guns.
This practice was unclassif ied, due to anunavoidable
breakdownof the coincidence range f inder assigned. It
wasanexcellentlyconducted practice,andsincethebattery
had previously f iredaperf ect minepractice, the results of
thetwogaveBattery D theKnox Trophy f or 1938.
The same setup was used as inthe 15s- mm. practice
already described, with the f ollowing exceptions: H eight
of site was ignored, as this was incorporated on the
rangedrums; anddisplacement wasdisregarded, sincethe
range f inder was near the directing point of the battery.
Consequently, thepredictor readonly therange corrected
f or travelof thetarget intimeof f light plus deadtime. To
quote f rom the battery commander's narrative report
... "this system gave splendid results insubcaliber
where the CRF was ef f ective, and materi el hits onthe
small target were obtained inevery prac ti c e."
SUBSEQUENT TESTS
The next test worthy of note was another 15s- mm.
GPF practice f ired by Battery I, inJ une, 1938. Super-
charge was used instead of normal charge, and the f irst
round was f ired at anactual range of 17,820yards. This
excessover the f iring table maximum of 17>400was due
GUN GUN
BALLIS T IC
Co AAE C"T IONS
RANGE
OFFICE R
RANGE PERCENTAGE
CORRECTOR'
(2 ME N)
ARBI'TRARY
Co RRE CT IONS
B
Ff lEDICTOR
(2 ME N)
RAOR
OFF RAT E OF RANGE CH ANGE . YDS . PE R S E e.
RANGES 1 234 5
14640 14200 14140 14080 14040 13980
14660 14220 14160 14100 14060 14000
14680 14240 14180 14120 14080 14020
14700 14260 14200 14140 14080 14020
14720 14280 14220 14160 14100 14040
Displacement was assumed asthe averagef or the f ield
of f ire. For batteries with awidef ield,displacement could
beeliminatedf romthepredictor and, byuseof anazimuth
dif f erencechart or similar device, applied f rom time to
time onthe ballistic scale of the range percentage cor-
rector.
The errorsintroduced by not taking asecond approxi-
mationf romthe f iring tables f or amoreaccuratesolution
of thepredicted rangewerenot consideredseriousenough
towarrant the extra labor involved.
OPERATION
To operate the system: The observer kept the target
waterlined constantly, halting every f our or f iveseconds
to allow the reader to phone the data to one predictor
operator.This manset the DPF range inthe lef t hand
columnagainst his'index, and operated a stop watch in
order to determine the rate of range change. H e made
thischeck every twenty to thirty seconds, and gave the
ratetothe secondoperator, who read the predicted range
intheproper columnto oneof the range percentage cor-
rectoroperators. The latter kept his tape set to the pre-
dictedrange, andthesecondpercentage corrector operator
setballisticandarbitrary correctionsandreadthedevation
indegreesover thedat; linetotheguns. The ef f ectwasto
have a continuous f low of data, as each reading was
aboutf ivesecondsapart; no "repeat" was used, asaman
waitedf or the next reading if he missed one. The esti-
mateddead time f or aDPF reading to be corrected and
setonthe guns was tenseconds. Guns f ired onthe next
readingaf ter "ready" and "set." The total range section,
not including recorders, consisted of oneof f icerand f our
enlistedmen. (Fig. 3.)
TH E RESULTS
Firewas opened at anactual range of 14,830 yards,
against a maximum f iring table range of 14,900 yards,
normal charge. The average rate of range change was
threeyardsper second,which gaveamaximumprediction
of 560yards. Gunpointersweregivenaninitial def lection,
and thereaf ter "jumped" their splashes. Although no
timeinterval systemwasused, the guns beat theK f actor
of f if teenseconds, f iring staggered salvos. Adjustment
Wasby thebracketing method. Out of twenty- f our record
shots,sixbroadsideandsixteenbow- onhits weresecured,
f orascoreof 272.2 (believed tobe arecordf or Iss- mm.
~~:~PRO~MN
Fi gure 2: A typi c al sec ti on of tbe tape
62
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
! a1JuarJ-FebruarJ
to alarge ballistic correction. Conditions were the same
asthe f irst 155- mm.practice, except that themaster gun-
ner made height of sitecorrectionsonthe range- elevation
tape of the range percentage corrector, and as the DPF
assigned was near the battery, displacement was disre-
garded. Theref ore, as inthe Battery Birney practice, the
correctionwas only f or travel of the target intime of
f light plus dead time. Out of twenty- f our record shots,
sevenbroadsideand twelvebow- onhits weresecured, f or
ascoreof 170'I. It should benoted that this practicewas
scored under 1938 regulations, while the f irst 155- mm.
practiceused the 1937score,which gaveahigher result.
Using the same f ormula f or each, as a comparison, the
practiceswereactually about thesameinexcellence.
Two other 155- mm. practices were f ired during the
next year, both by Battery G, using the samesystem. In-
asmuch as nothing new was tried, it is not considered
necessary to take the time and space to describe them.
One f act only isworthy of note: inoneof thesepractices
thebattery commander usedatimeinterval apparatus, and
f iredonthebell. This def initely didnot work sowell f or
this systemas the "continuous f low" idea, and was dis-
cardedinf uture practices of this type.
The last practice of all, Battery Smith, 6- inch DC,
f iredbyBatteryD, inJ une, 1939,wasinmany respectsthe
most interesting of thetests.
The systemusedwas basically the same as inthe f ive
preceding practices, except that the predictor itself was
eliminated, being replacedby arateof range change- per-
centage table. Time interval was discarded, and continu-
ous data was provided. As inBattery Birne:v,height of
sitewas included onthe range drums, and displacement
wasnegligible. Consequently, CRF rangewasset directly
onthe range percentage corrector, and the rate of range
change, takenasusual by amanwith astop watch, was
converted into a range percentage correctionand added
algebraically to the ballistic scale.Itisinteresting to note
that the relationchanged but slightly f or anincoming
target. Adjustment corrections were applied normally.
The idea worked, and out of twenty record shots, f our
broadsideandf ivebow- onhits weresecuredf or ascoreof
168.5.
This modif ied systemis sound, and should work very
well f or slowtargets, at low ranges, inalimited f ield of
f ire. H owever, if the target were at maximum 155- mm.
range, traveling at tenyards per second, the travel cor-
rectionwould be 3.68 per cent. This correctionwould
f allof f the ballistic scaleof the standard rangepercentage
corrector unless the scalewere doubled, or a larger cor-
rector constructed. These last two alternatives areimprac-
tical, as all tapes are printed ina standard scale, and a
great deal of work would berequired to construct anew
sca~eof di~erent size.Furthe~more, f or abattery requiring
vanable dIsplacement correctIonsby means of anazimuth
dif f erence chart, these corrections'would also have to be
added tothe ballisticcorrection, and such asystemmight
break downasit is too susceptible of error. Theref ore, it
appears that apredictor is the only practical answer f or
batteries f iring onlong range high speed targets, espe-
ciallyif the rangef inder has toberelocated. For slowtar-
getsat lowranges,with arangef inder near thebattery di-
recting point, the simplif ied system should prove ~atis-
f actorv.
CONCLUSIONS
These sixpracticesproved the merit of the locally con-
structed predictor system f or rapid f ireguns. All equip-
ment needed i s a range f inder. Everything else, includ-
ing therange percentage corrector, canbeconstructed b"
thebattery personnel. This equipment issimpleto under-
stand, and easyto operate. A plotting board is too slow.
A time interval systemf or rapid f ireguns isbelievedim-
practical. The f ollowing suggestions are deemed sound
andworthy of adoptionby theservice:
(I) All minor caliber f ixed armament, and all minor
caliber mobile armament onsemi- permanent emplace-
ments, should adopt a predictor system similar to that
describedinthisarticle.
(2) Plotting boardsand timeinterval apparatus should
be discarded.
(3) Universal tapes should be issued, each type ap-
plicable to a particular class of armament. These tapes
should be computed only f or travel of the target during
time of f light plus deadtime, asheight of sitecanbein-
corporated either onthe range drums (f or f ixedguns) or
ontherangepercentage corrector tape, and displacement,
if necessary, canbe corrected by the use of anazimuth
dif f erence~hart.Furthermore, th~setapesshouldcarrytwo
sets of f igures, one f or incoming and one f or outgoing
targets, indif f erent colors, and the tapes should be ex-
tended to cover any expected speed of target. The tapes
could be computed and constructed either locally or by
the Coast Artillery Board, and thenissued as reguired.
Thenall anorganizationwould need to do would beto
construct aboxtohousethetape, andprovidearangeper-
centage corrector with tape applicable to the particular
battery.
(4) That short rangearmament should adopt asimilar
system to that used by Battery Smith, using a rate of
range change- percentage chart inlieu of apredictor.
--
o
F
By WI. A. \VINDAS
Chapter 6: TH E SCORPIO
The Roman legion was well equipped with arrow-
throwers and ballistae, one machine being designed f or
use against personnel, the other against structures.
But the ballista- - even the 9o- pounder- - could not cope
with aheavily- f ortif ied city's mainwalls. H ence there was
need f or a more powerf ul engine, evenat the sacrif ice of
mobility and the f irst answer to this requirement was the
Scorpio. Itreceived its name because, like a scorpion, it
"carried its sting erect."
Like usual Roman engines, this was of the torsion type,
the twisted skein of specially prepared rope or mule- ?;ut
being at A. The arm B was thrust through the skeinwhich
kept the arm pressed up and f orward. At the top of this
armwas a large hook (usually f orked) f rom which hun?;
asling C. The winch at 0 pulled the arm back.
Cocking the machine put anadditional f raction of a
twist onthe skein. The stone (or ball of lead) was placed
inthe sling, and the piece discharged by strikin?; the
pulley of f the arm- hook at E . Note that one end of the
cocking- rope is f astened to the f rame, and passes over a
pulley to the winch. This arrangement prevented undue
"whipping" when the arm was released.
At discharge, the untwisting skein brought the arm
smartly up and f orward, until the latter's lower end struck
the check- board at F. The sling, continuing f orward,
Ripped over the end of the arm, throwing its projectile
at high velocity.
The range and energy of this weapon considerably ex-
ceeded that of the ballista. Itcould hurl its 17o- pound
missile 600 yards.
The engine was quite heavy and once in position, it
could not readily be shif ted to bear ona new target. But
this was comparatively unimportant inaweapon designed
to break battlements.
Sometimes a wooden canopy- shield was erected to
guard the "gunners" f rom enemy projectiles. This would
seem to be the f irst recorded "gun shield."
Af ter the time of Nf arius, the Romans altered the
scorpio, replacing the sling with a ladle- like cup as an
inteO'ral part of the arm. This and other modif ications
H
made the machine practically identical with the Greek
ballista and the name intime was changed to Onager, or
Wild Ass. This name was chosen because of a f allacious
belief that the stones, kicked up by the heels of a Aeeing
donkey, were deliberately aimed at his pursuer.
Because of its greater range, the onager tended to re-
place the ballista f or all stones of 50- pounds or larger, but
the latter machine continued to be the f avorite f or smaller
missiles, until the introduction of steel- tension engines,
which revolutionized the whole Roman artillery system.
/ .
64
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL J alJ / lary-Fe brttar)
T he U nited S tates
C oast A rtillery
A ssociation
x
The purpose of the Assoc i ati on shall be to promote
the effi c i enc y of the Coast Arti llery Corps by mai n-
tai ni ng i ts standards and tradi ti ons, by di ssemi nati ng
professi onal knowledge, by i nspi ri ng greater efJort to-
wards the i mprovement of materi el and methods of
trai ni ng and by fosteri ng mllttlal understandi ng, re-
spec t and c ooperati on among all arms, branc hes and
c omponents of the Re~ular Army, Nati onal Guard,
Organi zed Reserves, and Reserve Offi c ers' Trai ni ng
Corps.
OFFICERS
MAJ OR GENERAL A. H . SUNDERLAND
PRESIDENT
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM OrDvlANN
VICE- PRESIDENT
MAJ OR AARON BRADSH AW, J R.
SECRETARY- TREASURER
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF TH E EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
COI.ONEI. H . K. LOUGH RY
COLO:- ':EL C. C. DAWES
COLONEL F. S. CLARK
COI.O:- ':EI. C. S. GLEI~I
COLONEL E. A. EVA:- ':S
MAlOti A. V. WINTON
MAIOR MILO BRINKLEY
The Co a st Art i l l e ry J o urn a l
i\lAJ OH AAH Ol' BRADSH AW, J R., Editor
The J OURNAL prints articles onsubjects of
prof essional and general interest to of f icers of all
the components of the Coast Artillery Corps in
order to stimulate thought and provoke discussion.
H owever, opinions expressed andconclusions drawn
inarticles are inno sense of f icial. They do not re-
f lect the opinions or conclusions of the Chief of
Coast Artillery or any other of f icial or branch of
the War Department.
The J OURNAL does not carry paid advertising.
The J OURNAL pays f or original articles upon
publication. Manuscripts should be addressed to
the Editor. The J OURNAL is not responsible f or
manuscripts unaccompanied by return postage.
Election of Association Of f icers
The of f ice of Vice- President and f our places onthe
Executive Council h:1\'ebeen f illed by the election held
recently.
Brig;dier General \Villiam Ottmann, New York Na-
tional Guard, was elected Vice- President to f ill the of f ice
vacated by Colonel Avery J . Cooper whose term has ex-
pired.
The members of the Executive Council elected f or the
period J anuary 1,1940, to December 31,1941, are:
Colonel F. S. Clark, CAC
Colonel e. S. Gleim, CAC, NYNG
Colonel E. A. Evans, CA- Res
Major A. V. Winton, CAC
The new of f icers replace Colonel E. e. \Vebster, CAC,
RING; Colonel E. W. Thomson, CA- Res; Lieutenant
Colonel R. M. Perkins, CAC; and Lieuten:mt Colonel
J . P. H ogan, CAe.
Brigadier General Ottmann commands the New York
Coast Artillery Brigade consisting of the 212th Coast
Artillery (AA), the 244th Coast Artillery (TO), and
the 245th Coast Artillery (H D). H is service inthe New
York National Guard extends over the past two decades
and he has long beenanenthusiastic supporter of OllrAs-
sociation. General Ottmann has been a member of the
military staf f of the Governor of Ncw York since 1919.
Incivil lif e be is chairman of the board, the United States
Printing and Lithograph Company, Brooklyn, New York.
Colonel Clark is on duty with the War Department
General Staf f . H c is no stranger to thc. af f airs of the As-
sociation f or he served a f our- year term as secrctary- trcas-
urer and editor during tbe dif f icult post- war years of 1919-
1923 when the sledding was hard. H is intimate knowl-
ed?;eof our af f airs will provc a tower of strength.
Colonel Gleim commands the 245th Coast Artillery,
New York National Guard. H is thirty years of service
began with the Inf antry, but during the World War he
f ound his proper niche inour Corps. Entering the Federal
scrvice as a f irst lieutenant he was soonpromoted captain
and commandcd Battery E, 59th Artillery during the St.
Mihiel and rvIeuse Argonne of f ensives. Thc end of the
war f ound him inthe grade of major. Af f iliating with the
National Guard shortly af ter his return f rom overseas he
leached his present grade and command of the 245th tWO
years ago. Colonel Gleim is a leading civil engineer, in-
ternationallv known f or his work intunnel construction.
H e had a 1;13jorrole inthe construction of the H udson-
Manhattan Tubes. the East River Tunnels and f our water
tunnels inMexico. As engineer of construction on the
H olland Tunnel be rook aleading part intbe completion
of that f amous artery of communication. H e is now
engineer of constructio'n f or the Port of New York Author-
ity and has charge of all construction f or that body includ-
ing the new Lincoln Tunnel under the East River.
Colonel Evans of Los Angeles, Calif ornia, commands
the 203d Coast Artillery Brigade, Organized Reserves.
Our readers will recall that Colonel Evans was regiment31
commander of the 977th Coast Artillery (AA) f rom
1940
NE\,\'S AND COMMENT
65
1929to 1938 and that during his leadership the regiment
wonthe Coast Artillery Association Trophy f or excellence
inArmY Extension Course work. Incivil lif e, Colonel
Evans i~astmctural engineer, well to the f oref ront of his
prof ession...
~f ajor \Vmton recently C:Ulleto \VashlI1gton f or duty
inthe National Guard Bureau as head of the organization
section. H e entered the Army in1917 f rom the First Of -
f icers'Training Camp and since that time has seenvarie-
<Tatedservice at home and abroad. H e isagraduate of the
Battery Of f icers' Course and the Advanced Course of the
Coast Artillery School, and the Command and General
Staf f School.
The number of bailors cast this year again exceeded
those of previous years. This is truly indicative of the
healthy growth of member interest inthe af f airs of our
Association.
\Ve congratulate the newly- elected of f icers and bespeak
f or them the same cooperation that has contributed so
llluchto the work of the Association during 1939.
To the retirina- of f icers, the Association extends its
to
sincerethanks f or their hearty cooperation and help. Their
assistance has beena material f actor to our success during
their terms of of f ice.
Essay Competition
The judges have completed their deliberations and have
announced the re.sults inthe 1939 prize essay competition.
Inaddition to selecting the winner the judges awarded
honorable mention to one essay.
The winning essay is "National Def ense and Antiair-
craf t Def ense" by Major Thomas R. Phillips, Coast Artil-
lery Corps. Major Phillips receives the Association's
awardof two- hundred dollars.
The honorable mention essay is "National Guarding
theH arbor Def enses" by Major Bedf ord W. Boyes, 250th
Coast Artillery (TD), Calif ornia National Guard. Major
Boves received the Association's award of one- hundred
dollars.
The judges f or the contest were:
Colonel Frank S. Clark, GSc.
Colonel Godwin Ordway, USA, retired.
Colonel C.H . E. Schee;' CA- Res.
Major Phillips' essay appears in this issue. Major
Boyes'article will appear ina later number.
Prize Essay Winner
Bya unanimous vote the judges have declared the prize
winner inthe 1939 essay competition to be "Narional
Def ense and Antiaircraf t Def ense" by ivf ajor Thomas R.
Phillips, Coast Artillery Corps. To him goes the Associa-
tion's check f or two- hundred dollars and to the J OURNAL'S
pages anarticle that marks a milestone inmilitary litera-
ture.
~f ajor Phillips' essay theref ore gets the lead position in
PORTRAIT OF AN AUTH OR
Ma;or Tbomas R. Pbi lli Ps, wi nner of tbe 1939 pri ze essay
c ompeti ti on.
this issue of your magazine. But we strongly suspect that
his article would have occupied our opening pages had it
reached us by the customary channels through which
manuscripts Rowto the editorial desk. For "National De-
f ense and Antiaircraf t Def ense" isanable and penetrating
study of the United States antiaircraf t problem. Nf oreover,
to judge by the comment that has already appeared inthe
press we arenot venturing very f ar out onalimb when we
predict that Nf ajor Phillips' essay will serve as benchmark
onthe air warf are map f or years tocome.
Now, aword about the author; although this is hardly
necessary f or his name is known to all who only casually
thumb military literature. H e was born inWisconsin 011
J anuary 27, 1892, although he later transf erred his home
place to the state of \Vashington. H e opened his military
career by winning anappointment as second lieutenant,
Coast Artillery Corps, Washington National Guard, 011
February I, 1917. The date is important, f or exactly three
weeks later- <J n February 21, 1917- he was promoted to
the grade of captain. InJ une of 1917 he accepted ap-
pointment as second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps, in
the regular establishment and bef ore the war was wonhad
risento the grade of major.
Among the military schools f rom which he has gradu-
ated arethe Coast Artillery School Battery Of f icers' Course
(19
2
9). the Air Corps Tactical School (1928), and the
Command and General Staf f School (1936). Major
Phillips is onduty as aninstructor at the Command and
General Staf f School, Fort Leavenworth.
Nf ajor Phillips' reputation as anauthor has beenearned
b~'extensive writing not only f or the J OURNALof his arm
but also f or virtually all service publications of the United
States Army. Several of his articles have been reprinted
inf ull inthe f oreign military press and a considerable
number have elicited editorial comment inFrench, Brit-
ish and German military publications. Inaddition to this,
66 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
January-February
hehas f ound time tocontribute to the Saturday Eveni n?,
Post togivethelaymanapictureof modernwar. Recently
of f thepress ishis book The Roots o~ Strategy and he.IS
now hard at work onmaterial that WIllshortly appear 10
print andwhich wehopeto set bef oreyou. ,
Major Phillips has earned the congratulatIOns of the
Associationand the thanks of our citizens f or amaterial
contributiontothe literature of modernwar.
'f 'f 'f
Battery Fergusson- Battery Kessler
The J OURNALishappy to announce that the War De-
partment has honored the memory of .two distin~ished
Coast Artillerymen by naming batteries at Fort TIlden,
New York inhonor of Brigadier GeneralFrank K. Fergus-
sonand Colonel Percy M. Kessler. General Fergusson
died J uly 17, 1937, Colonel Kessler died September IS,
1935.
Bothof theseof f icersgraduated f romtheU.S.Military
Academy inthe class of 1896 and were commiss~oned
secondlieutenants of Artillery. From that date untIl the
dateof their deaths they serv~dwith distinctionat alarge
number of Coast Artillery stations inadditionto occupy-
ing staf f positions of great responsibility. Both wereout-
standing inthe Coast Artiller:
T
Corps, and their names
areassociatedwith Coast Artillery activities inthe New
York area. General Fergussondiedwhile incommand of
the Second Coast Artillery District, where the batteries
werepart of his command. Colonel Kessler diedwhile in
command of the H arbor Def enses of Sandy H ook in
which thesebatteries areincluded.
It is particularly f itting to name these batteries, so
closelyrelated intheNew York def ensescheme, f or two
of f icersso closely associated with each other, the Coast
Artillery CorpS: and with these particular units of the
def ense.
Colonel Kessler was awarded the Silver Star and cited
"For gallantry inactionagainst insurgent f orces inMa-
nila, Philippine Islands, February 5, 1899'"
Brigadier General Fergusson had been awarded the
Distinguished ServiceMedal, "For specially meritorious
and conspicuous service as Commandant of the Coast
Artillerv Training Center at Fort Montoe, Virginia. H e
rendered specially meritorious and conspicuous ser:ice in
organizing and administering that center and lU,the
preparationand executionof the plans.f or the orgaUlz,a-
tion, training, and equipment of theUUltsof Coast ArtIl-
lery f or overseas service."
'f 'f 'f
Germany's Aerial Westwall?
From U. S. Naval Insti tute Proc eedi ngs, Digest of an
article inA vi ati on.-Keep your eye onthe Germanat-
tempt toprove (or isit f or homeconsuu:ptiononly) t?at
anaerialWestwall canbeset up that WIllbe next to Im-
passablef or enemy ships. Instead of concentrating .m0:t
of her air def ensef orcesaround probabletargets, whIch IS
thesystemthat has generally beenf ollowed, Germany is
keeping hers up near the f rontier inwhat she calls the
West Air Def ense Zone. If it works aswell asthe Ger-
mans think it will, the air strategy textbooks will have
to be revised, asthey all claimthat def ense of af rontier
against air attack is;0 impossibletbat there's no usecon-
sidering it seriously. The Germans have gone ahead on
anelaboratepermanent setup designedtoprovetheexperts
arewrong.
The backboneof theAir Def enseZoneisalineof heavY
antiaircraf t guns (probably the 88- mm. that showed up
sowellinSpain) running f romSwitzerland totheNorth
Sea. These aresupposedto bethick enough tobring f ive
or six guns to bear onany spot up to about 20,000 f eet.
Combined with them arelighter guns totake careof low
attacks, and the usual array of searchlights and sound
detectors. Light mobile antiaircraf t units are also scat-
tered around the f airly wide stretch betweentheAir De-
f enseZoneandthef ront. Balloonbarrages arealsoused-
the Italians report that the Germans have beenworking
onavariationof this ideaby exploding the balloons f rom
the ground like mines instead of depending onthe at-
tackers being brought downby running into the cables.
J ust howef f ectivethezonehasbeensof ar can't be said.
Britishand French claims that it never touched themcan
betakenwith acoupleof grains of salt. Of more impor-
tancearethe of f icialGermanlistsof enemy shipsbrought
down, f or theseinclude acoupleknocked of f along way
behind the supposedly airtight zone. J ust how it can
hope to be ef f ectiveinthick weather is one f or the Ger-
nlans toanswer.
Behind the heavy antiaircraf t guns come f ields f or
f ighters; inthis part of the zone areanumber of search-
light companies specially trained incooperationwith
them. Apparendy the Germans havenot goneinheavilY
f or the elaborate underground hangars that have been
mentioned here and there. Instead they will depend on
scattering their ships over a lot of small f ields, which
they f igure will make destroying many of them onthe
ground abig job.
One possibleby- product useof the Air Def ense Zon.e
that the Germans arecounting onisemploying the anti-
aircraf t guns against a ground advance if one gets that
f ar. They claimthat at Balboa inthe Spanish war the
heavy antiaircraf t units of theCondor Legionhad todou-
bleasf ieldartillery f or Franco, and turned out to bevery
ef f ectivedue to their high rate of f ire. The guns inthe
Air Def enseZonehavebeenmounted and protected with
this useas abackstop inmind, and this may evenhave
had something to dowith the decisionto concentrate50
much antiaircraf t up near the f ront.
'f 'f 'f
Greetings f romtheChief of Staf f
Theholiday greeting f romGeneralGeorgeC.Mar5~all.
Chief of Staf f , reproduced onthe next pagewas rec~l\.ed
too late f or inclusioninour November- December Issue.
Nevertheless, wevoiceaheart\r- if belated- return greet-
ing tothe Chief of Staf f onbehalf of all members of the
Coast Artillery Corps.
Dear Gener al Sunder l and:
Fai t hf ul l y your s ,
Dec ember 18, 1939.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF T H E CH IE F OF S T AFF
WAS H INGT ON
A Mer r y Chr i s t mas and a H appy New Year t o eac h
member of your c or ps .
We f ac e t he New Year ' wi t h c ompl et e c onf i denc e
i n t he abi l i t y of t he Ar my t o pr ovi de f or t he Nat i onal
Def ens e.
1~Chr i s t mas gr eet i ngs and good wi s hes f or t he
New Year t o you and t he per s onnel of t he Coas t Ar t i l l er y
Cor ps , and rr~ t hanks and appr ec i at i on f or t he f i ne wor k
and l oyal s uppor t of your c or ps dur i ng t hes e c r i t i c al
mont hs .
Maj or Gener al Ar c hi bal d H . Sunder l and,
Chi ef of Coas t Ar t i l l er y,
Was hi ngt on, D. C.
The pas t year has been epoc hal i n t he peac e-
t i me hi s t or y of t he Ar r ny, f i r s t i nvol vi ng a maj or aug-
ment at i on f or t he Ai r Cor ps and def ens es of t he Canal
Zone, and r ec ent l y t he expans i on, c or ps or gani z at i on and
c onc ent r at i on of gr ound f or c es and t he r ei nf or c ement of
bot h t he c onunands i n Panama and Puer t o ~i c o. The f ur -
t her anc e of t hi s pr ogr am has made unus ual demands upon
t he Ar my, and t he whol e- hear t ed r es pons e of al l r anks t o
ever y demand has been an i ns pi r at i on and pr of ound gr at i -
f i c at i on t o t he War Depar t ment .
l' 7 l'
Adjustment by the Magnitude Method
By Captai n Perry Mc C. Smi th, C.A.C.
Thef ollowingvariationf romtheprocedureoutlinedin
paragraph43, CoastArtillery Fi eld Manual, Volume1 ,
Part 2, has beenf ound of great valueintraining inex-
periencedpersonnelinthemagnitudemethodof f iread-
justment andhassavedconsiderabletimeintheapplica-
tionof corrections. Bythis method, the oldbugbear of
applyingcorrectionsinthewrongdirectionisapparently
removedbecausethe eliminationof the "axis of correc-
tion"hasdoneawaywiththesourceof this too- f requent
error. The proced~rehas beenapprovedas satisf actory
andoptionalbytheChief of CoastArtillery.
The systemmight betermedthe "correctionsspotted"
method, incontradistinctionto the present "deviations
spotted" method. The spotting board is modif iedby
pastingscalesoverthegraduationsontheboardsoasto
keep300asnormal,but tomakeoversrangef rom300to
68 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
New Field Manuals FM 4- 85, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the
A newseriesof CoastArtillen' Field1vf anualsandone Piece,16- inchG~nsandH owitzers
newTraining Manual areto be published inthe near (present TR 435-
2
75).
f uture. Thesemanuals areto replacethe existingCoast FM 4- - - - :10, CAF1\.1SeacoastArtillerv- Service of the
Artillery FieldManual, Training Regulations,and most Piece, 3-
inch
Rapid Fire Guns
SpeciarTexts. It isplannedthat they will bepublished (Pedestal Mount) (present TR
underthef ollowingtitles: 435-
2
7
6
).
FM 4- 105, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Organiza_
COASTARTILLERY FIELDMANUALS T dT
tion, rainingan actics.
FM 4- 5, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Organization, FM 4- 110, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Gunnery,
TrainingandTactics. FireControlandPositionFinding
FM 4-
10
, CAFM Seacoast Artillery - Gunnen- (SpecialText No. 26 asabasis).
(present TM 2I60- 3o- revised). FM 4- 115, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Search-
FM 4- 15, CAFM Seacoast Artillery- Fire Control lights,SoundLocatorsandAcces-
andPositionFinding (present re- sories.
visedSpecialText No. 3
2
). FM 4- 120, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Forma-
FM 4- 20, CAFM Seacoast Artillery- Formations, tions, Inspections, Service and
Inspections,Service,and Careof Careof Materiel.
Materiel. FM 4- 125, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Service of
FM 4- 25, CAFM SeacoastArtillen'- Service of the thePiece,yinch Antiaircraf tGuns
Piece,I55- mm.Gun(presentTR (presentTR 435-
2
5).
435-
18
4)' FM 4- 13, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Service of
FM 4- 35, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the the Piece, I05- mm. Antiaircraf t
Piece, 14- inchg~n, M 1920MIl Guns.
onRailwayMount M-
I
9
20
(pres- FM 4- 135, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Marks-
ent TR 435-
22
7). manshipandServiceof thePiece.
FM 4- 40, CAFM SeacoastArtillerv- Service of the Antiaircraf t Machine Guns.
Piece, I2- inch Mortar, Railway FM 4- 14, CAFM Antiaircraf t Artillery- Service of
Artillery (present TR 435- 23). the Piece, 37- mm: Antiaircraf t
FN1 4- 45, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the Guns.
Piece,I2- inchGun(Battignolles) FM 4- 15, CAFM Examinationf or Gunners (pres-
Railway Artillery (present TR ent TR 435-31) .
435- 234). FM 4- 155, CAFM Ref erence Data (applicable to
FM 4- 50, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the bothSeacoastandAntiaircraf tAr-
Piece, 8- inch G~n, Railway Ar- tillery).
tillery (presentTR 435- 235). NEWTRAINING MANUAL
FM 4- 55, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the TM 2160- 105,CoastArtilleryAmmunition.
Piece, I2- inch Mortar (Fixed
Armament) (present TR 435-
255).
FM 4- 60, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the
Piece,I2- inchG~n(BarbetteCar-
riage) (presentTR 435- 260).
FM 4- - 65, CAFM SeacoastArtillen,- Service of the
Piece, 1O- inchGuns (DisappEar-
ing Carriage) (present TR 435-
26
5)'
FM 4- 70, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the
Piece,6- inchGuns (Disappearing-
Carriage) (present TR 435- 266).
FM 4- 75, CAFM SeacoastArtillery- Service of the
Piece, 6- inch Guns (pedestal
mount) (presentTR 435- 267).
FM 4- - - - 80, CAFM SeacoastArtillerv- Service of the
Piece,12- andI4- inchGuns (Dis-
appearingCarriage) (present TR
435-
2
7)'
NEWS AND COMMENT
-I -I -I
Index
We have i n proc ess of preparati on an i ndex to the COAST
ARTILLERY JOURNALthat wi ll show by subjec t and author
all arti c les pri nted si nc e the JOURNAL was fi rst publi shed.
The i ndex wi ll be exhausti vely c ross-referenc ed and when
c ompleted wi ll be a c omplete gui de to our pages for nearly
half a c entury .
Old-ti mers wi ll rec all that to begi n wi th our ti tle was
J ournal of the United States Artillery and that our fi rst
number c ame off the press i n Janu~ry, I~2. In July,
1 9 2 2 , we adopted our present name of the COASTARTIL-
LERY JOURNAL. Our i ndex begi ns wi th the January, I~2,
number and wi ll be worked up to the present.
We expec t to c omplete the i ndex wi thi n a month or
two. Thereafter we wi ll be prepared to furni sh referenc e
li sts on subjec t matter c ontai ned i n the JOURNAL to all
who c an make use of suc h materi al.
69
Total Buildinf !.
1 8
9
9 7
I~
0
)
4 7
2 5
1 7
8
3 7
55
1 8
1 0
")
II 2
1 7

2 2
5
III
9
59 3
7 4
2 2
7

II
3
7
1
3
75
2 7
4 4
0 0
7
0
1 4 1 4
1 3
1 2
! O5
2 8
7 4
0 0
2
3
6
4
44
1 0
50
2 1
10
II
12
7
I-
)
24
10]
45
JAPAN
Capi tal shi ps .
Ai rc raft c arri ers .
Heavy c rui sers .
Li ght c rui sers .
Destroyers .
Submari nes .
GREATBRITAIN
Type Underage
Capi tal shi ps 18
Ai rc raft c arri ers .
Heavy c rui sers .
Li ght c rui sers .
Destroyers .
Submari nes .
IS
75
4
FRANCE
Capi tal shi ps 7
Ai rc raft c arri ers 2
Heavy c rui sers 7
Li ght c rui sers I I
Destroyers 70
Submari nes 75
ITALY
Capi tal shi ps 4
Ai rc raft c arri ers 0
Heavv c rui sers 7
Li ght c rui sers 12
Destrovers 100
Subm;ri nes 98
GERMANY
Capi tal shi ps 5
Ai rc raft c arri ers
Heavy c rui sers 2
Li ght c rui sers 6
Destrovers 32
Subm;ri nes 50
1940
UNITED STATES
Type Underage Total Buildinf ,
Ca ' t I h'
1 4
1 ~
8
pI a SIpS ...........
)
Ai rc raft c arri ers ............ ,o ....
5 5
2
Heavv c rui sers ..........
1 7 1 7
I
Ugh; c rui sers ...........
1 7 1 7
8
Destroyers
..........................
54
2 2 1
4 3
Subm;ri nes
........................ 2 2
8g
2 ~
')
W orld Navies
The f ollowing f igures onthe navies of the World
Powersaretakenf romU. S.Naval Insti tute Proc eedi nf,s,
J anuary,1940:
-I -I -I
aJ nd shorts range f rom300to 600. Similar scalesmake
rightsshowaslessthan300andlef ts asover 300. H ence,
eachspot will appear onthe spotting board asthe correc-
tionwhich would haveplaced that shot onthe target.
Thesespots areplaced onthe f ireadjustment board as
readf romthespotting board. The operatorsof theadjust-
ment boardsthenhaveaseriesof corrections, andby tak-
ino- the center of impact of any desired number of shots
b .
orsalvos,the reading of the f ixedref erencescaleopposite
that center of impact is the correctionnecessary to bring
thar center of impact onthe target. To f acilitate reading
successivecorrections, the ref erence graduations of the
f ixedscaleshould be repeated every inch or sovertically
downthe adjustment board. Thus the movable scale
becomesmerely adevicef or placing thecorrectionsf or the
spotteddeviations onthe f ire adjustment board, and its
usef or reading corrections is eliminated. So, too, the
"axisof correction"may beomitted, astheoriginal lineof
targetsis along the 300 line, and each successiveline of
targets(positionsof thenormal- 300- 0f themovableslide)
istheverticallinedrawnthrough thelast center of impact
usedf or making corrections.
Inoperation,theref ore, thespotting boardoperatorsf ol-
lowtheir usual routine. The readings sent to the f iread-
justment boards, however, areopposite insenseto those
usedat present. The adjustment board operator (range
or def lection), starting with 300 as the original line of
targets,plots the spots (corrections) asreceivedf romthe
spottingboard. Whenacorrectionis indicated, he com-
putesthe center of impact of the shots considered, as in
the present method. H e then reads the f igure onthe
f ixedref erencescaleat that center of impact to the range
percentagecorrector or thedef lectionboard, drawsaverti-
callinetoindicatethe newlineof targets, and moves the
zeroof the movable scaleto this new line of targets f or
subsequentshotsor salvos. The timeordinarily consumed
inmovingthe zero of the movable scaleto the new line
of targets and reading caref ull:, the correctioncalled f or
onthe axis of correctionis thus saved, f requentl:' per-
mitting corrections to be applied one salvo sooner than
underthepresent method of adjustment.
.lIIDl.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~lllalllllllllllllllllilllmlllllll.lllllIIDllll.1 mll~llllmmllll~llllllIIIllllIIDlll.IIII~III.III~II.IIII~II.~m~"mll"'III,,~l
Coast altti llelt~ Boalt' dIlotes
mlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllill1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111_
Any i ndi vi dllal, whether or not he i s a member of the servi c e, i s i nvi ted to SHbmi t c onstTt/c ti ve SHgges-
ti ons relati ng to problems IInder swdy by the Coast Arti llery Board, or to present any new problems that
properly may be c onsi dered by the Board. Commllni c ati ons sholli d be addressed to the Presi dent,
Coast Arti llery Board, Fort j\1onroe, Vi rgi ni a.
TH E COAST ARTILLERY BOARD
COLONEL\X'ILLIAMS. BOWEN,C.A.C., Presi dent
LT.COLONELDONALDB.SANGIOR, Signal Corps
LT. COLONELGORDONB. \X'ELCH ,Ordnance Dept.
MAJ ORFRANKLINE. EDGECOMB, C.A.C.
ANGULARUNITS FOR155- :\1:\1.GUNS. (COAST ARTIL-
LERYBOARDSTUDY.) Questions inregard to the angular
units to be used with 155- mm. batteries have arisen at
various times since the adoption of these guns as harbor
def ense weapons. Two types of sighting equipment have
been developed. Sights and mounts emplo~'ing degrees
and hundredths f or direction, and degrees and minutes
f or elevation have been adopted as standard f or the 155-
mm. guns inPanama. Another type standardized f or use
.elsewhere, including the mobile 155 regiments, employ
mils f or both direction and elevation. H aving dif f ering
sighting equipment f or the same weapon has been dis-
advantageous f rom a procurement standpoint. Further-
more, except f or those inPanama, the 155- mm. guns are
now the only seacoast weapons utilized inharbor def enses
which employ the mil as the azimuth unit. The use of
other thanacommon azimuth unit f or all seacoast artillery
introduces dif f iculties inconnection with intelligence and
target assignment, as well as requiring the provision of
f ire control instruments to handle the extra unit. For
example, two types of azimuth instruments have been
supplied, one reading inmils and the other indegrees and
hundredths. Azimuth data f rom a depression position
f inder cannot be utilized by 155- mm. guns unless a con-
version is made f rom degrees and hundredths to mils.
For the reasons noted, unif ication of the angular unit
f or all 155- mm. batteries inthe hands of the Coast Artil-
lee:' Corps has beenconsidered desirable, with the degree
system pref erred f or azimuth me~urement. The problem
has beencomplicated by the availability of stocks of mil
equipment, including ivII91S azimuth instruments, and
the f act that the degree graduated panoramic sights de-
veloped f or 155- mm. guns inPanama have not proven
entirely satisf actory. These sights have limb scales gradu-
ated to one degree, which results ina spacing of gradua-
tions hardly sl;f f icient f or f acility and positiveness inset-
ting. Proper spacing using this method of graduation
would require anunduly large diameter limb.
The development of the Panoramic Telescope T 2 f or
MAJ OR H UGH N. H ERRICK,C.A.C.
CAPTAINROBERT\X'. CRICH LOW,J R., C.A.C.
CAPTAINROBERTH . KREUTER,C.A.C.
CAPTAINCH ARLESE. SH EPH ERD,C.A.C.
both Case II and Case III pointing of 155- mm. guns has
af f orded anopportunity f or introducing a unif ied svstem
of angular measure inazimuth. This instrument is de- I
scribed inthe November- December, 1935, issue of the
J OURNAL.The telescope, modif ied to employ degrees in
place of mils as the angular unit, and with anadditional
subdial f or Case II, has now been standardized as Pano-
ramic Telescope !'vIS. The arrangement of the scales of
the telescope is shown inFigure I. Itwill be noted dlat
the limb isgraduated to tendegrees while the micrometers
carry ten degrees with a le:lst gr:ldu:ltion of .05 degree.
With this arr:lngement, suitable worm gear r:ltios and
spacing of gr:lduations are obt:lined, without excessive
diameters of either limb or micrometer scales. It is
planned eventually to provide the Telescope MS f or all
155- mm. guns m:lnned by the CO:lst Artillery Corps.
The telescope C:lnbe installed on either the Telescope
Mount ivI4 (degrees) or the Telescope Mount M6
(mils) .
Inits study, the BO:lrdconsidered the ef f ect of :ldopting
the degree unit f or mobile 155- mm. regiments. These
may be employed in land warf are, possibl:, with Field
Artillery, which uses the mil unit. ItW:lSconcluded that
any dif f iculties due to the use of the degree unit would be
minor bec:luse of the comp:lr:ltive simplicity of f ire con-
trol ag:linst land t:lrgets, :lnd the f act dut f ire control :lnd
intelligence d:lt:l canbe t:tken f rom grid maps indegrees
:lnd hundredths quite as re:ldily :lSinmils.
The Board considered :llso the angular unit to be used
f or elevation. Unif ication inthis f eature is of minor im-
port:lnce with present f ire control equipment. The rela-
tion between range and elevation is distinctive f or each
type of gun, or charge, and anindividual device f or settin~
up the relation, such as a percentage corrector tape, is re-
quired no matter what the elevation unit employed. H ow-
ever, the possible development of a mechanical compuco
r
f or intermediate caliber guns points to the desirability of
utilizing acommon angular unit inelevation, as well asin
azimuth, f or these weapons. Otherwise aseparate design
19-W
CAS E mS CALE MICROME T E R
(ADJ US T ABLE ) GRADUAT E D 1 0 DE GRE E S
LE AS T RE ADING .05 DE GRE E S
CORRE CT ION S CALE
GRADUAT E D t 1 E ACH S IDE OF ZE RO
COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES
INDEX
FIXE D T O ROT AT ING H E AD
DE GRE E S
PA N O R A MI C T E L E S C O PE M8
ARRANGE ME NT OF S CALE S , INDICE S AND MICROME T E RS
FOR CAS E nAND CAS E m ME T H ODS OF FIRING
FIGURE .I.
CAS E m AZIMUT H S CALE
ADJ US T ABLE AND CLAMPE D
T O ROT AT ING H E AD
CAS E m S CALE INDE X
FIXE D
CAS E nS CALE AND INDE X
71
of computor may berequired f or 155- mm. guns, and f or
6- inchor S- inchguns. The standard seacoast data trans-
missionsystemMS employs themil astheelevationunit.
Inviewof this, andthef act that themilhasbeenf ound a
convenient elevationunit generally, the Board recom-
mendedadoptionof this unit of elevationf or 155- mm.
guns.
Thepolicy inef f ecting thenecessarychanges inequip-
ment, asapproved by the Chief of Coast Artillery, is as
f ollows:
(I) As rapidly as f unds permit, all sighting and
other equipment using themil astheazimuth unit will
bereplacedwith newor modif iedequipment employing
degreesand hundredths astheazimuth unit.
(2) New elevationequipment will employ the mil
unit,but existingelevationapparatus, suchasthedegree
graduated sight mounts inPanama, will beretained in
service.
hIPROVE:- f ENT OFSPOTTINGSETPH - 32. InCoast Artil-
leryBoardNotes appearing inthe May- J une, 1939,issue
of theJ OURNAL, it was reported that the Chief of Coast
Artilleryhad requested the Chief Signal Of f icertounder-
takearedesignof antiaircraf t spotting equipment with a
viewtoeliminating certaintroublesome f eatures.
Inaccordancewith this request, the Signal Corps sub-
mitted tothe Boardf or test inDecember, 1939,two new
photo- theodolites and anelectric time interval devicef or
synchronizing f ilm records. Test of these instruments
showed both to bevery satisf actory. The cameramove-
ment inthenew theodolites was consideredto begreatly
superior tothat intheprevioustheodoliteandit isbelieved
that all def ects noted inthe latter have beeneliminated
successf ully. The Signal Corps hasawardedacontract f or
procurement of f orty- two newtheodolites and twenty- one
electrictimeinterval devicesto theMitchell Camera Cor-
porationof West H ollywood, Calif ornia.
The electrictimeinterval devicewillbealmost identical
with the standard articlelisted inthe Signal Corps Gen-
eral Catalog asTime Interval Device PH - 73. The latter
consists of two slow- acting relays, a rheostat, amilliam-
meter, aresistor and f our switches assembled onapanel
and mounted inabox 26)!z inches long by I 1)!z inches
wideby 5% inchesdeep. It isusedf or closingperiodically
anelectriccircuit to operatesimultaneously time counters
of two theodolites by means of which the photographic
recordsof these theodolites aresynchronized. While the
impulseperiodintheelectric de';icecannot beadjusted as
accurately asinthemetronome type time interval device,
thef ormer hasthef ollowing advantages:
a. No mercury contact cupsareneeded asinthemetro-
72 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL ! anuary-Februar,
nome type, thus eliminating dif f icultieswith mercury dip visible through the red lenses whenthey could not be
contacts and making supply of mercury unnecessary. seenat allthrough amber glassesor with the naked eve.
b. Electric devicewill operateinany position. Under practically all conditions at least some impro~e_
c . Electric devicerequires nowinding. ment intracer visibility wasapparent with the redlenses.
d. Electric devicerequires maintenance of no mechan- As aresult of itsrecent experiencewith eyeglasseswith
ismssimilar tothemetronome clock. redlenses,theBoardisof theopinionthat suchglassesare
A f ilmviewerandediting machinecalledaMoviolawill more satisf actory f or spotters thanBinoculars T-2 with
replacetheprojectionequipment inthenewspotting sets. f ilters, becausethe latter areheavy and awkward tohold
Twenty- one of these devices, which are standard com- andhaveanundesirably limited f ieldof viewwhichof ten
mercial products, have beenpurchased f romthe Moviola makes it dif f icult to f ollowboth target and tracer stream.
Company of H ollywood, Calif ornia. A viewing micro- TabIesof BasicAllowances f or Coast Artillery Corps,
scopef or use with the Moviola, instead of the viewing J anuary 1,1939,providef or the issueof two pairs of eve-
glassf urnished asastandard part of the machine, is now glasses, amber colored, per machine gunof antiaircraf t,
being designed by the Signal Corps. This viewing harbor def ense,andtractor drawnunits.
microscope will include a reticle ruled with a grid of The Boardrecommended that:
la- mil squares similar to that onthe metal projection a. No f urther stepsbetakentoprovideBinoculars1- 2
screennow provided with projection equipment. The f or spotters inantiaircraf t automatic weaponf ireunits.
negative will beviewed directly through the microscope b. Tables of BasicAllowances f orCoast Artillery Corps
which will be designed so that the reticle grid may be be amended to provide two pairs of eyeglasses with red
rotated through the same angle as the camera prism. A lensesper machine guninlieu of the amber- coloredeye-
milscaleinscribedonthecircumf erenceof the reticlegrid glassesnowauthorized.
will enable the operator to set the camera prismangle of c . Four pairsof eyeglasseswith redlensesbeauthorized
elevationwhile looking through the viewing attachment. per 37- mm. gun.
Movement of themicroscopealong the X and Y axesof C
ALOBARRAYFILTERS.The Coast Artillery Boardre-
the reticle grid will be provided f or, to permit centering I f
cent y tested a number 0 calobar ray f ilters, f urnished
of the reticle onthe target image. A magnif icationof b h
yt eOrdnance Department, with aviewtodeterminin?;
about three- power is contemplated. The Moviola is h h h I I I
w et er t ey s1 0Ud repaceexisting standard f iltersused
operated either f otward or backward by anelectric motor
I Ih d
in telescopic lenses f or Coast Artillery purposes.
with variablespeedcontro. A t ou~h noshutter isuse , T I
hree caobar ray f ilters designed f or the Elbow Te1e-
the f ilmissocontrolled by aGeneva movement that the
I
scopeM2 were installed onthe telescopes of aTracker
observer sees a conventional motionpicture as the f i m T
1. Each calobar f ilter was of a dif f erent shade; light,
runs through the Moviola. This f eature has proved of d d
me ium an dark shades being provided. A second
value indetecting bursts whose images areindistinct on T k T b d
rac er 1was set up near y and equipped with stan-
thenegative. d b d f il
ar am er an blue ters inturn. Airplane targets were
Existing standard projectors do not produce amotion k d I I b b
trac e simutaneousy y 0 serversat eachtelescopeon
picturebut permit only thelaboriousexaminationof single b h df
" ot instruments. Tracking tests wereconducted on i-
f rames projected successively by hand operation. These f d d
erent days and against if f ering sky backgrouns in
P
rojectors have beenf ound to scratch the negative con- d b d
or er to 0 taincomparisons under various light coni-
siderably as it passes through the machine while the tions. Severalsetsof observerswereused andeachsetwas
Moviolacanhandle anegativerepeatedly without scratch-
interchanged between instruments inorder to obtaina
mg. recordof individual opinions astowhich typeof f ilterwas
Standardization of the new type theodolite and time best. Extreme limits to which atarget could be tracked
interval deviceand reclassif icationof the oldtype instru- were noted inanef f ort to learnwhether individual ob-
ments aslimited standard havebeenrecommended by the I
serverswere enabled to track at increasedrange throug1
Board. Replacement of existingequipment with newtype h I f I I f h
t euse of aparticu ar type 0 f i ter. Resuts 0 t istest
instruments is not anticipated until the f ormer has wort] I d
discosedno advantages f or calobar f ilters over the stan-
out. ardamber andbluef ilters.
EYEGLASSES WITH REDLENSESFORANTIAIRCRAFT Au- The three calobar f ilters provided f or the Azimuth
TOMATICWEAPONSBATTERIES. During recent tests by Instrument Ml9IO were installed inthree instruments
the Coast Artillery Boardinconnectionwith short range which weremounted ontripods near af ourth azimuth in-
antiaircraf t automatic weapons f irings, theBoardobtained strument of the same type which was equipped with a
locally severalpairs of eyeglasseswith red lenses. These standard amber f ilter. Various members of the Coast
glasseswere used extensively by spotters, adjusters, and Artillery Board using each instrument inturn observed
gunners (inindividual tracer control) and weref ound to objectsinwater areaswherebright sunglarewas ref lected
bemuch moresatisf actory f or observingthe tracer stream f romthesurf ace. It wastheconsensusof opinionthat the
thaneither glasseswith lenses~rother colorsor binoculars standard amber f ilter provided with the Azimuth Instru-
with f ilters. ment MI9IO appeared to be quite as satisf actory as am"
Under certainbackground conditions the tracers were oneof the calobar f ilters. Eye comf ort, maximum range
--
1940
COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES 73
of .vision, clarity and def inition of image, and reduction of
obre seemed to be just as good f or the amber f ilrer as f or
:>
[hecalobar.
Anexamination of light transmission curves f or three
sl13desof calobar glass and standard amber glass did not
J ppear to indicate any important advantages f or calobar
obss as compared to amber glass. Because of the com-
pJ r3tively shorr periods during which observing instru-
ments are used continuousl:' by Coast Artillery troops,
[hedif f erence between calobar and other types of glass is
nor considered suf f iciently important to warrant a change
f romthe standard f ilters with which such instruments are
provided.
In ref erence to the manuf acture of telescopic lenses
f rom calobar glass it is considered desirable to use clear
glass f or this purpose to insure maximum light transmis-
sionunder conditions of poor light. The use of removable
f ilters which can be used at will to produce the desired
ef f ects inthe optical system of the observing instrument
is believed to af f ord the more satisf actory arrangement.
Based onthe results of this test, the Board recommended
that:
a. Existing standard f ilters f or Coast Artillery f ire con-
trol optical instruments not be replaced by calobar f ilters.
b. Calobar glass not be used in the manuf acture of
telescopic lenses f or Coast Artillery purposes.
Advanced Technical Class, Coast Artillery School
1939- 1940
Standi ng, left to ri ght: Lieutenants Ogden, Chace, Cooper.
Seated, left to ri ght: Captain Rutter, Lieutenants Fern-
strom, Nelson
.lllIiI/J nm.IIII.III.llmlllllmlllllllllrnJ IIIlllIIlllll.lrnIIlll.llmIIIlmmJ IIIIM""'mJ I"."""mJ II'rnII,m"I,mn"""'M",o o "."'mJ I'W'mJ I,~l
Coast a' r.ti ll~~ ac ti oi ti es
mlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll!llllllllllIIlllIIlllIIllllIIlIIllIIlllIIllIIl1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111.
O FFI C E O F C H I E F O F C O A S T A R T I L L E R Y
Chi ef of Coast Arti /Jery
MAJ OR GENERAL A. H . SUNDERLAND
Exec uti ve
COLONEL J OSEPH A. GREEN
MaJeri el and Fi nt111CeSec ti on
LIEUTENANT COLONEL H . B. H OLMES, J R.
MAJ OR J .T . LEWIS
MAJ OR S. L.MCCROSKEY
CAPTAIN C. V. SCH UYLER
PlanI and Projec tI Sec ti on
LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. G. STRONG
MAJ OR L. L. DAVIS
Organi zati on and Trai ni ng Sec ti on
LIEUTENANT COLONEL D. D. H INMAN
MAJ OR AARON BRADSH AW,J R.
CAPTAIN J . E. H ARRIMAN
Perlo/mel
LIEUTENANT COLONEL K. T. BLOOD
~***************************
N otes from the C hief's O ffice
SEARCH LIGH TS AND SEARCH LIGH T EQUIPl\IENT engine which provides space f or f our or hve men inad-
Transportation f or 1939 antiaircraf t searchlight eguip- dition to the driver. Two views of the truck which was
ment was discussed brieAy under "Coast Artillery Board manuf actured by the Federal l'vIoror Truck Com P:U1 \ ",
Notes" in the May- J une issue of the J OURNAL. . Detroit, lvIichigan, are shown in the illustrations. The
As stated in the notes ref erred to, the 1939 equipment Rat Roar of the body f acilitates manuf acture and the pbc.
will be distributed intwo trucks. Due to the reduction in ing of equipment. Since there is room in the cabs of tht
weight and size of the new sound locator a trailed load f or two vehicles f or an entire searchlight crew, no additional
that article will no longer be nece?sary. The trucks sup- f olding or detachable seats :lre required in the body.
plied f or this equipment arc rated as medium 2ii- ton The hold down devices will be bolted to the body and
vehicles, 6 x 4 (4d.t.) with all steel body and a cab- over may be transf erred to other trucks when required. These
--
1940
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES
75
f ixtures provide def inite and secure f astening f or all es-
sential articles of equipment including the sound locator,
searchlight, power plant, controller and cable. The search-
light, power plant and cable reels will be held inplace by
turnbuckle f astenings. Ramps and block and tackle are
provided f or loading the searchlight and power plant. The
ramps when inuse will be f astened to the tail gate.
Due to manuf acturing delay the hold down devices
were not available when the trucks were delivered. It is
understood, however, that deliveries will begin early in
J anuarv. Instructions will be provided bv the manuf ac-
turer t~enable the organizations to complete this instal-
lation.
\Vhile the searchlight has been provided with pneu-
matic tires to provide against shock intransportation and
to assist movement over rough ground, the searchlight
should inno case be towed by amotor vehicle. The power
plant isprovided with anautomobile type chassis and may
be towed by a motor vehicle if reasonable care is used in
turning co;ners and driving over rough ground.
SEARCH LIGH TS
The 1940 searchlights will be f urnished inpart by the
Sperry Gyroscope Company and inpart by the General
Electric Company.
The Sperry equipment will be similar to 1939 and 1937
types except that the power plant is designed f or single-
speed operation f or both listening and arc loads. This sim-
plif ication has been made possible by improvement in
sound proof ing and quieting the power plant. The power
and controller cable reels will be supported in an "An
f rame type of rack instead of onwarehouse reels as in
recent models.
The 1940General Electric searchlight and power plant
will f ollow conventional lines but with certain dif f erences
inthe lamp mechanism and distant control system.
T rucks f or 1940 searchlight equipment will be similar
to those described above. They are to be manuf actured by
General Nf otors ..
DIESEL POWER PLANT
The Chief of Engineers is purchasing f or comparative
test with gasoline powered equipment, a Diesel powered
generating set. It is expected that the study and test of
this set will permit f urther ref inements of the character-
istics of such plants inorder that substitution of Diesel
f or gasoline motors may be made if the need f or such sub-
stitution arises. It isals~possible that certain locations may
f avor the use of a limited number of Diesel plants.
COLONEL RICH ARD F.Cox
Commandi ng 70th Coast Arti llery (AA)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL H AROLD F. NICH OLS
Ac ti tlg Assi std1Jt Commandant, Coast Arti llery Sc hool
Fort M onroe
BRIGADIERGENERAL FREDERICH . SMITH , Commandi ng
COLONEL WILLIAM S. BOWEN COLONEL ELI E. BENNETT
Presi dent, Coast Arti llery Board Exec uti t' e, Thi rd Coast Arti llery Di stri c t
COLONEL FRANOS P. H ARDAWAY
Post Exec uti ve; Commd1Jdi ng Harbor Defenses of
Chesapeake Bay and 2d Coast Arti llery
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DELMAR S.LENZNER
Commalldi ng Submari ne Mi ne Depot
By Major L. W. Goeppert and Li eutenant /. Du V. Stevens
Recruit training is the order of the day f or virtually all
organizations. The 70th isbeing steadily built up and the
initial cadres inboth the 2d and the 70th areworking hard
to transf orm their organizations into homogeneous units.
Inaddition to this daily recruit drill, routine, school and
board f irings, and submarine mine depot tests, make a
f ull schedule f or all hands inthe harbor def enses.
The Coast Artillery School has f inished the home
stretch of its condensed course f or the 1939- 40 regular
of f icers' class. Fif ty members were graduated onFebruary
I, 1940, with exercises at the school auditorium. Major
General A. H . Sunderland, Chief of Coast Artillery, de-
livered anaddress and presented the diplomas. Brigadier
General F. H . Smith, commandant of the school, also de-
livered atalk of timely and cogent appeal to the graduates.
Of f icers just graduating will probably augment the f or-
eign service detachments now training at various Coast
Artillery posts, and some will doubtless participate in
maneuvers announced by the War Department f or this
sprIng.
DRAMATICS
The Fort Monroe Dramatic Club has continued its
good of f icesand contributed much cheer to the garrison by
presenting a puppet show depicting the well known ad-
ventures of Ferdinand the Bull and a three act play,
Candleli ght. Mrs. Oscar D. McNeely prepared the entire
cast and scenery f or the puppet show and Lieutenant R. G.
Finkenaur wrote the script. P. G. Wodehouse' s adaptation
of Candleli ght, by Siegf ried Geyer, presented at the new
Fort Monroe Theatre on J anuary 21St added a new
wreath to the laurels of the club. J An enthusiastic audi-
ence enjoyed this production which was directed by lieu-
tenant G. U. Porter.
FORT MONROE CLUB
Those who have served at Fort Monroe will be inter-
ested to know that aconsiderable addition to the Casemate
Club has been made inthe f orm of a cocktail lounge.
The old opennorth porch has beenenclosed inglass and
is now acontinuation of the already existing porch dance
f loor, practically doubling the enclosed porch space. This
new porch area constitutes the lounge and has been f ur-
nished with chromium f inished f urniture. The whole in-
terior of the porch has been painted a light color, whose
cheerf ul note is enhanced by hanging baskets and wall
brackets. Comf ortable gliders af f ord a vantage point at
the junction of lounge and dance f loor, f rom which non-
dancers may enjoy watching the dancers. An orchestra
stand with curtain background adds a f inishing touch to
the very smart club atmosphere which has been attained.
Needless to say, the New Year's Eve Party held at the
club was a decided success.
PERSONNEL
Eleven new Thomason Act of f icers have joined the
harbor def enses f or duty. They are: Lieutenants S. W.
H ickey, W. C. Mahone}', J r., T. J . Bricker, H . P. Fasig,
E. E. Bellonby, R. F. H odge, J . C. J ef f ries, J r., W. J .
Stricklin, J r., T. H . Svmmes, J r., J . E. Arthur, J r., and
C. F. Cof f ev, J r..
Two newiv commissioned second lieutenants have also
beenwelcOln:ed to the harbor def enses: Lieutenants Allen
Bennett of Fort Monroe and J ohnE. H art of H olly H ilL
South Carolina. These two of f icers won their per~anent
commissions through competitive examination. Both are
assigned to the 70th Coast Artillery (AA).
First Lieutenant F. W. Regnier, Medical Corps, has
joined the station hospital as assistant to the chief of
medical service. H is previous station was H ot Springs.
Arkansas. First Lieutenant J . Z. McFarland, J r., Dent.-
Res. has beenordered to active duty and is onduty inthe
dental surgeon's of f ice. First Lieu'tenant W. B. 'Simms.
Dental Corps, is ontemporary duty at Carlisle Barracks,
attending the Medical Field Service School. Second Lieu-
tenant B. R. Painter, Ord- Res. has reported f or active
duty and is serving with the 6th Ordnance Company.
Major Leroy H . Lohmann, has reported f or duty and
isassigned asexecutive, 2d Coast Artillery and mine group
commander. Major Lohmann has recently returned f rom
Philippine service.
Lieutenant Colonel D. B. Sanger, has recently joined
the garrison f or duty with the Coast Artillery Board.
Colonel Sanger was previously onduty as H aw;iian De-
partment signal of f icer.
The garrison has extended congratulations to Warrant
Of f icer Ellis R. Lind, who was recently promoted to that
grade f rom master sergeant. Mr. Lind has lef t f or new
duties at Fort H aves, Ohio. Warrant Of f icer Edward
Turner, U.S.A., has reported f or duty with the post
quartermaster. Warrant Of f icer J . R. Tudor, has recentk
lef t onretirement leave, f or Calif ornia.
H awai i an S e parat e (oO ast A rt i lle ry B ri gad e
BRIGADIERGENERAL FULTON Q. C. GARDNER, Commandi ng
LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. M. S. SKENE, Chi ef of Staff
MAJ OR L. V. \' {rARNER, Adjlltant General & S-l
CAPTAIN G. SCH MIDT, S-2 &GII1I11e1J LIEUTENANT COLONEL J . H . LINDT, S-3
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. M. PERKINS, S-4
CAPTAIN I.H . RITCH IE CAPTAIN \V. H .KENDALL
Com. and Engi neer Offi c er Sec . A/h. Offi c er
CAPTAIN S. E. \VH ITESIDES, J R. LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. S. BARR
Chemi c al IFarfare Offi c er Ordna11c eOffi c er
COLONEL E. B. \ X' ALKER
Commandi ng Harbor Defemes of Pearl Harbor
COLONEL CH ARLES K. WING COLONEL W. D. FRAZER
Commandi ng 64th Coast Arti llery (AA) Co;nmandi ng Harbor Defemes of HOllollllr,
By Li eutenant J\1i lan G. Weber
PRESENTATION OF SOLDIER'S jy[EDAL
Private \Villiam B. Evers, Battery B, 55th Coast Artil-
len', was awarded the Soldier's Medal f or heroism dis-
pl~yed while rescuing another soldier f rom drowning in
Pearl H arbor last summer. General Fulton Q. C. Gardner
presented the medal to Private Evers at a review of the
troops of the H arbor Def enses at Fort Kamehameha on
December 15, 1939.
SPECIAL 8- INCH RAILWAY PRACTICES
OnDecember 5and 6, 1939, two special 8- inch railway
target practices were held at Brown's Camp. Under the
direction of Major W. L. jylcMorris, Battery A and B,
41st Coast Artillery, commanded by Captains D. D.
~vIartinand W. J . J v[cCarthy, f ired twenty rounds each
at a target at a range of approximately 17,000 :'ards.
Tentative scores appear to be:
Battery A 130'3
Battery B 225.6
The scores obtained inthe 8- inch railway practices held
inthis brigade during the past year have been consider-
ably higher than those obtained during preceding years
with the same armament. For the f our practices conducted
this year, anaverage score of 181.7 was made.
ANTIAIRCRAFT PRACTICES
The 64th Coast Artillery, commanded by Colonel C.
K.Wing, has returned toFort Shaf ter af ter the completion
of the third phase of annual target practices. For the j- inch
guns, this phase consisted of night f iring using the angular
unit of adjustment. Scores f or these practices have not
beencomputed, but hits were obtained inevery practice.
Inthese practices every ef f ort was made to secure realism.
Inspite of the suddenly- appearing targets, hits were ob-
tained inevery practice conducted by the 64th Coast Artil-
lery during the past year.
Battery A and E- the searchlight batteries of the 64th
Coast Artillery- - <:onducted their third advanced practice
onDecember 12. These practices were conducted as a
battalion problem, stressing control of searchlights inan
area def ense involving a considerable number of lights.
SOLDIER'S MEDAL
Pri l' ate JI! ' i //i am B. El' ers, Baftery B, 55tb Coast Arti llery
(ri gbt), ! li tb Bri gadi er General Fulton Q. C. Gardner,
taki ng tbe rel' i ew at wbi c b Pri l' ate Eloers rec ei r' ed the
Soldi er' s Medal
78
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
This controlproblemisonetowhichmuch thought and
studyisbeingdirectedbecauseof thesizeandshapeof the
def endedareaandthegreat number of searchlightsonthe
Islandof Oahu.
Battery I, 64th Coast Artillery, f ireditsthird seriesof
target practices.Two of these practiceswerewith .50-
caliberandtwowith '3o- calibermachineguns.No night
practicewasf iredduring this series.Machine- gunf iring
unitsof theseacoastbatteriesconductedtrainingwiththe
64th Coast Artillery at this time.
PERSONNEL CH ANGES
Major C. R. Robertslef t the IslandsonDecember 16
f or his newstationwith the Organized Reservesat Cin-
cinnati. Major Roberts has beenlargely responsiblef or
thesuccessof the sixadvancedsearchlight practicescon-
ducted during the past year. Other departures and new
stations include Lieutenants Peter Schmick (Fort
Worden), J .M. Donohue (Fort Barrancas),L. J .Ellert
(Fort Totten), B.M. Warf ield (Fort Crockett) andW.
G. Easton(Fort Sheridan).
Lieutenant ColonelA. E. Potts arrivedinthe Islands
onDecember 13,and has beenassignedasexecutiveof
theH arbor Def ensesof H onolulu. Major L. V. Warner
is the new adjutant general of the H awaiianSeparate
Coast Artillery Brigade. H e relievedMajor Francis A.
Maconwho had beenonduty at this headquarters f or
two years and sailedf or his new stationonGovernors
Island onthe December 16th transport. Major H . H .
Slicer,who arrivedonthe sametransport, has beenas-
signedtocommandof the1stBattalion,55thCoastArtil-
leryat Fort Kamehameha.Other newarrivalsandassi?;f l-
ments areLieutenants B.S. Evans,J r. (Fort Shaf ter)',J .
R. Gif f ord (Fort DeRussy), R. A. J anowski (Fo
n
Kamehameha), R. E. J ordan(Fort Ruger), L. A. Simon
(Fort Ruger), H . Weiseman(Fort Ruger), and K. L
Yarnall (Fort Ruger).
Major C. C. Morganand Lieutenant K. E. Tif f anv
havebeenassignedtothisbrigadef romInf antry unitsdt
Schof ieldandarestationedat FortsRuger andShaf ter,re-
spectively.
ATH LETIC NOTES
The f ollowingsummary showsthebrigadeleadersf or
thevarioussports,duringthepastyear:
Basketball- H arbor Def ensesof PearlH arbor, coached
byLieutenant G.V. Underwood.
Boxing- H arbor Def enses of H onolulu, coachedbv
Lieutenant W. S.Coit. '
Track- H arbor Def ensesof PearlH arbor, coachedby
Lieutenant L. A. H all.
Baseball- 64th Coast Artillery, Ft. Shaf ter, coached
byLieutenant O.Swain.
.Tennis- H arbor Def enses of H onolulu, coachedbv
Lieutenant W. S.Coit.
H arborDefenses of C ristobal
COLONEL RUFUS F.MADDUX, Commandi ng
By Captai n E. B. Thompson, C.A.C.
The intensive tralOlOgprogram recently initiated in periodwillincludebaseball,handball,sof tball,badminton.
Panamahaskept allorganizationsof the 1stCoast Artil- track andf ield,bowling,andtennis.
lerymorethanbusyf or sometime. Gunners'instruction CorporalJ osephChertick andPrivateFirst ClassWi!-
isbeingpushed, andpreparationsarebeingmadef or the liamL. Stringf ield, H eadquarters Battery 2d Battalion,
f unctionalf iringof severalseacoastbatteriesat Fort Sher- 1st Coast Artillery, haveeachbeenawardeda personal
man. Sincethesebatterieshavenot beenf iredf or several letter of commendationby the department commander,
years,itishopedthat somevaluableinf ormationastotheir Major GeneralDavid L. Stone,f or heroismdisplayedin
perf ormancewill beobtained. anattempt tosavegovernmentproperty. Onthenight of
Inspiteof being extremelybusy with training, af ew November 7, 1939,during anexceptionallyheavystorm.
momentsaref oundhereandtheretokeepupour schedule the 1- 47 brokeher moorings at the Chagres River dock
of athletics. The interbattery baseballschedulehas just d d
an washe uponthebeachonthewestsideof theriver.
beencompleted,andapostteamisnowbeingput inshape
to enter the Atlantic Sectot baseballleague. Owing to The next morning, whilethestormwasstillraging,Cor-
therecent organizationof onebattalionof the7
2d
Coast poralChertick andPrivateStringf ieldcrossedtheriverin
Artillery (AA) onthepostof Fort Sherman,theathletic anativecayuca,succeededinRoatingthe 1- 47' andat-
year was divided into two periods, and Battery C, 1st tempted to returnit to the dock. H owever, they were
Coast Artillery declared the winner of the post com- unableto makeany headway and weref inally f o~cedto
mander'strophy f orthef irstperiod. Sportsf orthesecond jump overboardand swima~horetosavethei; ownlives.
Fort S he ri d an
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J .LH O~f ER. Commandi ng
By Major C. S. Harri s
During November, allinactivebatteries of theregiment
together with the Medical Detachment were activated,
a~dbytheendof themonth, theregiment wasat f ull en-
listed.strength.
The present assignment of of f icersisas f ollows:
H EADQUARTERS
Lieutenant Colonel J ohnLH omer, commanding
Major Charles C. H arris, executive
Captain\VilliamE. Grif f in,S- 3,S- 4
CaptainRobt. LAnderson, adjutant
Lieutenant Dabney C. T . Davis, athletic of f icer
H EADQUARTERS BATTERY
Lieutenant Chas. C. Cloud, J r., commanding
Lieutenant J ohnM. Smythe, motor transport of f icer
1ST BATTALION
CaptainSamuel H . Morrow, commanding
Lieutenant Frank E. H oward, adjutant
BATTERY A
Lieutenant Kenneth 1.Curtis, commanding
Lieutenant Andrew M. Lundberg
BATTERY B
Lieutenant Wm. G. Easton, commanding
Lieutenant MelvinR. Swenson
BATTERY C
Lieutenant Robt. G. Platt, commanding
BATTERY D
Lieutenant Wm. L. Thorkelson, commanding
2D BATTALION
CaptainBurgoD. Gill, commanding
Lieutenant Robt. W. Carlton, adjutant
BATTERY E
Lieutenant Thos. C. Grif f in, commanding
BATTERY F
CaptainKenneth M. Briggs, commanding
Lieutenant Donald K. Nickerson
Lieutenant Darrell J .lnabnit
BATTERY G
Lieutenant Robt. B.Barry, commanding
BATTERY H
Lieutenant GoodmanK. Larson, commanding
On December 2d, the f ollowing sergeants were ap-
pointed f irst sergeants:
Sergeant Carl B. Lorentz, H q. &H q. Btry.
Sergeant ArdenW. Sistad, H q. &H q. Btr)'. Bn.
(Gun)
Sergeant GeorgeW. Mooney, Btry. A.
Sergeant Clair M. Lamb, Btry. D.
Sergeant ScammonE. LaReau, H q. &H q. Btry.
Bn.(AW)
Sergeant Emil F. Schlager, Btry. F.
Sergeant Fred N. Grossman, Btr:'"G.
Sergeant J ames G. O'Rourke, Btry. H .
Sergeant J ohnJ . Dema, was appointed staf f sergeant
(color). Corporal Frederick V. McWold, was appointed
staf f sergeant (supply).
During December, allbatteries participated inantiair-
craf t f irings or searchlight exercises,utilizing ammunition
availablef romthe War Department allotment f or winter
training and air missions f urnished by the 15th Observa-
tionSquadron. All batteries of the automatic weapons
battalionconducted antiaircraf t machine- gunf irings with
both caliber ,30and caliber .50weapons and alsoantiair-
craf trif lef irebysectionswith theservicerif le.Thesef irings
were successf ully completed onDecember 21st under a
clear sky, but with the thermometer registering tende-
greesbelow the f reezing point.
Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. H omer entertained the
of f icersandladiesof theregiment at luncheononDecem-
ber 23d, honoring Colonel and Mrs. J oseph A. Green,
andwereat hometotheof f icersandladiesof the post and
vicinity at noononDecember 31St,to receiveNew Year's
calls.
Lieutenant Charles LP. Medinnis, nowontemporary
duty at Fort H amilton, New York, visited the post with
his mother, Mrs. Mary Medinnis, during the holidays.
Lieutenant William G. Eastonreported f or duty on
J anuary ')dandwasassignedtocommand Battery B.lieu-
tenant Eastonhas just completed a tour of duty inthe
H awaiianDepartment.
P anama P rovisional C oast A rtillery Brigade (A A )
BRIGADIERGENERAL SANDERFORDJ ARMAN, Commandi ng
CAPTAIN L.W. BARTLETT LIEUTENANT W. M. SKIDMORE
Communi c ati ons and Intelli genc e Ai de-de-Camp
CAPTAIN M. K. DEICH ELMANN LIEUTENANT W. L. H EROLD
Plans and Trai ni ng Ai de-de-Camp
LIEUTENANT C. G.PATTERSON LIEUTENANT F. A.BOGART
Adjutant and Publi c i ty Muni ti o1lS.. Sltpply and Assi stant Plans and Trai ni ng
72d Coast Arti llery (AA) 73d Coast Arti llery (AA)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. R.FINLEY, Commandi ng LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. M. CH APIN, Commandi ng
By Li eutenant C. G.Patterson
Although the dry seasoninPanama supposedly begins
inJ anuary, it appears that there has beena slight mix- up
indates this year. Onone day early inJ anuarv there was
more rainf ali onthe Pacif ic side th~n the normal average
f or the entire month during the preceding years! Af ter-
noon downpours have been quite f requent, even during
the reception hour onNew Year's Day.
The biggest event of the pre- holiday period was the
brigade conf erence early in December. The 72d Coast
Artillery of f icers f rom Forts Randolph and Sherman came
to the Pacif ic side onthe morning train and attended an
all- day session. Between maps, plans, and talks by Gen-
eral J arman, members of his staf f and Lieutenant Colonel
F. M. Brady, executive of f icer of the 19th Wing, the
present and f uture antiaircraf t def ense of the Canal was
explained indetail. Battery T, 73d Coast Artillery (AA),
at Fort Amador, was host to all the of f icers f or dinner.
Af terward members of the 72d Coast Artillery were taken
around to visit installations onthe Pacif ic side.
TRAINING
Despite the prolonged rainy season, the Antiaircraf t
Brigade- Air Corps exercises were conducted f rom J anuary
4 to ro. All units occupied war positions throughout the
entire period. The 400 recruits who arrived onthe Grant
onJ anuary 4 were assigned and sent to their batteries in
the f ield. While the exercises were primarily inprepara-
tionf or the department maneuvers inMarch, much valu-
able experience was gained, especially inthe f unctioning
of the antiaircraf t artillery intelligence service. The plan
f or the exercises was based onthe Fort Bragg Exercises of
1938. For the sixteen of f icers inthe brigade who were at
Fort Bragg, the exercises began where we lef t of f when we
departed f rom that station.
FIRING
Because of unf oreseen dif f iculties insupply and trans-
portation, the f iring phase at Rio H ato has beenpostponed
until af ter department maneuvers. H owever, the rainy
seasondoesn't begin up there until J uly so no weather dif -
f iculties are expected. One admirable f eature of Rio H ato
is the complete absence of shipping lanes and f ishing
boats. At last the Coast Artillery has f ound af iring range
with aperpetually saf e f ield of f ire.
Battery 0, 73d Coast Artillery, lef t f or Rio H ato on
J anuary 5to construct the camp. Mess halls, latrines, and
tent H oorsto accommodate one regiment at atime will be
ready by March 1. La Venta Inn, close by, of f ers accom-
modations f or f amilies.
PERSONNEL
General J arman has beenrelieved f rom his dual assign-
ment of commanding Fort Clayton and the antiaircraf t
brigade and now devotes f ull time to commanding the
brigade. Colonel Nichols lef t Quarry H eights onDecem-
ber 6 to assume command of the 4th Coast Artillerv
(H D) and the H arbor Def enses of Balboa. Several of -
f icers' f amilies have arrived f rom the States and are living
inPanama City and Colon until quarters are available.
72D COAST ARTILLERY (AA)
The 72d is making good its promise to create history.
Rehabilitation of barracks and quarters, as well as new
construction, is continuing with soldier labor at Fort Ran-
dolph. Battery I, commanded by Lieutenant F. B. Rev-
bold, wonthe beer prize f or the battery showing the great-
est improvement since the organization of the regiment.
Battery P, commanded by Captain D. J . Bailey, was a
close second. Maneuvers over f or a while, we hope to
make the most of what dry seasonthere is to f inish con-
struction.
73D COAST ARTILLERY (AA)
Drill, maneuvers, construction, recruits to train- the
73d never has adull moment! The regiment ishitting its
stride and getting big things done in an artilleryman's
manner. Of f icers and men are experiencing f ield' condi-
tions, enjoying them, and boosting the morale. There
hasn't been much time to think of athletics as yet. The
Amador golf course looks most inviting- but, there's
work to be done.
Fort T ot t e n
COLO:- ;EL OUVER L. SPILLER, Commandi ng
By Major S. E. Wi llard
TRAI:- ;ING
The 1St Battalion is engaged inan intensive artillery
training period. During December, Battery B (Captain
?\{eltonA. H atch) and C (Lieutenant Leland R. Drake)
f ired 3- inch practices at Fort Tilden. Battery E (Lieu-
tenant Alf red L. Brassel) conducted .so- caliber f iring at
balloons at Fort Tilden. InJ anuary, Battery A (Captain
Peter \\1. Shunk) will conduct searchlight practice at
Camp Upton, and the batteries of the 2d Battalion will
conduct instructional f iring with the 37- mm. gun at Fort
Tilden. NIoreover, both battalions will take part ina road
march of three days during J anuary. Gunners' instruction
is well under way and it is expected to have the f inal
examination conducted by the f irst of ?\If arch. Inspite of
the cold and daily snow, inf antry drills are held and the
usual parades are "pulled" onschedule.
RECREATION AND SOCIAL
The Christmas seasonwas a f ull and merry one at Fort
Totten. Many post parties were held at the of f icers' club.
Colonel and NIrs. Spiller entertained with a tea dance on
the 27th. Captain and NCrs. Wald held atea dance onthe
26th. Lieutenant and NCrs. Skinrood and Lieutenant and
Mrs. Ashman held ahousewarming cocktail party onthe
29th at Lieutenant Ashman's new quarters.
The club held a grand New Year's Party, including
cocktails, dinner, adance; and, f or those still able to make
the grade, breakf ast.
The YMCA entertained with several parties, adance,
and the Christmas Tree and childrens' program with, of
course, Santa and his bag of gif ts.
Skating is inorder just now, as the duck pond is f rozen
over and everyone is enjoying the ice.
Basketball is king indoors with boxing next inline.
PERSONNEL
Recent arrivals include Lieutenant Colonel Small f rom
Panama, Chaplain Storaasli f rom Fort George Wright,
and Major O'Connell f rom Panama. The f ollowing
named of f icers are on detached service f rom the post:
Major LeRoy Lutes at Sixth Army H eadquarters, At-
lanta; Lieutenants Cory and Newcomber at Fort H amil-
ton; Lieutenants Routh, Wald, Schrader, Wood and Gil-
christ at Fort \\ladsworth; Lieutenant J ones at Fort Ben-
ning; Lieutenant H ullinghorst on the transport St.
l11i bi e! ; Lieutenant Cassevant at Fort ?\rf onmouth; Lieu-
tenants H internhof f and H enry at Fort Adams; and Lieu-
tenant Curtin at Fort J ay.
At a recent parade, Colonel Cooper, district command-
er, presented the Soldier's Medal to Private First Class
George Foster f or heroism inrescuing a manf rom drown-
ing while ondury inPanama.
The entire garrison was shocked and saddened by the
accidental death of Sergeant George Lucey of Battery A.
Sergeant Lucey was returning to the post as a passenger
inaf riend's car, when owing to iceand snow the car skid-
ded out of control and crashed into a large bus.
NEW CONSTRUCTION
The new temporary barracks are slowly nearing com-
pletion and Battery E expects to occ:.J py one shortly. The
motor park, garages and maintenance shops begin to take
f orm and the sides and roof will be completed bef ore J an-
uary 15th.
The restaurant has been renovated and the tap room
moved f rom the restaurant to a new location. In the
new location the bar and tap room have been remodeled
as anold English pub. Its beamed ceilings and panelled
walls are very ef f ective indark oak.
The Fort Totten Bus Company has turned over its
concession to the post exchange and the PX is now inthe
bus business. The new buses are gaily painted inthe Coast
Artillery colors. The bodies are 00 and have silver roof s
and awide red stripe running completely around the bus.
The lettering is inyellow onthe red.
Tbe new bus i n use at Fort Tottell
C orre gi d or
BRIGADIERGENERAL WALTER K. WILSON, Commandi ng
COLONEL FREDERICA. PRICE, Exec uti ve
LIEUTENANT CoLONEL R. B. PATTERSON, Adjutant Genffal &S-l
MAJ OR S.MCCULLOUGH , S-2 LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. E. COTTER, S-3
MAJ OR L. R. CREWS, S-4
COLONEL R. P. GLASSBURN, COLONEL WILLIAM C. KOENIG
Commandi ng 59th Coast Arti llffY (HD) Commandi ng 60th Coast Arti llery (AA)
COLONEL WILLIS SH IPPAM LIEUTENANT COLONEL J .B. CRAWFORD
Commandi ng 91st Coast Arti llery (PS) (HD) Commandi ng 92d Coast Arti llery (PS) (TD)
By MajorS. Mc Cullough
Outdoor training activitiesareinf ull swing. With the
rainy seasontapering of f ,materiel and personnel arecom-
ing out f rom under wraps and preparing f or the target
practiceseasonandtheWest Sector maneuvers, which this
year aretobeonalarger scalethanheretof ore. Intensive
training, to enable all organizations to perf ormtheir par-
ticular def ensemissions, isnow going on. Beachdef ense
exercises,mobilizationtests, preparationf or maneuvers,
sub- caliber f iring, artillery, communication, and search-
light drills,supplementary AA f irings,with inf antry close
order drill and ceremonies,occupy every availablehour in
this intensiveperiod.
Admiral T. C. H art (new commander of the Asiatic
Fleet) with Rear Admiral J . M. Smeallieand their staf f s
visited Corregidor recently and were conducted over the
post by General W. K. Wilsonandmembers of his staf f .
Not only have the local climatic conditions of Cor-
regidor receivedtheir just recognitionlatelyby of f icerswho
have come here "to recuperate f rom the ef f ects of the
tropics," but the Navy has alsobeenf inding awelcome
relief ashoreonCorregidor f rom the conf inement of de-
stroyers and submarines operating inthe uneasy China
Sea.
The new U. S. H igh Commissioner, Francis B. Sayre,
and his staf f will shortly visit Corregidor to inspect the
f ortif iedislands acrossthemouth of Manila Bay.
Sports onthe Rock havelately hit anew high, largely
through the ef f ortsof Major D. J . Rutherf ord (recreation
of f icer) andhis staf f . Severalexcellent boxing cardshave
beenput on, with both local and civiliantalent, f or the
benef it of large and enthusiastic audiences. The 59th
Coast Artillery wona closely contested match with the
60th Coast Artillery, 4- 3,thereby winning the post cham-
pionship intheAmericanDivision. The 91st Coast Artil-
lery (PS) took a3- 2decisionf romthe92dCoast Artillery
(PS), to winthe post championship inthe Scout Di-
vision.
Largecrowdshavebeenturning out to witness the de-
partment basketball games that have been played on
Corregidor. The 59th f inally wonthe department cham-
pionship f or 1939,with the 60th tiedwith Post of Manila
f or second place. Inthe Scout Division, the department
championship inbasketball was wonby the 24th Field
Artillery, who nosedout the 91st Coast Artillery by one
game.
Fort Mills teams f aredwell inthe department bowling
tournament. In the Of f icers' Division, the Fort Mills
teamwontheten- pinevent, and theFort Mills TeamA
wonthe duckpinevent. The 91st wontheenlistedmen's
ten- pintournament and the f ive- manduckpin congress,
and the60th wontheten- pinf ive- manand two- mancon-
gressand alsohigh singles.
The track seasonstarted November 1standwill extend
through December. Each of the f our regiments willcon-
duct aregimental meet f ollowedbyinter- regimental meets
betweenthe59th and60th, andbetweenthe91st and92d,
f or the post championship inthe American and Scout
Divisions.
Baseballcomesout of f iciallyonDecember 1st anddoes
not withdraw f romtheathletic sceneuntil J une 1st. Sepa-
rateinter- battery post, anddepartment leagueswillberun
of f inthat order.
For the benef it of our many ex- golf ing addicts, were-
port that thegolf ingseasonisinf ullswing. Anenergetic
golf committee, goodweather, thegolf courseinexcellent
condition, have allcombined to make this the mainf orm
of recreationamong the of f icerpersonnel at this time of
year.
Many replacements arrivedonthetransport Grant af ter
anuneventf ul crossing of the Pacif ic. Among themare
ChaplainPhilip F. Coholan; Major J ohnD. Cook, the
newquartermaster; Major Edmund H . Stillman, thenew
post exchange of f icer; Major Leonard R. Crews, thenew
S- 4; Major SamuelMcCullough, thenew5-2; Lieutenant
H arold L. Gard, MAC; Lieutenant Dwight D. Edison,
the new assistant provost marshal; Lieutenants H elen
Adams andK. L. Dollason, Army Nurse Corps.
Sailing onthe Grant f or the GoldenGate wereMajor
J ames J . Firestone, QMC, to Fort H ayes; Major "Dad"
Lohmann, CAC, to Fort Monroe; CaptainJ ohnH artY,
CAC, toFort Rosecrans; Lieutenant A. M. Lazar,CAC,
to Fort Monroe; Lieutenant F. LeR. Furphy, CAC, to
AberdeenProving Ground; Lieutenant p, A. Roy,toFort
MacArthur; and Lieutenant Thomas R. J ones, MAc'
toBrooklynArmy Base. Goodluck andbest wishesf rom
us allonyour newassignments.
59TH COASTARTILLERY
By Major Loui s H. Thompson
During thef irst part of October beach def ensef iringof
machine guns, 37- mm. and 7s- mm. guns was completed
with excellent results. All gunbatteries arenowengaged
t940
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 83
Insub- caliberpracticeinpreparationf ortheservicepractice
[0be heldinJ anuary andFebruary.
TheOctober transport brought two new battery com-
manderstothe59th, both of whomdrew outpost details.
GptainAlbert D. Miller was assignedto command Bat-
relYGandFort H ughes, and CaptainGuy H . Stubbs to
command Battery E and Fort Drum. Captain H . E.
Breitungwastransf erred f romthe 60th and f romduty at
FortWint tocommand Battery C,relievingCaptainR.R.
H endrix,whohasbeentemporarily assignedtoregimental
headquarterspending returnto the U. S. onFebruary
transport. Lieutenant Lawrence C. Baldwinwas trans-
f erredf romthe60th andwasassignedtoBattery Gat Fort
H ughes.
Included among the noncommissioned staf f arriving
ontheOctober transport, and assigned to the 59th were
thef ollowing: Staf f Sergeant StephenJ . Machuta (regi-
mentalsergeant major), Staf f Sergeant Daniel O'Connor,
Staf f SergeantMarionF. Greathouse, and 1stSergeant H .
D.Whitf ield.
The Grant carried away f romus and back to duty in
theStates the f ollowing: Lieutenant Aaron M. Lazar
(popularly knownas "Lazy," but whose characteristics
aretheantithesis of this nomenclature), assigned to Fort
~f onroe; Master Sergeant RichardParry toFort Winf ield
Scott; Staf f Sergeant J ohnF. Pray to Fort Totten; Staf f
SergeantLaurieC. Martinto Fort Banks; Staf f Sergeant
FoyK. H eath to Fort Barrancas; and Staf f Sergeant
H enricusLOoms to Fort Rosecrans.Technical Sergeant
BarneyMachovic retired onOctober 31st and has estab-
lishedresidenceinManila.
During October the 59th wonthe post boxing cham-
pionship(American) by def eating the 60th inf our out
of sevenbouts scheduled. The 59th basketball team, af ter
losingthe post championship (American) to the 60th,
wonf irstplaceinthe Philippine Department league.
60TH CoAST ARTILLERY
By Major Alli son W. Jones
Followingthe completionof supplementary machine-
gun.f iringsby the other regiments f or which the 60th
f urmshedtherecordssectionand the directing personnel,
BatteriesE and F commenced their f inal drive f or the
heightsof machine- gun excellence. Records are not as
yetentirelyready f or check and f or the computation of
scores, but indications areencouraging andalargenumber
of .gunnershave receivedvaluable training. One innova-
anontriedthis year worked out very successf ully. Inthe
paStthesmallnessof the landing f ieldandthe velocity of
thewindhavemade dropping targets dif f icult and more
thanonehasbeenlost. During the latter part of this sea-
sontargetsweredropped near thesaf etyboat, their kapok-
f illedseams keeping them af loat long enough f or the
crashboat to pick them up. Our lost target problem ap-
~ar~to be solved. The searchlight Battery (A), con-
sidenngold equipment, has beenmaking marked prog-
ress:Inspiteof thelonghours put inonoverhauling, and
tunmgupequipment and training personnel, it appeared
that theusual bad weather breaks might beat the battery
again. The "night owls"reported that excellent weather
usually prevailedf rom3:00A.M. to dawn. As aresult, the
battery has beeninpositionandready to go at 3:00 A.M.
daily f or the past week and will continue this routine
until servicepractice isheld. It beganto look as if their
f ighting spirit hadbrokenthejinx at last andthat Battery
A will not only have a target practice but anexcellent
one. The gunbatteries areusing all availablemissions f or
their training with special emphasis onthe stereoscopic
height f inders.While their intensiveperiodwillnot begin
f or another month, their preparations arewell under way
and point to asuccessf ulseason.
The big event of November was the celebrationof
organizationday. The usual ceremonieswereheld inthe
morning, f ollowed by abaseball game betweenTopside
andMiddleside organizations, which Midd1esidewon, 2- I.
Noonf ound allorganizations sitting downtomealswhich
makeThanksgiving andChristmas dinners look lean. Free
movies f ollowed f or the members of the 60th. Inthe
evening adinner was held at theCorregidor Club f or the
of f icersof the regiment and their guests, af ter which they
joined the 60th rooting section f or their department
basketball leaguegamewithNichols Field.
The 60thwasf ortunate ingaining thef ollowing of f icers
onthe October transport: Major Alexander H . Campbell
(regimental executiveandCO, 1stBattalion); Lieutenant
Arthur C.Peterson (Battery A); Lieutenant Robert D.
Glassburn (Battery D); Lieutenant William H . Ball
(DS Fort Wint). A f urther gainwas Lieutenant J ames
R. H olmes, transf erred f romthe 59th. We had the mis-
f ortune of losingCaptainE. W. Breitung and Lieutenant
L. C. Baldwin, by transf er to the 59th, and Lieutenant
EarleM. Shiley, by transf er to the staf f , as assistant post
exchange of f icer.
The 60th def eated the59th f or the post championship,
American Division. In the department championship
series,wearenowinthird place, with excellent prospects
of moving to second; the59th obtained revengef or their
earlier lossby goinginto atief or f irst place.Inboxing we
lost to the 59th by one point, the meet hanging onthe
decisionof the heavyweight bout, which was f ast and
f urious, with both f ighters almost out at thelast gong. In
the recent department bowling congress the 60th won
the ten- pin, f ive- manand two- man congress and also
highsingles.Inthegolf ingworldthe60thwontheannual
golf marathon and the inter- regimental Caldwell cup
matches by acomf ortable margin, af ter sometough com-
petition. Regimental golf ers have placed well in the
numerous tournaments that startedwith thedry season.In
thepost championship tournaments the 60th has lost out
inthetopf light but isdoingwell inthe others.
9IST COAST ARTILLERY (PS)
By Major V. P. Foster
Intensive training onprimary armament assignments is
now going on, inpreparationf or annual target practices,
scheduled to beginshortly af ter the f irst of the year.
Event Organi zati on
Sof t ball BatteryC
Volleyball BatteryB
Duckpins " BatteryD
Ten- pins Guard Battalion
Basketball BatteryC
The regiment is pleasedto welcomeLieutenant and
Mrs. GeorgeH . Crawf ord,whoarrivedonthelasttrans-
port.Lieutenant Crawf ordisnowcommandingBatteryE
of theGuardBattalion.
ColonelCrawf ordisrecoveringsplendidlyf romanap-
pendectomy and will, with Mrs. Crawf ord, spend the
month of December at Baguio.
84 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL la/1uar)' -Febrllar,
The regiment lost Major Leroy H . Lohmannwhen 92DCoASTARTILLERY(PS)
the Grant pulled out. The minecommandgavehima By Major lV. C. Braly
lustyMabuhay ashelef t thedock here,Manila bound. All batterieshavecompletedtheir annualbeachdef ense
Our new arrivalswere: Major J osephP. Kohn, who f iringssinceour last report andarenowengagedinsub-
becameregimental executive; CaptainWill K. Stennis caliberf iring,preparationf or the department maneuvers,
andLieutenant J ohnH . Davis,J r.,whowent tooutpost andconditioningof materielf orthetarget practiceseason.
duty,whileLieutenant StephenM. Mellnik wasassigned Smallarmsf iringwascompletedinOctober,withmuch
to commandBatteryD. success,under the directionof Lieutenant H aynes, regi- -
The inter- battery basketball league concluded with mentalrangeof f icer.
Battery B- CaptainCaluya, commanding- winning InaboxingmatchwithNational Universityof Manila
easily. The season'splay produced severaloutstanding at Fort Mills the 92dwon, 6 to 2, bef orea largeand
playersand the regimental basketball coach,Lieutenant enthusiasticaudience.A joint smokerwasstagedwithth e
D'Arezzo, had little dif f iculty inorganizing a highly 91StCoast Artillery (PS), alsobef orea packedArena.
promisingregimentalsquadinpreparationf orplayinthe The 92d wonthree out of f our preliminary bouts but
post championshipagainst our arch- rivals,the 92d, and droppedthreeout of f iveof thechampionshipmatches.
f or playinthedepartment basketballtournament (Scout IntheCaldwellCupmatchf or of f icers'golf teams,the
Division). The 91st wonthe post championship again 92df inishedinsecondplace,beingnosedout by the60th
thisyear by def eatingthe92dinthef irsttwo games,by by af ewpoints. The teamconsistedof CaptainKyster
scoresof 38- 25and31- 25,respectively.Thus f or another (teamcaptain), Lieutenant Croker, Lieutenant Colonel
yearwearepostchampions(ScoutDivision). Thesguad Crawf ord, Lieutenant Kessler,Major Braly, and Lieu-
of f if teenplayersis dividedinto three teams, all about tenant H arvey.
equalinability.Theveteranplayers- Imperial, Yambao, Organizationday f or the regiment was observedon
Alberto,DelaCruz,Reyes,Benito- were augmentedthis November 15th.Duringthemorningashortprogramwas
year by severaloutstanding recruits, among whom are heldinthe BottomsideCine, at whichthecommandinl!;
Denaga,L., andCunanan. Theentireregiment hasbeen generalmadeaninspiringaddressonteamwork.Trophies
behindtheteamasisevident by thelargecrowdswhich andmedalswerepresentedto winners invariousdepart-
witnessedevery home game. Inspite of the slowstart ment andharbordef enseathleticeventsbythecommand-
inthedepartmenttournament,theteamf inishedinsecond ing general,af ter which theregimental commanderpre-
place. sented cups to the f ollowingregimental championsf or
OnNovember 4th, theboxingteamdef eatedtheFar 1939:
EasternUniversity,last year'sinter- collegiatechampions,
bv thecount of 6 to2.The additionof RosalinoRojas,a
f ~atherweight, materially strengthened the 91st team.
Rojas'unusuallyf astworkandslynessismaterialf orsrudy.
ArmisticeDay the91st andtheUniversityof thePhilip-
pinesf ought it out,withthe91stwinningby thescoreof
5to 2. Another newcomer to the 91st, Felix Villamor,
demonstratedhisabilityasapug.Villamor'sstraight lef t
jab is somethingworth watching. The annual "Army"
boxing classictook placeonNovember 22d, whenthe
91st def eatedthe 92d, 3to 2. SixtoFajardo, f lyweight,
RosalinoRojas,bantamweight, andFelixVillamor,light-
weight,werethestarsf orthe91st.
FirstC oast A rtillery District
CoLONEL RODNEY H . SMITH , Commandi ng
MAJ OR ROBERT T. CH APLIN, Adjutant
COLONEL ROBERT C. GARRETT COLONEL MONTE J . H ICKOK
Commandi ng Harbor Defenses of Portland and Portsmouth Commandi ng Harbor Defenses of Boston
COLONEL T. H .J ONES MAJ OR E.P. J OLLS
Commandi ng Harbor Defenses of Long Island Sound Commandi ng Hat' bor Defenses of Narragansett Bay
CAPTMN CH ARLES N. BRANH AM
Commandi ng Harbor Defenses of New Bedford
The winter training and maintenance program f or the
First Coast Artillery District is progressing toward all ob-
jectives scheduled. This work is proceeding smoothly in
conjunction with the many added duties of all personnel
incident tothe intensive recruiting program; the f ormation
of new units; training of personnel f or the Coast Artillery
units inPanama; and, insome of our harbor def enses, the
increased training activities of National Guard units.
The District Commander and Mrs. Smith entertained
at a parry at their home onthe af ternoon of November
24th. Over IS0 guests, including many of the of f icers and
ladiesof the First Corps Area and the First Coast Artillery
District and many prominent citizens, were invited to
meet Miss Lucy E . Worthington, daughter of Mr. and
Mrs. Robert Briggs Worthington. The engagement of
Miss Worthington and Major Robert Chaplin, Coast
Artillery Corps, has recently beenannounced.
H ARBOR DEFENSES OF PORTLAND AND PORTSMOUTH
The 68th Coast Artillery (AA) is a new antiaircraf t
unit, although not a new Coast Artillery regiment, as
theoriginal 68th served overseas during the WorId War.
The f irst week of November saw the activation of the
regiment with station inthe H arbor Def enses of Port-
land, Maine, evacuated recently by the 5th Inf antry.
OnNovember 15th acadre of 184enlisted menarrived
f romFort H . G. Wright, to provide the nucleus f or the
regiment. In addition, several staf f sergeants f rom the
6gth Coast Artillery inPuerto Rico have augmented the
original cadre. Recruits have been, f or the most part,
f romthe Fif th Corps Area, and are arriving insuch num-
bersasto soonbring the regiment to f ull strength.
The new commanding of f icer of the H arbor Def enses
of Portland and Portsmouth, and the 68th Coast Artillery,
Colonel Robert C.Garrett, arrived and assumed comma~d
onDecember 5th.
InDecember the Portland Chapter of the National
Sojourners welcomed the of f icers of the 68th with arecep-
tionand dinner at the Columbia H otel. At this time the
regiment had reached such strength that the 2d Battalion,
lessBattery E, was able to move to its new home at Fort
McKinley. Later, Battery E moved to Fort Preble.
Training has necessarily been restricted to recruit in-
struction owing to the rapid expansion and high per-
centageof menwith no previous service.
A basketball team has been organized and has played
onegame with acivilianteam f rom Sanf ord. Although the
regiment lost- - 83 to 36- .1 start inregimental athletics
has beenmade.
The Panama Coast Artillery Detachment, 8th Coast
Artillery, was organized at Fort McKinley with a nucleus
of Lieutenants E. E. H ackman and W. M. Vann, both
f rom Fort Monroe, and twenty- seven enlisted men f rom
Fort H . G. Wright. This cadre was augmented by the
transf er of twenty menf rom the 8th to the Panama Coast
Artillery Detachment.
The 8th Coast Artillery proper continues its f unction of
maintenance of harbor def ense material with regard to the
primary mission of the moment: recruiting f or the Regu-
lar Armv.
H ARBOR DEFENSES OF BOSTON
During November and December many delightf ul
parties were givenboth onand of f the post. H owever, the
event of the season was the annual Christmas party f or
the younger members of the garrison. There are many
children onthe post, most of whom attended this very
popular party at Fort Banks. Itwas thoroughly enjoyed by
eighty- one children aswell asby the older members. The
post gym with its colorf ul decorations, amply ref lected
the season's spirit. The post commander gave a brief ad-
dress which was f ollowed by spirited music by the
orchestra. Santa Claus, played by Technical Sergeant
H enry H . Launspach, then made his appearance and pre-
sented each child anappropriate gif t. Ref reshments com-
pleted the entertainment. In charge of decorating the
gym was Technical Sergeant J oseph F. H ardiman, as-
sisted by Corporal Frank G. Underwood.
Plans are under way f or the construction of a skating
rink inthe vicinity of the barracks occupied by A Bat-
tery, 9th Coast Artillery. H owever, the opening of the
rink must be postponed until the arrival of f reezing
weather. Winter sports are not unknown inWinthrop,
but because of the usually very temperate climate inthe
vicinity of Boston H arbor it is not expected that the rink
will be inoperation bef ore the f irst of J anuary.
Bowling is now inf ull swing with nine teams com-
pleting the f irst half of the annual bowling tournament.
H eadquarters Battery and the Quartermaster Corps tied
f or f irst place. Af ter J anuary 1st the second half of the
tournament starts and it is expected that a team f rom
H eadquarters First Corps Area will be entered.
Approximately eighteen per cent of the Coast Artil-
lery troops of this command were transf erred to the 10th
86 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
1anuary-Februa,.,
Coast Artillery, Fort Adams, to f orm the cadre f or the
training of 500Coast ArtillerymeninthePanama Recruit
Detachment.
For the past month unit recruiting has beenconducted
with satisf actory results. Several recruits who have been
enlisted at this"post are making good progress intheir
elementary training.
H ARBOR DEFENSES OF LONG ISLAND SOUND
By Captai n Frank T. Ostenberg
OnNovember 1orderswere receiveddirecting all the
ThomasonAct of f icersat Fort H . G. Wright toreport to
newstations. Three went toFort Adams andthreetoFort
Preble.
The 1Ith Coast Artillery transf erred twenty- sevenmen
tothe8thCoastArtillery, Fort Williams, andtwenty men
to the5th Coast Artillery, Fort H amilton.
The 11thCoast Artillery f urnished acadreof 184men
f or the 68th Coast Artillery (AA) being organized at
Fort Williams. The noncommissioned of f icers'club gave
a f arewell party f or those departing f rom Fort H . G.
Wright.
Master Sergeant Charles E. Zonnevylle retired at Fort
H . G. Wright inOctober. Master Sergeant Emil Myers
retiredinNovember, atthis station.
The f ollowing noncommissioned of f icershave recently
arrived at Fort H . G. Wright: Staf f Sergeants William
H . Lebert,NormanR.Yeo,AlanD. Goucher andH orace
B. Davis; and Sergeants J oseph Vinelli, Gustin J .
Schwager, andWalter G. Streeter.
The f ollowing members of the 11th Coast Artillery
were recently promoted to master sergeants: Technical
Sergeants Edward L.Ledoux and GordonL.H arrington.
Sergeant WilliamJ .BeggsandPrivatesFirst ClassStatson
FloydandLuther Pierce,werepromoted tostaf f sergeants.
InDecember a detachment (Battery E) of the 242d
Coast Artillery (H D) Connecticut National Guard, com-
manded by Major Raymond Watt, arrivedat Fort H . G.
Wright f or oneweek of intensivetraining with antiaircraf t
guns.
Later Battery D, 242d Coast Artillery (H D) Con-
necticut National Guard, commanded by CaptainDonald
G. Kimball, replaced Battery E. Battery D f ired atarget
practicewith the IO- - inchguns with excellent results.
Colonel RussellY. Moore, commanding the242d, was
present f or allf irings.
Fort H . G. Wright was recently visited by the f ollow-
ing of f icers f rom Corps Area H eadquarters: Colonel
Charles L. Scott, Colonel Frank K. Chapin, and Lieu-
tenant Colonel J ohnS. Rice, Major Marshall J . Noyes,
and CaptainH arry V. Ellis.
The mine planter Bai rd, commanded by Captain
Nathan A. McLamb, returned f romthe shipyard during
December.
The post f ootball seasonended with Battery D 11th
Coast Artillery the winner. The f inal standings were:
Battery IVan Lost Perc entage
D 3;h 1;h .75
0
C 3 2 .600
B 2;h 2~ .500
A 2 3 .400
E 2 3 .400
H q. 2 3 .400
The duckpinbowling tournament isnowinf ullswinj;
with seventeams entered. At the half - way point noteam
issureof itsultimate positioninthef inal standings.
The post small- bore rif le team is doing well inthe
Mohegan Rif le League. A special boat transports the
teamtoNew London, twiceaweek f or this competition.
The post basketball seasonwill be at its best af ter the
holidays.
H ARBOR DEFENSES OF NARRAGANSETT BAY
By Captai n Vi rgi l M.Ki mm
Recent departures f rom Fort Adams include the 2d
Battalion, 13th Inf antry, to Panama, Major Edward L.
Supple, to Organized Reserveduty, Duluth, and Colonel
J ereBaxter, to Salt LakeCity.
Colonel and Mrs. Baxter weretendered analoha party
prior to departure. J ust bef ore dinner allof f icersandtheir
f amiliesmet at thenew Of f icers'Club whereanappropri-
ateceremony washeld inconnectionwith the installation
of abronze plaque over the f ireplacewith aninscription
asf ollows: "Dedicated to Colonel and Mrs. J ereBaxter.
whose creative ef f orts made possible this Fort Adams
Of f icers'Club."
The recruit training center has giventhe post anen-
tirely new complexion. Fivebatteries arebeing recruited
and trained f or serviceinPanama. Cadres weref urnished
by the 7th, 9th, loth, and 52d Coast Artillery.
Appointments to staf f NCO grade as a result of the
neworganizationare: To bef irst sergeants: Staf f Sergeanr
Eugene K. Marx, Sergeants William R. Belyea,Thomas
P. H ogan, GeorgeF. McPhee, andLouisL. Rath. To Ix
staf f sergeants: Sergeants David L. Dockerty and Ra\'-
mond C. McCormick.
Plans areunder way tohave the newly f ormed organi-
zations f ireservicepractices inthe spring with Batteries
Greene, Edgerton, Wheaton, Varnum, and Dickenson.
Battery Edgerton has not f ired a service practice since
1915' Battery Varnum since 19I1and the others since
19
2
9'
Our oldest resident, Mr. Gilbert H . Burnham, the
Ordnance machinist, relates that the last servicepractice
of BatteryVarnum wasoneof hisearliestexperienceshere.
The batrery was f iredby the old 117th Company. Af ter
waiting allday, Battery Walbach, of which only thec~r-
riages remainto remind one of its f ormer glory, f iredItS
practice. Then just bef ore sundown, October 28, 19
1
\ .
Bartery Varnum opened up and scoredaperf ect pracrice
which gave the coveted E to the 117th. Present f or the
f iring was aPathc~News cameraman, and this was pr~
ably oneof theearliest ef f ortsat getting the Coast Aro!'
1940
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 87
lerYinto the movies. At the f irst round both camera and
cameramantoppled overbackwards. H owever, thecamera-
manrecoveredand secured af ewshots which werelater
showninNewport theaters.
Constructionat Forts Adams and Wetherill continues.
Thenewboathouse isnearly f inished. The dock and new
minestorehouseat Fort W~therill arewell under way. A
WPA project torestoreand repair the redoubt tower and
galleriesat Fort Adams has started. During the summer
theoldbarracksat Fort Wetherill wererepairedandmade
habitable.
A newunit to trainat Fort Adams is the 243d Coast
Artillery,RhodeIsland National Guard, Colonel Earl C.
Webstercommanding. BatteriesGreeneandEdgertonand
a155T.D. Battery havebeenmadeavailableto the 24,d
f or week- end training throughout the f all and winter
seasons.
H ARBOR DEFENSES OF NEW BEDFORD
By Captai n Charles N.Branham
All military, naval, and civil authorities inNew Bed-
f ordcooperated inthe parade and ceremonies here on
Armistice Day. CongressmanCharles L. Gif f ordwasthe
principal speaker onthe program which didhonor to the
f allensoldiersand sailorsinour last war.
The majority of thebuildings atFort Rodmanhavenow
beencompletely renovated and the new paint has im-
provedthe appearanceof thepost. Itishoped that it may
be possible to rehabilitate the remaining buildings, in-
cluding the mainbarracks, the guard house, and the f ire
station, bef ore the cessationof current WP A work here.
Of f icersof the616thCoast Artillery (RAI), Lieutenant
Colonel R. C. Allencommanding, hold monthly troop
schools at Fort Rodman. Use of available f irecontrol in-
struments isstressedatthesemeetings andtheopportunity
of these of f icersto coupletheoretical with practical train-
ing is proving very satisf actory to all concerned. These
schools will be continued at Fort Rodmaneach month
until J une, accordingto the present schedule.
Severalmembers of this garrisonhad houseguests dur-
ing the Christmas holiday period. The childrenof the
post attended the annual children's Christmas party at
Fort Adams.
Pue rt o R i co
BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUND L.DALEY, Commandi nj;
By Li eutenant Peter S. Pec a
The peaceand quiet of Puerto Rico has beenbroken
manytimesduring thelast twomonths. Numerous trans-
ports havearrived- loaded with men, guns ammunition
andsupplies. Trucks, tractors, guns, and menhave trav-
ersedthe entire island. Never bef ore inthe history of
PuertoRicohas suchactivity beenwitnessed.
Intheoverseasmovement to Puerto Rico,Coast Artil-
lerytroopsplayed the important role. The 1st Battalion,
6<J rh Coast Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel o.tto G. Pitz,
commanding,completed its concentrationono.ctober 7,
whenBatteryA (lessoneplatoon) ,B,andCarrivedf rom
Galveston.Battery D, with oneplatoon, Battery A, 6<jth
CoastArtillery attached, wasalreadyhere.First Battalion,
5
1st
Coast Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel G. L. Flanigen
commanding,arrived ono.ctober 20f romFort Montoe.
The password inthe Puerto RicanDepartment is in-
tensivef ieldservice.o.ur def initionof f ieldservicecanbe
f oundby reading the accounts that f ollow.
1STBATTALION, ~TH CoAST ARTILLERY (AA)
By Captai n J . E. Morti mer
OnOctober 2d, the 1stBattalion, ~th Coast Artillery
participatedinagrimscene.As westoodinthe interstices
betweentrucksonthedeck of theSt. Mi hi el inGalveston,
We sawtherestof theregiment (f our of f icersand 126men
including band), our f amilies and sweethearts onthepier
wehadjust lef t.At thepier ontheother sideof us, laytwo
Britishshipsbeingpainted dark gray asf ast asthepainters
couldwork. But the Americanf lagspainted onthe sides
of theSt. Mi hi ellooked likeamilliondollarsto us right
then. H owever, that scene was the only event worth
mentioning until weweremet at thedock inSanJ uanby
Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Bundy, Lieutenant Peter S.
Peca, and CaptainW. F. McKee, and his cohorts f rom.
Battery D, who told us, "You canset your bags right
thereand start loading trucks." We gradually worked our
way out toCamp Buchanan. Af ter getting ourselvescom-
f ortably f ixed, we thenhad the privilege of unloading
another transport f illed to the gunwales with the equip-
ment of the 51st Coast Artillery and 2d Battalion, 7th
Field Artillery.
With the arrival of the troops of the 51st and 7th, we
put our shirts back onand retired f rom the stevedoring
business. Sincethen, wehavebeenengaged inpracticing
someof thethings youreadabout inbooks,but seldomdo,
namely, reconnaissance, occupationand organizationof
positions invirginterritory. This island, oldasit is,isso
virginthat thereisnot evenacontour lineordatum point
to get inyour way.
Betweenroadmarches, wehave beengetting plenty of
drill, Spanish lessons, basketball, volley ball, swimming,
IST BATTALION, 5IST CoAST ARTILLERY
By Captai n George R. Burgess
Rounding EI Morro early onthe morning of October
20,the transport St. Mi hi el brought the5Ist Coast Artil-
lery its f irst glimpse of its new station. The advance de-
tachment of thebattalion, commanded by Lieutenant W.
G. Fritz, was onhand at the dock with transportation
and the battalion proceeded immediately to Camp Bu-
chananwherecamping f acilitieshadalreadybeenprepared.
The arrival of this battalion, together with the 7th Field
Artillery (now the 25th Field Artillery), completed the
bulk of the troopsstationed at Camp Buchanan, bringing
thetotal complement of of f icersandmentoalmost I,300.
Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Flanigenestablished his sepa-
rate headquarters and withina f ew days the troops had
settled downto a routine which embraces the intensive
f ieldtraining scheduleof this newdepartment.
The problem conf ronting the battalionhas beentwo-
f old: f irst, the training inthe useof its many new pieces
of equipment and materiel, and, second, the thorough
reconnaissanceof theIsland of Puerto Rico. Bothf ieldsof
activity have beencarried out simultaneously and with a
great deal of dispatch. The additional problem of accli-
matizing the personnel to tropical service has required
constant attention. While the two f iring batteries, Bat-
tery B,commanded by CaptainG. R. Burgess, and Bat-
tery A, commanded by CaptainR. H . Grinder, proceeded
with the training ontheir new guns and tractors, H ead-
quarters Battery, commanded by CaptainE. D. Peddi-
cord, undertook the training of f ield radio operators and
meteorological details, at the same time setting up the
battalionmotor pool and repair shop. The transitionof
the 5Ist f romanintegral unit of the H arbor Def enses of
Chesapeake Bay to a self - suf f icient, f ield- operating bat-
talionhas beena dif f icult, but highly interesting accom-
plishment.
Both f iring batteries are equipped with new I55- mm.
guns mounted onrollerbearing wheels andeguipped with
electricbrakes. Inplaceof thetraditional H olt tractor, so
f amiliar to all tractor drawnunits, the batteries arepow-
ered with new Caterpillar Diesel Tractors, Model D7.
Tests of this newequipment wereundertakenimmediate-
lyaroundthevicinity of thecampandtheoperationof the
new tractors proved to be f ar inexcessof expectations.
88 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL January-February
excursionstohistoricpoints, many opportunities toseethe Shortly af ter midnight, November 25, both batteries
beautif ul scenery, and last but not least, f ree movies in accompaniedby theCO, Colonel Flanigen, moved outof
our openair the~ter. At present thetheater consistsof the Camp Buchananf or a f our- hour march to the townof
sideof ahill, ascreenonpoles and ashanty housing the Bayamonand return. At the time this isbeing written.
projector. Sometimes it rains, but so f ar, it has always Battery A is undertaking the longest march sinceOUr
stopped. arrival. As atest of itsmobility, it ismoving at topspeed
With three weeks of maneuvers next month and an along the north shoreof the island inorder to determine
augmented target practice seasonto give the f inishing theminimum timeinwhich it canmovef romSanJ uanto
touch, this battalionwill not dip its colorsto any other. Punta Borinquen, thearmy airbasesomeninety- f ivemiles
When our tour is over, will we snow them under back away. Battery B isexpected to march up into"the moun-
home with "H ow we f ought the battle of Puerto Rico!" tainswithinaf ewdaystof urther test theequipment, this
timeunder moredif f icult roadconditions.
While thesetestswerebeing initiated, small reconnais_
sance parties were sent out daily to various parts of the
island. Detailed reports f rom each party have resulted
inanunusually completestudy of allroadsand thecoast-
lineof theisland.
Firing positionshavebeenlocatedinat least twoplaces
around the harbor of SanJ uan, and both batteries have
f ired sub- caliber at towed targets f rom the positionat
EscambronBeach. These f irings were the f irst ef f ortsbv
Coast Artillery troops to prepare f or their primary mis-
sion. Curiously enough thesewerethe f irst shots f iredar
water targets f romthe Island of Puerto Ricosincetheold
Spanish regime. Bothbatteries havealsocamped f or two-
week periods at Punta Salinas where artillery drill ha~
beencarried onsimultaneously with instructi~nintheir
newweapon- the caliber .50machinegun. H eadquarters
Battery has maintained two- way radio communication
with camp sites,towing vessel,andCamp Buchanan.
The organizationassignments areasf ollows:
69th Coast Arti llery-Commandi ng, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Otto G. Pitz; Executive, Major Eugene T . Conwa\";
Adjutant, CaptainJ ohnE.Mortimer; Battery C, Captain
Charles H . Crim; Batterv B,CaptainErnest A.Merkle:
Battery D, Captain William F. McKee; H q. Btry. &
Com. Trn., Lieutenant PrestonSteele; Battery A, lieu-
tenant EthanA. Chapman; Battery D, Lieutenant Rob-
ert Totten; H q. Btry. &Com. Ttn.,Lieutenant Wilf ord
E. H . Voehl; Battery A, Lieutenant H arrisonF. Turner:
Battery B,Lieutenant Kermit R. Schweidel; H q. Btry.&
Com. Trn., Lieutenant J osephusA. Bowman; BatteryB.
Lieutenant LionelB.DeVille; Battery D, Lieutenant Lee
M. Kirby; Battery C, Lieutenant J ohnP. Mial; Batten'
C, Lieutenant Richard F. Ludeman; Battery A, lieuten-
ant CalvinO. Smith.
51st Coast Arti llery-Commandi ng, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Barrington L. Flanigen; Executive, Major Mario
Cordero; Battery B, CaptainGeorge R. Burgess; Batten'
A, CaptainRichard H . Grinder; H q. Battery, Captain
Everett D. Peddicord; H q. Battery, Lieutenant Edgar Q.
Taylor; H q. Battery, Lieutenant William G. Fritz; Bat-
tery A, Lieutenant Maurice M. Simons; Battery B,lieu-
tenant William J . A. H ussey; Battery B, Lieutenant
Oliver K. Marshall, J r.; Battery A, Lieutenant Charles
W. Reeves; H q. Battery, Lieutenant J ohnR. Snow.
iI~lllI111ll!!IIIII!11111111ll1111!111111!11111111111ll1111111111ll1111ll~1II111111mlllll!11111111111111111ll11111111111!11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111/11111111111111111111111111111/111//111111111/111/11/111/1111111111/11/111111111111II1II1/111111/1//llllm1ll1/11111II1II111111
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~f .- \STERSERGEANTWILLIAl\1H . BROWNis the draf tsman
whose maps you have been admiring inthe J OURNAL
these past three years. A native of Petersburg, Virginia,
he enlisted in1925 at Fort Nf onroe as a private, Coast
Artillery Corps. Af ter graduation f rom the Coast Artil-
lery School master gunners' course in 1927 he was ap-
pointed staf f sergeant and reached his present grade in
1939. H e has drawn the maps and diagrams f or many
military books and f or various service magazines. Ser-
geant Brown is onduty inthe of f ice of the Chief of
Coast Artillerv.
/
l' f f
~\'L"'J ORJ .H ALPINCONNOLLYwill be recalled as the author
of "War ina Mechanistic Civilization" in the J uly-
August, 1939, number of the J OURNAL.
f f f
DOCTORH . A. DEWEERD,prof essor of history at Denison
University, is also editor of our learned contemporary
the Journal of the American Military Institute.
f f f
CAPTAINFAIRFAXDOWNEYisawriter living inNew York.
BorninUtah, he was educated at Yale (A.B. 1916).
Af ter service as a sergeant with the Yale Batteries he
was commissioned asecond lieutenant of Field Artillery
and served with the 12th Field Artillery (2d Division)
during the \Vorld War. When he resi~ned he held the
grade of captain, 31st Field Artillery. Captain Downey
is the author of a number of books, and his work has
alsoappeared inmany magazines. At various times he
wasamember of the staf f onthe Kansas City Star, New
York Tri bune and Herald Tri bune and the New York
Sun.
\VARRANTOFFICERB.C. ELDERS, Army Mine Planter Serv-
ice,was borninMissouri. Af ter wartime service inthe
SATC he enlisted inthe Coast Artillery Corps in1920.
H e is a graduate of the Electrical Course, the Coast
Artillery Enlisted Specialists School. H e won his ap-
pointment as warrant of f icer of the Army Mine Planter
Service in1933, Mr. Elders islicensed a~chief engineer
of steam vessels by the Bureau of Steamboat Inspection.
H e isstationed at Fort Monroe.
f f f
CAPTAINJ . F. GAl\IBER,Coast Artillery Corps, hails f rom
Ohio. Enlisting inthe Inf antry, Re~ular Army in1919,
he wona cadetship at the U. S. Military Academy in
19
2
1 . Graduating with the Class of '25 he was appoint-
edinthe Coast Artillery Corps. Captain Gamber holds
the degree of BS inME f rom 1vf assachusetts Institute of
Technology (193 I). H e isagraduate of the Ordnance
School (193I) and the Coast Artillery School Regular
Course (1937). H e isonduty with the 4th Coast Artil-
lery inthe Canal Zone.
f f f
H . CH ARLESJ \ICBARRON, J R., is the artist who illustrated
"Old Rough and Ready." A native of Chicago, he at-
tended the local schools and ROTC and later studied at
the Chicago Art Institute. H e has beenchief ly engaged
incommercial illustration and his work has appeared
inmagazines of national circulation. For hobby, he col-
lects old American military unif orms and equipment.
H e painted aseries of Revolutionary Nf arine Corps uni-
f orms f or 1vf arine Corps H eadquarters and designed the
unif orm now wornby the Chicago Black H orse Troop.
Nf r. Nf cBarron makes his home inChicago.
f f l'
BRIGADIERGENERALH ENRY J . REILLY,ORC, was born at
Fort Barrancas, Florida. H e is the sonof Captain H . J .
Reilly who died inaction in1900 at the ~ates of Pekin
while commandin~ the f amous Reilly's Battery. Gen-
eral Reilly was graduated f rom the U.S. Military Acad-
emy as a second lieutenant of cavalry in19<>4,H e re-
signed in1914 to devote his time to newspaper work,
becomin~ the war correspondent f or the Chicago Tri -
bune inMexico and inEurope. Upon our entry into
the World War he rejoined the service as a captain,
rising shortly to the grade of colonel, Field Artillery.
H e commanded the 149th Field Artillery and 8"1dIn-
f antry Brigade of the 42d (Rainbow) Division. For his
World War service he holds the Disting- uished Service
Medal, the French Croix de Guerre, and the Legion of
H onor. Later, as war correspondent he covered the
Polish- Soviet war of 1920- 1921, the Manchurian cam-
paign of 192), and the recent Spanish Civil War. H e
has written f or various magazines and newspapers and
isthe author of several books. General Reilly makes his
home inNew York City.
f f f
LIEUTENANTJ . H . TWYl'- IAN,J R., Coast Artillery Corps, is
a native of Virginia. Graduating f rom the U. S. Mili-
tary Academy with the Class of 1930, he was appointed
a second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps. H e is a
graduate of the Coast Artillery School Regular Course
(1937)' Lieutenant Twyman is onduty with the 3
d
Coast Artillery, Fort MacArthur.
l' f l'
W. A. WINDASis a writer- artist who makes his home in
Calif ornia.
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-
Co a st a' tti lleJL~ O't~e'ts
1II1111l1l1l1ll1ll1l1ll1ll1l1ll1ll1ll1ll1ll1ll11ll1ll1111111ll1111ll1111111ll1111ll1111ll111111ll11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111II111II1II1II1II1II11II1II1II1Ii~
(C overing the P eriod N ovember 1 to December31, 1939)
Colonel \V. K. Dunn, to General Staf f
Corps. Philippines Dept.. revoked.
Colonel E. L. Kelly, retired, J an. 31,upon
his own application.
Colonel R. M. ~[itchell, f rom U. S. Army
transport Republi c Brooklyn, to Athens
H igh School, Athens, Georgia.
Colonel J . T. H . O'Rear, to the Philip-
pines. sailing San Francisco, J anuary 20.
Colonel J . P. Smith, detailed General
Staf f Corps, assigned Chief of Staf f , 4th
Corps Area. Atlanta.
Lieutenant Colonel H . C. A\1enpromoted
Colonel, 11:ovember 1.
Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Babcock
promoted Colonel November 1.
Lieutenant Colonel C. A. \V. Dawson to
13th. Ft. Crockett. Previous orders amended.
Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Dennis promoted
Colonel November 1.
Lieutenant Colonel F. M. Green pro-
moted Colonel October 1.
Lieutenant Colonel M. 11. Kimmel, J r.,
to Panama C.A. Detachment, Ft. \Vads-
worth.
Lieutenant Colonel D. S. Lenzner pro-
moted Colonel October I.
Lieutenant Colonel A. V. Rinearson, to
13th, Ft. Barrancas.
Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Scof ield. to Pan-
ama, sailing New York, February 21.
Lieutenant Colonel E. C. Seaman, to Org.
Res., Providence, R. I.
Lieutenant Colonel O. L. Spiller pro-
moted Colonel November 1.
Lieutenant Colonel R. \V. Wilson pro-
moted Colonel October 1.
~[ajor E. L. Barr. to the Philippines, sail-
ing New York, December 18, revoked.
~[ajor L. J . Bowler, to the Philippines.
sailing SanFrancisco, J anuary 20.
~[ajor G. \V. Brent, to Panama C.A. de-
tachment, Ft. Adams.
~[ajor H . D. Cassard, to 68th, Ft. Wil-
liams. revoked.
~[ajor A. K. Chambers. to the PhiliD-
pines. sailing San Francisco. J anuary 20.
Major B. C. Dailey, to Org. Res. Fif th
Corps Area.
~[ajor F. G. Epling. to Third Corps Area,
Baltimore, to General Staf f with troops.
~[ajor D. B. Greenwood, to 68th, Ft.
Williams, Me.
~[ajor A. L. H aggart, to 13th. Ft. Bar-
rancas.
~[ajor T. E. J ef f ords, to 7th, Ft. H ancock.
~[ajor E. C. J ones, to 65th, Ft. Winf ield
Scott.
~[ajor E. W. King, to Panama C.A. de-
tachment, Ft. H amilton.
~Iajor G. ~L O'Conne\1, to 63d. Ft. ~[ac-
Arthur. Previous orders amended.
~f ajor C. R. Roberts. to Org. Res. 5th
Corps Area, Cincinnati. Previous orders
re\'oked.
~[ajor H . W. Ulmo, to 10th, Ft. Rodman.
Captain J . G. Bain, to 69th, Ft. Crockett.
revoked.
Captain O. DeF. Bowman promoted
~[ajor. September 1.
Captain G. F. H eaney. J r., to 63d. Ft.
~[acArthur.
CaptainF. R. Keeler, to First Corps Area.
Boston.
Captain J .R. Love\1, to assistant military
attache to Germanv.
Captain H . H . ~hrah, to 69th, Ft. Crock-
ett.
CaptainJ .H . Pitzer, to 69th, Ft. Crockett.
Captain H . \V. Smith promoted Major
September 1.
Captain W. If. Vestal, to 7th, Ft. H an-
cock.
Captain S. E. \Villard promoted Major
November 5.
First Lieutenant \V. S. Blair, to 52d, Ft.
H ancock.
First Lieutenant A. S. Buynoski, to 62d,
Ft. Totten.
First Lieutenant J . C. East. to H awaii.
sailing SanFrancisco, November 25. Previ-
ous orders amended.
First Lieutenant G. H . H olterman. to
61st. Ft. Sheridan.
First Lieutenant W. H . Kinard, J r., to
65th. Ft. Winf ield Scott.
First Lieutenant R. H . Mattern, to 2d.
Ft. ~[onroe.
First Lieutenant H . P. Persons, J r.. to 2d.
Ft. Monroe.
First Lieutenant G. R. Wilkins, to 65th.
Ft. Winf ield Scott.
First Lieutenant P. H . \Vollaston. to
70th, Ft. ~[onroe.
Second Lieutenant Allen Bennett. CA-
Res. appointed 2d Lt. CAC, to 70th, Ft.
~[onroe.
Second Lieutenant D. R. Boss, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant F. X. Bradlev, CA-
Res. appointed 2d Lt. CACto Pana,j;a C.A.
Detachment, Ft. H ancock.
Second Lieutenant B. R. Brown, to the
Philippines, sailing San Francisco, April
16. Previous orders amended.
Second Lieutenant \V. D. Chadwick, J r.,
to 69th, Ft. Crockett.
Second Lieutenant ~L H . Clark, to 14th,
Ft. \Vorden.
Second Lieutenant W. C. DeBill, to 6th,
Ft. Winf ield Scott.
Second Lieutenant T. W. Davis, 3d. to
62d, Ft. Totten.
Second Lieutenant A. L. Evans, Jr .. 1 0
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant S. C. Farris, to tht
Philippines, sailing New York, April 2.
Second Lieutenant \V. J . Fling, to
Panama. C.A. detachment, Ft. DuPont.
Second Lieutenant F. H . Foerster, J r..
to Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant J . D. Garcia, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant R. E. Greer, to Ran.
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant C. J . H ackett. to
Panama C.A. detachment. Ft. Preble.
Second Lieutenant L. A. H all, to 68th.
Ft. Williams.
Second Lieutenant J . E. H art, CA- Res.
appointed 2d 1.1. CAC to 70th. Ft. ~[onr()('.
Second Lieutenant L. \V. H endricks. to
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant S. F. H udgins, to
11th. Ft. H . G. Wright.
Second Lieutenant J . T. Kingsley, J r.,to
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant A. J . Kinney, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant P. H . Lehr. to the
Philippines, sailing New York, April 2.
Second Lieutenant Carl Lentz, If, to
H awaii, sailing 1I:ewYork, February 20.
Second Lieutenant C. ]. Long, 3d. to
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant J . L. ~[cBride, to
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant N. J . McGowan. to
Randolph Field.
Second Lieutenant E. O. Meals, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant R. B. ~[iIIer, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant J . G. Nelson, to i th
Ft. DuPont.
Second Lieutenant D. K. Nickerson, to
61st, Ft. Sheridan.
Second Lieutenant J . G. Pickard, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant \V. T. Smith, to Ran.
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant J . T. \Valker, to 11th,
Ft. H . G. Wright.
Second Lieutenant C. E. White, to the
Philippines, sailing San Francisco, J anuar}'
20.
Second Lieutenant D. K. \Vhite, to Ran.
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant]. \V. Williams, CA-
Res. appointed 2d Lt. CAC to 13th. Ft.
Barrancas.
Second Lieutenant T. P. Wright, to Ran-
dolph Field.
Second Lieutenant P. D. Wynne, Jr., to
Randolph Field.
- -
\
M r. Villard's M ilitary C haos
OUR MILITARY CH AOS: The Truth About De-
f ense. By Oswald Garrison Villard. New York: Alf red
A. Knopf , 1939. 202 pages; $1.75.
The title of this book, like most book titles, is of
courseanexaggeration. More to the point, so is the sub-
title. The prominence of the author, and the near- rever-
encewith which his pronouncements are regarded by not
uninH uential parts of the community, suggest that it may
be worthwhile to point out the obvious f actual inaccura-
ciescontained inthe book, and to consider, if perhaps
only brieH y, the emotional animus which pervades the
entirevolume.
~vf r. Villard's thesis, succinctly stated, is that the
United States is impregnable, and that a warlike attack
onus by a major power would be impossible. H e insists
that our military policy is planless and chaotic, primarily
becauseour f oreign policy has not determined whether
Weareto "def end" America or to wage anof f ensive war
abroad. Our military organization is def ective, our mili-
tary expenditures wastef ul. A Council of National De-
f ens~should be established to coordinate the f ighting
5et\'lces.The war ref erendum measures should be passed.
A~darepresentative committee- not, however, to be ap-
pointed by the President, whose bias in f avor of large
arm.amentsdisqualif ies him f or the task of making the se-
lection- should make a national inquiry into the wisdom
of pre.SCnt- daymilitary expenditures and into the unclari-
f iedalms which have brought them about.
The major premise inthe above isthat war isimpossible,
andthat our f oreio"l1policy should be "clarif ied" so as to
. b /
Insureour always withdrawing inthe f ace of aggression.
lVll S
It would be comf orting could one believe inthe impossi-
bility of war, but the year just past has demonstrated very
dramatically the need f or circumspection inchalking up
international Q. E. D.'s. The H itler- Stalin pact was con-
sidered impossible by most of the inf ormed statesmen of
the world, and Russia's invasion of Finland was surely
regarded as impossible by the many persons who, symp~-
thetic to Mr. Villard's essential point of view, f elt that the
Soviet was the single disinterested f orce inEuropean af -
f airs.
"Our Planless Def ense," Mr. Villard's f irst chapter,
is essentially anattack onpresent- day f oreign policy: the
services cannot plansensibly f or war because they have not
been told whom we are going to f ight. Running a f oot-
ball team issomuch simpler, of course, because aschedule
of opponents has been caref ully arranged, and the tra-
ditional rival f or whom the team must point is known in
advance. If f oreign policy could likewise be f ormulated
ina vacuum, without regard to what other nations will
or might do, consistency of object and tactics would be
much easier of attainment. But the hard actuality of events
does not permit of absolutes, and policies abroad, just like
policies at home, necessarily represent the adjustments of
expediency. A f oreign policy cannot be constructed along
the lines of a rigidly logical system, least of all in the
troublous times of today. Theref ore the only possible
military policy isone that will serve to meet all contingen-
cies- and Nf r. Villard has obvious distastes f or the graver
ones.
Apart f rom this, however, Nf r. Villard is troubled by
the notion that, evenina def ensive war, of f ensive action
may be necessary. (It is amazing how dif f icult it is to
drive this idea home to many of the most intelligent
citizens; the eager acceptance of the alleged distinction
between "of f ensive" and "def ensive" weapons is a symp-
tomof the same dif f iculty.) This desire f or of f ensive action
Nfr. Villard attributes to "the prof essional military of f icer"
who "wants to extend the operations of awar to the enemy
territory so that it may suf f er and not the home country."
One would have supposed that this particular desire was
shared by the civilians of the home country, but then, as
is pointed out later, they may have been inf luenced by
militaristic propaganda and the Army- Navy "social
lobby."
Much of the f oregoing, of course, is not susceptible of
mathematical proof . But the conclusions drawn by Mr.
Villard rest inso many instances upon demonstrable in-
accuracies that anunbiased reader would be justif ied, by
that token alone, inf irst suspecting them, and then re-
jecting them altogether.
T
ES S A Y
Fi rst Pri ze $200.00
Honorable Menti 011 Pri zes .. 100.00
C O M P ET I T I O N
a. PERlIIISSIBLECOMPETITORS:
Any member of the Coast Artillery Associa-
ation at date of submission of essay.
"There are various reasons f or this huge number
[of Reserve of f icers] ,the need of of f icers f or the Army ,
of millions we are to raise being again the chief one;
but it must be pointed out that a large majority of
these of f icers have nothing to do with combat troops.
They are part and parcel of the War Department's
plans f or taking over the industrial machinery of the
United States so as to ensure the production of the
700,000 articles which the Army will need if war
comes again. These particular Reserve of f icers are
executives of large industrial plants; onthe outbreak
of war they will be called to active duty and assigned
to take charge of the f actories or mines or whatever
enterprise it is inwhich they are now engaged."
If Mr. Villard had taken the precaution to look at the
Secretary of War's Annual Report, hewould have learned
that, f ar f rom there being a large majority of reserve of -
f icers who "have nothing to do with combat troops," some
two- thirds of all the active Reserve Of f icers belong to the
combatant arms, and this does not include the many
Medical, Quartermaster, and Chemical Warf are of f icers
who are attached to or closely associated with combat
units.
The rest of the statement is a canard, pure and simple.
The Industrial Mobilization Plan does not contemplate
militarizing industrial plants, nor is there any body of
Reserve of f icers assigned to operate their own f actories ~r
mines inunif orm onM- day. Mr. Villard owes it to hiS
public, if not to himself , to avoid repeating astatement en-
tirelv devoid of f actual basis.
wf r. Villard says (p. 130) that high- ranking Army of -
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL Janllary-February
For instance, 11r. Villard bases his contention that tht
currently authorized American air f orces are excessivel,.
large upon the reports of the }..t[orrow Board, the Baker
Board, and the H owell Commissions- dated, respectivel\',
19
2
5, 1934, and J anuary, 1935. To suggest, inview ~f ,
what everyone knows of the development of aviationand
of aggressor air f orces since then, that these reports are
valid arguments against the recent authorizations, is,it is
submitted, either downright silly or else intellectually dis-
honest. And to state (pp. 7I - 72) that there has beenno
marked increase inthe f lying range of bombing planes
since 1923 is to make anerror so egregious that, at the
most charitable, one dismisses it as anoversight inthe
course of hasty composition, ona par with the mentionof
627 Congressmen and Senators (p. 182), which COUnts
inthe Senators twice.
But this is not all. Mr. Villard says (p. 115): "It isa ~
startling f act, however, that only once inour entire na-
tional history have we decreased the def ense f orces in
peace- time." Startling, indeed, if it were a f act; but e"e!)
a dim recollection of history recalls Army reductions in
1821, inI~, and in1920- 22. This is exclusive of what
might be called post- war peace- time reductions, in17&t.
1802, 1815, 1842, 1866, and 1919- 20, to say nothing of
the 1922scuttlings of our ships.
Mr. Villard states (pp. 9~9) :
1 940
c . PRIZES:
(1 ) Number:
(a) One First Prize- $200.00. Not to be
awarded if no essay submitted is outstanding.
(b) Not to exceed two H onorable Men-
tionPrizes- $100.00 each.
(2) Awarded by Chief of Coast Artillery upon
recommendation of Board of Of f icers appointed
by him. Membership of Committee to be pub-
lished only af ter awards f or the year have been
made.
(3) Ti me li mi t.
No essay received af ter September 30th,
1940, will be awarded a prize.
(4) Payments.
Payments of prizes will be made immedi-
ately af ter awards are made. All essays sub-
mitted become the property of the COASTARTIL-
LERYJ OURNAL.Any person receiving a prize f or
anessay will receive no other compensation. If
any essay is published the author of which re-
ceived no prize, such author will be paid at the
usual rates.
d. H ow SUBMITTED:
Essays will be submitted to the Editor of the
COASTARTILLERYJ OURNAL in a sealed envelope
bearing the notation "Prize Essay Contest." The
copy submitted will contain nothing to indicate its
authorship, will be signed by a "nom de plume,"
and will be accompanied by a separate sealed
envelope containing the nom de plume and also
the name of the writer. This latter envelope will
be delivered to the Chief of Coast Artillery when
received and will be opened inthe presence of the
Editor of the COASTARTILLERYJ OURNALaf ter the
relative merits of the essays have beendetermined.
e. FORlII:
(1 ) Essays should be limited to approxi-
mately 8,000 words, but shorter articles will re-
ceive consideration.
(2) Three typewritten copies of each essay
will besubmitted onletter size paper (one original,
two carbons) with double- spaced lines. At least one
of any illustration will be a drawing, tracing, or
photograph, not a blue print or brown print.
b. SUBJ ECT:
To be selected by the author. Appropriate-
ness of subject f or Coast Artillery readers is a
point to be considered inawarding prize.
92
1940
BOOK REVIEW'S
93
A R T I L L ER Y
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COAST ARTILLERY
J OURNAL
Order From
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f icers"have a f reedom of utterance not granted to similar
o/licials in other countries except under governmental
directionand with its approval." It is obvious that he is
unacquainted with the contents of Army Regulations.
~f r. Villard- but why go f unher? One does not ha\'e to
eatthe whole of anegg to know that it isbad.
H aving demonstrated to his owncomplete satisf action
chat our military expenditures are too large, and thor-
oughly unnecessary, Mr. Villard proposes a national in-
quiry into those expenditures. The risk of having a com-
mittee appointed by President Roosevelt is, he f eels, a
greater danger thanto have aprivately appointed commit-
teewithout the power of subpoena witnesses. As a matter
of f act, witnesses will not be necessary, f or 1vf r.Villard has
not only supplied his proposed committee with the ques-
tionwhich he wishes them to answer, he has generously
f urnished them with the :lOswer as well. H ere ishis neatly
loadedquery (p. 198):
"What will it avail us to arm to the utmost limit,
to subordinate our national and industrial lif e to
preparations f or war, if thereby we loseour democratic
soul- that soul we are supposed to preserve by pour-
ing out armament expenditures without end?"
Mr. Villard, of course, eagerly echoes the f amiliar re-
f rainthat war will mean the end of our democracy. That
modernwar will involve some pretty thoroughgoing con-
trolsisobvious, but that the peace will not seethe abandon-
ment of those controls is astatement which neither he nor
any of his f ellow- singers of the same song have ever
proved or even undertaken to prove. Indeed, both the
post- Civil War and post- v.,r arid War experiences are
proof that our democracy has survived and will again.
But the contrary is, intheir minds and inMr. Villard's,
unnecessary to prove; it has become anarticle of f aith, to
be accepted without questioning.
And that suggests that perhaps it has been unf air to
treat this volume as though it were a scientif ic treatise.
The f airer course would be to consider it as a tract inMr.
Villard's anti- military crusade, which he has been preach-
ing, with f ervor verging upon hysteria, f or at least a
quarter of acentury. (See e.g., Proceedings, Academy of
Political Science, J uly, 1916, p. 50')
Inthe present work will be f ound all the manif estations
o.f intense emotional bias- the tone of sustained indigna-
tion, the conjuring up of imaginary horribles, and the
magnif ication of triRes. Thus, Mr. Villard f iguratively
splutters with passion at the 1916 f ederalization of the
National Guard, "inviolation of historic tradition and per-
hapsof states' rights" (p. 100); at the attention givenby
the press to the military services- "Even a small- boy
cadet corps may come inf or much publicity if the sonof
theowner isa member" (p. 1 5I ); at Admiral Leahy's al-
!~gedposition as a de fac to Secretary of the Navy, called
a curious and rather ominous development" (p. 163)'
Nor is there any deanh of the ad homi nem attack so
characteristic of crusading editors. (ReRections on the
President may perhaps be discounted; all Presidents have
TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL
94
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111517thStreet,N.\X'. \X'ashington,D. C.
January-February l
been f air game f or choleric critics of every persuasion.)
General Arnold's veracity is questioned (pp. 6S- 66). The
circumstance that no disciplinary proceedings were insti-
tuted against General ?vloseley is the subject of adverse
comment (p. 137), though one may be permitted to
speculate whether court- martial, dismissal, and martyrdom I
would as ef f ectually have silenced that irate warrior. And
a distinguished f ield of f icer on the active list, now the
editor of aservice journal, is accused of writing H poisonous
Nazi stuf f " (p. 136) because he had occasion to publish
his f indings onthe psychology of military leadership.
If 'Nlr. Villard were more interested in f acts than in
f ascist f ootprints under the bed, he would not compare
adversely the large number of our Reserve of f icers with the
much smaller number of of f icers inthe pre- war German
army (p. 9S)' The f act is that the German of f icer corps
opposed any increase in its numbers, when Germany's
military program required such anincrease, f or f ear that
the purity of its Prussian J unkerdom might be diluted by
the admixture of bourgeois strains. Unbiased observers
might suggest that alarge body of Reserve of f icers, drawn
f rom all walks of lif e, and entering into the Regular Armv
through the Thomason Act and similar legislation, would
militate against the ascendancy of a particular caste, and
insure the essentially citizen character of the military
f orces. But Mr. Villard views the O. R. C.dif f erently, and
sees Reserve of f icers as potential spies, inindustrial centers,
uponthe working class (p. ISO).
As anobjective text, Mr. Villard's book hardly merits
extended consideration. As the product of a highly
emotional state of mind, however, it deserves the closest
kind of study. Indeed, there is need f or psychological re-
search into the complexes and neuroses of political lif eand
public af f airs. There have been papers galore onthe in-
f eriority complex, onthe mother- f ixation, on the many
curious attitudes and points of view recorded and classif ied
by Kraf f t- Ebing and H avelock Ellis. Is it not time to de-
vote some attention to the various kinds of tarif f enthusi-
asts, to the single- taxer, to the bureaucrat, or- save the
mark- to the congenital pacif ist?
For the work under review is the product of emotion,
not of reason. 1vlr. Villard clings tohis f irst love, pacif ism,
let the logic of events be what it may. Theref ore he dedi-
~tes the volume "to the American business men"- we
may disregard them; they are no f riends of his- H and to
the liberals who will not see." That is to say, to those
liberals who, in a world where only the strong are re-
spected, which has seen the submergence of Ethiopia,
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Poland- must we
now add Finland, too?- have abandoned the easy shib-
boleth of non- resistance and the peace that is no peace.
If they will not see through Mr. Villard's eyes, it is
because their instinct is sounder and their vision clearer.
FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER,
Captai n, lAG-Reserve.
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1940 BOOK REVIE\VS 95
ECONO~f IC PROBLEJ 'vf S OF TH E NEXT WAR. ~~~
B,'P:lUlEinzig. New York: TIle ~/f :tcmillan Company,
1939, 14
6
Pages; $2.50' ~
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENSE. By H arold M A G A Z I N ES U
~f acmillan, :M.P. New York: The ~vf acmillan Com- U
pan)', 1939. 67 Pages; $'50'
These books were written by Englishmen to persuade
their countrymen and their Government to prepare the
Empire's economic resources f or the war that has now ar-
rived.Printed words thus mnto obsolescence more rapidly
thanapublisher might desire.
H owever, there isacertain interest inarguments which
rum out to be post fac to. Dr. Einzig, inhis conclusion,
lisrstwenty- nine reasons f or anEnglish victory. They ap-
pear to be based onsix general premises: (I) a long war;
(2) British ability to isolate Germany economically; (3)
German lack of gold reserves and f oreign credits; (4)
British superiority in all mattcrs relating to cash and
credits, and the ability to use them inthe right places;
(5) agreater potcntial productive capacity among Britain
and her allies; and (6) economic aid, at least, f rom the
United Srates.
ReasonNo. 1 9, which says that Britain will win "be-
causeamong the potential allies of Great Britain, Soviet
Russiapossesses immense economic resources and is more
thanself - suf f icient," now looks very sick and makes somc
of the other reasons look alittle peaked too. Einzig could
seethe possibility of a Russo- Gcrman pact but he could
not seeBritish statesmcnship so "utterly short- sighted" as
toallowsuch asituation todevelop. J ust how much short-
sightcdness was involved- and when it came into play-
nowremains to be seen.
Einzig is a money cconomist, and though he surveys
brieRy the prospcctive internal control of war- time
consumption and production, his best work is inthe f ield
of budgetary control, f oreign trade and exchange, and
monetary control. Me. Macmillan, a member of Com-
mons, is primarily concerned with the political aspects of
economic def ense and with war objectives. H is brief tract
discussesproblems connected with the attempt to accom-
modatc democratic means to the social end of war, ancnd
which iscollectivistic- if not totalitarian- in its economic
characteristics. Both books are suggestive and persuasive,
rather than detailed .
. Einzig's discussions of the problem of inRation result-
II1gf romwar f inancing are worth noting. The Nazi cco-
~o~ic and f inancial system, he says, while it has worked
satisf actorily" intime of peacc, is not likely to stand the
sh~ks of a long war, especially inview of aninRation-
mll1dedpublic. Economists have been f ond of predicting
thedownf all of Nazi f inancial schemes, perhaps without
recognizing the revolutionary aspects of the regime. The
questionof f oreign credits, particularly the length Ger-
many will go toreceive economic aid f rom Russia, seems to
pco':ide the more crucial problem f or Germany to solve.
WhIch revolution will swallow which? W. C. G.
96 TH E COAST ARTILLERY J OURNAL lallllarY-FebmaJ
S!~~ fa TH E WAR GASES. By Dr. ~f ario Sartori. Transbt~~ 1
by L. \V. ~'f arrison. New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, 1939.360 Pages; Index; $7.50'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Price $2.50, Postpaid
T H I R D EDI T I O N , NE\XT
n
~- - - - - - 'rJ
H OW STRONG IS BRITAIN? By C.E. Count Puck-
ler. New York: Veritas Press, 1939.239 Pages; $2.5
0
.
This is essentially an economic estimate of British
strength by one of Germany's leading journalists who has
long beenrecognized both at home and inEngbnd as an
J uthority onjust this subject. Its f airness is best attested
by the glowing reviews it has received in the leading
British papers and this inspite of the f J ct thJ t it glosses
none of the weaknesses of the British Empire. Personally
we got J better and clearer picture of just what England ~s
up J gainst f rom H err Puckler than f rom any other est!-
mJ te that has come our way. Theref ore this book naturally
wins our hearty and unqualif ied endorsement.
The tide of the originalltalian edition is Ci Ji mi c a drll
r
Sostanze Aggressi ve. This tide should have been trans-
lated 'The Chemistry of \Var Gases" since this isdescrip-
tive of the contents of this truly chemistry textbook. Itis
the f irst book to be written onchemical warf are f romthe
purely chemical viewpoint and, as such, it should be in
the library of every student of military chemistry.
Part I of the book, covering only thirty- two pages,
deals with the physical chemical requirements of war
gases ingeneral, viz, the physiopathological properties-
lower limit of irritation, the limit of ul1Supportability, the
mortality product; the physical properties- vapor tension,
volatility, boiling point, melting point; and the chemical
properties- stability to atmospheric and chemical :1gen-
cies, stability onstorage, stability to explosion, and :1bsence
of artack onmetals. It also contains aninteresting chapter
onthe relation between chemical structure and aggressive
action and a chapter onthe several classif ications of war
gases.
The remainder of the book is devoted to a systell1:1tic
description of the several war gases. This covers histDlY,
methods of prepJ rJ tion, physicJ I J nd chemicJ I properties,
methods of detection J nd :1nJ lysis. In keeping with the
strictly chemicJ I treJ tment of the subject this sectioncon-
tJ ins no description of the physiologicJ I J ction of the
several WJ r gJ ses and rebted toxic gJ ses which are cov-
ered.
The book is notJ ble f or the thoroughness of the liter:1-
ture study which went into its preparJ tion and f or the
scientif ic :1nd technicJ I ability of its J uthor, who is the
chemist of the Itali:1nChemical Warf are Service. The
author index covers f ive pJ ges.
The trJ nsbtion iswell and accurately done. Itis:1wel-
come :1dditionto the comparJ tively f ew books onchemid
wJ rf are published inthe English bnguJ ge. Incidentally, so
br J S known by this reviewer, this is the only published
tr:1nsbtion into English of J ny book onchemical w:1rf are
published ina f oreign bnguJ ge. A. L. K.
Lif e Insurance Analysis
Provisions In Anticipation
of Death
The Army of the United
States
The National Guard
The Organized Reserves
The Reserve Of f icers' Train-
Ing Corps
The Organization Staf f and
Its Functions
A Background f or Peace
and War
Discipline and Leadership
by Gen. G. V. H . Moseley
Manall:ement of the Ameri-
can Soldier by Gen. D. C.
Shanks
Army Posts and DOL As-
signments In Each State
and Territory
Tactical Def initions and
Special Map Symbols
Index
The Army As A Career. by
Gen. J .G. H arbord. ChaIr-
man of the Board, the
R. C. A.
First Station
Orientation
Unif orms and Equipment
Assumption of Command
Exerclse of Command
Mess Management
Supply
Military Courtesy
Customs of the Service
Pay and Allowances
Leaves of Absences. Promo-
tion. Retirement
Ef f iciency Reports
Foreign Sen'lce
Army Educational System
Prlvlleges. Rights and Re-
strictions of Of f icers
Participation In Post Ac-
tivities
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This editionis not just arevision. Most of the sub-
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Inaddition to the NEW! DRILL REGULATIONS, this manual contains markmanship f or
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General
Rif leSquad
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Company
\X1eapons, Squads, Sections and Platoons
SIGNALS
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Arm- and- H and Signals f or Motor Vehicles
APPEi\TOIX
Ceremonial Parades
CONTENTS:
Drill f or Vehicles inSingle Column or Line
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Company Drill
FORMATIONS OF TH E BATT ALlON AND
REGIMENT
General
The Battalion
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CEREMONIES
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Escorts
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Inspections
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C O A S T A R T I L L ER Y JO U R N A L . W A S H I N G T O N , D. C .
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1'1
A M ER I C A N
C A M P A I G N S
By M A T T H EW FO R N EY S T EEL E
This standard work onAmerican Cam-
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The two volumes (Volume I- text;
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O::>NTENTS OF VOLUME I: 1
Colonial \\'ars Stones River Campaign ~
Revolutionary \"ar- Northern Campaigns Battle oi Chancellors ville 1
Re\'olutionary \"ar- Southern Campaigns Campai~n of Gettysburg- Fir,;t Day ~
\\'ar of 1812 Campaign of Gettysburg- Secoll(l and Thinl Day,;
~Iexican \"ar- Taylor's Campaigr Vicksburg Campaign
~lexican \\'ar- Scott's Camllaign Chickamauga Campaign
First Battle oi Bull Run Battles Around Chattanooga
Forb H enn' and Donelson Battle oi the \\'ilderne,;,; , .,It
Shiloh Canipaign Battle oi Spottsdvania Court IIot:: e .
Peninsular Campaign Siege of Petersburg
I
J ackson',; Valley Campaign Campaign of Atlanta
Second Battle of Bull Run Campaign oi Franklill and :\a~hvi1le [
:\ntietam Campaign Spanish- American \"ar l
Frederick,;burg Campaign Index '{
n CONTENTS OF VOLUME II: 311maps to illustrate the battles described 10 Volume I. J
B Formerly $1 0,00 N O W R EDU C ED T O 1
B '8~OOf or both volumes. 1
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I